A Conceptual Analysis of Perspective Taking in Support of Socioscientific Reasoning

Science & Education (2019) 28:605–638
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-019-00044-2
ARTICLE
A Conceptual Analysis of Perspective Taking in Support

of Socioscientific Reasoning
Sami Kahn 1 & Dana L. Zeidler

2
Published online: 11 April 2019

# Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract
Perspective taking is a critical yet tangled construct that is used to describe a range of
psychological processes and that is applied interchangeably with related constructs. The
resulting ambiguity is particularly vexing in science education, where although perspective
taking is recognized as critical to informed citizens’ ability to negotiate scientifically related
societal issues, or socioscientific issues (SSI) via socioscientific reasoning (SSR), the precise
nature of perspective taking remains elusive. To operationalize perspective taking, a theoretical
conceptual analysis was employed and used to position perspective taking within the context
of SSR. The resulting, more precise construct identified as socioscientific perspective taking
(SSPT) requires engagement with others or their circumstances, an etic/emic shift in one’s
viewpoint, and a moral context guided by conscience.
Keywords Perspective taking . Socioscientific issues . Socioscientific reasoning . Scientific

literacy . Conceptual analysis
1 Introduction and Theoretical Background
One need not look further than the halls of Congress, or perhaps the halls of one’s own school,
to recognize that seeing circumstances from other’s perspectives and having one’s circum-
stances appreciated by others is necessary for the resolution of controversy and fundamental to
human communication and socialization. Yet, perspective taking1 remains an ongoing chal-
lenge in society at large, in personal relationships, and in the education of students. Research
1
We use the term Bperspective taking^ as a noun and Bperspective-taking^ (hyphenated) as a compound adjective
to modify terms such as Btasks^ and Bbehaviors.^ We follow this convention in order to avoid confusion that
might ensue from joining Btaking^ with the noun that it modifies. We follow this convention with Brole taking^
as well.
* Sami Kahn
[email protected]
1
Department of Teacher Education, Ohio University, McCracken Hall 309Z, Athens, OH 45701, USA
2
Department of Teaching and Learning, University of South Florida, EDU 105, Tampa, FL 33620,
USA
606 S. Kahn, D. L. Zeidler
on perspective taking has been found to impact broad areas of educational developmental
psychology (e.g., Selman 1971a; Smith and Ross 2007; Walker 1980). However, in recent
years, perspective taking in science education has emerged as a particularly salient construct
related to current conceptualizations of scientific literacy that envision students developing as
an informed citizenry prepared to apply science content in the negotiation of complex, real-
world socioscientific issues (SSI), which are controversial and therefore incorporate multiple
viewpoints (Zeidler 2014). Examples of SSI include fluoridation in water, cloning, animal
research, mandatory vaccinations, and fracking. The suite of epistemic practices that students
utilize as they grapple with SSI have been identified collectively as Socioscientific Reasoning
(SSR) (Sadler et al. 2007), and perspective taking is arguably the most developmentally
significant component because it forms the gateway, as we argue, for more epistemologically
sophisticated forms of reasoning. The critical role of perspective taking in the resolution of
multi-faceted SSI, as well as its foundational role in argumentation and human understanding,
provides tremendous incentives for science educators to foster this skill in an effort to promote
SSR and ultimately, scientific literacy.
Yet, as is often the case in social science education research, constructs such as perspective
taking emerge as a sweeping Bcatch-all^ phrase used in varied contexts with shifting bound-
aries and referents. A review of the relevant literature suggests that perspective taking has been
used to describe a range of behaviors representing different psychological domains (Flavell
1968; Nilsen and Fecica 2011) and used both synonymously and distinctly from role taking
(Selman 1971b), empathy (Vilardaga 2009), and theory of mind (Premack and Woodruff
1978). Specifically, in the context of SSR, perspective taking has been cited as a particularly
difficult practice to operationalize, with researchers concluding that current conceptualizations
most likely underrepresent the true range of activities that are associated with the negotiation of
SSI (Sadler et al. 2011). Our review of the manner in which perspective taking has been
operationalized in the context of SSR bears this out with measures including the number of
different Breasoning modes^ (Wu and Tsai 2007, p. 1172), the extent to which one considers
diverse opinions and imagines oneself in another’s situation (Lee et al. 2013), whether
arguments represent personal, societal, or global concerns (Lee et al. 2012), the ability to
formulate counter-positions and rebuttals (Sadler and Donnelly 2006), and the ability to
conceptualize a problem beyond one’s own personal framework (Sadler et al. 2007). Clarifi-
cation of the perspective-taking construct, we therefore suggest, would undoubtedly assist
researchers in identifying and understanding the gaps in their work, the commonality between
their works and those of others studying related constructs, and the possible unwitting
presuppositions about the nature of the construct itself.
Perhaps a more pressing issue, however, is the fact that nowhere in the SSR construct,
which cites complexity, multiple perspectives, inquiry, and skepticism as its features (Sadler
et al. 2007), is any mention of an appreciation of the consequences of one’s actions, reflective
and reflexive judgment, moral sensitivity, and the like. These would seem to be necessary
components of reasoning that purports to aid in the negotiation of controversial issues within
SSI, given that the framework is premised upon the promotion of moral development (Zeidler
2014). Is it that the SSR construct is missing a necessary Bmoral^ component, or is it that the
Bmultiple perspectives^ aspect subsumes the many activities of moral reasoning that are tacitly
implied? We argue that this question warrants a methodical conceptual analysis of perspective
taking, both within and outside of the SSR context, in order to identify the activities and
outcomes reasonably attributed to perspective taking and explicitly delineate those activities
that are necessary for perspective taking in SSR. To advance this purpose, we position our
A Conceptual Analysis of Perspective Taking in Support of... 607
research within a framework of scientific literacy, socioscientific issues, and perspective-taking

theory.
2 Scientific Literacy, SSR, and Perspective Taking
2.1 Contemporary Deficit and Progressive Views of Scientific Literacy
In attempting to repair the USA’s leaky STEM pipeline, the authors of the Next Generation
Science Standards (NGSS; NGSS Lead States 2013) envisioned a framework that engages and
maintains students’ interests in science-related issues, while providing them with the content
knowledge and practical skills to apply science in their everyday lives. The opening paragraph
of the NGSS articulates this goal with the following statement:
There is no doubt that science and, therefore, science education is central to the lives of all Americans.
Never before has our world been so complex and science knowledge so critical to making sense of it all.
When comprehending current events, choosing and using technology, or making informed decisions
about one’s healthcare, science understanding is key. (NGSS Lead States 2013, p.1)
The Framework for Science Education (National Research Council 2012), upon which the
NGSS were premised, clearly foreshadowed an emphasis on the application of science to
citizens’ everyday lives:
Citizens now face problems from pandemics to energy shortages whose solutions require all the scientific
and technological genius we can muster. Americans are being forced to increasingly make
decisions—including on health care and retirement planning—where literacy in science and mathematics
is a real advantage. (National Research Council 2011, paragraph. 5)
It is apparent that scientific literacy has emerged as a sweeping concept which encompasses the
development of an informed citizenry who are able to consider and negotiate complex science-
related societal issues (Roberts 2007, 2011; Roberts and Bybee 2014). Far from early
constructs of science literacy, which involved learning decontextualized, canonical lists of
facts, a contemporary view of Bfunctional scientific literacy^ (Zeidler and Sadler 2011)
integrates the understanding of science content within the context of real-world socioscientific
issues (SSI). To achieve this ambitious goal, the NGSS articulates several conceptual shifts that
support current views of scientific literacy including emphases on real-world, applied science
knowledge, deep understanding of content and skills, connections with other disciplines
through alignment with Common Core State Standards, and ensuring that science is accessible
and culturally sensitive to the needs of diverse learners. Yet, while these standards seek to
prepare students for the application of science to real-world contexts, they fail to emphasize the
need for students to consider the moral consequences of their socioscientific decisions. By this
statement, we do not overlook the NGSS’ recognition of the importance of addressing the
trade-offs of STEM decision making by conducting an Banalysis of costs and benefits^ of
social, cultural, and environmental impacts (NGSS, p. 97), but rather, we suggest that such
Btidy^ language is inadequate for broaching such Bmessy^ humanistic concerns. One need not
scour the history of scientific and technological advancements to recognize the folly of arming
students with the content knowledge to Bdo science^ without promoting the development of a
moral compass that guides their actions.
Arguably, SSI is an ideal vehicle for achieving the NGSS’ goals while remedying this
shortcoming as it is a framework premised upon a vision of scientific literacy that emphasizes
contextualized, student-centered science learning as preparation for informed citizenship in an
increasingly diverse society (Roberts 2011; Roberts and Bybee 2014). Moreover, SSI extends
its framework to include the promotion of moral development and reflective reasoning as
students grapple with the ethical implications of their decisions. This emphasis on Bfunctional
scientific literacy^ (Zeidler and Sadler 2011) compels students toward better moral choices that
reflect Binternal consistency, respect for multiple perspectives, and tolerance for dissenting
voices^ (p. 181). While some might question whether science teachers are equipped to serve as
moral agents who have not only the capacity to make moral decisions but also possess an
affirmative duty to act in ways that promote moral development and moral results, we argue
that it is incumbent upon teacher educators and researchers to address the realization that
teachers make moral decisions each day, whether it be in deciding what curriculum to include
(or exclude), or how to position the inextricable link between scientific knowledge and its
nexus to both the head and the heart. As the field of science education seeks inclusive,
interdisciplinary, sociocultural approaches in curriculum and pedagogy, the importance of
SSR, and specifically, perspective-taking abilities becomes critical in the education of K-12
science students and their teachers by amplifying and filling a critical Bmoral gap^ in the
NGSS. Understanding how the use of SSI in the classroom promotes functional scientific
literacy requires exploration of the SSI framework. While the SSI framework is positioned in
science education, we suggest that other disciplines that frame pedagogy in a sociocultural
context may benefit from this conceptual framework and the analytic approach we employ to
uncover gaps in its relevant constructs.
2.2 A Route to Functional Scientific Literacy: SSI and SSR
Unique to SSI, when compared to other frameworks connecting science and society, is its
emphasis on students’ psychological and epistemological development, as well as on the
development of character and virtue that burgeons as students grapple with the ethical
implications of their decisions (Melville et al. 2007). The SSI framework’s emphasis on
considering multiple perspectives stems from a classical, virtue-ethic account of moral
reasoning that necessitates discourse and debate in order to allow the players to articulate
and clarify values. With its roots in works by Plato and Aristotle, virtue ethics is guided by
a quest for a virtuous life driven by pursuit of both arête (moral excellence) and phronesis
(practical wisdom to act thoughtfully in challenging situations), both of which are princi-
ples informing the SSI framework (Zeidler 2014). Because of the normative aspects
embodied in virtue ethics, it aligns well with the normative characteristics of SSI-based
discourse. The SSI framework does not deny the usefulness of deontological approaches to
morality; at best, rule-based ethics serves as a generalized heuristic because having a rule
is akin to knowing in advance what to do (Raz 1990) which tends to have the effect of
preempting protracted deliberations. In contrast, virtue ethics as practiced in social con-
texts, such as what might typically occur in a classroom setting or a town hall forum,
considers students acting as moral agents who make decisions on the basis and balance of
reason(s). It provides us with a more inclusive characterization of the moral domain
because no conceptual difference exists between the knowledge needed to understand
what morally matters to others and the knowledge we need to evaluate what is relevant to
our own moral stance.
Fig. 1 Socioscientific elements of functional scientific literacy. Reprinted by permission from Springer Nature:
BThe Role of Moral Reasoning and the Status of Socio-scientific Issues in Science Education^ by D.L. Zeidler
and M. Keefer, 2003, In D. L. Zeidler (Ed.), The role of moral reasoning on socioscientific issues and discourse
in science education, p. 12. Springer and Kluwer Academic Publishers. Copyright 2003
It has been noted that B…acquiring practical or functional knowledge of our own valuable
pursuits instructs us in the duties that we owe to others, just as being able to identify the duties
we owe to others requires knowing what is necessary for living a meaningful life^ (Zeidler and
Keefer 2003, p.25). Thus, by intentionally challenging students to exercise practical rationality
while working collaboratively on resolving ill-structured dilemmas, productive sociomoral
discourse is encouraged to facilitate transactive discussions that enhance students’ reasoning,
open-mindedness, and respect for others’ opinions, while thwarting students’ natural inclina-
tion to become entrenched in their own points of view (Berkowitz 1997). Consequently,
students not only become better prepared to engage in these issues as adults through experi-
ences in negotiation and conflict resolution, but may also translate this epistemological
orientation to the Nature of Science as well (Abd-El-Khalick 2006). Empirical evidence also
exists for SSI’s success in mediating argumentation, moral and character development, moral
sensitivity, as well as cultural perspectives necessary for responsible global citizenship (Zeidler
2014). Figure 1 depicts the SSI elements of functional scientific literacy.
Typical SSI curriculum proceeds by introducing the problem to students, having them
identify the parties involved, research the issues, reflect upon their values orientation, engage
in discourse with others through debates or role-play, either in person or via online discussion
platforms and/or writings, and reach a decision or consensus. Students are prompted to
question their existing beliefs, collect and examine evidence through multiple research expe-
riences, and develop arguments. They are exposed to different thought processes through
discussions, debates, and readings, and are encouraged to approach decisions in an unbiased
way while respecting and acknowledging different perspectives, beliefs, and other ways of
knowing (NSTA 2016). While we might reasonably argue that decisions, particularly those
aligned with self-interests and congruent with a prevailing personal epistemic belief can be
formed in an Bunbiased^ manner, an effective teacher can help ensure that such perspectives
are illuminated through reflective practices. An important aspect of the SSI curriculum is that,
although moral/ethical issues are integrated, teachers do not instruct students in what to believe
but rather help them acquire flexibility, open-mindedness, and perspective-taking abilities so
that they can integrate content knowledge with emotive, ethical, and intuitive influences.
Teachers can accomplish this by emphasizing and assessing students’ abilities to integrate
information from a variety of sources, evaluate the quality of those sources, understand the
impact of their decisions on others, and reflect upon their own epistemological stances (Zeidler
2014; Zeidler and Kahn 2014).
Of particular interest to researchers is the manner in which students reason through SSI
scenarios. By merging empirical investigation with an extensive review of literature on
epistemic practice, Sadler et al. (2007) operationalized SSR in order to describe the complex
mode of thought required for the negotiation of SSI and thus, identified the following four
features as comprising SSR: (1) recognizing complexity within SSI, (2) incorporating multiple
perspective, (3) appreciating the ongoing, open-ended nature of scientific inquiry, and (4)
demonstrating skepticism. Insofar as perspective taking is a central component of SSR, the
authors stated, BWe suggest that advanced practice should entail the ability to analyse SSI and
potential solutions from diverse perspectives and recognize substantive challenges to one’s
own espoused position.^ (p. 376). The authors’ reference to perspective taking makes clear
that this ability is essential for sophisticated levels of SSR, yet the definition of perspective
taking was not delineated in the text. While one might argue for a prima facie interpretation of
perspective taking, one that simply refers to seeing others’ viewpoints, this is insufficient
particularly when one considers the long and tangled history of this complex construct.
2.3 Perspective Taking—an Essential yet Messy Construct
It is difficult to imagine a more foundational constituent of human communication and

socialization than perspective taking as it contributes to the activation of empathy and
understanding, the resolution of controversy, and the social construction of knowledge
(Batson 1991; Clark and Marshall 1981; Corcoran and Mallinckrodt 2000; Krauss and
Fussell 1996). The ubiquitousness of perspective taking in all facets of human interaction
could easily lead one to assume erroneously that its development is inevitable, when in fact
perspective taking is a precarious process of carefully and thoughtfully balancing the act of
simultaneously distinguishing and integrating others’ viewpoints with one’s own, all within a
pervasive cognitive milieu of egocentrism. In attempting to capture the dynamic nature of
perspective taking, Selman (1971b) utilized Piaget’s genetic epistemological approach to
developmental stages of cognitive development, as well as Kohlberg’s (1968) stages of moral
development to develop his model for BCoordination of Social Perspectives^ in which he
mapped five stages for perspective taking. Like Piaget and Kohlberg, Selman suggested that
children proceed through a series of qualitative levels with each level moving the child away
from an egocentric to a multiple-perspective stance. Later models integrated social-relational
approaches to understanding perspective taking (Martin et al. 2008) by extending Selman’s
model to include pre-reflective interactivity during infancy/toddler stages and meta-reflective
sociality at the most sophisticated levels of perspective taking, the ultimate stage conceptual-
ized as communal problem-solving and dialogical engagement.
This latter point is significant for our purposes in that it maps well on the Reflective
Judgment Model (RJM) (King and Kitchener 2004) that describes the progression of
individual’s decision making through ill-structured problems as they move through increas-
ingly robust reflective stages consistent with the educational outcomes of SSI instruction.
Particularly noteworthy here is the consistent emphasis on reflection, characterized as the
ability to construct knowledge based on one’s own assumptions and evidence while remaining
open to new perspectives and revaluation, as well as decentering (Piaget 1926), described as
the movement away from egocentric interpretations of one’s interactions to more inclusive
ones, both of which are key elements of the SSI framework’s interconnection with moral
development. While much has been written on neo-Kohlbergian research as it relates to moral
and social epistemic perspectives, development, and education in general (e.g., Killen and
Smetana 2006; Nucci 2001), and within particular academic disciplines such as science
education in particular, (Greene et al. 2016; Zeidler and Keefer 2003), the lingering fact
remains that perspective taking remains chameleon-like: It changes its hue depending upon the
predilections and intellectual paradigms of the researchers. Because perspective taking has
become obfuscated in the literature by varying conceptualizations and operational defini-
tions of it, our intention is to advance conceptual clarity of that construct through a
systematic analytic process.
We further recognize that the emphasis on these models tends to focus on the development
of the individual within a social context. We do not diminish the phenomenological project that
considers the importance of social development within a collective pluralistic context. That we
dwell in a world where the co-construction of meaning and identity, the struggle and tension
between etic and emic2 perspectives is at best, a conceptual matter of discussion, is noted by
sociologists (Arendt 1958; Denzin 2017) and cultural anthropologists (Douglas 1970; Hollan
and Throop 2008) alike. After all, the human condition demands more than the contemplative
life; it requires the kind of active life predicated on one’s immersion in community and the
polis. Thus, how well one navigates the symbolic order of cultural systems (Kahan 2012) and
the degree to which one can seamlessly cross cultural boundaries (Aikenhead and Ogawa
2007) without distortion, determines, in part, how successful one is at perspective taking. The
inability to do so is destined to lead to relativism at best, or myopic discord at worst, and is
discussed by others (Harris 2010; Haidt 2012). Resolving this tension resonates with
eudaimonia—the Greek notion best conceived as Bhuman flourishing.^ It encompasses both
the ideas of phronesis—practical wisdom in action connected to moral intelligence—and
arête—a form of civic virtue based on excellence captured in performing actions well, with
dignity and transparency. This focus for our purpose in this analysis is how we think about the
formation of perspective in a social cultural context that requires argumentation, discourse,
negotiation, and the like, in order to add clarity in our conceptual analysis to particular features
most centrally located within the SSI framework.
Buttressing the foundational role of perspective taking in moral development is its cardinal
bearing on argumentation, a process that reflects the manner in which the practice of science
proceeds by enculturating student into scientific discourse (Jiménez-Aleixandre and Erduran
2007; Latour and Woolgar 1986). Researchers frequently gauge the quality of students’
argumentation by their abilities to develop rebuttals (Erduran et al. 2004; Sadler and
Donnelly 2006), a skill that requires the incorporation of multiple perspectives and is thus
particularly challenging (Simonneaux 2008). Yet, even with extensive research supporting its
2
The terms Betic^ and Bemic^ are used to describe social science research conducted from an outsider’s (Betic^)
or insider’s (Bemic^) vantage point. The terms were coined by Pike (1967) from the words Bphonetic^ and
Bphonemic^ and align with the linguistic traditions of these latter terms.
critical interweaving with moral development and argumentation, perspective taking remains a
strikingly nebulous construct. Within science education, lack of clarity regarding perspective
taking is evidenced by its array of measures including the number of different Breasoning
modes^ that students utilize (Wu and Tsai 2007, p. 1172), the extent to which one considers
diverse opinions and imagines oneself in another’s situation (Lee et al. 2013), whether
arguments represent personal, societal, or global concerns (Lee et al. 2012), one’s ability to
formulate counter-positions and rebuttals (Sadler and Donnelly 2006), and the ability to
conceptualize a problem beyond one’s own personal framework (Sadler et al. 2007). The
impact of this lack of clarity in the perspective-taking construct becomes particularly
underscored when studies relate to, but do not specifically focus on, perspective taking. For
example, Zeidler et al. (2013) have called for scientifically responsible thinking through the
development of character, a construct that appears to relate to perspective taking by requiring
consideration of the consequences of one’s actions on others; however, the precise nature of
the relationship between character development and perspective taking remains unclear.
Similarly, research on moral sensitivity in the context of SSI (Fowler et al. 2009) suggests
some overlap with perspective taking in that moral sensitivity requires one to be Battuned to the
feelings and reactions of others^ (p. 281). Yet, we are still left wondering whether moral
sensitivity, character development, empathy, and so on, are precursors, products, or simply
other names for perspective taking. Therefore, the overarching purpose of this study was to
Bremove the Bfuzz^ (Krathwohl 1993, p. 148) from the fuzzy construct of perspective taking.
Utilizing conceptual analysis, we aimed to fill significant gaps in the literature by explicating
the boundaries and referents of perspective taking, distinguishing it from related constructs,
examining its contextual requirements, and positioning it squarely within the SSR construct,
particularly as it relates to moral reasoning.
3 A Method of Conceptual Analysis
3.1 History and Use of Conceptual Analysis
The traditional method of analyzing constructs in order to decipher their boundaries and
referents is through conceptual analysis (Barrow 1990; Coombs and Daniels 1991; Monroe
and Harkness 2011; Soltis 1978; Wilson 1963). One might think of it as a theoretical form of
analysis that precedes empirical studies. While arguably foreign to those educational re-
searchers predisposed to more conventional methods of data collection and analysis, concep-
tual analysis challenges the researcher to develop examples, or cases, based on intuitions and
memories that help clarify constructs and distinguish them from related terms. In essence,
these cases become analogous to the data in empirical studies. Some examples of educational
concepts that have been analyzed through this method include Bdisciplines^ (Neumann et al.
2002), Bnull curriculum^ (Flinders et al. 1986), Bcritical thinking,^ (Ennis 1991), Breflection^
(Rogers 2001), and Bteaching^ (Green 1971; Komisar 1968; Smith 1960). We are aware that
the reliance on a priori knowledge may arouse skepticism in some as it does for critics
(Papineau 1993; Kornblith 2002) who question the use of thought experiments, intuitions,
and the like. Yet, these practices are generally accepted as foundational in philosophy (Bealer
1998; Jackson 1998), and conceptual analysis remains a cornerstone for developing and
clarifying concepts and theories, thereby readying them for empirical investigation. Further-
more, the analytic task may be employed a posteriori in revealing pervasive yet misguided
conceptual assumptions with respect to operational definitions evoked by researchers in the

course of empirical investigations. In undertaking our conceptual analysis, we implemented a
series of analytical techniques including (1) generic analysis (BWhat are concept X’s general
features?^); (2) conditions analysis (BWhat are the different basic meanings of concept X?^);
and (3) differentiation analysis (BWhat context conditions govern the use of concept X?^)
(Krathwohl 1993; Soltis 1978; Wilson 1963) as well as conception development (BHow can
problematic concepts be modified or restructured?^) (Coombs and Daniels 1991) to expose
and address the underlying conceptual structures concealed within the perspective taking
construct. We have written elsewhere in great detail about the history, epistemological
assumptions, mechanisms, and standards of rigor involved in conceptual analysis, particularly
as it pertains to Bfuzzy^ concepts in science education research (Kahn and Zeidler 2017). For
the purposes of the present study, we remind the reader that employing conceptual analysis
requires testing whether ordinary usages of a word would be appropriate in various situations,
or Bcases.^
To illustrate this process, we present an abridged analysis gleaned from our prior work
(Kahn and Zeidler 2017), let us say, for example, that we were interested in analyzing what is
meant by the concept of a Bbird.^ We could consider our knowledge of the common use of this
word to identify the necessary conditions of a bird such as: (1) A bird must have wings. We
would then test to see if this is a necessary condition by considering whether we can think of a
bird that does not have wings. If not, then it is likely a necessary condition. We would then test
to see whether it is a sufficient condition by determining whether we can think of counterex-
amples, or contrary cases that have wings but are not birds. Since animals such as bats and
butterflies have wings but are not birds, wings are an insufficient condition of Bbirdness.^ We
would continue in this line of reasoning until we had reached what all necessary and sufficient
features of birds are identified. To aid us in arriving at as complete an analysis as possible, we
could test the margins of our analysis by considering borderline cases that meet our conditions
yet still are somewhat odd. Emus and penguins might meet all of our criteria for birds, yet they
are unusual because they do not fly. Clearly, if a person who had never seen a bird asked, BCan
you show me a bird?^ you would be reluctant to use penguins or emus as examples as they are
not model cases of birds in the way sparrows or finches are. By focusing on the conditions that
make these borderline cases different from model cases, we can more specifically refine our
concept of what is and is not necessary for a complete concept of a bird. A related technique is
to ensure that the absence of our necessary conditions leads to a contrary case of a bird. In our
analysis, we would look at invertebrate, wingless, featherless animals to see if there is any way
that they could be construed as birds, which they could not. One last permutation of generic-
type analysis is to consider an invented case to test the boundaries of our concept even further.
In the case of birds, we could imagine biologists on a remote island discovering an animal that
has vertebrae, wings, and feathers, but also has fur and teeth. Would such an animal be
classified as a bird? Would we need to reevaluate our conditions?
Taken together, these analytic techniques help to gain clarity in our conceptual under-
standings. The conceptual analysis data, therefore, are the cases in which a term would
clearly apply (Bmodel cases,^ such as robins, finches, and blue jays) and those qualities that
are necessary (e.g., backbone, wings, and feathers), cases in which the term would clearly
not apply (Bcontrary cases,^ such as snails and earthworms), cases in which the term might
apply (Bborderline cases,^ such as flightless birds) and finally, Binvented cases^ that stretch
our imaginations beyond our lived experiences for the purposes of testing boundaries. For
those less familiar with conceptual analysis, the use of everyday contexts and recognizable
scenarios might appear somewhat simplistic and decidedly outside the boundaries of
empirical social science research. Yet, it is precisely these types of universally recognized
frames of reference that allow for disclosure of concealed assumptions that lay stealthily
within our everyday language. Green (1964), for example, utilized the context of teaching a
dog tricks to distinguish between the terms, Bteaching,^ Btraining,^ and Binstructing,^
eventually deriving a masterful analytic topology of teaching premised upon belief systems.
Similarly, Ennis (1991) utilized the common notion of a jury’s deliberation as the source of
his cases for his conceptual analysis of critical thinking. More recently, Lazenby (2016)
analyzed the boundaries of educational equality using scenarios involving running and
athletic footwear. We have followed suit by utilizing familiar scenarios that aim at deriving
logical, common-sense outcomes. Of course, it is critically important that we acknowledge
the limitations of this method. While conceptual analysis aids in clarifying and explicating
concept boundaries and assumptions, it does not develop a singular definition of a concept.
This is, in part, due to the fact that there are a variety of types of definitions, including
stipulative, descriptive, and programmatic (Scheffler 1960; Soltis 1978; Wittek and
Kvernbekk 2011), as well as cluster definitions that may be appropriate for concepts that
seem to defy traditional structure (Walker and Rogers 2018). The present study, therefore,
will not produce a Bone size fits all contexts^ definition of the construct; rather, it will
develop a conception of perspective taking that will allow researchers to better conceptu-
alize and subsequently operationalize perspective taking within the context of SSR, distin-
guish it from related constructs, and compare and contrast perspective taking for SSR with
perspective taking promoted in other fields.
Of course, another limitation of this study is that it will not produce empirical data
regarding perspective taking attributes. Rather, this study will lay the theoretical groundwork
for extensive future research in that area, as well as broader research in SSI curriculum
development and pedagogy and SSR instrument development. Insofar as methodological rigor
is concerned, in the philosophical tradition, quality inductive arguments are both strong and
cogent, the former referring to the likelihood of the premises and the latter to the likelihood of
the conclusion following from the premises if true, together making a convincing argument.
We remind the reader that inductive logic is not seeking certainty, but rather a conclusion that
is likely based on the truth of its premises. Therefore, even the most rigorous analyses lead to a
conclusion that is at best, most likely true. These tenets, in addition to our synthesis of leading
scholars’ indicators of quality conceptual analyses (Coombs and Daniels 1991; Green 1971;
Soltis 1978; Wilson 1963) led us to apply the following criterion: When examples of multiple
cases lead naturally and convincingly to a common-sense conclusion as to the boundaries and
referents of a concept, then methodological rigor is achieved in our work. Hence, we note that
additional cases, particularly imaginary ones, may well be available through ongoing philo-
sophical investigation; there is certainty neither in the findings, nor in the absolute complete-
ness of a conceptual analysis. However, we nonetheless strive to create a common
understanding, lest we risk becoming Ba Babel of speakers of different languages who
mistakenly think they disagree about a common subject matter^ (Sider 2001, p. 16).
It is also worth noting that, although conceptual analyses are often presented without
particular mention of the techniques utilized, we have opted to partition our analysis into
discrete sections that reference specific examples of model, borderline, contrary, and invented
cases. Doing so, we believe, enhances the transparency of our analysis, demonstrates the
unique processes and products of each technique, and ultimately, provides a clear, conceptual
Broad map^ for the reader to navigate through our analysis.
3.2 Generic Analysis
We begin our analysis by identifying model cases that epitomize clear examples of perspective
taking, or more accurately, are model perspective takers. To find such examples, we look to
film media as a fertile ground for identifying archetypes that exhibit distinct aspects of a
universal human trait such as perspective taking, as envisioned in its most commonly
understood BI know it when I see it^ meaning. We believe that this context, perhaps even
more so than the previously mentioned scenarios of Green’s dog walking, Ennis’ jury
experience, or Lazenby’s racing, allows us to access a collective unconscious of sorts while
the iconic characters portrayed serve as an effective shorthand to communicate vastly complex
human traits. We concur with Academy Award winning director Alejandro González Iñárritu
(2009 April 23), who asserted, BCinema is universal, beyond flags and borders and passports.^
3.2.1 Model Case
One possible model perspective taker that comes to mind is Mahatma Gandhi, a bigger than
life leader in the movie, Gandhi (Attenborough 1982). The movie-biography traced the life of
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi who dedicated his life’s work to causes on behalf of the poor,
women, and all Indians, regardless of religion or social class. Although born to an affluent
family and trained as a lawyer, Gandhi eschewed material wealth and instead lived modestly
among the poor rather than maintaining his social caste. Numerous scenes in the movie show
Gandhi engaging in acts of solidarity with others such as taking the place of servants in order
to serve tea to dignitaries, riding the trains through India in third class just to better understand
the life of India’s common people, and undertaking fasts to express commitment to the
impoverished Untouchables. In one of the most powerful scenes of the movie, Gandhi, a
devout Hindu, addresses a crowd declaring, BI am a Muslim and a Hindu and a Christian and a
Jew and so are all of you^ (Gandhi 1982). In another moving scene, a fasting Gandhi is
approached by a Hindu Indian who confesses that he believes he will go to hell for killing a
Muslim child. When Gandhi asks why he killed the child, the man tells him that it was in
retaliation for them killing his son. Gandhi, in a weak yet confident tone states:
I know a way out of hell. Find a child…a child whose mother and father have been killed. A little boy
about this high. And raise him as your own. Only be sure that he is a Muslim, and that you raise him as
one (Gandhi 1982).
In sum, Gandhi is portrayed as one who did not simply fight for others’ causes, but saw others’
causes as his own, consequently inspiring people to find commonalities among one another.
If we think about the behaviors and attributes that made Gandhi a model perspective taker,
we might first consider his engagement with people and the issues that impacted them. While
Gandhi could have easily turned away from those in need, he desired engagement with others.
But is engagement a necessary condition for perspective taking? To answer this question, we
need to consider whether we can envision a good perspective taker who did not engage with
the subject of their perspective taking. This question appears a bit ludicrous, as it would seem
to be implausible to be a perspective taker without even the slightest hint of engagement with
those whose perspectives one would take, even if only from afar without direct interaction.
Can we ever imagine saying, BGandhi was a wonderful perspective taker although he never
noticed people?^ We think not. Yet, if we agree that perspective taking requires at least some
level of engagement with others, is engagement sufficient for perspective taking? Can we think
of a case where engagement with others is present but perspective taking is absent? A character
with many similarities to Gandhi is Atticus Finch from the movie, To Kill a Mockingbird
(Pakula and Mulligan 1962), based on Harper Lee’s novel of the same name. In the movie,
Atticus, is a white southern lawyer who, like Gandhi, is deeply committed to fairness and
equity. He takes on a case to defend a black man named Tom Robinson who is accused of
raping a white teenage girl, an act that brings the level of racism in the small town to light. The
young protagonists of the movie are Atticus’ children, Scout and Jem, who undergo transfor-
mations in light of their father’s advocacy efforts. In one particularly tender scene, Atticus
explains his decision to defend Tom Robinson to his children by saying, BYou never really
understand a person until you consider things from his point of view... until you climb into his
skin and walk around in it.^ (To Kill a Mockingbird 1962). These words seem to capture
Gandhi’s attempts to live as others lived and put himself into their circumstances. Yet, as
admirable as Atticus’ words were, one must ask whether he was really able to practice what he
preached. In one of the final scenes of the movie, we learn that a reticent character named Boo
Radley protected the children from an attack by the drunken father of the allegedly raped girl.
Upon learning that Boo had protected his children, Atticus suggests to the sheriff that the
highly introverted Boo be publicly recognized for his courage. The sheriff, however, percep-
tively states that it would be Ba sin^ to force a shy man like Boo into the spotlight. And it is
Atticus’ young daughter Scout who suggests that her father’s idea would Bsorta’ be like
shootin’ a mockingbird, wouldn’t it?^ referring back to her father’s admonition against
shooting birds that do no harm. While Scout and the sheriff both seemed to be able to perceive
the situation from Boo’s viewpoint, Atticus did not. In essence, although Atticus had tremen-
dous engagement with and compassion for others, his young daughter and the sheriff better
understood Boo’s perspective. Similarly, in one of the most emotionally wrenching scenes in
the movie, Atticus meets with his client, Tom Robinson, after Tom is found guilty of the rape
by an all-white jury notwithstanding compelling evidence showing the crime to be implausible
due to Robinson’s physical disability. Yet, even in light of these frustrating circumstances,
Atticus vehemently encourages his client to appeal to the higher all-white court, a prospect
understandingly deemed futile by Robinson, who later that night attempted a hopeless escape
from prison and was shot. While Atticus can reasonably be viewed as a passionate advocate,
perhaps an eternal optimist and indomitable cheerleader for what is good and right, he
nonetheless was unable to see the futility of Tom Robinson’s situation.
3.2.2 Borderline Case
Thus, although unquestionably an admirable and heroic character, Atticus is revealed as a

borderline case of perspective taking, as he certainly connected with the interests of others and
spoke of climbing into their skin, yet it appears that his own passion and perhaps naiveté at
times caused him to project upon others rather than seeing himself as the others. Hence, while
both Gandhi and Atticus were portrayed as men having high integrity, social commitment, and
genuine interest in understanding others, Gandhi engaged in a behavior that seems necessary
for perspective taking, one that Atticus Finch alluded to but was unable to fully activate; that is,
his ability to take on an insider view of other’s circumstances. In sum, both Gandhi and Atticus
Finch engaged with others and their circumstances. Yet, engagement alone is not sufficient, as
we see that the ability to shift one’s mindset from outsider or Betic^ to insider or Bemic^ seems
to also be a necessary condition.
Having established the importance of a shift in viewpoint for perspective taking, one might
wonder whether our initial determination that engagement with others as a necessary condition
might simply be due to the fact that one cannot shift viewpoint without engagement. In other
words, is it possible that engagement with others’ circumstances is simply part and parcel of
assuming an insider’s viewpoint? To answer this question, we need to consider whether we can
think of a perspective taker who can shift their viewpoint yet not be a model perspective taker.
Answering this question will clarify whether engagement and shift are separate necessary
conditions and if so, is a shift in viewpoint sufficient in and of itself.
Consider the character of Michael Dorsey in the motion picture, Tootsie (Evans and Pollack
1982). In this movie, a struggling actor, who is notorious for being temperamental and difficult
to work with, has no future prospects. Out of sheer desperation, the character, Michael Dorsey,
auditions for a female role in a soap opera under the pseudonym, Dorothy Michaels. Upon
getting the role, Dorsey must maintain his female persona outside of work and finds himself
becoming a role model for women who admire his strong-willed, female character. Through
the movie, Dorsey struggles with the fact that, although he is literally in a woman’s shoes, he is
a man who only cares about role playing a woman for the sake of keeping his job and does not
really connect with his female persona or other women until late in the movie. Yet, eventually,
in the final scene, after his love interest learns that her friend Dorothy is really a man, Dorsey
states, BI was a better man with you as a woman than I ever was with a woman as a man^
(Tootsie 1982). Dorsey’s realization that he only was able to engage in a meaningful way with
women while playing a woman suggests that perspective taking requires both engagement and
an etic/emic switch. Yet Dorsey is clearly not a model perspective taker in the way Gandhi is,
as he lacked any genuine interest in engaging with the character whose perspective he took.
Instead, he is revealed as a borderline case of perspective taking through most of the movie,
one who does take on an emic viewpoint by living as a woman, but without a desire to engage
with or understand his female character.
3.2.3 Contrary Case
Are the two conditions outlined above, engagement with others and an etic/emic shift, sufficient
for perspective taking? In order to answer this question, we need to envision a case where these
attributes are lacking and determine whether such a case is a Bnon-example^ or contrary case of
perspective taking. A cinematic character who seemed to lack these attributes was BRaymond
Babbitt^ in the movie, Rainman (Guber and Levinson 1988). Raymond, a man with autism,
was portrayed as a self-absorbed individual who appeared detached from other people’s needs
and feelings. For example, Raymond maintained his obsessive television-watching and eating
schedules even when it caused tremendous stress for his brother, Charlie Babbitt. And while he
had savant-type skills in terms of visual memory and calculation, he demonstrated no under-
standing of others’ feelings or circumstances. This would seem to represent a most dramatic and
contrary case of perspective taking and in fact, it could reasonably be stated that Raymond had
no interest in engaging with others and no ability to shift viewpoints. Ironically, one could argue
that his brother Charlie Babbitt, although not autistic, was also a contrary case of perspective
taking early in the movie, as he was portrayed as a self-involved Yuppie who simply attempted
to use Raymond for his personal financial gain with no ability to understand the world from
Raymond’s viewpoint. Yet, the movie portrays a transformation in Charlie as one who becomes
more understanding of his brothers’ needs and mindset and arguably, a better
perspective taker.
Our initial analysis of perspective taking through cinematic characters suggests that per-
spective taking, in its generic usage, has at least two necessary conditions that together at this
juncture appear to be sufficient: (1) Engagement with others and their circumstances, and (2)
An etic/emic shift in viewpoint. The means by which these conditions were derived are
outlined in Table 1.
Of course, it is important to acknowledge that there may well be other conditions that could
satisfy this test for necessary and/or sufficient conditions for perspective taking. As noted
earlier, completion of a conceptual analysis is never certain. However, we propose that this
initial analysis provides sufficient grounding for our continued investigation, which may further
refine and illuminate additional conditions for perspective taking.
3.3 Conditions Analysis
Our generic analysis suggested that perspective taking requires engagement with others and a shift
from outsider to insider view as necessary and sufficient conditions for perspective taking in a
generic context, but are they sufficient within the context of SSR? At first glance, our generic
analysis seems sufficient within the context of SSR for after all, what more could we ask than to have
Ghandi-esque attributes in our students as they negotiate SSI? It is not far-fetched to envision an
invented case of a student who, when confronted with a socioscientific dilemma, readily connects to
an issue and the stakeholders involved, and then is naturally able to emotionally, intellectually, and
perhaps even physically position herself as one of them. To illustrate how this might play out in a
hypothetical classroom, let us imagine that a high school biology class has just learned about gene
therapy and the use of genetic engineering in newly fertilized human eggs to eliminate certain
genetic traits from a population. In this class, a sophomore named, BSarah,^ is challenged to decide
whether gene therapy should be used to eliminate myopia, or nearsightedness, from the population.
Our eager perspective-taker Sarah immediately researches myopia and learns that it causes great
difficulty as vision is blurred at distances, often requiring glasses, contacts, or surgery. Although she
does not wear glasses, Sarah decides that to truly appreciate the circumstances of a person afflicted
with myopia, she borrows her mother’s Bdistance correction^ glasses and wears them to school for
the next several days. Although teased and quite bruised from bumping into walls, Sarah then
decides to conduct interviews with an ophthalmologist about the risks and benefits of the surgery
and an owner of an optical store to understand the economic impact of eliminating myopia. After
considering these diverse viewpoints on the subject, Sarah ultimately decides to crusade for the
elimination of myopia by urging her classmates to wear distance correction glasses in solidarity with
those afflicted with myopia.
Unquestionably, Sarah’s ability to engage with this issue and its stakeholders, and to shift her
viewpoint from etic to emic for each, is quite exceptional. Like our model case of Gandhi, this
exceptional ability to place oneself in the position of others is beyond reproach and we assume that it
is a desirable trait. Yet, is it not possible that the same perspective-taking excellence could be claimed
by the movie character Hannibal Lechter in The Silence of the Lambs (Goetzman and Demme
1991)? Lechter, a psychopathic criminal with a penchant for eating his victims, was able to
understand the mind of the most heinous criminals so much so that he was used by the FBI to
capture them. Lechter thrived on using his innate perspective-taking abilities to terrorize and torture,
impeccably reading his victims thoughts, strengths, and weaknesses and capitalizing on the latter
with sadistic zeal. In the opening scene of the movie, the young FBI agent Clarisse Starling walks
down the long prison corridor approaching the cell of Dr. Lechter, who summarily picks up her scent
like a predator stalking its prey. After a very short exchange, Lechter declares:
Table 1 Generic analysis of perspective taking characters
Character Synopsis Engagement? Shift? Case type
Mahatma Gandhi Advocates for and lives among the poor and disenfranchised, undertakes fasts to show solidarity, sees Yes Yes Model
Gandhi (1982) himself as Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Jew.
Atticus Finch Advocates for justice and minority rights; makes personal connections with African American client; talks Yes No Borderline
A Conceptual Analysis of Perspective Taking in Support of...
To Kill a Mockingbird (1962) about Bwalking in others’ shoes^ but does not quite Bget^ Tom Robinson or Boo Radley.
Michael Dorsey/Dorothy Michaels Lives as a woman solely for the purposes of getting an acting job; learns about female point of view No Yes Borderline
Tootsie (1982) through experiences but does not connect with Dorothy. BI was a better man with you as a woman than I
ever was with a woman as a man.^
Raymond Babbitt Autistic brother of Charlie Babbitt. Has brilliant savant characteristics including memory recall and No No Contrary
Rain Man (1988) calculation but is indifferent to connections with others or their needs.
619
You’re sooo ambitious, aren’t you...? You know what you look like to me, with your good bag and your
cheap shoes? You look like a rube. A well-scrubbed, hustling rube with a little, taste... Good nutrition has
given you some length of bone, but you’re not more than one generation from poor white trash, are you
Officer Starling...? That accent you’re trying so desperately to shed – pure West Virginia. What was your
father, dear? Was he a coal miner? Did he stink of the lamp...? And oh, how quickly the boys found you!
All those tedious, sticky fumblings, in the back seats of cars, while you could only dream of getting out.
Getting anywhere – yes? Getting all the way – to the F...B...I. (Silence of the Lambs 1991).
Lechter’s ability to Bsize up^ Agent Starling by anticipating her reactions, reading her fears,
understanding her motivations, and utilizing these understandings to terrify and taunt her suggests
a powerful ability to shift his perspective to hers. And while some might say it is sacrilege to
compare Lechter to Gandhi (or even Sarah!), it is suggested here that both had exceptional abilities to
engage with others and put themselves in others’ shoes, so to speak, yet within markedly different
contexts. We argue that both characters are excellent perspective takers, and that the criteria of
engagement and shift are necessary and sufficient conditions for perspective taking, raising Lechter
to the status of a model perspective taker in the generic sense. But something is certainly amiss;
could we possibly find Lechter’s behavior to be even tangentially related to a behavior we would
want to promote in students? While it does appear that Lechter is a good perspective taker, he is not
exhibiting perspective taking in the manner in which we typically think of it, and certainly not in the
manner we wish to promote as educators. Clearly, perspective taking in the absence of a moral
context can render it a less than desirable attribute. It thus appears that a necessary context condition
of perspective taking is that a moral context must be present. By this, we mean that the perspective
takers’ actions should be motivated by a desire for positive outcomes that may result from their
actions.
To illustrate with a slightly less heinous example than Hannibal Lechter, we can look at the
all too, and unfortunately, familiar issue of bullies. Bullies are another, perhaps less extreme,
example of model perspective takers. A Bgood^ bully does not simply use generic tools to
exact pain in their victims. Bullies read the state of mind of their victim, understand their
desires, their motivations, and behave accordingly. Continuing with the cinematic examples of
model cases of perspective taking, consider the plight of Carrie (Monash and DePalma 1976),
the tortured teenager with telekinetic powers who dreams of being accepted by her classmates.
How do the class bullies torment Carrie? They do not simply tease her about her appearance,
her family, nor her naiveté. They precisely target in on Carrie’s hopes and dreams; they elect
her as prom queen to be paired with her school crush as prom king…only to publicly
embarrass and humiliate her, dealing out her worst nightmare. Arguably, those bullies knew
exactly how Carrie thought, what she would feel. This was not a case of students not knowing
that their perspective taking could cause harm, but rather, capitalizing on perspective taking to
cause harm. Again, this example suggests that perspective taking in the absence of a moral
context can render it a less than desirable attribute.
How could the absence of a context condition for perspective taking play out in a science
classroom? Imagine for a moment another hypothetical scenario whereby the students in
Sarah’s biology class are provided information on Huntington’s disease, a dominant lethal
genetic disorder whose terrible effects often do not surface until after an adult has already
passed the genes on to their children. Imagine further that the class participates in an SSI
activity where they are asked whether gene therapy should be used to eliminate Huntington’s
disease from the population. let us consider the following hypothetical exchange between
another invented case student, who we will call, Dante, and his teacher, a master at SSI
implementation.
Teacher: BAre you for or against gene therapy being used to eliminate Huntington’s Disease from the
population?^
Dante: BI’m against gene therapy because it’s playing God.^
Teacher: BO.K., Dante. But how do you think the family with Huntington’s that we learned about might
feel about this issue?^
Dante: BI can understand that the family would want to do gene therapy. It’s a terrible disease and they
wouldn’t want their kids to suffer.^
The teacher, utilizing a perspective-taking instrument that places value on the ability to analyze
SSI from Bdiverse perspectives and recognize substantive challenges to one’s own espoused
position^ (Sadler et al. 2007, p. 376) thinks, BHooray! Dante is demonstrating strong
perspective-taking skills!^ And yet, not more than a moment later, Dante continues his thought:
Dante: BYeah, I can understand that they would want gene therapy, but I really don’t care what they think.
My opinion’s the only one that matters. And I kinda’ like when people suffer!^
The teacher promptly erases the check mark next to perspective-taking skills on her scoring
rubric…but should she? Dante actually fulfilled the requirements of current instruments assessing
perspective-taking skills. He identified a perspective other than his own, not so differently than
Sarah; in fact, he appreciated the pain that the disease would cause to others, showing a level of
engagement. And yet, something is obviously amiss…Dante is clearly not an example of the type
of thinking pattern the SSI framework aims to promote. So, what is missing in Dante’s perspective-
taking skills (and arguably in the aforementioned instrument)? The answer may lie in a re-
examination of one of the key assumptions of this article, that is, that perspective taking is a
desirable behavior and worthy of promotion. This assumption seems reasonable, given that the
literature on perspective taking cites it as a precursor or co-requisite to moral development (Selman
1977), global citizenship (Lee et al. 2012), communication (Batson 1991; Clark and Marshall
1981), empathy (Gibbs 2003; Hoffman 2000), and the like. Yet, when we position perspective
taking in this light, we are assuming that it is a good thing when in fact in and of itself it is neutral.
One can connect with others and shift their viewpoint to appreciate others’ perspectives for
good, evil, or for no particular reason. What makes perspective taking appear to be a positive
behavior is the assumption of a moral context condition. Our conceptual analysis suggests that
our everyday understanding of perspective taking, as well as its usage within the current SSR
construct, may have fallen prey to a Bdominant subjective contextual use^ (Soltis 1978, p. 13)
and exacted a positive aura much the same way Blove,^ Bmother,^ and Bpuppies^ have. In and
of themselves, these terms are neutral and their definitions reflect that. Yet, we nonetheless
assign positive values to them, even though we are aware of the existence of dangerous loves,
BMommy Dearests,^ and even naughty puppies! Perspective taking is a similarly neutral term,
and in common speech, it may be acceptable to tolerate the ambiguity of this assumed value as
the meaning can readily be interpreted by the context of the sentence in which it is used. Yet, in
the context of educational research, the assumption of a positive value leaves our understanding
and defining of perspective taking imprecise, and seduces us into overlooking perhaps the most
important perspective-taking condition within SSR; that of a tacit moral context which must be
made explicit if perspective taking is to serve as a construct to be fostered and measured in
science education or related disciplines with sociocultural perspectives.
Given that neither the current SSR construct, nor instruments measuring the perspective-
taking component of SSR explicitly cite a moral context condition, there exists a gap that
leaves the SSR construct vulnerable to inadequate operationalization. And while the lack of an
Table 2 Conditions analysis of model and invented perspective taking characteristics
Character Synopsis Engagement? Shift? Generic Moral PTC

case type context for
condition SSR?
High School Science Responds to SSI on myopia by Yes Yes Invented Present Yes
Student—BSarah^ learning about the implications
of vision correction on others
and taking vision issue on as
her own.
Hannibal Lechter Psychopathic serial killer with Yes Yes Model Absent No
The Silence of the an uncanny ability to read
Lambs (1991) other’s thoughts, anticipate
their actions, and know
what they are feeling.
High School Science In an SSI on Huntington’s Disease, Yes Yes Invented Absent No
Student—BDante^ is able to recognize viewpoints
contrary to his own, appreciate
the pain experienced by HD
families, yet only cares about
his own desires.
articulated moral context condition in the SSR construct will not necessarily promote the
development of Hannibal Lechters or Dantes, it grants too much leeway in regard to the behaviors
that necessarily lead to the type of perspective taking and ultimately, the quality of character we
wish to promote. For example, if we assume that the quality of a student’s perspective-taking
ability is aligned with the number of perspectives they are able to take (Sadler et al. 2007), without
any requirement of a moral context condition, we could well assess Dante to be a model
perspective taker even though his use of this skill is for sadistic ends. In a somewhat less dramatic
example, if we define perspective-taking ability by the ability to formulate counter-positions and
rebuttals (Sadler and Donnelly 2006), or to conceptualize a problem beyond one’s own personal
framework (Sadler et al. 2007), a student may well be able to shift viewpoints like Tootsie,
perhaps only motivated by the prospect of a higher grade, but without any connection to or interest
in the stakeholders or without genuine concern for the consequences of their actions. Given that a
guiding premise of SSI is its contribution to the formation of character, clarifying the basis of
character development within the SSR construct itself is essential. It is not that we are suggesting
that the perspective taking we envisioned in Gandhi is fundamentally different than the one that
could take place in science classrooms; rather, that the tacit assumptions that underlie the construct
as used in everyday speech render it insufficiently operationalized and unripe for measurement in
education. This is particularly critical given that the moral context that counteracts the tacit
assumption in our analysis thus far is perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of SSI (and
therefore, SSR) from other science and science/technology/society frameworks (Zeidler et al.
2005). Table 2 summarizes the cases utilized in our conditions-type analysis relative to the
cultivation of perspective taking characteristics (PTC).
We are reminded that the finding of a hidden value lurking within a dominant subjective use
is not uncommon, as we have previously noted its presence within the common usage of the
term Bempathy^ as well (Kahn and Zeidler 2017). Although empathy is frequently operation-
alized as value-neutral, pertaining to one’s ability to feel what another feels, we can readily
recognize the inappropriateness of the sentence, BI feel my friends’ excitement about winning
the lottery; I empathize with her!^ This statement exposes the hidden value of empathy as
being appropriate for sad emotional events, thus belying the value-neutral definition and raising into
question the accuracy of instruments that define the construct in a neutral manner yet are employed
by researchers who only recognize the behavior when situated within a sad emotional event. Our
present study illuminates the threat of such hidden values even more clearly, as we have exposed the
potential for folly when one attributes moral motivations or even simply a positive aura to
perspective taking when it is perfectly plausible that undesirable or neutral motivations exist.
Thus far, our generic and conditions analyses have identified three conditions for perspective
taking within the context of SSR: (1) engagement with others and their circumstances, (2) etic/emic
shift, and (3) moral context. These necessary and sufficient conditions, which together contribute to
a novel conception for perspective taking within the SSR context, are outlined in Fig. 2.
Having identified the necessary and sufficient conditions for perspective taking within the SSI
context, we now examine the manner in which our understanding of perspective taking compares
to related terms such as empathy, role taking, and ToM by applying a differentiation-type analysis.
3.4 Differentiation Analysis: Distinguishing Perspective Taking from Related

Constructs
To continue our analysis, we move from the glitz and glamor of the big screen to that of a most
mundane scenario to which most readers can relate…an elevator ride! Imagine that you enter
an elevator and another person is standing there. You quickly acknowledge them and the door
closes. What are you thinking? If you are like many people, you might experience a moment of
awkwardness as you stare at the advancing floor numbers wondering whether or not to initiate
conversation. How do you determine whether to engage with another? Moreover, how do you
determine whether the other person wishes to engage with you? Perhaps obvious cues, such as
a smile, hint at their state of mind. The determination of whether to engage in conversation is
Fig. 2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for perspective taking in a generic and b SSI contexts
arguably intuitive; it is a Bgut reaction^ and primal attempt at mindreading the other’s
intentions to determine whether to expose one’s vulnerabilities through engagement or protect
oneself through isolation.
Let us imagine that upon entering the elevator, you notice that the other person is an amputee.
What are you thinking? Do you wonder, BHow did they lose their leg?^ BIs she/he a veteran?^ BIs
it o.k. to ask?^ BI wonder what life would be like without a leg?^ This type of thinking pattern is
decidedly more rationalistic than the prior intuitive mindreading. You intellectually envision
yourself in their place trying to see the world, which includes you, through their eyes.
What if the person lets out a groan? Do you feel their pain? This emotive response is again
different from the others. You are able to feel what you perceive them to feel, again putting
yourself in their place; but this time, it is not on an intellectual or intuitive basis, but an affective
one. Although you may be curious, would you ask, BHey, how did you lose your leg?^ We
suspect not, as a voice inside of you tells you that it is not appropriate to do so. Societal norms
have informed you that asking about another person’s hardships is seen as brutish, unrefined, and
insensitive. Your own sense of what is right may also prevent you from asking as you might
envision yourself being on the receiving end of such a question. In a sense, you step outside of
yourself and see yourself from the other’s and society’s view, and, if you are like most people, you
want that perception to be a positive one. Interestingly, this desire to meet both one’s own and
society’s expectations does not just impact our inactions, such as not asking the amputee about
their leg, but about our actions as well. Let us further imagine that moments before you entered the
elevator, you ate a triple garlic pizza for lunch. Does the specter of causing another’s discomfort
compel you to grab a breath mint? Hold your breath? Turn away? Breathe into your collar? The
powerful impetus to do what is right both in terms of how the other person, society, and your own
self-judgment drives many acts of omission and commission in our daily lives.
These Belevator thinking^ scenarios seem to have something in common: In every case, we
demonstrated some level of engagement with the other person in that we thought about their
interests (or at least our best guess regarding their interests) and how they or others would perceive
us as we navigated through this brief interaction. In essence, we took the time to attend to the
interaction and concerned ourselves with others. Our earlier analysis suggested that engagement is
a necessary condition for perspective taking, and it would appear that each of our scenarios
demonstrated this condition. But what about our second condition of perspective taking? Did we
exercise a shift in viewpoint? And if we did, can we reasonably be said to have exercised the same
kind of perspective taking in each case? Let us take a moment to look more closely at our scenarios.
Whether assessing the other person’s desire to talk, imagining the story behind their
amputation, or feeling their pain, we employed shifts in viewpoint whereby we put
ourselves in the place of the other. Yet, in each case, we primarily activated a different
psychological domain, a phenomenon which allows us to relate each response to a
distinctive perspective-taking activity. Our initial intuitive attempt at mindreading the
other person’s intentions and desires aligns closely with theory of mind (ToM; Premack
and Woodruff 1978) which is commonly described as an effort to infer the representa-
tional mental state of another individual, such as a belief or intention (Schaafsma et al.
2015), while our rationalistic tendency to envision how we would think or behave as if
we were in the other’s place aligns quite closely with role taking (Franks 2013). Finally,
our affective response of mirroring the other’s feelings (or at least our interpretation of it)
most closely aligns with empathy (Vilardaga 2009). Of critical importance here is that
perspective taking, construed as requiring engagement and shift, appears to be a neces-
sary yet insufficient condition for ToM, role taking, and empathy as each requires the
enlistment of a particular psychological domain to meet its defining conditions. Conse-

quently, although it is not incorrect to refer to ToM, role taking, and empathy as
perspective taking, it is imprecise in much the same way that identifying Chihuahuas,
greyhounds, and St. Bernards as Bdogs^ is correct yet highly imprecise. This fine
distinction may well contribute to the ambiguity surrounding the perspective-taking
construct in the literature.
Returning to our elevator scenarios, do you recall the Bvoices^ you heard telling you about
society’s or the amputee’s perspective on your behavior? We can view them as evidence of a
type of reflective perspective taking; that is, seeing oneself through others’ eyes. This type of
perspective taking, however, goes beyond simply seeing; judgment of right or wrong, good or
bad, enters into the thought process. One does not simply say, BI see myself asking the amputee
about their leg^ without a moral compass pointing to the next logical step… BI see myself
asking the amputee about their leg and believe it might be hurtful, or be seen as insensitive.^
While this is what Dewey (1910) meant as reflective judgment, requiring engagement and a
shift in perspective, these conditions alone are not sufficient to serve as a basis for moral
development. Moral development requires yet another voice of reflexive judgment: informing
one about oneself, thereby contributing to the development of conscience (Green 1999).
Conscience cannot develop from the voice of what others think of our actions alone; it also
requires a shift in internal perspective, as though one steps outside oneself, becoming etic to
one’s self. This is not the voice that asks what others would think, but the one that asks, BHow
do I see myself?^; BHow close do I come to the mark?^; BHow do I judge myself against my
internal voice for doing what’s right?^ Hence, perspective taking in a generic sense is not
sufficient to meet this standard; it requires engagement and a shift in perspective, combined
with a moral judgment to serve as the basis for moral development. This finding, of course,
harkens back to our earlier discussion of the need for a Bmoral context^ for perspective taking
Fig. 3 Perspective-taking components, or tasks, within a moral context. Each perspective-taking task is
distinguishable by its primary domain of psychological engagement
within the socioscientific context when we determined that perspective taking in its generic
form was inadequate to serve the needs of an educational framework premised upon moral
development (lest we allow Dantes and Hannibal Lechters to pass as model perspective takers
within our midst). Although the elements of that moral context eluded us earlier, our elevator
scenario has helped us to identify two perspective-taking components of the moral context:
reflective and reflexive judgment, together contributing to the development of moral judgment.
Perspective taking, it is therefore argued, is a prerequisite of ToM, role taking, empathy, and
reflective/reflexive judgment, in that its conditions must be met for these various Btypes^ of
perspective-taking tasks to exist, each relying on its own psychological domain of engagement.
This relationship is depicted in Fig. 3. Reflective and reflexive perspective taking, yielding
moral judgment, is seen as permeating all other perspective-taking tasks, and informs all moral
activities.
We have already alluded to the idea that different psychological domains, such as intuitive,
affective, and rationalistic, may be necessary in delineating between ToM, role taking, and
empathy. But are domain differences sufficient in distinguishing between them? Recall that our
earlier analyses led us to conclude that perspective taking requires engagement with others and
a shift. If we consider that each of the psychological domains represents a means of engaging
with others and their circumstances, then, the particular type of psychological domain invoked
informs the type of perspective taking being exercised. We are then left only to consider the
presence and nature of the shift. In his brilliant argument for the need for both Binside^ and
Boutside^ perspectives in understanding baseball, author Bill James (1984) described the
interplay between the quantitative, statistical Boutside^ perspective of baseball (as viewed
from the stands) and the qualitative, interpersonal Binside^ perspective (as viewed from the
field). This analysis of the etic/emic perspective has relevance to our analysis of perspective
taking and related constructs, as the question of whether the perspective-taker actually puts
themselves in the other’s shoes to develop an Bemic^ perspective, as in the case of role taking
and empathy, or whether the perspective-taker puts themselves in the position of an outsider, or
Betic^ perspective, to look back at themselves.
It should be noted that when we think about the shift that occurs in perspective taking, we do
not mean that a position on an issue must change. Rather, we are referring to its positionality.
For example, a student who exercises perspective taking to understand a stakeholder’s point of
view on a particular issue does not necessarily change their original position; it might stay the
same. Rather, what they are shifting is the manner in which they view the issue, whether from
their own Boutsider^ perspective (i.e., what Bthey^ think) to an Binsider^ perspective (i.e., what
I would think if I were in their shoes). To clarify this distinction a bit further, a brief look at the
differences between perspective, position, and orientation are in order.
3.5 A Primer on Perspectives, Orientations, and Positions
Before we proceed with our conception development of perspective taking within the SSR
context, it would behoove us to revisit our earlier work in which we utilized conceptual
analysis to distinguish perspectives from the closely related constructs of orientations and
positions (Kahn and Zeidler 2017). Using everyday language regarding the environmental
issue of fracking, we found that we tend to take positions on issues (as in the sentence, BWhat
is your position on fracking?^) yet give perspectives on those same issues (as in the sentence,
BHere, let me share my view (perspective) on fracking with you.^) We found that asking about
one’s position is essentially asking, BWhere do you stand?^ which is a question that can be
summarized quite concisely, and may even imply our political orientation. Yet, we found that
perspective requires a more intimate assessment of one’s internal predilections, requiring not
only where I stand but also why I stand there. We also found that the addition of the term
Btaking^ essentially renders the term Bperspective taking^ a Bdead metaphor^ (Green 1971, p.
62), for there is no actual Btaking^ of another’s perspective. Instead, this compound verbiage is
necessary to overcome the assumption of Bgivingness^ that undergirds perspective; in other
words, Btaking^ is added to emphasize a shift from the default value that we give, rather than
take our perspective on issues, as noted above. We further situated the terms perspective,
position, and orientation within the context of contemporary real estate websites which allow
homebuyers to ascertain the position of the house (where it stands), its orientation (position in
relation to other things such as parks, schools, or even the sun), and finally, the insider
perspective of the homeowner through the use of the Bstreet view function^ as well as virtual
tours of the home. These analyses led us to a conceptual understanding of the three terms as
follows (Kahn and Zeidler 2017, p.547):
& Position: where one stands on an issue;

& Orientation: how one approaches an issue in relation to others;
& Perspective: how one perceives and interprets an issue.
We were readily able to apply these definitions within the science education literature. For
example, in one study on SSI and moral sensitivity (Sadler 2004), college students were
questioned about two SSIs, one on whether gene therapy should be used to eliminate
Huntington’s disease and another on whether cloning should be used to counter infertility.
Students’ moral sensitivity in negotiating these issues was operationalized by the extent to
which they Binterpreted the reactions and feeling of others, understanding cause-consequence
chains of events and recognizing moral principles and guidelines^ (p. 345). Using our three
definitions described above, we found that students were examining their positions on the
particular issue, be it for or against, and were assessed based on their orientation, be it more or
less inclined to utilize moral considerations to justify their position. Moreover, given that some
students incorporated, Bconcern for others^ (p. 348) (e.g., BI don’t like to see people suffer and
if there’s something like this that can eliminate the suffering, then why not?) and Bempathy
towards others^ (p. 349) (e.g., BI thought about the parents^) which was expressed through
role playing, we concluded that this exercise arguably tapped into students’ ability to integrate
others’ perspectives. Applying our definitional heuristic to another example, we examined
Furberg and Ludvigsen’s (2008) study, which compared the manner in which two students
approached a question about genetically modified foods. The authors described the students’
initial research approaches as reflecting two different orientations, with one relying on
scientific explanations and the other on societal consequences, both ultimately establishing a
fact-finding orientation. To the extent that the authors contrasted the behaviors of students as
they examined the issues relative to each other, their application of the term orientation is
supportive of our analysis above. However, we found that this study diverges in an
important respect with our definitions of perspective. Therefore, it would not be
congruent with our definition and might not be seen as evidence of perspective taking
as other authors have suggested (Lee et al. 2012) since perspective would have
required a more nuanced epistemic understanding of students’ thinking about the
issue, rather than how they navigated the investigation in relation to others. In order
to ascertain students’ perspectives according to our definitional distinctions, questions
Fig. 4 Components of socioscientific reasoning (SSR). This figure integrates Fig. 3’s conception of perspective
taking into SSR
aimed at revealing their justifications for particular positions on the issues (which was
not the aim of this study) would have been required.
To reiterate an earlier (and critical) point, when we speak of a Bshift^ in perspective, we do
not mean that a student’s position must change in order for perspective taking to occur. We
mean that a student shifts their positionality, or viewpoint, to that of another person in order to
analyze a SSI, which is essentially a contextualized moral dilemma. With these understandings
in mind, we move next to position perspective taking within the SSR construct. In doing so, we
find the necessity of introducing a new, more refined, if not more comprehensive, construct.
3.6 Conception Development: Socioscientific Perspective Taking (SSPT)
Based on our analysis, the perspective-taking component of Sadler et al.’s (2007) SSR
construct can be further refined into sub-constructs of role taking, empathy, and ToM, all
residing within a context of moral judgment composed of reflective and reflexive judgment.
Their interconnection, showing our new model of perspective taking, is depicted in Fig. 4.
In trying to determine the manner in which students negotiate and resolve socioscientific
issues, Sadler and Zeidler (2005) identified a framework of Binformal reasoning^ utilized by
students as they worked through SSI scenarios. The framework identified three distinct
approaches, which the authors described as rationalistic, emotive, and intuitive, based on their
empirical analysis of the responses given by students as they reasoned through complex issues
related to genetic engineering. The authors concluded that the students often utilized multiple
patterns of informal reasoning to resolve their issue, and that to some extent, the patterns
related to the context of the issue, with some issues garnering greater emotive or intuitive
responses. Rationalistic reasoning was utilized by all participants in at least some of the
scenarios, and while science educators often tend to focus on logic and evidence as the driving
forces of reasoning, the authors suggest that intuitive and emotive reasoning also plays an
essential role in hooking students’ interest in the issue, and invoking students’ moral/ethical
sensibilities. Interestingly, when students utilized intuitive reasoning, it was always used first
before the other two styles. This makes sense when one realizes that the intuitive domain is the
most primary (Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994). The authors surmised that, BThe display of
multiple reasoning patterns was due at least in part to the recognition of the various perspec-
tives that can influence positions taken in response to socioscientific scenarios^ (p.129).
We would like to extend that thought and suggest that perspective taking parallels the informal
reasoning they identified; that their Bintuitive^ pattern was reminiscent of ToM, whereby students
decide whether to engage on a Bgut^ level in much the same way that we decide whether to engage
with another person in the elevator. The Bemotive^ pattern observed by the authors paralleled
empathic perspective taking and was invoked by particular scenarios in much the same way that
perspective taking with an amputee in the elevator might invoke greater empathy than with a person
who did not have an obvious disability. And the Brationalistic^ pattern is indicative of the more
familiar role taking form of perspective taking whereby we integrate prior and contemporaneous
knowledge to piece together Bevidence^ to establish our Bnarrative,^ much the same way we did in
the elevator as we began to think through life as an amputee. Insofar as moral reasoning was
concerned, the authors noted that it permeated through all other considerations contributing to their
decision making. Moral considerations were not partitioned but rather, comingled with non-moral
factors. We would suggest one reason it is impossible to tease out morality from other aspects of
informal reasoning is that conscience, stemming from reflexive and reflective patterns of perspective
taking, becomes subsumed in the patchwork of perspective-taking activities utilized in negotiating
dilemmas. As we saw in the elevator, our thoughts, actions, or inactions were informed by guiding
voices, what Green (1999) would refer to as the Bvoices of conscience^ which are developed
through reflexive and reflective judgment, both forms of perspective taking. Whether deciding if and
how to engage in conversation, whether to ask a Bpersonal question,^ or whether to let on to
someone that we feel their pain, we are informed and guided by moral judgment. As Green so deftly
pointed out, even the exercise of taking another’s perspective by Bstating the interests of others as
others see them, and stating them aloud and, if possible, in the actual presence of those others, is
often in itself a powerful exercise in empathy^ (pp. 81–82). Similarly, while egocentrism may be our
default state (Fenigstein and Abrams 1993), the development of perspective taking allows us to
develop empathy, ToM, and role taking, each contributing to the development of conscience. The
connections between the negotiation of SSI and the development of moral reasoning and character
development, which rest upon conscience, have been well-documented (Zeidler 2014).
In discussing the relationship between classroom argumentation of the kind advocated in SSI
and moral reasoning, Zeidler and Sadler (2008) pointed out that:
Central to all these studies is the importance placed squarely on understanding how students reason and
react reflexively to variant evidence and belief. In doing so, we have sought to provide opportunities for
students to negotiate and argue with others and ultimately reflect as they form judgments about
controversial issues. (p. 202)
Fig. 5 Socioscientific Perspective Taking (SSPT). This model emphasizes the suite of perspective-taking tasks
that ideally occur during the negotiation of SSI. (Note: BEngagement^ and BEtic/Emic Shift^ are depicted outside
of the BMoral Context^ to emphasize their contribution to the perspective-taking tasks)
It is perhaps not surprising that there is such a close overlap between SSR and
perspective taking and its related constructs. What emerges from this connection
between the patterns of informal reasoning in SSI and those of perspective taking is
that, possibly, a construct more specific than general perspective taking is needed
when referring to the component of socioscientific reasoning. The type of perspective
taking ideally desired for SSR values not simply applying perspective taking from a
single domain, but from all domains; not necessarily at one time, but competence in
SSR would suggest the ability to draw upon different perspective-taking tasks from
different domains as the particular SSI requires. Moreover, it would seem desirable to
explicitly incorporate reflexive and reflective judgment, as they are essential
perspective-taking tasks that educators should strive to promote.
Based on these considerations, we suggest a more robust construct called, BSocioscientific
Perspective Taking (SSPT)^ which incorporates engagement via various psychological do-
mains, an etic/emic shift, and demonstration of reflexive and reflective judgment (Fig. 5). This
model represents an emphasis on the development of a diverse suite of perspective-taking
skills as well as the moral context, composed of reflective and reflexive judgment, all of which
are keys for the promotion of SSR.
The model, derived from the analytic techniques employed through our conceptual
analysis, represents the confluence of all perspective-taking tasks within area BD,^
thus creating a BGolden Mean^ for the activation of all psychological domains. While
students may indeed exhibit patterns more akin to areas BA,^ BB,^ or BC^ during the
negotiation of many SSI, it is suggested that opportunities that tap students’ engage-
ment in all domains (i.e., area BD^) are most developmentally and pedagogically
desirable. It should be noted that engagement and etic/emic shift are depicted outside
of the moral context to emphasize the perspective-taking tasks that ideally take place
in their presence.
4 Conclusions and Implications for Educational Research
Perhaps the most critical finding of this study in relation to educational research in general, and
science education research in particular, is the confirmation of the complexity of perspective
taking within the SSI context. Sadler et al.’s (2011) insightful reflection that consideration of
perspective taking as a subconstruct of SSR rather than an independent construct led to
underestimation of its intricacy was quite prescient and suggestive of a need to develop better
instruments for its measurement. The operationalization of SSPT in the present research makes
this development possible and strongly suggests that measurement of SSPT must transcend
unitary indicators, such as the number of different viewpoints identified or whether counter-
positions or rebuttals can be articulated, in favor of multidimensional instruments that incor-
porate engagement, etic/emic shift, reflective judgment, and reflexive judgment. Although it is
our tendency to simplify rather than complicate matters, this is arguably one circumstance
where a molehill is indeed a mountain.
Another outcome of this study is clarification of related constructs including orientations,
positions, and empathy. By testing and elucidating the boundaries of perspective taking, we
found that these related yet unique constructs should not be used interchangeably, suggesting
that educational researchers might wish to revisit studies utilizing these terms and perhaps
apply conceptual analysis to more effectively ensure construct validity in future studies. An
associated benefit of this clarification is that it can promote more precise communication with
non-experts, who may hold the misconception that SSI or character development is directed at
changing students’ positions on issues, rather than broadening their perspectives. Such com-
munication is necessary to overcome the hesitance of some educators and administrators to
adopt SSI for fear that it may simply serve as a vehicle for imposing teachers’ beliefs upon
their students. Of related consequence is the need for research-based interventions that
specifically target SSPT development. While recognizing that the SSI framework has no doubt
provided an excellent conceptual foundation upon which the desired activities and attributes
can flourish, our research suggests that promotion of SSPT may well require the development
of an array of interventions that tap specific SSPT components (e.g., engagement and etic/emic
shift).
Given the fact that numerous educational fields such as special education, social studies
education, and drama education, have developed and empirically tested interventions to
promote perspective taking (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Foster 2001; Verducci 2000), it seems
prudent that educational researchers and curriculum developers be informed by this substantial
body of work. Comparing the manner in which perspective taking is operationalized and
promoted within these fields with the SSPT model, perhaps through theoretical inquiry (Grove
and Short 1991), would determine the feasibility of these fields as sources for promising
curricular interventions for SSPT, but more broadly, could promote cross-fertilization of best
practices among multiple disciplines each with an interest in promoting some facet of the
perspective-taking construct. We are particularly intrigued by frameworks such as historical
empathy (Lee and Ashby 2001) as a viable route to addressing the NGSS through the use of
historical controversies to promote SSPT. After all, if the study of history is premised upon the
notion that understanding past events informs current and future decision making, it is
reasonable to consider that study of past SSIs can provide students with an appreciation and
understanding of historical socioscientific dilemmas whose resolution and subsequent conse-
quences can inform current deliberations. One might consider such critical socioscientific
events as the Tuskegee experiments, the Manhattan Project, or Galileo’s imprisonment for
promoting a heliocentric model of the universe as potential contexts. We might dub these
dilemmas BHistorical SSI^ as they unquestionably represent situations that were ill-structured
and, at least at the time they occurred, were subject to diverse authoritative perspectives.
Like historical empathy, the study of such events as SSI would expose students to the
tentativeness of scientific knowledge. Just as it might be difficult for a student to understand
the depth and severity of the heretical nature of Galileo’s proposition during his time or the
Inquisition’s subsequent ban on his works, given all of the present-day subsequent evidence
that supports it, students can begin to consider contemporary parallels to current sociocultural
objections to climate change. It is not far-fetched to envision a rich study of the Manhattan
Project with students challenged to consider whether they would participate if asked to conduct
research: What was known at the time? What was the societal context? What was (is) the role
of a scientist? How do scientists decide on the research they are willing to conduct? How does
a scientist distinguish between what they are able to do versus what they ought to do? More
times than not, we know what we can do, what we should do, what we ought to do, yet we are
tempted not to do so for an array of reasons both internal and external to one’s conscience. This
is, essentially, what lies at the core of human dissonance, and creates the underlying ethical
tension present in any significant moral dilemma. Case studies that reveal such ethical discord
in science are not unknown, and in fact, Sadler and Zeidler (2003) encouraged the use of Bbad
science^ (p. 280) from the past such as Tuskegee and the BBig Tobacco^ cases to promote
moral reasoning by helping students to understand that ethical scientific practice requires
restraint.
What is suggested in the present study, though, is placing emphasis squarely on the
promotion of SSPT so that students are able to shift their perspective to that of an Binsider^
within the time of the dilemma. Moreover, students must consider the implications of actions
(or inactions) from the perspective of the stakeholders at that time. In order to do this, emphasis
would be placed on stakeholders’ knowledge and contexts. For example, a class could
endeavor to understand the tensions between Galileo and the church by reading Galileo’s
Daughter, A Historical Memoir of Science, Faith, and Love (Sobel 1999) which chronicles,
through 124 surviving letters written by Galileo’s illegitimate daughter to her father, Galileo’s
trial before the Inquisition on his heliocentric model. Use of this type of evidence, in addition
to resources describing religious doctrine, laws, and writings on the prevailing geocentric
model, and other contextual touchstones could provide students with the tools to engage with
the stakeholders and view them from within their own time rather than the present. Once
potential consequences of their actions are discussed, teachers can guide students through
connections to related contemporary SSI. Role-play can likely prove to be an effective tool in
BHistorical SSI.^ Duveen and Solomon (1994) described a role-play about Darwin’s On the
Origin of Species that involves developing dossiers on seven different historical characters,
including Charles Darwin, Thomas Huxley, Samuel Wilberforce, and Robert FitzRoy. The
authors noted that FitzRoy and Wilberforce, although both representing the religious Banti-
evolution^ stance, represented different gradations of the argument, with FitzRoy being more
of a religious fundamentalist. This type of historical role-play, which is quite common in
historical empathy, could foster engagement for students who might otherwise have difficulty
with taking perspectives of stakeholders from the past while readily connecting the NGSS’
three-dimensions of science learning (i.e., practices, crosscutting concepts, and disciplinary
core ideas) via a decidedly sociocultural approach.
Similarly, we find research on autism spectrum disorder (ASD) to be compelling as students
with ASD are often characterized as lacking of ToM (Baron-Cohen 1995); that is, they have
difficulty inferring the mental states of others (Minshew and Keller 2010). Key goals of autism
intervention are to foster students’ ability to consider (1) What are others thinking and feeling?,
(2) Is it different from my own thoughts and feelings?, and (3) How will my action/inaction
appear to others? (Gutstein and Whitney 2002). While the goal of these reflections is to foster
social competence in students with ASD, they are not qualitatively different from the concerns
of SSI, in which students are compelled to consider the manner in which others think about
controversial issues, how those beliefs differ from their own, and what repercussions might
stem from their actions/inactions. It is suggested here that the goals of autism interventions and
SSI may differ more in degree than in kind; in other words, students with ASD are not
grappling with a different kind of perspective taking but rather, are at a less advanced stage of
the same developmental progression. Close examination into the interventions that foster ToM
in students with ASD may provide insight into whether such approaches might inform SSI
curriculum development insofar as promotion of SSPT.
The promotion of students’ SSPT through the use of targeted SSI-based interventions begs
the question of whether such activities affect perspective taking in more generalized contexts.
For example, do students who receive SSPT interventions demonstrate open-mindedness about
such factors as race, gender, or disability? Is promotion of SSPT transferable to other
perspective-taking situations? Zeidler and Sadler’s (2011) used the word Binclusive^ to refer
to SSI’s facilitation of a broad interpretation of scientific literacy, one that compels students to
apply scientific content knowledge, argumentation skills, and ethical decision-making into
their lives as citizens. However, it seems plausible that exposure to activities specifically
targeted to overcome egocentrism while expanding the quality of perspective taking within the
SSI context might also impact students’ inclusive reasoning in everyday life, including their
interactions with peers. Permeation of perspective taking outside of the SSI context, if found to
exist, would bolster findings that SSI is capable of cultivating global citizenship when applied
within the SSI context and could conceivably emerge as a model case of a normative science
of morality (Harris 2010), that science has the ability to help shape and inform global morality.
While this does not ensure that all people would reach the same position as to what moral
stance should be taken on a given issue, it does help to ensure that at the very least all voices
representing diverse interests and perspectives would be heard. Of course, the next step is to
formulate policy where the Boptimal^ solution to a problem may be the second or third best of
all worlds—once competing interests are factored into the solution (Green 1975). The potential
for SSI to have an impact beyond the borders of science education through the cultivation of
SSPT might also lead to greater cross-fertilization of scholarship between science education
and non-science fields, thus upping the ante of what it means to foster truly inclusive moral
citizenship.
A related question is whether incorporation of activities that promote SSPT enhances
teachers’ SSPT, thereby supporting a key goal of SSI curriculum which is to transform both
students’ and teachers’ epistemological beliefs about science in real-world contexts. Teacher
change theory (Guskey 2002) posits that it is not professional development per se that changes
teachers’ beliefs or actions. Rather, it is successful implementation of such training with clear
connections to improved student outcomes that facilitates such change. It does not seem far-
fetched to imagine that that the act of designing and implementing lessons that target and lead
to improvement in students’ SSPT might broaden teacher’s understanding of their students’
perspectives, and perhaps even precipitate self-reflection as to their own core beliefs, as well as
their biases. McGinnis’ (2003) study of pre-service students’ ability (or inability) to plan for
the full inclusion of a hypothetical student with a developmental disability illuminates the
interconnectedness of teachers’ moral beliefs and their ability to enact methods of moral
teaching. In that study, students who believed inclusion to be a moral imperative, rather than
simply a legal or practical necessity, were more inclined to identify and implement practices
that demanded respect for and full engagement of all students. This suggests that it is essential
for teachers to recognize the value of moral development in their students and perhaps equally
important, to view themselves as moral change agents if the vast potential of SSPT is to be
realized. Continued and expanded research on teachers’ epistemological beliefs in SSI, with
particular attention to SSPT, seems warranted. Moreover, extended examination of perspective
taking across a wide swath of disciplines would lay the groundwork for enhanced promotion
of moral development through interdisciplinary avenues. The present study demonstrates the
efficacy of conceptual analysis as an appropriate and robust methodology for such inquiries.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
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A Conceptual Analysis of Perspective Taking in Support of Socioscientific Reasoning

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Science & Education (2019) 28:605–638

A Conceptual Analysis of Perspective Taking in Support

Sami Kahn 1 & Dana L. Zeidler

Published online: 11 April 2019

Keywords Perspective taking . Socioscientific issues . Socioscientific reasoning . Scientific

1 Introduction and Theoretical Background

research within a framework of scientific literacy, socioscientific issues, and perspective-taking

2 Scientific Literacy, SSR, and Perspective Taking

2.1 Contemporary Deficit and Progressive Views of Scientific Literacy

2.2 A Route to Functional Scientific Literacy: SSI and SSR

2.3 Perspective Taking—an Essential yet Messy Construct

It is difficult to imagine a more foundational constituent of human communication and

3 A Method of Conceptual Analysis

3.1 History and Use of Conceptual Analysis

conceptual assumptions with respect to operational definitions evoked by researchers in the

3.2 Generic Analysis

3.2.1 Model Case

3.2.2 Borderline Case

Thus, although unquestionably an admirable and heroic character, Atticus is revealed as a

3.2.3 Contrary Case

3.3 Conditions Analysis

Character Synopsis Engagement? Shift? Case type

Table 2 Conditions analysis of model and invented perspective taking characteristics

Character Synopsis Engagement? Shift? Generic Moral PTC

3.4 Differentiation Analysis: Distinguishing Perspective Taking from Related

enlistment of a particular psychological domain to meet its defining conditions. Conse-

3.5 A Primer on Perspectives, Orientations, and Positions

& Position: where one stands on an issue;

3.6 Conception Development: Socioscientific Perspective Taking (SSPT)

4 Conclusions and Implications for Educational Research

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. DC Heath: Lexington.

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