ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:

POSTCOLONIAL SECURITY STUDIES

Volume 3

THE FALKLANDS WAR

 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and
International Law

Edited by
ALBERTO R. COLL AND ANTHONY C. AREND
First published in 1985 by Allen & Unwin
This edition first published in 2021
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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© 1985 Alberto Coll and Anthony Arend
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 The Editors would like to dedicate this
volume to their teachers at the University of
Virginia, Princeton, and Georgetown without
whose example of moral and scholarly
excellence this work would not have been
possible.

A.R.C and A.C.A.

The Falklands War
Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy,
and International Law

Edited by
Alberto R. Coll
Georgetown University
and
Anthony C. Arend
University of Virginia

Boston
GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN
London Sydney
 © Alberto Coll and Anthony Arend, 1985
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention.
No reproduction without permission. All rights reserved.

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First published in 1985

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

The FaUdands War
Includes index.
1. Falkland Islands War, 1983—Addresses, essays,
lectures. I. Coll, Alberto R. II. Arend, Anthony C.
F3031.5.F34 1985 997M1 84-18622
ISBN 0-04-327075-1 (alk. paper)
ISBN 0-04-327076-X (pbk. : alk paper)

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Date

The Falklands War: lessons for strategy,

diplomacy and international law.
1. Falkland Islands—International status
2. Great Britain—Foreign relations-
Argentina 3. Argentina—Foreign relations
—Great Britain
I. Coll, Alberto R. II. Arend, Anthony C.
341.4'2 JX4084.F3
ISBN 0-04-327075-1
ISBN 0-04-327076-X Pbk

Set in 10 on IIV2 point Palatino by Mathematical Composition Setters

Ltd, Salisbury, UK
and printed by Billings and Sons Ltd., London and Worcester.
 Contents
Notes on Contributors page ix
Preface xiii
1 The Falklands War: Intersection of Strategy,
Diplomacy, and International Law by Anthony C.
Arend 1

Part One The Challenges to International Law

2 Historical and Legal Background of the
Falkland/Malvinas Dispute by Alfred P. Rubin 9
3 The Strategic Role of Legal Principles by Thomas M.
Franck 22
4 Philosophical and Legal Dimensions of the Use of
Force in the Falklands War by Alberto R. Coll 34
5 The Falklands War and the Failure of the Inter-
national Legal Order by Anthony G Arend 52
6 The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War by Howard
S. Levie 64

Part Two The Challenges to Diplomacy

7 Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy and the Falklands Crisis
by Douglas Kinney 81
8 American Diplomacy and the Haig Mission: An In-
sider's Perspective by David C. Gompert 106
9 UN Efforts at Settlement of the Falkland Islands
Crisis by Ms L. Claude, Jr. 118
10 The OAS and the Inter-American System: History,
Law, and Diplomacy by Srilal Perera 132

Part Three Looking to the Future: Strategic, Military,

and Political Implications
11 The South Atlantic Conflict: Strategic, Military, and
Technological Lessons by Dov S. Zakheim 159
12 Anglo-Argentine Rivalry after the Falklands: On the
Road to Antarctica? by Christopher C. Joyner 189
13 The Falkland Islands Crisis and the Management of
Boundary Disputes by David A. Colson 212
vii
 CONTENTS
14 Trusteeship for the Falklands under Joint U.K.-U.S.
Administration: A Proposal by Monroe Leigh 225
15 Lessons for the Future by Alberto R. Coll 232
Index 245

vui
 Notes on Contributors
The Editors
Alberto R. Coll is Assistant Professor of International Politics,
Law and Organization at Georgetown University. He is a
former Newcombe Fellow, Weaver Fellow, Eisenhower
Fellow, and the author of The Western Heritage and American
Values: Law, Theology and History (1982) and The Wisdom of
Statecraft (1985). In 1984 he was awarded a Leroy Hill
Fellowship by the Institute for Humane Studies.
Anthony C. Arend is a Lecturer of International Law at
Georgetown University, a consultant to the Center for Law
and National Security at the University of Virginia, and the
author of several articles on international legal issues. He is a
former Articles Editor of the Virginia Journal of International Law
and a former Weaver Fellow.

Contributors
Inis L. Claude, Jr. is the Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Professor of
Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia.
His works include such classics in the field of international
relations theory as Power and International Relations (1962)
and Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of Inter-
national Organization (4th ed. 1971).
David A. Colson is Assistant Legal Advisor for Oceans, Inter-
national Environment, and Science Affairs at the U.S. State
Department.
Thomas M. Franck is Professor of Law and Director of the
Center for International Studies at New York University. He
has served as constitutional advisor to several developing
nations, and former Director of the United Nations Institute
for Training and Research. His published writings include
African Law, The Structure of Impartiality, and Secrecy and
Foreign Policy,
David C. Gompert was Deputy to the Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs and a member of the Haig mission during
ix
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
the Falklands War. He also has served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Special Assistant
to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He is the author of many
articles on international security issues and editor of Nuclear
Weapons and World Politics.
Christopher C. Joyner is Associate Professor of Political Science
and International Relations at George Washington University.
He has been Senior Editor of the Virginia Journal of Inter-
national Law and Co-Director of Florida State University's
Center for Peace and Environmental Studies. He is the author
of numerous legal publications, including a forthcoming book
on the strategic and international legal status of Antarctica.
Douglas Kinney is a U.S. Foreign Service Officer with specializ-
ations in European and Latin American politics. In addition to
several Embassy posts abroad, he has served in Henry
Kissinger's Secretariat, in the Secretaries' Open Forum, in the
Office of UN Political Affairs, and most recently as Advisor to
Ambassador Kirkpatrick at the U.S. Mission to the United
Nations. He is currently at the Institute for the Study of
Diplomacy, Georgetown University, where he is doing a
study on "National Interests/National Honor: The Diplomacy
of the Falklands Crisis."
Monroe Leigh is a partner of the Washington law firm of Steptoe
and Johnson, and was Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Depart-
ment from 1975 to 1977. He was a member of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague from 1975 to 1980, and was
President of the American Society of International Law from
1980 to 1982. He specializes in international law and inter-
national trade law.
Howard S. Levie is Professor Emeritus of Law at St. Louis
University. He is a leading authority on the laws of war, and
the author of Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict
(1979) and Protection of War Victims (4 vols., 1981).
Srilal Perera is a lawyer and graduate fellow at Georgetown
University. He has served in several international organiz-
ations, including the United Nations and the World Bank, and
specializes on the role of regional law and organizations in
international politics and economics.
Alfred P. Rubin is Professor of International Law at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. In 1981-2 he
served as Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law
at the Naval War College. Among his many writings are two
books on European imperialism: The International Personality of
x
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
the Malay States and Piraq/, Paramountcy and Protectorates (both
1974).
Dov S. Zakheim is Assistant Under Secretary for Policy and
Resources in the U.S. Department of Defense. He is a former
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy, and principal analyst with the
National Security and International Affairs Division of the
Congressional Budget Office. He is the author of numerous
articles and major policy studies.

XI
 Preface
The origins of this book were a conference on the Falklands War
co-sponsored by the John Bassett Moore Society of International
Law and the Center for Law and National Security at the
University of Virginia School of Law in the fall of 1982. Some of
the papers presented at the conference are incorporated here, as
are also those of several other contributors who, though not
present at the conference, agreed to prepare chapters for the
book. In their work of editing and preparing the manuscript the
editors enjoyed the warm support and encouragement of the
Moore Society and its vice-president, Mr. David Whitescarver,
and of the Director of the Center for Law and National Security,
Professor John Norton Moore. The Department of Government
of Georgetown University and its chairman, Professor William
V. O'Brien, also provided valuable support, especially through
the dedicated and unfailing efforts of the department's
secretary, Ms. Sandra Rosenberg, who typed several chapters of
the book. Ms. Jennifer Bunch of the University of Virginia
School of Law likewise typed, with similar patience and effi-
ciency, some of the other chapters. We also wish to express our
appreciation to Ms. Leslie Sherman, University Fellow in the
Department of Government at Georgetown University, who
critically reviewed the manuscript with care and thoughtful-
ness. Without all of these concerted efforts, and without the
scholarly dedication of this book's contributors, the project
could not have been completed.
A differently edited version of Thomas Franck's essay in this
book appeared in the American Journal of International Law
(January 1983); a short version of Inis Claude's was published
in Global Perspectives, vol. 1 (1983); and some portions of
Anthony Arend's main essay appeared in the Virginia Journal of
International Law (Winter 1983). All these publishers kindly
offered their permission, and we extend our thanks to them.
Although the definitive history and political analysis of the
Falklands War will not be written for some time to come, the
editors hope that this work will be a valuable introduction for
any serious student of that conflict, its underlying crisis, and its
xiii
 PREFACE
multiple dimensions. The editors also take certain pride in
noting that this book represents a flourishing relationship
between Georgetown University and the University of Virginia,
a relationship centered around shared concerns for the norma-
tive, philosophical, and legal dimensions of international
politics.

ALBERTO R. COLL
ANTHONY C. AREND
Washington, D.C.
1 April 1984

xiv
The Falklands War
 1
The Falklands War:
Intersection of Strategy,
Diplomacy,
and International Law
ANTHONY C. AREND

The Falklands War of 1982 provided diplomats, strategists, and

international lawyers with the opportunity to apply their skills
to attempt to resolve the conflict and, after the fact, to assess the
implications of the war for the international system. Unfor-
tunately, scholars writing on the Falklands War, by necessity,
have normally limited their evaluation of the war to its implica-
tions for their particular disciplines. A full understanding of the
Falklands War, however, requires a multi-disciplined approach;
issues relating to politics, diplomacy, strategy, and law are inex-
tricably linked and must be examined together if lessons are to
be learned and further conflict is to be avoided.
In an effort to understand the many dimensions of the
Falklands Crisis, this study brings together essays by thirteen
scholars and practitioners of law, diplomacy, and strategy. These
essays are grouped into three parts. Part One examines the
"Challenges to International Law." Part Two discusses the
"Challenges to Diplomacy" and Part Three looks at the
strategic, military, legal, and political implications that the
Falklands War of 1982 has for the future of international
relations.
Part One begins with an essay by an international legal
scholar, Alfred P. Rubin. He sets the tone for the book by
1
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
describing the historical context out of which the 1982 conflict
arose and examining the applicable international law. He begins
by discussing the problem of discovery, explaining the various
British, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish sightings of the
Falklands in the 1500s and 1600s. Then he turns to the law
regarding questions of title to territory and discusses such con-
cepts as uti possidetis and effective occupation. Applying inter-
national legal doctrine to the conflicting British and Argentine
claims, Rubin concludes that there is still much uncertainty
about how a hypothetical tribunal would resolve the sovereignty
dispute.
Following this historical and legal overview of the sovereignty
question, Thomas M. Franck, another international legal expert,
continues the discussion with an examination of the strategic
role of legal principles. He takes up the question of the efficacy
of legal norms and demonstrates how legal principles played a
major role in shaping the response of states to the Falklands
War. According to Franck, many states were extremely con-
cerned about the precedent an Argentine victory might set.
They were concerned that the Argentine example, if unchecked,
would encourage other states to use force unilaterally in areas
where they had a direct stake. Thus, legal principles helped to
rally some nations to take a stand in the Falklands War. But the
problem, Franck explains, is that the principles were unable to
deter Argentine aggression. This is attributable in part to the
long list of violations of article 2 (4) of the UN Charter that have
gone unanswered since World War II. Franck contends that the
Falklands War illustrates a selective application of principles
and concludes that if a principle is invoked only occasionally it
loses its power to deter and calls into question the legitimacy of
fighting to defend an already emasculated norm.
After Franck's essay, Alberto R. Coll, a lawyer and political
scientist, examines the philosophical and legal dimensions of
the use of force. Before beginning his analysis of the law, Coll
raises an important caveat about legal judgments—they are in
reality only relative and never absolute. Although legal pro-
nouncements often seem black and white, they hide the real
subtleties of human behavior. Philosophically and theologic-
ally speaking, it may be improper to brand one state as the
aggressor and the other state as the victim. Corporate respon-
sibility and the fallen nature of all men make it difficult to ascribe
absolute wrong or absolute right in most cases. But within the
earthly order of things man must make normative judgments
2
 STRATEGY, DIPLOMACY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
about right and wrong—even if they do deviate from the
absolute. With this philosophical point in mind, Coll outlines
the evolution of the traditional international law of conflict
management from the pre-League period to the present. After
setting forth the current provisions of the United Nations
Charter, he analyzes Argentina's actions in light of the law of
the Charter. He also gives a detailed discussion of Argentina's
contentions about the legality of its behavior. Following this
legal analysis, Coll discusses some larger questions that the
Falklands War raises for the efficacy of the existing international
norms of conflict management. He concludes by suggesting a
possible international mechanism that could, in the future, help
resolve conflicts such as the Falklands dispute.
In the third essay of Part One, Anthony C. Arend examines
two problems revealed by the Falklands War: the failure of col-
lective enforcement and the illegitimacy of means of peaceful
change. He then explores the implications that these problems
have for the status of international law. He suggests that in light
of the inaction of the collective enforcement provisions of the
Charter, there may be a new norm emerging to fill the gap in the
law. After describing this possible norm, Arend looks at the
significance of the illegitimacy of means of peaceful change; he
argues that there has been a continued dilution of the Article 2(4)
prohibition against the unilateral use of force as states have
sought to take up arms for reasons of "justice."
Following this somewhat stark analysis of the jus ad helium—
the law relating to the recourse to hostilities—Part One con-
cludes with a more encouraging discussion of the jus in hello—
the laws of war. In this essay Howard S. Levie examines the
compliance of Argentina and Great Britain with the traditional
norms regarding the conduct of hostilities. Levie, a noted
specialist in the laws of war, reviews in detail the activities of the
belligerents and concludes that compliance was very high. He
discusses such important issues as the lawfulness of the
maritime exclusion zone, the involvement of fishing vessels, the
question of hospital ships, the use of incendiary weapons, the
role of protecting powers, the treatment of civilians and
prisoners of war, the involvement of mercenaries, and the issue
of neutrals and neutrality. Levie concludes his essay by examin-
ing the larger implications of the crisis for the future status of the
laws of war.
The study of the Falklands War continues with an examin-
ation in Part Two of "The Challenges to Diplomacy." Douglas
3
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Kinney, who served as advisor on Latin American affairs to
Ambassador Kirkpatrick at the United Nations during the war,
introduces this section with a discussion of British-Argentine
diplomacy. He provides an overview of the negotiations be-
tween Great Britain and Argentina from their beginnings in 1964
through the 1982 conflict. He examines the early diplomatic
maneuvers at the United Nations and the seventeen years of
bilateral negotiations. Then he turns to a detailed discussion of
the mediation efforts by Alexander Haig, President Belaunde-
Terry of Peru, and UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de
Cuellar. He explains how these efforts were perceived by the
parties and why, ultimately, they were unsuccessful.
After Kinney's tour de force, David C. Gompert, who was
Deputy to the Under secretary of State for Political Affairs and
was personally involved in the Haig mission, analyzes the
American efforts to mediate the crisis. Based on his first-hand
experience, Gompert's contribution describes how the conflict
was viewed from the perspective of the Argentines, the British,
and the Americans; he examines the frustrations of the Argen-
tines, the British underestimation of the problem, and the
conflicting foreign policy goals of the United States. Gompert
continues by explaining how the United States sought a political
solution to the conflict and examines some of the intricate
tactical problems of the Haig mission. He concludes with an
extensive examination of the lessons of the war for "national
diplomacy and decision-making, international order, and
organization."
Gompert's discussion is followed by a more detailed examin-
ation of the United Nations' involvement in an essay by inter-
national relations and organization theorist, Inis L. Claude, Jr.,
which explores the general lessons that the Falklands War
teaches about the United Nations. He begins by asking why ef-
forts at peaceful settlement failed and discusses some of the
theoretical problems involved. He argues that the UN was used
less as a "peace conference" than as a "battlefield" in which
both sides attempted to gain legitimacy for their particular pos-
itions. Claude reviews why Argentina did rather poorly in this
battle at the UN, despite previous indications to the contrary.
He then discusses why the British initially fared well at the
United Nations, but began to lose support once they landed on
the islands. This vacillation, Claude concludes, reflects a general
tendency of the UN to be committed to peace, but unwilling to
act when peace is violated.
4
 STRATEGY, DIPLOMACY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Moving from the universal to the regional organization, Srilal
Perera, a lawyer and political scientist, discusses in detail the
origins of the hemispheric system and formal arrangements for
establishing Inter-American security and how they figured in
the Falklands conflict. Perera begins with a discussion of early
efforts at securing American solidarity in the nineteenth century
and traces the adoption of legal instruments establishing
regional organization in the mid-twentieth century. Perera also
explores important provisions of the OAS charter that relate to
the regulation of the use of force. He then discusses some
historical inter- and intra-continental disputes that have caused
division among Latin American states. Having set the historical
stage, Perera continues his essay with an exploration of the
response of the OAS to the Falklands War and an analysis of the
legal problems involved. Perera concludes Part Two of this
volume with a discussion of the implications of the Falklands
War for the Inter-American system.
Part Three of this book, entitled "Looking into the Future:
Strategic, Military, and Political Implications," examines the
long-term as well as short-term effects of the Falklands War. In
the first essay, Dov S. Zakheim, a military analyst, provides an
in-depth exploration of the specific political and military lessons
of the Falklands War. He begins at the broadest level by looking
at what he terms the "politico-military implications." Here he
explores the general strategic implications of the war, examining
a number of questions: the problem of deterrence, the role of
naval forces in crisis management, the ability to plan for unan-
ticipated conflicts, the role of allies and access to supplies, the
problem of arms sales, and the question of home-front support.
Zakheim then turns to the more specific implications that the
war had for military operations; he looks at the importance of
naval surface forces, the amphibious mission, special operation
forces, logistics, the conduct of land- and sea-based operations,
and a number of other operational issues. Following this discus-
sion, he examines the lessons that can be learned from the
performance of particular weapons systems in the Falklands
War. Zakheim concludes his essay with some observations
about the most important implications of the war for military
planners.
Following Zakheim, Christopher C. Joyner focuses on the
effect of the Falklands War on another British-Argentine
dispute—their conflicting claims to the continent of Antarctica.
Joyner, an expert on Antarctica, examines the history of British
5
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
and Argentine claims to the continent. He then explores the
legal regime set up by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the possi-
ble sources of rivalry between the two countries. He concludes
his discussion by examining whether the current regime is
serving the interests of both states and whether either might be
tempted to use force to gain Antarctic resources.
Joyner's essay is followed by David A. Colson's discussion on
the management of boundary disputes. Colson, an assistant
legal advisor for the State Department, takes one of the under-
lying issues of the crisis, a boundary dispute, and demonstrates
how in some instances such disputes have been controlled in
the past and explains the role of interim measures in these situa-
tions. Colson begins by examining the importance of sover-
eignty disputes and shows how they have increased as coastal
state jurisdiction has expanded. He then discusses three cases
where arrangements were made to regulate a boundary dispute.
Colson concludes his essay by examining the possible use of
interim measures to obtain a modus vivendi, even though the
actual dispute may take much time to be resolved.
This book draws to an end appropriately by returning to the
question of the future of the Falklands themselves. Although a
military solution temporarily settled the Falklands issue, the
underlying sovereignty dispute has yet to be politically resolved.
Monroe Leigh attempts to deal with this problem. Presupposing
that UN, OAS, and bilateral methods continue to be unproduc-
tive, Leigh, former Legal Advisor to the State Department, sug-
gests that the United States and Great Britain should establish
a jointly administered trusteeship. Leigh recognizes the many
difficulties that such a proposal would involve, but nevertheless
demonstrates how it could be beneficial to the parties involved.
He discusses the legal mechanics of such a proposal and, while
recognizing that his suggestion is a bit unorthodox, cites
examples where trusts have been administered jointly in the
past.
In the final essay, Alberto R. Coll draws together many of the
important lessons that the Falklands War can teach diplomats,
military planners, and students of international law and politics.
By reflecting on these lessons, those involved in future conflicts
may be better equipped to help prevent or, at least, minimize
the destructiveness of armed conflict, while broadening their
understanding of the intricate and tragic tapestry of inter-
national relations.

6
 PART ONE

The Challenges
to International Law
 2
Historical and Legal
Background of the
Falkland/Malvinas Dispute
ALFRED P. RUBIN

Argentina's seizure of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and South

Georgia Island1 on 2 April 1982 caught the major centers of
international scholarship by surprise. Only one major account of
the competing claims to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands existed,
and the almost desperate search of the libraries in New York and
Washington for reliable information was the topic of amusing
dinner-table conversations. The following study draws much of
the historical evidence from that book, The Struggle for the
Falkland Islands, written by Julius Goebel in 1927.2 The historical
material is supplemented by a legal analysis of the validity of
British and Argentine claims to sovereignty.

Discovery: The Facts

The earliest recorded European contact with land that might
have been the Falkland/Malvinas Islands appears to have been
in 1501, when Amerigo Vespucci, an Italian geographer accom-
panying a Portuguese exploration, reported a sighting vaguely
in the area. The location is doubtful, and the description
unclear. Magellan, a Portuguese sea captain sailing under
Spanish flag, sighted something in 1519 that might have been
the Falkland/Malvinas group, but placed it 75 leagues (about 225
nautical miles) away, where there is nothing. In 1540, a voyage
9
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
sponsored by the Spanish Bishop of Plasencia under the com-
mand of Francisco Camargo might have landed on the
Falkland/Malvinas, but again the evidence is thin. The first
English seaman who might have sighted the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands was John Davis in 1592. The second was Sir Richard
Hawkins in 1593. Neither of their descriptions matches the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands and there seems to be no basis for
giving them greater weight than the equivalent descriptions of
Camargo.
The first unmistakable European sighting of the Falkland/
Malvinas Islands was probably that of the Dutchman Sebald de
Weert in 1600. In 1614 another Dutch expedition, under Le
Maire and Schouten, sighted the same land, and the map-
makers' practice of calling the group the "Sebald Islands''
began. The "Sebalds" were visited by the Englishmen William
Dampier in 1684 and John Strong in 1690. It was Strong who
renamed them the "Falkland" Islands after Viscount Anthony
Falkland, a commissioner of Admiralty. Captain Woodes Rogers
sighted them again in 1708 but did not land there. In the mean-
time, a Frenchman, Beauchesne Gouin, sailing from St. Malo,
"discovered" the islands in 1701, and other French voyagers
visited them in 1706, 1708 and 1711. They remained
uncolonized.

Discovery: The Law

From 1400 to 1800 there is no clear evidence that any European
state regarded mere discovery or sighting as sufficient to
establish sovereignty over unclaimed land. Indeed, even tem-
porary landings and the naming of rivers or other geographical
features were not regarded as sufficient to exclude the legal
claims of later explorers who did more. Instead, unpopulated
land was brought into the European system of territorial
jurisdiction by other legal means including symbolic acts, the
establishment of a colony, or an agreement between contesting
European states.
The Falkland/Malvinas might be construed to be within the
zone allocated to Spain by the Papal Bull Inter Caetera Divinae of
4 May 1493. But the Bull itself did not purport to grant sover-
eignty to Spain against any adverse claim, only the right to
conquer non-Christian princes and otherwise to acquire
territory within the Spanish zone to the exclusion of equivalent
10
 HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Portuguese rights. Moreover, the Bull was the outcome of an
arbitration to which only Spain and Portugal were parties.
England and France were not involved, and it would be a
serious misunderstanding of the politics of the time to suppose
that the Catholic monarchs of those two countries, which had
not yet entered the competition for overseas empire, considered
themselves bound, or were considered by anybody else to be
bound, by the results of that arbitration. Indeed, Spain and
Portugal themselves quickly relegated the secular aspects of the
Bull to the background by concluding in 1494 the Treaty of
Tordesillas, which moved the line drawn by the pope some 270
leagues westward. That treaty was not addressed formally by
the papacy until twelve years later when Julius II, the successor
to Alexander VI, purported to confirm it in what appears to have
been an attempt to preserve in formal documents a secular
power that had in fact already been rejected by Spain and
Portugal. Even if the transaction of which the Bull was a part
had been regarded as fixing rights in European law as of 1493,
and the Spanish and Portuguese adjustments between
themselves of those rights were regarded as wholly within the
framework of papal authority, in the light of the massive shifts
of sovereignty among European powers in the 500 years that
followed 1493 in the area covered by arbitration, and the com-
plete rejection of the Bull's authority by all the states concerned,
it seems irrational to attempt now to base a claim of right under
current concepts of international law on the Bull's eternal
validity.
Until the mid-eighteenth century there appear to have been
none of the symbolic acts regarding the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands that have frequently signaled the incorporation of unoc-
cupied territory into the European system. Instead, there were
complex political maneuverings in Europe among the British,
French, and Spanish authorities in which the general language
of various attempts to resolve the colonial wars of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries was interpreted differently by
the interested parties. The only significant legal development in
this period was the resurgence of uti possidetis. This was the
practice of fixing a critical date and agreeing by treaty that the
actual possessor of the disputed territory at that date had, as far
as the parties to the treaty were concerned, absolute rights to it.
Uti possidetis extinguished legal claims that no longer conformed
to facts, even if such claims had some merit. The key transaction
purporting to fix rights in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands during
11
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
this period involved treaties between Spain and England in 1667
and 1670. But there seems to be no credible evidence that either
power had actual possession of the islands before, during, or
immediately after that time.

Effective occupation
While it can be argued that "effective control" or "occupation"
was not necessary in addition to symbolic acts to bring un-
populated territory3 into the legal dominion of a European
power under seventeenth- and eighteenth-century international
law, it seems clear that in the absence of "symbolic" acts, the
open and unopposed exercise of effective control was sufficient
to vest sovereignty. Thus it is legally important to know the
history of actual occupation.
The first known European settlement was French. A small
settlement was made in April of 1764 by Antoine Louis de
Bougainville. The settlers were from St. Malo in France. When
Commodore John Byron surveyed the islands in 1765 for
England, he appears not to have known of the French settle-
ment, and not to have noticed it. Whether that is an indication
of the insignificance of the settlement or the superficiality of
Byron's survey is not clear. But in January 1766 a British colony
was established out of sight of the French colony. A dash
became likely between the imperial ambitions of the two powers
in this desolate area. Apparently no serious thought was given
to the possibility of dividing the small archipelago between the
two claimants. Instead the French sold their settlement and rights
to Spain. The transaction was complex, resulting in the transfer of
administration to the Spanish authorities in Buenos Aires.
(Since the settlers were from St. Malo, the French called the
islands the "Malouines"; in due course the Spaniards called
them the "Malvinas.")
Shortly thereafter a Spanish fleet dispatched from Montevideo
in June 1770 removed forcefully the entire British settlement. In
response, Great Britain threatened to go to war against Spain.
Intricate diplomatic maneuverings between the two antagonists
led to an agreement dated 22 January 1771 obligating Spain to
restore the small British colony on the islands. The two powers
openly agreed that this settlement was not an acknowledgment
by Spain of the validity of any underlying British claim to
sovereignty. In the exchange of diplomatic notes that concluded
the agreement, Spain stated that its promise to restore the
12
 HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
British colony "cannot nor ought in any wise to affect the
question of the prior right of sovereignty." The British, while
not repeating that precise language in their formal response,
accepted the promise to restore the colony and the apology for
the injury to British honor. In their note, the British stated that
the apology "together with the full performance of the said
engagement [would be accepted] as a satisfaction for the injury
done to the Crown." There was, however, no assertion of a
British right to sovereignty over the Falklands.
There is some evidence suggesting that there was more to the
agreement. After a review of what survives of the Spanish inter-
nal correspondence, and close examination of the events of the
next five years (to 1774), it appears that there was an unrecorded
British promise to repay the Spanish apology by dismantling the
British settlement. If this is so, then the overt Spanish apology
and replacement of the settlement would balance the Spanish
delict in removing the settlement without British permission;
the British "voluntary" removal of the settlement later would
balance the publicity surrounding the Spanish apology, and
leave the underlying conflict of claims to sovereignty unaffected
by the entire transaction. In any case, the British did not imme-
diately remove their settlement and Spain suspected Great
Britain of reneging on the unrecorded commitment. Another
crisis loomed. It was averted by the action of Great Britain in
actually removing the colony on 20 May 1774, leaving in its place
a marker recording the British claim to sovereignty.
The Spanish settlement, governed from Buenos Aires, sur-
vived two more generations. On the outbreak of the wars of
independence in Latin America in 1806, it was abandoned by
Spain. The colonists stayed on until 1811. There is no evidence
that Spain or the colonists intended their withdrawal to be more
significant legally than the British withdrawal of 1774. It seems
likely that the failure to leave an equivalent statement of the
claim behind was the result of the obvious assumptions of the
time; by 1811 it cannot have been suspected by any colonists
that a doubt existed any longer about the nature and extent of
the Spanish possession regardless of theoretical British claims.
There was no need to leave a marker behind because there was
no doubt about the legal implications of the withdrawal—it was
voluntary, prompted by internal affairs of Spain only, and not
the result of any diplomatic bargaining.
By 1816 the colonists of Buenos Aires had established their in-
dependence of Spain in fact, if not yet beyond dispute by Spain.
13
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
North American adventurers of a seafaring disposition flocked
to the standard of Latin American independence, including one
Colonel Daniel Jewitt. He took a privateer's commission from
the government of Buenos Aires and visited the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands. He found around fifty vessels there,
mostly American whalers and sealers, stopping for water and
rest. He gave them notice of Buenos Aires' claim to sovereignty,
but nobody seems to have paid much attention t J him.
In 1823 the authorities in Buenos Aires formally appointed a
government for the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and after several
commissioners of Buenos Aires had been thwarted by weather
and the vicissitudes of navigation in establishing a permanent
colony there, one Louis Vernet was successful. Vernet seems to
have been French by birth, but a resident of Hamburg in his
youth.4 He had resided some time in the United States, but
was a national of Buenos Aires by 1828 and acted as such in all
that followed. In January 1828 the government of Buenos Aires
granted him land tenure and freedom from taxation with regard
to his investments in the Falkland/Malvinas for twenty-three
years. On 30 August 1829 Vernet was formally installed on the
islands as Governor and Commandant of Military Forces for
Buenos Aires. Meanwhile, in 1823 Spain had recognized the
independence of its former colony and the government of
Buenos Aires received diplomatic and consular representatives
from many countries including the United States and Great
Britain.
The incidents of 1831-3 are complex but can be quickly sum-
marized. Vernet's authority was disputed by some American
sailing vessel captains. He seized three American vessels, one of
which escaped and made its way back to the United States.
President Andrew Jackson did not suffer inhibitions of
American activities gladly; he dispatched a naval vessel, the
Lexington, to the Falkland/Malvinas. Vernet, having sailed to
Buenos Aires on one of the arrested vessels to pursue admiralty
proceedings against both, found himself instead charged by
Captain Davison, the American commander answerable for the
conduct of both, with "piracy" and the subject of furious com-
plaint by U.S. Consul Slacum and the British diplomatic charg£
d'affaires, Woodbine Parish. Around this time, in December
1831, the Lexington entered the Buenos Aires port in the Falk-
land/Malvinas under a false (French) flag and bodily removed
Vernet's lieutenant, an Englishman named Matthew Brisbane,
to Montevideo.
14
 HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
In February 1832 the Buenos Aires government refused to deal
any longer with Slacum and he was replaced by Francis Baylies.
Negotiations proved futile, and the government of Buenos Aires
found itself incapable of restoring effective government to the
Falkland/Malvinas in the face of American opposition. Finally,
on 20 December 1832, two British warships arrived to discover
that the new Buenos Aires governor, Don Juan Esteban
Mestivier, had been murdered by the colonists. His deputy,
Don Jose Maria Pinedo, was told to remove the Buenos Aires
flag, which he refused to do. The British then landed a small
force and replaced the Argentineflagwith the Britishflag,which
flew over the islands continuously until the Argentine exped-
ition of 1982. In the course of a few years, Buenos Aires colonists
were peacefully and gradually replaced by British colonists.
Buenos Aires, and later Argentina, never ceased to protest
openly and loudly against British occupation and administration
of the Falkland/Malvinas.

The Law
The allegations of "piracy" against Vernet and Brisbane seem to
have been totally baseless by any understanding of the law of
the 1830s. The question was submitted in 1832 to the British Law
Officers of the Crown when the question arose about British
reactions to the American arrest of Matthew Brisbane. The Law
Officers concluded that "the United States will not be justified
in bringing Matthew Brisbane to trial for Piracy" because he was
acting in execution of the orders of a regular and acknowledged
government (of Buenos Aires) regardless of the dispute regard-
ing sovereignty in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.5
The Monroe Doctrine, under which the United States
announced its opposition to fxirther European colonization of
the New World in 1823, is not a legal document binding on
Argentina or Great Britain. To the degree British action in the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands might seem to violate American
policy, there is evidence that Francis Baylies had already
advised the British minister in Buenos Aires that the United
States would prefer British rule there to the continuance of the
horde of "pirates" that threatened American shipping. It is clear
that the United States did not in 1832 regard the Monroe Doc-
trine as any obstacle to British administration of the islands.
The major question as of 1833 was whether the British claim
15
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
had been abandoned in 1774; whether the British occupation of
the islands was simply the assertion of its old claim on terms
familiar to Argentina or was something new. The Spanish
departure from the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1811 and the
"American destruction of Vernet's settlement in 1831" left the
islands res nullius according to a British writer.6 That classific-
ation of the facts, imputing to Buenos Aires an intention to
abandon the islands, seems almost capricious. Can it be seri-
ously argued that the symbolic British plaque left in 1774 was
sufficient to preserve a British claim to islands allegedly aban-
doned voluntarily, while active Argentine protest was not effec-
tive to preserve a claim to islands evacuated under the threat of
force? Indeed, not only was the British plaque apparently
destroyed in 1781, but no British protest over the continued
Spanish colony between then and 1811 seems to have occurred.
If anybody abandoned a claim, it was the British between 1774
and 1811, and again it was the British whose silence between
1823 and 1832 in the face of open Buenos Aires assertions of
sovereignty might be construed to be an acquiescence in Argen-
tine control. Argentine protests after 1833 make it absurd to
speak of Argentine aquiescence in the new order of things
brought about by the British Navy during a time of political
unrest in Argentina and maintained in disregard of Argentine
interests ever since.
Thus the tempting route, the application of the rule of the 1928
Isle of Palmas (Miangas) Arbitration to quiet title, is foreclosed.
In that well-reasoned landmark award, the Swiss arbitrator,
Max Huber, gave sovereignty to the Netherlands over a small
island claimed by the United States as successor to Spanish
possessions in the Philippines. After holding that both the
Dutch and Spanish claims had been historically well-founded
but insufficient to exclude the equivalent opposing claims (as the
Spanish and English claims to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands
seemed to be until 1766 or 1774, or until enough time passed
after 1774 for the British claim to lapse by the implication of
British acquiescence in the open Spanish administration), Huber
argued that the silence of Spain and the United States over
many years had vested title in the Netherlands; Spain and the
United States had lost their adverse claim by extinctive
prescription—the imputation of acquiescence by silence. None
of this reasoning applies to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands after
1832 to extinguish the Argentine claim.7
A perusal of the other leading cases quieting territorial
16
 HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
disputes leads to the same uncertain conclusion. At the root of
the award in the Clipperton Island Arbitration, for example,
was the perception of the arbitrator, King Victor Emmanuel III
of Italy, that Mexico, the losing claimant, had established no
manifestation of sovereignty over the island prior to a French
proclamation and visit of 1858.8 France won the award. But in
the case of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Spanish occupation
had begun in 1766 with the purchase of French rights, and was
more or less continued by Spain and Buenos Aires until 1832.
Indeed, the Clipperton Island award supports the Argentine
position that the hiatus of 1811-23 is legally irrelevant and does
not return the Falkland/Malvinas Islands to the status of res
nullius; the award notes that the French failure to exercise
authority in Clipperton Island between 1858 and 1897, when
both France and Mexico landed there, did not return the island
to the legal situation of territorium nullius because France
showed no intent to abandon its claim. Given the political and
economic vicissitudes of France between 1858 and 1897, this is
understandable; so is the equivalent Buenos Aires silence of
1811-23. The situation is distinguishable from the British loss
after 1774, because Great Britain's intention to abandon its claim
can be derived from its silence in the face of adverse Spanish
continuous and peaceful administration. No such continuous
and peaceful occupation of Clipperton Island occurred to
deprive France of its rights. Thus, assuming the British plaque
of 1774 and the French declaration of 1858 to have had equal
legal effect, it was subsequent events and the applicability of the
notion of extinctive prescription vel non that makes the differ-
ence. Similarly, the 1953 judgment of the International Court
of Justice in the sovereignty dispute between England and
France over unpopulated islands in the English Channel rested
on considerations inapplicable to the Falklands.9 The deciding
factors in that case were the incorporation of the sovereignty of
those islands into the pattern of European landholding in
medieval times, and insufficient evidence of a continuous
adverse claim to deprive the British of sovereignty derived from
the feudal holdings of the ancient Dukedom of Normandy. In
the Falkland/Malvinas case, the Spanish possession until 1811
and the Argentine possession until 1832 were notorious.
There are many other cases supporting the conclusion that
the international law of territory offers little help in settling the
Malvinas problem; it would be tedious to spell out all the
analogies and differences among the existing cases. The over-
17
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
riding problem is that in the absence of a legal doctrine making
adverse possession sufficient to vest title to territory even in the
presence of protest and serious question about the validity of
title in the possessor, there is no way for the law to resolve the
dispute.
One may want to argue, as Sir Hersch Lauterpacht did fifty
years ago, that there are no disputes the law cannot resolve.10
Aside from various technical modifications of the Lauterpacht
logic, however, there is the tendency of judicial and arbitral
resolutions, in the absence of modifying instructions defining
"equity," to convert a mere likelihood of having a better claim in-
to a complete certainty, and a reasonable but inferior claim into a
nullity.11 Thus, with no one knowing how an arbitrator or pro-
perly seized court would weigh Argentine title lost by conquest
and maintained only by the underlying threat of force to repel
a counter-conquest, it is understandable that neither side is
anxious for third-party settlement. Even if one party were
convinced that his claim was likely to succeed with 80 percent
certainty, he would have to be prepared to risk losing all; if one
party were convinced that his likelihood of success before an
impartial tribunal was only 20 percent, he would have to face
the politically explosive risk of losing that 20 percent by submitt-
ing the case to an all-or-nothing judicial procedure.
The United Nations darter envisages this predicament by
not requiring judicial settlement or arbitration of disputes and
by focusing instead on the impermissibility of the resort to force
to resolve them. Article 2 (3) of the Charter says: "All members
of the United Nations shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered." This is the provision
Argentina violated in 1982, forcing the United States and others
to side with the United Kingdom in its attempt, backed by the
United Nations Security Council, to recover administration over
the Falkland/Malvinas.12 Under this provision of positive law,
the solution to unresolvable problems seems to be patience and
the application of non-forcible pressures. On the other hand,
the United Nations has in the past accepted the use of force with
minimal fuss, and approved its results when the remnants of
colonialism were involved, even in disregard of the will of the
people most directly affected. The most egregious case was the
Indian invasion of Goa after approximately 450 years of generally
peaceful Portuguese sovereignty. There are ironies in applying
that precedent to the Falkland/Malvinas situation. If the products
18
 HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
of colonialism were to be regarded as illegitimate, all the bound-
aries of Latin America and the very existence of some states,
including Argentina, would be legally doubtful.
One suggested solution is to apply the principles of self-
determination. It is possible to argue that if Great Britain never
had conquered the islands, but British settlers had become the
overwhelmingly dominant element of the population, they
might be entitled to self-determination as a political reflection of
the need of the international legal order for a cultural and
historical link between any identifiable group of people and its
government. But this approach is irrelevant to the Falklands.
There, the British removed the Argentine colonists and brought
in their own settlers, in what amounted to a population transfer.
It is legally questionable whether such forcible transfers can
create the basis for sovereignty or for the exercise of the right to
self-determination.13
One final implication might be noted. Since the Falkland/
Malvinas Islands are to some degree dependent on Argentina
for economic survival, and British investment in the islands is
not beyond the reach of compensation, it should be possible to
negotiate a compromise. The outlines of such a compromise are
easy to draw, involving the transfer of sovereignty and military
installations to Argentina on some of the lesser islands, and
British administration and economic control on the islands
which have already been partially developed by British enter-
prise. But without the willingness to negotiate, such outlines
seem illusions. The problem is that each side must be convinced
of the validity of the other's claim before it can have the political
backing of its home constituencies to enter into meaningful
negotiations. But the events of the 1980s have featured such an
exaggerated national pride, to justify the sacrifices which the
two governments' policies required their home constituencies to
make, that an appreciation of the other's case seems a long way
off. The situation is comparable in a sense to that of the
Penobscot and Passamoquoddy Indians in the state of Maine,
who had to win a series of lawsuits before the governor of the
state could explain to the non-Indian electorate why it was
necessary to settle the Indian claims; for their part, the Indians
had to settle for much less than their court victories entitled
them to have. The Indians feared that insistence on their legal
rights would lead to legislation nullifying the court rulings.
There is, however, no likelihood that any state in the inter-
national system would require its population to make the
19
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
sacrifices of "rights" the Indians made to achieve a politically ac-
ceptable result. The failure to achieve such a solution leads, in
turn, to heightened tensions, mounting economic burdens, and
even, as demonstrated by the 1982 Falklands crisis, to the
tragedy of war.

Notes: Chapter 2

1 South Georgia has its own history, and the basis for the Argentine claim to
it appears to be merely succession to British administrative powers exercised
from the Falkland/Malvinas. The steady Argentine rejection of the legal
effect of that British administration as a basis for establishing rights even in
the Falkland/Malvinas group itself would seem to justify rejection of the
Argentine claims to South Georgia without further analysis.
2 J. Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1927).
3 "Unpopulated territory" was the term used by the Europeans to refer even
to territory that was populated if the native population was not organized
politically in a way acceptable to the Europeans. This normally, but not
always, meant that the natives were organized militarily and able to resist
European advances. In the Eastern Greenland case, Denmark v. Norway,
PQJ Ser. A/B, no. 53 (1933), for example, the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice treated Greenland as "unpopulated" despite evidence of an
Eskimo population capable from time to time of massacring the Viking
settlements there. In the Falkland/Malvinas Islands there was no population
to 1764 as far as is known.
4 Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p.435.
5 A. McNair, Law Officers' Reports, 1956, p. 268.
6 J.C.J. Medford, Introduction to 1982 ed. of Goebel, The Struggle for the
Falkland Islands, p. xii.
7 See The Island of Palmas (Miangas) Arbitration 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, 1928,
p. 829.
8 The Clipperton Island Arbitration, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, 1931, p. 1107.
9 The Ecrehos and Minquiers Case (United Kingdom v. France), ICJ Reports,
1953, p. 47.
10 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1933), pp. 100-4.
11 cf. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), PCIJ Ser. A/B,
no. 53 (1933).
12 Other Charter provisions, such as article 2 (4) and article 51, seem inap-
plicable to the degree that they presume sovereignty to have vested in the
United Kingdom or Argentina. The Security Council did not specify which
provisions of the Charter it relied upon in its call for Argentine withdrawal
from the islands on 3 April 1982.
13 This issue has implications for the Middle East, where a significant portion
of the Israeli population consists of Jews "encouraged" to migrate, and
where large numbers of Palestinians left their ancestral homes in the terri-
tory now comprising the state of Israel. For an example of how the problem
was handled historically, see the series of Advisory Opinions by the PCIJ in
1923; Ser. B, nos. 6, 7, and 8 dealing with ethnic Germans resident in

20
 HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
territory ceded to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles, and with the failure of
a plebiscite to determine the boundary between Poland and Czechoslovakia;
and Ser. B, no.10 delivered in 1925 concerning the exchange of Greek and
Turkish populations under a 1923 treaty.

21
 3
The Strategic Role of
Legal Principles
THOMAS M. FRANCK

Since 1945, Britain has relinquished 5,200,000 square miles of

colonial possessions with some 800 million inhabitants. Many of
these ex-colonies like Malaya, Zambia, and Jamaica contain
inestimable billions of dollars' worth of natural resources.
Around the globe, from the Caribbean to Fiji, the thin, red line
has by and large responded rather gracefully to the recessional,
occasioning rarely a shot fired in anger. Then came the Argen-
tine invasion of the Malvinas. To hold those barren, forlorn
Falkland Islands, inhabited by a mere 1,800 agoraphiles, the
British expended the lives of about 250 of their countrymen and
killed nearly 1,000 Argentines. The cost of the operation to Bri-
tain has been put at 2-6 billion dollars, including the replace-
ment cost of seven ships.
What is to be made of all this by the international lawyer con-
cerned with world order? Was this a selfless, necessary defense
of principles that are the pillars of civilized conduct among
states? Or was it a declining world power's sclerotic delusion of
Thermopylae? Are we to derive from the Falklands War the
moral that principles do matter? Or only, as Samuel Johnson
said after the 1770 Falklands War, that an exaggerated sense of
patriotism "is the last refuge of scoundrels"?
These questions matter, because, on the one hand, small wars
are becoming endemic in a world brittle as a tinder-bed. On the
other, the erosion of principled conduct by states is equally alarm-
ing, since a decent concern for principle is the cohesive force
in building a society. Without it, social interaction is purely ran-
dom and social evolution directionless. The meaning of the
22
 STRATEGIC ROLE OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Falklands War thus affords an insight into the state of the inter-
national system.
Observing the unfolding of the Falklands crisis, in Britain and
at the United Nations, this lawyer became convinced that prin-
ciples of international law directly affected strategic outcomes
and had a dramatic mobilizing effect on public opinion, par-
ticularly in Britain and Western Europe. Principled legal think-
ing by governments also had significant consequences at the
United Nations. Ignoring strategic, geographic, ethnic, social,
and economic factors, nations reacted to the crisis by asking
"what precedential effect would an Argentine victory have on
us?" In a rather dramatic fashion, political-strategic concerns
were subordinated to considerations of principle; or, more
precisely, principle became a dominant factor in the political-
strategic equation. The Falklands crisis thus provides a case
study of the potential role of international legal principles in the
conduct of world politics. It also illustrates the dangers that arise
when principles are neglected or applied selectively.
The importance of the principles at stake undoubtedly con-
ditioned the speedy and unusually coherent policy of the Euro-
pean Community. Speaking on behalf of those nations, Mile.
Edmonde Dever, the Belgian Ambassador to the United Na-
tions, captured that feeling early: "If the use of force were to be
rewarded," she said, "this would encourage any state with
territorial ambitions to follow suit. Peace in the world would
become even more precarious and many countries, no matter
what group they belonged to, would feel threatened. The reac-
tion of many small countries in the world to the Argentine
invasion demonstrates, furthermore, that this danger has been
understood." This perception ensured the early passage, over
the opposition only of Panama, of Security Council Resolution
502 calling on Argentine troops to withdraw from the islands. It
also facilitated severe Western European economic and military
sanctions against Argentina.
What happened at UN Headquarters in May and June—and
what did not happen—illustrates the residual power of prin-
ciples to shape policies and behavior of members of the inter-
national community. In the corridors of the General Assembly
building, the junta found itself almost without support, except
from a few states with interests and ambitions similar to Argen-
tina's. It was clearly impossible for Argentina to summon up the
Third World's automatic majority by convening the General
Assembly, because there was no such majority in support of
23
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Argentina's action. In speeches at the Security Council, there
were pro forma invocations of colonialism's evils. But in the
delegates' lounge even most Latin Americans distanced
themselves from what they called the military "adventurists."
Ambassador Munoz Ledo of Mexico—a country which has a bet-
ter claim to Texas than Argentina has to the Falklands—stated
publicly: "We reject the use of force to settle this or any other
conflict." His Foreign Ministry condemned the invasion
outright. The Bogota delegation was nicknamed "British Colom-
bians" for their perceived posture. At home, public opinion was
equally skeptical. Rio de Janeiro's leading newspaper, Jornal do
Brasil, echoing the sentiments of its government, asked, "why
must Argentina's neighbors adopt a continental position as a
bloc when the Government of Argentina has demonstrated such
little appreciation for what peace on this continent means to
them?" (cited in the New York Times, 23 May 1982, p. 14).
This new deviation from Third World solidarity could not be
explained solely in terms of the Argentine junta's global
unpopularity, although this did play a part. Aside from the ac-
tion of Venezuelan dock workers in refusing to unload Scotch
whisky, the junta got very little tangible help, only some
watered-down resolutions of the OAS and the Havana meeting
of the non-aligned. Even these did not condone the use of force.
This can only be understood in the context of states' concern for
principles; not a theoretical but highly practical concern that
reflects strategic planning and national self-interest.
The principles which moved so many nations during the
Falklands crisis are both clear and basic to the system estab-
lished by the UN Charter. Article 2(3) obliges members to "settle
their international disputes by peaceful means" while 2(4)
prohibits "the threat or use of force" against a state. These
concepts are further embroidered in the landmark "Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation Among States" adopted by the General
Assembly in 1970. It "solemnly proclaims" that every state "has
the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the
existing boundaries of another State or as a means of solving
international disputes, including territorial disputes..."
Argentina, of course, joined in supporting that Declaration,
which also requires states to settle disputes by "negotiation,
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies, or arrangements or other means of
their choice" but never by resort to military force.
24
 STRATEGIC ROLE OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Another, more controversial, set of principles evoked by the
Falklands crisis has to do with the disposition of the islands,
which are a British colony. Under article 73 of the UN Charter,
the colonial power is obliged to recognize that "the interests of
the inhabitants of these territories are paramount" and to pro-
mote, within the UN system, "the well-being of the inhabitants"
including the right "to develop self-government, to take due
account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist
them in the progressive development of their free political insti-
tutions . . . " The Declaration on Friendly Relations also purports
to give the people of each colony the right freely to choose the
"establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the
emergence into any political status freely determined by a
people..." This is important because it makes clear that the
decolonization of a territory need not lead to independence or
merger with a neighboring state, but that self-determination can
take the form of free association with the "mother country," the
direction preferred by the Falkland inhabitants.
Diplomatic action at the UN in May and June showed that, for
the most part, principles matter in two related senses. First,
principles like article 2(4) are perceived to lay down the basic
rules of the game. Most states, if they are not themselves parties
to a current dispute, tend to "vote for the rules" because they
perceive themselves to have a greater national interest in
protecting those rules from erosion than in supporting either
side. Of course, in many instances it is difficult to tell who
violated the rules, which state "started" the crisis. But when
that is clear, as it was in the Falklands invasion, then states tend
to lean on the violator, as did Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and
Chile, even while occasionally genuflecting to the cherished
icons of hemispheric solidarity.
There is a second sense in which principles matter. Principles
are, after all, the ephemeral strands of extrapolative logic linking
one situation with others. Many at the UN with no direct stake
in the disposition of the Falklands chose sides because a key
issue—whether historic titles may be used to force changes in
established national boundaries—reminded them of another
situation in which they do have a strong interest. Of course, this
works both ways. Venezuela supported Argentina, while
Guyana strongly supported Britain, because the former has a
claim based on historic title against the latter. Guatemala and
Belize saw the issue as similar to their own boundary dispute.
25
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Kenya, a large part of its territory still claimed by Somalia on the
basis of historic title, was outspoken in Britain's cause. Address-
ing Argentina as "a violent member of the United Nations com-
mitting naked aggression against its neighbours/' Ambassador
Maina made it clear that

whether or not the [Argentine] claims are valid . . . they

should not be settled at the expense of people who now live
on the Falkland Islands. They are paramount, and in our view
their interests are paramount. Whatever claims Argentina
may have against the British based on history and the impe-
rialism of the past may be settled without treating the people
of the Falkland Islands like chattel in real estate . . . If we bend
the principle of decolonization of peoples to look like the
redistribution of territories, this Organization is in real trouble.
One has only to look at any map of one's choice to see why
. . . [A]ny attempt to redraw the maps of the world would
lead this planet to endless war and destruction.

The lack of African support for Argentina is also understand-

able in another sense which illustrates the role of reciprocal prin-
ciples in a slightly different fashion. As Ambassador Maina
pointed out, Argentina, as recently as September 1981, at the
meeting of non-aligned foreign ministers, had dissociated itself
from a resolution calling for support to Southern African libera-
tion movements insofar as this implied aid to armed struggle, on
the stated ground that "resorting to force is incompatible with
the Charter of the United Nations." Wryly, Mania asked: "what
happened between September 1981 and April 1982 . . . to
transform Argentina . . . ? "
The direct connection made by governments between the
events in the South Atlantic and matters dose to their own na-
tional interest was apparent to anyone following the pro-
ceedings in the Security Council. Of the fifteen current Members
of the Council, eleven are states on one side or another of prob-
lems very similar to that of the Falklands. France has a network
of fragments of empire, many in the category of "departments
d'outre mer," which wish to remain French. The deputy
representing one of these overseas departments (St. Pierre et
Miquelon in the Gulf of St. Lawrence) made a panicky predic-
tion, in May, of an imminent Canadian invasion of his
homeland. Guyana, equally nervous of an oil-rich neighbor
which claims two-thirds of its territory, on 11 May notified the
26
 STRATEGIC ROLE OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
UN that it had been the subject of a "threatening" incursion by
Venezuelan soldiers. Both Jeremiads proved, at the least,
premature. But they reflected the understandable fear that one
event could lead to another, an operational view of principle.
Even the United States has ties with Puerto Rico, and expects
soon to establish a relationship with the distant Northern
Marianas, comparable to that of Britain with the Falklands.
"Historic title" forms the basis of claims by Ireland to Northern
Ireland, Japan to the Southern Kurile islands currently in the
Soviet Union's keep, Togo to British Togoland which was
annexed to Ghana, Spain to Gibraltar, and China to those parts
of British Hong Kong colony ceded by China in 1842 and 1860.
As Panamanian Foreign Minister Jorge Illueca told the Security
Council, the Gibraltar case is indistinguishable from the
Falklands issue. "These colonial enclaves," he said, "have no
justification; they are inadmissible, reprehensible, and stand
condemned by the world conscience."
The Panamanian position, too, illustrated the role of a sort of
principled thinking. As the voice of this world conscience,
Panama, the only hispanic Latin American country then on the
Security Council, provided most of the ardent, if eccentric,
support for Argentina. Delegates were startled by the temper
of Illueca's outbursts, which attributed Prime Minister That-
cher's intractability to "the glandular system of women" and
called on the UN to deprive the British Ambassador, Sir
Anthony Parsons, of the use of his knighthood since, in the world
organization, "we do not have a monarchical system." The
Panamanians privately admitted that what occasioned all this
verbal excess was not the Malvinas so much as thoughts of the
Panama Canal. Here, again, the power of principles, of extrapo-
lative thinking, was at work. Illueca surprised delegates with
the theory that the Falkland islanders deserved no right of self-
determination because, he contended (wrongly), they are all
"employees of a colonial company who are of the same nation-
ality as the oppressor nation." The bigger game he was really
stalking, however, was the Panama Canal company and its resi-
dent U.S. "zonians." This author asked one Panamanian
representative whether he had considered that, if Argentina had
succeeded in asserting its historic title, the government of
Colombia might have revived its old claim to its isthmus pro-
vince. "Oh, but they wouldn't," the Panamanian replied,
somewhat uncertainly. But how could he be sure? Panama, after
all, had been "stolen" from Colombia by the same two colonial
27
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
powers, Britain and the United States, which, seventy years
earlier, had relieved Buenos Aires of the Malvinas.
For most countries, not being the subject of claims based on
historic title, the principles at stake ip the Falklands were not
quite so specifically relevant. Yet they were perceived as no less
important. As British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper wrote to the
New; York Times, "if Argentina had kept its spoil today, the rule
of law would have been replaced by that of force, and no
undefended island would have been secure/' Ambassador
Jacobs of Antigua and Barbuda said, "as a small island State
whose only defence against aggression by those larger and more
powerful than ourselves is the Charter of the United Nations
and the resolutions of the Security Council, we must deplore
Argentina's illegal use of force . . . " In a world where sixty-two
states have populations of fewer than a million, and thirty-two
have fewer than 200,000, Jacobs spoke for a significant constitu-
ency. Most of these vulnerable nations agreed with Shridath
Ramphal, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, who
said bluntly: "in making a firm and unambiguous response to
Argentina's aggression, Britain is rendering a service to the
international community as a whole . . . Commonwealth coun-
tries, including in particular Commonwealth countries in Latin
America, have stood full square behind Britain in this matter."
This was far from public posturing. Nations and territories felt
themselves threatened by the ripple effect an Argentine victory
would have had. Worried senior officials of the Netherlands An-
tilles rushed to New York in May to request UN technical
assistance in constructing a status that would permit their con-
stitutional link with the Netherlands to continue in peace. "We
do not wish to follow Surinam's disastrous experience with
premature independence," their spokesperson said. On the
other hand, the Antilles did not want the link with Holland to
provide an excuse for "liberation" from "colonialism" by a
powerful Latin American neighbor. When it was suggested that
the islands might escape the "colonial" label by constructing a
relationship with the Netherlands which either could terminate
on notice, one of the visitors replied, "Oh no. We cannot give the
Netherlands the power to rid themselves of us so easily."
But what does all this activity prove about the utility of prin-
ciples in the international system? Perhaps only that nations
may still be moved, or manipulated, by appeals to principle.
Reflecting Americans' traditional reserve towards such appeals,
Ronald Steel pointed out (New York Times, 28 May 1982, p. 32)
28
 STRATEGIC ROLE OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
that what the Argentina junta tried to do in the Falklands
follows quite logically from similar acts the international com-
munity has tolerated with a mere wink. The geopolitically
pragmatic practice, he argued, long ago obliterated the prin-
ciples. India's seizure of the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961
was benevolently overlooked by the UN system. Although the
Portuguese dictatorship made it impossible to demonstrate the
political preference of the Goans, it is probable that the in-
habitants of the enclave had no desire, after 450 years as part of
Portugal, to be "liberated" by India. When the Goan invasion
came to the notice of the Security Council, Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson charged that India had violated the Charter prin-
ciples. But nothing was done, except that U.S. Ambassadors to
New Delhi are still instructed not to visit the area in order to
avoid legitimizing its annexation. In a similar case, the United
States and the UN actually helped to take the western half of the
vast island of Papua New Guinea (West Irian) away from
Holland and, without the consent of the inhabitants, handed it
to Indonesia as a reward for its use of military force against the
territory. During the transfer, the UN flag flew over the area for
eight months. In 1963, after assuming control, Indonesia con-
ducted a rigged "consultation," which a shamefaced inter-
national community accepted as fait accompli.
More recent examples are the Indonesian seizures of Por-
tuguese East Timor and the Moroccan taking of the Spanish
(Western) Sahara, both in 1975. In each instance, the prefer-
ences of the local inhabitants for independence were clearly
evidenced and blatantly ignored. In Timor there was bitter
resistance to the invaders, which was brutally suppressed. The
General Assembly passed a toothless resolution. In the Western
Sahara, a visiting UN fact-finding mission reported the over-
whelming desire of the indigenous population for independ-
ence and the International Court of Justice in its advisory
opinion on the legal status of that territory reiterated its asser-
tion that "the subsequent development of international law in
regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-deter-
mination applicable to all of them." The "right of self-
determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will
of the people concerned." When all this was ignored by the
invading Moroccan army, the General Assembly passed two
contradictory resolutions, one recognizing the right of the
Saharawis to independence and the other ratifying the fait
29
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
accompli. Both times, the UN ineffectually criticized the usurping
government but did nothing more concrete. The British govern-
ment certainly did not identify with the Timorese, some 50,000 of
whom died defending the same right Britain now claims for the
Falkland Kelpers. As for the United States, it has made a short
shadow-play of restricting military sales to Morocco and Indo-
nesia, but has staunchly supported and supplied both aggressor
regimes.
These are dramatic instances of national policy based not on
principle but on pragmatic geopolitical strategy. In East Timor
and the Western Sahara, the West supported its surrogates, the
legions of General Suharto and King Hassan, without much
thought for cost to the credibility and deterrent power of the
principles at stake. Who could blame Galtieri's anger and confu-
sion at being treated so differently from Suharto and Hassan?
The junta's confusion was further compounded by the un-
principled way in which the Third World previously had dealt
with the Falklands issue in the General Assembly and in the
councils of the non-aligned. In both settings, the Argentine
claim has been essentially recognized since 1965 by resolutions
which called for negotiations between Argentina and Britain to
terminate the "colonial" presence. In 1973 the Assembly
explicitly determined that "the way to put an end to this colonial
situation is the peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty."
This was tantamount to a call for Britain to negotiate the islands'
transfer to Argentina, while somehow "bearing in mind" the
interests of the inhabitants.
That line of resolutions on the Falklands, paralleling others on
Gibraltar, while not sanctioning Argentina's use of force, did
implicitly reject the inhabitants' claim to self-determination. It is
the most egregious instance of abandonment by the Third
World of the very principle to which its member states owe their
existence. True, the population of Gibraltar (about 30,000) is
small, and that of the Falklands is even smaller. The UN
debates, however, show no attempt to make the distinction on
that basis, if only because there are other Third World countries
with comparably minute populations. Such a line would have
been impossible to draw without intense internal squabbling
within the Third World bloc. These resolutions did not, of
course, invite Argentina to invade the Falklands. But they did
encourage the junta to believe they had the Third World in their
pocket, a costly mistake for which the Third World must take
some responsibility. Why did the Third World for so long go
30
 STRATEGIC ROLE OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
along with such unprincipled principles in which most, as it
turned out, did not really believe? A senior Indian diplomat
explained it this way:

We just don't take these resolutions very seriously. Before the

non-aligned meet, various special interest resolutions are
drafted within the regional sub-group concerned. The rest of
us rarely get a look at the texts until a week or so before the
vote. Anyway, we really don't care, since it's all cut and dried
and doesn't affect us much. Among the Third World, each
region goes along with every other region's agenda. We vote
for theirs so they'll vote for ours. That's how we manage to
stay a group.

If the Africans and Asians didn't take the Argentine resolution

on the Falklands very seriously, neither did the British. When
a First World country feels strongly about one of the items and
applies bilateral pressure, as the United States has done when
resolutions about Puerto Rico have been under consideration,
the proposed resolutions are taken more seriously and their
implications are considered more carefully. But the British, a
Third World ambassador said, "never lobbied us about the
Falklands or Gibraltar resolutions when they were before the
General Assembly. They seemed to feel they were just a lot of
hot air. And we rather felt the same." Unfortunately, the Argen-
tines took them at face value, as a hunting license.
From all this, one might conclude that the principles for which
Britain purported to fight in the South Atlantic are bunk, to be
trotted out when convenient, then forgotten when not. Every
law student knows that for every principle there is a countervail-
ing one. International law is an illusion created by lawyers to
gull the naive into serving somebody else's self-interest.
Always, in international affairs, ahead of principle comes praxis,
which is highly selective, pragmatic, strategic, and indifferent to
rules. Well, as T. S. Eliot would say, that is a way of putting it.
But let us try another. The Falklands crisis points to a social
phenomenon: principles evidently can rally both people and
nations, even overcoming countervailing, more conventional,
perceptions of self-interest and alliance-politics. This rallying
has strategic consequences. There is no doubt that Argentina's
diplomatic isolation sapped its will to fight, as well as its ability
to secure weapons, replacement parts, and credits.
Besides their capacity to rally, principles have another
31
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
strategic capability. They can deter. Principles which are regu-
larly implemented over a long period of time tend to make
certain conduct "unthinkable." The idea that something "just
isn't done" is both descriptive and proscriptive. However, once
the principle is violated with impunity—the previously unthink-
able seizure of an embassy in Teheran, for example—it loses part
of its credibility and thus its capacity to deter. It is no longer
unthinkable. Restoring its unthinkability is rather like putting
toothpaste back in a tube. A government which sees others
successfully ignore principles will not give them much weight
when calculating its own strategic self-interest. After Goa, West
Irian, East Timor, the Western Sahara, Afghanistan, Cambodia,
the Iran-Iraq and Mid-East wars, and after the General
Assembly's resolutions on the Falklands and Gibraltar, it is
hardly surprising that Buenos Aires believed it could invade the
Falklands without stirring up a hornet's nest. The principles for
which Britain fought in the Falklands had lost their capacity to
deter violators, even if they still retained a lingering ability to rally
defenders. Unfortunately, a principle with just enough life to
rally defenders but not enough to deter violators is not simply
another compromise. It is a particular danger to world stability,
leading to unpredictability and potentially lethal miscalculations.
The sad truth is that the international community has not very
ardently tended even its most basic principles. Yet social scien-
tists teU us that rule-building is a universal social imperative,
that a sense of shared, generally obeyed principles gives defini-
tion to a society, distinguishing it from a random rabble. The
international system does, indeed, maintain many of the trapp-
ings of a society: a fixed population (of States), repetitious pat-
terns of interactions, an agreed system of communications, and
elaborate, if politically rudimentary, institutions. Yet when it
comes to principles, the states in the system remain careless
about going consistently to their defense.
Tending principles only once in a while is probably worse
then abandoning them altogether. Yet that is precisely what
happened in the Falklands. The British military action in the
Falkland Islands—costly, prolonged, perhaps Quixotic—was
senseless in cost-benefit terms if it was fought merely to reclaim
real estate. It is equally indefensible in Benthamite terms, for the
relative happiness of the 1800 islanders was purchased by the
greater unhappiness of an equal or larger number of battle
casualties. The campaign can be justified only as a reinforcement
of basic principles crucial to peace. These are surely worth
32
 STRATEGIC ROLE OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
fighting for, if states are thereby persuaded to adhere to them.
But a principle asserted occasionally may not be worth defend-
ing if only because it is already incapacitated, having lost its
power to deter.
In his June 1982 address to the British Parliament, President
Reagan emphasized that armed aggression must not be allowed
to succeed and that people must participate in the decisions of
government under the rule of law. "If there had been firmer
support for that principle some 45 years ago," he added,
"perhaps our generation wouldn't have suffered the bloodlett-
ing of World War II." But so, too, the Argentine invasion of the
Falklands and resultant bloodshed would probably have been
unthinkable if the international community had defended those
principles more vigorously in inconvenient settings like the
Middle East, Afghanistan, East Timor, and the Western Sahara.
One must assume, perhaps naively, that Britain and all those
who supported her at the UN have made a bond in blood which
commits them, not to the Kelpers, but to uphold in the future,
regardless of pragmatic strategic and geopolitical considera-
tions, the important rules of civilized conduct for which the
Falklands War was fought.

Note on Sources: Chapter 3

This essay is primarily based upon the provisional records of
meetings of the UN Security Council on the Falklands case from
1 April through 3 June 1982 (pertinent numbers in the series,
S/PV. 2345-72). A survey of the New York Times for the same
period also provided important information.

33
 4
Philosophical and Legal
Dimensions of the Use of
Force in the Falklands War
ALBERTO R. COLL

I
The great Cambridge historian and student of international re-
lations, Sir Herbert Butterfield, was fond of remarking that most
wars throughout history have not been contests between right
and wrong, but clashes "between one half-right that was too
willful and another half-right that was too proud/' Of all the
military conflicts since the Second World War, the Falklands
War is surely among those to which this Butterfieldian observa-
tion is most appropriate. It is difficult to ascribe moral and
political responsibility to one side without perceiving also the
other party's acts and omissions that contributed to the final
military showdown. Both adversaries showed ample reserves of
obduracy, pride, nearsightedness, and political willfulness in
their relations with one another before and during the war. In
spite of these realities which can be found underlying almost all
international conflicts—realities which Butterfield categorized
under the term of "man's universal sin"—international law
during the last seventy years has sought to develop a set of
normative standards for curbing the use of force by states.1
The animating spirit behind this legal enterprise is seemingly
at odds with the Butterfieldian emphasis on the universality of
the lust for power and the consequent falsity of making absolute
rather than relative judgments on a state's resort to violence.
Since the early days of World War I down to the present, inter-
34
 PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS
national legal scholars, unlike Butterfield, have sought to dif-
ferentiate aggressors from non-aggressors, states which have
breached the peace and set in motion the deadly chain of armed
violence from states that, regardless of their other sins, have not
committed the ultimate one of resorting to force.
In many ways this differentiation, and the attitudes underly-
ing it, are similar to the efforts of domestic legal systems to
define certain acts as crimes which the law will not tolerate and
for which it will hold responsible those agents who commit
them. Theological and philosophical reflections on the fallen
nature of man or the corrupting effects of society on the indi-
vidual play a very limited role in restricting the ascription of
criminal responsibility in most legal orders. With some narrow
exceptions such as the venerated McNaghten rule (or "insanity
defense"), the kinds of considerations discussed above play a
role mostly by redefining the criminal offense to a slightly lower
degree (as with "crimes of passion") or as mitigating circum-
stances suggesting a lighter sentence, but never as justifications
for denying the burden of criminal responsibility to the indi-
vidual who committed the forbidden action.
This refusal of the law to capitulate before the pressures of
relativism generated by thoughtful philosophic accounts of the
human condition has found support within the Western
philosophic tradition itself. Aristotle, whose reflections on
equity and prudence in Books V and VI of the Nicomachean Ethics
correspond with Butterfield's way of thinking, found it
necessary for society to have laws and institutions that would
punish the agents of particular acts and define these acts with
as much precision as possible. The role of equity was to soften
the impact of normative standards and adapt them to different
conditions, but not to dissolve the standards in a sea of skeptical
relativism. St. Augustine, who viewed all political reality sub
specie aeternitatis, argued that the City of Man needed to define
and enforce legal standards of order, even though such standards
were admittedly relative and ambiguous by comparison with
divine justice and truth. And Fyodor Dostoevsky, who in The
Brothers Karamazov had Father Zossima exclaim that each of us
is responsible in some way for everyone else's sins—a profound
insight when applied at certain levels of human relations—
throughout his novels also derided much of the intelligentsia of
his day for its softness towards criminals and its general inability
to draw moral and legal distinctions in its analysis of social
problems.
35
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Similarly, international law seeks to elaborate norms for the
control of armed violence among states. The norms, and the
situations to which they apply, are continuously defined with as
much precision as possible, even though such precision is
extremely difficult and often unattainable. Considerations of
equity, prudence, political forgiveness, generosity, and magna-
nimity are taken into account as the rules are elaborated through
the work of diplomacy, that indispensable partner of inter-
national law in preventing and settling disputes. But the rules
attempt to set certain minimum standards, and offer fairly
specific guidelines for the ascription to states of legal respon-
sibility for the outbreak of violence.

II

International law has not always pursued such an ambitious

task. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the
prevalent view, as stated by William Edward Hall in his Treatise
on International Law, was that

However able law might be to declare one or two combatants

to have committed a wrong, it would be idle for it to affect to
impart the character of a penalty to war, when it is powerless
to enforce its decisions . . . International law has consequently
no alternative but to accept war, independently of the justice
of its origin, as a relation which the parties to it may set up if
they choose, and to busy itself only in regulating the effects of
the relation. Hence both parties to every war are regarded as
being in an identical legal position, and consequently as
possessed of equal rights.2

World War I had a searing effect on the West's consciousness,

leading to a reexamination of traditional assumptions about the
permissibility of war, and the demand that international law
impose far more stringent standards on the resort to force. This
change seemed required by three major developments whose
pace had accelerated in the opening decades of the twentieth
century. First, as historians and sociologists such as Gordon
Craig and Raymond Aron have noted, there was a terrifying
increase in the destructive capabilities of military weaponry and
technology, coupled with a resurgence of the ancient notion that
wars were supposed to be total, involving the whole of a
36
 PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS
nation's capacities in a win-or-die struggle. Second, there was
greater economic interdependence among states than ever
before, as well as greater complexity and fragility of economic
and industrial infrastructures within societies, on which
depended the survival and well-being of entire populations.
Third, the trend begun during the previous century towards
faster population growth and higher urban density proceeded
even more quickly. All these seemed to imply that modern
civilization was a highly delicate and vulnerable set of arrange-
ments that no longer could tolerate the use of force as allowed
by the earlier international law.
It was out of this new awareness that a different view emerged.
The Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) restricted a
state's freedom to use force by requiring that disputes be first
submitted to peaceful methods of settlement, and that a
"cooling-off" period of three months be allowed to elapse. Only
after these conditions had been met was a state legally permitted
to resort to force. None of these restrictions, of course, applied
to the use of force in self-defense, in response to a previous act
of violence committed against the state.
The new trend marked by the League Covenant was con-
tinued by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which the
signatories (including the Great Powers at that time: France,
Germany, Italy, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan)
"condemn [ed] recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce[d] it as an instrument of national
policy in their relations with one another." Since the treaty was
concluded outside the League of Nations and is fully consistent
with the UN Charter, it theoretically retains its full force today.
Although Argentina did not sign it, it represented a growing
consensus in the international community on the direction in
which international relations should be moving, even though
the practice of most of the signatories continued to be at
variance with their solemn declaration.
In the Western hemisphere the closest parallel to the Kellogg-
Briand Pact was the Inter-American Treaty of 10 October 1933,
also known as the Saavedra-Lamas Treaty because of the
prominent role played in its proceedings by the Argentine
Foreign Minister. Article I states that "the high contracting
parties solemnly declare that they condemn wars of aggression
in their mutual relations or in those with other states, and that
the settlement of disputes or controversies of any kind that may
arise among them shall be effected only by the pacific means
37
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
which have the sanction of international law." The language of
this article seemed to limit the obligation to settle disputes
peacefully to those controversies arising among the "high con-
tracting parties''; thus, the treaty was not as inclusive as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. Nevertheless, it indicated a significant trend
within the Inter-American system to restrict the use of force.
Drafted in view of the bitter experience of World War n, the
United Nations Charter (1945) took an even stronger position
than that of the League Covenant on the issue of force. In the
twenty-six years from 1919 to 1945 the vulnerability of modern
civilization had increased considerably; the reasons for the
unacceptability of the use of force seemed more compelling than
ever. So the Charter took an absolutist position; except for self-
defense, the use of force was prohibited as a means of effecting
change in international relations.
The Charter's preamble indicates that one of the ends for
which the United Nations was established was "to ensure, by
the acceptance of principles and institution of methods, that
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."
Article 2 states:

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by

peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Even more directly relevant to the Falklands crisis is article 33,

which in the first paragraph says that "the parties to any
dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of
all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, concilia-
tion, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."
These provisions are to be read in conjunction with article 37,
which specifies that "should the parties to a dispute of the
nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means in-
dicated in that article, they shall refer it to the Security Council."
The UN Charter's position on the use of force was reflected in
the constitutive documents of the Inter-American system
adopted shortly after the Charter. The Inter-American Treaty of
38
 PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) of 1947 stated in its first
article: "The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war
and pledge themselves in the conduct of their foreign relations
not to have recourse to the threat or use of force in any form
incompatible with the provisions of the United Nations Charter
or of this treaty." Similarly, the OAS Charter (1948) stipulated
in article 21 that "the American states pledge themselves in their
foreign relations not to use force, except in the case of legitimate
self-defense m accordance with treaties in force, and in
obedience to such treaties."

Ill

In the light of these norms of international law, Argentina's

forceful seizure of the Falklands on 2 April 1982 was illegal. In
response to the specific charge of violation of the legal rules con-
cerning the use of force in international relations, Argentina has
made three general arguments. First, British control of the
Falklands represented a continuing act of aggression against
Argentina and its territorial integrity. Second, Argentina
searched for and exhausted peaceful methods of settlement, as
recommended by article 33, prior to using force. Third, in
signing the UN Charter, Argentina supposedly made reserva-
tions concerning the Malvinas, indicating its refusal to accept
the legality of the British presence and leaving to itself the
freedom to choose in the future whatever means it considered
appropriate to enforce its claims.
These legal arguments are difficult to accept. First, there is the
150-year-long peaceful occupation of the Falklands by the
British, which does not pose, and has not posed, any threat to
Argentina's security. The extent to which the British presence is
a threat to Argentina's territorial integrity depends on whether
the islands are Argentine territory. The Argentine claim to
ownership rests, first, on the argument that by 1833 the islands
(regardless of their status during the eighteenth century) were
Argentine territory and the forceful British occupation carried
out that year cannot be the basis of any legal rights. Second, the
islands are part of the South American continental shelf, and
since Argentina is the South American nation closest to the
islands, they are part of its territory.3
This second argument, known as the rule of contiguity, is
weak. Not only are the Falklands hardly contiguous, being more
39
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
than 500 km from the Argentine mainland, but also contiguity
is not sufficient to establish territorial sovereignty. As was stated
in the well-known Islands of Palmas arbitration of 1928:

Although states have in certain circumstances maintained

that islands relatively close to their shores belonged to them
in virtue of their geographical situation, it is impossible to
show the existence of a rule of positive international law to
the effect that islands situated outside territorial waters
should belong to a state from the mere fact that its territory
forms the terra firma . . . contiguity, understood as a basis of
territorial sovereignty, has no foundation in international
law.

The first argument supporting Argentina's claim that the

Falklands are part of its territory is more plausible, but still
highly problematic. Since 1945, when the United Nations
darter placed stringent prohibitions on the use of force, the
taking of territory by methods such as those used by the British
in 1833 can be considered illegal. Whether the international law
of the early nineteenth century took this same position is highly
doubtful. Moreover, even if the taking had been initially illegal,
a century and a half of continuous, peaceful, unmolested
occupation would have given rise to British rights of possession.
This is what the international legal doctrine of prescription
suggests.4 According to Hall, for example:

Title by prescription arises out of a long continued possession,

where no original source of proprietary right can be shown to
exist, or where possession in thefirstinstance being wrongful,
the legitimate proprietor has neglected to assert his right, or
has been unable to do so . . . The object of prescription as
between states is mainly to assist in creating stability of inter-
national order which is of more practical advantage than the
bare possibility of an ultimate victory of right . . . prescription
must be understood . . . to give title where an immoral act of
appropriation, such as that of the Partition of Poland, has
been effected, so soon as it has become evident by lapse of
time that the appropriation promises to be permanent, in the
qualified sense which the word permanent can bear in inter-
national matters, and that other states acquiesce in the prospect
of such permanence.5
40
 PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS
In The Law of Nations, J. L. Brierly has observed that "many
territorial titles and many frontiers are accepted by international
law today simply because they have existed de facto for a long
time; they exemplify the maxim e facto oriturjus, which is at the
root of prescription in all systems of law."6 In the development
of international law the doctrine of prescription has received the
support of other distinguished theorists. Arguing against Vaz-
quez's theory that prescription was inapplicable in international
law, Grotius wrote: "Yet, if we admit this, there seems to follow
this most unfortunate conclusion, that controversies concerning
kingdoms and the boundaries of kingdoms, are never extin-
guished by any lapse of time; which not only tends to disturb
the minds of many and perpetuate wars, but is also repugnant
to the common sense of mankind."7 Vattel, Burke, Phillimore,
and Wheaton took a similar position in support of
prescription.8
Since Argentina's title to the Falklands is not beyond dispute,
its assertion that the British presence constituted aggression
against its territorial integrity and required Argentina to use
force in self-defense is difficult to sustain. One, therefore, has to
turn to the second major justification of Argentina's recourse to
violence, the claim that Argentina complied with article 33 of the
UN Charter and sought a solution to the Malvinas dispute by
peaceful means. There are several problems with this claim. The
Charter does not say that a party can use force after it has made
a good faith effort to settle the dispute by peaceful methods. On
the contrary, the obligation to refrain from violence remains
absolute, even if the parties have sought and exhausted all
forms of peaceful settlement. The fact that the drafters of the UN
Charter felt constrained to insert article 51 on self-defense
indicates that all other uses of force were understood to be
outlawed unless undertaken with UN authorization.
Argentina engaged in negotiations with Great Britain over the
islands from 1965 to 1982. The Argentine government, espec-
ially since 1982, has described these as barren and futile. This,
of course, begs the question. If the islands are assumed to be
Argentine, then the British conduct during the negotiations is
best described as obdurate and standing in the way of a rightful
claimant. If, on the other hand, the underlying assumption is
that the legality of both parties' claims is less than firmly
established, then the negotiations' slow pace is seen as natural
and understandable. In fact, from 1965 to 1982 considerable
progress was made in creating many functional links between
41
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
the Argentine mainland and the islands; travel, communica-
tions, and economic contacts increased enormously.9 While the
issue of sovereignty remained intractable, major steps were
taken which in the course of time might have led to an
equivalent of those "functional solutions" to territorial disputes
discussed by David Colson in this book. Far from having run
their full course, the negotiations presented many possibilities
for a future accommodation, and indeed as late as February of
1982 important negotiations took place in New York.
Argentina did not avail itself of another peaceful method of
dispute settlement suggested by the UN Charter: arbitration or
recourse to the International Court of Justice. It is not enough
to say, as some critics have said, that arbitration and judicial
settlement are improper means for resolving disputes such as
this one because these legal procedures produce winners and
losers instead of balanced compromises. If Argentina's legal
rights to the Falklands are as strong as the claims, there would
be little to fear from an arbitral or judicial decision. Interestingly,
it was Great Britain that offered to submit to the International
Court of Justice in 1947 its dispute with Argentina over the
Falkland Islands Dependencies (South Georgia and the South
Sandwich Islands). Although these are legally distinct from the
Falklands themselves, and the claims of both parties to them
rest on different grounds than their claims to the Falklands, an
ICJ decision on the Dependencies would have required some
determination of the status of the Falkland Islands themselves.
Perhaps for this reason, or out of political pride, Argentina
turned down the British proposal. In 1955, concerned over
alleged Argentine encroachments on British sovereignty in the
Dependencies, Great Britain applied unilaterally to the ICJ for
redress. Argentina, however, declined to submit to the Court's
jurisdiction.
Even if Argentina had made full use of some of the peaceful
methods outlined in article 33, she was obligated, once it was
obvious that an impasse had been reached, to submit the
dispute to the UN Security Council, something she did not do.
As article 37 states: "Should the parties to a dispute of the
nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means
indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security
Council/' This article serves to underline the gravity of Argen-
tina's refusal to accept adjudication by the ICJ because its
provisions have to be read in the context of the preceding article
36, dealing with the Security Council's role in promoting the
42
 PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS
pacific settlement of disputes. According to article 36, "in
making recommendations under this Article the Security Coun-
cil should also take into consideration that legal disputes should
as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International
Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute
of the Court."
The third major justification offered by Argentina for its
recourse to violence is that it made certain reservations with
regards to the Malvinas when she adhered to the UN Charter. A
perusal of the documents, however, reveals no such reservations.
Moreover, had Argentina attempted to make any reservations
it is likely that most of the other signatory states would
have rejected them, and thus, under no accepted principle of
international law would the reservations have been legally
valid. It appears that what the Argentine government loosely
calls its reservations to the Charter concerning the Malvinas
were no more than unilateral statements, made at the time of
Argentina's signing of the Charter and addressed primarily to
domestic public opinion, which have no legal effects on Argen-
tina's obligations under the Charter.
The key obstacle to all of Argentina's justifications is the
absolute character of the Charter's prohibition on the use of
force as an instrument of change in international relations. To
interpret this Charter norm differently is not only wrong from
the standpoint of legal hermeneutics, but also could be politi-
cally dangerous. Excluding the Falklands, there are some fifteen
active island disputes in the world today, including that
between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel islands.
There are also eighteen active land boundary disputes, includ-
ing such dangerous ones as those between the USSR and China,
India and China, and Iran and Iraq.10 There are also, as David
Colson has pointed out, over 287 maritime boundary disputes,
of which forty-nine are active. In Central and South America
alone, as indicated by Srilal Perera in his study of the OAS,
numerous territorial and maritime boundary disputes have been
the cause of open warfare among states in the past, and could
be so again in the future. Finally, in many trouble spots around
the world a semblance of peace is tenuously maintained through
the acknowledgment of de facto boundaries and ceasefire lines
that have little de jure justification. This is true in much of the
Middle East, in Korea, and was true in Europe until West
Germany's recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier with Poland
in 1971 and the East-West Helsinki Accords of 1975 that
43
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
formalized the post-World War II political and territorial
arrangements. To admit the permissibility of force in adjusting
territorial claims is to introduce a principle of chaos and
unlimited destructiveness in an already highly unstable world.
Less needs to be said about Great Britain's use of force
which, regardless of whatever moral responsibility (in the
Butterfieldian, existential sense of the term) the British may bear
for the 1982 war, was allowed by article 51 of the UN Charter:
Nothing in the present darter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members
in the exercise of thisrightof self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as
it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security.
An interesting legal question is the effect which UN Security
Council Resolution 502 had on the inherent right of Great
Britain to self-defense. The Resolution, approved on 3 April,
noted that two days earlier the President of the Security Council
had requested the British and Argentine governments "to
refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the
Falkland Islands/' It then demanded "an immediate cessation of
hostilities . . . immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces
from the Falklands Islands," and called on the parties "to seek a
diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
The resolution was obligatory, for it was drafted and approved
pursuant to article 40, which states:
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Secur-
ity Council may, before making the recommendations or
deciding upon the measures provided for in article 39, call
upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional
measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or
position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall
duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional
measures.
44
 PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS
It would be improper to say that in its use of force, Great
Britain was carrying out the provisions of Resolution 502, as if
the Security Council had empowered or authorized the British
government to carry out enforcement measures on its behalf,
which, of course, was not true. What can be said, however,
is that, owing to Argentine noncompliance with its terms,
Resolution 502 proved ineffectual. To use the analysis suggested
by article 51, this was a case in which the Security Council tried
but failed to take the "measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security." Therefore, Great Britain's
inherent right to self-defense was not preempted by any UN
actions, and continued to operate in its full scope as long as the
Security Council's measures were frustrated by Argentina.
Thus, while Great Britain did not act as an agent of the UN, its
use of force was legal, resting on a right to self-defense which,
as article 51 indicates, antedates the Charter, rests on juridical
foundations independent of the Charter, and is sanctioned by
the Charter.
Two other legal issues related to the British use of force are,
first, the level of violence required to trigger the self-defense
provisions of article 51, and second, the level of violence that
this article permits an offended state to use in its response to
aggression. Although both issues can be highly problematic
under many circumstances, they were not so in the Falklands
crisis. A full-fledged armed invasion of a territory which has
been administered, occupied, and inhabited in its entirety by
nationals of a power for 150 years suffices to justify that power's
exercise of its right to self-defense.
The second issue can be very difficult, and involves the con-
nection between ins ad bellum and ius in hello. The extent of one's
defensive measures must be proportional to the degree of
aggression suffered. Classical just war theorists such as Vitoria
and Grotius, for example, insisted that no matter how justified
the use of force was, it had to be guided by the principles of
proportionate objectives and proportionate means. The legality
of one's cause could be tarnished or vitiated if the war's objec-
tives and means were grossly disproportionate to the injury in-
itially suffered. Thus proportionality linked the ius ad bellum and
ius in hello. The same link is acknowledged today by most
students of the problem of international violence. Argentina's
taking of the Malvinas, for instance, would not have justified
massive British bombings of the Argentine mainland (unless,
of course, such bombings had been absolutely essential to
45
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
recovering the islands). As Howard Levie has shown in this
book, the British use of force was generally proportional to the
degree of aggression initially carried out by Argentina. This
proportionality is doubly important in the light of the legal norm
outlined by Anthony Arend regarding states' obligation to
persue peaceful methods of settlement even during the course
of hostilities. Any disproportionate use of force beyond the
requirements of self-defense is likely to embitter relations
between the adversaries to the point where the reasonableness
and moderation required for the functioning of this norm
disappear.

IV
To describe the preceding analysis as excessively legalistic and
out of touch with the political realities represented by Argen-
tina's burning desire for the Malvinas is to lose sight of larger
questions at stake, questions which a realistic understanding of
international politics cannot ignore. One such question has to
do with the ancient problem of the use of force in international
relations, and the degree to which international law should help
to regulate and limit recourse to violence. Legal norms are
powerless in themselves to transform radically the practice of
states. Yet they can exert a subtle, leavening influence on con-
ceptions of international morality, and through these shape
notions of prudence within societies and even the conduct of
foreign policy itself. Whether or not a legal norm is respected
and upheld is, therefore, as Thomas Franck has argued, a ques-
tion of political and strategic significance.
The Charter's absolute prohibition of force except in strict self-
defense is a norm conducive to the establishment and preserva-
tion of a reasonably moderate and orderly international system.
The value of this norm has been made more imperative than
ever by the gradual emergence over the last two decades of a
multipolar world in which regional actors have increased in
number and grown in independence and power. The ordering
influence of the United Nations has decreased considerably
during this period as has also that of the Great Powers. As the
decade of the 1980s progresses, Hedley Bull's Anarchical
Society is becoming more fragmented and chaotic. A general
weakening of the principle of the impermissibility of force can
only accelerate the dynamism of this trend. Thomas Franck has
pointed to several attempts in Latin America and elsewhere to
46
 PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS
revise frontiers by force in the wake of Argentina's seizure of
the Falklands.
Another major question to be considered is that of justice.
The criticism is often made that the kind of legal reasoning
developed in this essay is best suited to serve the interests of the
strong in international relations, at the expense of the weak. Of
course, one can argue much more convincingly that in a world
where the first use of force is permitted along the lines
advocated by Argentina, it is the strong, not the weak, who will
profit most over the long run.
Ultimately, however, a legal analysis of the use of force during
the Falklands crisis cannot avoid raising a question that is pro-
foundly disturbing to many international legal theorists. To
what extent is the Charter's norm true international law, and to
what extent is it a moral aspiration clothed in juridical robes? As
even the most faithful supporters of the rule of law in inter-
national relations will admit, law requires authority as well as
control. Without authority, law is tyranny. Without control, it is
a fiction which, like the Holy Roman Empire, everyone will pay
outward obeisance to but in practical affairs will disregard. The
analogy between the Holy Roman Empire and the United
Nations is not without instructive parallels. In much of the
diplomatic and international legal literature of the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries the Empire was accorded a legal and political
significance, and a degree of universal authority, that hardly
comported with the realities of state practice. A similar situation
may exist today with regard to the UN even though a contem-
porary scholar has had the courage to suggest that the UN may
be "a 'non-system'—a vacuum in imagery, function, and design
that invites the substitution of rival models evocative of the
Chinese wei-ch'i board on which political players are expected to
further their independent destinies by dint of intelligence and
diplomacy."11 The behavior of many UN members during the
Falklands crisis raises doubts as to how authoritative the Charter
norm is, even though in their general rhetoric and in situations
where their immediate interests are not adversely affected by an
application of the norm these states proclaim their adherence to
it. As one observes the practice of states over the past thirty-
eight years, one is forced to conclude that the norm is not as
authoritative as other international legal norms dealing with
issues less critical than the use of force.
The dimension of control presents an even more dismal pic-
ture. As revealed by Inis Claude's analysis of the organization's
47
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
role in the Falklands War, the UN proved incapable of taking
even the most modest steps to ensure compliance with the
Charter's norm. And as the war progressed, the UN became so
divided, confused, and unsure of its identity that it abandoned
all pretenses of collective security and called for a mere ceasefire
that would have left the aggressor's forces in place and in-
directly would have rewarded thefirstuse of force. The Charter's
norm was not vindicated by the UN, but by that old represent-
ative of power politics distrusted by contemporary international
law: self-help, in the form of the Anglo-American entente.
If the Charter norm is far less authoritative than would be
suggested by the formal declarations of states in support of it;
and if it has no control mechanisms other than those provided
by individual states and their allies in accordance with the
configuration of the existing balance of power; to what extent is
it true law? The arguments advanced here have proceeded on
the assumption that it still is, and numerous policy justifications
have been offered to support the proposition that it should be
law. Yet, should the trends of the last two decades continue
with regards to decreasing authority and the lack of control, the
time will come when it will be necessary to consider reform-
ulating the norm in the direction of more modest objectives and
aspirations, lest the gulf between international law and political
realities grow dangerously wide. As Bozeman argued over a
decade ago in The Future of Law in a Multicultural World:

Since the modern world is being shaped decisively by war, it

is unrealistic to pretend not only that peace is the rule but also
that law as the servant of peace can effectively defy force. In
this, as in other matters once believed subject to international
law, nations would profit, singly and collectively, from a
return to the less ambitious Grotian view of the role of inter-
national law, in terms of which it was possible to regulate many
selected incidents and consequences of war because war as
such was accepted as an unfortunate yet common
phenomenon of international life. In short, if international law
is to have a future in world society, what seems to be called
for is a contraction of the domain of law and a de-escalation
of legal rhetoric.12

Insofar as these reflections run counter to the still widely held

belief that international politics is progressively becoming more
susceptible to legal regulation, they are not likely to be received
48
 PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS
with much enthusiasm. Yet the issue cannot be ignored by any
sensitive study of the relationship of international law and
politics in today's world.
A full return to the pre-1914 permissiveness on the use of force
may be unwise as well as unnecessary; given the growing
destructiveness of contemporary warfare and military tech-
nology, most states are likely to be unwilling to embrace Hall's
doctrine again. Nevertheless, some "de-escalation" of the UN
Charter's legal rhetoric, a relaxation of the Charter's absolutist
stance through some carefully elaborated qualifications, may
become imperative. The precise form such qualifications may
take is, of course, a broad subject well outside the scope of this
essay. But several alternatives, each of them with its share of
problems and potential disadvantages, loom on the horizon.
One would be to define more broadly the concept of self-
defense, as American policymakers and lawyers tried to do dur-
ing the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Another would be a partial
return to the methodology and analytics of just war theory, as
many Third World states and the UN General Assembly itself
have been doing since 1967 albeit with a selectivity that is highly
undesirable. Yet another possible avenue would be a downplay-
ing of the illegality of first use of force in return for greater
development of the norm outlined by Anthony Arend concern-
ing the obligation of'states to seek peaceful settlement during
the course of hostilities. At some point in the future, the respon-
sibility of statesmen and scholars may be to debate and work
out, creatively and thoughtfully, such qualifications in the form
of more flexible legal rules, instead of clinging to an absolutist
norm that may have lost the inner dynamism and relationship
to social realities which Oliver Wendell Holmes and other jurists
have considered essential to the life of the law.13
Beyond these philosophical considerations, it may be useful to
suggest a possible institutional mechanism that in some cases
comparable to the Falklands could make it less tempting for
states to resort to force. In his report of 7 September 1982, the
UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, commented:

There are many ways in which Governments could actively

assist in strengthening the system prescribed in the Charter.
More systematic, less last-minute use of the Security Council
would be one means. If the Council were to keep an active
watch on dangerous situations and, if necessary, initiate
discussions with the parties before they reach the point of
49
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
crisis, it might often be possible to defuse them at an early
stage before they degenerate into violence.

In view of the Secretary-General's concerns, this may be an

appropriate time to explore the feasibility of setting up a
permanent UN commission on territorial and maritime disputes
under the direct authority of the Secretary-General and staffed
by experienced, competent negotiators. Aside from submitting
an annual report to the General Assembly on the general scope
of its work, the commission would conduct its proceedings
along the lines of quiet, traditional diplomacy.14 The commis-
sion would select a series of disputes where the danger of the
use of force is especially acute. Its role would be to persuade
parties, quietly and unobtrusively, to use its good offices and
mediation. The commission also could try, with the permission
of the disputants, to involve third-party states that might pro-
vide incentives and guarantees for a settlement. The avoidance
of publicity would be essential, in order to avoid the hardening
of positions that often takes place when negotiations are con-
ducted in the public eye. Although the Secretary-General did
not make as specific a proposal in his report, he suggested the
need for and potential usefulness of a mechanism such as this
one.
It is illusory to think that mere mechanical tinkering with the
UN will increase substantially its capacity to maintain the peace
and enforce the norms of the Charter. As long as the bitter,
global power struggle between the Soviet and Western blocs
persists, the Security Council will be paralyzed, and so will be
the UN's capabilities to regulate the use of force by states. There
are disputes, however, such as the Falklands, which may be
sufficiently removed from the superpowers' rivalry to make it
possible for a UN diplomatic commission to provide the
necessary incentive to negotiation that can make the difference
between peaceful accommodation and resort to war. The pro-
posal would be worth implementing even if all it did was to
postpone, or altogether prevent, the outbreak of violence in a
few spots in a conflict-torn world.

Notes: Chapter 4
1 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, 7th ed. (Lauterpacht), Vol. 2 (London:
Longmans, Green. 1952); Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict,
50
 P H I L O S O P H I C A L A N D LEGAL D I M E N S I O N S
2d ed. (New York: Rinehart, 1959); C. H. M. Waldock, "The regulation of
the use of force by individual states in international law/' Recueil des cours
(Hague Academy of International Law), vol. 81, no. 2 (1952), p. 455; Ian
Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1963).
2 W. E. HaU, A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1924), p. 82.
3 See the speech by Argentina's Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez,
before the OAS on 5 April 1982, OEA/Ser. G, CP/ACTA 489/82 (Protocolar),
5 April 1982; also the statement by the Representative of Argentina, H.E.
Dr. Jose Maria Ruda, before the Subcommittee III of the Special Committee
on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (New
York, 9 September 1964); and The Argentina Rights over the Malvinas Islands,
Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nacion,
Secretaria de Informacion Publica, 1982).
4 W. W. Bishop, Jr., International Law, 3d ed. (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown,
1971), pp. 416-17. Note the authorities dted, especially Hyde, International
Law, 2d ed. (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown, 1945), pp. 386-90; and D. H. N.
Johnson, "Acquisitive prescription in international law/' British Yearbook of
International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), p. 332.
5 Hall, A Treatise on International Law, pp. 143-4.
6 J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p.
167.
7 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads, Ub. n, Cap. IV, section 1.
8 J. B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Printing Office, 1906), section 88, pp. 293-5.
9 See the series of Anglo-Argentine agreements signed and implemented in
1971 and 1972, Documentos relacionados con la apertura de comunicaciones entre
el Territorio Continental Argentino y las Islas Malvinas, en ambas direcciones
(Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Reladones Exteriores y Culto, Direccion
General de Antardida y Malvinas, 1972).
10 See John Norton Moore's discussion in the American Journal of International
Law, vol. 77, no. 3 (July 1983), pp. 610-15.
11 Adda Bozeman, The Future of Law in a Multicultural World (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 185-6.
12 ibid., pp. 184-5.
13 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (New York: Little, Brown,
1881); Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1922).
14 For two highly illuminating discussions of the complex relation of publicity
to diplomacy, see Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue among States (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), and Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The impact of public
opinion upon foreign policy and diplomacy: open diplomacy revisited",
Publications of the Institute of Social Studies, Series Minor, Vol. IX (The Hague,
1965).

51
 5
The Falklands War and the
Failure of the International
Legal Order
ANTHONY C. AREND

The Falklands War confirms two major failures of the contem-

porary international legal order. First, the crisis illustrates that
the method of conflict management envisioned by the founders
of the United Nations—a modified form of collective security-
does not work; it fails both to deter and to repress aggression.
Second, and inextricably linked to the first point, the Falklands
War demonstrates that the mechanisms of peaceful change,
so vital to the success of even a limited collective security
framework, lack legitimacy. These observations are, of course,
not new; scholars have repeatedly discussed the shortcomings
of the Charter. The step that is often not taken is to determine
what these failures mean for the status of contemporary inter-
national law. The purpose of this essay is to examine how the
Falklands War represents another breach in these fundamental
Charter provisions and to explore the ramifications this breach
has for the legitimacy of these principles of international law.

Collective Security and the Falklands

The theory behind the collective security mode of conflict
management is relatively simple. It is premised on the assump-
tion that the unilateral use of force by a state is never an appro-
priate means to alter the status quo. Even in the face of a past
"injustice" a state cannot use force to augment its territory, alter
52
 FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
a boundary, or coerce some other change from another state.
Under the United Nations Charter, this unilateral use of force is
expressly proscribed by article 2(4), which provides that "all
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations." The only explicit
exception to the prohibition to this unilateral use of force is self-
defense, which is described in article 51 of the Charter as an
"inherent right." As McDougal and Feliciano explain, the
Charter norms proscribe the unilateral use of force for "value
extension"—acts forcibly extending the influence of the state
beyond its boundaries—but permits force for "value conserva-
tion"—protection of the political and territorial integrity of the
state.1
Under a pure collective security mechanism, if a violation of
this basic prohibition against the unilateral use of force does
occur, all members of the international community will unite to
repress the aggressor. This means that all capable states must
take up arms, if necessary, against the recalcitrant state to
prevent its aggression from succeeding. In fact, it is hoped that
the very willingness of all states to join in the fight against a
would-be aggressor would deter any state from undertaking an
aggressive act.
This theory of collective security is reflected, in a limited
fashion, in the Charter. Chapter VII of the Charter sets forth the
framework for preventing aggression. Under article 39, the
Security Council is empowered to "determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion" and then to determine what action is necessary to rectify
the situation. Article 41 allows the Council to employ a number
of different nonmilitary sanctions against the violator. But if
these measures fail to resolve the problem, or if they are initially
deemed inadequate by the Security Council, the Council "may
take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security." Under
article 43 all members of the United Nations are obligated to
make available to the Security Council "armed forces, assist-
ance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."
As long as a member has been allowed to participate in the
"decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment
of contingents of that Member's armed forces," it must supply
53
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
troops and other military assistance when ordered by the
Council. Indeed, article 43 provides that members must
negotiate agreements well in advance of any possible conflict to
determine the specific arrangements for troop utilization.
Theoretically, if an outright act of aggression—such as the
Argentine invasion of the Falklands—were to occur, the Security
Council could order member states to initiate an enforcement
action against the aggressor.
But even from the adoption of the Charter at San Francisco,
it was recognized that the United Nations could be at most only
a limited collective security system. Since realistically no collec-
tive military action could be taken without the agreement of the
major world powers, the Charter enshrined the principle of the
veto. Under article 27, no substantive action can be taken by the
Security Council without the concurrence, or at least the acqui-
escence, of the five permanent members of the Council—the
United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and
China. It is interesting to note that the only collective military
action authorized by the Council to date occurred in 1950 when,
due to a Soviet boycott of the Council, the Council was able to
recommend that members of the United Nations fight against
North Korea. Yet even this action was not an enforcement action
proper because the Council did not order members to participate
in combat, but rather recommended that they take part. Aside
from this one occasion, the Council has never ordered or recom-
mended collective military action, despite the myriad threats to
the peace and outright breaches of the peace that have occurred
over the last thirty-three years.2
In light of this lack of success that the international commu-
nity has had with the enforcement of the international law of
conflict management, it is no surprise that the United Nations
did not militarily come to the aid of Great Britain in her attempt
to repel aggression. Instead, the Security Council, in resolution
502, simply determined the existence of a breach of the peace,
and called for "an immediate cessation of hostilities" and "an
immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland
Islands/' The resolution also called upon "the Governments of
Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solu-
tion to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations." In an effort to
promote a diplomatic solution to the problem the Secretary-
General offered his good offices to the parties. But direct military
assistance was not suggested by the Council or any other organ
54
 FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
of the UN as a solution, nor would it have been reasonable to
expect such a recommendation. In essence, a collective security
action was never seriously contemplated as a means of resolving
the Falklands crisis.

Peaceful Change and the Falklands

Similarly, the Falklands crisis revealed yet another problem of
the international legal order—the illegitimacy of mechanisms of
peaceful change. As noted earlier, article 2(4)'s restriction on
the unilateral use of force prohibits states from changing the
status quo by forcible means. Yet the intention of the framers
was not to set the post-World War II status quo in stone.
Inasmuch as times and circumstances change, so it is to be
expected that states, over the course of time, would have valid
reasons to desire some alteration in the existing international
order. The purpose of the Charter was not to prevent such a
change, but merely to ensure that the change would take place
exclusively by peaceful means. Argentina's desire for the
Falklands seems to fall into this category.
Even though the Argentines justify their claim to the
Falklands in terms of legal title, what they actually seem to want
is an alteration to the existing configuration of boundaries.
Although, as Professor Rubin has pointed out, Argentina may
have had possession stripped from them, the combination of a
century and a half of effective occupation by the British and the
desire of the "Kelpers" to remain British, sharply brings into
question the credibility ot an existing Argentine legal claim. But
this fact does not invalidate the legitimacy of Argentina's desire
to renew its possession of the islands. What is at stake is not an
issue of law, but rather one of policy. As Inis Claude observes,
Argentina is requesting not a legal determination of ownership
but a legislative change of the legal status quo.
If understood in terms of a "peaceful change" problem, the
Falklands War can be seen in a new light. For years the Argen-
tines sought to work with the United Nations machinery to gain
control over the Falklands again. Indeed, as Inis Claude explains
elsewhere in this book, the Assembly had seemed to favor the
Argentine desire for the Falklands by placing the islands into
the category of a "colony whose removal from that status should
be negotiated as part of the process of implementing Resolution
1514 (XV), the Assembly's great emancipation proclamation of
55
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
I960." The Assembly even adopted Resolution 3160 in 1973
which, as Claude notes, "praises Argentina for its efforts to bring
about the decolonization of the territory and presses the parties
to make progress in negotiating the end of the colonial situation."
Given this UN support, why did Argentina resort to force to
gain the islands? Gaude suggests that this support may have
been precisely the reason. With the past record of UN approval
of "decolonization," Argentina could have perhaps anticipated
that the UN would be sympathetic, even if not overtly so, to
their action. But under the surface the Argentine action in-
dicates another problem—an utter lack of faith in the legitimacy
of the UN system of peaceful change. Under the theory of
peaceful change, states give up their right to self-help with the
understanding that institutional means will assure them a
reasonable way of seeking their desired change. This does not
mean that all countries will get what they seek, but rather that
the procedure will be workable and relatively impartial. Thus,
states will abide by the final result of such a procedure. By
attacking the Falklands, Argentina demonstrated that it had no
confidence in the ability of the United Nations to provide a just
resolution to their claim for the Falklands. Unfortunately, this
lack of confidence seems but symptomatic of a general feeling
that the United Nations system of peaceful change is ineffective.

International Law Revisited

Given these two shortcomings of international law—the failure
of collective security and the little legitimacy of means of
peaceful change—international legal scholars are forced to ex-
amine the larger question of the current status of international
law. If the Falklands War is another confirmation of these two
failures, what does this mean for the international law of conflict
management?
According to the jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and
Harold Lasswell, a legal norm is a rule that is both
"authoritative," that is, perceived as legally binding, and to a
large extent "controlling" of the actual behavior of states. While
some of the Charter provisions dealing with collective security
and peaceful change may indeed be viewed as authoritative, it
is more difficult to argue that they are to a large degree controll-
ing of state behavior. States did not behave in the Falklands
War as though they expected the enforcement provisions of
56
 FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
Chapter VII to be implemented. And the very fact that Argen-
tina resorted to force indicates that her behavior was not consis-
tent with the norms of peaceful change. A realistic assessment
suggests that it may no longer be appropriate to call those norms
"law," thus leaving a substantial gap in contemporary inter-
national law. But what, if anything, is attempting tofillthis gap?

(1) The Failure of Collective Security and the

Emergence of a New Norm
With respect to the gap caused by the failure of the Chapter VII
provisions on collective security, there may be a new norm that
is emerging to substitute for collective enforcement measures—
the extension of the Charter obligation to pursue the peaceful
settlement of international disputes from solely a pre-hostilities
obligation to one that continues even once hostilities have
begun. Under the Charter, states are obliged to pursue the
peaceful settlement of specific disputes. Article 33(1) provides:
"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice." Thus, states are to pursue the settlement of
disputes that are liable to endanger peace and security. If they
are unable to resolve the matter themselves, they are further
obligated, under article 37, to refer the matter to the Security
Council, which can, of course, intervene "at any stage of the
dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation
of like nature."
The initial intent of the framers of the Charter seems to have
been for this article 33(1) obligation to apply only prior to
Security Council consideration.3 Certainly once hostilities had
begun, the founders assumed that the Chapter VII provisions
would enter into effect. But with the failure of collective enforce-
ment, the international community seems to be trying to extend
the article 33(1) obligations throughout the conflict—to the
period following Security Council consideration and even after
hostilities have begun. This effort by the international commu-
nity can be seen in certain actions taken during other conflicts,
such as the Iran-Iraq War, but it is most recently noticeable in
the Falklands War.
As noted earlier, under the United Nations Charter rationale,
57
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
the blatant violation of article 2(4) by Argentina should have
given rise to collective sanctions against Argentina. Instead,
Resolution 502, while recognizing the existence of "a breach of
the peace" and putting the onus on Argentina to withdraw
from the islands and end hostilities, called upon both sides "to
seek a diplomatic solution" to the conflict. Even though the
Resolution placed more responsibility upon one country, the
Resolution implied that the Security Council, unwilling to act
militarily, expected both sides to fulfill a general responsibility
to seek a peaceful solution.
Before the British task force arrived at the islands and suc-
ceeded in removing the Argentine forces, a number of efforts
were made to achieve a peaceful resolution to the dispute, as
Professors Gaude and Kinney have pointed out. Among these
attempts to bring about a diplomatic solution was the mission
led by United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig.
Although both sides received Haig at their capitals and dis-
cussed the dispute, a compromise became impossible: "Neither
side could concede anything on the fundamental principle of
sovereignty. Britain demanded a return to the status quo ante;
Argentina insisted on recognition of the new status quo."4
Subsequently, President Belaunde-Terry of Peru and Javier
Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations,
attempted to reconcile the parties.
Even though all these efforts failed, they indicate the belief on
the part of at least some of the members of the international
community that, despite the occurrence of an armed attack,
both sides should still try to work out their differences by other
means. An example of this belief is revealed in a statement by
David C. Gompert, contained elsewhere in this volume.
Gompert, who was intimately involved in the Haig mission,
seems to acknowledge this mutual obligation to pursue peaceful
settlement while arguing that such an obligation cannot nullify
the right to self-defense: "Provided they are making a
reasonable effort to find a peaceful solution, countries that have
been attacked must be spared the onus of refusing to end
hostilities." The thrust of his argument is that Argentina cannot
simply attack another state, seize its territory, and then contend
that the other side has a responsibility to settle and, conceivably,
force it to concede the lost territory. But in making this argu-
ment, Gompert nevertheless recognized that even the attacked
state should make "a reasonable effort to find a peaceful solu-
tion." Indeed, it seems to be this assumption that lay beneath
58
 FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
both United States and United Nations peacemaking efforts
during the Falklands War.
While these responses of the international community do not
positively indicate the existence of a new norm of customary
international law, they do represent an attempt to Ml the void
left in international law by the failure of Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter. These efforts do suggest that the
obligation to pursue peaceful settlement during hostilities may
be emerging as a norm of the international law of conflict
management. This would be a positive development. Rather
than simply tolerating the existing gap in the law, the inter-
national community may be attempting to develop a new norm
to substitute for collective enforcement.

(2) The Failure of Peaceful Change

The growing illegitimacy of mechanisms for peaceful change
poses even more difficulties for the norms of conflict manage-
ment. Whereas the norm that may be emerging to act as a back-
up for collective security can be reconciled with the Charter
framework, the normative implications of the ineffectiveness of
means of peaceful change cannot be so neatly squared with the
Charter. Instead of conforming to the Charter prohibitions
against the use of force as a means of change, Argentina's
actions seem to confirm an unsettling trend toward the
legitimization of force based on the "justice" of the cause.5
As noted earlier, in 1960 the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 1514, which called for an immediate movement
toward decolonization. It further stipulated that, contrary to the
original desire of the framers of the Trusteeship system, lack of
preparation could not be used as a "pretext" for the colonial
powers to hinder rapid granting of independence. In the wake
of this Resolution, more and more colonies began to gain
independence. This decolonization process greatly altered the
composition of the United Nations. As newly independent
countries became members, they began using the General
Assembly as a platform for voicing their demands for inter-
national " justice."
These new states' demands for justice took several forms. Of
course it was natural that they demanded the continuing of the
decolonization process. States under the yoke of colonialism
were to be freed expeditiously. But the claims went beyond a
simple desire to end colonialism. The former colonies, as less
59
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
developed countries, began calling for "distributive justice."
The new states argued that, in light of the past injustices of the
exploitative colonial system, the industrialized countries owed
them for gains made at the expense of the colonies. Third World
countries began demanding a new world arrangement, a "New
International Economic Order" to solve the problem.
This movement toward justice also began to challenge radic-
ally the norms of conflict management. Claims for justice began
to imply the legitimacy of force to support movements for self-
determination. While arightto an indigenous revolution or war
of independence is recognized under international law, the new
claims implied that external states could forcibly assist the
liberation process. When India attacked the Portuguese colony
of Goa in 1961, it claimed, among other things, that it was acting
in self-defense, since the conquest of Goa in 1510 constituted an
act of aggression that continued for 450 years.6 It also con-
tended that the calls by the General Assembly for rapid decolon-
ization gave India the right to retake the colony. Indeed, the
"Definition of Aggression" adopted by the General Assembly in
1974 even suggested that liberation movements may have the
right to seek outside assistance. After enumerating a list of
actions that should normally be considered aggression, article 7
provides in part that " [n] othing in this Definition . . . could in
any way prejudice the right of self-determination, freedom and
independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly
deprived of that right . . . particularly peoples under colonial
and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the
right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive
support in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in
conformity with [the Declaration on Friendly Relations]"
(emphasis added). Although this right to "seek and receive
support" is qualified by reference to the Charter, it, in fact,
seems directly to contradict the intent of article 2(4). It implies
that liberation movements could receive outside assistance in
their struggle against the authority structure of a given state.
And, as Inis Claude has noted, the Resolution "is not an isolated
bit of United Nations rhetoric, but a passage typical of a long list
of resolutions solemnly approved by overwhelming majorities
in the United Nations and numerous other international
organizations, conferring international legitimacy upon wars of
national liberation, wars to achieve national self-determination,
wars to end racial oppression, and the like."
In view of these developments, it is not surprising that
60
 FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
Argentina took forceful steps to redress the perceived injustice of
British rule over the Falklands. The UN, as noted above, had
already labeled the Falklands issue a colonial question. The
international community also seemed to be downgrading the
importance of peaceful change, by approving resolutions that
seemed to make decolonization a legitimate causa belli. Given
these circumstances, it is no wonder that Argentina did not use
international mechanisms that it perceived as ineffective or too
slow.
The implications of this trend away from peaceful change are
disturbing for the future of international law. With force being
used more and more for establishing "justice," there seems to
be a retrogression to the pre-League of Nations regime of self-
help. If existing modes of pacific change have little legitimacy
and if collective enforcement mechanisms are ineffective, the
entire normative structure of the international law of conflict
management must be carefully examined. If the test that was
applied to the Chapter VII enforcement mechanisms is applied
to the most basic norm of conflict management, article 2(4), the
result is troubling. With the trend toward unilateral use of force
continuing, the scholar must question whether article 2(4) is
both authoritative and controlling. States often give lip-service
to the normative import of this proscription against force, thus
lending authority to the provision; but the great discrepancy
between the norm and state behavior indicates a lower level of
control. In light of this low level of control, it must be asked, as
Alberto Coll, Thomas Franck, and others have done, whether
this fundamental norm is still "law."
This problem presents a dilemma for students of international
law. On the one hand, scholars are obligated by intellectual
honesty to provide an accurate assessment of the current state
of international law. They must identify those norms that are
truly authoritative and controlling. But on the other hand, they
must endeavor to promote the maintenance of norms of conflict
management that attempt to provide for a more stable, secure,
and just world order. Article 2(4) may have lost some authority
and much control, but it may still be the best foundation for the
international law of conflict management. One does not want to
proclaim the norm's demise prematurely, and thereby con-
tribute to its decline.
This quandary is not easily resolved, but perhaps a moderate
course can be suggested. First, scholars must acknowledge the
shaky condition of article 2(4); they must recognize the trend
61
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
away from the basic prohibition of the unilateral use of force for
change. But, second, they must acknowledge that the norm has
not yet passed into oblivion. There is, admittedly, an ever
decreasing rate of compliance, but states do feel some sense of
obligation and the norm has restrained certain states from using
force on occasions when their short-term national goals seemed
to demand the use of force. In the Suez crisis, for example, the
United States acted against its French and British allies in order
to support the article 2(4) prohibition against the forceful
takeover of the canal. The United States recognized that the
control of force was in the long-term interest of the international
community and the United States. One reason Argentina may
not have received much physical support from her compadres in
the OAS who rhetorically supported her is that they sensed the
illegitimacy of the Argentine actions. Generally, states still seem
to want article 2 (4), even though in a particular setting they may
change their minds. Writing in response to Professor Thomas
Franck's 1970 article, "Who killed Artide 2(4)?/' Professor Louis
Henkin has commented that" [njo government, no responsible
official of government, has been prepared to pronounce it
[artide 2 (4)] dead/7 In sum, artide 2 (4) still has a legitimizing
and constraining influence that prevents the international
environment from disintegrating into something even more
anarchical. A pre-League regime of self-help that is legitimized
by customary international law would be far worse than the
contemporary order, even with all its problems.7

Conclusion
From the perspective of international law, the Falklands crisis
demonstrates both a positive and a negative trend. With the
failure of collective enforcement mechanisms, there is a new
norm emerging—the extension of the obligation to pursue
peaceful settlement of international disputes. This is positive; it
demonstrates the efforts of the international community to com-
pensate for the loss of collective security. But with the perceived
illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of means of peaceful change, the
normative force of artide 2 (4) is being called into question. This
negative trend could have grave effects on the Charter structure
of conflict management. If, however, as Professor John Norton
Moore has pointed out, the international community is con-
stantly engaged in a "struggle for law/'—a struggle to determine
62
 FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
what the law will be—then the task for statesmen, scholars, and
diplomats should be to encourage the positive development of
a new norm, while discouraging a return to the old system of
self-help.

Notes: Chapter 5
1 M. McDougal and F. Felidano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 18-19.
2 T. Franck, "Who killed article 2 (4)? Or: Changing norms governing the use
of force by states," American Journal of International Law, vol. 64 (1970), p. 809.
3 See L. Goodrich, E. Hambro, and A. Simons, Charter of the United Nations,
3d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 261.
4 L. Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands," Foreign Affairs, vol. 61
(1982), p. 146.
5 See I. Claude, "Just wars: doctrines and institutions," Political Science
Quarterly, vol. 83 (1980), pp. 92-6.
6 Q. Wright, "The Goa incident," American Journal of International Law, vol. 56
(1962), p. 622.
7 Quote from L. Henkin, Editorial Comment, "The reports of the death of
article 2 (4) are greatly exaggerated," American Journal of International Law, vol.
65 (1971), p. 547.

63
 6
The Falklands Crisis and
the Laws of War
HOWARD S. LEVIE

One week before the Argentine surrender at Port Stanley, the

well-respected British news journal, The Economist, published an
article captioned "War Laws—Made To Be Broken." After
discussing a number of provisions of the laws of war which the
writer, obviously not an expert in the field, thought had been
violated during the course of the hostilities, he ended up with
this alarming conclusion: "These, and no doubt other matters
not yet to appear, will be the subject of anguished inquiry, once
the fighting ends." Despite such contentions, the laws of war
were more widely observed in the Falklands crisis than in any
other conflict since World War n. This essay will analyze several
law-of-war problems that arose during the hostilities, and will
illustrate the degree to which both belligerents succeeded in
observing legal norms of combat without any significant military
disadvantage.

Maritime Exclusion Zone

The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands began on 2 April
1982. Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations that same day;
but it was not until 7 April 1982, five days later, that Great
Britain took itsfirstreal retaliatory step, announcing that as from
12 April 1982 it was establishing a "maritime exclusion zone"
200 miles around the Falkland Islands, and that any Argentine
warships and naval auxiliaries thereafter within that zone "will
be treated as hostile and are liable to be attacked by British
64
 THE LAWS OF WAR
forces." On the following day Argentina responded by
establishing a 200-mile defense zone off its coast and around
the Falklands.
When the British announcement was made the impression
was given, and it was generally understood, that the British
nuclear submarine Superb was on station in that area and this
was undoubtedly the major reason for the failure of the Argen-
tine fleet to emerge from its base at Puerto Belgrano, south of
Buenos Aires. There were later complaints that the press, as
well as the Argentines, had been intentionally misled when it
was discovered that the Superb was at its base in Scotland.
However, this was a perfectly valid and successful piece of
"disinformation" by the British.
Since the 1856 Declaration of Paris it has been a settled rule of
maritime warfare that a blockade, in order to be binding, must
be effective; that is, the blockading belligerent must be able to
enforce its announced blockade. The British declaration was not
really a blockade, as merchant ships and neutral vessels were
not barred from the exclusion zone; it only applied to enemy
naval vessels. It was, therefore, nothing more than a gratuitous
warning to the Argentine naval forces. A state of armed conflict
certainly existed between Argentina and Great Britain and,
hence, the armed forces of each, including naval vessels, were,
apart from some limitations not here applicable, subject to attack
wherever found. In any event, if, by disinformation, a
belligerent can convince the enemy (and neutrals) that there is
an effective blockade in existence, then there is an effective
blockade.
On 23 April the British informed the Argentine government
that "any approach on the part of Argentine warships, sub-
marines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which would
amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces
in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate
response." At the same time it stated that "all Argentine
vessels, including merchant vessels orfishingvessels apparently
engaged in surveillance of or intelligence gathering activities
against British forces in the South Atlantic, would also be
regarded as hostile." Then on 30 April the British extended their
maritime exclusion zone to include "any ships and any aircraft"
found therein. This was now a true blockade—and, presumably,
there were now British submarines on station in the area
prepared to enforce the declaration. So far as is known, only one
Argentine support ship, the Formosa, managed thereafter to
65
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
reach the Falkland Islands. A number of military cargo aircraft
were also successful in reaching their destination before the
British carriers arrived in the area. It is interesting to note that
sometime after the hostilities had ended a United Press Inter-
national dispatch from Buenos Aires quoted an Argentine general
as saying that the British air and sea blockade "was a success,
a total success."
On 2 May the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, was sunk
by a British submarine with a loss of almost 400 lives. The exact
location of the Belgrano at the time of the attack has not been
officially disclosed, but there have been suggestions that it was
about 35 miles outside the maritime exclusion zone. Certainly,
a cruiser of a belligerent has no right to consider itself immune
from enemy attack because it is on the high seas beyond the
range of a proclaimed maritime exclusion zone. Great Britain
justified its action by pointing out that the cruiser was a threat
to its picket ships, frigates, and destroyers, and that it had
previously advised the Argentine goverment of the estab-
lishment of a defensive zone around units of the British fleet
which the Belgrano had disregarded. Sympathy for the Argen-
tine loss, and the feeling that the British had somehow been
"unfair," were quickly dissipated when, two days later, on 4
May an Exocet missile fired by an Argentine plane hit and sank
the British destroyer Sheffield with a loss of about twenty lives.
On 7 May the British extended their war zone to 12 miles off
the Argentine coast. This blockade was completely effective,
made so by the Argentine fear that if its fleet sortied from its
base it would be the victim of the British nuclear submarines
which were now, beyond any doubt, patrolling the waters off
the coast of Argentina outside the twelve-mile limit. However,
on 15 May the Soviet Ambassador in London advised the British
government that the Soviet Union considered the British
blockade to be unlawful because it "arbitrarily proclaimed) vast
expanses of the high seas closed to ships and craft of other
countries," citing the 1958 Convention on the High Seas as the
basis for its claim. Of course, a blockade always denies the use
of part of the high seas to other countries. While the Soviet
Union might have questioned the extent of the blockaded area
as excessive, if the blockade was effective (and there seems little
doubt that it was), it was a valid blockade under the 1856
Declaration of Paris, to which Russia was one of the original
parties.

66
 THE LAWS OF WAR
Fishing Vessels
In 1900 the United States Supreme Court held that by customary
international law fishing vessels were exempt from seizure by
enemy naval forces in time of war.1 In 1907 this rule was incor-
porated into the Hague Convention No. XI. Article 3 (1) of that
Convention says, in part, that "[v]essels used exclusively for
fishing along the coast... are exempt from capture." Paragraph
2 of that same article goes on to qualify that provision by stating
that " [tjhey cease to be exempt as soon as they take any part
whatsoever in hostilities." As we have already seen, on 23 April
1982 the British government informed the Argentine government
that, among other things, "fishing vessels apparently engaged
in surveillance or intelligence gathering activities" would be
regarded as hostile. This statement was really unnecessary as it
was merely another declaration of the British intention to apply
existing law.
On 9 May 1982 the Argentine fishing vessel Narwal was
attacked by British forces and was so severely damaged that she
sank on the following day. At the time of the attack she was
about 60-70 miles within the British maritime exclusion zone,
shadowing British fleet units. According to one report: "She
was not armed but she was a spy ship with an Argentine Navy
Lieutenant Commander on board sending back information
about the [British] fleet's movements."2 The Argentines have
not denied that allegation. That being so, the Narwal had lost her
immunity and was legally subject to the treatment which she
received.

Hospital Ships
Shortly after hostilities in the Falklands began the British
government requisitioned the SS Uganda, a vessel previously
used for education cruises for schoolchildren, converting it into
a hospital ship. There were allegations that en route to the
South Atlantic the Uganda carried combat troops.3 If such
allegations are true, this was a violation of articles 30 (2) and 33
of the Second Geneva Convention of 1949 on the treatment of
sick and wounded sailors. While extra medical personnel may
be carried on hospital ships, combat troops may not be. The fact
that after the combat troops were debarked the vessel was used
exclusively for proper purposes does not change the situation.
67
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
When a hospital ship is used for improper purposes it ceases
permanently to be entitled to the immunity granted to such
ships. During both World Wars there were numerous claims of
the misuse of hospital ships and rejection of their subsequent
entitlement to immunity. It appears that such claims are inevit-
able and that, all too often, they will be justified.
The Economist (5 June 1982, p. 20) asserted that by bringing
the Uganda into Falkland Sound at night to pick up wounded
and shipwrecked Argentine soldiers the British "may have
breached" the provision that hospital ships must "be situated in
such a manner that attacks against military objectives cannot
imperil their safety." The reporter or editor who wrote that
article was obviously not very familiar with the laws of war. He
cited the First Geneva Convention of 1949, which is concerned
with land warfare, not sea warfare; and the provision he quoted
relates to the placement of medical establishments and units on
land, not to hospital ships. Article 18 (1) of the Second Conven-
tion makes it mandatory that" [a] fter each engagement, Parties
to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures to
search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick."
This is presumably what the Uganda was doing in the Sound,
and it is one of the humanitarian functions of everf hospital
ship.

Incendiary Weapons
Among the Argentine material captured by the British on the
Falkland Islands was a large supply of napalm, one of the most
effective incendiary weapons in military arsenals. This caused a
great deal of critical comment in the British press. Actually, even
under the provisions of Protocol III of the still unratified 1980
Conventional Weapons Convention, incendiaries such as
napalm are not outlawed, only their mode of use is restricted;
and since those restrictions are all directed towards the protec-
tion of civilians, it does not appear that they would have been
violated by Argentine use against British combat troops.

Protecting Powers
Diplomatic relations between Argentina and Great Britain were
broken off on 2 April 1982, immediately after the news of the
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 THE LAWS OF WAR
Argentine landings on the Falklands reached London. Shortly
thereafter Great Britain requested the Swiss government to act
as its Protecting Power vis-^-vis Argentina, presumably
pursuant to Common Article 8/8/8/9 of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions, while the Argentine government requested Brazil
to act in that capacity on its behalf. Even though they performed
no major functions in the military area, this is of extreme import-
ance in view of the fact that it was the first clear-cut instance of
the use of Protecting Powers since World War II, despite the
innumerable international armed conflicts which have occurred
in the interim. There were, for example, no Protecting Powers
in either Korea or Vietnam, and there do not appear to be any
in the Iran-Iraq War.

Civilians
Civilians presented on the whole a physical rather than a legal
problem. However, there were a number of rules of the laws of
war which came into play. When resistance at Port Stanley ended
on 2 April, Governor Rex Hunt (in full ceremonial dress with
a white-plumed Napoleon-style hat), his wife, and his family
were escorted to an Argentine Air Force plane and flown to
Montevideo, Uruguay. The British Antarctic Survey Team's
civilian scientists, based at Grytviken, on South Georgia, were
also repatriated by the Argentines after a short delay. LADE, the
airline which had been operated by the Argentine Air Force
between Port Stanley and Commodoro Rivadavia, in South
Argentina, continued to fly after the Argentine takeover. While
eighty to one hundred British subjects who were living on the
islands as civilian employees of the British government elected
to avail themselves of this method of departure with their
families, only twenty-one "Kelpers" so elected; and when
members of the Anglo-Argentine community in Argentina pro-
posed that a neutral ship be sent to the islands to evacuate the
300 children to the mainland, it was the Falkland Islanders, not
the Argentine government, who rejected the proposal.
Article 35(1) of the Fourth Geneva convention of 1949
authorizes the departure of protected persons (civilians) from
the territory of a party to the conflict. On the basis of the Argen-
tine claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their
dependencies, this article would have been applicable. How-
ever, if we adopt the thesis of British sovereignty, then the
69
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
departure of those who left the islands was an act of grace by
Argentina since article 48 of that Convention, relating to
occupied territory, only requires the Occupying Power to permit
the departure of protected persons who are not nationals of the
power whose territory is occupied—and all but thirty of the
Falkland Islanders and other residents were British nationals.
(The other thirty were Argentines.) One British subject, William
Luxton, was deported, probably because he was considered to
be a subversive influence; several others were apparently placed
in a detention center at Fox Bay. Article 41 (1) of the Fourth Con-
vention states that the only measures of control which the
Occupying Power may adopt with respect to protected persons
are assigned residence and internment. Deportation is specific-
ally prohibited by article 49 (1) of the Convention but it may be
assumed that Mr. Luxton preferred it to internment. Article 42
(1) of the Convention authorizes internment if the security of the
Occupying Power makes it necessary—a decision which, of
course, is a subjective one made by that power. Accordingly, the
action of the Argentines in this respect was within the purview
of and in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
There were estimated to be 17,000 British passport-holders in
Argentina when hostilities commenced on 2 April 1982. The
Argentine government announced that it would guarantee the
safety of these individuals. Nevertheless, on 5 April the British
government broadcast a radio message recommending that
they leave the country. How many did so is unknown but there
is no evidence that the Argentine government made any effort
to prevent them from exercising the right granted to them by
article 35 of the Fourth Convention, mentioned above, to leave
the territory of a party to the conflict.
Argentina claimed in a television broadcast that the British
were guilty of "indiscriminate bombing" of Port Stanley as
a result of which two civilians were killed and four were
wounded. Inasmuch as more than 10,000 members of the
Argentine military forces were crowded into the area of that
small town (normal population: 1,050), with somewhere
between 250 and 600 civilians who had remained in their homes,
the civilian casualties appear to have been remarkably light.
Certainly, the British bombardment and bombing of the Argen-
tine personnel and positions in Port Stanley cannot be said to
have violated any provision of the 1907 Hague Regulations on
Land Warfare, 1SK)7 Hague Convention No. DC on Naval
Bombardment, or the as-yet inapplicable 1977 Protocol I. The
70
 THE LAWS OF WAR
residents of Port Stanley were British nationals and were the
persons on whose behalf the British forces had traveled 8,000
miles to fight and there is no reason to believe that the British
commanders did not exercise the utmost caution on their behalf.
Thus, when, on 13 June 1982, the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) proposed the creation of a "neutral zone"
for the protection of the civilians still in Port Stanley, the British
immediately agreed. The Argentines did so on the following day
and the ICRC announced that it had arranged for such a zone.

Prisoners of War
Article 13 (1) of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 provides
that " [p]risoners of war must at all times be humanely treated."
Although there were undoubtedly individual cases in which this
provision was violated during the hostilities in the Falkland
Islands, on the whole the treatment of prisoners of war, first by
the Argentines and later by the British, more closely resembled
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 than either World War I,
World War II, Korea, or Vietnam. In this respect, as in others,
the war was fought as a "gentlemen's war." Thus, although
article 118 of the Third Convention merely requires the release
and repatriation of prisoners of war "without delay after the
cessation of active hostilities," the Royal Marines captured on
both the Falkland Islands and on South Georgia were
repatriated almost immediately by the Argentines. So also were
two Royal Air Force technicians captured at the airfield at Port
Stanley, men who were able to provide the British with valuable
intelligence information.
When the British began to take prisoners of war, first on South
Georgia and then on the Falkland Islands, they followed the
pattern established by the Argentines of promptly repatriating
them. In fact, the practice was so regular and so prompt that it
aroused the ire of the Royal Navy when the entire crew of the
Argentine submarine Santa Fe, captured by the British at South
Georgia, was quickly returned to Argentina. As one report
stated, "to give the Argentines back a fully trained crew of
submarine specialists seemed the height of folly."4
We have seen that article 118 of the Third Convention requires
the repatriation of prisoners of war "without delay after the
cessation of active hostilities." Despite this clear provision, India
held Pakistani prisoners of war for over two years after the
71
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
complete cessation of active hostilities, from December 1971 to
March-April 1974, allegedly because there was no guarantee
that hostilities would not break out again, but actually as
political hostages in an effort to compel Pakistan to recognize
Bangladesh. Contrary to the procedure followed by India,
which flagrantly violated the Convention provision, Great
Britain began the repatriation of Argentine prisoners of war
immediately after the final surrender of the Argentine forces on
the Falklands. At first the British sought to obtain a statement
from Argentina acknowledging the cessation of active hostil-
ities. Even though such an acknowledgment was not forth-
coming, the British quickly repatriated over 10,000 prisoners of
war, retaining about 550 officers, including the Argentine com-
mander on the Falklands, General Menendez. Within a month,
despite the Argentine government's refusal to admit to a
complete cessation of hostilities, the remaining prisoners of war
were returned by the British.
There were some instances in which it has been suggested
that the provisions of the Third Convention may have been
violated. When the Royal Marines at Port Stanley surrendered
they were required to lie on the ground, face down, under
guard while they were being searched for weapons.
Photographs were made of that scene. It has been implied that
the taking of those photographs violated article 13(2) of the
Convention which requires that prisoners of war be protected
against "insults and public curiosity/' Inasmuch as hundreds of
photographs have been taken and published in every war of the
moment of surrender, hands held high in the air, and full-faced,
with no complaints by the belligerents, and inasmuch as it is
impossible to recognize any particular individual in the
Falklands picture, there is at least a reasonable doubt that the
photograph violated article 13 (2) of the Convention.
One Argentine naval sub-officer was shot and killed while a
prisoner of war, while apparently attempting to sabotage the
captured submarine Santa Fe. The British immediately informed
the Argentine government of the incident through the medium
of the International Committee of the Red Cross and instituted
a Court of Inquiry, presumably pursuant to article 121 of the
Third Convention. TTie Argentine government was advised of
the result reached by that court, which exonerated the British
guard, and apparently it was satisfied that justice was done.
As in all modern armed conflicts, land mines were used in the
Falklands in great profusion; at the end of hostilities, their
72
 THE LAWS OF WAR
removal became a major problem. Article 7 of Protocol II to the
as yet unratified 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention con-
tains provisions for the recording of the location of minefields.
Apparently, as is not unusual in modern warfare, this was not
done in many instances by the Argentines, with the result that
the locating and removal of the numerous buried mines became
a slow, painstaking, and dangerous procedure.
After World War II large numbers of captured German
soldiers were retained in France for the purpose of removing
mines, and a substantial number were killed or injured in the
process. As a result, article 52(1) of the Third Convention
specifically provides that only prisoners of war who volunteer
for the task may be employed on labor which is of a dangerous
nature, and the third paragraph of that article provides that the
removal of "mines and similar devices" is to be considered
dangerous. It has been asserted that captured Argentine
soldiers were "ordered" to clear minefields near Goose Green.
If this was so, it constituted a clear violation of the provisions
of the Convention. If they were volunteers, it did not.
Article 117 of the Third Convention provides that "[n]o
repatriated person may be employed on active military service."
While the meaning of this phrase is subject to numerous inter-
pretations there can be no doubt that it precludes the use of
repatriated personnel in actual combat. There are charges that
some Royal Marines, captured by the Argentines on South
Georgia and repatriated to Great Britain, were subsequently
included in the British Task Force. If this was so, it was a
violation of the provisions of the Convention.
One interesting episode occurred with respect to prisoners of
war. When Captain Alfredo Astiz, the commander of the Argen-
tine forces on South Georgia, surrendered to the British forces
on 22 April 1982, he and the commander of the Santa Fe, the
Argentine submarine which had been captured that morning,
were entertained at dinner by the British officers. Subsequently,
it was alleged that Captain Astiz was the infamous "Captain
Death," one of the most sadistic of the government's inter-
rogators during the suppression of the guerrilla movement in
Argentina some years before. Sweden wanted to question him
concerning eyewitness reports that he had shot a young
Swedish girl. France wanted to question him concerning the
disappearance of two French nuns. This raised an interesting
question of law. The offenses were alleged to have occurred in
Argentina long before the beginning of the hostilities between
73
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Argentina and Great Britain. Assuming that they constituted
violations of article 3 of the Fourth Convention, dealing with
non-international armed conflicts, can a Detaining Power in a
subsequent international armed conflict turn over a prisoner of
war to a third state, a party to the Conventions, for possible trial
and punishment? The British answered that question in the
negative, rejecting the Swedish and French requests. Whether
that decision was correct remains an open question. After being
taken to Great Britain, where he was subjected to what has
been described as a "token" interrogation, Captain Astiz was
repatriated.

Mercenaries
One of the most difficult problems which confronted the
Diplomatic Conference drafting the 1977 Protocol I involved
proposals seeking to eliminate the use of mercenaries. Under
the definition now contained in article 47 of that instrument, one
of the requirements for categorizing an individual as a
mercenary is that he "is motivated to take part in the hostilities
essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised
by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party".
The Gurkha Rifles have been part of the British Army for well
over 100 years. They are recruited from an ethnic group which
lives in what is now Nepal. During World War II there were 100
battalions of Gurkhas in the British Army; today there are five
such battalions. When it became known that the 7th Gurkha
Rifles was being sent to the Falklands, Argentina protested to
Nepal. Whether that protest was based on the allegation that the
Gurkhas were serving the British as mercenaries, or was made
merely because they were Nepalese citizens, is not known. The
Gurkhas are certainly motivated by the desire for private gain.
They serve the required number of years, and then retire in
Nepal as relatively prosperous citizens. However, inasmuch as
they receive a considerably smaller pay than do British soldiers,
it is doubtful that they come within the definition of
mercenaries.

Neutrals and Neutrality

Prior to World War n, during hostilities there was a dichotomy
74
 THE LAWS OF WAR
under which all states in the world community were either
belligerents or neutrals, with well-established rules applicable to
each status. At various times in the course of World War II, Italy
and Spain, and perhaps others, announced that they were
"non-belligerents." That term can be defined best by saying: "I
hope that you win, and I will do everything I can to help you,
except fight." During the Anglo-Argentine hostilities in the
Falkland Islands, the United States did not officially use the term
"non-belligerent," but that was undoubtedly its status. After
Secretary Haig failed in his peacemaking efforts, the United
States announced its support of Great Britain which included a
willingness to supply any military aid short of direct involve-
ment of American combat forces. On 29 April 1982 the United
States Senate adopted a resolution in which it declared that "the
United States cannot stand neutral." Five days later, on 4 May,
the United States House of Representatives adopted a similar
resolution in which it expressed "full diplomatic support of
Great Britain in its efforts to uphold the rule of law." In the
course of the war the United States furnished the British with
a secure method of communication with its nuclear submarines
in the war zone, weather information, aviation fuel, use of the
airfield on Ascension Island, ammunition and missiles, and
KC-135 tanker planes.5 A request for AWACS was refused
because it would have involved American airmen in the
hostilities. Whether the United States acted in accordance with
the rules of neutrality which existed prior to World War II is, at
the very least, questionable.
There was speculation that, despite the strong anti-
communist stance of the Argentine junta, it was receiving aid of
various kinds from the Soviet Union. It can be assumed that if
the Soviet Union considered the granting of such aid to be in its
own interests, it would not have found it impossible to overlook
the ideological differences. The USSR abstained on, but did not
veto, United Nations Resolution 502, calling for Argentina to
withdraw its forces from the Falkland Islands. The Soviets also
employed surface vessels and planes from Angola and Cuba for
surveillance of the British Task Force as it sailed towards the
South Atlantic. This, however, may have been routine since
Soviet ships and planes do this with respect to all naval
movements of Western powers; there is no hard evidence that
the USSR passed the information so obtained to the Argentines.
In fact, it has been suggested, with a good deal of reason, that
had the Soviet Union been doing so the Narwal would never
75
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
have been sent on the suicidal spy mission in which it was
engaged when it was sunk by the British.

Implications for the Laws of War

In some important respects, the Falklands crisis offers much
hope for the continued viability of the laws of war. Despite the
intense nationalistic rivalries underlying it, the conflict
illustrates that states can wage conventional warfare in com-
pliance with the laws of war without thereby giving adversaries
a substantial military advantage. But, on the other hand, one
must be mindful of the peculiar qualities of the Falklands War
that made it possible for the laws of war to exert their restraining
influence. First, this was a limited war, fought for limited ends
with limited means. For both parties the end was quite specific-
control of a particular territory. This was not an abstract, hazy
goal, but rather a concrete, easily recognizable objective. The
means, too, were limited. The adversaries restricted their opera-
tions to the disputed territory, and refrained from military
actions against die enemy's homeland; had it not been con-
ducted otherwise, the war would have been much more violent
and destructive and could have released the kind of political
frenzy and hatred that weaken the observance of the laws of
war. Second, the adversaries, despite obvious differences in
political regimes, saw themselves as members of the same
civilization, and shared many cultural affinities and bonds-
some stretching over centuries. This helps to explain why the
war was in many respects a "gentlemen's war." Third, the con-
flict was brief. It is difficult to predict how well the laws of war
would have been observed had this been a protracted struggle,
filled with the usual weariness and mounting frustration against
the enemy. It is an open question whether further conflicts that
lack all these special characteristics will have as encouraging a
record on the observance of the laws of war as did the Falklands
War of 1982.

Notes: Chapter 6
The facts presented in this essay were drawn primarily from Christopher
Dobson, The Falklands Conflict (1982), and from press reports contained in such
publications as The Economist, U.S. News & World Report, Time, the New York
Times, and others for the period of 1 April to 1 July 1982.

76
 THE LAWS OF WAR
1 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
2 Christopher Dobson, The Falkknds Conflict (London: Hodder & Stoughton,
1982), p. 104.
3 The Uganda may have been confused with the Canberra (New York Times, 28
May 1982, p. A8:4). In a letter dated 8 October 1982 Captain L. W. L. Chelton,
R.N. Chief Naval judge Advocate of the Royal Navy, advised the author that
no British hospital ship carried combat troops to the South Atlantic; and that
members of the International Committee of the Red Cross, carried thereon,
could verify this.
4 Dobson, The Falkknds Conflict, pp. 156-7.
5 The British were legally entitled to use the Ascension airfield under an agree-
ment, "Use of Wideawake Airfield in Ascension Island by United Kingdom
Military Aircraft/' signed at Washington, 29 August 1962 (13 UST1917, TIAS
5148, 449 UNTS 177).

77
 PART TWO

The Challenges to Diplomacy

 7
Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy
and the Falklands Crisis
DOUGLAS KINNEY

Argentina raised the question of the Malvinas Islands in the

Subcommittee on Small Territories of the UN Special Commit-
tee on Decolonization (the C-24) in 1964. Both Britain and the
United States were then members of the C-24. The British posi-
tion was that sovereignty was not negotiable but that questions
of the welfare of the islanders and contacts with Argentina
should indeed be discussed. The report of the Special Com-
mittee resulted in General Assembly Resolution 2065 of 16
December 1965, citing the Falklands as an instance of "colonial-
ism." The Resolution called for bilateral negotiations toward a
peaceful settlement of the territorial dispute and referred to both
the UN Charter and the 1960 General Assembly Resolution 1514
(XV) on decolonization.
In January 1966, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart discussed
the Falklands with authorities in Buenos Aires and six months
later a bilateral meeting was held in London. The British hoped
to lessen friction and limit the scale of the dispute. But Argen-
tina sought the return of its sovereignty over the islands. They
saw the 1966 talks as too formal and without any serious results.
The Argentines made a four-page statement. In response, the
British unofficially, and under the cover of public disclaimers
to the contrary, suggested that the United Kingdom had no
strategic, political, or economic interests to pursue in the
Falklands, that the islands were almost self-sufficient, that they
would eventually become Argentine territory, and the main
question was the timing and method of Argentina's recovery of
sovereignty.
81
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Unofficial incidents raised Argentine public consciousness
about the Falklands as much as official policy. In September 1964
a light plane landed at Port Stanley, planted an Argentine flag,
and took off without being stopped. In September 1966 twenty
Argentines hijacked an Argentine Airline's DC-4 and forced it
to land at Port Stanley. The Argentine government denied
responsibility for or association with both incidents. Thefirstof
these incidents led to the establishment of the contingent of
Royal Marines on East Falklands, and the second one to that
contingent being raised to platoon strength.
In November 1966 Britain proposed a thirty-year freeze on the
question of sovereignty. During the freeze no actions regarding
normalization of relations, trade, and other contacts would be
taken as affecting either party's position. At the end of the
freeze, the Falklanders would choose between British and
Argentine sovereignty. Argentina rejected the freeze proposal.
In March 1967 the British informed Argentina that under cer-
tain conditions the United Kingdom would cede sovereignty of
the Falkland Islands to Argentina. The primary condition was
that the wishes of the islanders were to be a determining factor.
It was made clear in parliamentary and public statements that
the United Kingdom would not cede sovereignty without the
express consent of the Kelpers.1 As the parties began to
negotiate a preliminary understanding, the islanders objected to
what they perceived as a movement toward Argentine
sovereignty. They began lobbying Parliament and the British
public through the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee
against any discussion of sovereignty transfer. Soon the British
government publicly stated that there would be no such transfer
without the consent of the islanders.
Discussion of the wishes of the islanders, however, was a less
difficult issue than safeguarding their interests in the event of a
sovereignty transfer. In August 1968 the United Kingdom
agreed to language recognizing future Argentine sovereignty
following a settlement of how the "interests of the islanders
would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be
offered by the Argentine government." In a unilateral statement
to be published in parallel the British government would state
that the transfer of sovereignty would have to be acceptable to
the people on the islands. This was the high water mark of con-
crete discussions of the transfer of sovereignty but it was turned
back by the reaction of the Kelpers, Parliament, and the British
press. The Argentine government stated that it could accept
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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE DIPLOMACY
neither the contingency on the wishes of the islanders nor the
United Kingdom's unilateral statement on the subject being
linked to the memorandum of understanding. The British
Cabinet then decided to abandon the attempt to reach a settle-
ment on the basis of transfer of sovereignty as sketched out in
the memorandum.
From December 1968 the principal course of British policy on
negotiations was set. They would negotiate with Argentina, yet
make it clear that the transfer of sovereignty without the
Kelpers' consent was not negotiable. The wishes of the islanders
(self-determination) were enshrined as the basis of British
negotiation policy.
Strangely, Argentina was willing to reopen talks in June 1970.
Sovereignty was not on the agenda. Improved communications
and transport were successfully negotiated and, in 1971, air and
sea services arrangements between the Falkland Islands and
Argentina were agreed upon. Argentina offered the Kelpers a
travel document allowing them freedom of movement in Argen-
tina and a package of economic inducements, including
reciprocity on taxes, exemption from Argentine military service,
scholarships and domestic-rate mail service, telegram and
telephone service. Within five years the agreements led to the
Treaty of Communications, which included the abolition of
passports and the Argentine construction of an airstrip. Argen-
tina undertook to supply fuel and air transport for the
Falklands. Argentina perceived that with the communications
agreement it had made major concessions; it had abandoned
years of consistency on subjects such as rejecting postal and
passport arrangements and, in its view, had received no
reciprocal concessions from the United Kingdom.
The British government in January 1974 began to assess the
possibility of a condominium rather than an outright transfer of
sovereignty. After consultations with the islands' executive
council, the new Wilson government raised with the Argentines
the possibility of a condominium without the approval or par-
ticipation of the islanders. By August 1974 it was clear that the
Kelpers were balking and the United Kingdom informed the
Argentine government that the discussions would not be
practical.
Taking a cue from the apparent Argentine willingness to pur-
sue the mutual benefit approach, the United Kingdom proposed
in July 1975 discussions of joint development of the southwest
Atlantic. Argentine Foreign Minister Vignes accepted the
83
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
possibility and linked it to a transfer of sovereignty with a lease-
back for a fixed term. The Argentine proposal included
immediate occupancy of South Georgia and the South Sand-
wich Islands.
The hardening of the Argentine position, under way for some
two years already, was cemented by the announcement in
October 1975 of the Shackleton survey to assess the long-term
economic possibilities for the development of the Falkland
Islands and its dependencies. Argentina noted that the
Shackleton team arrived in the islands on the anniversary of the
1833 occupation, and increased its strong rhetoric implying
the possibility of an invasion. Argentina also rejected Prime
Minister Callaghan's offer of 2 January 1976 to send a senior
British official for confidential discussions.
In February 1976 the Argentine destroyer Storni fired on and
attempted to board a British vessel, coincidentally called the
Shackleton, 78 miles south of Port Stanley. Interestingly enough,
this action took place under a civilian government. The military,
though apparently not the Argentine government, had been
planning the action since before the first of the year with the
apparent intention of avoiding casualties and, not incidentally,
reinforcing the Argentine claim to a 200-mile territorial sea
which included the continental shelf and encircled the Falklands
as well.
In July and August 1976 private talks began with the military
government which had taken power in the coup of 23 March.
The Callaghan government had reviewed its policy and decided
in March that a fresh dialogue on the full range of issues in
the dispute, including future constitutional relationships
(sovereignty), was in order.
It is interesting to note that the first instinct of President
Videla's military government was to turn not to the force of
arms but to bilateral talks and then to the United Nations.
Argentina secured in Resolution 31/49 approval of the view of
the C-24 that Argentina had made continuous efforts to facilitate
decolonization and to promote the well-being of the Kelpers.
The military were also pursuing a parallel track along the lines
of the earlier Shackleton incident. The patrol helicopter of HMS
Endurance, the icebreaker on station each Antarctic summer,
discovered an Argentine military presence on the South Sand-
wich island of Southern Thule. The Argentines apparently had
gone ahead with a unilateral occupation. The British Foreign
Minister requested a military response.
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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE DIPLOMACY
A formal British protest on 19 January called the establishment
of the station a violation of British sovereignty in the South
Sandwich Islands. The United Kingdom presented no ultim-
atum, however, simply expressing the hope that Britain would
soon learn that the program had been terminated. This left the
Argentines the opportunity either to retain their presence or
gracefully retreat, confident that the effort and the precedent
were worthwhile for their cause. The British made no public
announcement and the existence of the station remained a
closely held secret for almost five months. During that period
the station was reinforced. Indeed, the intention had been to
reinforce it to considerable size until mid- or late March when
weather would prevent British ships from entering South
Atlantic waters.
If any one factor would make succeeding Argentine decision-
makers doubt the political will or military capability of the
British government, it was their continuing, militarily unchal-
lenged presence on Southern Thule. Distinct, minor, and token
as that presence might be, the United Kingdom had labeled it
a violation of its sovereignty, as it clearly was. The fact that it
was tolerated from 1977 to 1982 spoke well for British restraint
in the Falklands negotiations but augured poorly as a
demonstration of British will to the Argentines.
In November 1977 the British government secretly dispatched
a hunter-killer submarine and supporting surface ships to the
Falklands in response to both the earlier firing on HMS
Shackleton and the Argentine landing on Southern Thule. The
diplomatic climate was bad. The Argentine press was rife with
invasion rumors and the Argentines had interrupted the fuel
supply to the Falklands. New York talks were scheduled for
December with Ted Rowlands leading the British delegation.
But Argentine press and public opinion saw these as unlikely to
be productive. Invasion was again the watchword in Argentina's
lively political culture. The British colony of Belize also bordered
on crisis, reinforcing the general feeling that Argentina might
try force in the Falklands.
The level of bilateral tension decreased, as the New York talks
were smooth, if not highly productive. The parties set up sub-
commissions to discuss sovereignty and the parallel economic/
social conditions and programs. The submarine and its escorts
remained on station during December as these negotiations pro-
ceeded in New York. The British Cabinet decided that the
dispatch of the submarine should be kept secret lest it prompt
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
the Argentines to invade. Since Argentina was not informed of
the submarine's presence in the area, it was neither militarily
deterred nor made aware of the potential cost of an invasion.
The attack on a British vessel and the other hostile measures
were not met with any known British response other than a
return to the negotiating table.
The high water mark of the lease-back concept came in the
winter of 1979-80. Under this proposal formal sovereignty
would be transferred to Argentina but administration of the
islands would remain with Great Britain for a limited period (to
be negotiated, likely to be somewhere between twenty and fifty
years). Lease-back as a concept antedated the Tory government
of 1979 but, while it was favored by those concerned with
relations with Argentina and Latin America in general, it was
vitriolically opposed by the Falklands lobby and its supporters
in Parliament.
Minister Ridley of the Foreign Office nonetheless pursued
what he saw as the only rational, viable policy alternative for
settling the Falklands crisis. Lord Carrington saw its policy
merits but also its domestic political liabilities. Mrs. Thatcher
opposed any concessions to the Argentines. The Overseas and
Defence Committee of the British Cabinet passed the idea to the
Cabinet itself which gave Ridley little or no support. He was in-
structed to put a range of options to the islanders in consulta-
tions, which predictably resulted in their choosing the status
quo.
In February 1981 another round of the New York talks began.
Ridley had no realistic negotiating strategy given the political
constraints on British diplomacy concerning the Falklands. Nor
did this leave him even clever means of delay. The British had
little to offer or discuss on sovereignty. As reported later by The
Economist (19 June 1982, p. 37) the British were considering a
ninety-nine year lease, and the settlement that was to com-
mence the lease was to be finalized somewhere between the
years 2000 and 2081.
In the subsequent negotiations of February 1982 the Argen-
tines were fully aware of the extensive discussion within the
British government of the lease-back option and may indeed
have decided that it was their own best alternative. Costa
Mendez's instructions to the Argentine delegation in New York
were to obtain a regular schedule of meetings, inclusion of
sovereignty in the list of negotiable items, and a firm com-
mitment to reach agreement within the calendar year. The
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compromise reached on 26 February 1982 met the Argentine
demands to a large extent. A negotiating commission would
meet with an open agenda and aim for settlement in 1982. Each
side would seek political agreement as rapidly as possible. The
closing communique was positive.
On the morning of 3 March, however, the Argentine junta
stated its total dissatisfaction with the outcome of the February
New York talks and implied that it would no longer feel bound
to pursue its national interests by peaceful means. Argentina's
stated goals had been for the discussions to continue and pro-
gress to be made. The junta's unstated agenda, however, was
sovereignty by the year's end. The appropriate national means
was to be Argentine Marines. The only question now was when.
The invasion's architects were junta member Admiral Anaya
and Foreign Minister Costa Mendez; the latter indicated that a
nonviolent invasion would provoke little or no reaction from the
United Kingdom or elsewhere.
While rumors and press speculation on the invasion reached
a crescendo, they were not based on any substance until 19
March when the scrap metal crew landed on South Georgia and
raised the Argentine flag. In response to British diplomatic pro-
tests Costa Mendez assured the British that he would have the
party removed. The Endurance embarked twenty-one Marines
and moved to the area from Port Stanley. She was drawn away
with half the Marine force, hundreds of miles from the real
drama for which the South Georgia incident was a cause or
pretext: an Argentine invasion of the Falklands.
Argentina seized the moment. The absence of a British naval
presence, a reduced Marine garrison, the onset of Antarctic
winter, the diplomatic cover of recent "unsuccessful negotia-
tions", and finally the British "menace" to Argentines in South
Georgia determined the timing. They were proximate and per-
missive factors, not causes. The Argentine grievance was cen-
turies old, the motivations as deep as culture, the reasons of
convenience many. At its heart, however, the invasion was a
diplomatic inevitability. It had loomed several times over several
decades. Seventeen years of British diplomacy unsupported by
either military force or the political leeway to settle a territorial
question definitively had inevitably failed.

The Mediation Attempts

There were major diplomatic efforts to mediate the Falklands
87
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
dispute by American Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Presi-
dent Belaunde-Terry of Peru, and UN Secretary-General Javier
Perez de CueUar. Their approaches and working methods were
radically different. They worked by shuttle flight, telephone,
and alternating sessions with the parties. Their efforts spanned
the stages of military crisis from standoff to full-scale war.
The proposals by the three mediators had several elements in
common, stemming from the combination of the military and
territorial nature of the crisis. Each proposal sought a military
disengagement, an arrangement for interim administration of
the territory, and provision for continuing negotiations to solve
the underlying sovereignty dispute. Military disengagement
involved the end of military hostilities by mutual withdrawal of
armed forces, and a commitment not to reintroduce those
forces. Arrangements were to be made and verified by a third
party, but each side wanted to be in a position to act unilaterally
if it considered it necessary. Interim administration of the islands
also would involve a third party, national, multinational, or
international. Proposed third-party administrators were to be
essentially independent of, although in cases assisted by, the
traditional organs of local self-government. Local autonomy was
balanced in most proposals by the possibility of increased
Argentine access to the Falkland Islands (and their dependen-
cies) during the period of interim administration.
During those mediation efforts the United Kingdom had six
basic objectives. First, it sought a cease-fire and permanent
withdrawal of Argentine forces. Second, it wanted the restora-
tion of British authority, either in whole or in part. Third, it
desired a guarantee of local rights and institutions. Fourth, it
wanted third-party assistance in the implementation of the
settlement. Fifth, it sought to reestablish Argentine access to
and communication with the islands at preconflict levels, as
governed by the 1971 bilateral agreements. Finally, the United
Kingdom wanted an interim agreement which would not pre-
judge the final outcome of sovereignty negotiations.
Argentina had at least eight major goals. First, they desired
the continuation of negotiations, leading to Argentine
sovereignty in the near term. Second, they wanted the interrup-
tion of British rule. Third, they sought effective Argentine con-
trol of interim administration of the islands. Fourth, they
wanted freedom of access to the islands. Fifth, they desired a
settlement formula which would result in Argentine sovereignty
at a near (fixed) future date. Sixth, they wanted involvement of
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third parties principally to limit British use of force and help
secure Argentine gains. Seventh, they wanted immediate
military withdrawal to home bases, preserving Argentina's
geopolitical advantage and ability to use force again with mini-
mum warning time. Eighth, they sought widened recognition
that this was a decolonization issue and that the controlling
norm was territorial integrity.
Since the civilian landings of March 19 in South Georgia,
Argentina had reasserted its claim that Britain had illegally
seized the Falkland Islands in 1832. On J30 March (three days
before the invasion) Britain had stated that "the unauthorized
presence of Argentine citizens" on South Georgia was unaccep-
table and that, "if it comes to the point, it would be our duty to
defend and support the Falkland islanders to the best of our
ability." An armed British ice-patrol vessel was standing by, and
the hunter-killer submarine Superb had reportedly been dis-
patched from Gibraltar on 25 March.
On 2 April the British UN delegate charged Argentina with
aggression and asked the Security Council to demand that the
Argentine forces withdraw from the islands immediately. The
Argentine delegate denied the charge, stating that Argentina had
"recovered for its sovereignty islands that properly belonged to
it." Argentina, he said, would negotiate any issue with Britain
"except for sovereignty." The Argentines stated that "if the
Argentine people are attacked by military, naval, land or air
means, the Argentine nation in arms, with all means at its
disposal, will present battle." The Argentine Navy was on alert,
and it was reported that two of its three submarines left for the
islands on 3 April. Military supplies were arriving hourly by
plane at Port Stanley. A naval transport ship had brought
dozens of heavily armored amphibious vehicles to the harbor
there. Such was the diplomatic climate in which the United
States volunteered to mediate. That climate would affect the
mediation before the mediation could begin to affect relations
between the parties.
According to the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir
Nicholas Henderson, Secretary of State Haig operated from two
premises. Haig believed that Argentina was guilty of aggression
and should not be allowed to get away with it lest they set an
example with dire consequences for world peace; and, second,
that a military solution would harm not only both parties but
also the United States.2
Henderson has characterized Haig's approach as one of taking
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
sides while giving the impression of complete impartiality. This
neutral posture, maintained until the end of April, "was difficult
for people to understand on the other side of the Atlantic" since
the British saw themselves as an ally who had been the victim
of aggression. Haig was worried that any tilt toward Britain
prepared fertile ground for the Soviets in Argentina and in
Latin America at large. Although Haig assured the Ambassa-
dor several times that there would be "no repeat of Suez,"
Henderson insightfully has captured some of the American
doubts about the Falklands case which made the Suez analogy
very applicable: "a recessive feeling about colonialism, concern
that the United States would eventually expect Britain to pick up
the check, worry about the Russians and the fear that what
Britain was doing would rally other countries in the area against
Western interests."
The United States was, as Haig assured the ambassador,
"not at heart impartial." It was partial in two directions; strong
currents of support were running for both the British and
Argentine causes. The traditional United States neutrality on
territorial disputes had tacitly favored the status quo and thus
Great Britain. Neutrality now favored the Argentine status quo
in occupation of the Falklands. Haig met separately with the
Argentine and British ambassadors to Washington on 6 April.
The two adversaries represented competing U.S. interests in
that the United States wanted to maintain a full range of con-
structive bilateral relationships with each.
Britain's new Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, instructed his
ambassador in Washington to inform the Reagan administration
on 6 April that the British goal was Argentine withdrawal and
the return of British administration to the Falkland Islands.
Pym's message to Haig also made clear the British view that the
American role would be crucial.
Secretary of State Haig's response to the British demarche was
that he had indeed been thinking of an American mediation of
the crisis aimed at possibly securing a mixed or multilateral
administration of the Falklands.3 The British ambassador
clarified to Haig that the British government could not enter
negotiations about the future of the Falklands until Argentine
troops were withdrawn. Further he said that it was improper to
think in terms of multilateral administration. He stressed that
Argentine withdrawal and the reimposition of British adminis-
tration were preconditions for negotiations and that the United
kingdom was not concerned with Galtieri's future; he indicated
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that the political climate in Great Britain was analogous to
America's attitude in 1980 to its fifty-two hostages in Iran.
Accepting the British precondition of Argentine withdrawal,
Haig suggested a mixed commission to mediate and function as
an interim administration, or the possibility of involving the
Organization of American States. The British ambassador
expressed doubt that either would be constructive and spoke
against further involving the United Nations, describing Resolu-
tion 502 as a sound basis for action.
The British view throughout the diplomatic efforts was that,
with the British Task Force under way, unsuccessful diplomacy
would lead to use of force by the British. The British impression
was, nonetheless, that Argentina did not believe that the United
Kingdom was prepared to use force to retake the Falklands. The
British also believed that this might become a self-fulfilling pro-
phecy due to the Antarctic winter, the length of the supply line,
and the expenditure of fuel and other scarce resources. Argen-
tina probably also hoped to discourage the United Kingdom
militarily with the semblance of offensive preparations and a
gradual acceptance by international opinion of its occupation.
There was no major Argentine preparation to defend the
recovered islands, no second half of the Malvinas plan. If the old
war game for invasion relied on U.S. or UN intervention leading
to resumed bilateral negotiations, the ad hoc plan seemed to rely
on a series of third-party mediations. Argentine diplomacy held
little room for concessions, taking rather an all-or-nothing
approach. Holding out for guaranteed sovereignty by a certain
date, Argentina abandoned the most creative aspect of the tradi-
tional "just war" plan: the return to the bargaining table without
absolute insistence on the fruits of military victory. Such
insistence led to diplomatic and then military failure.
President Reagan directed Haig actively to sound out the
United Kingdom and Argentina on ways of avoiding a military
confrontation. Haig began that process on 8 April in London by
meeting with the senior British officials, including Prime
Minister Thatcher.
The British were prepared to back up with force their insist-
ence on Argentine withdrawal, British sovereignty and adminis-
tration, and self-determination for the islanders. The War
Cabinet, for example, had declared a total exclusion zone of 200
miles around the Falklands while Haig was en route from
Washington. Since the legal validity of such blockades rests on
one's ability to enforce them, the implication was that British
91
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
submarines would be on station when the TEZ came into effect
on 12 April. Diplomacy was preferable, but not in any absolute
sense; force could and would be used. The Thatcher govern-
ment pictured itself in a political corner in which national honor
would not permit either appeasing "a dictator" or appeasing
invasion, much less the two combined.
Haig was caught between this British posture and an Argen-
tine administration which demanded either a time-specific
negotiated solution yielding Argentine sovereignty, or a system
of interim administration which would give Argentina a domi-
nant role in the interim period leading inevitably to sovereignty.
Haig was firm to the British government. He did not pretend to
proceed from identical interests, only parallel ones. His tactic
was to emphasize to the British that Argentina needed a way to
withdraw with its national honor intact. He expressed his con-
cern about the risk of an enhanced Soviet presence or role. He
emphasized the great hazards to the British of a military
landing, and realistically pointed out that a solution other than
a negotiated one would have public opinion costs, especially in
the United States. He urged Britain to be less unequivocal in
asserting sovereignty and suggested an international or
multinational solution as he had originally speculated about
with Henderson in Washington.
The British Cabinet and Foreign Office were of the opinion
that Haig did not understand their position. Many of his themes
were old material to Falklands experts, and seemed to amount
to a plan, a plan they found overtaken by events. Its balance
seemed to them to ignore the new element in an old equation:
aggression. At the Foreign Office and in 10 Downing Street the
British government became disillusioned. Haig's emphasis on
giving something to the Argentines and on avoiding war
seemed to the United Kingdom to limit both its options and the
legitimacy of its cause. Hence, the Prime Minister and later her
Cabinet seemed in their response more stern and purposeful
than even they intended.
Next, Haig met in Buenos Aires with Argentine Foreign
Minister Costa Mendez for four hours and held two short
meetings with President Leopoldo Galtieri. The principal open-
ing question was: in the event that Argentine withdrawal and
a halting of the British Task Force could be arranged, on what
basis, and by whom, would the islands be governed ad interim?
The United States suggested a joint interim government with
participation by Britain, Argentina, and a third party, possibly
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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE DIPLOMACY
the United States. The Argentine government rejected this pro-
posal as not guaranteeing Argentine sovereignty as the outcome
of negotiation. They felt that, at a minimum, the Argentine flag
must fly until its sovereignty was formalized by negotiations.
Argentina's public position was that it did not "reconquer" the
Falkland Islands simply to return to the status quo ante.
On Monday, 12 April, Haig returned to London as the British
blockade took effect and President Belaunde-Terry of Peru
proposed a seventy-two-hour truce. Argentina immediately
accepted the Peruvian proposal and stated that it would await
a British response, but Argentine officials tacitly acknowledged
that cease-fires and negotiations benefited Argentina given its
occupation of the Falklands. Peru had created the first of the
overlaps and conflicts which would characterize the mediating
process.
On the same day, 12 April, Haig's mission almost collapsed
when Argentine officials reneged on an understanding with Haig
about the possible terms of settlement. The change involved a
new junta proposal which would have the effect of prejudicing
in favor of full Argentine sovereignty and setting the date in
advance. (Haig had thought their agenda to be ratification of
interim administration.)
Thatcher said publicly that she had made it plain to Secretary
Haig that Argentine troop withdrawal was a precondition for
negotiations and that the wishes of the Falklanders would
govern British positions in any negotiations. Raising the
political-military temperature slightly, she not only warned
against any Argentine testing of the total exclusion zone, but
said that any such challenge would be taken as evidence that
diplomacy had been abandoned in favor of force. Before the
junta proposal, the United Kingdom had shown some flexibility
on Monday. The British had suggested that it might be possible
to consider joint administration while discussing sovereignty.
On Tuesday, 13 April, the Prime Minister conceded only that
the interests of the islanders might be considered as well as their
wishes and that the islands' administration must at least be
"recognizably British." Upon leaving London, Haig said that he
had received "some new ideas" which indicated British will-
ingness to pay some diplomatic price to avoid the necessity of
using force.
The mediation then stalled. As the Secretary returned to the
United States, British officials were openly confident about
American backing and pessimistic about a diplomatic solution
93
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
before the arrival of the British Task Force. Haig returned to
Washington to brief the President, describing the situation as
increasingly dangerous since neither side showed flexibility.
They decided to sharpen the point to be made to Argentina. On
14 April Reagan urged Galtieri to showflexibilityand to exercise
restraint. On the same day Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
in a speech before the House of Commons, stated that a pre-
requisite for settlement was the withdrawal of Argentine troops
from the islands. She further insisted that "the sovereignty of
the islands is not affected by the act of invasion and that, when
it comes to future negotiations, what matters most is what the
Falkland islanders themselves wish." Britain had set her
political goal: self-determination, which was also the status quo
desired by the Kelper majority. Thatcher reaffirmed Britain's
desire for a peaceful solution, but warned that if the 200-mile
blockade zone around the islands was tested, the British would
conclude that the Argentines had abandoned the search for a
peaceful solution in favor of force. Britain had reached the limit
of its preference for diplomacy over force; Argentina was not to
consolidate what it held.
The Argentines, for their part, stated that the Britishfleetmust
halt before Argentine forces would withdraw. The Argentine
government staked out its minimum political condition: that the
Argentines retain some element of sovereignty, for instance, the
continued presence of the Argentine flag over the islands,
during discussions on the area's future.
Haig followed with talks in Buenos Aires from 15 April to 19
April, impressing on the Argentines the long-standing nature of
American obligations to the United Kingdom. He warned that
when the first major armed dash took place the United States
would have to stand at the side of the United Kingdom. During
this second round of talks in Buenos Aires, the British fleet was
nearing Ascension Island, about a week's sailing time from the
Falklands. The junta began to focus on holding what they now
saw as a possible military threat at Ascension. Haig advanced a
preliminary plan calling for Argentine withdrawal, diversion of
the British fleet, the establishment of provisional administration
under Argentine-U.K.-U.S. supervision (until December 1982),
and then negotiations over the final status of the islands to begin
in December 1982.
Argentina rejected the proposal indirectly. Argentine officials
were clear, at least in public, on their position at this point:
there was not going to be a peaceful settlement unless Britain
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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE DIPLOMACY
conceded the sovereignty issue. Admiral Anaya's navy was
prepared, they believed, to defend the islands. Air Force chief
General Lami Dozo was hesitant about war, but his service
decided to commit themselves. Galtieri led the fifty-four army
generals toward war. The three services were "unanimous."
Realizing that his "Five Points" were not selling, Haig re-
worked Costa Mendez's proposal and conveyed it to the British
telegraphically at 9:00 P.M. on the evening of Monday, 19 April.
The Argentine proposal specified joint administration with U.S.
supervision; Argentine representation on the Council; and
United Nations resolution of the sovereignty question.
The British had considerable reservations about the Argentine
peace proposals which Haig had conveyed earlier. The insist-
ence on guaranteed Argentine sovereignty was unacceptable.
The essential elements of settlement in the British view were a
return to British authority in the islands, including the return of
the Governor-General, as well as self-determination for the
Kelpers. In their view the aggression must be completely
undone and the prewar situation restored.
The British would not confirm reports that the Argentine
proposals, as reworked by Haig, included referring the
sovereignty issue to the United Nations. On the basis of
previous General Assembly resolutions, Great Britain perceived
that the UN favored Argentine sovereignty. The British also
feared that the Security Council, despite Resolution 502, had
become reluctant to support them.
As Haig left Buenos Aires on Monday, 19 April, the Argentine
government was still adamant about the guarantee of Argentine
sovereignty. There was also an equally firm British stance that
open-ended negotiations would be the only negotiations upon
which the United Kingdom would enter. Argentina thus began
pursuing other channels. It was already in the process of
requesting a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the
Rio Treaty and was notifying foreign offices and diplomatic
missions that Argentina fully intended to invoke the "attack on
one, an attack on all" clause in the 1947 document.
Argentina offered to withdraw its troops in favor of joint
administration and full Argentine sovereignty by the end of
1982. There seemed to be no way around Argentine insistence
on guaranteed sovereignty. There was hope until the end that
Galtieri might settle for "territorial integrity" rather than
"sovereignty" as the end of the proposed talks. Costa Mendez
not only could not deliver that but he also brought to the Buenos
95
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Aires airport, as Haig prepared to depart, news of an OAS
initiative and a new demand. In the end, Haig's efforts failed.
The British tacitly rejected the Argentine offer, as the Argentines
had Haig's. Haig, however, still told the Argentines as he left
that the last Argentine text should be considered the basis for a
settlement.
Argentina went on the offensive and the junta pursued a Rio
Treaty meeting. The OAS decided on 21 April that it would
convene on the 26th as the Organ of Consultation of the Rio
Treaty. Galtieri flew to the Fadklands, where he stated that
Argentina would continue to insist on a guarantee of its
sovereignty. He restated the junta's rejection of the British
proposal for compromise, but dispatched his Foreign Minister to
Washington to meet again with Haig.
Great Britain responded with equal force to the Argentine
escalation. On 24 April Pym termed the latest Argentine pro-
posals unacceptable and returned to London. The next day,
British forces recaptured South Georgia. The Argentine Foreign
Minister announced, somewhat belatedly, that Argentina and
the United Kingdom were at war. He arrived in Washington on
25 April. In view of the British retaking of South Georgia, Costa
Mendez postponed his meeting with Secretary Haig. He
indignantly cited the attack on South Georgia as having led
the Argentine government to believe that "negotiations with
Britain had terminated." But the United States would not agree
that the U.S. mediation effort was ended. Haig told the OAS
that UN Security Council Resolution 502 was the proper basis
for a peaceful settlement. He said that the Rio Treaty did not
provide such a basis and was not an appropriate or effective way
to solve the Falklands crisis.
The United States made an urgent appeal to the parties to
accept a proposal as the basis for settlement to avoid major
military engagement. Haig did indeed resume talks with Costa
Mendez, who informed him that Argentina had not rejected the
US proposals. Costa Mendez seemed to imply that the impend-
ing hostilities were leading to some flexibility in the junta and
some preference for diplomatic over military solutions. Chief
among these areas forflexibilitywould have been the removal
of Argentine troops in exchange for the lifting of the British
threat, but Argentine thinking at its most posibilista was still
focused on a brief period of British administration, to be
followed by a formula such as joint rule of the islands. Argen-
tine sovereignty was still assumed as the outcome.
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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE DIPLOMACY
Major elements of the detailed U.S. proposed memorandum
of agreement were cessation of hostilities; a fifty-percent reduc-
tion of forces within several days; total Argentine withdrawal
within fifteen days; the end of economic and financial sanctions;
a tripartite U.S.-U.K.-Argentine special interim authority, each
party to be staffed by not more than ten persons and accom-
panied by his flag; the presence of at least one Argentine on
each island council; restoration of movement, travel, and
transport; and negotiations on removal of the Falklands ques-
tion from the UN's List of Non-Self-Governing Territories by 31
December 1982. Had the parties been unable to reach agreement
by the end of the year, the United States would have under-
taken a six-month mediation.
The United Kingdom increased the political-military pressure
on 28 April by extending its 200-mile sea and air blockade
around the Falklands to apply to all traffic of all nations beginn-
ing on 30 April. Both sides were in the process of official con-
sideration of the Haig plan, but the plan was widely noted to
contain neither of the party's stated preconditions; it had no
guarantee of ultimate Argentine sovereignty, nor did it make a
firm commitment to self-determination of the Kelpers as sought
by Great Britain. British commandos were known to be ashore
in the Falklands and attention turned to the possibility of full-
scale amphibious landings. Prime Minister Thatcher told the
Commons in emergency session that the issue of war and peace
was up to Argentina. She had concluded, she said, that
diplomacy was not going to produce Argentine withdrawal. She
discounted the usefulness of UN or ICJ intervention, but was
not yet willing to reject the Haig proposals.
In retaliation to the British action, Argentina declared its own
blockade of 200 miles around the Falklands as a free-fire zone,
effective immediately. Elements of the British fleet were known
to be within the 200-mile zone and the declaration seemed
directly aimed at them.
Secretary Haig told the House of Representatives Committee
on Foreign Affairs that it was unlikely that war could still be
avoided. He stated that the United States agreed with Great
Britain that aggression should not be rewarded, and believed
that his diplomatic shuttle had apparently failed to produce a
solution to the crisis.
In retrospect, it is clear that the Argentines interpreted Haig's
consultation process with the British as a successful upgrading
by the United Kingdom of their special relationship with the
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
United States. Unconsciously grouping the Anglo-Saxons, and
misreading a partnership which comes as close to sovereign
equality as any in the modern world, the Argentines clung to
their hope that the United States would wish to restrain the
United Kingdom and would be able to do so, both militarily and
politically. With the Suez analogy in mind, they ignored the
new realities of the Trident partnership and the influence, in the
mainstream politico-legal culture, of the principle of non-resort
to force, a principle which is especially against the interests of
major states.
Galtieri's reaction to Haig's approach was critical all along.
Two elements of the U.S. approach were particularly objection-
able to the Argentines. Thefirstwas the insistence on Argentine
withdrawal as the key element of what the Argentines saw as
the larger and ongoing problem. Founded on UN Resolution
502, this American position was nonetheless seen by the
Argentines as the enforcement of British interests as opposed
to equity. The second major irritant was the increasingly clear
fact that not only did Argentina have to get out, but that if it did
not, the United States would help the United Kingdom. These
two perceptions led to hardened Argentine positions, including
the insistence on the 31 December deadline for the transfer of
Argentine sovereignty, and poisoned both the American and
Peruvian peace initiatives. They also led to thinking along the
lines of "even if we lose, we can still obtain the original objective
of getting the United Kingdom to bargain seriously."
Foreign Minister Costa Mendez thought that the greatest
stumbling block in the Haig proposals was British insistence on
consulting the islanders. He interpreted the proposed return to
British administration without a fixed date for ending the
negotiations as status quo ante, since the population would
clearly not choose Argentine sovereignty. He harbored equally
grave doubts about the U.S.-U.K. majority vote in interim
administration.
Argentina also failed to adjust its conduct militarily and
diplomatically. It was preparing for siege warfare in both these
fields. Amphibious warfare doctrine attributes such strength to
dug-in defenders that overwhelming superiority (six-to-one) in
troops is needed for an amphibious attack. Thus the uncoor-
dinated Argentine planning to hold the Falklands did not pay
attention to the brevity of the thirteen-month Argentine con-
scription period (only recently begun for the bulk of the troops
on the Falkland Islands), nor to the lack of combat experience for
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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE DIPLOMACY
the few hundred career officers and noncommissioned officers,
whose services had not fought a war since the Chaco War with
Paraguay in 1876, but on the simple preparation of trenches and
lightly fortified positions for a seemingly adequate number of
defenders.
Argentine diplomacy had the advantage but also the con-
straint of being singleminded; the goal of sovereignty had been
embedded for 150 years in the national consciousness. The
Argentine position was widely known, and known to be firmly
held. No Argentine diplomat needed to wonder about over-
arching goals, or government support in pursuit of them. Yet
this also limited the creativity of Argentine diplomacy. Argen-
tine diplomacy in the pre-invasion years had been a relentless
but creative pursuit of one goal through such diverse means as
naval gunfire, the establishment of weather stations, and the
agreement to supply oil and education for the islanders. In the
crisis stage it became cautious, inflexible, and a prisoner to its
own consistency. First abandoned in favor of force, diplomacy
was then called on to prevent counterforce, an inconsistent and
self-defeating use of the instrument.
Although it was more flexible and creative, British diplomacy
was hampered by political considerations, principally the
unyielding requirement that the Kelpers approve any solution
which could be negotiated. In addition, national honor
demanded that British administration, dislodged by force, be
reimposed by negotiation if possible, by force if necessary. As
in the years of bilateral negotiations, Britain found itself with
little to offer in bargaining. Concessions could not be made on
those issues which national honor determined were questions of
principle: self-determination and non-resort to force.
Tactical military developments and prospects seemed to deter-
mine to an unreasonable degree the negotiating postures of the
parties to the Falklands dispute, yet larger strategic develop-
ments were ignored by one side as they gave firmness to the
other. The British declaration of the 200-mile exclusion zone
around the Falklands should, for example, have pointed out to
Argentine authorities how limited their options were. Resupply
by air was inefficient and expensive. It limited the defenders of
the islands to a low volume of military material and, as the Ant-
arctic winter approached, food, fuel, and other supplies. The
aging Argentine fleet, while it might use the ship and air-
launched Exocets as well as the air arm to inflict deadly harm on
the British, would certainly not itself survive such attacks. The
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
sinking of the Belgrano made this all too clear to the Argentine
Navy which played no further major role in the Falklands
conflict. The navy took the islands, then left attack to the air
force and defense of the islands to the army and marines. What
compelled Argentina to pursue the military rather than
diplomatic course at this juncture? Certainly, the air bridge was
an encouragement. C-130 transports were able to continue
supply and personnel changes through early May to the main
airport at Stanley. And there were also the illusions generated
by that critical high-technology weapon, the Exocet missile.
On 30 April President Reagan announced full U.S. support for
the United Kingdom, framing Argentina's taking of the islands
as "armed aggression," ordering partial economic and arms
sanctions against Argentina, and offering materiel support to
the United Kingdom in any armed conflict. Former Argentine
Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ortiz de Rosas, believes
that the U.K. request to the United States to take sides was fatal
to peace and even to the United Kingdom's own interests. He
argues that the United Kingdom knew that U.S. military sup-
port would be available if needed and ought to have recognized
that U.S. good offices (in other words, neutrality) should have
been maintained and the United States kept in reserve as an
ongoing intermediary.
President Belaunde-Terry's initiative on 2 May was a peace
plan based on Security Council Resolution 502. The text sug-
gested by Peru to Argentina and the United Kingdom called for
a cease-fire, a troop withdrawal, a commitment not to introduce
troops again, an interim administration by a contact group,
consultation with the islanders on a definitive settlement,
acknowledgment of the conflicting claims of the two parties, and
consideration of both the aspirations and the interests of the
Kelpers, with an effort to bring the British and Argentines to a
definitive agreement before 30 April 1983. A contact group of
Peru, the United States, Brazil, and the FRG was to be estab-
lished for purposes of arbitration, supervision, and ad interim
administration.
At the time, British forces were not yet militarily engaged in
large-scale hostilities. South Georgia had been recovered and
East Falkland bombed, but neither Argentine military credibility
nor survival of forces were yet major factors. Even following the
occupation of the islands by Argentina, the dispatch of the
British Task Force, and the failure of the American mediation,
the Peruvian initiative seemed to offer a last chance for peace.
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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE DIPLOMACY
The principal Argentine objections to the 2 May proposal were
the presence of the United States among the four guarantors
and the continuing British insistence on both the interests and
wishes of the islanders being reflected in the settlement. Costa
Mendez proposed the substitution of the " views of the islanders
concerning their interests" early in the morning of 2 May. Also
during the morning of 2 May Argentina conceded the U.S. par-
ticipation in the interim government. At 11:00 A.M. Buenos
Aires time on 2 May Belaunde-Terry called and said the United
Kingdom had agreed to consider his plan.
At 2:15 P.M. Buenos Aires time Belaunde checked with
Galtieri to confirm that his Foreign Minister was empowered to
propose and agree upon language. Galtieri confirmed that Costa
Mendez was so empowered. He said, however, that he, as
President, must still ratify it with his "senate." Belaunde
pressed for an answer and was promised that at a scheduled,
7:00 P.M. meeting the junta would consider the proposal
favorably, and that Belaunde would havefirmArgentine agree-
ment by 8:00 P.M. Buenos Aires time, or 6:00 P.M. in
Washington or Lima. Belaunde scheduled a 6:00 P.M. Lima
press conference to announce peace in the South Atlantic.
At 3:00 P.M. Washington time the nuclear hunter-killer sub-
marine HMS Conqueror put two torpedoes into the Argentine
cruiser ARA General Belgrano, sending her to the bottom. In the
political calculus of the junta, the sinking of the Belgrano made
compromise at that moment unacceptable for Argentine
national honor. Within hours of the sinking of the Belgrano,
Galtieri informed Belaunde that the deal was off. It is still to be
established that it was ever on.
The British view of the state of negotiations on 1 and 2 May
was conditioned by the military situation. Pym had returned to
Washington stating that he was there to visit an ally instead of
a mediator. Port Stanley had been bombed and other attacks
had been made on the Falkland Islands themselves. South
Georgia had been retaken on 25 April. Around midday 2 May
the War Cabinet met at the Chequers country residence of the
Prime Minister and decided to authorize the sinking of the
Argentine cruiser Belgrano by the nuclear submarine Conqueror.
At 8:00 P.M. London time (3:00 P.M. Washington time) the order
was carried out.
Pym had met with Haig for two hours on the morning of
2 May in Washington. Signals to the British were mixed: while
conveying President Reagan's conviction that U.K. forces were
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
"doing the work of the free world/' Haig also pleaded that
large-scale hostilities were unnecessary. He outlined the Peru-
vian initiative in general form. Haig noted that the ideas were
similar to his own of the previous month, but thought they
would be more acceptable to Buenos Aires having been
presented by another South American government. Hender-
son's view is that they could not possibly have been described
as proposals.
Pym replied that while he was, of course, ready to consider
new ideas, the Peruvian plan was not all that different from the
Haig proposals Argentina had tacitly rejected. Pym said that he
would need to discuss any new ideas with the Cabinet on his
return to London. Haig agreed that both more time and work
were needed. They met later for lunch at the British Embassy
and spoke again by phone before Pym's departure for New
York. Henderson's account is that it was only at this point in the
afternoon that it was possible for Pym to telegraph a report to
London. The telegram was dispatched at 5:15 P.M. Washington
time, that is, 10:15 P.M. in London, or two hours and fifteen
minutes after the captain of the Conqueror carried out his instruc-
tions to torpedo the Belgrano. The British view is that the lack of
a sense of urgency concerning the Peruvian initiative was
justified by the fact that "nothing had happened in Washington
to suggest that any new peace initiative was afoot, or that
anything more significant was likely than the numerous pro-
posals that had been made in previous weeks, to which the
Argentines had always responded negatively."4
From the British perspective in early May, Argentine air and
submarine forces were real and immediate threats. Argentina
was still supplying the Falklands by sea. The British Task Force
lacked early warning, reconnaissance, and air defense
capabilities. The British Task Force was, in its own estimation,
highly vulnerable.
What specific threat, though, did the Argentine surface fleet
represent? The British view was that the task force of the
Belgrano was itself a threat, and that the two escorting
destroyers, at least, were equipped with Exocet missiles.
Whatever the Belgrano's position or course at the time of the
attack, she was thought to be searching for and providing
guidance for air attacks on the British Task Force, if not herself
executing the order to seek and destroy Royal Navy surface
units.5
The diplomatic loop, from the British point of view, was
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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE DIPLOMACY
closed. The Peruvian plan was discouraged, if not rejected,
because of its vagueness and its similarity to previously rejected
suggestions. There seems to have been no firm or specific com-
munication to the United States, much less to Great Britain, or
an Argentine willingness to consider the Peruvian effort.
Therefore, there was no urgent communication with London,
Northwood, or Chequers.
The Peruvian effort was criticized as not being original and
fresh, that is, it was seen as emanating from earlier efforts by the
United States; as not being serious since it did not involve a con-
vening of the parties; as biased, involving a Latin American with
strong sympathies for Argentina in the Falklands crisis. But it
also seems to have been criticized because of its ad hoc and
straightforward effort. Yet its very simplicity and the ease of con-
veying its points by telephone were what almost made it work.
Belaunde-Terry made a second try on 5 May after Argentina's
vengeance on the Sheffield, but the spirit of compromise seemed
to have been lost. Argentina was already in the process of con-
sidering the good offices of the UN Secretary-General, and prob-
ably estimated that it could maximize its gains in the politically
hospitable forum of the United Nations. The British government,
however, expressed its willingness to negotiate the possibility of
diluted British sovereignty as in the Peruvian proposal. Whether
or not the Thatcher government could have steered the Peru-
vian plan through the Parliament is an interesting but academic
question. It made the political commitment to the United States
and Peru to negotiate on the basis of the Peruvian proposal,
demonstrating considerable political courage.6 On 5 May Great
Britain responded favorably to the Peruvian mediation. But,
crucially, the United Kingdom raised the stakes: their reply
added the unacceptable element of reimposition of British
sovereignty. By now, however, the similarities of Belaunde's
proposals to those of Haig were dominating the discussions
in Buenos Aires. Exocet reloads seemed in the offing, and as
Thatcher began to prefer Peru to the UN, Argentina decided the
opposite. Exocet sadly made terms unobtainable in the era of
bilateral negotiations seem undesirable now. Costa Mendez
indicated that Argentina had already accepted the mediation of
UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar. The Peruvian efforts
ended in tragic and unnecessary failure.
The United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Perez de
Cuellar, had maintained close contact with Argentina and the
United Kingdom from the beginning of the Falklands crisis. At
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
the outset, he quietly began preparation for UN Secretariat in-
volvement. On 5 May the Secretary-General began a formal
mediation. In the exercise of his good offices he made specific
proposals for interim arrangements which might serve as the
basis for a settlement.
Perez de Cuellar began his series of separate meetings with
each side. He was to hold over thirty such sessions at which he
explored the parties' positions. He introduced his own ideas to
guide both toward possible common ground. In response to the
Sheffield, the United Kingdom yielded on the question of pure
self-determination but insisted on an Argentine surrender of a
guarantee of sovereignty. The junta pondered from 6 May to 11
May, then accepted. It was an historic leap of diplomatic
imagination. The two sides edged closer. The British in turn
added the idea of interim UN administration rather than the
return of British administration (somewhat implied already by
the entering of this mediation process). By 13-14 May a settle-
ment was emerging: UN supervision of withdrawal, administra-
tion, and negotiations that would conclude within the year. The
British Ambassador to the UN, Sir Anthony Parsons, decided to
take the emerging deal to London to explore its advantages and
disadvantages with his government.
It was not accepted in London, but was judged a start. In the
week since the landing force had been dispatched from Ascen-
sion the Cabinet had accustomed itself to the possible costs of
a military solution. These costs, however,were clearly growing
daily and apparently this was the basis of Argentina's bargain-
ing strategy, not only in New York but for any resulting
negotiating period. Although Argentina did not gain sover-
eignty firmly, Britain certainly surrendered in its proposal the
prospects of continued effective British administration.
Parsons took an amended proposal back to New York. At that
stage it is likely that Argentina could have secured three-
quarters of its interests in the Falklands in the following approx-
imate form: United Nations administration, with both the
British and Argentine flags flying along with that of the United
Nations. There would have been no return to traditional British
administrative or military presence in the islands. The inev-
itability of full Argentine sovereignty would have been
established. It would have been most difficult for the United
Kingdom to reestablish any political or diplomatic momentum
for a return to the status quo. Indeed it can be argued that

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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE DIPLOMACY
Britain had no desire, except insofar as the Kelpers were not
convinced, to return to the prewar insecurity.
Argentina balked. Concentrating on procedure and drafting
instead of substance, Argentina found the drafting of the British
version unacceptable. The Argentine decision to reject the
British proposal does not appear to have been well-reasoned. It
is clear that Argentine decision-making by this juncture in the
crisis was confused, awkward, and imprecise. The image that
many held of an autocratic government, with the presumed at-
tendant advantages of centralized power enhancing the clarity
and speed of decision-making, was inaccurate. An imaginative
diplomatic solution at this point would have consolidated
Argentina's territorial, diplomatic, and military gains by
dislodging British forces. Far more than the miscalculations
resulting in the decision to invade, the decision not to accept UN
administration on 18 May was at the root of Argentina's tragedy
in the Falklands. If not its last, it was its best chance.
On 20 May, the Secretary-General informed the President of
the Security Council that his efforts did not offer the prospect of
success. The following day, he so informed the Security Coun-
cil. On 21 May the British Task Force established its beachhead
at San Carlos Bay on East Falkland Island and the British cam-
paign to regain the Falkland Islands militarily was under way.
International diplomatic mediation and negotiation had failed
their most crucial test, to prevent war.

Notes: Chapter 7
1 House of Commons Official Report, 26 and 28 March 1968.
2 Sir Nicholas Henderson, ''America and the Falklands: case study in the
behaviour of an ally/' The Economist, 12 November 1983.
3 ibid., p. 32
4 ibid., p. 35
5 Admiral Lombardo, Argentina's operations commander in the South Atlantic
at the time, later publicly confirmed the Belgrano's orders: search out and
sink.
6 See the House of Commons minutes of the proceedings of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, session 1982-3 (London: HMSO), 11 May 1983, Draft, Chair-
man's report on a policy for the Falkland Islands, section 3, para. 11.

105
 8
American Diplomacy and the
Haig Mission: An Insider's
Perspective
DAVID. C GOMPERT

The Falklands War holds great fascination for military and

political analysts. Militarily, it had a bit of everything: air, naval,
and ground operations in every conceivable combination; stag-
gering logistical difficulties; decisive tactical judgments; and
widely varying behavior of troops under extreme conditions.
Moreover, these military phenomena occurred under
laboratory-like circumstances: we know why some weapons
systems worked well and others not, why some soldiers fought
well and others not; we can work our way through the cam-
paign with great precision, and we can see clearly the logic of
the result.
The war is just as compelling a subject for students and practi-
tioners of diplomacy and law, providing them, too, with a little
bit of everything: a major peacemaking effort was undertaken
by the United States; both the United Nations and a regional
organization became involved; and certain key principles of
international conduct were tested. Furthermore, neither the
underlying dispute nor the conflict itself was so entangled in the
East-West strategic and ideological competition that one's con-
clusions about it are skewed by prejudices about those larger
questions. Finally, there is little confusion or room for debate
about what happened. Negotiations had proved barren for
seventeen years, and there was no reason to foresee progress.
Argentina was clearly the first to use force. The British right of
self-defense was beyond reasonable challenge. Even taking into
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 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE HAIG MISSION
account that the territory was in dispute—which has been and
remains the view of the United States—the inhabitants and their
administration were unmistakably British.
Despite these seemingly ideal conditions for assessing the
conflict, it is important to realize that this peculiar episode was
an aberrant blip on the radar scope of world affairs. Future
historians may find the significance of the conflict as mystifying
as its origins. For example, lest one assume that there are clear
lessons to be learned about the norms and patterns of
decolonization, one should recall that decolonization never was
the real issue. The Argentines went to war not because the
Falklands are governed from London but because they are not
ruled from Buenos Aires. Independence for the islands is as
objectionable to the Argentines as is British rule. The underlying
problem virtually defied solution through compromise, another
reason to avoid drawing exceedingly broad lessons from the
war. Argentina was unable to entertain any solution short of a
guarantee of eventual sovereignty over the Malvinas, while
London excluded solutions that would not have the support of
the islanders themselves. For their part, the islanders remain
inalterably opposed to Argentine sovereignty.
Those of us involved in the Haig negotiating mission knew
from the outset that the logic and force of each side's position
would not only make a settlement depend on a high degree of
compromise, but would make such compromise extremely
difficult. The first round of talks in London and in Buenos
Aires—when we heard the sides' positions point-blank—left us
even more pessimistic than when the mission began. And by
the time the U.S. effort had run aground and the UN effort was
under way, we who had tried and failed knew better than
anyone—save perhaps the British—that there would be a fight to
the finish.
Yet if the politics and passions of the situation reduced the
hope for peace, the clarity with which the military outcome
could have been foreseen should have facilitated a political solu-
tion. Once the British decided to use force—and with Thatcher
this was never in doubt—the real choice for the Argentines was
not between their goal of sovereignty and the solution offered
by the United States, namely, some improvement over the status
quo ante but short of sovereignty. Instead, the choice was the
U.S. proposals or defeat. Nevertheless, the Argentine junta had
great difficulty realizing this, and insofar as it did, it consistently
failed to take this reality into account in its decisions. Much of
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
our time in the negotiations was spent trying to convince the
Argentines that what did happen would happen.
It is difficult to derive clear-cut lessons about diplomacy and
law on the basis of an episode that inherently defied negotiated
solution and in which one of the two governments had trouble
appreciating reality. But some tentative conclusions can be
drawn. It may be helpful at this point to explain how the conflict
was seen from three different vantage points: Buenos Aires,
London, and Washington.
No goal has had greater salience in Argentine foreign policy
over the years than the establishment of Argentine rule over the
Malvinas. There is a genuine national feeling that the country
will remain less than whole—and not just in the geographic
sense—until the Malvinas are returned. Far from dissipating
when economic and political conditions on the mainland
worsened, the passion for the Malvinas only intensified. The
proximity of the islands, and the image of a tiny British garrison
hanging onto real estate of such great value to Argentina
and seemingly little interest to London, made the British
presence all the more repulsive, heightening the Argentine
sense of frustration.
For seventeen years negotiations had led nowhere. The British
seemed to hold all the cards. Every time a solution was con-
ceived—such as a lease arrangement, with the Argentines gain-
ing sovereignty—it was aborted by what the Argentines viewed
as a handful of Tory M.P.s acting on behalf of the Falkland
Islands Company under the banner of self-determination.
Moreover, from the Argentine perspective, the British used a
web of discriminatory restrictions to make it impossible for the
Argentines to compete through trade, investment, and immi-
gration. This was Catch-22: the islanders were to determine the
islands' future, but the islanders would always be exclusively of
British stock.
One of the most striking revelations for us when we first ar-
rived in Buenos Aires was that the rage among the professional
diplomats in the Foreign Ministry was if anything more intense,
though of course less frenzied, than the rage in the streets. This
was more than a bungled decision by a handful of officers who
whipped up and then had to answer to the crowd outside the
Casa Rosada. It took extraordinarily poor judgment to invade
the Falklands, and it is unlikely to happen again. But the fury
in Argentina will not go away.
The Argentines had lost hope that they could obtain their
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 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE HAIG MISSION
central foreign policy goal through peaceful means. Moreover,
they did not see themselves committing a crime, at least not one
with a victim. They recalled Goa and other territories that have
shifted hands without great harm done. They did not think
there would be a war, as evidenced by the fact that they made
no real preparations for one. They meant no harm to the
Falklanders; they had every intention of compensating those
who wanted to leave and accepting those who wanted to stay.
It has been argued that the goodwill shown by the Reagan
administration toward Argentina led the junta to conclude that
Washington would prevent a major fuss. Undoubtedly, the
Argentines misread Washington almost as badly as they did
London. Yet there is no reason to believe that continued bad
relations between the United States and Argentina would have
given Galtieri pause. And it is absurd to argue, as some have,
that the Reagan administration should have had the foresight to
refrain from improving relations with Argentina lest the junta be
emboldened to invade the Falklands. Indeed, we were thankful
in the negotiations that we had at least some influence, though
it proved inadequate.
If frustration and miscalculation caused the war, rigidity
assured that it would run its logical military course. At times
during the course of the American mediation effort it appeared
to us that the Argentines might accept something less than a
guarantee of sovereignty. They seemed willing to discuss a
peaceful outcome involving a severance of direct rule from
London, partial relief from the restrictions on contacts between
the islands and the mainland, and a timetable and sympathetic,
though not prejudicial, terms of reference for negotiations on
sovereignty. But in the end, the obsession with sovereignty
made compromise impossible. The occasionalflickerof progress
in the talks was only enough to keep us going, not enough to
create any momentum.
In contrast to the Argentine perspective, the British prior to
April 1982 never had viewed the Falklands as an issue of the
first order. It did not occur to London that one of the very last,
and very least, remnants of history was so combustible. The
British have managed to shed scores of colonies efficiently and
gracefully. (Indeed, as one member of Thatcher's Cabinet
pointed out to us, the British Empire may be the only one in
history to have been dismantled without leading to the death of
the metropole.) The British underestimated Argentine frustra-
tion and will to use force. With greater attention and awareness
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
of the risks, as well as a little ingenuity, the British could have
found a way to solve this problem over the years, consistent
with their (our) principles. Once the Argentines struck,
however, several powerful forces impelled the British toward
military action.
First, the Thatcher government could not allow the use of
force to go uncontested. Many in Great Britain, though not
including the Prime Minister, wanted above all lo punish the
Argentines. Mrs. Thatcher's policy was to restore British
authority and remove the Argentine forces by whatever means
were required: negotiations, military pressure, or the use of
force. Her first message to us in the talks was that she was
prepared tofightbut not determined to fight. She felt compelled
by both British interests and legal principle to show in one way
or another that the Argentines could not gain by force what they
could not gain by peaceful means.
Second, and quite apart from the question of who struck first,
the cause of the islanders' self-determination came to be seen in
Great Britain as the cause of democracy threatened by dictator-
ship. Only at some risk could English politicians take the posi-
tion that this was a cause not worthfightingfor, especially since
the victims were Her Majesty's subjects.
Third, the British considered the Argentine attack one more
humiliation, having been battered over the years by a series of
reverses and predicaments from Suez and Northern Ireland to
their more recent economic problems. A success was needed to
revive the British spirit. Mrs. Thatcher would have done what
she did even in the absence of this mood, but the mood ensured
public support and therefore bolstered the chance for military
success.
Not surprisingly, the outbreak of hostilities dramatically
transformed the stakes for the British. The Argentines failed to
understand that the British, once attacked, would fight for that
which, by objective standards, might not have been considered
a vital national interest.
The initial American reaction combined concern about the
consequences of being caught between two friends, with deter-
mination that the resort to force not go unchecked. Important
American interests were on a collision course with one another:
on the one hand, the Anglo-American special partnership
and the principle of non-aggression, on the other, our Latin
American relationships and our ability to maintain peace and
tranquility in this hemisphere.
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 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE HAIG MISSION
The United States faced a number of early tactical questions.
Since the dangers to its interests existed whether or not it made
a diplomatic effort to avoid war, it had to weigh the costs of try-
ing such an effort and failing, against the costs of failing to try.
Since we were hesitant to conclude that a political solution was
utterly impossible, the case for trying was compelling. Critics
have argued that the Reagan administration failed to follow the
dictum that the smart player saves his strongest card until the
end of the game, in other words, that the Haig mission was too
soon and too senior. Yet the Secretary realized that unless the
United States was involved centrally in a negotiating effort, it
would be expected to—and, indeed, should—support the
British, and that, once having supported the British, it would
lose its credibility in Buenos Aires and thus its effectiveness as
mediator. Such considerations made it necessary to launch a
negotiating effort without delay, postponing active support for
the British until that effort ran its course. Haig also feared that,
as their forces drew closer together, the parties to the conflict
could become less flexible, an additional reason for the urgency
of American mediation.
The question of level of effort was also resolved quite easily.
Since the antagonists held diametrically opposed positions, the
United States knew that one or both of them would have to
modify their positions drastically in less time than it would take
the British fleet to reach the Falklands. We kept maps with us
on the London-Buenos Aires shuttle with the progress of the
British fleet depicted in terms of how many days we had left
before our diplomacy would be overtaken by hostilities. At 12
knots, the fleet was much swifter than we. It was also clear that
any political solution that would permit the survival of one of
the two governments would likely bring down the other. No
one short of the Secretary of State could have produced the sort
of rapid and major movement that was needed. The U.S. aim
was not simply to avert bloodshed, though the immediate
human consequences weighed heavily on our minds. Rather,
our aim was to produce an interim political solution that met
two basic criteria: first, that Argentina would not be granted
control over the islands as a reward for the first use of force;
second, that the solution would provide a solid, albeit unbiased,
basis for subsequent negotiations on the final disposition of the
islands.
While the United States wanted to prevent loss of life, it was
willing to allow the British to recover the islands by force. At no
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
point were the British asked to alter their military plans to give
more time for diplomacy. Had the Argentines thought that
negotiations could be used to delay military action until the
British suffered either logistical or political collapse, they would
have had little incentive to negotiate. Paradoxically, the clock
was our enemy but we dared not tamper with it.
In the course of the Haig mission we made several pivotal
decisions. We decided to urge London to accept an arrangement
more advantageous to the Argentines than was the status quo
ante. General Galtieri could not contemplate a withdrawal with
nothing to show for it. Although we realized that such a pro-
posed solution might be interpreted as rewarding the use of
force, we thought that Argentina might accept minor gains well
short of sovereignty as the prospect of defeat became nearer and
clearer. While we tried to persuade the Argentines to leave the
islands peacefully, our inducements were never so substantial
as to run theriskof encouraging others around the world to con-
template aggression.
When it became evident that the negotiating positions of the
two sides were drawing closer together far more slowly than
their forces, the Haig mission came forward with its own
proposal on 27 April. Our purpose was to convince the Argen-
tines that, irrespective of the British attitude, we were not
prepared to support a settlement that guaranteed Argentine
sovereignty. Haig told his Argentine counterpart, Costa
Mendez, that time was running out and that the U.S. offer was
the most Argentina could hope to obtain. We felt that if the
Argentines came to realize that this proposal was their historic
opportunity they might settle for interim arrangements that
would improve their position without assuring sovereignty.
Had Argentina accepted the U.S. proposal of 27 April, it
would have been difficult for the Thatcher government to reject
it in favor of hostilities, since the U.S. plan safeguarded the
principle of self-determination. When the Argentines rejected
the American plan, hopes of a peaceful solution all but evapo-
rated, notwithstanding the continued—and noble—efforts by
the President of Peru and the UN Secretary-General. At that
point, the United States decided to break off its mediation effort
and support the United Kingdom. While obviously not helpful
to current U.S. interests in Latin America, American support for
the British reflected the view in Washington that successful
seizure of disputed territory would have been the worst out-
come of all. Throughout the crisis we were absolutely candid
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with the Argentine government, warning them not only that the
British would fight but that unless Argentina displayed flexi-
bility we would end our negotiating effort and support the
British. We were careful, of course, not to tell the Argentines
that we knew the British would win, for that would have
offended them and damaged what influence we had. But it was
my distinct impression that the Argentines did not have to be
told what the result of hostilities would be.
The tentative lessons to be learned from this conflict—its
origins, its course, and its outcome—extend into the spheres of
national diplomacy and decision-making, international order,
and organization. The first is that it is essential to be clear about
the principles on which one's foreign policy is based. There is
a natural tendency to express national policy goals and limits in
terms of interests instead of principles. Of course, states are far
more disposed to act to protect their interests than their prin-
ciples. Yet the two are obviously related, in the sense that our
principles are the offspring of a marriage between our interests
and our values. Failure to act in defense of principles can lead
others to conclude that aggression can be safe and successful
provided it is not directed against the interests of any state
strong enough to frustrate it. And if we are prepared to act in
defense of principles, it is important, for the sake of avoiding
miscalculation, to make sure that others know this. British
policy during the Falklands War was a vivid reminder of the
legitimacy, indeed the morality, of the use of force under such
circumstances.
Furthermore, the fact that the British negotiated in good faith,
and that the United States made a major peacemaking effort
before backing the British, underscore the importance of ex-
hausting all available peaceful means. The Soviets sometimes
are puzzled by American reactions to Soviet moves that do not
imperil U.S. interests. Perhaps, they will learn the lesson that
the United States is quite capable of acting in support of the rule
of law, even when our immediate interests might suffer.
A second lesson is that world public opinion can have the
wrong effect on international politics, even when undergirded
by noble intentions. It is a perfectly normal, indeed admirable,
human impulse to want to stop a conflict before it gets worse,
especially given justifiable fears about escalation in the nuclear
age. The problem is that wars often begin with an act of aggres-
sion, and aggressors are usually better prepared at least to start
a war than their victims. So they tend to get the upper hand
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
early. Then, as world political pressures to stop the war mount,
well-intentioned people begin to think that if only the fighting
were stopped the adversaries could sort things out and achieve
a just settlement.
The problem, however, is that those who initiate wars can too
easily find support for a ceasefire without a return to the status
quo ante, while the defender comes to be seen as resisting world
demands for peace. When an institution like the United Nations
becomes a vehicle for such pressure, it is difficult for it to play
a constructive role. It is ironic that the British were put in the
position of needing to minimize United Nations involvement in
the later stages of the conflict for fear of coming under pressure
to compromise their right of self-defense. Overcoming this
curious problem requires resolve, discipline, and emphatic
clarity about the right of self-defense. Provided they are making
a reasonable effort to find a peaceful solution, countries that
have been attacked must be spared the onus of refusing to end
hostilities.
A third lesson is that one cannot assume that democracies are
at a disadvantage in a war because of the difficulty of holding
public support. The perseverance of a free people obviously
depends on their attitudes about the merits of the conflict: the
Falklands and Vietnam were vastly different. But the point is,
support for Mrs. Thatcher actually increased after the casualty
lists started coming in. Of course, it is also clear that once the
public is enraged an elected government may have less room for
compromise. Democracies can be formidable adversaries.
There are also lessons to be learned about the effectiveness of
international organization. The main shortcomings of the
United Nations were the failure to require compliance with a
Security Council Resolution, and the tendency to exert political
pressures to stop the fighting without first ensuring withdrawal
of the invasion force. We can hardly count on internationally
legislated solutions to crises, especially without strong sanctions
for noncompliance.
Neither was the Falklands War a moment of glory for Western
hemispheric security mechanisms, which have had and will
continue to have American support. Indeed, the United States
traditionally has viewed the Rio Treaty and the Organization of
American States as providing a more effective framework for
dealing with hemispheric problems than the United Nations.
Regional bodies, however, cannot act at odds with the purposes
and principles of the UN Charter, and are expected to help
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 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE HAIG MISSION
discharge UN Security Council decisions. In supporting the
Argentine position, the Rio Treaty's Foreign Ministers did not
support either Great Britain's right of self-defense or the Secur-
ity Council's call for Argentine withdrawal. Unfortunately, at a
moment when the world should have affirmed the basic rule of
law with one voice, irrespective of relations with the disputants
and differences over the merits of the dispute, condemnations
were reversed and the law became muddled. While it would be
unwise to conclude that the OAS and Rio Treaty mechanisms
cannot be constructive and effective, it is important to realize
that they are best equipped to deal with situations not involving
aggression against an extra-hemispheric state.
One can learn not only from the crisis itself, but from the
seventeen years of futile negotiations that preceded it. The best
way to ensure that disputes are not settled violently is to settle
them nonviolently. Every dispute that festers is not only a crisis
waiting to happen but also a failure of international order in its
own right. In this case the Argentines, at least momentarily,
gave up on peaceful means because, from their perspective,
these means had failed.
The scores of outstanding disputes, including the Falklands
dispute itself, raise questions about national diplomacy as well
as multinational cooperation. Should the United States depart
more frequently from its traditional position of not taking sides
on territorial disputes? Would the expression of strong
American views on the merits help to drive disputes toward
resolution before they turn violent? They might, or they might
not, depending on whether the U.S. views have powerful
political or moral weight with the parties. There is also the ques-
tion of whether the United States should play a de facto judicial
role, that is, whether the United States could strengthen inter-
national order by exerting pressure on the direction a settlement
should take, as opposed to pressure on both parties to settle
through compromise and the use of available machinery.
Naturally, the political costs to the United States of taking sides
would have to be considered.
The durability of territorial disputes is the result of a lack of
community pressure, will, and spirit of compromise, not lack of
machinery. The International Court of Justice could be used far
more than it is, but states often lack confidence in the Court and
in their own legal positions. There is also the Hague Permanent
Court of Arbitration and a network of extant regional
agreements on arbitration and conciliation. Much of this
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
machinery is rarely used. (Every machinist knows that the best
thing for machinery is use.) Moreover, binding third-party
decisions are sometimes reopened, as we have seen in several
cases. Sadly, domestic politics in many states rewards the
maintenance of claims more than the settlement of disputes.
What is needed may seem fairly obvious. First, compulsory
jurisdiction of international judicial machinery should be
expanded. But that would require the consent of states. Second,
binding settlements should be reopened only under extra-
ordinary circumstances. Yet how, short of sanctions, can com-
pliance with third-party decisions be enforced? Third, it makes
far more sense to revitalize and use existing mechanisms than
to create new ones. There may be some value in blowing the
dust off some of the older agreements, updating them, and pro-
moting their use in the course of a systematic, case-by-case
review of oustanding disputes, at least in the Western
hemisphere.
Better international dispute-settlement machinery would not
necessarily have resolved the Falklands issue before it exploded,
nor can it resolve it now. And it is difficult to prove that had the
United States taken a position on the merits of the dispute it
would not haveflaredinto war. But the Falklands tragedy does
serve to remind us of the importance of settling differences
whether or not conflict has occurred or seems imminent. While
the prospect of conflict inevitably stimulates efforts to settle
disputes, one must be careful not to allow the threat of violence
to be used advantageously in settling disputes, lest one reward
the threat of force, which is scarcely more consistent with the
rule of law than rewarding the use of force.
The subject of law and order in a decentralized and highly
diverse international society isfilledwith paradoxes and quand-
aries. The ultimate determinant is politics. And politics need not
be the enemy of compromise, fairness, or principle.There may
be little basis for optimism if one looks only at the mechanics of
peacemaking. But what will surely matter far more over the long
run is whether politics, international and domestic alike, will
exert a normative pressure which will reward compromise
without abandoning justice.
The UN Secretary-General correctly placed the Falklands on
his recent list of UN failures. In fact, one could safely list the
Falklands on the list of failures of the entire postwar inter-
national order. True, the resort to force did not pay, which is,
of course, an important lesson. But this was the result of relative
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military capabilities. One can hardly count on the targets of
aggression to have superior military forces. It is difficult to be an
optimist about the rule of law. But this should only strengthen
our own commitment to principle.

117
 9
UN Efforts at Settlement
of the Falkland Islands
Crisis
INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.

The long-standing dispute between the United Kingdom and

Argentina over the Falkland Islands has been in some sense
before the United Nations since 1965, when the General
Assembly passed a Resolution dealing with the matter. That
body passed similar Resolutions in 1973 and 1976. The acute
crisis in relations between the claimants was brought to the
Security Council on 1 April 1982, just before Argentina's
military move, and received the close attention of the Council
and the Secretary-General throughout the period of impending
and actual military conflict. We know how it all turned out.
What remains is to see what we can learn about the United
Nations from an examination of what happened and what did
not happen in this case.
The observation that seems naturally to come first is that the
United Nations failed to achieve a peaceful settlement of the
dispute and thereby to prevent war. A case can be made for the
proposition that the organization hoped and tried to produce
that result: the Security Council, by consensus procedure,
backed its president on April 1 in urging Argentina to refrain
from sending troops to the islands, and the Secretary-General,
who had made a similar appeal on 1 April, worked valiantly first
to head off and then to persuade the parties to call off the war,
acting first without and later with a formal mandate from the
Security Council. Why did these efforts fail?
A notable feature of the case was its old-fashioned slow-
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moving quality. From the first, the United Kingdom made clear
its intention to respond militarily to Argentina's military
initiative, but it moved to do so at the pace of the steamship
rather than the jet plane. Nearly a month went by before signifi-
cant encounters began, and nearly two months before large-
scale British landings turned the confrontation into real war.
The occurrence of this interval makes it all the more striking that
the peacemakers failed; shortage of time was clearly not one of
their handicaps.
The Secretary-General deferred to the government of the
United States and then to that of Peru as they undertook
mediatory efforts. He entered actively into the picture only after
those efforts had failed, at about the beginning of May, although
he had carried on careful preparations during the period of
Secretary Haig's shuttle diplomacy and had passed the word
that the United Nations would provide whatever assistance
might be needed in implementing a settlement. Although it
might have been better if the April mediator had been Perez de
Cuellar rather than Haig, we can never know. It appears that
Haig had better credentials for the task, for both the British and
the Argentines regarded the United States as a friendly country,
while Britain appeared to have some misgivings about the
Secretary-General's capacity to transcend his Latin American
origins and about the capacity of the United Nations to set aside
its anticolonial bias. Not for the first time, the United States
seemed more neutral than the United Nations. In any case, it is
not evident that it was a mistake for the Secretary-General to
await his turn, or that the delay in his moving to center stage
doomed his efforts.
If there was an error in the timing of the UN's peaceful settle-
ment efforts, it can be argued that it occurred before, not after,
Argentine forces moved into the Falklands on 2 April. Before
that date, there was a dispute in the settlement of which the
assistance of third parties might have been valuable. After that
date, there was a conflict to which the theory of collective secur-
ity might well have been regarded as more pertinent than the
theory of pacific settlement. Indeed, the first action of the Secur-
ity Council supported that view of the matter: it passed, as
Resolution 502, a draft submitted by the United Kingdom that
treated the Argentine invasion as a breach of the peace and
demanded withdrawal. Moreover, Britain asserted without
challenge that the Council was acting under article 40 of the
Charter—that is, under the enforcement provisions of Chapter
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
VII rather than under the pacific settlement provisions of
Chapter VI. One might argue that, after the Council had passed
such a Resolution, the United Nations ought to have pressed
Argentina to comply with the order for withdrawal rather than
shifting to a mediatory role; in short, there should have been a
continuation under Chapter VII instead of a reversion to
Chapter VI. According to this viewpoint, Argentina had started
a war, even if Britain had not yet fought back, and the possibility
of pacific settlement had been superseded by the necessity for
enforcement action.
On the theoretical plane, there are numerous unsolved prob-
lems in the relationship between the pacific settlement and the
collective security functions of international organizations. Both
the League of Nations and the United Nations have been con-
stitutionally assigned both types of function. It seems logical to
assume that, whenever possible, the search for peaceful solu-
tions is to be made first, and that collective security measures are
to be treated as a last resort. But what are the characteristics that
mark a situation as appropriate for the one or the other
approach? At what point should pacific settlement efforts give
way to the sterner measures of enforcement? What problems
stem from the conflicting requirements imposed by the two
approaches upon international organizations or individuals
serving as their agents—pacific settlement's requirement of
scrupulous neutrality and avoidance of normative judgment of
the positions of conflicting parties, as against collective secur-
ity's demand for condemnation of the offending party and
mobilization of support for the victim? The awkwardness of the
normative switch required by the turn from the former to the
latter approach was illustrated in this case by the charge made
several times in the Security Council against the United States,
that its taking the side of Britain after negotiations had failed
was proof that the United States had been dishonest in purport-
ing to serve as an impartial mediator in the earlier stage of the
crisis. It is unlikely that those who insisted that the United
States had been pro-British all along, and had strung out the
negotiations to give the British time for military preparations,
would have been mollified by the explanation that the switch
from impartiality to partisanship is required by the transition
from pacific settlement to collective security. A United Nations
that sometimes takes sides can hardly avoid compromising its
reputation for the kind of neutrality that is essential to some of
its most important functions. In short, the notion that mediatory
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 UN EFFORTS AT SETTLEMENT
and enforcement roles can be combined without difficulty in an
international organization requires more careful consideration
than scholars or statesmen have yet given it; it may be accept-
able as a conclusion, but not as an assumption. We have been
spared major difficulty about this combination only by the
failure of the League and the UN to take the assignment of the
collective security function seriously. In the absence of its
second half, the combination poses no problem.
In any case, the Security Council's approval of Resolution 502
would have been a fitting introduction to the operation of a col-
lective security system, if such a system had existed. It was far
less appropriate as a preliminary to efforts to promote agree-
ment on a settlement, although I cannot see that it actually
hampered the Secretary-General in the negotiations that he con-
ducted, on his own initiative, after other mediators had failed.
Perez de Cuellar is generally acknowledged to have performed
with admirable professionalism, and he evidently commanded
the respect and confidence of both sides, overcoming the doubts
said to have been initially harbored by the British. The incon-
gruity between the Council's original approach to the case and
the subsequent actions of the Secretary-General and the Council
does, however, offer us a clue to the collective indecisiveness of
the members of the UN and the conflicts of purpose among
them that affected the organization's handling of the Falklands
crisis. The failure of the UN's peacemaking efforts cannot be
ascribed to lack of time, mistaken technique, or inadequate
facilities. We must look for something more fundamental.
It may be that the first step toward understanding is to eman-
cipate ourselves from the assumption that the central objective
of the United Nations in this case was to achieve a peaceful
solution. Peace has universal appeal only as an abstraction; in
the concrete case, commitment to peace is rarely unqualified.
The prominence of other values inspires attention to the terms
on which peace is to be welcomed or accepted. In the UN, as in
the world outside, states recognize that the commandment "Do
not fight" must frequently be translated "Accept the status
quo," and their devotion to peace varies with their satisfaction
with things as they are. For most participants in the UN pro-
ceedings concerning the Falklands affair, the urge to maintain
the peace was secondary to some other consideration. If this
was least clearly true of the Secretary-General, whose motiva-
tions surely included the improvement of the organization's
reputation for effectiveness as a peacemaker, it was most
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
conspicuously true of the parties to the dispute. They switched
places on the scale of enthusiasm for peace after the Argen-
tine landing on 2 April. Before that event, peace meant victory
for Britain in the quarrel over the islands; afterwards, until the
ouster of Argentine forces, peace meant victory for Argentina.
The UN was not simply used, unsuccessfully, to promote a
peaceful resolution of the conflict. It was also used by the parties
and their sympathizers for purposes less related to settling than
to winning the dispute, and the insistence of the parties on
using it in this way was undoubtedly the fundamental cause of
the Secretary-General's failure in the use that he sought to make
of the organization. Our consideration of the UN as peace
conference must now give way to consideration of the UN as
battlefield.
Both parties attempted to exploit the organization's value as
a dispenser of collective legitimacy, which is to say that each
undertook to secure the blessing of the UN for its own cause and
to call down a UN curse upon that of the opponent. They were
less concerned about what the UN might do, as a mediator, for
both of them, than about what it might do, as a partisan, for one
of them and to the other. Neither, I think, seriously expected the
UN, as an organization, to "do anything" in the furtherance of
its cause, in the sense of military activity, but both clearly
attached considerable importance to the UN's distribution of
praise and blame, symbolic support and opposition.
Argentina came off rather badly in this battle for the support
of the UN, or, more precisely, the battle in the UN for the sup-
port of other states. For the relatively dispassionate observer of
the case this was something of a surprise, and may be taken as
hopeful evidence that the ideological predictability of the
organization, the knee-jerk inexorability of its moral reflexes, is
less perfect than we have sometimes supposed. For Argentina,
it was a bitter pill. Argentina, quite legitimately, felt double-
crossed by the UN. It had expected, and had ample reason to
expect, that the organization's overwhelming majority would
consider this a case of necessary and proper military initiative to
achieve decolonization. Argentine spokesmen invoked the
analogy of Goa, which India had liberated from Portuguese
colonial rule in 1961, and elaborated the theme in much the
same way as India had done: the UN has outlawed colonialism;
the retention of colonies is an act of continuous aggression; their
liberation is therefore a defensive reaction to aggression and a
service to the community, worthy of praise and support. In the
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 UN EFFORTS AT SETTLEMENT
case at hand, Argentina was freeing a portion of its national
domain that Britain had illegally occupied in 1833 and now
illegally persisted in occupying. Since a state cannot be said to
invade its own territory, Argentina's forces were to be described
as liberators, not as invaders. The UN's condemnation, the act
of judgment that is the essence of the collective legitimization
function and would serve as the trigger for the operation of a
collective security system if there were one, should fall upon the
United Kingdom, guilty of I'agression de tous les jours.
Everything that the General Assembly had officially said in the
past about the Falklands encouraged the expectation that this
Argentine position would be endorsed by the United Nations.
In Resolution 2065 (XX) of 1965, ninety-four members of the
Assembly had voted for, and none had voted against, the
classification of these islands as a colony whose removal from
that status should be negotiated as part of the process of imple-
menting Resolution 1514 (XV), the Assembly's great emancipa-
tion proclamation of 1960. In 1973 the Assembly had adopted,
by a vote of 116 to 0, with fourteen abstentions and five
absences, a text recommended by the Special Committee
charged with overseeing the implementation of Resolution 1514.
This Resolution 3160 (xxvm) expressly praises Argentina for its
efforts to bring about the decolonization of the territory and
presses the parties to make progress in negotiating the end of
that colonial situation. A substantially similar document, which
invoked the authority of declarations emanating from the con-
ferences of the Non-Aligned Countries at Lima in 1975 and
Colombo in 1976, had been approved by the Assembly in 1976,
as Resolution 31/49. The Argentine position was also formally
endorsed in that year by the Inter-American Juridical Commit-
tee. In summary, most of the states of the world had repeatedly
gone on record, in the United Nations and in other multilateral
forums, as supporting Argentina's contention that the removal
of British rule from the Falklands was in keeping with the sacred
mission of decolonization.
Why, then, was Argentina unable to rally the UN to its side
in the spring of 1982? Was it, perhaps, because Argentina
shifted from negotiation to the use of military forces, thereby
creating the risk, later turned into reality, of war? It is true that
the General Assembly had not endorsed the use of force to oust
the British. It had called for negotiations, and its Resolutions
were themselves intended to serve as instruments of diplomatic
pressure to be wielded by Argentina against the United
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Kingdom, but they called for the political surrender of the
colonial power, not its military defeat. Nevertheless, Argentina
anticipated general acquiescence in, if not overt approval of, its
resort to military action to take the islands. Its spokesmen
seemed to rely heavily upon the Goan precedent, in which
India's use of force had elicited no formed condemnation and
had in fact been widely regarded as a blow for freedom. They
undoubtedly relied as well upon the record of steadily increas-
ing multilateral support, in the UN and elsewhere, for the
activities of entities that are billed as liberation movements—
the various groups that succeeded in turning Rhodesia into
Zimbabwe, the PLO, SWAPO, Sandinistas, and the like. Their
expectation must have been nourished by the proliferation of
texts adopted by organs of the UN, including the Assembly's
1974 definition of aggression (Resolution 3314 [XXIX]), affirming
that the use of force for decolonization is excluded from the
disapprobation generally conferred upon violence. For some
twenty years, the trend in the UN had been for anticolonialism
to override anti-aggression—for aggression in the anticolonial
cause to be regarded as justified and therefore not to be called
aggression. Given that history, the Argentine expectation of
friendly reaction in the UN to the military seizure of the islands
seemed reasonable.
It turned out, of course, that Argentina had guessed wrong.
Resolution 502, proposed by Britain, deplored Argentina's
occupation and called for withdrawal of its forces. Only Panama
fully endorsed Argentina's case and voted against the Resolu-
tion. The most striking feature of the Security Council's action
was the defection from Argentina of Third World states, the
custodians of anticolonialism; Guyana, Jordan, Togo, Uganda,
and Zaire constituted half of the majority that passed the
Resolution. These states supported Argentina's claim to the
islands but rejected the resort to military measures, and insisted
that this was the position of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Argentina won on the merits, but lost on the method.
Why was the Argentine military initiative deemed unaccept-
able by most members of the Council, and most particularly by
Third World states? Some of the opposition can be attributed to
a general conviction that violence is too dangerous a thing to
unleash in today's world. Argentina was especially culpable
because it had acted in defiance of urgent appeals by the Council
and the Secretary-General; it could not say that it had not been
warned. This explanation will not suffice, however, for most
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 UN EFFORTS AT SETTLEMENT
members of the United Nations have a record of excusing or
even extolling violence when it appears to be used in support of
what they consider just causes. The argument that the UN
abhors violence, unconditionally, will not wash. The crucial
fact, then, was that the Argentine cause was not regarded as
good enough to justify resort to military action; the anticolonial
aspect of the case was considered weak. This is the point on
which Argentina felt itself betrayed. For years, the General
Assembly had declared the Falklands a colony that ought to be
emancipated. Now, the Security Council took the position that
the islands' colonial character was not sufficiently clear to give
legitimacy to their seizure. More precisely, the Third World
abandoned Argentina. Its earlier call for decolonization of the
Falklands was now hedged by the proviso that force must not
be used. This access of squeamishness was occasioned by
second thoughts about the validity of the anticolonial aspect of
the case.
The heart of the matter was that the ethnic combination was
wrong. Decolonization justifies violence only when it is a matter
of freeing non-Europeans from European rule, so as to satisfy
their presumed demand either for independence or for union
with their non-European neighbors. The Goan case, for in-
stance, was a proper one: India evicted the Portuguese so that
its kinsmen in Goa could join India. This case was altogether too
much an intra-European affair. The Argentines, an essentially
European people, undertook to establish their rule over a British
population that clearly preferred to remain under British rule.
This could hardly be represented as emancipation; it was a
peculiar brand of decolonization that violated, rather than
implemented, the principle of self-determination. It threatened
to establish, rather than promised to remove, alien dominance
over the Falklanders. According to the Third World's doctrine,
British rule over a British people could hardly qualify as
colonialism—certainly not as the kind of colonialism that is
wicked enough to justify violence for its extirpation. Argentine
rule over a British people might qualify.
British and Australian representatives used the phrase
"Argentine colonialism" in the Security Council, but it re-
mained for the delegate from Kenya, in the meeting of 24 May,
to offer a devastating rebuttal of Argentina's claim that its
military initiative deserved praise, as an act of decolonization,
rather than blame, as an act of aggression. He accused Argen-
tina of treating the people of the islands like chattels, as it
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
sought to establish colonial rule over them. Moreover, he
denied Argentina's anticolonial credentials, reminding his
audience that Argentines, unlike Africans, had not lived for the
last century under colonial rule. Finally, he repudiated the inter-
pretation of Argentina's claim against British possession of the
islands as a colonial question; it was, he said, "a pure territorial
claim against the United Kingdom based on history, in total
disregard of the people who now live on the Falkland Islands."
Note the importance of this characterization. He was saying that
it was not the kind of claim that African states feel bound to
support—a demand for the defeat of colonialism, so as to permit
the exercise of self-determination. Rather, it was precisely the
kind of claim that African states generally regard as most
dangerous to their security and tranquility—a demand for
redrawing of boundaries, justified on historical grounds,
without regard for the will of the affected people. Kenya was
telling Africa that Argentina's action was not a continuation of
the crusade against colonialism but a precedent that might
produce chaos in Africa. A more dramatic demonstration of
Third World defection from Argentina's cause would be hard to
imagine.
In short, when push came to shove—when diplomatic
pressure was succeeded by military seizure, and rhetorical con-
sideration by the General Assembly gave way to efforts at crisis
management by the Security Council—the Third World
discovered that it had previously overstated its commitment to
Argentina's campaign to wrest the Falklands from Britain. If it
had believed as deeply as it had purported to believe in the
colonial character of the case, it would not have been as troubled
as it was by Argentina's resort to force. In the moment of truth,
the Falklands did not appear to be a full-fledged colony, nor did
Argentina's liberationist credentials seem clearly valid. This
episode may confirm the notion that the Latin American states,
or at least the ones exhibiting most conspicuously the evidence
of their European origins, are acknowledged only as supporters,
not as real members, of the Third World—having a status some-
what analogous to that of white participants in the American
civil rights movement. The action that Argentina had expected
to be hailed as a blow for decolonization was regarded instead
as an effort to round out its territory, in disregard of the
principle of national self-determination.
The United Kingdom had greater success in the United
Nations than Argentina. As we have noted, the Council's
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 UN EFFORTS AT SETTLEMENT
Resolution 502 was an endorsement of the British position that
Argentina's invasion of the islands was an improper and unac-
ceptable act. In effect, Britain succeeded in having its adversary
characterized as an aggressor and itself as the victim of aggres-
sion. As we have also noted, this might have been the first stage
of a collective security procedure, but in fact there was no
serious expectation on the part of anyone that the UN would do
anything more than deplore and urge Argentina to reverse its
military intrusion. The case confirms the world's frequently
noted, but never quite admitted, abandonment of the ideal of
collective security. A few months later, in the introduction to the
first Annual Report that he had submitted as Secretary-General,
Perez de Cuellar vaguely revived that ideal, but I have found no
evidence that either he or anyone else displayed the slightest
interest in the notion that the Security Council might organize
the enforcement of its demand for removal of Argentine troops
from the Falklands. For better or for worse, that conception of
the role of the UN had long since evaporated, and it was evident
that collective legitimization was to be considered a substitute
for, rather than a preliminary to, collective security operations.
Britain got more than it ought to have expected from the UN:
an official characterization of the situation that at least put
Argentina in the wrong and at most could be construed as
authorizing Britain and its sympathizers to respond militarily to
the Argentine challenge.
Having gained in the Security Council an implicit license to
mobilize pressure against its adversary, Britain, without neglect-
ing conspicuous preparations for the ultimate contingency of
military action, turned to its allies. The European Community
imposed economic sanctions upon Argentina early in April,
and, with two defections from its ranks, renewed them on 25
May. The United States, frustrated in its efforts to mediate the
dispute, joined the British side at the end of April, and resorted
to sanctions. The NATO Defense Ministers declared their sup-
port for Britain early in May. On the other side, Argentina's case
was endorsed by the Organization of American States in a
Resolution approved on 28 April, which also deplored the EC's
sanctions; the OAS reiterated its support for Argentina on
29 May. The Soviet bloc stuck resolutely to the view that the
West was compounding the sin of unrepentant imperialism by
resorting to economic aggression—and planning military
aggression—against Argentina, in retaliation for its eminently
proper liberationist initiative. All this demonstrates with
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
dramatic clarity that the Security Council's act of declaring the
community's will that force not be used to press demands for
change, however meritorious they may be, had been an aber-
ration. The community, concerned about the general order, was
a passing fancy; what remained in the UN was a congeries of
competing alliances, concerned about victory and defeat.
A significant qualification needs to be added, however, to this
comment about the persistence of the habit of choosing sides.
Although it is true that European and Latin American states
played their predictable favorites, it is also true that both sets of
allies displayed an ambivalence, as did the UN as a whole, that
seems to me explainable primarily by reference to the phenom-
enon of quasi-pacifism, an ill-defined but powerful aversion to
violence.
Argentina, as we have seen, was the first victim. Numerous
states that supported its claim were alienated by its military
action. Argentina was disappointed in the strength of the
support given by the OAS, which was purely verbal; at no point
did Argentina's hemispheric brethren seem inclined to do more
than denounce Britain and its supporters. They were not quite
comfortable about Argentina's initial use of force, and, although
they sharply disapproved of Britain's violent riposte, they were
unwilling to consider participation in the fray.
The quasi-padfist reaction affected the British position in an
even more striking way. Although the Security Council's initial
disapproval of Argentina's occupation could logically be con-
strued as implying approval of British military action to oust the
invaders, if other means should fail, it does not appear that this
is an accurate interpretation of the attitude of those who
supported Resolution 502. Britain's partners in the EC became
notably less enthusiastic about involvement in economic sanc-
tions as it became apparent that the issue was moving toward
a military denouement, and two of them, Ireland and Italy,
dropped out when the sanctions were renewed. The Europeans
seemed to draw a nice distinction between deploring and
resisting Argentina's action; they confined their participation,
and perhaps even their approval, to the former. Other states,
less identifiable as partisans of the British cause, were even less
sympathetic to Britain's insistence upon taking the islands back
by force if necessary. In Security Council debates and else-
where, British recourse to coercion to oust the Argentines was
widely regarded as aggression. In some measure, this is attribut-
able to Britain's willingness to delay response to the Argentine
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 UN EFFORTS AT SETTLEMENT
invasion and to seek a nonmilitary solution; the longer the
interval between attack and resistance, the greater is the risk
that the defender will seem to be starting the fight.
Britain's success in the UN was substantially confined to the
passage of Resolution 502, just after the Argentine invasion.
What was to happen after the event? In the British view, Argen-
tina was to be pressed to withdraw, in accordance with that
Resolution, and could properly be forced to do so, if persuasion
and economic sanctions failed. The prevailing attitude in the UN
was quite different: Britain and Argentina were to negotiate a
settlement, which means that an arrangement for handing the
islands over to Argentina was to be worked out, and new
violence was to be avoided. Support for Britain in the UN was
inversely related to the proximity of British forces to the
Falklands. As those forces began to arrive in the South Atlantic,
and clashes with the Argentine forces began, it became clear
thatfightingback was little more popular in the UN than picking
a fight. In short, the collective-security slogan "Thou shalt not
commit aggression, but shalt resist it" gave way to the quasi-
pacifistic slogan "Thou shalt neither commit nor resist
aggression."
After serious fighting began—that is to say, after Britain
launched its effort to force the Argentine withdrawal for which
Resolution 502 had called—support for the British cause steadily
declined in the UN. Ceasefire, always an appealing notion with
its implication of movement from war to peace, became in effect
an anti-British slogan; it meant that Britain should not challenge
the new status quo that Argentina had created by seizing the
islands. Britain countered with withdrawal, which meant that the
preinvasion status quo should be reestablished. On 26 May the
Council unanimously approved a new formulation, Resolution
505, which was a compromise between these positions. It called
for negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General to
achieve a ceasefire, rather than demanding that Britain desist,
and it referred approvingly but vaguely to Resolution 502, rather
than reiterating, or talking of enforcing, the demand that Argen-
tina withdraw. This Resolution, which produced no results, was
significant mainly as an indicator of the shift of opinion that was
occurring in the UN; if Argentina had been the villain in Resolu-
tion 502, Britain was at least equally culpable in Resolution 505.
In the next stage of the Security Council's action, Britain was
treated even more clearly as the defendant in the case. Beginn-
ing on 2 June, the Council considered a Draft Resolution
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
submitted by Panama, Argentina's most avid supporter in the
Council, along with Spain. This draft would have had the
Council order a ceasefire, abandoning the earlier motif of urging
the parties to negotiate such an arrangement. Britain took this
as an effort to have the Council insist that Argentina be per-
mitted to retain the islands, and declared that it would accept a
ceasefire only if it were linked to a definite plan for the immedi-
ate withdrawal of Argentine forces. The draft was amended so
as to imply that withdrawal was to follow the cessation of
hostilities, but Britain was unconvinced that the amendment
genuinely altered the original "Britain must surrender the
islands to Argentina'' thrust of the Resolution. Hence, when it
came to a vote on 4 June Britain, along with the United States,
voted against the Resolution. Nine states voted for it, and four
abstained. This meant that the British and American negatives
were vetoes. In view of the fact that Ambassador Kirkpatrick
subsequently announced that American policy called for absten-
tion rather than use of the veto, it appears that Britain really
stood alone in opposing a Council majority.
This impression is somewhat diluted by the fact that four of
the states voting for the draft—Ireland, Japan, Uganda, and
Zaire—asserted that they shared the British view that a ceasefire
should be tied to withdrawal and believed that the amended
draft satisfactorily made that connection. Hence, even though
they disagreed with the British reading of the document, they
did not oppose the British position. In fact, however, the British
interpretation seemed to be confirmed by the Argentine
representative, speaking after the vote. He, quite accurately,
treated the episode as a victory for his country, and he gave no
intimation that Argentina considered the vetoed resolution as
anything other than a call for peace in the sense of Britain's
abandonment of its effort to force Argentina to give up the
islands. No member of the Council other than Britain had clearly
opposed that Resolution.
When Argentina used force to take the Falklands, the Security
Council objected. When Britain used force to retake the
Falklands, the Security Council objected. In these matters, I
believe that the members of the Council were reasonably
representative of the full organization. This may be taken to
mean that members of the UN are deeply devoted to peace, or,
what comes to the same thing, that they are mortally afraid of
the spread of international violence. It may also be thought to
mean that positions stated in the name of the UN are frequently
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 UN EFFORTS AT SETTLEMENT
not to be taken seriously—that members set forth symbolic
positions, for the record only, unaccompanied by any serious
interest in their effectuation. The UN supported decolonization
of the Falklands, until Argentina sent in its troops, whereupon
the UN became less interested in decolonization than in pre-
venting aggression. In keeping with its commitment against
aggression, the UN demanded the withdrawal of Argentine
troops, until Britain sent its forces to compel that withdrawal,
whereupon the UN became less interested in resisting aggres-
sion than in keeping the peace.
These two interpretations of the Council's vacillations in the
case at hand are not antithetical, but can be combined. One can
draw from this story the conclusion that spokesmen for states,
gathered in international organizations, can neither resist the
urge to endorse high principles nor muster the resolve to
uphold them, particularly when the upholding entails the risk
of violence. The commitment to peace, like other commitments,
is hedged in this way; peace is to be sought, but not at the price
of accepting positive responsibility for suppressing its violation.

A Note on Sources
This essay is based primarily upon the provisional records of meetings of the UN
Security Council on the Falklands case from 1 April through 3 June 1982 (perti-
nent numbers in the series, S/PV. 2345-72). A survey of the New York Times for
the same period also provided important information. Reference is also made to
the Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization submitted to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly,
which appeared in preliminary form as UN Document A/37/1, 7 September
1982.

131
 10
The OAS and the
Inter-American System:
History, Law, and Diplomacy
SRILAL PERERA

In its numerous attempts throughout its history to ensure peace

and stability in the Western hemisphere, the Organization of
American States has had to deal with two types of conflicts: first,
extracontinental ones involving the threat or use of force
between a member of the OAS and a nonmember state outside
the American continent, and, second, intracontinental conflicts
in which all the participants are member states of the OAS. The
Falklands War fell into the former category, and it illustrated a
series of ambiguities and challenges which the OAS is constitu-
tionally and structurally ill-equipped to handle.
In order to provide a better understanding of the OAS and its
limitations in extracontinental conflicts such as the Falklands,
this essay will survey the evolution and history of hemispheric
security arrangements that culminated in the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 and the OAS Charter of
1948. These treaties will then be examined to determine the
degree to which they have been effectively applied, and the
extent to which some of their provisions may conflict with the
UN Charter. The essay will probe also the different positions
taken by member states prior to and during the crisis, and the
underlying causes for these differences, and will conclude by
offering some tentative guidelines through which the OAS
could become a smoother and more effective organization for
promoting regional and international order.
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

The Early Phase: Meeting Security Threats from Europe

The first two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the
formation of a number of newly independent states on the
American continent. In July 1811 Venezuela declared its in-
dependence from Spain. Simon Bolivar led this struggle for
independence in the northern sector of South America, and
successfully routed the Spanish Army at Boyaca in New
Granada. Following the independence of Venezuela and then
Ecuador, the colossal new state of Colombia, comprised of New
Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador, was created. In the south,
Jos£ de San Martin carried out the struggle for independence
and defeated the Spanish in decisive battles that won independ-
ence for Uruguay, Peru, and Chile. Brazil's transition into in-
dependence was peaceful. It came in December 1822, when
Pedro, the son of King Joao, formally proclaimed himself con-
stitutional Emperor of Brazil. A serious concern to safeguard
this newly won independence in South America motivated
Bolivar to call for the establishment of an inter-American
organization that would "serve as a council in great conflict, as
a point of contact in common dangers, and as a faithful inter-
preter of public treaties where difficulties occur, as a conciliator,
in short, of our differences." The new states feared that Spain,
with the assistance of the Holy Alliance, to which it was a party,
might try to recover its lost colonies.
These and other security concerns were articulated at the
Congress of Inter-American States which met in Panama and
drafted a treaty in 1826. The Panama Treaty, which never came
into effect, was but one of several legal instruments proposed at
the conference which incorporated the ideas of collective
defense and peaceful settlement of disputes. The parties to the
treaty would have bound themselves to settle all disputes
peacefully and where there was potential for conflict, to bring all
disputes before the assembly of the confederation. The treaty
also stipulated that any state could be excluded from the con-
federation if it substantially changed its form of government.
Once excluded, such members could rejoin only with the
unanimous consent of all other members. The reason for this
stipulation was to prevent monarchical elements from gaining
power in a Latin American state and subjecting it to the
hegemony of Spain or the Holy Alliance. In essence, a major
objective of the treaty was to thwart any Eurocentric extra-
133
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
continental threats, even when they might be posed by a regime
in the area serving as a surrogate for a European power.1
By this time, Great Britain was already the world's mightiest
naval power. Throughout the eighteenth century, the British
had developed an intricate network of strategic military and
commercial outposts connecting their colonies in North
America, Africa, and Asia. Spanish America, where British
influence was negligible, gained increasing attraction for the
advocates of a more extensive British Empire, a development
which coincided with the gradual, but undeniable, retreat of
Spain from its former position as afirst-classworld power. The
British incursion into the Falklands in 1766 was but one of a
series of forays into Central and South America that culminated
in the colonization of several territories, including many of the
Caribbean islands. The efforts of Great Britain to conquer and
control new markets for its widely expanding commerce and
industry were also illustrated by such military enterprises as the
Anglo-French blockade of the River Plate from 1806 to 1807.
But despite the Spanish, British, and French threats to the
region, Bolivar's efforts to build a confederation that would
provide security against European powers failed. A number of
internal factors help to explain why the Panama Treaty of 1826
was not ratified. First, there was the growing sense of national
separateness, which divided South and Central America into a
large number of states, each jealous of its newly won sov-
ereignty. Also, nearly all Latin American states had unsolved
boundary problems with each other, which caused friction
among them. Hence, publicly expressed sentiments of solidarity
and brotherhood were undercut by private suspicion and
jealousy.
The immediate post-independence period in South and
Central America was marked by numerous frontier disputes. To
reconcile these disputes, the new states agreed to use the
Roman Law principle of uti possidetis with the critical date of
1810. This principle meant that for purposes of setting the
boundaries for these states, the administrative divisions used by
Spain in 1810 to govern her colonies would become the borders
for the new states. Hence, uti possidetis could only apply to
boundary disputes among former Spanish colonies. The problem
was that many of the old Spanish boundaries which were to
serve as the source of the new frontiers had been drawn arbi-
trarily, often on the basis of faulty maps that indicated Spanish
possession even of uncharted and unexplored territory. Thus,
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
by the late nineteenth century, most of the disputes over ter-
ritorial issues were intracontinental rather than extracontinental
conflicts. But it was this series of latent intracontinental security
threats, in the form of simmering boundary disputes, that
played the most critical role in wrecking the Panama Treaty's
efforts to address the extracontinental threats facing the new
republics. During the last century and a half, this curious rela-
tionship between intra- and extracontinental security problems
has remained essentially unaltered. Intracontinental conflicts
have been the greatest bar to united action on extracontinental
challenges to the region's security. One can safely assume that
only when Latin America succeeds in developing institutions for
effectively regulating its intracontinental disputes will it be able
to speak and act in concert on extracontinental issues.
During the nineteenth century, the tension among Latin
American states continued. The lack of a mechanism to ensure
peaceful settlement of regional disputes was demonstrated by
the protracted and costly Paraguayan War (1864-70), involving
Bolivia's claim to the Chaco Boreal on the west bank of the
Paraguay River, and the War of the Pacific (1879-83), in which
Bolivia lost control over its outlet to the Pacific and became a
land-locked state. Where vital interests were not involved,
better prospects for peaceful settlement were visible, as in the
Argentine Paraguayan Boundary Arbitration, where a stronger
state yielded to a weaker claimant. In 1882 James G. Blaine,
Secretary of State of the United States, called for the convening
of a Congress of All American Republics. Since the United
States was already a strong power, fully capable of thwarting
any European threats to the hemisphere, its interests in the
cause of regional cooperation and unity had shades of political
and economic hegemony. South and Central America were by
this time renowned for their natural resources, and American
investments in the region were growing. Blaine's proposed
conference, which never took place, included on its agenda a
scheme for establishing arbitration as a mode of securing inter-
national order and the development of closer economic relations
between the United States and Latin America. The most
significant attempt to devise a major system of arbitration came
in 1899 when, with the exception of Costa Rica and Honduras,
the rest of the Latin American countries became parties to the
First Hague Convention, which included purely obligatory
provisions for investigation and arbitration of disputes. In
subsequent years, Mexico and Venezuela were the only two

135
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
countries which submitted their disputes for arbitration before
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.
While most intracontinental disputes during the nineteenth
century were based on territorial issues, confrontation with
Western powers and the United States revolved around finan-
cial problems. Outstanding debts to foreign states and nationals
and the lack of compensation for expropriated property
resulted, for instance, in the blockading of the ports of
Venezuela by Germany, Great Britain, and Italy to demand
remedies. In 1902 Argentina's Foreign Minister, Louis Drago,
proclaimed what is now known as the Drago Doctrine—that
states should abstain from the use of force to collect outstanding
debts. The United States agreed with this proposition so long as
the disputing parties submitted their causes to arbitration.
Although a version of the Drago Doctrine had been included in
one of the Hague Conventions of 1899, this Convention was
ratified only by Mexico and a few Caribbean states. The same
proposal was agreed to at the Second International Conference
of American States held in Mexico in late 1902, but the treaty,
though ratified, was on no occasion referred to or followed. It
effectively lost its validity as an enforceable instrument.

The Intermediate Phase: Intervention from Within

With a position of unquestioned leadership in the Western
hemisphere, the United States saw no necessity during the early
part of the twentieth century to forge any mutual defense
arrangements with other Latin American countries. The latter,
however, became increasingly apprehensive about U.S. power
and its exercise in several military interventions in South and
Central America. The Spanish-American War and the conse-
quent occupation of Cuba; the annexation of the Philippines and
Puerto Rico; the occupation of Vera Cruz and Pershing's
invasion of Mexico in pursuit of Villa; and the control exercised
at different times over the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and
Nicaragua provided ample grounds for Latin American suspi-
cions of U.S. imperial ambitions. On all these occasions the
United States justified intervention through a broad interpreta-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine formulated by President Theodore
Roosevelt, against the strong opposition of a number of Latin
American jurists and statesmen. Because no single American
republic could challenge the United States by force, it gradually
136
 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
became clear that a collective defense system would be
necessary, among other things, to prevent American interven-
tion in the region.
At the Havana Conference of 1928, Latin American jurists
strongly advocated certain principles. They argued that no state
has therightto intervene in the internal affairs of another. States
were, in fact, juridically equal. International disputes were to be
resolved by peaceful means; the use of force to settle disputes
was to be proscribed; aliens were to be treated by the law on an
equal basis with citizens; and states were to be committed to
democracy and social justice. The United States strongly
defended intervention in regional affairs using general prin-
ciples of international law. Charles Evans Hughes, who headed
the U.S. delegation, stated that intervention was necessary
purely on grounds of self-defense, to safeguard American
rights. He claimed that in most of the countries where the
United States had intervened, the governments had no de facto
control; law and order had ceased to function; there were
serious constitutional violations; property, including that of
U.S. nationals, had been expropriated without compensation,
and the lives of U.S. citizens had been in danger. Nevertheless,
the Havana Conference helped to make clear to the United
States that continued intervention in the hemisphere would
only further strain inter-American relations and would jeopar-
dize any prospects for productive regional associations. The
Washington Treaty, drawn shortly after the Havana Con-
ference, made provision for the compulsory arbitration of
disputes. But the treaty was accepted with so many reservations
that its objectives were nullified, and it was therefore never
used.2
The Good Neighbor Policy enunciated by Franklin D.
Roosevelt in 1933 signaled a major shift in U.S. behavior
toward Latin America, bolstering hopes for the establishment
of a genuine regional security system rooted in the principles of
the equality of states and peaceful procedures for the settlement
of disputes. At the heart of the Good Neighbor Policy was the
principle of non-intervention. While dispensing with unilateral
intervention, the United States also took other deliberate steps
to diffuse the growing tensions between itself and its neighbors.
As Drier explains:

In the field of doctrine and policy, the United States, in the

Clark memorandum of 1928, formally abandoned the
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The military in-
terventions in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua
were liquidated as rapidly as circumstances permitted. The
Platt Amendment under which the United States was given
the right to intervene in Cuba, was abrogated in 1934. A new
treaty regarding the Canal was negotiated with Panama in
1936, eliminating some of the more objectionable aspects of
the original agreement.3

Constructive proposals for nonintervention and the settle-

ment of disputes through pacific means were included in articles
8 and 10 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
agreed to at the Seventh International Conference of American
States at Montevideo in December 1933 with the United States
as a signatory. Article 8 reads: "No state has the right to inter-
vene in the internal and external affairs of another/' Article 10
states that "The primary interest of states is the conservation of
peace. Differences of any nature which arise between them
should be settled by recognized pacific methods." But although
the Convention's provisions were motivated by good inten-
tions, words such as "intervention" and "pacific methods" were
never defined. The United States defined "intervention" as the
use of military forces, whereas the Latin American countries
understood the term to include even diplomatic representations
for the protection of persons or property of nationals of the
intervening state. There was also no agreement on the means
and methods adopted for applying peaceful procedures for the
settlement of disputes. Like its predecessors, the Convention
lacked real support. Notwithstanding the Montevideo Confer-
ence, the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay continued.
Without hemispheric solidarity, even U.S. efforts lacked the
strength to produce an effective security system. Only much
later, after the end of World War II, did the fear of "international
communism" succeed in producing the kind of bold initiatives
necessary to formulate regional law for hemispheric security.4

The Tertiary Phase: Emergence of Basic Instruments

The outbreak of the Second World War and complications aris-
ing out of subversive activities by Nazi and Fascist sympathizers
heightened the need for hemispheric solidarity against external
threats. During the course of the war the Foreign Ministers of
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
the American republics met three times. At Panama (1939) they
adopted a common policy of neutrality. The second meeting
convened in Havana (1940) made concrete suggestions for the
adoption of a regional security system. Resolution 14 of the
Declaration of the meeting stated that "any attempt on the part
of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of
the territory, and sovereignty or the political independence of
an American state shall be considered an act of aggression
against the states which sign this declaration." The Resolution
only mentioned non-American states. It also stated that in the
event of such aggression or threat of aggression, Latin American
states would "consult among themselves in order to agree upon
the measures it may be advisable to take." Subsequently, when
the OAS Charter incorporated a similar provision, the term
"non-American states" was dropped from its text.
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there was a
more determined attempt to formalize the many proposals that
had been made in the past, to incorporate them into a legal
framework for regional security. The Third Consultative
meeting at Rio de Janeiro (1942) restated the idea that an attack
against an American state was an attack against all, as did the
Act of Chapultepec adopted at the Inter-American Conference
on the Problems of War and Peace (1945).
These meetings led to the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro in 1947, the
first instrument adopted that had prospects for effective applica-
tion. Although the drafters of the UN Charter had acceded to
strong pressure from Latin America to incorporate regional efforts
into the UN's system, certain contradictions remained; the
major problem was the issue of which international organization
has precedence in regional conflicts, the UN or an inter-
American body. The Rio Treaty, formally known as the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, imposed upon its
members obligations based on principles that had developed
within the hemisphere for nearly a century. The treaty's major
focus was on collective defense. Article 6 indicated the circum-
stances and conditions under which principles of collective
defense ought to be applied. It provided for consultation among
the American states whenever the inviolability, integrity,
sovereignty, or political independence of any state was affected
by an act of aggression, an armed attack, an extracontinental or
intracontinental conflict, or any other fact or situation that might
endanger the peace of the Americas.
The language of the treaty left room for broad interpretation,
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
and some key phrases were not defined. A mere threat was
sufficient cause for consultation among member states to
examine the feasibility of applying regional defense measures.
The precise nature of these measures, however, was never
indicated in the treaty. Although article 6 called for consultation
even in the case of intracontinental conflicts, a different standard
was to be applied in the resolution of such conflicts. Article 7
stressed the need for peaceful settlement of disputes, and
required the parties to suspend hostilities and "restore matters
to the status quo ante." The parties were to take necessary
measures to reestablish inter-American peace and security and
to seek a peaceful resolution to the underlying conflict. An
interesting corollary to article 7 was the statement that "the
rejection of the pacifying action will be considered in the deter-
mination of the aggressor and in the application of measures
which the consultative meeting may decide to adopt." Hence,
article 7 gave considerable latitude to the Consultative meeting
to pass judgment and to enforce collective security measures.
But a similar provision in the OAS Charter eliminated any such
process for the determination of an aggressor.
Since the OAS Charter had direct implications during the
Falklands crisis it is necessary to examine several articles that
relate to conflict management. During the 1945 Chapultepec
Conference, the delegations instructed one of the earliest
institutions of the Pan American system, the Inter-American
Juridical Committee (IAJC), to prepare a draft of an "Inter-
American Peace System which would coordinate existing
agreements in such a way that gradual and progressive applica-
tion of these agreements will perforce lead to the desired end."
The OAS Charter is primarily the product of IAJC work. For the
most part, the Rio Treaty was incorporated into the Charter.
Articles 15 through 19 of the OAS Charter address the issue of
nonintervention; article 16 states:

No state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures

of an economic or political character in order to force the
sovereign will of another state and obtain from it advantages
of any kind.

Article 17 states:

The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object

even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly on any
ground whatever. No territorial acquisition or special advan-
tage obtained either by force or by other means of coercion
shall be recognized.

These articles along with articles 15 and 19 were subject to article

18 that gave a party to a dispute the right of self-defense.
The articles dealing with pacific settlement of disputes are
important in any analysis of the OAS Charter. Article 20 states
(emphasis added) that "all international disputes that may arise
among American states shall be submitted to the peaceful pro-
cedures set forth in the OAS Charter before being referred to the
Security Council of the United Nations." Article 21 delineates
peaceful procedures such as direct negotiations, good offices,
mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement,
arbitration, and those which the parties agree to. A key issue is
whether all the provisions dealing with pacific settlement of
disputes restrict themselves to intracontinental conflicts or
whether these articles, particularly when read in conjunction
with others, allow an interpretation that might lead to the
application of the Rio Treaty to extracontinental conflicts.
Chapter V of the OAS Charter applies directly to extracon-
tinental threats and deals specifically with collective defense. It
is important to note its implications because of its direct
relevance to the Falklands crisis. Article 24 declares that:

every act of aggression by a state against the territorial

integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the
sovereignty or political independence of an American state
shall be considered an act of aggression against the other
American states.

Article 25 states that:

should there be such violations, the American states in

furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collec-
tive self-defense shall apply the measures and procedures
established in the special treaties on the subject. (Emphasis added)

It is not clear what the special treaties on the subject are, because
of the number of instances in which the term "special treaty" is
used in the Charter. One of the special treaties referred to in the
OAS Charter is the Bogota Pact (the American Treaty of Pacific
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Settlement). The Pact was negotiated and approved in 1948, and
states that it was concluded in fulfillment of the requirements of
article 23 of the Charter. Provisions incorporated in the Pact
included the following procedures:

(1) The establishment of a commission of conciliation and rules

for the cooperation of disputing parties with the commis-
sion in its attempts to resolve the dispute.
(2) Submission of the dispute to the ICJ in the event that a
settlement could not be achieved.
(3) Reference of the dispute to arbitration in the event that the
ICJ decided that the dispute was "non-justiciable."

The stringent requirements contained in the Pact are both its

weakness and strength. If applied without reservation, the
process would have ensured peaceful settlement of all disputes.
Yet provisions relating to compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and
arbitration required sacrifice of sovereignty from the signatories.
Nevertheless, the United States was willing to accede to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ with the reservation that
"submission on the part of this government of any controversy
to arbitration, as distinguished from judicial settlement, shall be
dependent upon the conclusion of a special agreement between
the parties to the case."
The Pact of Bogota has been rarely, if ever used. It was made
directly applicable only in the border dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in 1957. In this case the Council of the
OAS with great difficulty persuaded Nicaragua and Honduras
as signatories to the treaty to refer the dispute to the ICJ.
According to article 102 of the OAS Charter, none of the provi-
sions of the OAS Charter should be construed as impairing the
rights and obligations of the member states under the Charter
of the United Nations. And article 7 says that every American
state has the duty to respect the rights enjoyed by every other
state in accordance with international law.
One can identify several problems with the major legal
instruments at the foundation of the inter-American system:

(a) There are no clear linkages between the Rio Pact, the OAS
Charter, and the Pact of Bogota. It is difficult to identify the
instrument, as well as the specific provisions, that are
applicable to a given situation.
(b) There is insufficient clarity with reference to the special
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
treaties. These special treaties should have been named in
the OAS Charter and appended thereto for operational
purposes.
(c) There is some confusion on the distinction between extra-
continental and intracontinental conflicts. It is also unclear
whether the articles on peaceful settlement of disputes and
collective security apply to both types of conflicts in the
same way.
(d) Despite article 102, the question of whether regional pro-
cedures should take precedence over UN procedures or vice
versa is not answered with the necessary clarity. This is a
major procedural and legal problem.

All these problems emerged during the Falklands crisis and

had to be dealt with by the OAS. The manner in which the OAS
confronted them, and the different interpretations which
member states offered of their legal obligations, are of great
interest, especially when viewed within the context of the
internal problems of each member state and their relations with
one another.

Relevant Antecedents to State Behavior

during the Falklands War
Outstanding intracontinental frontier disputes have been a
major source of divisions within the OAS. Besides its conflict
with Great Britain over the Falklands, Argentina's relations with
Chile have been strained over ownership of three small islands
at the mouth of the Beagle Channel at the tip of South America.
This dispute has recently been exacerbated by Argentina's
unilateral rejection of the unfavorable arbitral award. Chile has
further territorial claims against Argentina in the north, and is
embroiled in territorial disputes with Peru and Bolivia dating
back to Chile's victory in the Pacific War of 1879-83.
Another important actor in intracontinental disputes is
Venezuela. Its major dispute began on an extracontinental level,
involving Guyana which was a former British colony. Venezuela
claims that a cartographer employed by the British in 1840-3
improperly drew Guyana's boundary far into eastern Venezuela
in order to facilitate the work of British gold prospectors.
Largely through the good offices of the United States, an inter-
national tribunal was set up to examine the issues. In its finding
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
the tribunal decided in favor of the British. Venezuela, however,
reopened the case, citing a memorandum from a U.S. tribunal
member alluding to a secret deal between the British and Soviet
tribunal members. In 1970 Venezuela and Guyana agreed to set
aside the dispute for twelve years. With the lapse of this period
in 1982, Venezuela refused to renew the protocol. Next to the
Falklands, this dispute has had the greatest potential for
outbreak into violence; large oil deposits are believed to exist
in the disputed territory and Venezuela has a clear military
advantage.
Venezuela is also involved in a dispute with Colombia over
sea rights in the Gulf of Venezuela, the entry-way from the
Caribbean to Venezuela's petroleum fields in Lake Maracaibo.
All attempts at third-party mediation have failed. Bilateral talks
between the two countries from 1968 to 1980 were equally
unsuccessful. Although Colombia agreed to a treaty in October
1980, Venezuela refused to accede. Two armed incidents
occurred between the two countries immediately after the
Falklands War. Colombia itself has had troubled relations with
Nicaragua over ownership of the islands of San Andres,
Providencia, and three adjoining keys. In 1979 the Sandinistas
repudiated a 1928 treaty in which Nicaragua had ceded to
Colombia its historic claims to these islands.
Guatemala claims that the British seized what is today Belize
(formerly British Honduras) from Spanish-held territory.
Guatemala has threatened to invade Belize repeatedly, but has
been deterred by a British garrison of 1,600 troops and a
squadron of Harrier jet fighters. British troops have remained in
Belize, even though the country was granted independence in
September 1981. The regime of General Rios Mont reiterated
Guatemala's historic claims to Belize, as has also its successor.
Ecuador and Peru clashed in 1981 over territorial claims to a
region near the headwaters of the Amazon known as the
Cordillera del Condor. The claims date back to the fifteenth
century. Sporadic attempts at arbitration have failed. The Rio
protocol of 1942 recognized Peru's de facto control of the upper
Amazon basin. Although Ecuador has challenged the legal
authority of the protocol, the Peruvians have insisted upon its
validity on the grounds of Ecuador's ratification of it. This
dispute has been brought before the OAS at every one of its
meetings since its inception.
In addition to the conflicts cited above, literally every state in
Central and South America is involved in territorial disputes:
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
Chile and Argentina (frontier dispute); Panama and the United
States (rights over the Panama Canal); Brazil and Paraguay
(Brazil's control over Guaira Falls which recently have shown
potential as an unlimited source of hydro-electric energy);
Guyana and Surinam (boundary dispute); Costa Rica and
Nicaragua (frontier dispute); Honduras and Nicaragua
(territorial dispute); Mexico and the United States (area of land
between El Paso and Ciudad); Haiti and Dominican Republic
(boundary dispute); and many more, numbering nearly fifty.5
Except in a few instances where open conflict has occurred,
most of these disputes have never been brought before the
OAS. But their continued existence has colored inter-American
relations, and during the Falklands War they affected the posi-
tion which some states took towards Argentina's seizure of the
islands.

The Falklands Crisis: Conflict of Laws

Because extracontinental parties have no jurisdiction before the
OAS, a conflict between such a state and an OAS member
presents serious constitutional difficulties for the organization.
This is especially true when the member state insists that the
OAS take up the matter, even though the extracontinental party
cannot appear before the OAS to present its version of the case.
For this reason, Argentina traditionally has been hesitant to use
the OAS to settle the Malvinas problem, preferring instead the
United Nations.
Although there is evidence that Argentina brought to the
notice of the OAS its rights over the Malvinas during the Rio
Convention of 1947, it was only in 1976 that the dispute was
formally considered by the Inter-American Juridical Committee
(IAJC). In a Declaration dated 16 January 1976 the IAJC, after
referring to Argentina's just title to sovereignty over the
Malvinas, stated that "the Republic of Argentina has an
undeniable right of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, for
which reason the basic question to be resolved is that of the pro-
cedure to be followed for restoring its territory to it." The IAJC
did not point out or recommend any procedures that could have
been unilaterally or collectively applied to restore the Falklands
to Argentina. This was probably not within its jurisdiction,
although article 108 of the Charter gives it "the broadest possible
technical autonomy." For all practical purposes, therefore, the
145
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
declaration had little usefulness except as evidence of Argen-
tina's efforts to resolve the dispute peacefully through the OAS.
As an instrument of Argentina's title to the Malvinas, however,
the IAJC's declaration probably had little validity under inter-
national law, a point which was strongly emphasized by the
representative of Trinidad and Tobago during subsequent OAS
meetings.
The occupation of the Falklands by Argentine troops in April
1982 prompted Great Britain to request a meeting of the United
Nations Security Council. In its Resolution 502 the Council
demanded an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from
the islands, and called upon the parties to seek a diplomatic
solution to their problems. The United States voted in favor,
while Panama, the only Latin American country on the Security
Council at the time, voted against it. The fact that Resolution 502
preceded any formal attempts by the OAS to resolve the crisis
is of great importance. Without complying with Resolution 502,
Argentina next attempted to bring its case before the OAS
permanent council. At Argentina's request, the OAS agreed to
raise the issue at its 12 April meeting. It is significant to note that
during this meeting the OAS failed to agree on a resolution on
the crisis. An impasse was reached when several of the English-
speaking Caribbean nations (all former British colonies) refused
to support a Latin American Resolution that did not condemn
Argentina's use of force. The OAS finally passed an innocuous
Resolution expressing its deep concern over the crisis and
offering its cooperation to reach a peaceful solution.
Faced with the vehement opposition of the Caribbean member
states (many of whom have been helped by Great Britain to gain
special economic advantages in the European Economic Com-
munity), Argentina made the important move to invoke the Rio
Treaty. Since only the original members of the Rio Treaty have
rights of participation in proceedings related to it, Argentina's
move was calculated to leave out of the decision-making process
the pro-British former Caribbean colonies which had joined the
OAS in the 1960s and 1970s. Eighteen of the twenty-one original
members voted to convene a meeting under the Rio Treaty. The
United States, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago abstained.
The 20th meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers was
convened on 26 April, and its first session lasted until 28 April.
The Argentines received the support they sought, though it was
qualified. In their Resolution the Foreign Ministers recognized
Argentina's right to sovereignty over the Falklands, and the
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain was urged
"immediately to stop the hostilities it is carrying out within the
security region defined by Article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance, and also to refrain from any act that
may affect Inter-American peace and security." Interestingly,
the Resolution was preceded by a preamble which stated:
"Having Seen: Resolution 502 (1982) of the UNSC, all of whose
terms must be complied with . . . Resolves . . . " Whether this was a
direct recommendation to the antagonists or a purely
ceremonial bow to Resolution 502 is uncertain. In any event, the
Resolution did not instruct the British to withdraw their fleet,
and Argentina was asked to "refrain from taking any action that
may exacerbate the situation." It seems that the Foreign
Ministers paid some attention to UNSC Resolution 502, for
article 6 of their Resolution stated that it deplored the adoption
of coercive measures of an economic and political nature by the
EEC, indicating that they "constitute a serious precedent
inasmuch as they are not covered by Resolution 502 of the
UNSC." Did this mean that all other conditions in Resolution
502, mentioned in the preamble, had to be met? This was left
unclear. The conference also agreed to keep the meeting open
"especially to oversee faithful compliance with this Resolution."
The Resolution was carried by seventeen votes with four absten-
tions: the United States, Chile, Colombia, and Trinidad and
Tobago. But the quick pace of events soon consigned these early
OAS maneuverings to little more than irrelevance; the fighting
escalated; the Haig mission failed; and the mediating efforts of
the President of Peru and the Secretary-General of the United
Nations foundered.
On 27 May the Foreign Ministers of the OAS reconvened to
consider Argentina's claims of British aggression. It was at this
meeting that the divisiveness among OAS members came out
into the open. After several warnings, the United States in-
formed the OAS that it had no alternative but to support Great
Britain. Secretary of State Haig reiterated the U.S. position as
stated by the U.S. Senate's Resolution of 27 April 1982 regard-
ing U.S. policy in the Falkland Islands. The Senate had declared
that since the UNSC Resolution 502 had been passed in
response to a breach of peace, it was binding under inter-
national law. While there was no treaty obligation (including the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) requiring or
implying U.S. support of, or neutrality toward, an act of inter-
national aggression, the United States could not stand neutral
147
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
with regard to the enforcement of Resolution 502. The Senate
added that the U.S. government should prepare, through
consultations with the Congress, "to use all appropriate means
to assist the British government in achieving in the Falkland
islands full withdrawal of Argentine forces and full implemen-
tation of the principle of self-determination/' This Senate Reso-
lution thus became a handy justification for the Reagan adminis-
tration to wield before its frustrated Latin American neighbours.
With the United States deviating from neutrality and sup-
porting the principles of adherence to Resolution 502 and
self-determination, any hope for inter-American solidarity
disappeared. Argentina and its friends resented the U.S.
position that since Argentina had been the first to use force in
invading the Falklands, and therefore was the causus belli, there
was no basis for taking collective action under the terms of the
Rio Treaty. But the Argentines also had difficulty in obtaining
the full support of several other influential powers in the region.
Remembering the involvement of other OAS members in
similar frontier disputes, Brazil (for reasons of hemispheric
hegemonial aspirations) and Mexico argued that the Rio Treaty
should not be invoked in support of Argentina, for the proper
forum to resolve the conflict was the United Nations. While
supporting Argentina's rights to the Malvinas, the Foreign
Minister of Mexico, Rafael de la Colina, stated that "the parties
to the conflict must comply loyally and fully with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations/' who was entrusted by Resolu-
tion 505 with carrying out a ceasefire, not disregarding the terms
of Resolution 502.
Ecuador, faced with the almost identical situation of Great
Britain in its confrontation with Peru, supported Argentina with
the reservation that Ecuador wished to reaffirm its permanent
disregard for territories obtained through threats or the use of
force, and that the occupation of territories did not validate the
title to such territories with the passing of time. Ecuador's
representative, Sr. Falconi, further reiterated the importance of
the use of peaceful means to settle international controversies.
Chile and Colombia also were placed in the same position as
Ecuador. Like Mexico, they alluded to Resolution 502 and
informed the OAS that it could not evade the fulfillment of its
requirements. Chile officially declared its neutrality during the
Malvinas crisis and stated that the Rio Treaty could not be
invoked because all of its provisions had not been strictly
adhered to. Colombia, fearful that Nicaragua's Sandinista
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
regime might be encouraged to seize the San Andres
archipelago, declined to support Argentina, arguing that it did
not recognize any legitimacy in the principle of seizing disputed
territories by force.
One of the most articulate protests against Argentina and its
allies came from the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago. As the
Foreign Minister, Mr. Ince, remarked during the OAS session of
27 April 1982,
my delegation is unable to agree that the OAS or any of its
agencies, including the Inter-American Juridical Committee,
possess any competence to confer sovereignty on any territory
or land claimed. The OAS is not a court of justice and cannot
therefore usurp the functions of the Hague Court. One of the
elemental rules of justice includes the question of hearing the
other party to a dispute, and this in my delegation's view has
gone unsolved. My delegation has made reference to the fact
of the adjudication by the Inter-American Juridical Committee
in a dispute without calling up the other party to the dispute.
My delegation regards this action as contrary to the principles
of natural justice.
The Foreign Minister then alluded to articles 52 and 53 of the UN
Charter, and to article 103 of the same Charter which states that
obligations of member states under the United Nations Charter
must prevail over obligations under any other regional arrange-
ments. Thus, Trinidad and Tobago stressed the preeminence of
UN arrangements over regional treaties, a position which it
reiterated at the 27 May meeting by emphasizing that a settle-
ment should be reached only through the application of
Resolution 502.
The proponents of the Argentine cause were equally articulate
about the propriety of a regional settlement for the Malvinas
issue, the legality of Argentina's claims over the islands, and the
validity of Argentina's interpretation of the terms "aggression"
and "self-determination." Argentina based the legality of its
claims to the Malvinas on the grounds that it had inherited title
to them from the rights enjoyed by Spain; she argued that
Captain Vernet, an Argentine, had established and maintained
an Argentine settlement between 1828 and 1833 when the
islands had reverted to a status of terra nullius; and geophysic-
ally the islands were a natural extension of the Argentine con-
tinental shelf. In addition, Argentina deplored the neo-colonial
status of the islands and Great Britain's inflexibility.
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Argentina's allies never doubted the validity or applicability of
the Rio Treaty in the Falklands War. They argued that to stretch
the precedence of UN efforts over and above any possible
regional efforts, as suggested by the Ambassador from Trinidad
and Tobago, was to nullify the whole concept of regional
arrangements acknowledged by the UN itself. While the efforts
of the UN via Resolutions 502 and 505 were never at any point
dismissed even by Argentina, there was a deliberate attempt to
focus on regional measures by countries like Venezuela, which
proclaimed that the bellicose actions undertaken by Great
Britain provided a direct threat to the solidarity of the Americas.
More specifically, Venezuela, in a speech by its Foreign Minister
on 28 May, claimed that by escalating its aggression Great
Britain had disturbed the peace and security of the Americas
and manifested its intentions to defy the collective security pact
embodied in the Rio Treaty. (The term collective security was
perhaps loosely used by the Foreign Minister because the collec-
tive security option under the Rio Treaty was never invoked.)
Others, like Nicaragua and Peru, went further and charged the
United States with violating the Rio Treaty. The Peruvian
Foreign Minister indicated that the United States, by materially
supporting Britain in its measures against Argentina, had
violated its obligations as a member of the inter-American
system, of the OAS, and as a signatory of the Rio Treaty.
At no time, however, was there any serious consideration of
applying collective defense measures against Britain. The OAS
adopted on 29 May a Resolution in which, recalling its earlier
Resolution of 29 April, it agreed to "condemn most vigorously
the unjustified and disproportionate armed attack perpetuated
by the United Kingdom affecting the security of the entire
American hemisphere/' Further, it urged "the government of
the United States of America to order the immediate lifting of
coercive measures applied against the Argentine Republic and
to refrain from providing material assistance to the United
Kingdom, in observance of the principle of hemispheric solid-
arity recognized in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance." It also requested parties of the Rio Treaty to give
the Argentine Republic the necessary assistance that each
judged appropriate, and warned them to refrain from any act
that might jeopardize that objective. Support for Argentina
could be offered through affirmation "of the basic constitutional
principles of the Charter of the Organization of American States
and of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
particular, those that refer to peaceful settlement of disputes."
The Resolution also expressed support for UNSC Resolution 505
and the mission of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
to pursue a ceasefire. The OAS Resolution was carried by four-
teen votes with the same four abstentions as in the previous
resolution of 29 April: the United States, Colombia, Chile, and
Trinidad and Tobago.
The arguments of Trinidad and Tobago were valid because of
the extracontinental nature of the dispute, and because Britain
had no locus standi before the IAJC, and none of the regional pro-
visions would therefore apply to it. If these provisions had
applied to Britain, then Argentina would have been in violation
of article 7 of the OAS Charter, which states that every
American state has the duty to respect the rights enjoyed by
every other state in accordance with international law. Argen-
tina's actions also would have been a violation of articles 15 and
17 unless it could have shown that it had acted in self-defense.
One can argue that in terms of a strict interpretation of the OAS
Charter other American states than Argentina acted overtly
or covertly in violation of OAS provisions. For instance, the
United States may have violated article 16 which says that "no
state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign
will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind/'
The United States, by applying economic sanctions and openly
supporting Britain, could be said to have violated the principle
of nonintervention, in spite of its assertion that Argentina by its
first use of force was in violation of international law. One also
could suggest that Chile disregarded the principle of noninter-
vention by assisting British intelligence during the hostilities, an
assistance which, of course, the British and Chilean govern-
ments have denied. One need not be persuaded by these claims
of U.S. or Chilean violation of the OAS Charter to perceive the
critical problem: the lack of clarity underlying many of the
fundamental legal concepts and institutional mechanisms at the
heart of the inter-American system, and the vast ambiguities in
the relationships of that system to the wider world of inter-
national relations in general and the United States in particular.

Future Prospects
The major problems within the inter-American system revealed
by the Falklands War are legal as well as political.6 Legally,
151
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
there are serious doubts obscuring the relationship between the
UN Charter and the legal instruments of the inter-American
system. So far, no principle or method has been agreed to by
the Latin American community for hierarchically ordering the
norms contained in these constitutive documents. Moreover,
even within the regional treaties themselves there are too many
unanswered questions on important issues such as the peaceful
settlement of disputes, the use of collective defense measures,
and whether extracontinental disputes and security threats are
to be handled differently from intracontinental ones. Perhaps,
one of the most challenging and constructive tasks which the
Inter-American Juridical Commission could undertake would be
to reexamine and redraft the legal instruments at the foundation
of the inter-American system in order to clarify and resolve
some of the existing ambiguities. In this work, the IAJC could
solicit the collaboration of the UN International Law Commis-
sion so as to eliminate, or at least reduce in scope, some of the
apparent uncertainties of the relationship between regional law
and the UN Charter. But while such efforts may be legally and
philosophically appealing, they are likely to encounter substan-
tial political opposition from within the Latin American com-
munity. After all, no matter how displeasing they are to the
legal mind, ambiguities are prized by statesmen as valuable
sources of freedom of action and moral justification.
Functionally, the OAS needs to develop better mechanisms
for the peaceful settlement of extracontinental as well as
intracontinental conflicts. In the past, one mechanism that has
proved useful on several occasions, at least at the level of
intracontinental disputes, has been the Inter-American Peace
Committee. The IAPC was formed at the 1948 Bogota Confer-
ence when the representatives of the Dominican Republic asked
for a reactivation of Resolution XIV of the Second Meeting of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Havana in July 1940. Resolution
XIV had requested the Governing Board of the Pan-American
Union to set up a committee composed of representatives of five
countries. According to the Resolution, this committee had "the
duty of keeping constant vigilance to insure that states between
which any dispute exists or may arise, of any nature what-
soever, may solve it as quickly as possible, and of suggesting . . .
the measures and steps which may be conducive to a settle-
ment." This Resolution was reactivated at the 1948 Bogota Con-
ference because there was a perceived need for informal
methods of peaceful settlement whose flexibility would permit
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
their use without the political risks attendant in the procedures
of the Pact of Bogota.
Immediately upon its creation on 31 July 1948, the committee
was faced with a number of conflicts that needed resolution. In
spite of its early effectiveness, however, the IAPC ran into
difficulties. The tenth Inter-American Conference, which met in
Caracas in 1954, attempted to resolve these by adopting a new
IAPC statute that provided for rotating membership for the
committee. According to this statute, a party directly involved
in a conflict could request the committee's aid, but the commit-
tee could intervene only with the consent of all parties to the
dispute. Still, the IAPC has had partial success. In 1961 the
governments of Honduras and Nicaragua requested the com-
mittee's assistance in implementing an International Court of
Justice advisory opinion dealing with a boundary dispute
between the two countries. In response to this request, the
IAPC sent a commission that resolved many of the outstanding
problems, and ensured the peaceful transfer of the territory in
question.
Unfortunately the IAPC has not been used since that time,
and its legal and institutional status is not clear today. There is
great need, however, for a mechanism such as the IAPC that
would institutionalize and give specific substance to the norms
for peaceful settlement of disputes outlined in the OAS Charter.
Even more informal mechanisms could be very valuable, too, if
they were perceived as legitimate and were to be used on a
regular basis by inter-American states rather than as sporadic
last-minute reactions to imminent outbreaks of violence. Thus,
there are rich possibilities presented for OAS fact-finding and
mediating missions, as well as for the recent initiatives under-
taken by the five-nation Contadora group (Mexico, Panama,
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela) to launch peace negotia-
tions between guerrilla factions and Central American govern-
ments. Interestingly enough, these efforts have been endorsed
unanimously by the European Community's ten leaders,
including Great Britain. On the other hand, more ambitious
proposals such as those that often have been put forth to
establish an inter-American peace force have been unacceptable
to governments and are likely to continue to lead nowhere.
Extracontinental threats and disputes will continue to pose
severe functional challenges. Efforts by the OAS to mediate con-
flicts between a member state and an outside power are
frustrated by the bonds of Latin American solidarity; few, if any,
153
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
outside powers trust the OAS to exercise the required impart-
iality and objectivity in mediating such conflicts. Perhaps it is
the United States, rather than the OAS, that is best suited to
play this special conciliatory role by virtue of its dual position as
a leading OAS member and a superpower with vast respon-
sibilities for the maintenance of international order.
But if the United States is to play a constructive part in the
peaceful settlement of extracontinental disputes, it will have to
restore its credibility within the OAS. American credibility has
suffered from the Falklands War, as well as from past abuses
and sheer neglect by the United States of its southern
neighbors. A common Latin American complaint is that
whenever the extracontinental threat is international com-
munism in any of its forms, the United States is quick to lead
the OAS in action; if the threat is of a different type, however,
the United States will try to restrain and immobilize the OAS,
even though the matter at hand may be of great concern to the
Latin American community. Similar complaints and frustrations
resurfaced with vigor during the Falklands War. One scholar of
international affairs has captured the ominous mood in Latin
America during the critical months of April, May, and June
1982:

The Inter-American System, which had been painstakingly

forged under U.S. leadership for almost a centuiy, was under
attack by many of the Spanish-speaking nations who ques-
tioned whether a "Latin American system" that excluded the
United States might not better serve their needs. Thus, there
was talk of moving the OAS permanent secretariat to Central
America, and of transferring some of the military organs of the
Inter-American System to a South American country such as
Venezuela to remove them from overwhelming U.S. influ-
ence. The impact was especially strong on the organs of the
inter-American military system, such as the Rio Treaty (the
1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), the
Inter-American Defense Board, the Inter-American Defense
College, the periodic military conferences and exercises, and
the complex network of U.S.-controlled military-assistance
groups and arms suppliers.7

While the feared rupture did not take place, the lesson for
policymakers should not be lost—the United States must not
take the inter-American system for granted. It may not be in the
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 THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
United States' best interests to make Latin America the center-
piece of its foreign policy, but the United States needs to take
more seriously regional concerns if it is to regain its credibility
in the area. While the OAS needs the leadership and support of
American power and initiative, the United States also needs an
effective OAS that can help to maintain order and negotiate
peaceful change in a region of critical importance to the United
States.

Notes: Chapter 10
1 See John C. Drier, The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 16.
2 For a detailed description of the many conferences, see Samuel G. Inman,
Inter-American Conferences: Historic Problems (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing
Office, 1965).
3 Drier, The Organization of American States, p. 22.
4 For an illuminating discussion of these issues see Bryce Wood, The Making of
the Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
5 See G. Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions and Conflicts in South America (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941).
6 See A. Haffa and N. Werz, "The Falklands conflict and inter-American
relations/' Aussenpolitik, vol. 34 (February 1983), pp. 185-201.
7 Jack Child, "Abstention or intervention?/' Orbis, vol. 26 (Summer 1982),
pp. 311-17 at p. 315.

155
 PART THREE

Looking to the Future:

Strategic, Military, and Political
Implications
 11
The South Atlantic Conflict:
Strategic, Military, and
Technological Lessons
DOV S. ZAKHEIM

The South Atlantic conflict was a strange little war. It was fought
in one of the most remote parts of the world. Its prize was real
estate that may have been worth less than the asset value of the
forces committed to defend it (or to seize it, for that matter). The
combatants were a power whose glory days had long since
passed—by its own reckoning—and a power whose days of
glory were at times more imagined than real. The battles harked
back to an earlier era—involving big naval task forces, am-
phibious assaults, and forced marches. Those whose job it is to
plan for future conflict undoubtedly never conducted a
"Falklands/Malvinas war game" prior to that conflict. More to
the point, it is unlikely that they would do so now that it has
been fought.
Yet this war was surely fought, by two governments fully in
possession of their collective faculties. Like all wars, this one has
its military lessons and its political lessons as well. This essay
will attempt to recount some of these, and indicate the interac-
tion between the political and the military. (For geographical
reference see Figures 2 and 3, pp. 184-5.)

The South Atlantic Conflict:

Politico-Military Implications
As remote and unlikely a war as the South Atlantic conflict was,
perhaps because it was so remote and unlikely, it offers a host
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
of politico-military lessons that are applicable to crises and con-
tingencies that the United States and other Western powers are
likely to face during the remainder of this century. The first, and
most important of these lessons relates to the role of maritime
forces in modern crisis management and warfare. A second
concerns the importance of allies and of available geographic
footholds along the lines of communication between a country
and the scene of its military activities. A third lesson relates to
the sale of arms to other states. A final lesson concerns the
interaction between domestic politics and military effort taking
place overseas: the management of government relations with
the press, the public, and opposition parties. Each of these
issues will be dealt with in turn.

Deterrence, Defense, and the "Unforeseen Contingency"

It is commonly agreed by all who have thus far evaluated the

South Atlantic conflict that the outbreak of hostilities was due to
a fundamental Argentine miscalculation of the consequences of
their seizing the islands.1 At this point, however, agreement
comes to an end. Sir James Cable, whose seminal volume
Gunboat Diplomacy was translated by the Argentine Navy in
1977, has recently asserted that

what was needed years ago was not a garrison or a naval

presence capable of defeating all-out attack, but sufficient
forces in place to make serious fighting inevitable. This would
have convinced Argentina—and mere words unsupported by
visible preparations never convince anybody—that the
Falklands could only be seized at the cost of war.2

Cable points out that even lesser measures might have deterred
Argentina. For example, had the Ministry of Defense's an-
nounced intention to send naval task groups to the islands
"been implemented earlier, successive visits by separate task
groups would at least have demonstrated resolution and
capacity".3
The Franks Report, the official U.K. government post mortem
on the outbreak of hostilities, implicitly rejected Cable's would-
have-been solution in light of the very complex set of factors
surrounding the future of the islands, factors over which the
U.K. government had only partial control. The Franks Report
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 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
has been described as an "extraordinary document," whose
evaluation of the government's behavior during and prior to the
crisis leaves room for considerable interpretation, and whose
frankness regarding British intelligence apparatus and structure
is unique.4 The British were confronted by an unyielding island
population that refused to consider even the possibility of a
transfer of sovereignty, by an equally determined Argentine
government, and by fiscal constraints and political priorities that
had forced an ever greater concentration of resources on the
U.K. contribution to the defense of Western Europe. Added to
these factors were the ongoing negotiations with Argentina, and
the cycle of tensions, Argentine threats, and British counter-
actions—all well below the scale of all-out hostilities—that had
been intensifying since 1965. As the Franks Report noted, by
1982 there appeared to remain only one solution that might
satisfy all parties, a leaseback arrangement with Argentina; and
the prospects for that solution were diminishing rapidly.5 As
all other policy options diminished, the "dilemma" between
containing the dispute by diplomatic means and maintaining a
commitment to defend the islands continued to sharpen:

The Islands were always at risk, and increasingly so as Argen-

tina's military capability grew stronger; but a British decision
to deploy to the area any additional warships, whose secrecy
could not always be assured (as it had been when two frigates
and a nuclear powered submarine were deployed during a
1977 crisis over the islands), also carried a risk, depending on
its timing of frustrating the prospect of negotiation, (emphasis
added)6

Thus, according to the Franks Report, a solution such as that

proposed by Cable might actually have brought about the very
ciraimstances that the government was desperately hoping to
avoid, namely, an even more determined Argentine position
leading to an invasion. On the other hand, of course, the inva-
sion did take place anyway. Furthermore, the Franks solution-
continued negotiation and retention of the ice-patrol ship
Endurance, whose announced withdrawal in June 1981 certainly
influenced Argentine assessments of British resolve—likewise
might not have been the answer either. For that solution begs
a larger question that the Argentines may have posed and that,
in any event, they answered wrongly: That question was not,
would Britain defend the islands, but could it do so?

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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
This issue was raised in an article by Lawrence Freedman,
who asserts that "It may be that the underestimation [of British
reaction] was not so much of British anger and readiness to take
up the challenge as of its actual capacity to retake the islands by
military means/'7 To buttress his contention, Freedman notes
the seeming Argentine nonchalance about the timing of its
invasion. A delay until after the Easter holiday would have
made it more difficult for Britain to assemble a task force, since
a major deployment to the Indian Ocean was scheduled for the
following several months. Such a delay would have also en-
abled Argentina to receive more deliveries of new arms, includ-
ing French Super Etendard aircraft, which can carry antiship
Exocet missiles. Argentina thereby could have improved its
military position vis-&-vis any task force that might have been
sent south by the British. Finally, such a delay would have made
it almost inevitable that Britain would have been forced to retake
the islands during the South Atlantic winter, a most daunting
prospect.
Freedman provides no prescriptions for the United Kingdom
as to how it might have disabused Argentina of its notions about
British capability to fight and win. Surely, continued deploy-
ment of the Endurance would not have done so. Nor would infre-
quent naval visits; at most, that might have led the Argentines
to plan their invasion for July or August, as Freedman states
they should have.
What, then, should Britain have done; or could it have done?
Perhaps more significantly, for those seeking political-military
lessons from this conflict, what actions are required in order to
prevent similar aggression from taking place in a context where
long-standing negotiations have proved fruitless and where
parties to the dispute, to whom one of the negotiators has
long-standing commitments, have a de facto veto over any
negotiated outcome? The issue could apply to a host of situa-
tions, including the Middle East. There are, of course, no pat
answers to these questions. But the conflict may have pointed
to approaches other than those pursued by the United States
before 1980, and by the United Kingdom before the Argentine
surrender at Port Stanley.

Naval Forces in Modern Crisis Management

"Gunboat diplomacy" is a concept that conjures up images of
colonial powers browbeating helpless natives by means of a
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 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
small show of force. In fact, as Sir James Cable and the studies
in the 1970s by Barry Blechman and Steven Kaplan have
demonstrated, such tactics have by no means been discarded in
the late twentieth century. Their effectiveness, however, is
another matter. Some, like Blechman and Kaplan, have argued
that the long-term impact of the redeployment of naval forces in
response to a crisis is difficult to measure, and may be quite
limited. Others have argued that the success of such
redeployments is immeasurable, because success is defined as
the prevention of any adverse action occuring: by definition,
nonoccurrence produces no data points.
In no case since World War II, however, have naval forces as
large as the task force deployed from Britain to the South Atlan-
tic initially for crisis management, actually been committed to
full-scale naval hostilities. Thus, until the South Atlantic war
there was no way of demonstrating that naval redeployments
permitted a calibrated response to crises that began with naval
presence but ended in force. Without an explicit readiness to
resort to force, in the event mere presence failed, presence was
inherently meaningless. The absence of such a resort to force
may have been responsible for the increasing skepticism with
which many observers viewed the deployment of naval forces
in a crisis, even if those forces were powerful aircraft carriers.
Certainly, even the deployment of the large British Task
Force, as a last resort, did not force Argentina to agree to
Britain's demand to return to the negotiating table. At bottom,
therefore, as Freedman notes, what was at issue was Britain's
military credibility: Would it fight, and if so, could it win? Since
the Royal Navy did fight, and win, the lesson for future poten-
tial aggressors may well be what Mrs. Thatcher has hoped it
would be: states will take necessary military action to protect
their interests, however far off those interests may be.
Moreover, Britain's behavior in the South Atlantic may have
restored the credibility of gunboat diplomacy for crisis manage-
ment, since ships will have been seen to fight as well as wave
the flag. The future of such diplomacy will, of course, continue
to depend also upon perceptions that a state can provide the
wherewithal to back up its "gunboats" with viable and timely
force when necessary. To create such perceptions, however,
requires other than the mere stationing of a few small naval
units in potential crisis areas.

163
 THE FALKLANDS WAR

Planning Forces for "Unplanned" Conflicts

It has become de rigeur among military systems analysts to

postulate precise sets of assumptions about the nature of
conflict, and then to plan forces whose capability in wartime are
highly sensitive to those assumptions. Such force planning has
always been difficult with respect to maritime and rapid
development forces (in the case of forward deployed maritime
forces the two are synonymous), whose inherent advantages lie
in theirflexibilityto cope with a variety of crises, rather than in
their optimal performance in any one conflict. Because "flexi-
bility" cannot be measured in terms of effectiveness, analysts
have often discounted it entirely, and correspondingly have
assigned lower priority to the need for additional maritime
forces relative to other, more precisely defined requirements.
Keith Speed was dismissed as First Lord of the Admiralty
because he contended that maritime requirements were
wrongly being assigned lower priority by John Nott, then British
Secretary of State for Defense.8
If any conflict could be labeled "unplanned" it was the South
Atlantic War. The Franks Report acknowledged as much.9 It is
impossible to assert that, had Britain undertaken a program to
maintain, operate, and develop more flexible forces for long-
distance operations—a large proportion of which would have
been maritime—the Argentine invasion might not have taken
place. Even such a program might not have altered perceptions
based on over a decade of determined British efforts to scale
back all non-European military activity and commitments.
Nevertheless, such a program, including more frequent exer-
cises that demonstrated rapid British response capability outside
NATO, even if such exercises were not held in the South
Atlantic, might have caused the Argentines to think again. Their
planners might not have concluded, as Freedman speculates,
that Britain could not win a limited conflict. Moreover, a deter-
mined British effort to increase its out-of-NATO capabilities and
presence would likely have created a planning atmosphere in-
side the Ministry of Defense that would have led at least to the
retention of Endurance in the South Atlantic, and possibly to the
sorts of "presence" visits that Cable has cited as necessary.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the decision to scrap
Endurance was made by the Ministry of Defense over the protest-
ations of Lord Carrington at the Foreign Office. While at first
blush it might have been expected that the roles between the
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 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
two ministries might have been reversed, in practice the cry
"send a carrier" has more often been that of foreign ministries
in response to crises than that of military planners.
Ultimately, in the case of U.K. action in the South Atlantic,
considerations of cost effectiveness, driven by measures of
effectiveness that could easily be quantified, overcame political
imperatives. Only in a climate where it would have been recog-
nized that some measures of effectiveness must encompass
other than purely statistical considerations (and, as noted
above, who can measure the value of presence, when its effec-
tiveness is defined in terms of preventing things from happen-
ing?) could a more vigorous British effort to pursue flexible
military programs geared to "out-of-area" contingencies
possibly have taken place.
It is, therefore, highly significant that the experience in the
South Atlantic appears to have fostered a climate in British
military planning circles that stresses a more vigorous effort to
pursue flexible military programs geared to "out-of-area" con-
tingencies. While not in any way rejecting the primacy of its
European commitment, the Ministry of Defense in its own
evaluation of the South Atlantic conflict has pointed to a large
number of actions that are obviously directed at improving the
flexibility, adaptability, and responsiveness of its forces in
general, and its maritime units in particular.10
One such action is the revaluation of the cost effectiveness of
certain naval forces. The example in question is the fate of the
carrier, or "through deck cruiser," Invincible. The ship was the
first of a class of three units, whose cost had risen dramatically
since the inception of the project. Operating cost for the ships
also appear to have been higher than anticipated. A second
ship, Illustrious, has been completed; and construction of a
third, Ark Royal, has already begun. Given Britain's primary
naval mission of contributing to the protection of the Atlantic
sea lanes in the event of a conflict with the Warsaw Pact, the
marginal cost of a third Harrier carrier did not seem to justify the
marginal effectiveness that such a ship offered to the successful
pursuit of that mission. Her Majesty's government, therefore,
determined that it could not afford to operate all three ships. As
a result it undertook an effort to sell the oldest of the three,
Invincible, and found a buyer in the Australian government,
whose own large deck carrier, Melbourne, was nearing
retirement.
Before the transfer could take place, the crisis broke in the
165
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
South Atlantic. The Invincible played a critical role supporting
Harrier operations, as it was the only other truly air capable ship
apart from the older carrier, Hermes. Within weeks of the war's
end, the government announced that Australia had agreed not
to press ahead with the purchase; the ship will remain part of
the British fleet.
The cost of operating Invincible has not been reestimated
downward. No announcement has been made of changes in
British plans to operate the other two ships of the same class.
Moreover, Britain remains committed to operating two older
amphibious ships, the Fearless and the Intrepid, whose retire-
ment, again determined by cost considerations, had only been
forestalled in March, two months before the war began. It was
not marginal cost considerations therefore, but the revised
British estimate of Invincible's effectiveness measured against the
opaque, but nevertheless real, demands for flexibility in
"unforeseen contingencies'' that saved Invincible.
It is unlikely that those analysts for whom measures of
effectiveness obtain their validity in direct proportion to their
susceptibility to quantification will ever accept the proposition
that the marginal utility of flexible maritime forces, such as
multipurpose carriers and surface units, justify their costs.
Nevertheless, the South Atlantic experience should give them
pause. A greater commitment to maintaining and exercising the
responsiveness inherent in maritime forces might have averted
the crisis altogether. The employment of those and other rapidly
deployable forces led to its successful (from the British perspec-
tive) conclusion.
Cost effectiveness critically depends upon the choice of
appropriate measures of effectiveness. Deterring and coping with
unforeseen problems simply requires capabilities whose
effectiveness cannot easily be quantified, but are no less real.
Those measures differ in both kind and degree when applied to
the viability of developing programs for the acquisition, opera-
tion, and deployment of flexible, rapidly deployable maritime
(and other) forces, such as those which won the war in the
South Atlantic.

Of Allies and Access11

For many Europeans, and indeed Americans, the "Alliance" is
a code word for the NATO organization, or the North Atlantic
Alliance. Few Europeans think of bilateral U.S. ties with
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 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
individual European states in the context of a conflict, primarily
because there is little interest in supporting American opera-
tions outside Europe. There is also little enthusiasm for address-
ing non-European situations in which individual European
states might become involved. Such "regional" contingencies
are meant to take place only among Third World states.
The South Atlantic conflict demonstrated that bilateral
alliances are still extremely important. It showed that the
dependence upon individual allies for access to facilities along
extended lines of communication is not merely a problem for the
United States alone. It highlighted the fact that America's
bilateral relations with her allies, in addition to the multilateral
relationship that defines the NATO alliance, are critical to any
coordinated Western effort to cope with threats outside the
NATO area. And it demonstrated that America takes its bilateral
ties seriously, and that American support for an ally can be
meaningful politically as well as militarily.
Britain clearly required the goodwill of the United States—
apart from any material support it might have received—if it was
to prosecute its South Atlantic operations successfully. That
goodwill was the key to America's willingness to tolerate an
intensive level of operations on Ascension Island, which
supported a number of Vulcan bombing runs against Port
Stanley airfield, provided enroute bases for refueling of Harrier
aircraft, and served as a way station for naval forces steaming
further south. Without Ascension it is unlikely that Britain could
have prevailed in the conflict.
The importance of American support on Ascension Island has
been ignored in^a number of accounts. For example, the two
articles entitled "The Falklands War" and "Military Lessons
of the Falklands Campaign" that appear in Strategic Survey
1982-1983, do not even mention the island facility.12 On the
other hand, former British Secretary of State for Defense John
Nott stated that the RAF moved over 5,800 people and 6,600
tons of stores through Ascension in over 600 sorties by CC-130
and UC-10 aircraft.13 Moreover, it is inconceivable that any
bombing raids would have been conducted without the use of
Wideawake, and the availability of the airfield and its surround-
ing facilities to the large number of tankers (ten) required for
each single raid.14 Layman was informed during his stopover at
Ascension that Wideawake Airfield had replaced Chicago's
O'Hare Airport as the world's busiest.
Of course, America also announced it would provide the
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
United Kingdom with material support. That support amounted
to roughly $100 million in sales, for which the United Kingdom
had to provide payments under the normal terms of such
agreements. Perhaps more important than the magnitude or
even the details of those sales, however, was the psychological
impact of the U.S. announcement. Argentina stood branded
before the world as an aggressor by a state that clearly had
sought to cultivate its goodwill. Furthermore, by its decision to
take sides, the United States added further credibility to the
British claim that aggression simply could not be tolerated as a
means for solving long-standing diplomatic disputes. The use of
military force by the British, and the American support for that
force, demonstrated to other potential aggressors that actions,
not mere words, stood behind fundamental Western principles
of justice and fair play.

Selling Arms: Who Are Your Friends?

Arms-producing states that sell their wares abroad have always
assumed, explicitly, or implicitly, that such sales would not
result in their having to defend against the systems they have
sold. Sales are meant for "friendly" states, or at least, states that
are not "unfriendly." Western states, including the United
Kingdom, have pointed to arms sales as a means of fostering
their own interests abroad, and as a surrogate for their having
to commit their own forces to conflicts in distant locales. In
addition, the sale of arms is often integral to the survival of a
state's domestic armaments manufacturing sector, and is
viewed as a key source of export revenue.
The South Atlantic crisis demonstrated in a most graphic way
that there is no guarantee that the vendor nation will never face
its own weapons, or those of its allies, in future combat. British
forces found themselves operating against Blowpipe and other
systems produced by their own industries. Moreover, French
systems continued to be delivered to Argentina until the
invasion actually occurred. Indeed, after the war broke out
Argentina tried desperately to acquire more of those systems
both from France and from other suppliers of Exocet missiles
and other systems. While no evidence was ever produced to
verify constant reports of arms and spare parts reaching Argen-
tina, such transfer was possible given the markets that had been
carved out in Latin America.
The fact that Argentina employed Western systems, many of
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 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
which were also potentially available from states other than
those which produced them (even if in fact it failed to acquire
them), points to the great need for caution when selling arms to
other states. That lesson might easily have been applied some-
what earlier, in the event of a confrontation between Iranian and
U.S. forces, had the hostage crisis continued. The loss of F-14
and other U.S. systems after the fall of the Shah drove home to
at least some Americans the need for selectivity and caution
when selling arms abroad. The South Atlantic conflict should
leave no doubts on this point.
Finally, acquisition of a foreign system allows the purchaser to
learn that system's strengths and weaknesses. The transfer of
British defensive systems to Argentina created opportunities for
the Argentines to train and perfect tactics for anticipated combat
by using their own, virtually identical, systems as proxies for the
British. Prior to the attack on the Sheffield, Argentine pilots
reportedly trained against their own Sheffield-class ships that,
like the British Type 42x, were armed with the Sea Dart
missile.15
If there are any policy disputes between vendor and buyer,
the vendor should be cautious despite the pleas of arms
manufacturers. Spare parts inventories may have to be carefully
controlled; key subsystems may have to be excluded; and sales
may have to include restrictive clauses to prevent unauthorized
transfers to third parties. Arrangements with allies may be
necessary to assure similar behavior on their part. Such cautions
should by no means be seen as a restriction upon arms sales. To
the contrary, it is simply a manifestation of what the relation-
ship of sales should be to national policy: sales are a vehicle
for national security policy, and should be governed by that
policy, not, as was sometimes the case in the past, vice versa.
Those who were shot at by Blowpipes or Exocets are unlikely to
forget the experience soon, if they were lucky enough to have
survived it.

Winning the War at Home: The Lesson of Public Support

Many Americans, still recalling the Vietnam experience, have
been prone to question the likelihood that public support could
ever be elicited for any conflict other than one that threatens the
survival of the nation. To a lesser extent, the Suez experience
left similar impressions among many thoughtful British
observers. The South Atlantic conflict demonstrated quite
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
conclusively that there was little merit to the "simple . . .
assumption that democratic societies have a low level of
tolerance for war, with national will being snapped with each
casualty and lurid media coverage/' Freedman notes that things
might have been different in other circumstances: had Britain
not maintained the initiative; had the war turned into a
stalemate; had allied criticism been more vociferous; had the
war not been so far away; had British soldiers not been dying
in Northern Ireland; had the issue not been one of democracy
against dictatorship, but one involving "shadowy notions of
national interest."16 Yet Freedman misses the entire point of
public support for the government during the war.
The intensity of public support for the government went
beyond mere polling results. In its basest manifestation, fans
hounded Argentine footballers from the playing fields of their
English home dubs. More interestingly, the public outcry over
"too much" media objectivity for employing Argentine footage
demonstrated an impatience with television efforts to report on
the war along the lines that the U.S. media reported Vietnam.17
It was public support that spurred the rapid mobilization of
industrial resources for the war effort, and the successful con-
version of civilian assets to military capabilities that may have
been the difference between victory and stalemate.
Public support for the war should have been lower because it
was in a "far away place," as indeed Vietnam was (as was
Czechoslovakia before it, in 1938). Again, public attitudes to the
United States verged on hostility, in part because the United
States was perceived as "letting Britain down." Finally, the
entire South Atlantic issue was one that dearly did not involve
an obvious national interest; it was precisely for that reason that
the government could never bring itself to devote greater
resources to the defense of the islands. What Freedman misses
is that the matter was not one of national interest but of national
pride: the British public was not prepared to tolerate the blow to
national pride that the Argentine invasion represented. The
lesson of the conflict, perhaps its most important political
lesson, is that patriotism remains alive and well in the Western
democracies.

Implications for Military Operations

Two conflicting impulses tempt the military analyst studying the
South Atlantic conflict. On the one hand, what transpired in
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 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
and around the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in the summer of
1982 included the "first truly naval confrontation since the
Pacific conflict in World War II."18 As such, the conflict could
be seen as a cornucopia of lessons for those seeking to plan
naval strategy, tactics, and forces for other possible scenarios
that might arise during the latter part of the twentieth century.
On the other hand, however, the South Atlantic crisis could be
dismissed entirely as an artifact of a bygone era. In this view, it
would bear little real relationship to the demands of conflict that
would likely arise in the event that hostilities commenced
between, for example, the world's two great power blocs,
NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
The truth, of course, lies somewhere in between. The South
Atlantic conflict was sui generis in some respects, but the validity
of some lessons is not diminished by that fact. In particular,
the conflict's outcome appears to have significant implications
for five major facets of strategy operations and tactics: (1) the
role of naval surface forces; (2) the relevance of the amphibious
mission; (3) the potential contribution of Special Operation
Forces; (4) the coordination of land- and sea-based operations;
and (5) the critical importance of logistics. The following
sections will address each of these facets.

The Continuing Importance of Naval Surface Forces

Ever since the battles between Louis Johnson, Truman's
Secretary of Defense, and the carrier admirals over the future of
the carrier fleet, experts have argued over the validity of main-
taining large and costly surface naval forces in the age of the
bomber and submarine.19 The debate has bifurcated into two
issues: the viability of the aircraft carrier in particular, and the
utility of surface ships in general.
The debate over both carriers and surface ships intensified in
the aftermath of the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by a
Soviet-built Egyptian Styx antiship missile. Proponents of the
view that modern fleets should emphasize aircraft, submarines,
and small patrol boats argued that the Eilat incident proved the
inherent advantage lay with the antiship force. They pointed to
the tremendous disparity between the cost of a large surface
warship and the cost of the small number of missiles that could
sink it. Proponents of large surface fleets, such as United States
Navy spokesmen, argued that the Styx incident vindicated the
concept of "defense in depth." A powerful aircraft carrier, itself
171
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
capable of surviving multiple hits by enemy missiles, would be
afforded several layers of additional protection, both from air-
craft deployed from its decks, and from highly specialized escort
ships whose purpose it was to shoot down enemy bombers and
missiles.
Continuing efforts by the United States Navy to build larger,
more capable, and more costly carriers and escorts, coupled
with improving accuracies on cruise missiles, and the deploy-
ment of even larger numbers of these missiles aboard Soviet
ships, submarines, and bombers, further fueled the debate on
the wisdom of acquiring large aircraft carriers. At the same time,
the navy's implicit decision to concentrate all its firepower in its
carrier force and to relegate escorts to purely defensive mis-
sions, led some analysts to criticize the level of expenditures
being applied to ships whose mission foreordained their rapid
demise once hostilities opened at sea.
The South Atlantic conflict certainly did not put to rest the
arguments on either side.20 But the war demonstrated that
surface ships could survive, even in the face of determined and
capable opposition. Furthermore, it indicated that nations
operating in hostile environments, at the end of long lines of
communication and in the absence of friendly land bases, could
not hope to complete successful military operations without
adequate defense-in-depth and the "cover" provided by sea-
based aviation. The Sea Harriers operated by the Royal Navy
and the GR3 Harriers flown by the Royal Air Force enabled the
U.K. surface forces to survive determined assaults by the Argen-
tine Air Force. The absence of early warning, however, was
manifest virtually every time a British surface ship was sunk.
Moreover, British forces were fortunate that the absence of elec-
tronic countermeasures aircraft was not a liability since the
Argentines did not employ many of the weapons of electronic
warfare available to other military powers.
To be sure, the sinking of the Sheffield and other British surface
ships did point to their continued vulnerability. But the loss of
a ship, like the loss of a tank on land, does not signify the
uselessness of that system. What is remarkable is not how many
British ships sank, but how few of them did—a testimony to the
imaginative employment of limited air defense resources for
defense in depth. The Argentine tactical aim was to sink the
carriers Invincible and Hermes.21 Freedman notes the degree to
which the careful positioning of British warships forced the
Argentines to fly profiles too low to enable their iron bombs
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 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
to detonate.22 Strategic Survey 1982-1983 reaches a similar
conclusion.23 Too much should not be made of this point,
however, since the Argentines may have miscalculated the
optimum release point for their weapons. Britain did not have
at its disposal the modern radar systems, target identification
systems, data management systems, and electronic warfare
units that, for example, would have been available to a United
States Navy task force operating under similar circumstances.
And, as the U.S. Navy report on the conflict rightly indicated,
"A well-rounded complement of aerial surveillance aircraft,
interceptors, anti-submarine aircraft and all-weather attack
bombers would have made all the difference" to the survival of
a larger part of the surface fleet.24

The Amphibious Mission

The amphibious mission has been synonymous with the United
States Marine Corps since its birth in 1775. Its modern expres-
sion comprises carefully timed operations that involve pre-
attack "preparation" of the landing site by naval aircraft and
guns, highly synchronized landings of troops, vehicles,
helicopters, and support forces from a variety of landing ships
and craft, and the seizure of major beachheads as preparation
for a sustained offensive. The Marine amphibious landing, as it
is familiar both to military specialists and to avid viewers of war
movies, reached its zenith during the Pacific island hopping
campaign of World War II and the Inchon landing of 1951.
Since then, however, and particularly since the advent of
the cruise missile, the Marines and their mission have been
subjected to much of the same criticism that has been directed
at carrier forces. Beginning in the 1970s, critics argued that the
Marines were sentimentally tied to a mission that simply could
not stand up to the cold reality of modern warfare. The World
War II island hopping campaigns were a thing of the past.
Critics contended that past Marine campaigns had little mean-
ing in relation to a major war on the European continent, where
Marines seeking to assault beaches in slow moving landing
ships and craft would find themselves literally looking into
launchers of highly accurate cruise missiles. The Marines would
never reach any beach, much less seize it.25 Needless to say,
whatever critique applied to the U.S. Marines was presumed to
apply, ipso facto, to all other similar units, whose size was a frac-
tion of that of the U.S. force.
173
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
The realization by U.S. strategists that there is a world outside
Europe altered the way in which they viewed the Marines. The
Corps formed an integral part of the Rapid Deployment Force
and likewise is a prime element in the new U.S. Central Com-
mand. The South Atlantic conflict/ however, yielded the opera-
tional proof that even the most meticulous tables of operation
and equipment could not provide; the landings on East Falkland
demonstrated that the amphibious mission was alive and well.
Just as the British surface force performed well without the
luxury of many defensive and offensive systems integral to
American surface units, so too the British landing by the Royal
Marines' Commando Brigade was bereft of many capabilities
that would be a critical element in an equivalent landing by
United States Marines. The British actually employed few
specialized amphibious units, since they did not have many. At
the start of the operation, the United Kingdom had only eight
amphibious ships available—Fearless, Intrepid, and six smaller
logistic landing ships (LSLs). As noted earlier, the two prime
dock landing ships, the Fearless and Intrepid, actually had been
slated for retirement until a prescient reprieve by the British
government several months before the conflict retained them in
the force. The Royal Marines' Brigade had no specialized tank
landing ships such as U.S. LST classes, and no multipurpose
amphibious ships, such as the massive (39,000 ton displace-
ment) LHA-1 class, which can by itself carry all the men and
equipment for a battalion landing team, as well as the aircraft
and landing ships to support it.
British forces were hampered by a shortage of helicopter land-
ing spots on ships and, due to the destruction of three of the
four available CH-47 helicopters, the British suffered from a
shortage of heliborne lift as well. Finally, although U.K. naval
guns performed admirably in providing fire support for the
landing units, they were limited by gun caliber and therefore
range and power. Nevertheless, the significance of British naval
gunfire is revealed in the following recollection of the com-
mander of the Argentine Fifth Marine Battalion: "Naval
Artillery had tremendous precision... They fired at an im-
pressive speed... We were hidden well enough, but if we so
much as lifted our heads, we would be decapitated."26 Due to
careful planning, dedication, and as a consequence, erroneous
Argentine assumptions about prospective landing sites, the
British landed without initial opposition, despite the loss of two
key logistic landing ships.
174
 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
The South Atlantic experience thus clearly underscores the
relevance and importance of the various improvements that the
United States has applied to its own amphibious forces since the
1960s. The United States has refined its concept of "vertical
envelopment," which incorporates landings inland by outsized
cargo and troop helicopters, such as the CH-53E, in conjunction
with conventional landings ashore. The United States is also
introducing the air cushioned landing craft (LCAC), a high-
speed boat that can carry troops, or even a tank, for about 200
nautical miles at speeds in excess of 40 knots.
Conscious of its own lack of sea-based firepower support for
landing units, the United States Navy is reintroducing the four
IOWA class battleships into the fleet after nearly two decades
(and in some cases, nearly three decades) in mothball status.
These ships, with their 16 inch guns, will provide longer range
and more potent firepower support than anything the British
were able to field in the South Atlantic. In addition, the battle-
ship's cruise missile armament opens up new tactical
possibilities for the landing forces. Long-range cruise missiles
could be targeted against enemy strongholds, airfields, and
command centers well before the landing force comes within
200 miles of the shore. At that point, it could seek to establish
air superiority while deploying long-range LCACs. As the force
approached the shore, the shorter-range landing forces could
operate under both air cover and supporting fire from the 16
inch guns.
It is expected that carrier-based aircraft would provide the
above noted "air superiority" and "air cover" for U.S. landing
forces. However, the Marines have been the first to recognize
the potential of the British Harrier as an aircraft that could fit
easily into the integrated air/ground landing embodied in the
U.S. amphibious assault operation. The Harrier's versatility
renders it the only plane that can move with the Marines
through every single stage of an amphibious operation: from the
ships, to the initial assault, to operations on bare strips of land,
and finally combat, once initial objectives have been taken.
One lesson of the South Atlantic conflict, therefore, is that
these weapons developments for amphibious forces, many of
them costly, are well justified. The amphibious mission remains
viable, even in the late twentieth century, given the availability
of improved systems, and of ample ingenuity of the kind that
the British recently demonstrated when their forces landed on,
and took, East Falkland.
175
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Special Operations Forces
The South Atlantic conflict again reaffirmed the value of the
proper use of Special Operations Forces, those elite sea, air, and
land units that can conduct unconventional warfare operations,
operate behind enemy lines, and train the forces of other states
in counterinsurgency operations.
The British Army's Special Air Service (SAS) units and the
Royal Marines' Special Boat Squadron demonstrated the
versatility of these forces. They provided tactical intelligence for
the landing units on both South Georgia and East Falkland, and
were able to relay their findings in a timely manner to opera-
tional commanders. They carried out a series of raids that misled
the Argentines as to the actual location of the major landing.
They also successfully carried out sabotage missions. In one
such operation, an SAS raiding party, supported by naval
gunfire, destroyed an ammunition dump, stores, and eleven air-
craft. In all cases, these forces suffered few casualties, and their
"unconventional warfare" activities are acknowledged to have
had a major influence on the outcome of the battle.27
The United States has long operated four Special Forces: the
Army's Green Berets, the Navy's Sea-Air Land (SEAL) units,
the Marine Corps Reconnaissance units, and the Air Force
special forces. At one time an aura of romanticism seemed to
surround these forces, particularly during the early 1960s, when
the Kennedy administration's planners seemed infatuated with
the Green Berets. In recent years, however, both the size and
scope of U.S. special forces suffered from post-Vietnam budget
reductions. U.S. forces could, of course, provide the same
catalytic support for regular force operations as the British forces
did for their own regular units. But Special Forces are far from
inexpensive. They require costly training, including language
proficiency (often in dialects unique to particular regions), and
unique weapons systems. For this reason, the Reagan adminis-
tration, while committed to reviving the capabilities of these
forces, has proceeded with caution in funding only modest force
level increases for the Special Forces. Funds are being devoted
as well for the research and development necessary to provide
these special units with the weapons and equipment that will
enable their missions to succeed.
Logistics
Armchair strategists often overlook the importance of logistics;
professional soldiers, at least those who have conducted
176
 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
successful operations, rarely do. It is pointless to plan a daring
operation if supplies are unavailable or to mount an assault
when ammunition quickly runs out. To the credit of the British,
they were able to overcome the hazards posed by extremely
long lines of communication and successhilly, if barely, kept
their forces sufficiently well supported to maintain the tempo of
battle necessary for victory. Once again, the lesson was an old
one whose validity was no less current for its age: logistics is a
necessary condition for success on the battlefield.
The contrast between British and Argentine logistics manage-
ment was particularly stark. Argentina, favored by geographic
proximity, could not distribute adequately the stores of muni-
tions and weapons that it had stockpiled on the islands soon
after it seized them. As a result, some units were short of equip-
ment that was in fact available in supply dumps elsewhere on
the small islands.28 In addition, Argentina was not able to
maintain a constant pace of resupply once the British exclusion
zone came into force. While the clandestine flights into the
Falklands by small supply planes were small victories for the
Argentines, their payloads were by far insufficient to have
sustained their forces indefinitely against a determined British
attack. According to one report, from 2 to 30 April, the period
prior to the British assault on the islands, Argentina transported
500 tons of supplies and 1,500 persons from the mainland. From
1 May, when the British landing began, until 14 June, Argentina
was only able to transport 304 persons and 70 tons of
supplies.29
The British logistics management problem was an entirely
different one. Distance posed the most formidable barrier: a line
of communication stretching some 7,000 nautical miles, broken
only by the small Ascension Island, whose runway and storage
space were extremely limited, and whose facility was jointly
operated and managed by United States forces. Still another
problem was that which attends any amphibious assault-
managing the transfer of logistics from ship to shore in a hostile
environment. As the beachhead grew, the problem became
more manageable, but even after initial landings, the timing and
mix of combat and support landing operations remained
especially demanding for the logisticians.
Britain employed a particularly ingenious solution to cope
with its logistics problem: it called upon civilian assets, con-
verted them rapidly to military use, and brought into play plans
that had been formulated well before the crisis broke. Not every
177
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
state may be able—or need—to deploy its civilian resources with
the same rapidity. Interestingly, the Argentine Navy employs
merchant tankers in place of replenishment oilers, and included
two such tankers in the Task Force it had organized in late April
to counter a possible British assault on the islands or the
mainland.30 Every state contemplating operations at remote
distances (and there are others apart from the United States that
have done so in the recent past) must pay heed to the demands
of logistics if its forces are not to wither on the battlefield "for
want of a bullet/'

Coordination of Land- and Sea-Based Operations

The South Atlantic conflict was not, strictly speaking, a "naval
war." It could be more accurately termed a "maritime conflict."
The distinction is not trivial. Naval conflict involves only sea-
based forces, whether they operate on or under the sea, or in
the air. "Maritime operations" include land-based forces that
operate against targets at sea, as well as sea-based forces—such
as Marines—whose operations are conducted primarily on land.
The British forces demonstrated that land-based units can
successfully complement those which operate at sea, given a
clear allocation of missions, suitable training for maritime opera-
tion, an appreciation of the technological limitations of the
assets available, and the successful integration of command and
control of both types of forces. A notable example of British
efficiency in conducting maritime operations at long distances,
apart from the ship-to-shore movements of men and materiel
noted above, was the employment of Vulcan bombers to strike
the Port Stanley airfield. TT\e Vulcans were only able to complete
the mission from their bases in Ascension Island to their targets
in Port Stanley as a result of carefully planned refueling opera-
tions along their 3,300 nautical mile route. By successfully
threatening the airfield (though not actually inflicting as much
damage as the United Kingdom had hoped) the Vulcans both
struck a blow at Argentine morale and helped initially to limit
the flow of supplies to the beleaguered island.
The Argentines' most notable effort in this regard was, of
course, the series of air strikes that they undertook against the
British Naval Task Force. Argentine pilots displayed great
courage in flying operations at the furthest reaches of their
planes' combat radii, and in conducting successful strikes against
the surface ships. Had the Argentines operated more modern
178
 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
aircraft, and benefited from electronic support measures, their
rate of success against the British would likely have been
considerably higher.
As technology enables aircraft to fly longer missions—at
higher speeds and with greater payloads—the opportunity for
land-based air defense of maritime sea lanes, as well as for land-
based strikes against distant maritime targets, will continue to
grow. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that a recent U.S. Navy/
Air Force memorandum provides for expanded training in com-
bined maritime operations, including antiship, maritime recon-
naissance, and airborne early warning missions.

Other Operational Findings

While the role of surface naval and special forces, of amphibious
operations, and of logistics in modern maritime combat are
among the most noteworthy aspects of the South Atlantic con-
flict, other lessons deserve brief mention.

Training, leadership, and high levels of morale are essential to

successful military operations.

British forces scored positively on all three counts; the Argen-

tine record was, at best, mixed. The air force was well trained
and highly dedicated, and, not surprisingly, turned out to be
the most serious threat to British success. The surface navy
remained in port once the cruiser General Belgrano was sunk. The
army, whose officer corps was professional, but whose enlisted
men were conscripts, betrayed the greatest failings in all areas:
morale was poor, training was limited, and, by all accounts,
there was little positive leadership provided by officers to their
men.31

Adequate medical services are critical to morale, and are a boon to the
professionalism of a fighting force.

British medical teams preserved the lives of 90 percent of British

casualties; about 90 percent of the injured returned to their
fighting units within six months of the conflict. The return of
these troops added to the cadre of British veterans who would
be a vital source of training and expertise to new recruits. The
benefits in terms of morale when fighting men see that they are
not being abandoned when injured are incalculable.
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Technological Developments
Technological lessons are, of course, difficult to winnow from
operational lessons, since the proper use of advanced
technology enhances the chances of operational success. The
South Atlantic crisis was not a high technology war as the 1982
conflict in Lebanon was. Nevertheless, high technology systems
were used, and it is somewhat misleading to imply that because,
for example, in one instance a 4*5 inch gun was able to shoot
down a Skyhawk aircraft, older systems could in some way
substitute for weapons incorporating newer technologies.
Despite the relative absence of electronic countermeasures
and counter-countermeasures, the British did employ other
forms of countermeasures, notably chaff. Both sides used highly
complex aircraft. The British employed the Harrier, whose
vectored thrust engine is certainly not a simple technology;
Argentina employed the Super Etendard. Both sides used "high
technology" missiles to shoot at their targets. The British also
employed a variety of electronic communications equipment, as
well as specialized equipment for SAS and SBS, both of which
fall within the class of "high technology." Finally, the British
employed nuclear-powered submarines for antiship missions,
the first time that SSNs have been operated in wartime.

Aircraft
The Harrier. The British Harrier V/STOL aircraft was accorded
the greatest prominence of any weapons system operating
during the South Atlantic conflict. As already noted, it was the
only source of on-site air cover for the landing forces, and
provided air-to-ground support as the assault progressed. Its
most publicized exploits involved its aerial combat with Argen-
tinefighters:twenty-three Argentine planes were shot down by
Harriers, while no Harriers were lost as a result of these
dogfights.
Nevertheless, while these statistics are certainly impressive,
they are somewhat misleading. The Harrier was operating
against aircraft that were at the limits of their combat radii. Their
endurance and freedom of action were therefore highly
restricted. In addition, they did not benefit from avionics or
weaponry as modern as those of the Harrier. In particular, the
Harrier's effectiveness was significantly enhanced by the
infrared homing AIM-9L Sidewinder missile. The Argentines
did not themselves employ an equivalent heat-seeking missile.
180
 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
Perhaps a more significant indicator of the Harrier's utility is
the measure of its readiness and sortie rates during the conflict.
The forty-two Harriers achieved 95 percent availability at the
outset of each day and flew 99 percent of all planned missions.
These statistics point to the responsiveness and versatility of the
V/STOL plane, and justify the determination of the Marine
Corps to acquire the AV-8B Harrier on the grounds that V/STOL
type aircraft could more rapidly respond to the time-urgent
demands of the ground commander for aerial firepower on a fast
changing battlefield.

Super Etendard. For its part, the Argentine Air Force demon-
strated the capability of the Super Etendard aircraft, which
France operates as a carrier-based system, but which flew from
Argentine land bases. The combination of Super Etendard and
Exocet missile was probably the greatest threat to the British
naval force. The plane's inertial navigation system and attack
radar permitted it to fly attack profiles at very low levels, pop up
tofire,and then exit rapidly. Because the aircraft can be refueled
while in flight, it did not suffer from the same constraints that
affected other Argentine planes flying at the limits of their com-
bat radii. Unlike the American A-7E, however, which the U.S.
Navy considers comparable to the Etendard, the latter did not
carry iron bombs. Nor did the Etendards benefit from target-
locating assistance in three of the five missions that the small
squadron undertook.32

Missile Systems
Exocet. The important role of this subsonic sea-skimming
missile already has been noted several times in this essay.
Exocet's low-level flight profile creates new demands upon both
surface naval anti-air radars and the guns and missiles that they
direct and/or control. It is noteworthy that the Argentines also
attempted to employ Exocet in its land-based variant, despite
having to employ a makeshift battery in order to do so. Never-
theless, one land-based Exocet reportedly did score a hit during
the campaign.

Rapier. A number of different missile types were employed by

the British to defend against incoming attack aircraft. Of these,
the most modern was the Rapier system, a relatively lightweight
missile employed against low- and medium-altitude targets. The
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
missile appears to have performed reasonably well, enabling the
British to shoot down fourteen Argentine aircraft (and possibly
six more).
Rapier did not conclusively prove itself to be a capable system
for an expeditionary force, however. It appears to have suffered
from the dampness of the sea journey. It may have had elec-
tronic interference from the Royal Navy Identification Friend-or-
Foe Radio Transmissions. Rapier also proved difficult to deploy
quickly from ship to shore, and was unavailable to defend the
forces that landed at Bluff Cove and were subjected to a surprise
attack by the Argentine Air Force.33 Finally, the Rapier was not
subjected to serious countermeasures, thus leaving unresolved
the question of its capabilities in the kind of conflict that could
take place in Europe.
Sea Wolf. Sea Wolf is a radar-controlled short-range defense
missile that can be fired in bursts of two. Its operation in the
South Atlantic was itsfirstexposure to wartime conditions. The
Sea Wolf, emplaced aboard three ships, proved to be extremely
effective, achieving five kills for six launches. All of the kills
were aircraft; Sea Wolf was not employed against Exocet,
though it has an antimissile capability. In November 1983,
however, a Sea Wolf missile shot down an Exocet during a test
firing. This was the first time that the low altitude Exocet had
been shot down by a close-in naval missile defense system.
Sea Wolf nevertheless failed to provide last-ditch weapons
defense during the conflict. The United Kingdom has acknow-
ledged as much, and is seeking a different type of close-in
system.34 One possible lesson of the war may be that missile
systems, however capable, do not provide the responsiveness
and speed required for close-in defense. On the other hand, the
radar-guided Vulcan/Phalanx gatling gun system provides the
U.S. Navy with the kind of defense that the British needed in
the South Atlantic.
Sea Skua. The Sea Skua is a helicopter-launched antiship missile
that had not been certified for fleet use prior to the South Atlan-
tic conflict. Developed for employment by Britain's lightweight
Lynx naval helicopter, Sea Skua performed impressively, scor-
ing from four to eight hits out of eight shots. The United States
has introduced an air-launched antiship missile, the Harpoon,
which has a longer range than Sea Skua, but performs the same
mission. Its viability was clearly validated by the Sea Skua's suc-
cess in the South Atlantic.
182
 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL LESSONS
Submarine Warfare
The South Atlantic conflict marked the first use ever of nuclear-
powered submarines in combat. The British nuclear-powered
submarines clearly affected the pattern of Argentine surface
naval operations. The ability of the subs to transit at high sus-
tained speeds enabled the U.K. government to establish the
200-mile exclusion zone more quickly than otherwise would
have been possible. The availability of a total of five SSNs, as
well as a diesel/electric submarine, also permitted the United
Kingdom to expand its sea control area and to announce a cordon
sanitaire that began 12 miles from the Argentine coast. Finally,
once the General Belgrano was sunk by HMS Conqueror, the
Argentine Navy effectively remained in port and dropped out of
the war.
The Argentines employed two diesel/electric submarines, one
of which, the German-built type 209 Santa Fe, made a patrol of
about thirty-six days during the conflict. While the Santa Fe
operated near the British force for a short period, it was unable
to effect a successful attack. There is no clear evidence that the
British restricted their operations as a result of Santa Fe's prox-
imity; on the other hand, British antisubmarine warfare efforts
failed to locate the boat.
The success of British submarines, and the potential damage
that could have been wrought by the undetected Argentine
submarines had their fire control systems been fully operational,
point to a mission often neglected in discussions of submarine
warfare. Submarines tend to be viewed as the best submarine-
killers available. Indeed, Britain labels its diesel/electric sub-
marines, SSKs, or sub-killers. Yet the South Atlantic war
demonstrated that the first historic mission assigned to sub-
marines, the sinking of ships, remains important today. And
the success of the British SSNs in immobilizing the Argentine
surface force illustrates the degree to which technology has
expanded the potential of the submarine for carrying oat this
long-standing mission.35

Concluding Observations
It is extremely difficult to summarize in one essay the strategic,
military, and technological implications of a conflict whose
results continue to be studied in great detail. Perhaps its most
important lesson was one alluded to earlier: that of the danger
183
 Figure 1 Atlantic Ocean
Distances between significant locations
 Buenos Aires

»Mar Del Plata

Grytviken

«-• Puerto Be I grano

Belg South (Jcorgia
Islands

\ *c

12 mi. limit
around Argentina

Til 317.8.4 MODLOC

Comodoro Rivadavia / pehh|e ffipffiffi/^

i Island
'mm
San
Carlos /
, ^./^OOn.mi. TEZ

) !"> A p r i AKA Sum

) 2 M;i\ ARA <H:I
! 4 M:i\ {IMS She!
4i \* M;iv I-A" N A R V
5 1 25 M;n MV Allan
I : > Ma'v HMS i\n

Figure 2 South Atlantic Ocean

Approximate positions of ship sinkings, the total exclusion
zone (TEZ) and RN carrier operating area (MODLOC)
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
that arises when planners focus on only one scenario, however
demanding it might be. Such an emphasis tends to overlook the
importance of flexibility, which is the sine qua non for coping
with crises not foreseen by planners.
The South Atlantic conflict also demonstrated that an unan-
ticipated crisis can create new demands and place a strain on
forces which initially had been planned for meeting a particular
need. Failing the availability of additional forces to meet these
new demands, the next best approach is to develop forces which
are readily adaptable to different contingencies. Britain was
forced to draw on some of her NATO-related assets to prosecute
the battle for recovery of the islands. Nevertheless, because of
decisions either recently reversed or forestalled, Britain retained
sufficient numbers of flexible forces capable of meeting the
demands of an entirely different combat environment. That she
did so was a decisive factor in her dear victory over a gallant foe
nearly half a world away from the British Isles. It is a lesson that
others should learn and remember.

Notes: Chapter 11
The views, opinions, and conclusions contained here are solely those of the
author and do not reflect the endorsement or approval of any agency or depart-
ment of the United States government. They are based on analysis of material
available to the public and should in no way be construed to prejudge or affect
the official Department of Defense evaluation of the conflict.

1 See Lawrence Freedman's exhaustive review of British/American literature

on the war, "Bridgehead revisited: the literature of the Falklands," Inter-
national Affairs, vol. 59 (Summer 1983), pp. 445-52, and Simon Collier, "The
First Falklands War?: Argentine attitudes," ibid., pp. 458-64, for a survey
of the Argentine literature.
2 Sir James Cable, "The Falklands conflict," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, vol. 107 (September 1982), p. 74.
3 loc. cit.
4 For an assessment of the report see William Wallace, "How frank was
Franks?," International Affairs, vol. 59 (Summer 1983), pp. 453-8.
5 Lord Franks, et al., Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy
Counsellors, Cmnd. 8787 (London: HMSO, 1983), p. 77.
6 ibid., pp. 19, 77, 91.
7 Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982," Foreign
Affairs, Fall 1982, p. 199.
8 Speed's account, which argues that his views were vindicated by the South
Atlantic conflict, appears as Sea Change: The Battle for the Falklands and the
Future of Britain's Navy (Bath: Ashgrove, 1982).
9 Franks, et al., Falkland Islands Review, p . 88.
10 The Falklands Campaign, the Lessons, Cmnd. 8785 (London: HMSO, 1982), pp.

11 The title of this section is borrowed from a paper devoted to the subject. See

186
 STRATEGIC, MILITARY, T E C H N O L O G I C A L L E S S O N S
Dov S. Zakheim, "Of allies and access/' Washington Quarterly, vol. 4 (Winter
1981), pp. 88-%.
12 Strategic Survey 1982-1983 (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1983), pp. 116-24.
13 John Nott, "The Falklands campaign/' United States Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings, vol. 119 (May 1983), p. 120.
14 See Michael Moodie, "Six months and three wars," Washington Quarterly,
vol. 5 (Autumn 1982), p. 31, and Captain C. H. Layman, R.N., "Duty in
bomb alley," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 119 (August 1983),
p. 39.
15 See Dr. Robert L. Scheina, "The Malvinas campaign," United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, vol. 119 (May 1983), pp. 107, 112.
16 Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982," pp. 209, 210.
17 See Edgar O'Ballance, "The other Falkland campaign," Military Review,
January 1983.
18 United States Department of the Navy, Lessons of the Falklands: Summary
Report (February 1983), p. 1.
19 For a discussion, albeit somewhat biased in favor of the "carrier admirals,"
see Paul B. Ryan, First Line of Defense: The U.S. Navy since 1945 (Stanford,
Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), pp. 12-14.
20 For a discussion of the fact that, as George and Coughlin state, "everyone
seems to be claiming that the conflict in the South Atlantic vindicates his line
of strategic thought," see Bruce George, M.P., and Michael Coughlin,
"British defense policy after the Falklands/' Survival, vol. 24 (September/
October 1982), pp. 201-2 (from which the quotation is borrowed); Com-
mander Kenneth R. McGruther, U.S.N. "When deterrence fails: the nasty
little war for the Falkland Islands," Naval War College Review, vol. 36
(March-April 1983), p. 47; Jeffrey Record, "The Falklands War," Washington
Quarterly, vol. 5 (Autumn 1982), pp. 45-6; Norman Friedman, "Lessons
learned and mislearned," Orbis, vol. 26 (Winter 1983), p. 939.
21 For a discussion see Major General E. H. Dar, Pakistan Army (Ret.),
"Strategy in the Falklands W a r / ' United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol.
109 (March 1983), pp. 132-4.
22 Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982," p. 205.
23 "Military lessons of the Falklands campaign," p. 122.
24 Lessons of the Falklands, p . 2.
25 A comprehensive critique appears in Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record,
Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1976).
26 Scheina, "The Malvinas campaign," p. 116.
27 See George and Coughlin, "British defense policy after the Falklands,"
p . 206, and The Falklands Campaign, p. 18.
28 Lessons of the Falklands, p. 47.
29 Scheina, "The Malvinas campaign," p. 109.
30 ibid., p. 105.
31 For a discussion of the importance of training see Record, "The Falklands
War/' pp. 46-7, who notes the contrast between British troops trained to
conduct operations at night and in cold weather, and the Argentine forces
who had been poorly trained for night and bad weather combat. Most
British advances on the ground were conducted at night. For additional
perspectives see Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S.N. (Ret.)/ "The unobvious
lessons of the Falklands War," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol.
119 (April 1983), p. 56. For a personal account of life and morale in "bomb
alley," as San Carlos Water was called, see Layman, "Duty in bomb alley,"
pp. 35-9.

187
 THE F A L K L A N D S WAR
32 See Dr. Robert L. Scheina, "Super Etendard: super squadron/' United States
Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 119 (March 1983), p. 135, and Scheina, "The
Malvinas campaign," p. 114.
33 See J. P. Robinson, "The use and effectiveness of air defense systems in the
Falkland Islands," (Hughes Aircraft Company Weapons Systems
Laboratory, unpublished, November 1982), pp. 12-13, and George and
Coughlin, "British defense policy after the Falklands," p. 205.
34 The Falklands Campaign, pp. 33-5.
35 For a recounting of Argentine views of the impact of British SSN operations,
see Scheina, "The Malvinas campaign," pp. 107, 116-17.

188
 12
Anglo-Argentine Rivalry
after the Falklands:
On the Road to Antarctica?
CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER

The Falkland Islands War of 1982 generated heated debate over

military, political, economic, and legal issues. Even so, scant
serious attention has been focused upon possible geostrategic
implications of the conflict. This appears to be the case par-
ticularly with regard to the Antarctic, a region where both
Great Britain and Argentina have espoused conflicting territorial
claims of sovereignty and purported administrative jurisdiction.
Several major questions are posed. Given the Falklands military
crisis of 1982, what geopolitical ramifications, if any, can be
inferred about ongoing Anglo-Argentine activities in and
around the Antarctic continent? What justifications under inter-
national law have been made for each state's respective
territorial claims in the region, and to what extent are their legal
positions incompatible with each other? What genuine merits to
legal title have accrued to Great Britain and Argentina vis-a-vis
their respective claims over portions of Antarctica and select
circumjacent island groups? Is the current Antarctic regime
sufficiently stable to withstand the political challenge of a
disruptive outbreak of Anglo-Argentine rivalry over Antarctica?
Finally, what is the likelihood of conflict over Antarctica, and
what factors could operate either to precipitate or to deter a
possible military confrontation between the two powers? This
essay seeks to address these queries by examining both Argen-
tina's and Great Britain's historical experiences in the Antarctic
region, ascertaining the nature of their territorial claims there,
189
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
and assessing the relative prospects for cooperation or confronta-
tion in the wake of the 1982 Falkland Islands War. Consequently,
this study will attempt to provide a better understanding of the
historical nuances and legal complexities surrounding Anglo-
Argentine rivalry in the region not only for the Falkland Islands
situation in particular, but also for the broader Antarctic context
in general. (See Figure 3.)

Argentina's Activities in Antarctica, 1834-1958

Exploration and Development

Argentina historically has regarded the Antarctic region as
strategically significant. Serious concern persists about the
ostensible need to protect the Argentine mainland's southern
flank from attack and possible blockade. The South Atlantic
Ocean and the Antarctic continent are seen not merely as
distant, frigid, ice-covered wastelands; rather, they are per-
ceived as embodying an all too near springboard from which
hostile military activity could be launched against Argentina's
national security.
No doubt, Argentina's security anxieties stem not only from
geographical realities, but also from historical experience in the
area, perhaps most emphatically the long-standing dispute with
Great Britain over the Falklands. Since the British occupation
of the Falklands in 1834, the Argentine government has been
willing neither to recognize legally Great Britain's territorial
claims nor to accept politically any proclaimed British adminis-
tration over the area. Furthermore, Argentina views its disputes
with Great Britain over the Falkland Islands and portions of
Antarctica as one and the same. Both the Islas Malvinas and
other Antarctic-related claims have been treated politically and
legally by Argentina as if these areas were sovereign national
territory. For example, schoolchildren are taught from early ages
that these areas are integral portions of the Argentine
homeland; the population of these regions, particularly that of
the Malvinas, is included in Argentina's national census
returns; and island residents visiting Argentina are treated as
Argentine citizens, being liable for call into the military service
and required to carry Argentine passports.
Prior to 1900 Argentina expressed only passing interest in the
Antarctic. In 1903, however, the Argentine gunboat Uruguay suc-
cessfully completed Argentina's first voyage through Antarctic
190
 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
waters, in the process rescuing the Nordenskjold expedition
from the Snow Hill Islands. The following year, in February
1904, at the invitation of the Scottish National Antarctic Expedi-
tion, Argentina assumed official control over the meteorological
observatory on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys, and has
maintained its operation continuously since then.
Although Argentine Antarctic activities remained dormant
over the next two decades, in 1927 interest in the region was
renewed. A radio transmitter was installed at Laurie Island, and
Argentina first enunciated its claims officially in a statement
delivered to the Universal Postal Union: "The Argentine terri-
torial jurisdiction extends in fact over the continental area, the
territorial sea and the islands of Tierra del Fuego, the archi-
pelagoes of Estado, Ano Nuevo, South Georgia, and to the
Polar lands not yet delimited."1 Argentina initiated more exten-
sive Antarctic-related endeavors during the 1940s beginning
with the creation by government decree of a permanent
National Commission on the Antarctic (Comision Nacional del
Antartico) on 30 April 1940. Two years later the Argentine naval
transport Primero de Mayo undertook a highly visible Antarctic
expedition, visiting Deception Island, Melchin Island, and
Winter Island en route. The Primero de Mayo deposited on these
islands bronze tablets bearing inscriptions which proclaimed
Argentine annexation of all lands lying within the area south of
latitude 60° south and between longitudes 25° west and 68°34'
west.
The election of Juan Peron in 1946 stabilized Argentina's
domestic situation, giving the government an opportunity to
elevate Antarctica as a principal focus of Argentina's political,
military, and diplomatic concern. That year, a significant
governmental expeditionary program was initiated in Graham's
Land (later Palmer Peninsula), and concurrently, a vigorous
domestic publicity campaign was launched to make the Argen-
tine people more Antarctica-conscious. By November 1946
sufficient cartographical evidence had been accumulated to
suggest that Argentina tacitly had accepted sectorization of its
claim to the Antarctic continent, consisting of a territorial wedge
emanating outward from the South Pole between 25° and 74°
west longitude, bounded to the north by the 60° parallel.
Of related significance was Argentina's posture in negotiating
the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio
Treaty). Perusal of this regional security compact reveals three
interesting pertinent provisions. First, "an armed attack by any
191
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
State against an American State [would] be considered as an
attack against all the American States" (article 3(1)). Second, the
area applicable for the treaty's designated jurisdiction speci-
fically included the South Pole, as well as longitudinal bound-
aries designed to encompass Argentina's Antarctic claims
(article 4). Third, the Peron government appended to the treaty
text a formal reservation which retained Argentina's national
rights over claims in the Antarctic-circumpolar region. As a
consequence, the "American Antarctic" effectively became sub-
sumed under the Rio Treaty's security umbrella. Moreover, a
commitment was made by the parties, including the United
States, to resist "aggression" against Argentina by an "extracon-
tinental Power" (ostensibly read by the Argentine government
to mean "Great Britain").2
Before entry into force of the current Antarctic Treaty regime
in 1961, Argentina's activities regarding the circumpolar region
assumed an increasingly nationalistic hue. In 1951 the Antarctic
Institute (Instituto Antarctico Argentina) was created and placed
under the policy aegis of the Ministry of the Army. Four years
later, on 28 June 1955, new national legislation, the "Provincial-
ization of the National Territories," was promulgated. This new
law formally incorporated Argentina's South Atlantic territories
into provinces of the national federal domain. On 28 February
1957 the Argentine government proclaimed the establishment of
"The National Territory of Tierra del Fuego, the Antarctic and
the Islands of the South Atlantic." Including the Islas Malvinas,
this new national territory was reaffirmed as an integral part of
the Argentine homeland, and, supposedly, was to be adminis-
tered from its provincial capital of Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego.

Argentina's Claims to Legal Title

In light of the above observations, Argentina's assertions to
legal title over territories in the South Atlantic-Antarctic are
predicated upon certain historical, geographical, and geological
considerations peculiar to the area. From the Argentine view-
point, for instance, Argentina's uninterrupted maintenance
since 22 February 1904 of the weather station on Laurie Island
in the South Orkneys constitutes sufficient effective occupation
under international law to advance a bona fide claim meriting
territorial sovereignty over the Antarctic region. Surely not
unrelated in this respect is the allegation that certain symbolic
acts were performed during the course of Argentina's receiving
192
 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
the Laurie Island outpost from the Scottish jurisdiction in 1904:
namely, after the completion of formal transfer of authority the
Argentine flag was raised over the station as a gesture of
national ownership. In addition, an Argentine citizen present at
the occasion performed a stamp cancellation ceremony, pur-
portedly to demonstrate establishment there of a post office, a
factor which under international law generally is considered to
indicate administrative jurisdiction and sovereign control over a
territory.
Argentina's continuous operation of the Laurie Island facility
over eight decades is not at issue. Serious questions arise,
however, as to whether such presence on a single relatively
insignificant islet can constitute a degree of effective occupation
sufficient to legitimize Argentina's concomitant claims to the
Malvinas/Falklands, South Georgia, the South Shetlands, the
South Sandwich group, and several hundred-thousand square
miles of land space on the Antarctic mainland. Legally, one
cannot but harbor grave doubts about such an assertion.
Concerning symbolic acts as evidence of effective occupation,
no legal credibility is attached to them without actual prolonged
settlement. Argentina has gone to considerable lengths to
highlight its claims in the circumpolar area by performing
several intermittent ceremonial acts implying administration,
such as placing property plaques, designating postmasters,
coroners, and local magistrates, issuing postage stamps com-
memorating the claimed territories, delivering children there,
and declaring a national "Antarctic" holiday. All this notwith-
standing, international law regards such activities as mere forms
of "fictitious occupation," without any real legal foundation.
Consequently, Argentina's symbolic acts of sovereignty in the
region are regarded by most legal commentators as just that:
symbolic acts, not facts.
Perhaps more interesting from the legal historian's vantage
point is Argentina's reliance upon the Latin American doctrine
of uti possidetis juris to bolster its Antarctic-related claims. It was
argued that legal title to possessions in the Western hemisphere
does not spring from occupation and settlement of res nullius
lands in the New World, because appropriate legal title already
had been granted by the pope to the Spanish throne in the
fifteenth century. In 1493 Pope Alexander VI issued his famous
Bull Inter Caetera, which drew a line from Pole to Pole, extending
370 leagues from the Cape Verde Islands. Concurrently, the
pope declared that all lands lying west of 46° longitude
193
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
belonged to Spain, and those situated east of the demarcation
belonged to Portugal. This papal division of the New World was
formally agreed to by Spain and Portugal in 1494 in the Treaty
of TordesiUas. In effect, then, modern legal titles over territories
in Latin America are deemed to have been transferred from the
Spanish and Portuguese Empires to their legitimate heirs, who
were created through the attainment of national independence.
The historical essence of uti possidetis juris has been aptly
described as follows:

When the Spanish colonies of Central and South America

proclaimed their independence in the second decade of the
Nineteenth Century, they adopted a principle of Constitu-
tional and International Law to which they gave the name of
uti possidetis juris of 1810. The principle laid down the rule that
the boundaries of the newly established republics would be
the frontiers of the Spanish provinces which they were
succeeding. This general principle offered the advantage of
establishing the absolute rule that in law no territory of old
Spanish America was without an owner. To be sure, there
were many regions that had not been occupied by the
Spaniards and many regions that were unexplored or inhabited
by uncivilised natives, but these sections were regarded as
belonging in law to the respective republics that had
succeeded the Spanish provinces to which these lands were
connected by virtue of old Royal decrees of the Spanish
mother country. These territories, although not occupied in
fact, were by common agreement considered as being occu-
pied in law by the new republics from the very beginning.
Encroachments and ill-timed efforts at colonisation beyond
the frontiers, as well as occupations in fact, became invalid
and ineffective in law. The principle also had the advantage,
it was hoped, of doing away with boundary disputes between
the new States. Finally it put an end to the designs of the col-
onising States of Europe against lands which otherwise they
could have sought to proclaim as res nullius.3

Thus, Argentina maintains that its title to territories claimed in

the South Atlantic and Antarctica flows directly and irrefutably
from the uncontested Spanish title, recognized and sanctioned
by Pope Alexander VI in 1493-4.
It is arguable whether the doctrine of uti possidetis juris
retains substantial legal applicability as a tenet of contemporary
194
 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
international law. As one study curtly put it, "Because modern
international law does not recognize the authority of fifteenth-
century pontiffs to bind nations five centuries later, this theory
carries little weight today."4The Papal Bull of 1493 long antedated
creation of the sovereign nation-state system and the Eurocen-
tric corpus of international law. Moreover, uti possidetis juris fails
to square properly with the legal establishment of non-Hispanic
states in the New World, as well as the more recently evolved
principles of decolonization and self-determination. Further-
more, except for Latin American states, succession from original
Spanish rights has neither commanded widespread respect nor
attracted international acceptance, either in practice or in prin-
ciple. This apparent lack of contemporary legal recognition
indicates that uti possidetis juris contributes little, if any, legal
support for Argentina's South Atlantic and Antarctic claims.
Turning to factors of geography, Argentina (as well as Chile)
has advanced the contention that a state's propinquity (that is,
proximity or contiguity) may enhance its claims to legal title.
Argentina is the state located closest to various South Atlantic
islands and Antarctic lands; having the most proximate location
supposedly conveys a special right vis-&-vis legal possession,
particularly when the notion of sectorization is applied to
national claims on the continent. The sector theory, adapted
from the Arctic experience, defines claimants' territorial bound-
aries according to longitudinal lines that converge on the South
Pole from baselines originating either from mainland perimeters
of the claimant state (for example, Argentina) or from a section
of the Antarctic coast "discovered" or "occupied" by the
claimant state (for example, Great Britain).5 Though not recog-
nized internationally, sectorization has been adopted and imple-
mented by claimants to Antarctica as a means of neatly dividing
up the continent.
While Argentina's proximity to the Antarctic is geographically
evident, it is insufficient by itself to justify a legal title. Mere
propinquity is not, nor is it likely to be, respectfully regarded in
international law as a definitive criterion for asserting title to
sovereignty. Moreover, while the sector method of demarcating
claims in Antarctica has been used by claimant states as a
convenient apportionment device, it has not been accepted as a
universal principle or a rule of law. Legal opinion overwhelm-
ingly concurs that polar sectorization through propinquity
serves primarily as a political convenience for the involved
parties; but as a steadfast, acknowledged norm of international
195
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
law, sectorization and its basis for title has been repudiated in
substantial measure.6
A third aspect of Argentina's legal argument aims at
establishing claims to portions of the circumpolar region upon
geological and geomorphological grounds. Put simply, "the
highlands of Antarctica must be regarded as a continuation of
the Andes."7 Geomorphological evidence actually has revealed
that a regionally submerged mountain chain does exist, of
which the Falkland Islands, Shag Rocks, South Georgia, the
South Sandwich Islands, and Graham Land are parts protrud-
ing above water. This so-called "Antillan Loop" is believed to be
an integral segment of the Andean chain, linking together Tierra
del Fuego with the mountains in Graham Land.8 Perhaps not
surprisingly, the Argentine legal view holds that Graham Land
geologically is an extension of the Andes system, and,
moreover, that the various island groups associated with it are
joined to South America by a prolonged continental shelf area.
Consequently, Argentina believes that its claims of sovereignty
over these juxtaposed territories have priority over those of
other states.
While Argentina's geomorphological reasoning may be appeal-
ing, its legal deduction proves fallacious, at least by the
international community's standards. While not discounting
theoretical contingencies, practice in international law has
mandated that efficacy, rather than purported geological con-
tiguity, should be the overriding determinant of legal title. As
stated by Professor Van der Heydte,

The natural boundary lines of any application of the rule of

contiguity are drawn, precisely, by its very origin from the
general principle of effectiveness. Admitting the existence of
such a rale, we only assert the existence of an individual case
of applying the principle of virtual effectiveness as defined
above. It is proper, therefore, to speak of contiguity only as far
as one can speak also of virtual effectiveness.9

To accept the notion that Argentina's continental shelf pro-

longation legally constitutes appropriate contiguity relative to
circumpolar territories undercuts the traditional international
legal framework affecting territorial sovereignty over land; it
also displaces relevant considerations of the law of the sea,
particularly those principles concerning territorial delimitation
of coastal states, the exclusive economic zone, the legal status of
196
 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
islands, and various high seas freedoms. Additionally, applica-
tion of Argentina's geological contiguity position tends to
disregard an obvious fact of geography: the lack of sufficient
adjacency required to exercise a claim of contiguity. It is at best
difficult to accept that Argentina can qualify as a state "adjacent"
to Antarctica, unless some 450 miles of ocean space and pack ice
are construed to be a transcontinental bridge. In short, J. Peter
Bernhardt put it well when he concluded, "Applying the
contiguity principle to the Antarctic would be an unwarranted
extension of an already overstretched idea."10

Concluding Observations
Argentina historically has shown considerable interest in the
Antarctic, and since the early 1900s the government often has
attempted to demonstrate the legitimacy of its claims through
manifold symbolic displays of sovereignty. Further, beginning
in the 1940s, the Antarctica-Falklands issue assumed saliency in
Argentine domestic politics, engendering at times an ultra-
nationalist fervor. Especially sensitive and acute for Argentines
is the issue of foreign colonialist domination, allegedly exempli-
fied by the perceived intervention of Great Britain into Western
hemispheric affairs and the former's refusal to recognize Argen-
tine territorial claims in the region. As a diplomatic counterpoise
to the British presence in the South Atlantic-Antarctic, Argen-
tina contends that its valid legal claims to title have been ac-
quired regionally through succession from the fifteenth-century
Spanish Empire, relative proximity to the area, and geomor-
phological contiguity of the Andes chain transoceanically with
the Antarctic Mountains. Nonetheless, when viewed within the
context of contemporary international law, Argentina's claims
to sovereignty at best appear to be tenuous, anachronistic, and
polemical; at worst, they may be challenged on grounds of be-
ing perfunctory, contentious, and perhaps, even nugatory.

Great Britain's Antarctic Activities 1675-1962

Exploration and Development

Great Britain's presence in the Antarctic has been evident for
more than two centuries. The earliest discovery of land in the
area is believed to have been South Georgia in 1675 by the
British merchant Anthony de la Roche. A century later the
197
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
island was "rediscovered" by the English Captain James Cook,
who on 17 January 1775, claimed its possession for King George
III and named it South Georgia in the king's honor. In that same
month Captain Cook also reportedly discovered and claimed the
South Sandwich Island group for Great Britain.
The early nineteenth century witnessed numerous British
expeditions into the Antarctic. In February 1819 William Smith
discovered the South Shetlands and claimed them for the British
Crown. The first sighting of the Antarctic coast, probably along
the northern extremity known as Trinity Peninsula on Graham
Land, is credited to Edward Bransfield, a Royal Navy officer, in
1820. The South Orkney Islands were discovered and claimed
for Great Britain by George Powell in December 1821. Captain
Henry Foster of the Royal Navy explored and claimed parts of
the Antarctic mainland in 1828-9 and deposited a copper
cylinder on Hoseason Island, declaring it a British possession in
the name of King George IV. Three years later, on 21 February
1832, Captain John Biscoe circumnavigated the continent and
visited part of the Palmer archipelago. Claiming the area in the
name of King William IV, Captain Biscoe mistakenly called it
Graham Land, apparently convinced that he had actually
discovered portions of the mainland. Between 1841 and 1843 Sir
James Qark Ross circumnavigated the continent, charted some
500 miles of coastline in Victoria Land, and discovered Ross
Island and the northern edge of the Ross Ice Shelf. On 6 January
1843 Ross landed on the eastern shore of Palmer peninsula,
claiming Ross Island and all "contiguous lands" for the British
crown.11
Save for whalers, scant British interest was shown in Antarc-
tica over the next fifty years. However, between 1895 and 1905
seven major national expeditions set out for Antarctica, two of
which were British-sponsored: the British Antarctic Expedition
of 1898-1900 under C. E. Borchgrevink, and the larger British
National Antarctic Expedition of 1901-4 led by Captain R. F.
Scott. In the following years, private expeditions by British
subjects contributed much in the way of scientific discovery and
Antarctic cartography. Foremost among these were Captain
Scott's second expedition (1910-13) in the Ross Dependency,
and the exploits of Sir Ernest Shackleton (1907-9,1914-17, and
1921-2) who claimed possession of the Ross Dependency for
Great Britain. During this "Heroic Age of Antarctic Explora-
tion/' Great Britain formally announced its claims to portions of
Antarctica. In 1908 and 1917 the British government promulgated
198
 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
two Letters Patent, setting out boundary delimitations for the
British claims which became subsequently known as the
Falkland Islands Dependencies.
From 1923 to 1939 the Discovery Committee, a British-based
organization, produced more accurate maps of the Dependen-
cies and gathered information useful to Great Britain's whaling
industry. Significantly, a series of survey voyages also were
sponsored under the committee's direction, leading to en-
hanced oceanographical studies of the Southern Ocean, two
circumnavigations of the Antarctic continent, and recharting of
the coasts of South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South
Shetlands, and the South Sandwich Islands.
British appreciation of the Antarctic's strategic importance
was accentuated by World War n. Accordingly, during 1943-5
"Operation Tabarin" was undertaken to secure military bases at
Deception Island and Graham Land, ostensibly to preclude an
"Antarctic coup" by either Argentine or German forces. In 1945
these stations were transformed into the Falkland Islands
Dependencies Survey (renamed the British Antarctic Survey in
1967) under whose aegis British exploration and scientific
activities in the region have since been conducted. In 1962
Britain established through an Order-in-Council the British
Antarctic Territory. Effective since 2 March 1962, the territory as
designated would comprise all lands and islands lying south of
60° south latitude and between 20° and 80° west longitudes,
encompassing all British-claimed territories within the area set
out in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The Falkland Islands
Dependencies were reduced in size to only South Georgia, the
South Sandwich group, and various oceanic rock formations, all
located north of the Antarctic Treaty perimeter.12

Great Britain's Claims to Legal Title

Of all states who had serious interest in the South Atlantic-
Antarctic area prior to 1900, none was more active than Great
Britain. The historical record speaks for itself, particularly in
terms of British discovery and exploration efforts. Those ex-
plorers who laid claim to various territories in the South Atlantic
and Antarctic for Great Britain were officers in the Royal Navy,
duly commissioned and officially assigned to make these
voyages in the name of the king. This undeniably imparts some
measure of governmental legitimacy to British claims in the
region. Even so, the issue to be addressed here is the extent to
199
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
which British allegations of sovereign control over Antarctic
territories merit valid title under international law.
Under contemporary international law six methods of acquir-
ing title to territory are recognized by states: occupation, accre-
tion, prescription, voluntary cession, conquest, and treaties of
peace. Historically, discovery represented the paramount
means of securing title to vacant lands. Since the eighteenth
century, however, discovery alone has been deemed insufficient
to effect a claim of valid legal title; it must be followed by "effect-
ive" occupation, ostensibly demonstrated through permanent
settlement and responsible administrative jurisdiction. It is
largely on the grounds of discovery and consequent effective
occupation that British claims to Antarctic territories are
predicated. These claims have been formally stated as follows:

by reason of historic British discoveries of certain territories in

the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic; by reason of the long-
continued and peaceful display of British sovereignty from the
date of those discoveries onwards in, and in regard to, the
territories in the dominions of the British Crown; by virtue of
their formal constitution in the Royal Letters Patent of 1908
and 1917 as the British Possession called the Falkland Islands
Dependencies: the United Kingdom possesses, and at all
material dates has possessed, the sovereignty over the terri-
tories of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and in particular
the South Sandwich Islands, South Georgia, the South
Orkneys, South Shetlands, Graham Land and Coats Land.13

The central question therefore becomes how effective Great

Britain's occupation has been, and whether or not it has been
sufficient to warrant legal recognition as full and complete
sovereign control. When set against the accepted criteria for
effective occupation, the recorded British experience since 1675
in the region leaves room for doubt as to whether legal condi-
tions for conferring British sovereignty have been fully met.
International law through state practice has defined effective-
ness of occupation as "the objective manifestation of a con-
tinuous development of control commencing with discovery
and subsequent inchoate title and continuing by permanent
settlement and administration."14 If this is so, the British claim
suffers noticeably from the absence of any permanent settlement
on all save one of their territories, the Falklands, which have a
local population of about 1,800. South Georgia and the South
200
 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
Sandwich Islands are virtually uninhabited, and the South
Shetland Islands, the South Orkneys, and Graham's Land are
populated only by a chain of small meteorological stations. The
few "residents" there are neither indigenous peoples nor British
colonists, but scientists assigned to operate the facilities.
The South Polar area, of course, is incredibly inhospitable;
Antarctica is the coldest, driest, windiest, and remotest place on
earth. Given these extraordinarily harsh environmental condi-
tions, the suggestion has been made that special consideration
ought to be made for Antarctica-based claims; because normal
"effective occupation" is essentially impossible in Antarctic
conditions, less stringent requirements for effectiveness should
be applied. This is not the place to debate the "exceptions"
polemic; others have done that more authoritatively, without
universally conclusive results. What must be posited, though, is
that effective control for securing recognized sovereign title in
the Antarctic would necessitate at least "actual continuous and
peaceful display of state functions," if not directly through
permanent settlement, then indirectly through "effective"
administration.15
Administratively, British claims to legal title were clearly
spelled out in the King's Letters Patent of 1908. This royal pro-
clamation publicly declared formal organization of the Falkland
Islands Dependencies, consisting of the Falkland Islands, South
Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the South
Sandwich Islands, and Graham's Land. As British commen-
tators are quick to note, the Letters Patent did not make a claim
of British sovereignty; such an assertion was presumed already
extant and deemed legitimized, principally because no overt
foreign challenge to it had been made during the nineteenth
century.16 The statement, it is argued, simply confirmed Great
Britain's previous circumpolar claims and consolidated them
under a unitary administrative structure.
As a suitable vehicle for substantiating British sovereign
control in the Antarctic, the Letters Patent of 1908 has some
critical deficiencies. First, although predicated upon title to
territory secured by discovery, portions of some lands included
in the Letters Patent had been discovered or initially surveyed
by nationals from states other than Great Britain. For example,
Admiral Thaddeus Bellingshausen of Russia extensively
explored the South Sandwich group during 1819-21. In 1838-40
a French expedition under Dumont d'Urville surveyed and
charted the South Orkneys, South Shetlands, and Graham's
201
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Land. The Belgian Antarctic Expedition commanded by Adrien
de Gerlache in 1897-9, the Swedish Polar Expedition of 1901-4
led by Otto Nordenskjold, and the French Antarctic Expedition
of 1903-5 under J. B. Charcot all performed noteworthy explora-
tions in the Graham Land area. Hence, considerable foreign
discovery and exploration activity occurred in British-claimed
areas, apparently without the seeking or securing of official
British advice or permission.
A second difficulty associated with the Letters Patent of 1908
is that such a unilateral declaration looms inadequate for
demonstrating national sovereignty over a territory. The pro-
clamation was merely a Royal Prerogative, designed to modify
administrative boundaries of a non-self-governing territory, and
to set up an appropriate supervisory structure. Consequently,
the Letters Patent of 1908 must be viewed purely as a domestic
measure, intended to facilitate Great Britain's governance of
claimed lands over 8,000 miles away. Obviously, such an inten-
tion presupposes the legal right to govern. But the Letters
Patent neither substantiated the daims nor validated sovereign
title; legally, it merely presumed the daims' validity.
Third, as stated in the 1908 Letters Patent, the enumerated
"Dominion" island groups are described as being "situated in
the South Atlantic Ocean to the south of the 50th Parallel of
South latitude and lying between the 20th and 80th degrees of
West longitude/' Interestingly, if interpreted literally, those
geographical coordinates would encompass several islands
offshore Chile and Argentina in the lower Patagonian zone,
south of the 50th Parallel. In order to assuage possible political
misunderstandings, particularly by Argentina, a second Letters
Patent was issued on 28 March 1917. This proclamation, while
reaffirming the intent of the 1908 document, clarified Great
Britain's claim to include "all islands and territories whatsoever
between the twentieth degree of west longitude and the fiftieth
degree of west longitude which are situated south of the 50th
Parallel of south latitude; and all islands and territories what-
soever between the fiftieth degree of west longitude and the
eightieth degree of west longitude which are situated south of
the 58th Parallel of south latitude."
Hence, island groups or rocks located within the territorial
waters of Argentina and Chile were exduded from British
appropriation. Even so, like its 1908 predecessor the 1917 Letters
Patent must be regarded under international law as only provid-
ing a domestic declaration of policy; it did not embody either
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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
validation or substantiation of Great Britain's claim to sovereign
title over these territories.
Also relevant to Great Britain's assertion of title is the fact that
its claim to the Ross Dependency and Australian Antarctic
Territory were made by Orders in Council in 1923 and 1933
respectively. At that time, the former territory was placed under
the jurisdiction of New Zealand and the latter under the govern-
ance of the Commonwealth of Australia. Parenthetically, it is
interesting to speculate on the legal complications that would be
generated if Great Britain's claims to its Antarctic territories
someday were adjudged by an international tribunal never to
have been legally sound. New Zealand's and Australia's claims
to territory in Antarctica then could become liable to challenge,
and their legal status would become relegated to that of adopted
offspring, spawned from an illegitimate parentage.
Notwithstanding the above critique, there is no doubt that
during this century the British government has evinced substan-
tial confidence in the accepted legality of its claims in the Antarc-
tic region. This self-assurance was shown in December 1947
when Great Britain offered the opportunity to Argentina and
Chile of adjudicating rightful title through the International
Court of Justice. Similarly, in April 1951 and again in February
1953 Great Britain renewed its offer to Argentina and Chile, but
all these offers proved fruitless. Finally, in May 1955 the British
government submitted a unilateral application to the Court.
Directed specifically at Argentina and Chile, the British Antarc-
tica Cases Application averred:
(1) that the legal titles of the United Kingdom to the Falkland
Islands Dependencies, and in particular to the South Sand-
wich Islands, South Georgia, the South Orkneys, South
Shetlands, Graham Land and Coats Land, are, and at all
material dates have been, superior to the claims of any
other State, and in particular to those of the Republic of
Argentina;
(2) that, in consequence, the pretensions of the Republic of
Argentina to the South Sandwich Islands, South Georgia,
the South Orkneys, South Shetlands, Graham Land and
Coats Land, and her encroachments and pretended acts of
sovereignty in those territories are, under international law,
illegal and invalid.17
Perhaps not surprisingly, Argentina and Chile refused to accept
the International Court's jurisdiction in the matter, and Great
203
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Britain's petition subsequently was removed from the Court's
consideration.

Concluding Observations
Great Britain has had ample and long-standing historical
interest in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic. British subjects
were among the earliest and most active explorers and carto-
graphers of the region. In terms of pre-1900 discovery and
exploration Great Britain must then rank extremely high, if not
paramount, among states attracted to the area.
However, valid title and justifiable sovereign claims under
modern international law are not predicated upon discovery
and exploration alone. Substantial settlement, complemented
by a genuine intention to occupy the region permanently, are
necessary for a state to perfect legal claims and sovereign title to
territory. These essential requirements appear to be lacking
in the British position. Admittedly, the British government
historically has regarded selected parts of the Antarctic duly and
legally as British, and since 1908 it has sought through admin-
istrative acts to portray the exercise of a legitimate title to these
territories. Nevertheless, these administrative actions presup-
pose the reality of a clearly recognized, uncontested British title
to those lands, something which never has been acknowledged
unequivocably by the international community, even up to the
present day. In sum, Great Britain's claims in the Antarctic
region suffer legally from three obvious shortcomings: (1) these
lands never have been permanently settled; (2) consequently,
they never have been effectively occupied; and (3) finally, British
claims never have been legally recognized. When viewed within
the context of contemporary international law, South Georgia,
the South Shetlands, the South Sandwich Islands, the South
Orkneys, and Graham's Land therefore might be regarded as
terra nullius more than as bona fide British territorial
possessions.

The Antarctic Treaty Regime, 1961 to the Present

The Antarctic Treaty

The regime presently governing activities on the Antarctic conti-
nent was created in 1959 by the Antarctic Treaty. A diplomatic
outgrowth of the 1958 International Geophysical Year, the
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 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
Antarctic Treaty entered into force on 23 June 1961, after ratifica-
tion by all twelve signatory states. Seven of these (Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, and
Norway) had made prior legal claims to the region; the remain-
ing five (Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and
the United States) had neither claims nor the intention to
declare any. The treaty has functioned well since 1961, being
regarded as a milestone in Cold War diplomacy. It provides for
demilitarization, denuclearization, and peaceful use of the conti-
nent. Moreover, freedom of scientific research, information
exchange, and cooperation, as well as on-site inspection and the
obligation to settle disputes peacefully, are guaranteed.
Perhaps most important for this study, however, is article IV,
which relates specifically to territorial claims. This provision
directs that no acts or activities occurring while the treaty is in
force should "constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or
denying a claim to territorial sovereignty," or "create any rights
of territorial sovereignty" on the continent. Furthermore, no new
claims or enlargements of existing claims to sovereignty are to
be asserted while the treaty is in force. Finally, existing claims
and interests are safeguarded by a proviso that nothing con-
tained in the treaty should be interpreted as a "renunciation" by
any party of "previously asserted rights," "claims," or "basis of
claim to territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic." Article IV
legally froze the status quo ante of various sector claims made to
Antarctic territory south of 60° south latitude, without qualify-
ing or clarifying the legitimacy of the claims' character under
international law. Today, that same situation persists regarding
the overlapping set of Argentine and British claims to the
region.

Potential Sources of Anglo-Argentine Rivalry in Antarctica

Antarctica can be described as a vast frigid desert, a wind-swept
barren, ice-clad wasteland. Why, then, should anyone really
care about activities in the region, much less about possible
Anglo-Argentine rivalries there? Undoubtedly, this is a view
commonly shared by the vast majority of laymen, and by a
considerable number of government policymakers. The answer
to this query has to do with the potential presence of natural
resources, both living and nonliving, and the prospects for their
eventual commercial exploitation during the remainder of this
century.
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Regarding nonliving resources in the Antarctic, most informa-
tion on the availability of substantial mineral deposits is primar-
ily speculative. If the geoscientific notion of "continental drift"
is accurate, and the earth's land masses were at one time con-
joined into a "super-continent," then minerals found in the
southern portions of South America, Africa, India, Australia,
and several associated Pacific island chains conceivably could
exist in Antarctica as well. So far, only trace findings of these
minerals have been discovered; nonetheless, several studies
have suggested that there may exist in Antarctica commercially
recoverable deposits of coal, copper, gold, uranium, silver,
nickel, manganese, cobalt, tin, beryl, platinum, molybdenum,
and phosphates. In addition, there has been great interest in
potential hydrocarbon fields located within Antarctica's con-
tinental shelf, particularly beneath the Weddell Sea. As early as
1974, at least one U.S. government study reportedly said that as
much as 45 billion barrels of oil and 115 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas potentially might be found there.18 The Weddell
Sea lies within the sectorial region claimed by both Argentina
and Great Britain.
As for living resources, the South Atlantic-Antarctic
ecosystems teem with marine life. In the circumpolar waters
there are significant stocks of seals, whales, fin fish, squid, and
penguins. The greatest opportunity, however, may lie with a
small shrimp-like crustacean called krill (Euphasia superba). If the
projections that have suggested annual harvests of 100 million
metric tons were fulfilled, krill supplies could help to meet the
world's burgeoning demand for protein.19 The most extensive
krill concentrations swarm around certain circumpolar island
formations, namely, Bouvet Island, the South Shetlands, the
South Orkneys, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich
group. Save for Bouvet, which is claimed exclusively by Nor-
way, the other island groups are disputed by Argentina and
Great Britain. In sum, Antarctica's resources are potentially of
tremendous significance, even if today they are undeveloped
because of harsh environmental conditions, difficulties of
technological access and extraction, and high operational costs.
Finally, it must be noted that a major portion of these natural
resources are found seaward from the South Pole at 25° through
75° west longitude, north to 60°south latitude, virtually coinci-
dent to the disputed territories historically and legally claimed
by both Argentina and Great Britain. Should exploitation of
Antarctica's living or nonliving resources eventually become
206
 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
commercially profitable, the stakes of Anglo-Argentine rivalry in
the region could arise accordingly. Interestingly enough, it was
reported in 1982 that the possibility of petroleum deposits
offshore the Falkland Islands might have helped to precipitate
the Falkland Islands crisis.20
If past national behavior is a prologue to future international
relations, the unraveling of Anglo-Argentine rivalry over An-
tarctic natural resources would not come as a great surprise.
Indeed, given the protracted, highly sensitive territorial dispute
over South Atlantic and Antarctic territories, patently exacer-
bated by the recent Falklands military conflict, some observers
might regard such a British-Argentine confrontation as logically
inevitable in the near future. Yet, for the foreseeable term such
a resource war between Great Britain and Argentina seems
unlikely to occur. Deterring such a conflict is the continued
availability of relatively inexpensive mineral commodities,
hydrocarbons, and fishery protein from traditional, non-
Antarctic sources. Additionally, the inaccessibility of Antarctic
resources, complicated by the harsh physical environment,
makes present commercial exploitation of the region econom-
ically unattractive, and will likely continue to do so throughout
the rest of this century. Perhaps paramount in preventing
Anglo-Argentine resource competition in the circumpolar
region is the political character of the contemporary Antarctic
Treaty regime and the respective roles each government has
assumed in maintaining it.

The Consultative Party Mechanism

The Consultative Party System is integral to sustaining Anglo-
Argentine peaceful coexistence in the Southern Ocean, as well
as for the functioning of the Antarctic Treaty regime. As
provided for in article IX of the treaty, the Consultative Party
Group is composed of the twelve original parties to the treaty,
plus four new entrants, Poland in 1977, the Federal Republic of
Germany in 1981, and India and Brazil in 1983. The Consultative
Parties meet biannually to formulate regional policies, which
they develop through consensus in the form of "recommenda-
tions." The Antarctic Consultative Party Group serves as the
governing body for the Treaty regime. Argentina and Great
Britain are principal actors in this consultative process. They
have enjoyed Consultative Party status since the treaty's entry
into force in 1961, and have participated together regularly and
207
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
actively, even during the 1982 Falklands War, to fashion policy
recommendations under the treaty's auspices. Present indica-
tions suggest that they will continue to cooperate together in
Consultative Party negotiations, in spite of the vehement
territorial dispute in the area that has clouded Anglo-Argentine
relations for over a century.
Given the climate of discord, especially in the aftermath of the
Falklands War, one is prompted to speculate why either Argen-
tina or Great Britain should continue to sit down with each other
at the same negotiating table and participate in discussions
aimed at establishing oversight policies for territories which
they both claim to be their own. The answer to this seemingly
paradoxical question is found in political pragmatism: the
current Consultative Party system serves both Argentina's and
Great Britain's national interests in the region better than the
absence of a formal regime. The present system also appears to
them preferable to other conceivable alternative regimes.
Among these less desirable options would be the inter-
nationalization of the Antarctic as part of "the Common
Heritage of Mankind;" transition of the region into a trusteeship
territory under the United Nations' supervision; or reversion of
the continent to terra nullius, so that it would be open to national
claims and unrestricted exploitation by all states.
Thus, for the time being, Argentina and Great Britain appear
politically willing to support the Treaty regime. They both reap
the full diplomatic benefits of Consultative Party status, such as
priority assessment, policy input and direction, representative
voice, and consensus vote, without incurring the risks and costs
associated with bilateral disputes. Further, they are both
members of a relatively small decision-making body of sixteen
who have assumed legal responsibility for political and environ-
mental supervision of Antarctica. This status carries inter-
national clout, particularly as the vast majority of the world
community remains barred from ever gaining Consultative
Party membership. Despite past exploration investments,
declarations of title, and strategic considerations, the Con-
sultative Party process today is deemed more palatable by
Argentina and Great Britain than other imaginable schemes;
and, barring some dramatically unsettling political develop-
ment, this pragmatic attitude seems unlikely to change before
the treaty becomes eligible for review in 1991. In short, the
Consultative Party process remains the strongest administrative
cement sustaining pacific Anglo-Argentine coexistence in the

208
 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
Antarctic. It has ameliorated nationalistic tensions and anti-
pathies over disputed territories, even if it has left in limbo the
contradictory legal claims.

Conclusion
The Falkland Islands War of 1982 highlighted the tension
between Argentina and Great Britain over South Atlantic
territories, but it also reminded the international community
that Anglo-Argentine rivalry in the region goes far beyond the
Falklands/Malvinas archipelago. It encompasses the islands of
South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the
South Sandwich group, as well as a substantial segment of
Antarctica. Anglo-Argentine rivalry is neither of recent vintage
nor of fleeting duration. Historically, it has been protracted,
intransigent, udtranationalistic, and violent. The seeds for future
conflict between Argentina and Great Britain have been sown in
Antarctica's frozen turf.
With regard to international law, both Argentina and Great
Britain have purposively designed legal arguments substan-
tiating their respective claims to sovereign title over selected
territories in the region. None of these arguments, however, is
sufficiently compelling to warrant award of clear and unequiv-
ocal title to either party. Given the politico-legal arrangement
for the Antarctic during the past two decades, both Argentina
and Great Britain appear willing to accept the status quo and
forgo pressing their claims. Were they to act otherwise, they
would be bringing about an unravelling of the Antarctic Treaty
regime and forfeiting the privileged Consultative Party status
they now enjoy.
t h e Falklands War revealed that, at least for Argentina and
Great Britain, lands in the South Atlantic are worth a consid-
erable measure of military, economic, diplomatic, and human
capital. For the foreseeable future, it seems safe to predict that
neither Great Britain nor Argentina will attach such high stakes
to Antarctica and its indigenous resources. Nevertheless,
another prediction also seems certain. As worldwide industrial-
ization proceeds and population growth persists, finite natural
resources will dwindle. Accordingly, commercial interest in
exploiting Antarctica's resources will increase on the part of
both Argentina and Great Britain, and the international
community as a whole. One can only speculate about how
Argentina and Great Britain will respond to that situation.
209
 Stations in the Antarctic Peninsula Area Summer Stations Year-round Station
1 Arctowski Polanu
2 Bellingshausen USSR
3 Preside me Frei Chile
4 C'apitan ArturoPrat. .. . .. .Chile
Deeepeion . .. Argentm
.SYit-7// ^ / ^ " / ^ h Petrel Argent in
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y
^ Vicec<»modt>roMdrambio ... Argentina
1 !<• TemenieMatienzo Argentina
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1:
! Calmer USA.
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Argentine Islands
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| \K (ieneral San Martin . .-Argentina

Figure 3
 ANGLO-ARGENTINE RIVALRY
Whatever their reaction will be, it will affect greatly any future
exploitation opportunities in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic
regions. More importantly, it will indicate whether geopolitical
conflict or peaceful accommodation will prevail over the cold
continent.

Notes: Chapter 12
1 Letter to the Director of the Universal Postal Union, 14 September 1927,
reprinted in U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, vol. 46
(1948-9), p. 218.
2 See Robert D. Hayton, "The 'American' Antarctic," American Journal of Inter-
national Law, vol. 50 (1956), p. 588.
3 This quotation is from the dictum of the Federal Council of Switzerland
which served as an arbiter in the Colombia-Venezuela boundary dispute,
as quoted in J. B. Scott, "The Swiss decision in the boundary dispute
between Colombia and Venezuela," American Journal of International Law,
vol. 16 (1922), p. 428.
4 Note, "Thaw in international law? Rights in Antarctica under the Law of
Common Spaces," Yale Law Journal, vol. 87 (1978), p. 814, n. 43.
5 ibid., pp. 822-3.
6 ibid., p. 823, n. 90.
7 Lincoln Ellsworth, "My flight across Antarctica," National Geographic, vol. 70
(1936), p. 35.
8 E. W. Hunter Christie, The Antarctic Problem (London: Allen & Unwin,
1951), p. 263.
9 F. A. Van der Heydte, "Discovery, symbolic annexation and virtual effect-
iveness in international law," American Journal of International Law, vol. 29
(1935), p. 470.
10 J. Peter Bernhardt, "Sovereignty in Antarctica," California Western Inter-
national Law Journal, vol. 5 (1975), p. 342.
11 Facts are cited in Antarctica Cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina; United
Kingdom v. Chile), ICJ Reports, 1956, p. 11.
12 See Christie, The Antarctic Problem, for a discussion of these events.
13 Antarctica Cases, p. 37.
14 Bernhardt, "Sovereignty in Antarctica," p. 322.
15 The Island of Palmas (Miangas) Arbitration, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, 1928,
p. 829.
16 Christie, The Antarctic Problem, p. 240.
17 Antarctica Cases, p. 37.
18 "Frozen assets?," Wall Street Journal, 21 February 1974, p. 1.
19 Barbara Mitchell, "The politics of Antarctica," Environment, vol. 22 (1980),
pp. 12-13.
20 Jack Anderson, "Argentina eyes Antarctic too," Washington Post, 12 April
1982, p. C-15.

211
 13
The Falkland Islands Crisis
and the Management of
Boundary Disputes
DAVID A. COLSON

From a practitioner's perspective, the Falkland Islands crisis is

an example of how not to control, or resolve, a sovereignty
dispute between states. Yet, the same underlying sovereignty
question at the heart of the Falklands crisis is found in many
parts of the world. There are many land borders which remain
to a significant degree unsettled. To name only a few, unsettled
land boundaries include China-Soviet Union, Chad-Libya,
Iran-Iraq, Sudan-Ethiopia, India-China, Vietnam-China,
Venezuela-Guyana, and Peru-Ecuador.1 Also, as a result of
the establishment of zones of maritime jurisdiction extending
200 nautical miles from the coast into the ocean, more than 300
maritime boundaries await resolution. In about 20 percent of
these cases, there is an actively contested dispute between the
neighboring states; of these, in about half the cases the problem
is more difficult because a sovereignty dispute over land
territory makes it impracticable to address the maritime bound-
ary issue.2 Many of these maritime boundary situations have
the potential for creating an international crisis of major propor-
tions. One need only mention those of the East and South China
Sea, of the Aegean, and of the Persian Gulf to indicate the global
nature of the matter. States have an interest in seeing these
problems dealt with responsibly.
This essay has two purposes. First, it will identify and discuss
three situations where states have put aside doctrine and
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 MANAGEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES
successfully resolved or controlled a sovereignty dispute by
negotiating a functional solution. Second, the role of interim
measures will be discussed. If sovereignty disputes are to be
resolved without war, no principle may be as important as that
which holds that interim measures taken to manage the problem
pending its resolution must be without prejudice to the basic
position of either side to the dispute. This discussion will shed
some light on issues relevant for any future negotiations about
the status of the Falklands.
The Falklands crisis has reaffirmed the point that sovereignty
disputes can create wars. Sovereignty disputes have a different
character from political or economic disputes. Sovereignty
disputes deal with ownership, national pride, prestige, and self-
image. Sovereignty includes the right to extract resources from
the area concerned. Furthermore, in today's world, sovereign
rights over the land territory bring with them the right to
adjacent marine resources. All of these factors played a role in
the Falklands crisis.
The recent development in international law to recognize or
authorize the extension of coastal state jurisdiction over the con-
tinental shelf and fisheries and other economic uses of the sea
out to 200 nautical miles from the coast has greatly complicated
the settlement of land disputes where a coastline is involved. A
few examples include: Colombia's dispute with Nicaragua over
the sovereignty of small islands in the Caribbean; the Beagle
Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile; island disputes
between the United Arab Emirates and Iran; the Spratly Island
dispute in the South China Sea; the Paracel Islands dispute; the
dispute over the Northern Territories between Japan and the
Soviet Union; and the Liancount Rock dispute between South
Korea and Japan.
In addition, many new disputes have arisen relating solely to
the question of how to delimit the maritime area. For instance,
the United States and Canada, close friends and allies, with the
longest unguarded border in the world, suddenly find
themselves with four unresolved maritime boundary disputes
including more than 15,000 square nautical miles at issue in the
Atlantic and more than 6,000 square nautical miles in dispute in
the Arctic.3
Furthermore, what once may have been a manageable prob-
lem relating to the legal status of a generally unusable small
piece of territory, such as a rock or islet, may now have grown
into an issue of significantly wider scope because such pieces of
213
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
territory have become the platform for states to justify claims to
wide zones of maritime jurisdiction in international law. The
new Law of the Sea Convention seeks to deal with this issue in
article 121. Yet, like much of the Convention, this provision is
fraught with ambiguity and can be interpreted to support
different positions. The present boundary dispute between the
United Kingdom and Ireland relates in part to the question of
whether the British rock/island Rockall is entitled to be used to
extend British maritime jurisdiction.
Thus, the extension of coastal state maritime jurisdiction has
created a wide range of problems. But, fundamentally, the
ingredients of these sovereignty issues are not new. In the past,
states have come to grips with differences over sovereignty, and
have negotiated regimes for the legal management of the con-
cerned areas. The three situations discussed below are in
concept as different and intractable as that of the Falklands, yet
these problems were managed, if not resolved, by the disputing
states.

Spitsbergen

Spitsbergen, known also as Svalbard, is an archipelago located

about 400 miles north of Norway. Its land area is substantial,
measuring about 62,000 square kilometers—about the size of
West Virginia. Through the nineteenth century, whaling and
sealing vessels occasionally visited the islands, but no govern-
ment asserted sovereignty. In those days, the islands were
widely regarded as terra nullius, no man's land. At the turn of
this century, coal deposits of commercial value were found. A
U.S. company began to exploit the coal, and soon companies
from other countries followed suit. A permanent mining
population developed on the islands. The growth in economic
activity and population in the first years of the twentieth century
made desirable the creation of governmental authority.
In 1914 Norway hosted an international conference attended
by Germany, the United States, Denmark, France, Great
Britain, Norway, the Netherlands, Russia, and Sweden to
establish an administration for the islands. The conference's
efforts to prepare a treaty proceeded on the assumption that
Spitsbergen was terra nullius. Thus, the only jurisdictional basis
for the establishment of governmental authority over the
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 MANAGEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES
individuals on the islands was that which nations have over
their nationals wherever they may be. There was no territorial
sovereign. It was proposed that the islands' administration
would be conducted by the several governments acting in
concert through joint agencies. The treaty which the conference
drafted, and which it almost completed, embraced a compre-
hensive scheme of civil and criminal jurisprudence. It included
the recognition of the rights of persons who had asserted claims
to land in the islands; and it also provided for the adjustment
of differences growing out of conflicting claims. Underlying this
unique and comprehensive scheme of government were finely
spun legal theories, some of them undoubtedly a bit too fine.
Whether or not this treaty and the legal system it proposed
would have worked remains an open question. The outbreak of
World War I interrupted the conference, forcing it to set aside
the draft agreement.4
In connection with the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 a new
effort was made to deal with the question of establishing a
common governmental authority for Spitsbergen. This effort
resulted in a treaty quite different from the 1914 draft. The new
accord, which was signed in 1920 and entered into force for the
United States in 1925, remains in force today. It provides for the
recognition of the sovereignty of Norway over Spitsbergen
"subject to the stipulations of the present Treaty." These
stipulations are substantial.
The treaty states that Norway must ensure that the nationals
of all parties enjoy equal rights of access to the land and
territorial waters of the islands for purposes of economic
exploitation. The treaty also recognizes the private rights of
nationals of the contracting parties. In this regard the treaty
establishes an interesting and important precedent. It accords
international recognition to private rights which had theretofore
been legally undefined. Norway, as the recognized sovereign
authority in the islands, was obligated under the treaty to give
effect to these private rights by appropriate municipal enact-
ment of laws and regulations consistent with the international
recognition of those rights.
The treaty also obligates Norway to provide mining regula-
tions, which Norway did in 1925. Since then, through its inter-
nationally agreed responsibility for environmental protection,
Norway has adopted rules that further regulate mining
activities.
The treaty provides an important arms control function.
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
Norway may not create, and is obliged to prohibit, the estab-
lishment of any naval base or fortification in the archipelago.
The territory never may be used for warlike purposes.
The Spitsbergen/Svalbard Treaty continues to function today
in a world of changing social strategies and economic interests.
It has proved to be a resilient instrument. Adherence to its
neutrality provisions by the United States and the Soviet Union
is an important component of the overall balance required for
global stability. While its solution to the sovereignty question
was to recognize that Norway was sovereign, the Spitsbergen/
Svalbard Treaty can only be characterized as recognizing that
Norway's sovereignty is unique, subject to the provisions of an
international instrument to which approximately forty states,
including the United States and the Soviet Union, are parties.

Antarctica
A second example is the Antarctic Treaty, discussed in greater
detail by Christopher Joyner elsewhere in this book. On the
whole, as Joyner points out, the treaty has been a resilient legal
instrument. During the Falklands War, despite the fact that both
Argentina and the United Kingdom claim parts of the Antarctic
continent, that their claims overlap to a significant degree, and
that there is an arguable interrelationship of issues, the Antarc-
tic Treaty was unshaken. Throughout the war, meetings within
the Antarctic Treaty system proceeded in a workmanlike
manner.
The fundamental purpose of the Antarctic Treaty is to ensure
that Antarctica does not become the scene or object of inter-
national discord. The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated and
signed in 1959 by the twelve nations that participated in the
International Geophysical Year in Antarctica, 1957-8. Seven of
these states—Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand,
Norway, and the United Kingdom—claim sovereignty over
territory in Antarctica. The others—Belgium, Japan, South
Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States—neither assert
nor recognize claims of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica,
although several of them, including the United States, hold that
they have a basis for a claim to sovereignty in the area. Since the
treaty entered into force in 1961, fourteen other states have
adhered to its provisions. Included among these are Poland and
the Federal Republic of Germany which have attained con-
sultative status under the treaty based upon their activities in
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 MANAGEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES
Antarctica. Despite the disparate political relationships between
these countries, and their legal position on territorial claims, the
Antarctic Treaty system has functioned effectively.5
When the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated, the major concerns
of the parties were the containment of the Cold War and the
need to allow scientific research to continue in Antarctica despite
the conflicting sovereignty claims. The treaty commits all
signatories to prevent Antarctica from becoming an area for
international conflict. Under its terms, Antarctica is nonmilitar-
ized, there are open inspection provisions, the dumping of
radioactive waste is prohibited, and scientific activities take
place in a setting of cooperation.
The treaty did not seek to resolve the fundamental sover-
eignty dispute. It simply set it aside. A state's participation in
the treaty does not affect its legal position on territorial claims.
Only those jurisdictional questions foreseen in 1959—those
relating to scientific research and expeditions—were addressed.
Official observers and exchange scientific personnel, under the
treaty, are subject only to the jurisdiction of the contracting
party of which they are nationals. The treaty also provides a
framework for resolution of other jurisdictional questions. In
such a case, the parties are obligated immediately to consult
together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.
If this consultative procedure is unsuccessful, the treaty directs
a recourse to dispute settlement.
Since the treaty came into force, the Antarctic Treaty system
has developed a number of legal norms for conduct in Antarc-
tica. Through the system of recommendations provided for by
article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, and through other legal
instruments developed within the treaty system to deal with
specific situations or special needs, pragmatic solutions have
been reached. The parties have found that a mutually agreed
approach is more desirable than the chaos, conflict, and legal
uncertainty that could result from unilateral action. Thus, just as
the Antarctic Treaty was possible because all the states con-
cerned believed it necessary to protect their competing national
interests, the same competing interests provide an incentive for
cooperation as new issues arise.
The Antarctic Treaty has achieved, and continues to achieve,
its original objectives. The development of technology,
however, making possible resource exploitation in the hostile
Antarctic environment, has required the Antarctic Treaty
system to shift its focus to contemporary concerns about
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
environmental protection and resource conservation. In 1980
the Treaty system produced the Convention on the Conserva-
tion of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, which is now in
force. Presently, the Treaty system is engaged in active negotia-
tions on the question of exploration and exploitation of mineral
resources.
The sovereignty question is a matter of extreme sensitivity in
relation to the question of mineral exploration and exploitation,
as it often is whenever the economic use of an area comes to the
front of a diplomatic agenda. The Antarctic Treaty identifies the
"preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarc-
tica" as among its principles and objectives. It does not,
however, prohibit commercial development. Both claimant and
nondaimant states theoretically regard economic activities as a
permissible "peaceful purpose" in conformity with the treaty.
Yet the views of the two sides are fundamentally different: the
claimant state believes that it has a right to control such activ-
ities; while the nondaimant state believes it has a right to
conduct such activities subject only to such restrictions as it may
impose upon itself or otherwise agree to. In such a case, unlike
those that were foreseen when the treaty was negotiated, the
jurisdictional relationship between claimant and nondaimant
states is not resolved by the treaty.
In matters where there is not a common jurisdictional
understanding, articles IV and VI of the Antarctic Treaty
expressly preserve the positions of claimant and nondaimant
states even though the activities of one state would normally be
regarded as legally prejudicial to another's position or interest.
Article IV provides that the treaty does not change any party's
position concerning its claim of territorial sovereignty, nor its
recognition or nonrecognition of another state's claim. It further
provides that any activities conducted by the parties while the
treaty is in force shall not be the basis for asserting, supporting,
or denying either an existing claim or a new daim of sovereignty
in Antarctica. Article VI provides that nothing in the treaty shall
prejudice or affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, that
any state may have under international law regarding the high
seas in the area covered by the treaty. These provisions combine
to serve the interest of both claimant and nondaimant states.
They prohibit new claims and the expansion of existing
claims. They also permit all states to interpret the treaty's other
provisions consistently with each state's position on territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica.
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 MANAGEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES
Each state is thus assured that activities not covered by
express provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, but undertaken
within the Treaty system, are not regarded as a jurisdictional
plus or minus for either a claimant or nonclaimant state. The
fundamental juridical difference between a claimant and
nonclaimant state does not disappear; new activities are simply
treated as legally neutral. With such an assurance, no party
needs to take action in order to balance any perceived juridical
equation. In this situation, cooperation, coordination, and
consultation between claimant and nonclaimant states are
nevertheless essential so as to cause as little friction as possible.
The past success of the Antarctic Treaty system gives one reason
to believe that it will succeed in managing the problems
associated with the exploration and exploitation of mineral
resources.
In connection with the Falkland Islands one may note, as
Professor Joyner has done, that due to the islands' proximity to
Antarctica, if the Treaty system fails to resolve new issues the
potential for conflict spilling over to the Falklands is high.
Specifically, the Antarctic interests of the United Kingdom and
Argentina, and the way in which both states perceive the
existing legal regime in Antarctica, will affect their stance on the
Falkland Islands and their willingness to reach an accommo-
dation of their competing interests. A disintegration of the
Antarctic Treaty system would harden the Argentine and British
positions on the Falklands by suggesting that the region's
disputes are not manageable by peaceful legal and diplomatic
procedures.
The Spitsbergen and Antarctica examples are multilateral
approaches to the resolution or management of a sovereignty
dispute. They resolve or bypass the disputes by identifying the
functional issues at stake and negotiating a solution to them. In
the case of Spitsbergen, Norwegian sovereignty was recognized
only after the private economic interests were protected; while
in the case of Antarctica, a system capable of dealing with
practical problems was established while the sovereignty issue
was held in abeyance.

The Torres Strait

Functional approaches may also be used to resolve bilateral
problems. One example is the recent bilateral agreement
219
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Their 1978 Treaty on
Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries and Related Matters
addresses a set of difficult sovereignty problems and illustrates
the fact that boundary disputes are often not one-issue
problems.
The area in question, the Torres Strait, is a unique maritime
area located between Cape York and the northern coast of
Australia and the southern coast of Papua New Guinea. Papua
New Guinea was a dependent territory of Australia. The area
consists of a considerable number of islands, some large and
inhabited, others amounting to no more than small rocks and
uninhabited cays. Some populated Australian islands are
situated close to the Papua New Guinea coast. In geographical
terms alone, it is one of the world's most complex maritime
boundary situations. In addition, because Papua New Guineans
of the mainland are ethnically distinct from the Torres Strait
islanders, the need to protect the livelihood and way of life of
the local inhabitants was a major factor to be taken into account
in devising a solution to the maritime delimitation problem.
Thus, in this case, there were problems concerning differences
in cultural heritage and practices of the local population, percep-
tions about the equity of different divisions of maritime jurisdic-
tion, island sovereignty disputes, differences over fisheries
management and utilization, and concerns about navigation
responsibilities.
The Torres Strait Treaty is highly imaginative.6 It should be
noted that, as of August 1983, the Torres Strait treaty was not
yet in force. Among its novel features are separate seabed and
fisheries jurisdiction lines, a Protected Zone in the middle of the
Torres Strait, and arrangements regulating the sharing of the
catch of commercial fisheries. The treaty points to the fact that
complex bilateral sovereignty issues may require that jurisdic-
tional and conceptual arguments be abandoned and functional
solutions sought. While such an approach may lead to complex
solutions (in this case a treaty of 32 articles and 9 annexes), it
also ensures that each matter is dealt with in the light of its
unique characteristics. Taken as a whole, the Australia-Papua
New Guinea Treaty represents a creative approach to maritime
delimitation that equitably takes account of various interrelated
issues.
Functional solutions to bilateral sovereignty disputes do not
always succeed. For example, the United States and Canada
signed an East Coast fisheries agreement and a maritime
220
 MANAGEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES
boundary settlement treaty in March 1979 designed to resolve
a sovereignty dispute over some 15,000 square nautical miles of
resource-rich ocean created by the extension of jurisdiction to
200 nautical miles by both countries in 1977. Together the two
treaties would have provided for the adjudication of the con-
tinental shelf and 200-nautical-mile fisheries zone boundary of
the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine area between
the New England States and the Maritime Provinces; and the
establishment of a fisheries resource regime to manage and
allocate the fisheries between the United States and Canada on
the Atlantic coast.
This effort failed because the negotiated fisheries agreement
bore no relationship to the economic expectations and political
realities in New England. The fisheries agreement was complex,
consisting of 25 articles and 4 annexes. It provided for the
establishment of a bilateral commission and an elaborate dispute
settlement mechanism. It was a work of lawyerly art; unfor-
tunately, it was not a fisherman's agreement, and it failed to
attain political support in the United States. Thus, the United
States and Canada were left with the sole alternative of a "no-
holds-barred" adjudication wherein jurisdiction in the area
would be determined by binding third-party settlement pro-
cedure. On 25 November 1981 the United States and Canada
jointly submitted this boundary dispute to a Chamber of the
International Court of Justice for a binding determination of the
boundary.
Thus, functional approaches can be difficult to implement
because they are inevitably complex. They must deal in some
form with the full scope of rights and duties making up the
sovereign rights of states. No quick fixes are likely in a negotia-
tion of such matters; long negotiations responsive to local
interests are required so that the negotiations succeed from a
political as well as a legal perspective. In the end, all sides and
interests must be confident that they are better off with the
agreement than they are with uncertainty and possible chaos
and conflict.
Functional approaches to sovereignty disputes are used when
states are not prepared to make a full concession on the ultimate
question of sovereignty. Such concessions are rare. There are
occasions, however, where the political will exists to concede
one's sovereignty claim. The United States recently did so in
four treaties in which the United States renounced its claims to
sovereignty over twenty-five small islands in the south and
221
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
central Pacific. The treaties are with Tuvalu, Kiribati, the Cook
Islands, and New Zealand in respect of the Tokelau Islands.
While the United States claims were virtually without legal
merit, they had been maintained over the years despite the
strong opposition of allies—the United Kingdom and New
Zealand—and the peoples of the region. Continued mainten-
ance of the United States' claims in today's world would have
given the United States a claim to marine resource jurisdiction
over thousands of square nautical miles of ocean. Nonetheless,
in this case the judgment of the United States government (from
the Nixon administration forward) was that maintenance of the
weak U.S. claim would do more damage to its political position
in the region than any perceived benefits from maintaining the
claim.

Interim Measures
From the foregoing it may be said that the only limit on design-
ing means to resolve a sovereignty dispute is one's imagination.
Any approach that works is the best means of resolving that
dispute. What works is a function of political will and time. In
this connection, the important problem of how one manages the
dispute until a solution is reached must be considered.
Under article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, states
are obligated to seek a solution to their disputes by peaceful
means of their choice. This often takes time. During that time,
provisions for interim arrangements, or a modus vivendi, must
operate between states to keep the dispute under control. The
dispute must be managed so that events occurring during the
period are regarded by both sides as juridically neutral—in other
words, those events do not hurt or help the position of either
side.
The parties to a dispute are in the best position to adopt
pragmatic interim arrangements. Yet, so often, they are unpre-
pared to do so because of perceptions of prejudice to their
positions. Where sovereign rights are in question, the simple
fact of negotiation, compromise, and agreement with another
state on a practical interim arrangement is often regarded as
adding an element of prejudice to one's position since inevitably
such an arrangement entails something less than a recog-
nition of one's sovereignty. When interim arrangements are
formalized, they are almost without exception predicated on
222
 MANAGEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES
compromisory or disclaimer provisions which provide that
the arrangements and acts occurring thereunder are without
prejudice to the position of the parties in future negotiations or
adjudications concerning the legal nature of the dispute.
Nonetheless, in the nature of things, states will often seek to
take advantage of their acts and those of their nationals occurr-
ing under such a modus vivendi. They also will argue that another
state's forbearance or willingness to accept the status quo in an
interim arrangement is tantamount to acquiescence. The status
quo becomes a powerful negotiating tool for one side or the
other. Beyond the problems that status quo arrangements pose
for negotiators, some conciliators and arbitrators tend to look to
the status quo for solutions. Thus, rather than being applauded
for statesmanship, the party exercising forbearance under a
modus vivendi all too often finds itself disadvantaged in later
proceedings.
If states are to be encouraged to negotiate rather than fight,
the legal neutrality of interim arrangements must be strictly ob-
served. A state must be assured that international law and
diplomatic practice will not penalize it for forbearing from the
exercise of its claimed sovereign rights prior to the resolution of
the dispute. If a state cannot rely on this assurance, and if
activities undertaken during the course of the dispute are given
legal status by dispute settlement procedures, international law
and diplomatic practice will have seriously hindered the efforts
of states to deal responsibly with these matters.

Notes: Chapter 13

The views expressed are those of the author and have no official standing.

1 Alan J. Day (ed.), Border and Territorial Disputes (Detroit, Mich.: Gale Research
Co., 1982).
2 See R. D. Hodgson and R. W. Smith, "Boundary issues created by extended
national marine jurisdiction/' Geographical Review, vol. 69 (October 1979), p.
423.
3 See M. B. Feldman and D. Colson, "The maritime boundaries of the United
States," American Journal of International Law, vol. 75 (October 1982), p. 729.
4 For a discussion of the 1914 conference and the treaty it drafted see R.
Lansing, "A unique international problem," American Journal of International
Law, vol. 11 (1917), p. 763.
5 For a general discussion of the workings of the Antarctic Treaty system see
David Colson, "The Antarctic Treaty system: the mineral issue," Law and
Policy in International Business, vol. 12, no. 4 (October 1980), p. 841.

223
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
The treaty has been described in detail in H. Burmester, "The Torres Strait
Treaty: ocean boundary delimitation by agreement/' American Journal of
International Law, vol. 76 (1982), pp. 321-49. It should be noted that, as of
August 1983, the Torres Strait Treaty was not yet in force.

224
 14
Trusteeship for the Falklands
under Joint U.K.-U.S.
Administration: A Proposal
MONROE LEIGH

Final resolution of the Falklands dispute continues to elude the

international community. The UN and OAS efforts to promote
a settlement prior to and during the recent military confronta-
tion have already been examined. With the cessation of
hostilities on the islands, there is no reason why these efforts
should not continue. Indeed, the major premise of the modest
proposal which follows is that any and all UN and OAS efforts
to find a solution should enjoy priority of consideration so long
as there is any reasonable prospect of success under the direct
sponsorship of these two obviously appropriate international
institutions. Only if they fail altogether or hopelessly bog down,
would I urge an alternative which involves a joint initiative by
the United Kingdom and the United States. Nor would I urge
this alternative if there were any indication that the parties to
the dispute might be able to reach agreement by means of
bilateral diplomatic negotiations or by referral of the dispute to
international adjudication, either in the International Court of
Justice or by binding arbitration.
Thus it is necessary to keep firmly in mind that this proposal
is contingent on four principle defaults:

(1) failure of the UN to promote a settlement;

(2) failure of the OAS to promote a settlement;
225
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
(3) failure of the parties to negotiate a diplomatic settlement;
and
(4) failure of the parties to submit the dispute to binding inter-
national adjudication.

If all these defaults occur, the United Kingdom with U.S.

support should offer to place the Falklands under a UN
Trusteeship pursuant to a provision never heretofore invoked,
namely article 77 (1) (c) of the UN Charter, which provides that
states responsible for the administration of a territory may
"voluntarily" place such a territory under the UN Trusteeship
system. Heretofore, article 77 has been invoked only with
respect to paragraph (1) (a), dealing with formerly "mandated"
territories, such as Southwest Africa and Palestine, and
paragraph (1) (b) dealing with territories detached from states as
a result of World War II, of which Somaliland is the only
example. However, the innovative paragraph (1) (c) has never
been actually invoked, though it has been frequently suggested
for such areas as Trieste, Berlin, and Jerusalem. As Professor
Thomas Franck pointed out in his June 1982 article in the New
York Times, there is no reason why the UN Trusteeship system
should not be used more creatively.
My proposal is a simple one. The United Kingdom, in concert
with the United States, should endeavor to place the Falklands
under UN Trusteeship under the joint administration of the
United Kingdom and die United States. Clearly, such a proposal
would fall within the contemplation of article 77 (1) (c) of the
Charter. Obviously this proposal raises a number of questions.
The first one is: Why should Britain agree to relinquish an area
it has just fought to retain at high cost in lives and in money?
To this there are several answers. First, Britain fought not so
much to retain the islands as to prevent aggression from
succeeding. The islands are not defensible by Britain over the
long term—at least not at any reasonable level of military
expenditure. Second, although the islands are not economically
viable in any circumstances, whether under Argentine rule or
British rule, Britain cannot abandon its Kelpers, nor can it
forcibly resettle them elsewhere as the Soviet Union did with
respect to the Finnish territories ceded to it after World War II.
Third, in the long run, a gradual political solution which inter-
nationalizes the area is in Britain's interest and not necessarily
contrary to the interests of the Kelpers. Finally, the co-
trusteeship has a peculiar procedural advantage: it permits the
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 U . K . - U . S . TRUSTEESHIP: A PROPOSAL
United Kingdom to take an initiative without thereby forever
surrendering the initiative. If British terms for trusteeship are
not acceptable to the UN, Britain is free to withdraw the proposal.
A second question is: Why should the United States accept
joint administration with the United Kingdom of this remote
but constantly threatened territory? First, recent history
demonstrates that the United States cannot remain aloof from a
dispute which carries the potential for outbreak of war between
its oldest and most important ally in Europe and a major
member of the OAS, when the latter is prepared to resort to
force in violation of the UN Charter, with all the dangers which
that action poses for the stability of both the international
security system and the regional American security system.
Second, on one calculation, the additional burdens beyond
those the United States now bears need not be great. The joint
administration could be shared with the United Kingdom, with
that nation continuing to be responsible for the political,
economic, social, and tactical military concerns of the Falklands.
The United States' role, under my proposal, would be limited
to providing strategic military support to preserve the territorial
integrity of the Falklands so long as they would remain under
UN Trusteeship, which I would suggest be limited to a term of
years—say twenty-five years—at least long enough to permit the
passions in Argentina and Britain to cool and to permit the
Kelpers to consider the long-term implications of their desolate
situation. One does not need to be a mathematical wizard to see
that the two to three billion pounds which the British spent in the
spring of 1982, would, if divided equally among 2,000 Kelpers,
make millionaires of every one of them. This would be enough
to purchase handsome estates in Scotland. But this point need
not be pressed beyond the suggestion that total monetary
inducements to settle voluntarily in another part of the world do
not appear to be beyond the range of financial possibility.
The third question that could be raised is whether the UN will
accept the offer of a trusteeship for the Falklands. No one can
be sure of the answer to this question until the proposal is put
to the test. The proposal is fully consistent with the purposes of
the UN as set forth in article,1, which include the maintenance
of international peace and security, the settlement of inter-
national disputes, and the development of friendly relations
with respect for the self-determination of peoples. More
important, the proposal is consistent with Chapter XII of the
Charter, which establishes the Trusteeship system.
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
The proposal for a Falkland Islands co-trusteeship requires
that the status of the Falklands be changed from that of a Non
Self-Governing Territory (NSGT) under Chapter XI of the
Charter to that of a trust territory under Chapter XII. While
there is no prior example of such a change of status, it clearly
may be accomplished under the provision in Article 77 (1) (c)
which allows "territories [to be] voluntarily placed under the
system by states responsible for their administration."
Therefore, Great Britain can turn the territory over to the
United Nations Trusteeship System by invoking Article 77 (1)
(c). The terms of the trusteeship agreement, which under article
79 must be "agreed upon by the states directly concerned," in
this case Great Britain and the United States, will provide for
administration by the British and defense by the United States.
Since article 81 allows the administering authority to be "one or
more states" (emphasis added), the trusteeship agreement will
designate both Great Britain and the United States as admin-
istering authorities.
Notwithstanding the fact that there have been instances of a
territory being administered by more than one nation, the
proposed arrangement is somewhat unorthodox. However,
there are Charter provisions that address the factors which
require such an unusual measure. Article 76, which states the
principles of the Trusteeship system, holds that while self-
government or independence of the territories is a goal, it must
be pursued "as may be appropriate to the particular circum-
stances of each territory, and its peoples and the freely
expressed wishes of the people concerned." Advocates of this
proposal can argue that the "particular circumstances" of the
Falklands, a small island group near a large and threatening
nation, require that it be defended by a friendly power. If there
is doubt that the power is indeed "friendly," advocates may
point to the principle in article 76 that account be taken of "the
freely expressed wishes of the people concerned." According to
most reports, the Falklanders desire to remain British subjects,
and this proposal is one means of ensuring that their wish is
granted. It may be advisable to hold a plebiscite on this proposal
in the Falklands. Approval of the co-trusteeship by the
Falklanders would strengthen the position that article 76
supports the proposal.
Great Britain and the United States may wish to take the
additional step of designating the Falklands' trust a "strategic
area" under article 82. The Pacific Islands Trust Territory enjoys
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 U . K . - U . S . TRUSTEESHIP: A PROPOSAL
this status. Article 82 does not specify the additional features of
a "strategic area." However, one author has stated that " [t]he
strategic trust [Article 82] was devised to allow the Trust
Territory to be under Security Council rather than Assembly
supervision [and thus subject to the veto] and to permit the
closure of areas under national security claims."1 Under article
83, strategic trusts are administered by the Security Council
rather than the General Assembly. The "strategic trust" course
should be followed if Britain and the United States anticipate
more trouble for their proposal in the General Assembly (from
Third World nations) than in the Security Council (from the
Soviet Union).
The proposal for a co-trusteeship is a departure from the usual
arrangement in which a territory is administered by one nation.
However, there are two cases in which territorial administration
was shared. These cases suggest certain features that should—
and should not be—present in a Falklands co-trusteeship.

(1) The New Hebrides

The Pacific islands formerly known as the New Hebrides (now
the independent nation of Vanuatu) were jointly administered
as a "condominium" by Great Britain and France from 1914 until
July 1980. The treaty between Britain and France provided that
separate schools, courts, and police, among other services, be
administered by each sovereign.2 The result of this split was
described as a "comic opera atmosphere."3 Tensions between
French and English speaking subjects never ended. Nor did
Britain and France see eye to eye on the islands: when rebellion
broke out, "France would not let either French or British troops
suppress the rebellion before independence [was granted] ."4
Given the New Hebrides treaty's concern with duality, it
seems that there were competing French and British claims of
sovereignty and that the condominium was an attempt at a
workable compromise. In the Falklands, there would be no such
confusion. The United States, as shown by its actions in the
British-Argentine war, does not dispute the essential British
claim to sovereignty. When drafting the trusteeship agreement,
it would be advisable to specify the very limited scope of the
United States' duties. All government services in the islands
would be British with the possible exception of certain defense
roles assigned to the United States by agreement.
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
(2) Nauru
The South Pacific island of Nauru was formerly a trust territory
administered by Australia, the United Kingdom, and New
Zealand. The trusteeship agreement, however, specified that
Australia was the administering authority. According to one
author, New Zealand and Great Britain were named as "admin-
istering authorities" solely to round out the Trusteeship Council
so that it was comprised of an equal number of administering
and nonadministering nations.5 Thus Australia's role was
never in doubt among co-trustees. This was emphasized by the
Australian delegate to the UN in the course of the General
Assembly's debate on the trusteeship agreement when he
stated that "the government of Australia will administer the ter-
ritory until it is agreed among the three governments that one
or other of the three governments will assume this function."
Nauru was smoothly governed by Australia until its recent
independence, and it provides a good example of the
possibilities of a co-trusteeship when only one nation is charged
with daily administrative duties. While the Falklands proposal
assigns more responsibility to the United States than New
Zealand and Great Britain had in Nauru, the Nauru trusteeship
remains a solid precedent for co-trusteeship.

Of course, the co-trusteeship proposal may not prove acceptable

to the United Nations but there is one additional consideration
worth comment. If the majority sentiment in the UN is against
acceptance of the proposal, the United Kingdom is perfectly free
to withdraw the proposal and proceed by bilateral treaty to set
up essentially the same arrangement outside the UN system.
The existence of this possibility should militate in favor of UN
acceptance.
The question of Argentine reaction to the proposal is reserved
for last. One must anticipate that Argentina would immediately
declare the proposal unacceptable because it does not recognize
Argentina's claim to sovereignty. But the same answer is to be
expected from Argentina as to any other proposal which could
conceivably be acceptable to Britain. The positions of the two
disputants would continue to be irreconcilable. A reconciliation
of the conflicting claims to sovereignty cannot be expected for
some years to come.
Even if Argentina publicly condemns the proposal, one hopes
that it would not pressure the United Nations to reject it. The
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 U.K.-U.S. TRUSTEESHIP: A PROPOSAL
proposal should be judged by its long-term tendencies. In
reality, it would be afirststep by Britain toward the relinquish-
ment of that sovereignty which it fought the war to retain. In
this sense, it is a first step in the direction which events must
move if Argentine aspirations are to be realized.
Typically a trusteeship involves the relinquishment of sover-
eignty during the period of the trusteeship. The exact provisions
on this critical issue would need to be dealt with in the agree-
ment between the United Nations and the "states directly
concerned." Or, in default of resolution in the agreement, the
sovereignty question would need to be decided at some future
date by the Security Council or the General Assembly. It would
be foolish to minimize the difficulties involved in the resolution
of the sovereignty issue. Nevertheless, I would maintain that
there are elements of advantage in the long run to Argentina.

Notes: Chapter 14
1 R. Russell The United Nations and United States Security Polio/ (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 241n.
2 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 10, p. 34.
3 The Economist, no. 275, 1980, p. 14.
4 The Economist, no. 278, 1981, p. 37.
5 RusseU, The United Nations and United States Security Policy, p. 33.

231
 15
Lessons for the Future
ALBERTO R. COLL

The task of drawing lessons from, or ascertaining the meaning

of, recent historical events is not easy. Many historians, ranging
from Jacob Burckhardt to Herbert Butterfield, have pointed to
the need for decades or even centuries to pass before scholars
can obtain a balanced appreciation of the significance of a
particular historical occurrence. The Falklands War of 1982 is no
exception. As David Gompert and Dov Zakheim have indicated,
one can see this conflict in at least two different ways. On the
one hand, it may turn out to be little more than a strategic,
political, and military curiosity devoid of any long-term impli-
cations, an isolated exception to the predominant currents of
world politics to be remembered and evaluated in the same way
as the War of 1812 between England and the United States or
the Russo-Finnish War of 1939. On the other hand, however,
future students of international politics may see the events of
1982 as confirming and giving added impetus to various currents
in international relations, much as the brief Russo-Japanese War
of 1905 or the Spanish-American War of 1898 are remembered
today. Regardless of the ultimate historical verdict, it is possible
to draw some tentative lessons that may serve as helpful
guideposts for statesmen and scholars of this generation.
In the realm of political and military strategy several important
lessons emerge. First, it is of critical importance for a state facing
a crisis such as Great Britain did in April 1982 to formulate a
coherent strategy incorporating all of its political, diplomatic,
legal, economic, and military resources as comprehensively as
possible. The success with which the British did this is instruc-
tive. Although perceived by many as a declining economic and
military power with little if any political will to recover two
232
 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
barren islands 7,000 miles away, Great Britain turned out to be
a formidable adversary largely because of its skill in making the
most of its limited assets. Politically and diplomatically the
British capitalized heavily on the special relationship with the
United States, the strong ties of solidarity with the Common-
wealth, and even the distrust of Latin American states such
as Chile and Brazil toward Argentina. In the economic area
the British were quick to perceive their adversary's great
vulnerability as a major exporter with a mounting foreign debt;
subsequent British sanctions against Argentina, and successful
pressures on the United States and the European Community
to do likewise, played a critical role in demoralizing and
weakening the Argentines.
Against all odds the British were also successful at the
United Nations, especially during the critical month of April
when it was imperative for them to gain a diplomatic, political,
and moral momentum that would give credibility to their threat
to use force if necessary to recover the islands. The skill with
which Sir Anthony Parsons steered Resolution 502 through the
Security Council without a Soviet veto and with the passive
approval of many Third World states has been noted by U.S.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and others as evidence that it is
possible for a Western power to score a victory at the United
Nations, as long as the right circumstances are present and they
are combined with a vigorous, creative diplomacy.
As Thomas Franck has argued in this book, a very important
element of British diplomacy and of the overall British strategy
was the appeal to international law and morality. The British
successfully used as one of their resources international
law, validating the warnings given by Hardy Dillard, Myres
McDougal, and John Norton Moore over the last two decades
that true political realism requires the incorporation into a
state's diplomacy and strategy of notions of legitimacy, in other
words, the skillful union of law and power without short-
sightedly sacrificing one of these dimensions of strategy for the
sake of the other. In the fashion of Metternichian Austria, Great
Britain persuaded its allies, both in the Western alliance and in
the Commonwealth, that what was at stake in the Falklands
crisis was a principle of legitimacy which, if disregarded by the
Argentines with impunity, would be fatally weakened, with
dangerous consequences for the future security of those states.
In the corridors of the UN and elsewhere many statesmen
grasped that support for the forceful Argentine takeover of the
233
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
islands would set a precedent which rapacious neighbors might
use in the future to their disadvantage. By linking legitimacy
and international law with a broad, long-term conception of
national security in the minds of many decision-makers around
the world, and harnessing that connection to their own political
purposes, British diplomats achieved a major strategic and
diplomatic breakthrough in which international law played an
important role.
Not to be overlooked, of course, is the military component of
British strategy. Although only one of several components in a
comprehensive, multifaceted strategy, this was the ultimate
guarantor of that strategy's credibility and success. Had the
military operations to recover the islands failed, the Argentine
flag would have continued to fly over Port Stanley. In addition
to the high degree of professionalism, careful attention to detail,
and the even quality of leadership and morale shown by the
British military at all levels, one is struck by two characteristics
underlined by Dov Zakheim in his detailed study of the military
aspects of the conflict: tacticalflexibilityand improvisation. No
military strategy can succeed without the support of tactical
flexibility and improvisation to compensate for the innumerable
contingencies that inevitably dot the course of even the best-
conceived plans. This is as true of a Superpower such as the
United States, as of a smaller power with limited resources such
as Great Britain. The lesson here is dear: in devising ways with
which to cope with the Soviet conventional Behemoth in Central
Europe, NATO's planners should concentrate on methods for
incorporating the highest degree of tactical flexibility and
improvisation in their defensive strategy, forsaking perhaps, as
the Argentine military should have done, the alluring tempta-
tion to rely inordinately on a few standard tactics involving
highly expensive weapons systems. Similarly, NATO can learn
much from the broad range of military instruments which the
British combined to achieve their impressive military victory:
from standard naval forces and a professional air-fighting
capability to less common but highly effective commando
tactics, special forces, sabotage of enemy infrastructure, and
propaganda. In contrast to the Argentines, whose military
successes rested on the superb courage of their pilots and the
functioning of two sophisticated weapons systems (the Eten-
dards and the Exocet missiles), the British relied on a combina-
tion of numerous military instruments, in each of which they
showed a high level of professional competence and technical
234
 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
proficiency. No discussion of British military strategy, of course,
can fail to note that the decision to retake the Falklands was
fraught with considerable risks and easily could have ended in
a military disaster reminiscent of the ill-fated Spanish Armada
or the Athenian expedition to Sicily. Whatever lessons future
strategists draw from the British success should not obscure the
tremendous vulnerability faced by naval forces in the type of
mission undertaken by the British Task Force.
If the coherence and comprehensiveness of British strategy
after 2 April 1982 provide valuable lessons for future policy-
makers, so do the absence of these qualities—indeed the
absence of any strategy—in British policy towards the Falklands
during the preceding years. In particular, as Dov Zakheim and
Douglas Kinney have observed, British policy was unclear in its
objectives towards the Falklands; the confusing signals sent to
Argentina during the 1960s and 1970s did not create a clear
picture of what Great Britain intended to do with the islands or
how vital she considered them to her national honor. Indeed,
there was sufficient ambiguity in British policy to suggest to the
Argentines that if the ultimate test of force ever came the British,
a bit shamefacedly perhaps but not without a sense of relief and
gratitude, might yield the barren rocks to their eager claimants.
The apparent incoherence of British policy was reinforced, and
communicated in a most telling way to the Argentines, by the
absence of any meaningful links between British rhetoric on the
importance of the islands to the British government and people
and the requisite military power to sustain whatever commit-
ment Great Britain was willing to make to preserve the status
quo. Even on those occasions when the British government
unequivocally explained to the Argentines that the use of force
to gain the islands would be unacceptable, the lack of a visible
and adequate British military presence in the area persuaded
many Argentine leaders that the British did not mean what they
said, that they were simply engaging in diplomatic formalism
devoid of the substance of power. If, as Walter Lippmann and
Hans Morgenthau argued so persuasively, a nation's policy
must be commensurate with its resources, it is also true that a
policy must be complemented by the willingness, exhibited
openly and with ample symbolism, to use the resources
available in support of it. This is such a simple truism as to seem
almost undeserving of the name of a lesson, yet statesmen seem
to disregard it periodically and with costly results; in this case,
it cost the British several hundred dead, over two billion dollars,

235
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
and numerous other less tangible but nonetheless considerable
political and economic assets.
Moving from the realm of overall strategy to that of
diplomacy, one finds that the 1982 war underlined the severe
weaknesses, as well as some of the constructive possibilities
offered by the diplomatic mechanisms and institutions of the
contemporary international system. At a regional level, the OAS
failed to play a constructive role in defusing the crisis. This
failure illustrated, as Srilal Perera has shown, two perennial
weaknesses of the OAS: its inability to deal constructively with
conflicts involving extraregional powers, and its inner fragmen-
tation and divisiveness caused by political and economic
rivalries and numerous territorial disputes among OAS
members. No amount of legal draftwork has been able to over-
come these weaknesses and produce a truly effective inter-
American system. In a broader sense, the flaws of the OAS are
indicative of those of many regional organizations and of
regionalism generally. The consensus and greater integration
achieved through regionalism is often at the expense of outsiders,
at the cost of a heightened sense of distinctiveness and exclus-
ivity from the rest of the international community. The concomi-
tant of Latin American or Arab solidarity is often a greater
recalcitrance to accommodate with Englishmen or Israelis.
Thus, regionalism is not necessarily a step in the direction of a
more integrated world community; it can be seen also as the
way by which various communities linked by common values or
a common history join forces to resist absorption into a seem-
ingly alien, cosmopolitan international society. The reservoir of
solidarity binding such communities may be sufficient to unite
them against outside powers, but not enough to prevent fester-
ing intraregionalrivalriesfrom breaking out into open violence
once the threat or challenge from the outside has receded. In
today's international system, even among members of a com-
mon regional grouping, the nation-state continues to be the
dominant actor, and its interests the primary determinant of the
shape and substance of foreign policies.
Universal, as distinct from regional, organizations do not
necessarily have better diplomatic capabilities. Inis Claude's
analysis of the United Nations' handling of the Falklands War
makes this quite clear. In particular, the UN's efforts to achieve
a settlement lacked coherence in both substance and style
because of the tension within the organization between two
contradictory currents. On the one hand, there was a vague
236
 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
desire to restrain the Argentines and let them know that aggres-
sion does not pay and cannot be accepted by the international
community. This was the essence of the Security Council's
Resolution 502. Yet there was also an undefined but strong
current of pacifism, illustrated by later efforts, which had an air
of desperation about them, to obtain a ceasefire at all costs even
if it meant that such efforts diminished any incentives the
Argentines had for complying with Resolution 502. The entire
episode in all of its tragicomic details revealed once more that
vast and perhaps fatal ambiguity at the heart of the United
Nations, and of the liberal political philosophy underlying it: to
what extent is the burning desire for peace characteristic of
modern liberalism reconcilable with the requirements for main-
taining and enforcing peace in an anarchic world? Can any
political institution that is aimed at the preservation of peace
operate effectively while making peace, rather than other
values, its highest principle of conduct? In the tentative answers
to these questions one can discern further lessons from the
Falklands War.
The mediation efforts of the Secretary-General indicate the
extent to which the United Nations, despite its limitations, can
play a constructive diplomatic role not so much through its
proceedings in the grand halls and corridors of New York but
by throwing its weight behind a sensible, impartial negotiator
such as Perez de Cuellar proved to be. The amazing thing about
the Secretary-General's mission was not that it failed but that,
as Douglas Kinney has pointed out, it came close to success, in
fact, closer than that of the U.S. Secretary of State. As Dag
Hammarskjold showed during the Congo crisis of 1960, an
energetic and creative Secretary-General can use the prestige
and credibility associated with his office, if not to settle an inter-
national conflict, at least to manage it and prevent it from
spreading and drawing in the rival Superpowers. Whether in
the case of the Congo or that of the Falklands, where the twin
goals were containment and settlement of the dispute, the key
to the UN's effectiveness is more the personality of the
Secretary-General and the way in which he holds out the
prospect of a third-party authoritative settlement and an impar-
tial multinational guarantee of it, than any intrinsic institutional
strengths of the UN itself.
Perez de Cuellar's failure, as well as the failures of the
American and Peruvian mediation efforts, illustrate that states
do not always conduct their diplomacy rationally and in strict
237
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
accordance with a well-defined conception of the national
interest. As Kinney has pointed out, all of the settlements
discussed in the course of the three third-party mediations
offered to Argentina much more than what, only a year before,
she could have obtained through bilateral negotiations with the
British. Yet she rejected every one of them. A combination of
misplaced national pride, a maximalist diplomacy feeding on
what Machiavelli would have described as hopes rather than
realities, a lack of a sense of limits, and an overly anxious view
of the historical process drove the Argentines to reject terms
which, before 2 April 1982, they would have rightly seen as only
a short step away from the fulfillment of their centuries-old
ambition. The gambles and miscalculations of Argentine
diplomacy demonstrate once more the radical changes in
political perceptions and expectations brought about by the out-
break of war. Once force is used and it appears capable of fully
achieving one's political goals, it is as difficult for statesmen as
it is for generals to accept even a partial return to the former
status quo in the form of a moderate compromise. War not only
alters the perceptions of what is possible; it also heightens
expectations of what is rightful and desirable.
Looking to the future, diplomacy may prove capable of
providing a settlement satisfactory to both parties. But itwill not
be easy, and will not occur anytime soon. A "functional"
approach to the dispute such as David Colson has suggested can
work only if the British make substantial concessions in the
direction of granting sovereignty eventually to the Argentines,
something which, as of 1984 at least, the Thatcher government
did not seem prepared to do. On the Argentine side, the new
civilian government, unencumbered by any responsibility for
the military's decision to take the islands by force, has some
room forflexibilityand maneuvering, but even so would most
likely reject any settlement that would postpone the handing
over of sovereignty to Argentina beyond a "lifetime" period of
forty orfiftyyears. Over the long run there will be great political
and economic pressures on Great Britain to yield to Argentine
demands. As The Economist eloquently put it in one of its
editorials, it is absurd for a major Western power to spend
upwards of $400 million yearly to protect the Falklands against
another Western power with important economic and cultural
ties to Great Britain. As desirable as it would be in an ideal
world to satisfy the wishes of the 2,000 Kelpers for the indefinite
continuation of a British Falklands, prudence suggests that such
238
 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
wishes ought to be disregarded in view of more important
considerations.
A British transfer of sovereignty over the Falklands to Argen-
tina could be accomplished gracefully, honorably, and with due
regard for the long-term interests of Great Britain. Such a
transfer, for example, could make provisions for an equitable
share between the two parties of any major economic resources
that are discovered or become commercially viable in the future.
Generous financial compensation could be offered to those
Kelpers wishing to leave the islands, and the Argentines could
be persuaded to share the costs of these compensatory efforts.
A transfer of sovereignty, especially if scheduled to take effect
not earlier than fifteen or twenty years after the end of the 1982
war, would not be seen as a disgraceful British retreat. By then
passions should have cooled down in Great Britain and the
costliness of a continued British presence should be the pre-
dominant concern. Moreover, the cost in lives and money of the
1982 war could be seen not as a futile waste, but as the spirited
defense of principles which, as Thomas Franck has argued, have
great strategic and political value. Without a doubt, Great
Britain's political will and military capabilities are more feared
and respected today than they were before 2 April 1982, a point
of no small consequence for the credibility of British defense
efforts in the North Atlantic against any prospective Soviet
threat.
Other possible diplomatic approaches which come short of
transfering sovereignty to the Argentines at a date in the near
future will not be acceptable to the latter and will fail to defuse
political and military tensions in the area. Involving the United
States as a military co-protector of the Kelpers and a co-
guarantor of continued British rule is equally problematical,
regardless of whether it is done within the institutional arrange-
ments of the UN's Trusteeship System or outside of them.
Thus, for example, while Monroe Leigh's creative proposal
offers many constructive possibilities, and while, as he argues,
it has "elements of advantage in the long run to Argentina," it
faces two almost insurmountable obstacles. First, the Argen-
tines will not perceive it as sufficiently advantageous; the cul-
tural and historical circumstances explaining such a seemingly
rigid Argentine attitude are alluded to by both Alfred Rubin and
Douglas Kinney in this book. Anglo-Saxon pragmatists may
deplore the unbending nature and apparent irrationality of
Argentine perceptions, but they cannot change them. Second,
239
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
and equally important, the United States will not consent to
sacrifice its interests in Latin America and Argentina in order to
protect the Falklands militarily. The United States was a hesitant
ally of Great Britain when the latter was attacked by the Argen-
tines; it will be considerably less eager to provide continued
military support to prop up one of the parties in what, according
to the official viewpoint of the U.S. government, is a sovereignty
dispute. The replacement in 1983 of the Argentine military junta
by a civilian government committed to democracy and human
rights makes the prospects of U.S. military involvement in the
Falklands even more remote. These are the same obstacles
facing proposals that Great Britain grant independence to the
Falklands and then proceed, in concert with the United States,
to guarantee by treaty their future security.
In the realm of international law, the Falklands War offered
some lessons by confirming several important trends in the
ongoing development of international law in the late twentieth
century. The first of these is the decline, amply discussed by
Thomas Franck and Anthony Arend, of the United Nations
Charter norms limiting the recourse to violence by states; this
decline has been accompanied by the continuing failure of the
UN mechanisms for collective security and maintenance of the
peace. The creation of authoritative institutions that will provide
for peaceful change and the nonviolent accommodation of
clashing national interests remains as baffling a problem for
international law today as it has been throughout its past.
Whether the recurring weaknesses of the ius ad helium enshrined
in the UN Charter's prohibition of the first use of force will be
compensated for by new legal norms requiring states to seek
peaceful means of settlement even after hostilities break out is
an open question. Although, as Howard Levie has suggested,
the ius in hello during the Falklands War presented a much more
hopeful picture than the ius ad helium, it is appropriate also to
point out that the "Gentlemen's War" of 1982 may be an excep-
tion to a broader trend, of which the Iraq-Iran War, the conflicts
in Indochina and Afghanistan, and numerous "wars of national
liberation" elsewhere are examples, of a growing disregard for
the laws of warfare.
The Falklands also confirmed the increasing desuetude into
which international institutions for the adjudication and arbitra-
tion of disputes seem to be falling, a trend which many scholars
have noted over the last decade. Not only do states ignore the
decisions of the International Court of Justice (as Iran did in
240
 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
the 1979 hostages case) or those of impartial arbitration panels
(as Argentina when it recently rejected a binding arbitration
finding against it in the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile).
More seriously yet, states seem to be dispensing even with the
formalities of bringing disputes before such bodies. Between
1972 and 1980, only six cases were brought before the Inter-
national Court of Justice; in five of these the states named as
parties defendant refused to appear.
The events of 1982 were a sharp reminder of the critical role
played in international politics and law by simmering territorial
and boundary disputes, of which there are many in today's
world threatening to break out into open violence. The lesson
here, as David Colson and others have pointed out, is that these
disputes need to be taken more seriously by the international
community and the parties directly involved. In this connection,
a contemporary scholar, David Downing, noted in 1980 that
Border disputes provide an all too-convenient platform for the
expression of international hostility, and waving the flag and
waxing lyrical about the nation's sacred soil are time-
honoured methods of silencing internal opposition . . . But
however invidious the role of governments, it cannot be
denied that the very existence of ill-drawn borders has played
a major role in the fomentation of all this century's major
wars.1
There are few territorial and boundary disputes which, if they
were to lead to war, would not carry the risks of involving the
rival Superpowers. Even the Falklands War, fought over two
barren islands of dubious economic and military significance,
drew in the United States, and easily could have drawn the
Soviet Union had a state different from Argentina (closer to the
Soviet Union politically, ideologically, or geographically, for
example) been one of the antagonists.
Another trend confirmed by the war, and one which helps to
explain the volatility and increasing significance of boundary
and territorial disputes, is the greater prominence in inter-
national law and politics of issues related to the development,
management, and allocation of natural resources. The techno-
logical revolution of the post-World War II decades has helped
to fuel this trend, as has also the rising world demand for food,
energy, and raw materials to sustain a growing population and
an ever more sophisticated industrial base. The Antarctic Treaty
of 1959, the controversial Law of the Sea negotiations
241
 THE FALKLANDS WAR
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and the Convention deal-
ing with the commercial exploitation of the moon illustrate
the efforts of international law and diplomacy to develop
rules for the exploitation and allocation of valuable living
and nonliving resources in areas which are becoming increas-
ingly accessible to modern technology. In a sense, the Falklands
War was not directly related to these issues; so far, there
is a very little evidence of the islands being a reservoir of
substantial economic resources. Yet, in another sense, the
perception by many Kelpers and by the British and Argentine
public that there are vast untapped economic resources in and
around the islands contributed to keeping both sides from
reaching an agreement before the war. Also, as Christopher
Joyner has indicated, the Anglo-Argentine rivalry over the
Falklands may have adverse effects over future Anglo-Argentine
cooperation in Antarctica, an area where sovereignty disputes
among Argentina, Great Britain, and other states is directly
related to issues of natural resources. For the foreseeable future,
the effective management of such issues, whether in the context
of the Antarctic Treaty which becomes open for review in 1991,
or the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty's seabed mining provisions
which the United States and other industrial powers are
unwilling to accept, will continue to pose for diplomacy and
international law some of their most demanding challenges.
Viewed from a broader philosophical perspective, the war also
offers important reminders that can be properly described as
lessons for the future. In spite of its limited setting, the war was
a microcosm of the perpetual fragility of international order, a
rich and colorful parable of the cataclysmic and violent character
of international relations and of history itself. A distinguished
intellectual tradition stretching from Thucydides in thefifthcen-
tury B.C. to Jacob Burckhardt and Raymond Aron in more
recent times has tried to remind us that the essence of inter-
national politics is its chaos, its unpredictability, and its recal-
citrance tofitinto any single mold of intellectual understanding.
The recurrent efforts of many statesmen and theorists of
international law and politics to ascribe to their subject matter a
degree of rationality and predictability that it lacks has been the
source of many a disaster. The Falklands War, as well as other
events in the long course of this troubled century, suggest that
in an anarchic international system states must be prepared
for the worst eventualities. Foreign policy must be made
with an eye for not only the known uniformities, but also the
242
 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
innumerable surprises which the course of international
relations continually produces.
Moreover, the war once again showed that underneath the
delicate edifice of modern civilization and the elegant institu-
tions of international law and organization, powerful forces of
anarchy and disorder rumble on, ready at any moment to erupt
to the surface and destroy the fragile proprieties and restraints
of international society. Preeminent among those forces is
nationalism which, contrary to the predictions of numerous
observers, shows no signs of abatement in the late twentieth
century. Argentina's display of intense nationalistic fervor did
not surprise anyone, but the same cannot be said of the vast
reservoirs of patriotism which Mrs. Thatcher suddenly dis-
covered among a people supposedly too sophisticated to hold
such seemingly antiquated values. As suggested by Dov
Zakheim, the British fought tenaciously and victoriously mainly
for reasons of national pride and honor, sentiments which
before 2 April 1982 many observers, and indeed many of the
elites in the West, had considered nonexistent and even inap-
propriate in an advanced industrial democracy with a Welfare
State such as Great Britain. Patriotism and national pride will
continue to play a critical role in international relations, much to
the chagrin of world order theorists. As exasperating and
baneful as these social values may seem, they are also an
indispensable source of that dynamism and vigor essential for
the survival and independence of a community in today's
world.
Finally, the war revealed, for anyone too insensitive to have
noticed it before, the tragic character of international conflict.
The shortsighted obduracy of the Kelpers and the British
government in not reaching a pragmatic settlement with the
Argentines prior to 1982; Argentina's own impetuosity and bold
miscalculation; the exceedingly narrow margin by which the
mediation efforts failed to defuse the conflict; the great human
and economic costs of the war to both adversaries; and the
present predicament of a "Fortress Falklands" in which mount-
ing social problems ranging from alcoholism to unwanted
births, and the permanent presence of a large military force,
make it very difficult for the islanders to lead the kind of good
life for which the war was fought; these are illustrations of a
tragedy not uncommon in the history of international politics.
It is the kind of tragedy which, even after the Falklands dispute
is settled at some future date, is likely to reappear in one form
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 THE FALKLANDS WAR
or another in other parts of the world, imposing on scholars and
statesmen alike the sober responsibilities of intellectual and
political creativity, patience, and catholic understanding.

Note: Chapter 15
1 David Downing, An Atlas of Territorial and Border Disputes. (London: New
English Library, 1980), p. 8.

244
 Index
Act of Chapultepec 139, 140 in Antarctica 190-7; attitude to
"Aggression, Definition of" 60, trusteeship 230-1; failure of
124 diplomacy 238
aircraft 180-1 Aristotle: on equity 35
Alexander VI, Pope: Inter Caetera arms trade 168-9
Divinae 10-11, 193 Aron, Raymond 36
All American Republics, Ascension Island 167
Congress of 135 Astiz, Capt. Alfredo 73
American Treaty of Pacific Augustine, St: on legal
Settlement (1948) 141-2 standards of order 35
amphibious warfare 173-5 Australia: Torres Strait dispute
Anaya, Admiral 95; architect of 219-22
Argentine invasion 87 Australian Antarctic Territory
Anglo-Argentines 69, 70 203
Antarctic Institute (Institute)
Antarctico Argentina) 192 Baylies, Francis 15
Antarctic Treaty 192, 204-9, Belaunde-Terry, Fernando: as
216-19; Consultative Party mediator 58, 88, 93, 100-1, 103
Group 207-9 Belgian Antarctic Expedition 202
Antarctica 210; Anglo-Argentine Belgrano: sinking of 66, 101, 102
rivalry 189-211; Argentine Belize: attitude to Falklands'
activity in 190-7; sectorization War 25; crisis in 85; boundary
195; British activity in 197-204; disputes 144
natural resources 205-7; Bellingshausen, Adm. Thaddeus
boundary dispute 201
management 216-19 Bernhardt, J. Peter 197
Antilles, Dutch 28 Biscoe, John 198
arbitration 42; Hague Permanent Blaine, James G. 135
Court of Arbitration 115 blockade 64-6
Arend, Anthony xiii, 3, 46, Bogota Pact, see American Treaty
52-63 of Pacific Settlement
Argentina: Falklands Bolivar, Simon 133
administered from 12; Bougainville, Antoine Louis de:
independence from Spain 13, first settler 12
14; formal government of boundary disputes: incidences of
Falklands 14; expelled by 43; commission on 50; in
British 15; legal arguments for South America 134, 143;
invasion 39; Anglo-Argentine Argentine-Paraguayan
diplomacy 81-105; UN attitude Boundary Arbitration 135;
towards 122-6; Beagle management of 212-23;
Channel dispute 143; activity maritime 212-14; Spitzbergen

245
 INDEX
214-16; Antarctica 216-19; dispute 144
Torres Strait 219-20; interim colonialism: French 12; British
measures 222-3; see also 12-13, 15; Spanish 12-13;
territorial disputes Buenos Aires 14; British
Bouvet Island 206 relinquish 22; UN charter on
Bozeman, Adda: The Future of 25; UN support for
Law in a Multicultural World 48 decolonization 55-6, 59; UN
Bransfield, Edward 198 Special Committee on
Brazil: attitude to Falklands' War Decolonization 81; Falklands
24; 148; as Protecting Power as colony 81, 123, 125-6
69; independence 133 Colson, David A. 6, 42, 212-24
Brierly, J. L.: The Law of Nations Comision Nacional del
41 Antarctico 191
Brisbane, Matthew: arrest 14, 15 condominium: proposed by
British Antarctic Expedition 198 Britain 83; in New Hebrides
British Antarctic Survey 199; 229
repatriation of 69 Congress of All American
British Antarctic Territory 199 Republics 135
British National Antarctic Congress of Inter-American
Expedition 198 States (1826) 133
Buenos Aires, state of, see Conservation of Antarctic
Argentina Marine Living Resources,
Butterfield, Sir Herbert 34 Convention on 218
Byron, Commodore John 12 Contadora group 153
contiguity, rule of 39-40
Cable, Sir James 160 Convention on the Conservation
Callaghan, Jim: negotiations of Antarctic Marine Living
with Argentina 84 Resources 218
Camargo, Francisco: first landing Convention on the Rights and
10 Duties of States 138
Canada: East Coast fisheries Conventional Weapons
agreement 220-1 Convention (1980) 68, 73
Carrineton, Lord 86, 164 Cook, Capt. James 198
Chapvdtepec, Act of 139, 140 Costa Mendez: and diplomacy
Charcot, J. B. 202 86; architect of Argentine
Chile: boundary disputes 143; invasion 87
neutrality during Falklands' Craig, Gordon 36
War 148
civilians 69-71 Dampier, William 10
Claude, Inis L. xiii, 4, 55, 60, Davis, John: first British sighting
118-31 10
Clipperton Islands Arbitration 17 Davison, Capt. 14
Coll, Alberto R. 2-3, 6, 34-51, de la Colina, Rafael 148
232-44 de la Roche, Anthony 197
collective security 52-5; failure de Weert, Sebald; first confirmed
of 57-9; UN and 127; and Rio sighting 10
Treaty 139; and OAS 141, 150 Declaration on Principles of
Colombia: attitude to Falklands' International Law Concerning
War 24, 148-9; boundary Friendly Relations and

246
 INDEX
Cooperation Among States 24, force: UN charter on 18, 24, 53;
international laws governing
decolonization: UN support for 34-9
55-6, 59; UN Special Foster, Henry 198
Commission on 81 France: sale of settlement rights
Dever, Edmonde 23 12; overseas departments 26
Dillard, Hardy 233 Franck, Thomas xiii, 2. 22-33,
diplomacy: Anglo-Argentine 46, 62, 226, 233
81-7; mediation attempts Franks Report 160-1, 164
87-105; British successes 233-4 Freedman, Lawrence: on timing
discovery: early sightings of of invasion 162; on public
Falklands 9-10; law on 10-12 opinion 170
Dostoevsky, Fyodor: The Brothers French Antarctic Expedition 202
Karamazov 35
Downing, David: on border Galtieri, Gen. Leopoldo 95;
disputes 241 reaction to Haig 98
Drago Doctrine 136 General Belgrano, see Belgrano
Drier, John C : on US-South Geneva Convention, First 68;
American relations 137-8 Second 67, 68; Third 71;
Dumont d'Urville 201 Fourth 69
Dutch Antilles 28 Gerlache, Adrien de 202
Gibraltar 27
East Timor 29 Goa: Indian invasion of 18, 29,
Economist, The 64, 68, 86, 238 60, 124, 125
Ecuador: boundary disputes 144; Goebel, Julius: The Struggle for
support for Argentina 148 the Falkland Islands 9
Eilat 171 Gompert, David C. 4, 106-17;
Endurance 161, 164 on negotiated settlement 58
equity 35 Good Neighbour Policy 137
European Economic Community: Gouin, Beauchenese 10
attitude to Falklands' War 23; Graham's Land (Palmer
sanctions against Argentina Peninsula) 191, 198
127 Great Britain: first sightings of
exclusion zone 64-6; extended Falklands 10; colony 12, 15;
97; limits Argentine options 99 claim to sovereignty 13;
exploration: of Falklands 9-10; colony relinquished 22; right
of Antarctica 197-9, 201-2 to self-defense 44-5; Anglo-
Argentine diplomacy 81-105;
attitude of UN towards 126-7,
Falkland, Viscount Anthony: 129; incursions into Latin
islands named after 10 America 134; alliance with US
Falkland Islands Dependencies 166-8; public opinion in
42, 199; King's Patent 201 169-70; and Antarctica
Falkland Islands Dependencies 197-204; success in Falklands
Survey 199 232-3; ambiguity over
Falkland Islands Emergency Falklands' position 235
Committee 82 Grotius, Hugo: on prescription
Feliciano, F. 56 41
fishing vessels 66 Guatemala: attitude to

247
 INDEX
Falklands' War 25; boundary Inter-American States, Congress
dispute 144 of (1826) 133
gunboat diplomacy 162-3 Inter-American Treaty (1933)
Guyana: support for Britain 25; 37-8
threat from Venezuela 26-7 Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (1947),
Hague Convention: on fishing see Rio Treaty
vessels 67; on Naval Inter Caetera Divinae 10, 193
Bombardment 70; First 135 International Committee of the
Hague Permanent Court of Red Cross 71
Arbitration 115 International Conference of
Hague Regulations on Land American States (1902) 136;
Warfare 70 (1933) 138
Haig, Alexander: as mediator 58, International Court of Justice 17,
88, 89-% 42, 115; on Antarctica 203;
Hall, William Edward: Treatise on decline of use of 240-1
International Law 36; on internment, of civilians 70
prescription 137 Invincible 165-6
Havana Conference 137
Hawkins, Sir Richard 10 Jackson, Andrew 14
Henderson, Sir Nicholas 89, 102 Jacobs, Ambassador 28
Henkin, Louis 62 Jewitt, Col. Daniel 14
historic title 27 Jornal do Brasil 24
historical background 9-15 Joyner, Christopher C. 5-6,
Holmes, Oliver Wendell 49 189-211
Hoseason Island 198 Julius II, Pope: confirms Treaty
hospital ships 67-8 of Tordesillas 11
Huber, Max 16
Hughes, Charles Evans 137 Kellogg-Briand Pact 37
Hunt, Rex 69 Kenya: support for Britain 26
Kinney, Douglas 4, 81-105
King's Patent (1908) 199, 201-2
Dlueca, Jorge 27
Kirkpatrick, Jeanne 233
Ince, Mr. 149
incendiary weapons 68
India: seizure of Goa 18, 29, 60; LADE 69
and prisoners of war 71-2 Lami Dozo, Gen. 95
Institute) Antarctica Argentina Lasswell, Harold 56
192 Latin America: attitudes to
Inter-American Conference Falklands' War 24;
(1954) 153 independence movements 133;
Inter-American Conference on boundary disputes 134-5,
the Problems of War and 143-5; intracontinental
Peace (1945) 139 conflicts 135; foreign debts
Inter-American Juridical 136; suspects US imperialism
Committee 125, 140; findings 136
on Malvinas 145 Laurie Island 191, 192-3
Inter-American Peace Committee law: legal background 15-20;
152-3 legal principles 22-33; Future

248
 INDEX
of Law in a Multicultural World Operations Forces 176;
48; laws of war 64-76 logistics 176-8; coordination
law, international: territorial 178-9; medical services 179;
15-17; Declaration on morale 179; success of British
Principles of International Law 234
Concerning Friendly Relations missiles 181-2
24, 25; on use of force 34-9; Monroe Doctrine 15, 136
Treatise on International Law 36; Moore, John Norton 62, 233
and war 36-46; Law of Nations Munoz Ledo, Ambassador 24
41; de-escalation of 49; failure
of 52-63; British resort to 233; Narwal: sinking of 67
developments in 240 nationalism 243
Law of the Sea Convention 214, Nato: support for Britain 127;
242 bilateral alliances 166-7
League of Nations: Covenant 37 Nauru: co-trusteeship 230
lease-back: proposed by natural resources: exploitation of
Argentina 84; some support 241-2
from British 86 navy: modern role 162-3; force
legislation: International Court planning 164-6; surface forces
of Justice 17, 42, 115, 203, 171-3; aircraft carriers 171-2;
240-1 coordination with army 178-9;
Leigh, Monroe 6, 225-31 submarines 183
Levie, Howard S. 3, 46, 64-77 negotiated settlement: outline
liberation movements 60 for 19; history of 41-2; UN
Luxton, William 70 Charter 57; during hostilities
57-9
McDougal, Myres 53, 56, 233 Netherlands 10
Magellan, Ferdinand 9 neutrality 74-6
Maina, Ambassador 26 New Hebrides: co-trusteeship
"Malvinas": origin of name 12 229
maritime boundary disputes Nordenskjold, Otto 202
212-14 OAS, see Organisation of
maritime exclusion zone 64-6 American States
mediation 87-105; US role in 58, occupation: history of 12-15
88, 89-%; UN role in 104-5, "Operation Tabarin" 199
118-31, 236-7; British Organisation of American States
objectives 88; Argentine 132-55; Charter 39, 139, 140;
objectives 88-9; Peru's role in endorses Argentine position
100-3 127, 146-7; and
Menendez, Gen. 72 extracontinental conflict 145-6,
mercenaries 74 153-4; resolution on
Mestivier, Don Juan Esteban: Falklands' War 146; failure in
Governor 15 crisis 236
Mexico: attitude to Falklands' Orkneys, South 191, 198, 201
War 24, 148 Ortiz de Rosas 100
Miangas, see Palmas "out-of-area" contingencies
military implications 170-9 164-5
military strategy: naval 171-2;
amphibious 173-5; Special Pacific, War of (1879-83) 135

249
 INDEX
Pacific Settlement American Rights and Duties of States,
Treaty of (1948) 141-2 convention on 138
Palmas (Miangas): Arbitration Rio Treaty 38-9; Organ of
18,40 Consultation 95, 96; supports
Palmer Peninsula (Graham's Argentina 115, 146; and
Land) 191 collective defense 139; invoked
Panama: support for Argentina by Argentine 146; on
27, 124 Antarctica 191-2
Panama Treaty 133 Rogers, Capt. Woodes 10
Papua New Guinea 14; Torres Ross, Sir James Clark 198
Strait dispute 219-22 Ross Dependency 203
Paraguayan War 135 Ross Island 198
Paris, Declaration of 66 Rowlands, Ted 85
Paris Peace Conference 215 Rubin, Alfred P. 1-2, 9-21, 55
Parish, Woodbine 14
Parsons, Sir Anthony 104, 233 Saavedra-Lamas Treaty 37-8
Passamoquoddy Indians 19 Sahara, Spanish 29
peaceful change: illegitimacy of San Martin, Jos£ de 133
55-6; failure of 59-62 Sandwich Islands, South 42,
Penobscot Indians 19 84r-5, 198, 201
Perera, Srilal 5, 43, 132-55 Santa Fe 71, 72, 183
Perez de Cuellar, Javier 49-50; Scott, Capt. R. F. 198
as mediator 58, 88, 104-5, 121, Scottish National Antarctic
237 Expedition 191
Peru: as mediator 100-3; "Sebald Islands" 10
boundary dispute 144; self-determination 19; and UN
accusations against US 150 declaration 25; right of 29;
Pinedo, Don Jose Maria 15 basis of British diplomacy
Plasenda, Bishop of 10 82-3, 94, 99
Powell, George 198 Shackleton, Sir Ernest 198
rescription 40-1 Shaddeton, HMS 84, 85
• de Mayo 191 Shackleton Survey 84
prisoners of war 71-4 Sheffield: sinking of 66
Problems of War and Peace, Shetlands, South 198, 201
Inter-American Conference on Slacum, Consul 14
(1945) 139 Smith, William 198
proportionality 45-6 South Georgia 42, 84, 200;
Protecting Powers 68-9 Argentine flag raised 87;
Protocol I (1977) 74 recapture 96; discovery 197-8
public opinion 114; in UK South Orkneys 191, 198, 201
169-70 South Shetlands 198, 201
Pym, Francis 90, 102 sovereignty: and discovery 9-12;
and occupation 12-15; British
claim 13, 16; legal aspects
Ramphal, Shridath 28 15-20; disputes 16-17;
Reagan, Ronald 33 diplomacy concerning 81-7;
Red Cross 71 basis of Argentine diplomacy
res nullius 16, 17 99; Argentine claims in
Ridley, Nicholas 86 Antarctica 192-3; British

250
 INDEX
claims in Antarctica 199-204; Treaty on Sovereignty and
management of disputes Maritime Boundaries 220
212-23; transfer of 239 Trevor-Roper, Hugh 28
Spain: settlement in Falklands Trinidad and Tobago: anti-
12, 13 Argentine protest 149
Special Operations Forces 176 trusteeship: proposed solution
Speed, Keith 164 225-31
Spitsbergen: boundary dispute
214-16 Uganda: as hospital ship 67-8
Steel Ronald 28 United Kingdom, see Great
Stevenson, Adlai 29 Britain
Stewart, Michael 81 United Nations: lack of support
Strategic Survey 1982-1983 167, for Argentina 23-4, 122-3;
173 Declaration on Principles of
strategy, see military strategy International Law 24, 25;
Strong, John 10 previous recognition of
submarines 183 Argentine claims 30;
Swedish Polar Expedition 202 "Definition of Aggression" 60;
Switzerland: as Protecting Power Special Committee on
69 Decolonization 81; mediation
118-31, 236-7; sanctions
Tabarin, Operation 199 against Argentina 127;
technological implications 180-3; trusteeship of Falklands
aircraft 180-1; missiles 181-2; 225-31; see also United Nations
submarines 183 Charter; United Nations
territorial disputes: legal cases Security Council
16-17; UN declaration on 24; United Nations Charter;
Antarctica 189-211; uti Argentine violation of 18;
possidetis juris 194-5; principles expressed in 24; on
geographical arguments 195; colonies 25, 123-4; on use of
geological arguments 196; and force 38, 53; authority of 47-8;
Antarctic Treaty 205; Treaty failure of 52; and collective
on 220; see also boundary security 53-4; decline of 240
disputes United Nations Security Council:
Thatcher, Margaret; opposed to Resolution 502, 23, 44, 129,
concessions 86; stresses self- 146; settlement of disputes
determination 94 42-3; and veto 54; Resolution
Third World: encourages 505 129
Argentina 30-1; anti-violence United States of America:
124 opposition to Buenos Aires
Thule, Southern 84-5 14-15; Monroe Doctrine 15;
Timor, East, Portuguese 29 and neutrality 75; full support
Tokelau Islands: US relinquishes for UK 100; diplomacy 106-17;
sovereignty 221-2 relations with South America
Tordesillas, Treaty of 11, 194 136-7; loss of credibility in
Torres Strait Treaty 219-20 OAS 154; bilateral alliance
Treaty of Communications 83 166-8; naval strategy 171-2;
Treaty of Rio de Janeiro see Rio Marines 173-4; Special
Treaty Operations Forces 176; East

251
 INDEX
Coast fisheries agreement Victor Emmanuel III, King of
220-1; sovereignty Italy 17
relinquished 221-2; and Videla, President Jorge Rafael 84
trusteeship of Falklands Vignes: Foreign Minister 84
225-31
USSR: stance on Falklands' War war: international law on 36;
75, 127 laws of 64-76; Hague
uti possidetis juris 11, 194-5 Regulations on Land Warfare
70
Washington Treaty 137
Van der Heydte, F. A. 196 weapons: Conventional
Vanuata, see New Hebrides Weapons Convention 68;
Venezuela: support for incendiary weapons 68;
Argentina 25, 150; history 133; technological developments
boundary disputes 143 180-3
Vernet, Louis: Governor of Weddell Sea 206
Falklands 14, 15, 149
Vespucci, Amerigo 9 Zakheim, Dov S. 5, 159-88

252