Namil VS Comelec
Namil VS Comelec
Namil VS Comelec
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, to set aside the November 6, 2001 Resolution No. 4615,
promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc installing the
[1] [2]
1. NOREN B. APIL
2. MALOD B. MOSADI
3. DIMALUB P. NAMIL
4. ABDULNASSER A. TIMAN
5. TERESITA G. AKOB
6. MABANING P. SAMAMA
7. EPAS T. GUIAMEL
8. MALIGA M. AMILUDIN
The above-named candidates took their oath, and assumed their offices on June
30, 2001 as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang.
[4]
The next day, May 21, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang
issued COCVP No. 8031109 which listed the private respondents as winners, namely:
1. JOENIME B. KAPINA
2. MONIB B. WALINGWALING
3. MAULANA G. KARNAIN
4. ABDULGAPHAR M. MUSATAPHA
5. MALOD B. MOSADI
6. ABDULRAKMAN A. TALIKOP
7. WILSON K. SABIWANG
8. MABANING P. SAMAMA
1. Finds that there was a VALID PROCLAMATION of the winning candidates for
positions of Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat
as contained in Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation No. 8031109;
2. That there being a VALID PROCLAMATION, there is NO NEED for adjudication on
this matter; and therefore
3. Respectfully RECOMMENDS to the Commission En Banc, the adoption of the
following recommendation [Annex D] of Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Dir., Law
Department and Atty. Gregorio T. Saraos, Attorney II, IPD, Law Department.
The public respondent further asserts that the twin requirement of notice and
hearing in annulment of proclamation is not applicable when the proclamation is null
and void, citing Utto vs. Commission on Elections. [8]
In this case, the public respondent nullified the proclamation of the petitioners and
ousted them from their office as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang,
based solely on the recommendations of its law department and of Commissioner
Sadain, and on the memoranda of its officers. The petitioners were not accorded a
chance to be heard on the said recommendations and the memorandum of Regional
Election Director Clarita Callar, certification of Celia Romero, and certification of
Election Officer Malic Sansarona dated September 12, 2001 before it issued the
assailed resolution.
The conclusion of the public respondent that the basis of the petitioners
proclamation was a fictitious and falsified document was grounded, inter alia, on a
confidential certification of Election Officer Malic Sansarona dated September 12, 2001.
However, it appears that a certification was earlier issued by the same election
[10] [11]
officer on June 25, 2001, stating that the petitioners whose names were listed
as winning candidates as Sangguniang Bayan members in the COCVP (C.E. Form No.
25) No. 8031108, the very certificate declared by the public respondent in its Resolution
No. 4615 as fictitious and falsified document, won in the elections.
In the case of Caruncho III vs. Commission on Elections, this Court has held that
[12]
due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice
and hearing. The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not
been notified of any motion to set aside his proclamation. This Court also ruled
in Sandoval vs. Commission on Elections that:
[13]
... Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and
issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction
tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner
is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due
process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary
that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words, due
process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support
his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of
the case. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner
without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order
based solely on private respondents allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. vs. COMELEC:
The public respondents reliance on the ruling of this Court in Utto vs. Commission
on Elections is misplaced. The Court, in that case, held that the twin-requirement of
[14]
are far different from those obtaining in Utto. In the Utto case, a notice of appeal was
filed questioning the ruling of the board of canvassers but, the latter proceeded in
proclaiming Utto as the winning candidate. This made the proclamation illegal. In the
present case, nobody questioned the petitioners proclamation.
We rule that the petition in this case was not prematurely filed. Generally, a motion
for reconsideration is a pre-requisite to the viability of a special civil action for
certiorari. However, there are exceptions to the rule. The aggrieved party is not obliged
to first file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before filing a petition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended where, as in this case, (1) the
question is purely legal, (2) judicial intervention is urgent; (3) its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; and (4) the controverted acts violate due process. [16]
The private respondents cannot invoke Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code
to fortify their cause, because the said law specifically refers to pre-proclamation
controversies, thus:
Even the fact that the public respondent initiated the proceedings for the partial or
total annulment of an illegal proclamation would not dispense with the requirements of
notice and hearing. This was made clear in Sandoval vs. Commission on Elections: [18]
Citing Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent argues that the
COMELEC is authorized to annul an illegal proclamation even without notice and
hearing because the law states that it may motu proprio order a partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any
proclamation, if one has been made. ...
...
The phrase motu proprio does not refer to the annulment of proclamation but to the
manner of initiating the proceedings to annul a proclamation made by the board of
canvassers. The law provides two ways by which annulment proceedings may be
initiated. It may be at the own initiative of the COMELEC (motu proprio) or by
written petition. In either case, notice and hearing is required. This is clear from the
language of the law. [19]
[1]
Rollo, pp. 18-21.
[2]
Commissioner Alfredo L. Benipayo (Chairman), Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S.B.
Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra, and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
(members).
[3]
Rollo, pp. 24, 25-29.
[4]
Id. at 24.
[5]
Id. at 20.
[6]
Id. at 21.
[7]
132 Phil. 353 (1968 ).
[8]
375 SCRA 523 (2002).
[9]
Bince, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 218 SCRA 782 (1993).
[10]
Supra.
[11]
Rollo, p. 44.
[12]
315 SCRA 693 (1999).
[13]
323 SCRA 403 (2000).
[14]
Supra.
[15]
Supra,
[16]
See Severino S. Tabios, Annotation on Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies as a Ground for
Motion to Dismiss, 165 SCRA 352 (1988); Jariol vs. Comelec, 270 SCRA 255 (1997).
[17]
Underscoring supplied.
[18]
Supra.
[19]
Supra.