CASE STUDY ON DELHI METRO

SUBMITTED TO : PROF(DR.) JP SAXENA

SUBMITTED BY: Ankit Malhotra E 62 Vishal Bengani E32 Pooja Grover B 61

INTRODUCTION
Delhi, the capital city of India, is one of the fastest growing cities in the world with a population of 13 million as reported in the Census of India Report for the year 2000. Until recently, it was perhaps the only city of its size in the world depending almost entirely on roads as the sole mode of mass transport. The total length of the road network in Delhi has increased from a mere 652 km in 1981 to 1122 km in 2001 and it is expected to grow to 1340 km in the year 2021. This increase in road length is not at par with the phenomenal growth in the number of vehicles on these roads in Delhi. The cumulative figure of registered private and government buses, the main means of public transport, is 41,872 in 1990 and it is expected to increase to 81,603 by the year 2011. The number of personal motor vehicles has increased from 5.4 lakhs in 1981 to 30 lakhs in 1998 and is projected to go up to 35 lakhs by 2011. With gradual horizontal expansion of the city, the average trip length of buses has gone up to 13 km and the increased congestion on roads has made the corresponding journey time of about one hour. Delhi has now become the fourth most polluted city in the world, with automobiles contributing more than two thirds of the total atmospheric pollution. In this context, the decision of the Government of India to develop a mass transport system for Delhi providing alternative modes of transport to the passengers was most appropriate. The first concrete step in the launching of an Integrated Multi Mode Mass Rapid Transport System (MRTS) for Delhi was taken when a feasibility study for developing a multimodal MRTS system was commissioned by the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) at the instance of the Government of India in 1989 and completed by Rail India Technical and Economic Services Limited in 1995 (RITES, 1995a, 1995b). it was only in 1998 that the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation was formed with equal equity participation of the Government of India and Government of the Capital Territory of Delhi to plan, execute, operate and maintain the Delhi Metro.The Delhi Metro Rail Project is being planned and executed in four phases - Phase I, Phase II, Phase III and Phase IV.It consists of 3 lines - Line 1, Line 2 and Line 3. Line 1 is partly elevated rail and partly surface rail. Line 2 is underground metro. Line 3 is partly underground and partly elevated rail. Line is completed and is operational. Phase I is scheduled for completion by 2005, Phase II by 2010, Phase III by 2015 and Phase IV by 2020.The project requires the deployment of several technologies - Constructional Technology, Rail Coach Technology, Power Systems Technology, Rail Communication and Control Technology, Microprocessor Controlled Smart Card Technology. Underground tunnel

construction involves considerable risks due to uncertain geological conditions. The project is executed with the help of both local and international contractors who are contracted to design and build the facility. An International Consortium of Consultants oversees the work.Japan Bank for International Cooperation is extending loan to the project to the extent of 56% project cost. Government of India, Ministry of Urban Development and the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi are each investing 15% of the project cost. The remaining is met through interest-free loans and property development. The operation and maintenance costs are essentially met by ticket sales.

Overview of MRTS Phase 1 Distance corridor

65.10km 1.shahdara-barwala(22) 2.vishwa vidhyalya- central secretariat(11) 3.Barakhamba road- Dwarka(22.8) 4.Barakhamba road- indraprastha(2.8) 5.Extension to dwarka subcity(6.5)

Phase 2
53.02km 1.vishwa vidhyalaya- Jahangirpuri(6.36) 2.Central secretariat-Qutab minar(10.87) 3.Shahdara-dilshad garden(3.09) 4.Indraprastha-new ashok nagar(8.07) 5.Yamuna Bank- Anand vihar ISBT(6.16) 6.Kirti nagar-mundka(18.47) 8026crores(2004prices)

Investment 6406crores(2004 prices) Phase 3 Distance corridor

62.2 km 1.Rangpuri to Shahabad Mohammadpur 2.Barwala to Bawana 3.Jahangirpuri to Okhla Industrial Area Phase I 4.Shahbad Mohammadpur to Najafgarh

Phase 4
1.Jahangirpuri to Sagarpur West 2. Narela to Najafgarh 3. Andheria Mod to Gurgaon

ABSTRACT
The Delhi Metro project gave Delhi a world-class mass rapid transit system. More importantly, it stood out from most other public sector projects in India in that it was completed on schedule and within the budgeted cost.

The case describes the organization and planning of the project and highlights the steps taken by the DMRC to ensure the successful completion of the project. It also explains how the DMRC managed the various stakeholders like the central and state governments, the contractors, and the citizens of Delhi, to ensure that the project was implemented smoothly. The case ends with a brief discussion on the future plans of the DMRC.

ISSUES
 Understand the preliminary activities to be taken up before a large infrastructure project can be started  Appreciate the significance of the role of a project manager in project execution  Understand the importance of the right work culture in successful project management  Recognize the importance of managing the various stakeholders in a project  Appreciate the difficulties involved in the execution of large infrastructure projects in developing countries, and how these can be overcome

KEY WORDS
Delhi Metro, Construction of Delhi Metro, Project management of Delhi Metro, DMRC, Sreedharan Delhi Metro, Project planning, Stakeholder management, Project implementation, Project evaluation

KEY QUOTES
Everyone who has traveled by the Delhi Metro wants one in his or her city. Today, there is a national resurgence in public interest in urban public transport." - Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, in 2006. "The successful implementation of the Delhi Metro project would not have been possible without timely availability of funds and the necessary political support. An equally important role has been played by the DMRC's corporate culture, which emphasizes that targets are most sacrosanct and our dignity is in performing our duty well." - E. Sreedharan, Managing Director, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., in 2005

INTRODUCTION
With a 6.5 km section of Line 3 becoming operational in April 2006, Phase I of the Delhi Metro project was nearing completion. Of the total length of 65.16 km of the first phase, 62 km had been completed and opened for service. This phase was set to cost Rs. 98 billion. As of early 2006, around 450,000 passengers were traveling by the Delhi Metro every day.

The Delhi Metro was meant to solve Delhi's traffic problems, which had become almost unmanageable. The first steps to build a metro system in the city were taken in the early 1990s. In 1995, the Government of India (GoI) and the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) formed the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd (DMRC) under the Companies Act to construct the Delhi Metro. Conceived as a social sector project, a significant portion of the project cost was funded through a soft loan provided by the Japanese government through Japan Bank International Corporation (JBIC). The rest was contributed by GoI and GNCTD through equity.

E. Sreedharan (Sreedharan) was appointed managing director (MD) of the DMRC and project manager for Phase I of the project in November 1997. Work on Line 1 of Phase I started in October 1998. DMRC formed consortiums to advise it on the project and to provide it with the latest technology. It also saw to it that the foreign companies worked with the Indian companies to ensure that the latter assimilated their expertise and technological know-how.

The DMRC faced any number of technical and systemic challenges during the construction of the metro However, thanks to thorough planning, an effective project design, and a 'we-mean business' culture, it was able to overcome all these hurdles. The organizational culture was based on punctuality, honesty, and a strict adherence to deadlines. The DMRC successfully managed the various stakeholders in the project like the general public, government bodies, etc., and also ensured that the project was environmentally safe.

With Phase I of the Delhi Metro project nearing completion, the GoI decided to extend the metro network and work on Phase II of the Delhi Metro project was set to commence in September 2006. In the process of implementing the project, the DMRC had gained a lot of technological expertise, which would be used by other cities in India and abroad to build metro systems similar to the Delhi Metro.

BACKGROUND NOTE
Metro systems were generally considered as a transport option when the population of a city crossed the 1 million mark. Delhi crossed that milestone as early as in the 1940s.

The 1950s saw a doubling of the city's population; with that, the vehicular traffic also soared. By the early 1990s, Delhi had more registered vehicles than Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai put together.

It had become one of the most polluted cities in the world, with automobiles contributing to more than two thirds of the total atmospheric pollution. There was an urgent need felt at this point to improve both the quality and availability of mass transport services in Delhi.

The first ever traffic study of Delhi (titled the 'Origin Destination Survey of Traffic of Greater Delhi') was carried out by the Central Road Research Institute (CRRI) in 1957. As many as 35 more studies on Delhi's transport problems were conducted subsequently by various entities Almost all these studies recommended the Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) as a means to solve Delhi's traffic problems.

In 1989, the GNCTD, with support from the GoI, commissioned a feasibility study for developing an MRTS for Delhi. The study was undertaken by Rail India Technical & Economic Services Ltd. (RITES) and completed in 1991.

DELHI METRO PROJECT In order to implement the Delhi Metro project, the GoI and the GNCTD set up a 50:50 joint venture company called the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC). The company was incorporated under the Companies Act in May 1995. The DMRC was to complete Phase I of the project within 10 years, i.e., by the end of 2005.

FUNDING OF THE PROJECT

Globally, most urban MRTS projects were financially unviable because the fares could not be fixed solely on a commercial basis. If the fares were fixed too high, the passenger numbers would remain low, thereby defeating the very purpose of setting up the system. Therefore, the concerned governments generally bore the capital costs of an MRTS system. In the case of the Delhi Metro project too, the GoI and the GNCTD bore the capital costs. The total cost of the first phase of the project was initially estimated at Rs. 60 billion, at April 1996 prices. Later in 2002,

with the cost of the project rising by approximately 10% per year, the estimate was revised to Rs. 89.27 billion...

THE PROJECT TEAM

With the funding for the project being finalized, the next step was to constitute a project team. Sreedharan was appointed as project manager and managing director of the DMRC in November 1997. A technocrat, he had had a long stint in the Indian Railways (IR) and had retired in 1990. During his service with IR, he had earned a reputation for completing major projects on time and within the budget.

PLANNING THE PROJECT

In India, major infrastructure projects are often stalled because of a lack of funds, political interference, lack of professionalism and accountability, property disputes, corruption, etc. Therefore, even before the commencement of the project, the DMRC attempted to put in place effective systems to ensure the smooth progress of the project.

Funding was not an issue in the case of the Delhi Metro project because it was settled even before the project commenced. In order to steer clear of political interference, the DMRC sought autonomy on all major matters and the GoI promised to give it this autonomy. "Financial powers were vested in the managing director. Also, the managing director was the last authority on tenders," said Anuj Dayal (Dayal), chief public relations officer, DMRC.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Construction work on the project commenced on October 1, 1998. The entire project was divided into three lines. Further, these lines were divided into

Line 1 (Shahdara to Rithala)

The work on Phase I commenced with the Shahdara-Tis Hazari section of Line 1, covering a distance of about eight kilometers. The work involved utility diversions, barricading, and actual civil construction. A major part of this section was on elevated tracks. All tracks in the elevated corridor were laid on concrete (ballastless). The tracks were supported on single piers...

MANAGING THE STAKE HOLDER IN THE PROJECT

Effective project management involved not only completing the project on schedule and within the budget, but also managing the project's stakeholders. The stakeholders included the governments, the contractors, the funding agencies, and the general public. Despite assurances that the DMRC would enjoy autonomy, it faced political pressure not only in its recruitment processes, promotions, and contract awarding but also in land acquisition.

PROJECT EVALUATION
The successful completion of the project effectively silenced the critics who had been skeptical about the ability of an Indian public sector organization to complete any project, let alone one as complex and costly as the Delhi Metro, on time and within the budget...

THE TECHNICAL AND HUMAN FAILURES

The causes of the failure are mainly two,  Material deficiencies  Design deficiencies

Material deficiencies:
The concrete was well compacted. There were no visual evidences of voids or irregularities, and the reinforcement spacing and lapping was generally in accordance with the design drawings. However based on the tests carried out on the coarse taken from the pier and cantilever, it was found that the concrete fails to meet the strength criterion by a wide margin. They have also advised that the cement content is only marginally lower but meets the requirements, and therefore, the cement and cement quality does not explain the lower strength of concrete. The reinforce steel is of required quality. The only conclusion that the committee has arrived at is the lack of curing might be the reason for the low strength.

Design deficiencies:
The cantilever design has not adequately taken care of various forces and hence there is deficiencies in provision of steel at critical points and the reinforcing detailing also suffer from major deficiencies.

FAILURE ANALYSIS

Possible reasons of the failure are listed below. A. Observation 1 The pier cap of affected pier (P-67) has sheared from the connection point of the pier and pier cap. It is a cantilever pier cap.

It was informed by the contractor and DMRC representatives that the support system for viaduct was initially designed as portal pier till the casting of the pier was over. The shop owners put up resistance against casting of the other leg of the portal and it was subsequently decided by DMRC that this would be changed to a cantilever pier, similar to P-68 which is still standing at site.

B. Observation 2

It was noticed that the prop support of the cantilever has failed from its connection to the pier.

C. Observation 3 The top reinforcement of the cantilever beam does not have any development length into pier concrete. As learned from the sources, the top reinforcement of the cantilever beam had an L bend of 500 mm only.

There is very nominal (or no trace) of shear reinforcement at the juncture.

D. Observation 4

The launching girder has fallen below with the failure of pier cap. Also, the span between P67 and P-68 has fallen inclined, supported by the ground at one end and pier cap (P-68) on the other.

Analysis
i. The pier (P-67) was initially designed as a leg of a portal frame and subsequently changed to support cantilever pier cap. ii. The same method was followed for P-68 and P-66. iii. The alignment of track here is in curvature and gradually leaves the median of the road to align on one side of the road. iv. The longitudinal reinforcement of the pier was protruding by around 1500 mm beyond top of pier. v. The top reinforcement of pier cap was 36 mm in diameter and had a development length of 500 mm. only as an L from the top. There was insufficient bond length for the structure to behave like a cantilever beam. vi. During launching operation of the launching girder itself, this pier cap developed crack and work was stopped for couple of months. During this period, the cantilever pier cap was grouted in crack areas and further strengthened by introducing prop or jacketing as shown in observation.1. vii. However, the behavior of the structure changed due to introduction of this jacket and the cantilever pier cap remained no more cantilever.

viii. The segments of superstructure for the span between P-66 and P-67 was erected and launched and the prop beam / jacketing could sustain the load to that extend. ix. During the launching of superstructure segments between P-67 and P-68, only 6 segments could be lifted and the whole system collapsed when seventh segment was hooked for lifting. x. The sequence of failure is as follows: a. The support of the prop / jacket got sheared from its connection due to inadequate section / welding. b. The cantilever pier cap which was behaving as a simply supported beam due to introduction of prop / jacket started behaving like a cantilever beam suddenly after failure of the prop which it cannot sustain ( It was inadequately designed). So, the so called cantilever pier cap collapsed. c. The launching girder / span between P-67 & P-66 / the temporarily erected segments between P-67 and P-68, all got collapsed in one go.

CONCLUSION
It is concluded that the failure of pier cap occurred due to inadequate prop / jacket. This was coupled with failure of cantilever pier cap due to inadequate development length of top reinforcement of the cantilever pier cap. For major constructions the following measures are to be taken, 1. Structural designs should be proof checked by experienced structural engineer. 2. Once failure observed, structure should be as far as practicable abandoned and new structure should be built up 3. More emphasis should be given on detailing of reinforcement to cater for connections and behavior of the structural components. 4. Any make-shift arrangement to save a failed structure should be avoided. 5. Reinforcement detailing in corbels, deep beams, cantilever structures should be checked as per the provisions of more than one type of Standards (both IS & BS should be followed).

OUTLOOK
The Delhi Metro was expected to play a major role in relieving the transport problems faced by the city's residents. Moreover, with the GoI planning extensions to the Metro, it appeared that the benefits of an efficient transport system would be enjoyed by people living in a wider geographical area than originally planned. The GoI and the GNTCD had prepared a comprehensive plan to extend the Delhi Metro to 244 km by 2021 in three subsequent phases