Cinanum Tempus PDF

"Cinnanum Tempus": A Reassessment of the "Dominatio Cinnae"
Author(s): Christoph Meinhard Bulst

Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte , Jul., 1964, Bd. 13, H. 3 (Jul., 1964),
pp. 307-337
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4434843
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"CINNANUM TEMPUS":
a reassessment of the "Dominatio Cinnae"
This article is part of a thesis entitled "Roman Politics during the Social
and Civil War", in which an attempt is made to come to a better under-
standing of the troubled period of Roman history between the legislation of
Drusus and the final victory of Sulla. The section "Finance and Economics"
thus covers the earlier period, for Cinna's policy is not to be understood without
it. The thesis was submitted in Trinity Term I96I and was awarded a B. Litt.
Oxon.
Thanks are due to all those who kindly helped with this posthumous publi-
cation, especially to Prof. Dr. W. Schmitthenner and Frl. Dr. U. Weidemann.
SUSAN BULST
The Consulate of Cinna
Cinna's first action, apparently even before Sulla had left Rome, was to
persuade one of the new tribunes to launch a prosecution against him." One can
only guess the nature of the charge, but there were a number of points on which
Sulla was open to attack. So he left Rome, joined his army in Capua and pro-
ceeded to the war with Mithridates. Presumably then the prosecution was
dropped. More serious matters were to be dealt with in Rome. Once Sulla was
in the East fighting for the republic, Cinna may have found it difficult to in-
criminate him. His absence was all Cinna could hope to achieve,2 for Sulla's
recent actions had just proved that one could not depose him while he was in
command of an army and even those who objected to Sulla could not be keen
to provoke a second march on Rome. Cinna could however presume that the
field was clear for his own action, and he was very nearly right.3
1 Cic. Brutus 179; Plut. Sulla 10, 4. 2 Cass.Dio fr. 102, I.

3 A monograph has been devoted to Cinna already by H. Bennett, Cinna and His Times,
Menasha/Wis. I923, but despite convincing results in detail his more general conclusions
do not seem to be consistent with the facts and he seems to misunderstand both Cinna's
position in Rome and his importance in Roman politics, cf.: p. 62 "Thus perished in the
fourth year of his despotism the first tyrant of Rome since the expulsion of the Talquins,
the forerunner of the army-made emperors"; p. 63 "Though it cannot have been a long
premeditated plan, autocracy was undoubtedly Cinna's ultimate aim"; p. 68 "Cinna made
himself master of Rome . . . simply to gratify a personal ambition for power"; p. 69 "The
chief point of his significance lies in his plan of cloaking absolute power behind the forms
of constitutional government".
200

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308 CHRISTOPH MEINHARD BULST (t)
The oath which Sulla had compelled Cinna to swear made it sufficiently
clear that he would be unable to achieve anything in Sulla's presence.4 The
intention of the oath is comparable to that on the acta Caesaris. The main
difference from that of Saturninus is that force was probably not applied
openly. It demonstrates the fears and suspicions that Sulla had about Cinna.
But the question remains: what did Sulla anticipate or rather what were
Cinna's plans? Something must have been known in Rome about them, since
to a great extent he owed his election to his proposed position in Roman politics.
Later, when Cinna is expelled from Rome, he can make the Italians5 believe
that this has happened to him for their sake and the Italians whose credulity
had been misused before are not likely to have been deceived. In 85/4 Cinna
appeals again successfully for their help, arguing that it is for their sake that
he must now defend himself against Sulla. The firm opposition of the opti-
mates suggests that he had not many powerful supporters in the senate at this
time. The objections which provoked Sulla's comment on Cinna's election, that
he was glad to see the people use the freedom which he had provided, came also
from the nobility.6 This again would be very odd unless some of Cinna's plans
were known and feared. (He was a nobilis too and there was no other reason
to bar him from the consulate.)
Two traditions exist about Cinna's first step. According to one he set out
to restore Marius and the other exiles and because of that was banished him-
self.7 The other, though not unanimously given by our sources, seems preferable.
From Appian8 one must accept that there was a connection between Cinna and
o. T&v qpuy0ocav 96LXo0 and that they probably encouraged him to take up
the plans of Marius (as it is said!), to distribute the new citizens into all the
tribes. The same people, friends and relations of the exiles would besides be
eager to find somebody who would bring about the return of the exiles, once
Sulla had refused to grant this. Once Cinna had decided to disregard Sulla with
respect to the franchise there was no need to postpone the restitution of the
exiles, if it would be otherwise advantageous to him. But not only the small
4 Plut. Sulla IO, 3: euVOwaeLv tolg IauToU 7tp&y.lxaLv. Cass.Dio fr. 102, 2: xOc otUg&V 6 TL
o C' xaoC yvLwJV OvUTOU 7rp&ctV U)7tkaX7ro. Schol. Gron. in Cic. or. in Cat. III 24.
6 App. bellum civ. I (66) 302; (76) 347. 6 Plut. Sulla 10, 3.
7 (Aur. Victor) de vir. ill. 69, i; Flor. II 9, 9s.: "Cornelio Cinna Cn. Octavio consulibus
male obrutum resurrexit incendium, et quidem ab ipsorum discordia, cum de revocandis
quos senatus hostes iudicaverat ad populum referretur; cincta quidem gladiis contione sed
vincentibus quibus pax et quies potior profugus patria sua Cinna confugit ad partes. This
looks very much a conclusion from subsequent events; it also helps to discredit Cinna.
8 Schol. Gron. in Cic. or. in Cat. III 24: iure iurando astrinxit eos, ut nullus contra acta
Sullana faceret; discessit. Coepit Cinna de libertinorum suffragiis agere, Octavium cum
senatu contra se habuit. Ortum est bellum civile. App. I (64) 287 and E. Gabba, Appiani
bellorum civilium lb. i. Introduzione, testo critico e commento con traduzione e indici,
Firenze I958, ad l.c. "6 pregiudiziale per ottenere il ritorno di Mario." Cic. Phil. VIII 7:
.. . Cinna cum Octavio de novorum civium suffragiis ...

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"Cinnanum Tempus" 309
number of men closely connected with Sulpicius and Marius can have backed
the candidate Cinna in the senate; with their support he would not have
reached the consulate, not having Sulla's favour.
Appian should refer to the victims of the quaestio Variana as well as to the
men banished by Sulla. But it is quite likely that Cinna included the former
without much hope for their return. They had not been convicted because of
their intercession for the rights of the Italians, but as optimates for having
attempted to overthrow the equestrian repetundae-court. That Sulla had refused
to rescind his own law is easy to understand, not so his refusal to call back the
victims of the lex Varia. He may not have wished to appear as fulfilling the
programme of Sulpicius. Besides, fresh disturbances could arise and further-
more these senators might be more useful to him in Asia while they were still
in exile eager to oblige him.
All this however does not make the recall of the exiles a primary aim of
Cinna. Rather he was brought into close contact with these circles - in so far
as the connection did not already exist - in consequence of his decision to make
the full franchise for the Italians his platform. He had little to gain by supporting
the exiles' cause except the good will of their friends. But they might hesitate
to aggravate the situation by the use of unconstitutional methods for their
purposes. The return of Marius might be a popular cause, but objection and
disapproval might be equally strong. The surprise of Sertorius,9 when he hears
from Cinna that he has summoned Marius, shows that the connection between
the two was only recent. The later destruction of Marius' Bardyaei by Cinna
and Sertorius suggests also that the alliance was not very intimate.10 But in
Italy the presence of Marius would be of great use; the invidia he brought upon
his enemies would be as important as his military experience." Plutarch'2
assumes that Marius came on his own account - Cinna's message probably
reached him only at a later stage - and it can at least be said that he would
have come even if not called for, once he heard that Cinna was openly at war
with his colleague on behalf of the Italians. Thus it cannot be decided whether
Cinna left the problem of the exiles for the moment untouched and only called
them when he was already banished from Rome himself."3
According to Appian, who states that Cinna was bribed to take up the cause
of the allies, he met with the resistance of o? cpyX-oto i.e. the old citizens,'4
9 Plut. Sert. 5, I-3; Bennett p. 12. 10 Bennett p. 30.
U Vell. II 20, 5. 12 Plut. Mar. 4I, 2-4.
13 Cass.Dio fr. 102, 8: 76v v60ov r6v 7Epl 7rq xc868ou -rWV Puyc8
no conclusion, because it may refer to Sulpicius' law rather than to a previous proposal of
Cinna. Sulla was asked to recall Marius (Plut. Sulla 6, 12; App. I (63) 282); perhaps not
only by his friends but also by people who foresaw that Marius would not acquiesce in
exile and wanted to prevent his use of force.
14 App. 1 (64) 287-90; cf. Flor. 11 9, 9/I0; Bennett p. 6 thinks that Cinna cannot have
been elected as sympathizer of the Italian and was only later urged by them into action.

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3IO CHRISTOPH MEINHARD BULST (t)
in doing so, whom Appian proceeds to describe as ro' xa6mp"repoV WXAog.

Yet one hesitates to trust Appian. By whom was Cinna elected - against the
objections of Sulla - if he meets at once with the firm resistance of the old
citizens? From Appian it becomes quite clear that the opposition against Cinna
was much more organized than that against Sulpicius.'6 Even that had died
down once the consuls were no longer behind it. Cinna from the beginning
would have the additional support of those that were indignant about Sulla.
Consequently there was not as much eagerness in Rome to fight Cinna later,
as there had been to fight Sulla.'8 And the officers and other senators with the
army at Nola are not said to have left him as they left Sulla.'7
At first Cinna like Sulpicius seems to have attempted legal action in and
with the senate. Sulla's march on Rome had certainly not improved his po-
sition there and thus gave Cinna a chance to dissociate the senate from him,
which for Cinna was the only way to reach a peaceful lasting achievement.
This for a time looked practicable. Cinna could argue that by the oath the
libertas populi Romani could not possibly be so infringed as to prevent all
legislation. Res publica is suitably brought into play.'8 Octavius however re-
fused any change of the status quo, which perhaps was to be expected, and the
majority of the senate remained inactive or even sided with Octavius. But
Cinna like Sulpicius did not acquiesce. For the senate the situation was more
difficult to handle than ever before, because it was one of the highest magis-
trates who chose to disregard the constitution (i.e. the veto of his colleague) and
pursue his own policy; he could ultimately command larger forces than a
tribune. Besides the senate had lost some authority by submitting to Sulla and
acquiescing in the banishment of Marius. One can be certain that Cinna once
the fighting had begun knew how to exploit this.
There are hints in Appian's account of the attempted legislation, in spite of
what he says to the contrary, that Cinna had considerable support from the old
citizens. Cinna's supporters, according to Appian, the new citizens, gather
armed with daggers on the forum and clamour for distribution into all the old
tribus, while the opponents likewise armed gather round Octavius. Cinna,
apparently, as was his right, proposes his law, but is vetoed by the tribunes,
as Appian wrongly states the majority of them.'9 (From the fact that Cinna
This is what Appian comes down to. But then the Italian question would only be a means
for Cinna's ambition; this was very good propaganda against Cinna, but need not be true.
Without this strong political motive his election seems hardly explainable.
15 App. I (55/6) 243-7. 16 App. I (65) 298. 17 App. I (57) 253-
18 Sall. hist. fr. I 26 (Maur.): nihil esse de re publica neque libertate populi Romani
pactum.
19 This sounds very much like a justification of Octavius; legally one veto would have
been quite sufficient. It is in fact wrong - six tribuni plebis left with Cinna. Liv. per. 79;
Gran. Lic. p. IS ed. Flemisch: Constabat notari carmine Cinna sexque tribunis patria pulsis
tranquillum otium et securitatem futuram,

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"Cinnanum Tempus" 3II
the consul himself proposed his laws one can also conclude that he did not rely
only on the lower classes. Had that been the case he could easily have acted
through a tribune.) The masses now threaten the opposing tribunes, but
Octavius intervenes and with a picked force disperses them. Cinna takes to
flight and Octavius' men, without his orders as Appian asserts, fall into the
crowd and a great slaughter ensues. This cannot be argued away; Cicero men-
tions it as the worst example of street-fighting before his own day.20 It looks
as if Cinna was taken off guard. Even Appian admits that Octavius' men
started the fighting. One wonders whether Octavius had already troops at his
disposal. Cinna in any case seems to have reckoned with so much support that
he need not prepare for serious fighting; Octavius on the other hand was
determined to check Cinna. He also expected Cinna to prevail - and had his
men ready. A iustitium would not suffice to avoid a recurrence. Octavius de-
cided to expel Cinna from Rome, a tempting "solution" to which Sulla had
shown the way.
But Octavius in the siege of Rome later did not have much support from
the population. Probably Velleius is not far from right, when he states that
Cinna was driven away collegae optimatumque viribus2l; he cannot but term
the whole procedure iniuria. Cinna's "guilt" may not have been very obvious.
Octavius took succour from the libri fatales, i.e. the Sibylline books,22 where
the banishment of Cinna and the six supporting tribunes was advised.19
It may be pressing the evidence to conclude from Velleius' words ex auc-
toritate senatus that Octavius at first tried to deal with Cinna alone but was
vetoed. Then one could accept Appian: Octavius disposed of some of the six
tribunes only because of their veto to his own proposal to expel Cinna, as they
before had vetoed Cinna's somewhat radical proposal. That a senatus consultum
ultimum was ever passed, as it has been confidently presumed,23 followed by
an abrogatio imperii in the "comitia centuriata" is highly doubtful and almost
contradicted by Cinna's appeal to the troops at Nola.24 Possibly the decree of
banishment was passed only after he had been driven away by force. That the
20 App. I (64) 291-2; but it is confirmed not only by Plut. Sert. 4, 5, but also by Cic.
Sest. 77; Cat. III 24.
21 Vell. II 20, 3; haec iniuria homine quam exemplo dignior fuit; (cf. Vell. II I8, 4;
I9, i for the accuracy of Velleius); App. I (64) 293 supports this; wether Cinna when his
supporters were dead or dispersed called out the slaves is uncertain; it may be only the
obvious diffamation.
22 Liv. V 14, 4; 15, Ix; Suet. Div. Iul. 79, 4. Wether Antonius as augur (Schol. ad
Lucan II 12I ed. Usener) had any share of this, must remain uncertain. Little is known
about the X- or XV-viri "who were in charge of the Sibylline books" (Serv. ad Verg.
Aen. VI 72). Philippus had brought his augurate into play before that (Cic. de legg. II 31).
When Marius marched on Rome the Sibylline books were used again (Plut. Mar. 42, 4).
Octavius' superstition (Val. Max. I 6, io; Plut. Mar. 42, 5; App. I (7I) 326) cannot have
been the sole reason.
23 Gabba ad App. I (65) 296. 298-99; Liv. per. 79. 24 App. I (65) 298/99 cf. 296.

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3I2 CHRISTOPH MEINHARD BULST (t)
majority of the tribunes sided with Cinna is still no proof that his cause was
legally right. But it is noteworthy to find P. Magius on his side. His father
Minatus (sic) Magius25 from Aeclanum in Campania had raised a legion from
the Hirpini in the social war and fought under Sulla,28 although his own home
town and the whole tribe were not on the side of the Romans. This had earned
him the civitas Romana and his sons the cursus honorum. It has rightly been
assumed that Sulla supported these candidates, but the conclusion "Silla non
pote prevedere che, divenuti cittadini, sarebbero stati democratici"27 goes too
far. That they would still support the attempt to give the full franchise to the
Italians Sulla could know, that they wanted more cannot be proved. This case
is a good example, if one is needed, to show how Sulla lost sympathy in Italy
by driving Marius out of Rome.
It is not possible to estimate the arguments which led the senate - the
sources do not mention the election and Plutarch even assumes appointment
by the consul Octavius - to choose L. Cornelius Merula, the flamen Dialis, as
consul suflectus. Merula himself assumed this office much against his own will.28
Octavius certainly wanted unchallenged supreme command for himself,29 which
proved to be not altogether successful. Perhaps his own superstitions help to
explain his choice. That a suffect consul was appointed at all demonstrates the
endeavour of Octavius not to appear as the beneficiary of Cinna's exile. It
would then be easy to declare Cinna as the innocent victim of his ambition.
Perhaps the senate was not so keen either to leave the supreme power to
Octavius alone.
As the list of Marius' victims shows, there were some other men available
besides Merula, last not least Cn. Pompeius Strabo. He was swept into the
centre of interest by these events and for a few months held the key position
in Roman politics. But for his premature death he would have been more than
the father of Pompey the Great. The dominatio Cinnae might well have been
a dominatio Strabonis instead. He was an ambitious man; the only question is
how far he would go to satisfy his aspirations.
When the senate called for him, Strabo came to Rome with his army; but
he did not strike immediately at Cinna and Marius who lay in siege of Rome.
Their forces grew daily and thus he indirectly helped them or is at least accused
of this.30 In fact even after the arrival of Metellus in Rome the commanders
hesitated to risk all their forces in one engagement with Cinna, which may be
25 RE s.v. Magius no 8; IO; 6 the other son under Fimbria in Asia joins Mithridates;
after Sertorius' defeat he tries to return to Rome.
26 Vell. II i6, 2; App. I (39) 175; (5I) 222. 27 Gabba, Athen. 32, 1954, p. ioi n. 2.
28 Diod. fr. 38/9, 3; Plut. Mar. 41, I; App. I (65) 296.
29 This is borne out by Cic. har. resp. (25) 54: cum Octavio conlega Cinna dissedit;
utrique horum secunda fortuna regnum est largita, adversa mortem.
30 Liv. per. 79; Gran. Lic. p. i8/ig Fl. (because he waits for Metellus).

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"Cinnanum Tempus" 3I3
due to some hope of reconciliation.31 Oro

say that Strabo joined the government only when Marius and Cinna had
turned down his offer32 to cooperate with them. Velleius33 however knows no-
thing about this and finds it difficult to reconcile his waiting with the fact that
he later on strikes. For Strabo undeniably fought two great battles against
Cinna. The only charge made against him, that he did not allow Crassus to
follow up his victory because he wanted to secure a consulate for himself first,34
does not deserve as much credit as is usually accorded to it. Subsequent events
are not sufficient to confirm a saga, which some people were quick to spread,
that only the guile of Strabo had deprived the senate of a final victory. In
pursuit of the enemy Crassus would only be separated from the city and quickly
outnumbered and overpowered and thus would eventually in spite of initial
gains weaken the already inadequate defence of Rome. Even Metellus was
accused of treachery, when he advised negotiations with Cinna35 (Cinna had
served under Pompeius Strabo before, perhaps together with Metellus). It can-
not be coincidence that both generals advised that peace should be made before
unconditional surrender became necessary, whereas Octavius, all but consul
sine collega, remained firm. The strength of Cinna's position in this siege of
Rome is indicated by the great numbers of slaves who deserted Rome to join
him, when before they had followed neither his nor Marius' summons .36
When Strabo suddenly died during the siege of Rome, it was a useful - and
possibly quite easy - expedient to have the body of the dead general abused by
the populace.37 The blunder of the politician Octavius would not be so glaring.
It is certain that Strabo had hoped to reach another consulate, perhaps as a
price for negotiating the peace. The battle demonstrated to Cinna that it was
not as easy as it had been for Sulla to get into Rome by force. He was prepared
to negotiate. But his ally Marius had his own reasons for objecting to this. The
future consuls would be Strabo and Cinna, or after the death of Strabo, Metellus
in his place.
The victims of Marius and Cinna
The entry of Marius and Cinna into Rome has provoked censure and disgust
both ancient and modernm. Dio39 narrates how the city gates were closed so
that nobody could escape and an indiscriminate massacre followed. This prob-
3' App. I (69) 315. 32 Oros. V I9, Io. 33 Veil. II 21.

34 Gran. Lic. p. i8/i9 Fl.; Bennett p. i8; RE Pompeius 45 col. 2260 (Miltner); Momm
sen (R.G. II p. 313) knew better. 35 Diod. fr. 38/9, 2, 1.
36 App. I (69) 3I6; Marius: App. I (58) 262; Plut. Mar. 35, 5; Plut. Sulla 9, 7; Oros. V
19, 5. Cinna: App. I (65) 293. 296.
37 Plut. Pomp. I, 3 makes Strabo hated only because of his avarice.
38 Diod. fr. 38/9, 4; T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, I, II,
Supp. New York i9602, II p. 46; CAH IX, p. 26I-65.
39 Cass. Dio fr. I02, 8 cf. Bennett p. 24.

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ably derives from Sulla's memoirs. Yet openly no comparison is drawn, because
it would not have come out in favour of Sulla. He was to surpass the events of
87 by far, and Cinna is not accused of the avarice" that stained the victory of
the former. One must besides distinguish between the outrage and cruelties
committed by Marius' Bardyaei - 'a motley gang of freed slaves and des-
peradoes'41 - who may have formed only part of Marius' following (they were
only 4,ooo rather than 8,ooo men strong)42 and the murder of various prominent
men by order of Marius, Cinna and their council. Marius' bands were dreaded
by his own allies even before they arrived in sight and after five days of horror
they were cut down by the order of Cinna and Sertorius. According to Plutarch
the death of Marius made a great difference43 to Rome. As this is not said to
defend Cinna, we have no reason to doubt it. Marius, perhaps justly, was
blamed for taking private revenge under a political pretext." The whole of
Rome had to suffer for the injustice done to Marius by Sulla. But this lasted
only a few days and, since no numbers of victims are given, it cannot have in-
volved very many people.
Recently attention has been paid to the senatorial victims of Cinna and
Marius.45 The conclusion however that most of these men were ex-Marians is
not convincing. As this question is likely to shed some light on the relation
between Marius and Cinna and on the character of the dominatio Cinnae it will
be re-examined here. Fourteen names are known, not many more than Sulla
had banished in 88, and that after armed resistance to Cinna under the authority
of the senate. Since the "cruelty" of Cinna has met with so much interest and
nowhere high figures are mentioned, the number of victims cannot have been
much higher than fourteen.48 The difference between this and 8i is striking47
and should not be overlooked. At least since Saturninus, life could be the price
of political failure; Octavius knew that as well as Cinna and perhaps because
of that refused compromise. But Octavius knew from the beginning that ulti-
mately legality would not be the deciding factor; he had also overstepped his
right in expelling Cinna. He was to pay for his miscalculation. That these men
40 Cic. ad Att. VII 7, 7; Vell. II 22, 5; the citizens did not plunder: Val. Max. IV 3,T4,
thus Appian I (74) 343 may again be exaggerating.
41 E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.) Oxford I958, p. 238 no 4.
42 Plut. Sert. 5, 5: 4000; Plut. Marius 44, 6; App. I (74) 343/44; Cass. Dio fr. 102, II;
Oros. V I9, 24: 8ooo; Schol. Gron. Cic. or. in Cat. III 24. That took place on the 13th or
17th 1. 86 cf. App. I (74) 346. If it is true the alliance must have been indeed a heavy
burden for Cinna. 43 Plut. Marius 45, 5. Flor. II 9, I7.
44 App. I (7I) 330; Bennett p. 30; App. I (73) 339: 7rOXk 8i xxl &XoX jv
p6voq &q &XXkXouq &vneA,uvoq but Appian is biased against Cinna, cf.
(not all the friends of Sulla can have been murdered).
4 Badian, Historia 6, 1957, p. 339 no 177.
46 App. I (7I) 330 ss.; Bennett p. 32 s.: "The list of victims that has come down
is probably far from complete." There may have been some more equites, but even there
Appian's account does not imply a high number. 47 Cic. in Vat. 23.

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were executed and not expelled is amply explained by the political situation.
Expelled they would only strengthen Sulla. Besides, Sulla the year before had
done his best to hunt down Marius and Sulpicius.48 Cinna was in a better
position to reach his aim, holding Rome in siege and possibly standing on better
terms than Sulla with the population.
The order of Appian, who gives the fullest list of the intended victims, will
be followed. (Diodorus asserts that a formal treaty was concluded with the
senate, in spite of which the leading anti-Marian senators were murdered, but
Cinna's vague promise as given by Appian49 sounds more likely.)
Octavius had led the opposition against Cinna and during the war shown
himself in no way prepared for compromise. He was warned not only by his
friends, but even by Cinna who apparently wanted Octavius' personal safety.60
Perhaps Cinna intended to put him on a formal trial to avoid the odium of
murdering his colleague and even seems to have given him some conditional
promise which Octavius rejected. There were things that could be said against
the consul Octavius; for example the violation of the tribunate was a good
pretext even forty years later. Octavius paid no heed. He was determined to
become the martyr of his cause and to put Cinna into the wrong. He gathered
his friends and the remainder of his troops and adorned with fasces et secures he
awaited his enemies somewhere in the laniculum. His murderer, identified by
Miinzer with C. Marcius Censorinus,61 an old enemy of Sulla who possibly had
been exiled by him with Sulpicius, certainly acted on Cinna's orders. It was
most important, as Cinna knew well, to secure the person of the other consul,
especially as he showed no sign of submission, lest he might become a source of
new trouble. To no small extent the alertness and severity of Cinna and his
council are to be explained by their own experiences. They did not want to
run the risk of anybody repeating their own coup d'6tat.
Then Appian enumerates eleven senators sought for and with one exception
found and killed. That they were killed by order is implied by the context46
and in some cases explicitly stated. Some are to us no more than names but
that need not imply anything about their political importance at the time.
The brothers Caesares, C. Strabo and L. Caesar the consul of 90 B.C., are
named first. C. Strabo knew what to expect after his competition with Marius
in the previous year, which has even been seen as violent opposition to Marius.
He took refuge with a client and hospes in Tarquinii,62 who proved ungrateful
48 Cic. Phil. XIV 23: civile bellum Sulla duxit legionibus in urbem adductis, quos
voluit expulit, quos potuit occidit, supplicationis mentio nulla.
49 App.1 (70) 321: U'7rk(rETO 8i XAl Ue, &XXV 068VA Crcpnyi OctLtOq gaeaX1t.
50 App. I (70) 32I; (7I') 326-7; IG XIV I297 1. Io and Gabba ad A. I (70) 321.
51 RE s.v. Marcius 43. His position before these events is unknown, hence it is not safe
to assume a previous banishment, perhaps only on the grounds of his previous rencontre
with Sulla (Plut. Sulla 5, 6).
$2 Cic. de or. III Io; Val. Max. V 3, 3; Badian, Historia 6, 1957, p. 336 no. i55.

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and delivered him to his murderers. His brother seems to have felt safer; per-
haps he had not openly supported the candidature of his brother. It is not
attested that he took part in the defence of Rome but this is likely since he was
an experienced commander. Like all others mentioned by Appian, with the
exception of a certain Cornutus,53 who escapes, he meets his end.
(Sex.) Atilius Serranus," who has been identified with the consul of io6 B.C.,
Caepio's colleague, is but rarely mentioned. He was one of the optimates who
fought against Saturninus. For all we know he was never on friendly relations
with Marius and indeed for the colleague of Caepio the contrary is more likely.
He took action against Cinna - and probably against Sulpicius before him -
just as formerly he had opposed Saturninus. Only for Cinna and Sulpicius we
do not know the names as well as for Satuminus where Cicero provides them.55
P. Cornelius Lentulus56 is mentioned only as the legate of L. Caesar in
90 B.C.; Marius was legate of the other consul! That Lentulus adopted a son
of the "ex-Marian" officer M. Claudius Marcellus does not prove him to be ex-
Marian as well. Marcellus is not mentioned under Cinna's victims; his grandson
started his career under Cinna.57 Whether the family connection was political
or not, perhaps the Lentuli Marcellini owed their protection to Marcellus when
P. Lentulus perished.
The Baebii seem to have been deeply involved in politics at this time. We
find victims of this gens on both sides. A. C. Baebius served under Sex. Caesar
in the social war.1, A. M. Baebius was executed by Cinna59 and another Baebius,
if Florus can be trusted, was murdered by Sulla on his return.60 Yet the daughter
of a Q. Baebius was married to L. Valerius Flaccus the consul of 8661 and a
Baebius of senatorial status appears in 74.62 The relation cannot be ascertained,
but it looks as if we here have a family that tried to make the best out of the
rapid changes of power. Whether they stood in the forefront on either side does
not emerge from this. It may well be that they, less protected than certain
patrician and noble houses, had to pay more heavily for their blunders. The
vicissitudes of this gens demonstrate that neither the rectitude nor even the
advantage of a political decision was obvious at this time.
P. Crassus and his sons are listed by Badian as ex-Marians solely because a
Venuleius, who may have been a relative of Crassus' wife Venuleia was executed
by Sulla.63 Even if the connection were certain, the implication is not justified.
The death of Venuleius in 82 B.C. may well have been prompted by his property
53 App. I (73) 336/37. 54 RE no 64 by Klebs. 55 Cic. pro Rab. perd. 21.

56 RE no 203; Badian, Historia 6, 1957, p. 339; if P. Corn. Lentulus, RE no 202, was
his father, the connection with Marius becomes even less likely.
57 RE no 228. 58 App. I (48) 210.
59 Lucan II iig; Appian I (72) 332; Flor. II 9, 14 s.; Aug. civ. dei III 27.
60 Flor. II 9, 26. 81 RE s.v. Valerius 178. 62 R. Syme, Historia 4, I955, p. 56.
63 Badian, Historia 6, 1957, p. 332; Cic. ad Att, XII 24, 2; Flor. II 9, 26; Oros. V 21,8.

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rather than caused by his political convictions. (We cannot tell what the orator
L. Crassus might have done, had he still been alive).64 This branch of the Crassi
took its stand with the senate against Cinna and led the army against him,
which need not be explained by fears of Marius, which we have no reason to
assume. The fate of the youngest son of P. Crassus, the future IlIvir makes it
quite clear that the death of the other members of the family was not due to
the irrational rage of Marius, but to their own choice and action in this year.65
Because of his youth he had no share in these events and hence was in no im-
mediate danger. He feared however for his life in the future and thus fled to
Spain.66
M. Antonius67 had taken action against Cinna. In vain he tried to escape
the consequences.68 His death has been made into an illustration of Marius'
cruelty. Valerius Maximus makes Marius embrace the murderer sprinkled with
the blood of Antonius. But Appian, who gives the story in some detail, does
not go as far as that and even his account may be exaggerated. It is quite
possible that Marius did rejoice in the death of this man, but then the feelings
of a deeply wounded resentful old man, who may well have seen enemies in all
those who were not exiled with him, allow no conclusion about political develop-
ment during the nineties.
The fate of the expraetor Ancharius69 affords an example of how a story
about the insane cruelty of Marius could be concocted. Appian makes him
deliberately cross Marius' way, when he can suppose him to be in a mild humour,
to sue for pardon, but Marius cannot be moved to cancel the sentence already
passed on him and he is executed on the spot. In the other sources he is cut
down by Marius' bodyguard only because Marius cannot be bothered to return
his greeting; and his bodyguard henceforward execute at once all men whose
greetings are not returned by Marius.
Formally tried were L. Cornelius Merula, presumably because he had
usurped Cinna's consulate, and Q. Lutatius Catulus. His name is not mentioned
in connection with the fighting but he had been sent with his son and Antonius
as envoy to call Metellus for the protection of Rome against Cinna.70 Yet he
hoped for mercy, which shows that he did not regard the rift as complete and
was not conscious of having broken with Marius.71 Again his son does not seem
64 Badian, Historia 6, 1957, p. 329.

65 App. I (69) 315; Gran. Lic. p. 19. 23 Fl. 66 Plut. Crass. 4, 1-2.
67 His former friendship with Marius has been overemphasized. He may have under-
taken the defence of M. Aquilius at Marius' request (Cic. de or. II 194-6) but there is no
reason to presume that Marius was behind Antonius' part in the prosecution of Sex.
Titius (Broughton II p. I. 2 cf. Badian, Historia 6, I957, p. 336).
68 Val. Max. IX 2, 2; App. I (72) 333-5; Bennett p. 26.
69 Plut. Mar. 43, 3; App. 1 (73) 339; Flor. II 9, i6.
70 Diod. fr. 38/9, 4, 2-3; Gran. Lic. p. 20 Fl.; App. I (68) 309. (74) 34I/2; Cass. Dio
fr. I02, 6-7. 71 RE s.v. Q. Lutatius Catulus no 7 col. 2079.

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to have been prosecuted and escapes to Sulla. As Q. Catulus hoped for mercy it
is not likely that his son fled before his death. Afterwards he cannot have left
against Cinna's will, as in the case of the younger Crassus.
Merula, who had resigned the consulate when there was a hope of reconcili-
ation with Cinna, now abdicated his priesthood and committed suicide like
Q. Catulus.72 It has been plausibly suggested that they were singled out for a
formal trial because their guilt was not obvious. Cinna may have insisted on
Merula's death to have his revenge; Marius ever since Vercellae resented the
ungrateful ally of former days. Perhaps Cicero heard Marius on this occasion
dwell on his sufferings and thus justify the executions.73
Others, known and unknown, were left to escape and perhaps only after-
wards exiled. With this limitation it is true to say that no men of importance
made their escape.74 But on the other hand, though we cannot in all cases prove
it, it is true to say that only those who were thought incapable of compromise
had to die, with the possible exception of Merula and Catulus.
Only Catulus (he was put on trial!) seems to have been an ex-Marian in the
sense that he had had the support of Marius previously but had for some while
in no way furthered the interests of Marius. Otherwise the list looks much like
that of IOO B.C.,55 when a tribune had taken recourse to violence and thus in-
curred the massive resistance of the senate. Six of the men are mentioned in
both instances, but Cicero mentions only prominent men, and men only of
pretorian rank in 88 attract no interest in IOO B.C. unless they belong to
patrician and noble families. The situation was very similar. Res publica called
for defence against unlawful attempts to redress grievances real or alleged.
Marius had then sided with the senate when the illegality grew manifest,
perhaps with the hope of thus earning a VIIth consulate. The following ten
years and even the social war did not bring him nearer to his aim. Thus Marius
tried to get in spite of the senate what he could not get from it. When he came
back with Cinna these men stood up for the republic against him and not as
ex-Marians in fear of his revenge. Hence they cannot be added up to a party
of ex-Marians.
The comparatively small number of men involved and for example the
appointment of the aged [P.] Caelius75 to defend Placentia shows that either
from lack of enthusiasm or from careful estimation the defence of res publica
was half-hearted after all.
II
The relations between Rome and Sulla 87-83
The men who had been murdered by Marius and Cinna did not die because
they had been friends or partisans of Sulla, but as opponents of Marius and
Cinna. which is not the same. But Marius was only by a timely death prevented
72 Bennett p. 27. 73 Cic. p. reditum ad Quir. I9. 20. 74 Bennett p. 29. 75 Val. Max. IV 7,5.

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from waging war against Mithridates - and Sulla as well. For Cinna the enmity
with Sulla which before had brought him the support of Marius remained as a
liability. Without the cooperation of Marius it would have taken him longer
to get into Rome, but he would also have been in a far better position to
negotiate with Sulla - and the senate. Appian' states that Sulla was declared
a public enemy by Marius and Cinna; but Plutarch apparently found nothing
about this in the memoirs of his hero and Memnon2 even implies the contrary.
Thus if Marius was in fact able to pass such a decree, it was rescinded after his
death or at least tacitly ignored. Otherwise a reference to it would have to be
expected later on, when the senate passed more than one decree against the
wishes of the consul Carbo. Even the flight of Metella, Sulla's wife, with her
small children cannot be explained by this decree of banishment since she
apparently fled during the year 86 and the decree would have to be expected
for the end of 87.3 It may even have been a friendly gesture of Cinna to allow
her to leave Italy and join her husband. In this way normal relations could be
re-established. It is true that Sulla's property in Rome had been destroyed but
that if it was not the immediate result of the hostilities happened on Marius'
rather than Cinna's orders and would not be a serious obstacle for a recon-
ciliation. It need not surprise us that there are no traces in the sources of these
attempts to come to an agreement. Indeed the contrary is asserted: Metella
bade Sulla come back to Italy and rescue his friends. Thus Cinna is defamed
and a motive given to justify the return of Sulla.
On the other hand Cinna could not reckon with the loyalty of Sulla towards
his government in 86 B.C. after what had happened. He had to be prepared for
the outbreak of an armed conflict. An open attack on Sulla however would
meet with little sympathy in Rome. The senate was neither so intimidated by
Cinna nor so won over to his side that it would support him against Sulla. Thus
a policy of guarded approach is to be expected from Cinna. Sulla likewise4 had
no interest in putting himself into the position of an outlaw by breaking off all
official connections while he had the war with Mithridates still in front of him.
After the death of Marius, L. Valerius Flaccus, member of a noble family
1 App. Mith. 5I. 54. 6o; b. civ. I (73) 340, but he mentions it at a much later date
(I (77) 350/I; (8I) 370), almost implying that it was passed only in 85.
2 Memnon 24, 1/2 Jacoby (F. Gr. Hist., III B, p. 353). The Greek is ambiguous, but
since in the following lines about L. Flaccus is said: xat6p ia o t.oLc T7XeLto, he can-
not have been expected to engage with Sulla first.
3 App. Mith. 5I; b. civ. I (73) 340; (77) 35I. She is present at the siege of Athens, but
Appian dates her flight to 85. It is not certain wether the twin children Faustus and
Fausta were already born, there would be one small son of Sulla in any case (Plut. Sulla
6, 12; I3, I; I4, 6; 22, I; 37, 2). That the daughter Cornelia, widow of the young Pompeius
Rufus with her small son fled as well, as Gabba ad App. p. 200 implies, is nowhere attested.
Be that as it may the flight of Caecilia Metella cannot have taken place against Cinna's will.
4 Badian, Clientelae p. 241 puts this even more strongly.

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and brother of a consularis was appointed consul sugectus.5 He was sent with
two legions to the East. He had probably earned the consulate by the timely
surrender of Ostia to Marius.6 This alone would not be enough to identify him
as a Marian: the superior strength of Marius and Cinna made the choice easy -
and urgent. But his family seems to be on good terms with some new families,
the Perpennae and the Herennii. Both these seem to side with Cinna.7 Thus the
cooperation of the Flacci is not surprising; we shall hear more of them.
L. Flaccus was well qualified to go to Asia it seems, because of his experience
and popularity there from a previous governorship and also because of the
patronage that his family held over Tralles and perhaps other places.8 But
there may have been other expretors suitable to go to Asia. The Caesares had
their connections with Asia, so had the Valerii Messalae.9 It would be most im-
portant to know exactly what he was ordered or expected to achieve.
Plutarch10 makes him set out ostensibly against Mithridates, but in fact against
Sulla. That may well derive from Sulla's memoirs: other authors are less ex-
plicit about this point. Was Flaccus to supersede Sulla or at least win over his
troops or failing in this to attack him ?1" According to Memnon2 he was sent to
cooperate with Sulla 64uoLoc 9povoiWvr T-rj FUYXX?drco against Mithridates and
failing to accomplish that, to fight Mithridates first. The man whose cousin was
to advise a reconciliation in 8512 is likely to have been sent as a suitable me-
diator. That probably was the main reason for entrusting him with this ex-
pedition and not somebody else of equal status and with superior military
qualifications. A man who was conspicuous for his lack of military experience13
and talent would not have been sent to fight Sulla. Besides Flaccus had only
two legions as against Sulla's five,'4 and the loyalty of Sulla's troops for their
general had been tested before. To fight him it would have been necessary to
send a large army, which could have been enrolled as the following events show.
Perhaps the more reliable C. Flavius Fimbria who had committed himself
deeply to Cinna's15 cause was sent with Flaccus to ensure his loyalty towards
the government in Rome. Besides, Fimbria was an able soldier."'
r RE s.v. Valerius 178; App. Mith. 51. 6 Gran. Lic. p. i8 Fl.
7 Diod. fr. 38/9, 14; Vell. II 30, i; Val. Max. VI 2, 8; Plut. Mar. 5, 4.
8 Cic. pro Flacco 52. 55. 59- 9 Dessau ILS 8774. 10 Plut. Sulla 20, I.
11 Bennettp. 45. 12 Liv. per. 83; App. I (77) 353. 13 App. Mith. i. "1 A
15 Gran. Lic. p. 2I Fl.: the winning of the Samnites; Liv. per. 8o: the end of the
Crassi; Flor. II 9, I4: that of the Caesares.
16 It is not absolutely certain which position Fimbria held; Vell. II 24, I: praefectus
equitum. Liv. per. 82 (and from him Oros. VI 2, 9): legatus. App. Mith. 52: &vrtLa'7p&T-)Yq.
Strabo I3, I, 27: TaoA.aq
The mistake in Strabo's text is most easily explained by a confusion with the quaestor
Flaccus, with whom Fimbria has a quarrel, whereas the '&vnatTpa&yoq' of Appian who
gives the affair in most detail, and also the fact that Fimbria was deposed by Flaccus,
suggest that he was in fact legatus pro praetore.
praefectus equitum as Velleius has it, is only once used again by Livy for republican

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"Cinnanum Tempus" 32I
Consequently L. Flaccus did not attack Sulla but marching through Mace-
donia and Thrace crossed over to Asia minor.17 If a reconciliation was attempted
by him at this point it came to nothing. Sulla in spite of his superior strength
did not attack Flaccus either, obviously not because he could not trust his
soldiers that far but out of consideration for his position in Rome. On the other
hand even after the assassination of Flaccus his legate Fimbria refrains from
an attack upon Sulla or a coalition with Mithridates.
Appian and Dio exploit the capture of Ilion, as if Fimbria had sought en-
trance under false pretences and then cruelly punished the allegiance of the
inhabitants to Sulla,'8 but this is the only example they can find for his cruelty -
and enmity towards Sulla. The other sources state that he took Ilion by force. He
could of course not accept a previous submission to Sulla. All other towns would
claim the same to avoid Roman garrisons. Not even the victorious Sulla was
later readily admitted."' To the communities of Asia minor it did not make
much difference which Roman army "liberated" them.
Later on Fimbria expected cooperation from Lucullus, who commanded the
fleet of Sulla and could have blockaded Mithridates from the sea when Fim-
bria's forces lay in siege of Mithridates at Pitane.20 But Lucullus sailed past.
He did not think that it would be in t.he interests of Sulla if Mithridates were
captured by his opponent Fimbria. Thus Mithridates escaped. Probably it was
only Sulla's better conditions which allowed him to prevail over Fimbria in his
dealings with Mithridates. It was the immediate threat from Fimbria rather
than the defeats suffered by his generals in Greece which made Mithridates sue
for peace. Fimbria was not far from accomplishing his mission; after the defeat
of Mithridates he could, if need be, have compelled Sulla to give in. (This
possibility of course made Sulla prepared to come to terms with Mithridates
himself.)
His clementia to the then outmanouvered Fimbria, well attested and de-
scribed in detail,21 was clearly meant to affect public opinion in Rome; Sulla's
own soldiers stood by their own general in any case and those of Fimbria were
already deserting hiim.
Sulla in his memoirs must have preferred to leave hiis temporary recognition
of the dominatio Cinnae unmentioned; Plutarch knows nothing about it but
times and not likely to be meant as terminus technicus (Mommsen, Rom. StR. II p.I77,
no 5; Liv. X 29, 9). Velleius probably is loosely using a term of imperial times. Eventually
Fimbria styles himself imperator (Greenidge and Clay, Sources for Roman H1istory, 21960
p. 286). 17 App. I (75) 346 and Gabba ad l.c.
18 App. Mith. 53; Cass. Dio fr. I04, 7; cf. Broughton II p. 59* 19 App. Mit
20 Plut. Luc. 3, 4/5; Oros. VI 2, IO; Sulla in his memoirs and Appian suppres
The bias of Appian and Plutarch is obvious elsewhere too. From Fimbria's military
and the continued existence of the two Fimbrian legions (Plut. Sulla 23,6; App. M
we can infer that the loss by shipwreck and desertion cannot have been as heavy as A
states (Mith. 5I. 59). 21 Broughton II p. 59.
2I Historia XIII,3

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322 CHRISTOPH MEINIIARD BULST (t)
Livy and Appian mention attempts at reconciliation. After the peace of Dar-
danos and the suicide of Fimbria Sulla took the initiative and reported the
conclusion of the war with Mithridates to the senate. He reminded the senate
of his service to Rome. He promised safety to Italy and guaranteed the citizen-
ship of the new citizens but, complaining about the treatment of his property,
family and friends, he announced vengeance on his enemies in Rome. The
frightened senate desperately tried to prevent Cinna from further provocation
and attempted: auvcXXMe&tv oUTrov -roZq eX&poZq regarding itself as arbiter

rather than siding with Cinna. Livy mentions L. Valerius Flaccus,22 the princeps
senatus and cousin of the murdered consul of 86, as the man who per eos qui
concordiae studebant might win a majority in the senate for a peaceful settlement
with Sulla. - This apparently was not against the wishes of Cinna and Carbo
nor did it alienate Valerius Flaccus from them; he is not one of the victims of
Damasipp in 82. -
Sulla clearly hoped to drive a wedge between the two consuls, their followers
and the rest of the senate and Italy. Yet lie seemed to consider a peaceful
solution possible and did not attempt to take Cinna and Carbo by surprise but
delayed his return to Italy for nearly two years. The senate sent ambassadors
to ascertain what guarantees he demanded for hiis safety. These negotiations
should however not be taken as proof for the presence of "a strong Sullan
element" in the senate.23 It was understood that he would disband his army
on his return to Italy. At the same time, in spite of the senate's orders to thle
contrary, Cinna and Carbo were recruiting soldiers, since otherwise they were
completely at Sulla's mercy.24 This of course did not encourage confidence on
Sulla's part. To be independent from the senate Cinna and Carbo had them-
selves re-elected as consuls for 84 and leaving Rome continued their military
preparations.
Some time in 84, when Cinna had already perished in a mutiny of his troops
while trying to cross the Adriatic,25 Sulla's counter embassy arrived in Italy
and brought his demands: restitution of the exiles and full restoration of his
own position. Appian, adding again the threat of revenge to Sulla's enemies,
says that the ambassadors never got to Rome but hearing in Brundisium about
Cinna's death ox 8' r?Uiq &7br Oroi Bpevreacou, KLvvocv Te MEAO,LeVOL trevacv0
xal trv 7ToXLv &Go,xicov elvor, 7rpO, row Xu)XXOv &'psTPov &rpmxro!.
returned at once. According to Livy they reached Rome, but Carbo and his
factio cui bellum videbatur utilius broke off the negotiations. (The epito-
mator of Livy does not mention anything unfavourable about Sulla if he can
avoid it.) Since the senate at this time first attempted the election of a consul
22 Liv. per. 83; App. I (77) 350-2; Mith. 6o; in the Mith., where Appiani is concerned
only with the war, he can afford to give a better picture of Sulla; he is made to report
only the peace with Mlitl. 23 Bennett p. 34, 66.
24 Liv. per 84; App. I (76) 348 s. 25 App. I (78) 355-57.

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suJectus26 and then hindered Carbo in co

Italy, Carbo's fear that he might be sacrificed to obtain peace with Sulla is
understandable. Only too late - then loyally supporting the consuls of 83,
Scipio and Norbanus, - the senate realized that it could not avoid a war with
Sulla.
It is not certain whether at any point Sulla or Cinna sincerely tried to come
to an agreement with each other. Cinna at least did not prevent such attempts
though he did not rely on them. At some point in 84 he decided to fight Sulla
when he realized that the senate might not stand entirely by him. Hence it was
important to commit the senate and his troops to his cause so that there was
no choice left to them whether to fight or not. Carbo however lacked Cinna's
flexibility and thus after Cinna's death valuable time was wasted in an internal
dispute between him and the senate which could have been avoided. Mean-
while Sulla after having waited for more than a year decided some time in 84
to force his way back into Rome. Both sides of course trusted in their own
superior strength. Sulla's decision was probably influenced by the division of
opinion at Rome. Against a united senate and Italy Sulla's chances would not
have been so good and he might not have taken the risk.
That however is not to say that either of them planned this from the be-
ginning. Recent events known to us with more detailed evidence demonstrate
that war is more frequently the result of mutual distruct than of a planned
policy on either side.
The failure of Cinna and his party is to a certain extent due to the obstruc-
tion from the senate. That this was not broken in the same way as by Sulla in
87 and 82/80 B.C. is perhaps the best vindication of the dominatio Cinnae that
can be given.
III
Collapse of Party and System
There is no need to pursue here the details of the final struggle between the
Cinnan government at Rome and Sulla, since the material is easily accessible
thanks to Broughton, Gabba's edition of Appian and the new edition of
Greenidge & Clay. A few facts however deserve notice, since they can throw
some light on the position of the Cinnani at Rome and that of the Italians in
this struggle. Items like the proposed dismissal of all troops by an S.C.,' the
appointment of Verres and presumably his successor M. Pupius Piso as questors
to the consul,2 and the sending of Damasippus against the rebellious Pompey,3
all expressly by order of the senate, attest the normal functioning of res publica.4
26 App. I (78) 358-59.

I Liv. per. 84. 2 Cic. Verr. II I, 34, 37. 3 Diod. 38/9, 9.
' Even the melting down of sacred treasures in the consulate of Marius and Ca
82 was due to S.C. and is not ascribed to the tyranny of the consuls: Val. Max. VI
2I1

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324 CIIRISTOPII MELINHARD BULSr (t)
The activity of the tribunes against Carbo,5 and the opposition against his
attempt to collect hostages from the Italians6 in 84 proves rather the regime's
regard for the constitution than the wearing thin of concordia. Nor was it mere
obstruction on the part of the senate; it was prompted by the same policy
which led to the election of Scipio and Norvanus for the consulate of 83: Carbo
the all too autocratic consul sine collega was called to order and the Italians
suitably impressed with the concern of the senate for Italia7 and the unity of
the ruling class at Rome. This was no pretence either. Sulla's emissaries had the
impression that Rome was not at all well disposed towards him. Appian, after
asserting that cpoL 7rco?)o'C -rv LNpCvZov were with Sulla,8 was of course not
eager to display the fact that there was still a Cinnan senate at Rome and hence
mentions only peremptorily oc 8' ev arsTr. as in great fear of Sulla following
the consuls.9 In fact the attempt of Sulla to split the senate by attacking only
his enemies in his letters had failed.
Only as Sulla's victories in the field proved the incompetence of the Cinnani,
the senators gradually changed sides. Then they had to prove their loyalty. -
Cethegus was one of many. - Verres had prudently left in 84 with the army
chest.'0 His explanation of its disappearance did not find much credit with
Sulla. He was despatched to Beneventum where under good control he could
exert his zeal for res publica and the liberation of Rome. Unless he had made
his reputation by then one would have to draw the conclusion that Sulla was
at this stage rather suspicious about senators joining his troops for no apparent
reason. There may have been not very many.
We have seen that several members of the Roman nobility were closely allied
with Cinna despite all that is later said about his tyranny and against their
implication in it. Nothing is mentioned of a solid opposition against Cinna;
and Cicero has to admit that there was not much of a bodyguard." No con-
spiracies are mentioned against Cinna or Carbo (Plutarch and Valerius Maximus
would not miss such a good exemplum). Cinna fell victim to an absolutely un-
political mutiny, which did not affect the political constellation at Rome in the
least. Nor should that be seen as the revenge of the disappointed Italians.'2
Exuperantius"3 gives a hint of what might be the real reason, the immanis
saevitia of Cinna. There may have been veterans of Marius who had not for-
gotten about the slaughter of the Bardyaei of Marius. Besides, discipline did
not count much with the soldiers during this period. And Cinna while coming
to terms with the senate may easily have lost hold of the masses.
Little is known about Cinna's "policy," not even with certainty when he
fulfilled his promise to the socii and how that was done. It must be maintained
in spite of what Rudolph says that they cannot have lost the local jurisdiction
5 Badian p. 242/3. 6 cf. above p. 322. 7 Liv. per. 84; App. I (79) 362.
8 App. I (8I) 370. 9 App. I (8I) 371. 10 Cic. Verr. II 1, 34-38. 11 Cic. Phil. V 17.
12 Badian p. 242. 13 in Sall. ed. Gerlach, Basiliae I852 p. 177 1. II ss.

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which so far they had held.'4 We know of pre-Sullan IVviri, the existence of
whom proves that the enfranchisement was completed during the Cinnan
period.15 This timetaking process cannot have been begun by the senate in 84
as Livy suggests;1 the comparatively low census number for 86 as given by
Hieronymus'6 if it is correct is due to the fact that this enrolment took time
and besides many Roman citizens were absent in Asia. Moreover many had
perished there and in the social war. Quite possibly the senatus consultum con-
ferring sugragium to the new citizens marks the conclusion of the enfranchise-
ment and is a demonstration to the Italians that the right they had fought for
is now beyond civil strife and not in danger of being cancelled by a reactionary
senate. The announced distribution of the freed men into the 35 tribes indeed
gives it the appearance of an emergency measure.
The senate had granted citizenship to the whole of Italy - with the exception
of Samnium and possibly Etruria and Lucania, to whom Cinna and Marius
promised itl7- only as an emergency measure against the approaching Cinna
at the end of 87.18 This for the present was of no avail. Cinna, while trying to
win the senate, was obviously not in a position to hasten the enfranchisement
since that might eventually prove unprofitable both to the Italians and to his
own position. However he did not have to reckon with widespread disapproval
among the Italians."9 The younger Marius was elected not to appease them but
to rewin sympathy in Rome. Cinna's factio, though popularis, ran the danger
of losing touch with the masses during the inevitable struggle within the nobility.
Neither a Scipio nor a Norbanus could command much popularity, but Marius,
the son of the protagonist of old, would remind the people of the iniuriae that
had been done to the saviour of Rome and this appeal was not in vain.
On the other hand Sulla had from the beginning to make concessions to the
Italians,20 to avoid a guerilla war. He expected stout resistance and even after
he had defeated a consular army he was forced to enter negotiations with
Scipio,21 the proposed result of which looks like a guarantee of the status quo
14 cf. Lex Latina tabulae Bantinae (Bruns7 I909) no 9; Cic. pro Cluentio 125-7;
E. G. Hardy, Some Problems in Roman History, Oxford 1924, p. 260; Strasburger in:
Gnomon I937 p. i8o (about H. Rudolph, Stadt und Staat im romischen Italien, 1935).
15 Cic. pro Clu. 25; the IVvir lege Cornelia = (CIL X, I13-II4) in an inscription of the
Antonine period cannot very well go back to this. The name of the law could in any case
refer to Cornelius Scipio cos. 83 as well (cf. however Gabba ad App. p. 258); cf. L. R. Taylor,
The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic, Rome I960, p. Io6.
16 Hieron. chron. ad 01. I73, 4 not as Gabba ad App. p. I57. 200.
17 Liv. per. 8o; Gran. Lic. p. 2I Fl.
18 Luc.: App. I (53) 231; (68) 309/1I; Etrur.: Exup. p. 179 1. 7 SS.
19 The position of the Latin colony of Placentia (Val. Max. VI 2, I0) which had to be
taken by force by the Cinnani in 87 (Val. Max. IV 7, 5) should not be taken as typical.
20 App. I (79) 364 and for what it is worth Exup. p. I79 1. 29.
21 Cicero (Phil. XII 27) in the situation must stress the difference between flos nobili-
tatis on Sulla's side as against Scipio's socii belli; his optimism may not be very honest,

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providing of course for the claims of Sulla for himself and for his army; and
Cicero in spite of the later proscriptions sees a real possibility in these nego-
tiations.
Appian repeatedly stresses the antagonism of the Italians towards Sulla,22
which is amply borne out by Sulla's punitive measures later.23 Thus the de-
sertion of Scipio's entire army must be due to his irrational and uninspiring
behaviour,24 which in view of his military experiences in Illyricum is puzzling
indeed.25 Apart from that the consular armies were of course seriously handi-
capped by their lack of experience with the result that often a single battle
dissolved a whole army.26
Appian stresses that the desertion in battle was not planned but the result
of fear and confusion. The younger Marius was once left by his troops because
the commissariat had collapsed.27 But the flight of Carbo and the other leaders
was not necessitated by the desertions of the Italians; the ancient authors
stress that it was the result of their own military and political incapacity.28 In
82 Sulla concluded a formal treaty with (some?) Italian tribes.29 This however
does not prove that only the name of Marius was able to "rouse shortlived
enthusiasm," rather that Sulla found such persistent opposition that he saw
no other means to end the war.
Pompey was very careful not to resuscitate the war in Sicily by undue
severity.30 Appian makes the position and fears of the Italians abundantly
clear and Exuperantius3' even relates how deserters fell back on Carbo's army.
This should not be rashly disbelieved. Sulla of course did not wish to be hin-
dered in his own military movement by the untrained masses of the Italians;
he wanted them simply to disband, and they became suspicious, believing the
Cinnan propaganda about him to be true. This goes especially for Samnium,
Lucania and Etruria. Once fighting had begun, these tribes could easily be
persuaded that their citizenship, given as it was by Marius, was null and void
with Sulla.32
We do not have enough evidence to assume that Samnium had in fact so far
enjoyed a state of semi-independence.33 One would then have to ask why Sulla
gave them the citizenship, if in this case there was the possibility of turning
what so far had been a privilege into a disadvantage.
The promotion of ex-Mariani by Sulla shows that originally there had been
but few senators with Sulla; thus even after the proscriptions he had to win
22 App. I (82) 374-5; (86) 388; 393; (88) 406. 23 App. I (96) 445-8.
24 App. I (85) 385-7. 25 Broughton II p. 59 no. 2. 28 App. I (87) 398.
27 Diod. fr. 38/9, I4.
28 Sail. hist. I 38 (Maur.): Carbo turpi formidine Italiam atque exercitum deseruit;
Liv. per. 88; App. I (92) 425.
29 Liv. per. 86, cf. Badian p. 247. 30 Cic. Verr. II 2 II3; Diod. fr. 38/9, 20.
31 Iul. Exuperantius p. 179 1. I5 ss. 32 Iul. Exuperantius p. 179 1. 9 Ss.
33 Badian, Foreign Clientelae p. 240/42.

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adherents among the leading class to safeguard the stability of his arrangements.
We can name the Samnite Statius, 34who was to make a successful career, and
he was not the only one. And where Sulla could or would not relent other
members of the nobility stepped in, C. Carrinas C.f., the son of the Marian
leader who had been executed after the battle at the Colline gate, became heir
in the testament of Q. Metellus Nepos35 in about 54 B.C. Later he had a brilliant
career culminating in a triumph in 28 B.C.36 This testament, strange as Valerius
Maximus finds it, is not at all mysterious seen under a political aspect. In the
constellation of the fifties Etruria might become important and the claims of
the descendants of the proscripts might be taken up again.
On the other hand Oppianicus, who joined Metellus Pius because it was not
safe for him to show his face in his home town Larinum, may well be typical
for Sulla's immediate followers in Italy. His return per illam L. Sullae vim
atqzte victoriam37 could not have taken this form had his position and option
been in any way typical for his home town - the contrary is more likely. The
Granii of Puteoli look more representative of the respectable gentry of Italy,m
and so do the Roscii of Ameria, connected with some noble houses at Rome39
but politically neutral. Their veteres inimicitiae40 were of a private nature: the
nobility and Cicero would have looked for a better test case, had the elder Sex.
Roscius been in any way made suspect by Marian connections.
The victory of Sulla was thus, as far as Italy is concerned, not due to the
desertions of the Italians caused by disapproval of the Cinnani in power at
Rome which made them prefer Sulla. A comparison with the "invasion" of
Caesar is instructive and shows the difference. There was of course a general
weariness, as might be expected from a civilian population especially after the
second war within a decade. This however was not strong enough to effect an
unconditional surrender. Sulla realized that and acted accordingly.
In 82 the situation of the Cinnani at Rome was worse than some months
previously. All negotiations had failed and in battles they had mostly been
defeated. Some senators must have begun to think about joining Sulla. There
was a series of summary executions. Four senators were killed by the pretor
L. Junius Brutus Damasippus4' on a special order of the consul, the younger
Marius, as toU 18[ouq eX4pok. This however happened when the last
struggle had already begun - it is the only outrage of this kind. The vague
34 App. IV 25 and the Lucanian Albinovanus; and Gutta from Campania fighting for
Marius App. I (go) 4i6; Cic. Cluent. 98. I27 perhaps Titus Gutta Cic. ad Quint. fr. III 8, 6.
35 Val. Max. VII 8, 3; Oros. V 2I. Io; RE s.v. Caecilius 96 cOs. 57; RE s.v. Carrinas 2
(Muinzer).
36 Cass. Dio 5I, 2I, 6. 37 Cic. pro Cluentio 25.
38 Cic. Verr. V 154; a P. Granius was prosecuted by Verres under the pretence that he
had been with Sertorius.
39 Cic. pro Rosc. Am. 152. 40 Cic. pro Rosc. Am. I7; cf. Badian p. 247.
41 RE 58; Liv. per. 86; Vell. II 26, 2; Val. Max. IX 2, 3; App. I (88) 403; Oros. V 20,4.

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assertions of the epitomator of Livy omnem quae in urbe erat nobilitatem

trucidavit and other writers should not be taken verbally. None of the more
contemporary authors were able to exploit the event in this way.
Of these four P. Antistius42 may well be typical for the majority of the
senate. No strong political attachment seems to exist. The tribunate in 88 had
brought him some popularity. Thanks to that and the absence of other more
prominent orators he obtained some prominence in the courts and reached the
aedileship. He married his daughter to Pompeius when as judge he had ac-
quitted him on the charge about the booty from Asculum.43 Probably he hoped
to win amicitia and possibly protection from this promising young man. The
connection however proved fatal.44 When Pompeius joined Sulla, Antistius
became suspect. That there was in fact no contact between Antistius and Sulla
is sufficiently proved by Sulla's order to Pompeius to divorce Antistia. Had
her father died for Sulla, this besides being most unreasonable would be bad
policy; in fact it was so that Pompey had to be severed from his past al-
together. Antistius by not committing himself was regarded as untrustworthy
by both sides. His wife was a daughter of the banished Bestia, probably the
consularis; she did not wish to outlive him.45
L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, consul in 94 B.C.,46 was already an older man.
He is not mentioned again in these last ten years of his life. It is not known
whether he had established a connection with his other nephew in Sulla's camp,
the suspicion of which caused his death. Thus only in the cases of C. Papirius
Carbo Arvina47 and Q. Mucius Scaevola is the suggestion that they were in-
volved in a plot to quicken the overthrow of Carbo and Marius probable,48
since they were both too prominent to be killed on suspicion. On the other hand
the brother of Arvina was in Sulla's camp and Appian calls these men the
personal enemies of Marius, who may have taken his revenge while he could -
without special reason.
If one tries to sum up the intentions and effects of the Cinnan period for
Rome - bearing in mind the paucity of our information - a modification of the
traditional opinion seems called for. It may remain a matter of opinion whether
Cinna took up the cause of the socii in the first place to meet his own ends. But
he can claim to have attempted the solution of 87 at his own risk and also to
have carried the reforms in the following years in such a way as to make their
cancellation impossible. (Public opinion in Rome and the senate had accepted
the full franchise so that Sulla could not hope to win any favour by a reactionary
restrictive policy.) Thus both from his constructive plan and from his success
Cinna was far more of a statesman than Sulla. If one regards Cinna as an un-
scrupulous adventurer, the obstinacy and narrowmindedness of the kind of
42 RE i8. 43 Plut. Pomp- 4- 44 Plut. Pomp. 9, 2. 45 Vell. II 26, 3.

40 RE 26. 47 Cic. de or. III io; Brutus 3ii; ad fam. IX 21, 3.
48 Badian, IHistoria 6, 1957, p. 329 no. 98.

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men who died with Octavius are the more deplorable, because they had made
a policy like that of Cinna possible and indeed necessary. One should con-
template what would have become of the remainder of the bellum Italicum
under the regime of men like Octavius. Sulla's brutality against the Samnites -
given that it was necessary - is no argumenit against Cinna either. A period of
four years cannot possibly undo 30 years of senatorial policy which had cul-
minated in the only war whiclh threatened the existence of Rome.
Equally it is a gross misunderstanding of the situation to see in Cinna the
forerunner of "military despotism,"49 or to See his importance for the history of
Rome in his attempt "to cloak absolute power behind the forms of constitu-
tional government." Again a comparison with the position of Caesar after
46 B.C. is sufficient to show the difference. The achievement of Cinna however
can best be seen in contrast with Sulla. Sulla silenced the opposition effectively
enough, but until the time of Caesar the social unrest was due to his arrange-
ments which, as is not often said, stand in glaring contrast witlh his constitution.
The fact that the expropriations were necessary not so much for the settlement
of the veterans but as a bid for the support of the new order elucidates the
situation.
The least that can be said about the financial policy of Cinna's period is that
it did not result in widespread dissatisfaction or rebellion in Italy or in any
province, though the revenue was without Asia certainly reduced. - Sulla's
method there was for the moment efficient but hardly recommendable. -
Cinna's moderate taxation and policy of "good money" meant that he could
not afford a large army or sufficient military preparations.
It must have been difficult to pursue a creditable and coherent policy as
regards Sulla. Even if Cinna wanted war from the beginning he would not have
been strong enough to enforce that in the senate. Likewise the Italians would
not be eager to fight for Cinna against Sulla unless there was good reason for
it, that is unless it could be demonstrated that Sulla was going to fight in any
case and that his victory would mean loss of their rights. But to make this clear
and inspiring before 83 would be very hard. Sulla's first march on Rome was
not directed primarily against the Italians and would not suffice to prove the
case in point.
The true reason for the defeat of Cinna's party - which is not the same as a
defeat of Cinna - and the collapse of the system was not opposition in the senate
and in Italy. Cinna was the victim of a mutiny and only indirectly of Sulla.
After his death there was no leader to match Sulla's ability and ruthlessness,
who could inspire the party and command Italy. Even without his knowledge
of Cinna's role in 87 one can see this clearly from the events of the civil war itself.
The other equally important reason for failure was the lack of a Popularis
doctrina strong and comDreliensive enough to unite Ttalv apainst Sualla The
49 Bennett p. 62. 69.

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traditional battle-cry of the opposition, to defend the Roman people against

avarice and presumption of the senate and the nobility, was singularly ill-
suited for a ruling party. Thus it was more difficult to move Italy to fight
Sulla than for Sulla to extort money from the provinces and bind his army to
himself. Only on the arrival of Sulla in Italy had the Cinnani a compelling
cause but no leader - and that sealed their doom. In consequence, broadly
speaking, the romanisation of Italy was wrought by Sulla's veterans and not
by Cinna's partisans - a gain neither for Rome nor Italy.
Finance and Economics from 9I to 83
Few periods of Roman history have seen so much of what can be summarized
as economic legislation as this decade. Partly this was caused by the financial
losses during the wars. But there seems to be more behind it: the difficulties
started before the social war. The solutions attempted were also new, since it
was probably not possible to re-impose a tax upon free Roman citizens after it
had lapsed for over 70 years. Rome had begun to rely on the provinces and
could no longer draw on the resources of its own citizens; the fabric of the res
publica had begun to crack.
The one law of Drusus which was not rescinded proposed to issue one eighth
of the silver coinage in - presumably - plated copper.' Apparently the state
finances did not balance even then. The figure given by Pliny2 for the treasury
is corrupt and in any case there is little data with which to compare it. Probably
this questionable method, officially adopted previously only in the need of the
Hannibalic war,3 was largely meant to meet the cost of the proposed leges
agrariae et frumentariae.4 That it was kept in spite of their cancellation illus-
trates the gravity of the situation.
We do not know the exact contents of the law; it probably provided tlat
one eighth of the future coinage should consist of plated coins, but it may have
1 Plin. n. h. 33,46. This was no attempt at token-coinage. The plated coins looked like
silver, otherwise the testing could have presented no difficulty (Plin. n. h. 33, I32) and the
percentage would not have mattered much, cf. E. A. Sydenham, The Coinage of the
Roman Republic, London 19522 p. XLIV: The sentence in Pliny is most certainly corrupt
or Pliny had no clear idea of the law himself. "It may refer to the regulation of the pro-
portion of plated denarii issued and permitted by the Roman government." Plated coins
exist in such numbers and perfection that not all of them can be ancient forgeries. On the
other hand we have no trace of alloy-coins, which Pliny seems to suggest. Mattingly
(JRS, 1922, p. 232), who attributes this law to the elder Livius Drusus, deduces from it a
general inclination of the optimates for debasement, whereas equites and democratic party
were concerned with the purity of the coinage. But for official debasement of the coinage
we have only the two instances mentioned above, cf. T. Frank, An Economic Survey of
Ancient Rome, Baltimore 1936 ss. I p. 266.
2 Plin. n. h. 33, 55; T. Frank I p. 228.
3 Zonaras 8, 26, 14 (p. I 4I6 C); cf. Sydenham p. XLII. 4 Liv. per. 71.

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"Cinnanum Tempus" 33I
left open the interpretation that one eighth of the entire currency, which in
any case it would be difficult to estimate, was to be coined in plated coins. That
would imply that the state for some time could issue plated coins at a much
higher rate. The effect of this did not become apparent at once to the general
public, but those who were used to dealing with capital transactions must have
disapproved of it from the beginning. There would be two unpleasant results:
it was easier to forge money once official falsifications were in circulation and
ready money would become scarce as everybody would tend to keep his silver,
not being sure that he would get silver back in return. Thus trade in general
would decline.
For the state as for individuals the social war on top of this meant not only
extra cost but also loss of income from the land that was occupied or devastated
by the rebels. Only the ager Campanus was for most part of the war undisturbed
and so could provide corn for the Roman armies.5 Asia paid her tribute and
even assisted in the social war,6 but from 88 to 82 neither public nor private
income could be derived from this source. During the social war public land
round the Capitoline hill, left to various cults probably to cover the outlay of
their ceremonies, had to be sold and the money for Sulla's army against
Mithridates had to be taken from the temple treasures.7 Besides, there is some
evidence to suggest that the government borrowed some money from private
individuals8 or enforced some kind of tax, which eventually was to be repaid.
But even before Mithridates invaded the province of Asia a considerable
number of people seem not to have had enough money to meet their obligations,
because agriculture and of course trade in the insurgent areas had suffered or
even become impossible. Thus the praetor urbanus of 89, A. Sempronius Asellio,9
pressed by the debtors, consented to revive an old law that forbade the taking
of interest. It apparently had never been repealed, but of course had long be-
come obsolete, being incompatible with any higher form of society. Some
thirty years ago Cato the consul of ii8 had passed a bill in this field. But there
the intention was only to limit this recognized practice, not to abolish it. He
died in the same year. The subsequent conviction of his brother by Gracchani
iudices through the Mamillian commission may well be connected with this.10
This revolutionary step was taken in 89 because riots had apparently already
broken out and there seemed no other way. One wonders who were to be the
iudices to decide about the extent and legality of existing debts, senators or
equites. If they were to be equites the creditors cannot have been representative
of the equestrian order. This however cannot be ascertained.
5 Cic. de leg. agr. II 8o.

6 Memnon 2i, Jacoby (F. Gr. Hist., III B, p. 351).
7 Oros. V I8, 27; App. Mith. 22 (gooo pound gold). 8 Cic. pro Font. i.
8 Liv. per. 74; Val. Max. IX 7, 4; App. I (54) 232-39, cf. Gabba ad l.c.
10 Cic. Brutus 128.

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The proposed procedure at once found determined resistance. A tribune,

L. Cassius (Valerius Maximus supplies the name1") vetoed the proceedings and
as this had no effect led the equestrian creditors against the pretor, who was
murdered even while he was proceeding to sacrifice. According to Appian the
senate offered in vain a reward and even impunity for a denunciation but the
moneylenders hushed up everything. Appian is very certain about placing the
equestrian order and the senate on opposite sides.12 Further it has been as-
sumed13 that the equestrian order had lost so much prestige as a consequence
of this event that it had to submit to the unfavourable lex Valeria of 86. The
interference of the tribune does not however necessarily intimate that the
proposed procedure was directed against the interest of the plebs,14 rather that
the creditors were not confined to the equestrian order. On the other hand had
Sempronius acted in the interest of the senatorial landlord one cannot see why
the senate at a moment when its power was decisively increasing failed to
resume this project in some other form. However, the attempt to prosecute the
murderers does not necessarily indicate any serious general interest to find the
guilty, and indeed none were found. One must conclude that Sempronius'
action was supported only by a small group of men who afterwards had to
abandon their project.15
It seems necessary at this point to investigate and compare the sources of
senatorial and equestrian income. Usually it is assumed that in general the
senate was a landowning aristocracy as opposed to the equestrian order, a class
with largely commercial interests. This however, is an oversimplification. Often
the diversities are stressed and seem corroborated by for example Pliny who
gives publicani as the name of the equestrian order until the time of Cicero.16
Trials like that of P. Rutilius Rufus where the equestrian jury followed no-
thing but the interest of the publicani seem to confirm this. Yet one hesitates
to accept this as typical, since the rare quarrels between taxfarmers and the
provincial government have come unduly into the foreground; of course the
taxfarmers took care to place men likely to defend their interests into the
equestrian panels.
11 This must be implied from the fact that the murderers were concitati by a tribune.
He did not incur prosecution; hence he cannot primarily have encouraged the murder but
rather went too far in trying to stop Asellio, first legally, then by force.
12 Liv. per. 74 for what it is worth is more vague: cum aere alieno oppressa esset
civitas.
13 T. Frank I p. 272. U T. Frank I p. 268.
15 E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae, 1958 p. 227 no 3 sees the lex Plotia as a result of this
outrage, though there is no hint of that in the sources. Furthermore the interpretation
proposed here is supported by the fact that not even a false denunciation could be
achieved. There was not much concern from any quarter about what had happened to
Asellio.
'1 Plin. n. h. 33, 34. This should not be used as straightforward evidence, e.g. Cic.
Verr. III i68 is only a generalisation.

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But it remains to be determined how far this picture is representative of the

normal relations between senators and equites. Collisions of interest were pos-
sible only in the provinces. We find, however, the equites not only as publicani
but also engaged in various forms of trade and commerce :17 in origin they were
the landed gentry of Italy. The legislation of the Gracchi against latifnftdia
would have been of little consequence and would have had even less chance of
popularity and success but on the other hand more support from the equestrian
order as a whole, if it had been directed only against a few senatorial estates.
Had this been the case the equites would not have had much reason to take
sides at all in the struggle between the senate and Tib. Gracchus.18
It is not possible either to establish a clear contrast between equestrian in-
terest and senatorial disinterest in Asia; from a successful war there members
of both orders would derive benefits. But the war against Mithridates was pro-
voked by only a few men in contempt of his strength. The complete failure of
it in the beginning did not add to the popularity of the senate in Italy. Whether
Marius was behind M. Aquillius must be doubted; he would not have risked
defeat in this way. Appian"' stresses besides that both the raid on the territory
of Mithridates and the outbreak of open war were due to the initiative of the
Romans present, not to that of the senate or even a senatus consultum. Largely
due to lack of sources we know little about the financial activities of senators in
Asia. One could mention the manipulations of Aquillius and his consorts wlhiclh
drove Nicomedes into debt and war. The Flacci as patrons of Tralles20 need not
have purely commercial concerns there, but relations like this indicate sena-
torial interest. Less than a generation later, we find Roman senators owning
farms in Sicily, Greece and Asia minor.21
In Cicero's day the lex Claudia and Cincia22 were a dead letter. Cicero did
not need to remind senators of their interest and it was still disreputable to be
involved in business. But senators had commercial interests all the same as
we happen to know in the cases of Pompey, Crassus, Brutus, Caelius and others,
though our knowledge is very scarce.23 That need not surprise us: even Cicero
was perturbed to discover in his governorship that behind comparatively small
men like Scaptius stood in fact a man like Brutus. Behind these publicani and
negotiatores stood senatorial as well as equestrian capital (both from Rome and
Italy).
Thus the financial interest was fairly evenly spread. And main interest of
the equites (like that of the senators) still lay in Italy, otherwise one would
expect a general alignment with Sulla. But though the majority had little
17 Sicily: Cic. Verr. III ii; Asia: App. Mith. 47; Gaul: Cic. ad fam. XIII ii; XIII I4.
18 Vell. II 3, 2. 19 App. Mith. II, I7. 20 Cic. pro Flacco 52. 56. 57.
21 Cic. Verr. III 97; pro Flacco 85. 22 Liv. XXI 63; Broughton I p. 307.
23 Cic. ad Att, VI I, 3; pro Flacco 85/6; J. Hatzfeld, Les Trafiquants Italiens dans
l'Orient Hellnique, Paris I9I9, p. 200/01.

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334 CHRISTOPII MEINHARD BULST (t)
choice but to remain in Italy, a considerable number followed Sulla and must
have profited under his party. Sulla's large confiscations demonstrate their
substantial property, even though they had been without revenue from Asia
for some years and lost some capital there.
Not all the laws however seem to have a real economic impact. That of an-
other tribune of 89, C. Papirius Carbo, reduced the weight of the asses to half
an ounce, which cannot have had much effect upon the difficulties of state and
private finance. For the senatorial mint this of course implied a considerable
reduction in the cost of the production of coins, but the absolute gain cannot
have been high. The reason may have been a temporary scarcity of copper.
Since the copper coins were no more than token coins even before this, it found
no objection and was perhaps even welcomed as making day-to-day trans-
actions less cumbersome.24
That the situation was grave is however confirmed by a law of Sulla, consul
in 88, which granted some relief to debtors, though that seems to have been
very limited. To us its main importance lies in the fact that it shows that no
party policy lay behind these laws but that they were enforced by the situation.
Probably the repeal of the lex Sempronia frumentaria, which can only roughly
be dated between 9i and 8I B.C., was also made necessary by the depleted
treasure.25 One would tend to place it in the pre-Cinnan period, especially as
Cinna is not blamed for it.
During Cinna's consulate the state was in considerable financial difficulty.
No tribute came from Asia and since Cinna had won his way back to Rome
with the help of the Italians, on whom he might have to rely in future against
Sulla, it would not be wise to draw any extra money from the Italian com-
munities, even if that could have been enforced.
Soon after he had entered his second consulate a law was passed not by him,
but by his colleague L. Valerius Flaccus, which ordered the remission of three
quarters of all debts with the condition of course, though that is not stated,
that the rest was to be paid in cash.26 On the common equation Cinna =
equites = money lenders this law is difficult to understand; that Cinna could
carry it against the will of the equites is not likely since, not being able to rely
on the senate, he had to count on their co-operation. Thus the inevitable con-
clusion is that the law was carried with the approval of the equestrian order
at large; a small part of which, the professional moneylenders, would have to
face a loss.
24 Festus ed. Lindsay p. 5i6 s.v. unciaria lex; cf. Frank I p. 269/70.
25 Broughton II p. 47I, cf. G. Niccolini, I fasti dei Tribuni della plebe, Milano I934,
p. 426 s.
26 Cic. pro Font. i s.; Sall. Cat. 33, 2: ac novissume memoria nostra propter magni-
tudinem aeris alieni volentibus omnibus bonis argentum aerc solutum est. In view of
Catilina's plans this approval is quite understandable. Vell. 11 23, 2; the disapproval of
Velleius is not surprising.

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"Cinnanuin Tempus" 335
Whlereas the attempt of Asellio would strike at the root of all business, this
would only mean a momentary loss which inducing people to pay would even-
tually encourage trade. It has been held27 that it meant more loss than gain to
the state; but the very fact that several successive questors paid state debts
according to this law disproves that. The debts the state had incurred in the
social war can hardly have been settled before this time and thus a number of
obligations could now be solved. The law was passed in the comitia centuriata
and not in the tributa which shows that it was based on fairly substantial
support and was not just the product of agitation. Even so the recovery was
slow and this measure did not suffice.
L. Valerius Flaccus' law was only a part of the financial legislation under
Cinna. Closely connected is a pretorial edict drafted by the whole body of
pretors with the support of the tribunician college. It was published in antici-
pation by one of the pretors, M. Marius Gratidianus, who apparently thus
tried to win popularity in order to reach the consulate. It seems he was only
elected to a second pretorship, but in the city of Rome unusual honours were
paid to him.28 He was a Roman knight from Arpinum, related to Cicero and
Catilina, and adopted son or nephew of Marius. In 82 he was most cruelly
murdered by Catilina and the son of Q. Lutatius Catulus on Sulla's orders, not
because of this "democratic" law as one might assume, but as the murderer of
Q. Catulus.29 It is however certain that Sulla was eager to dispose of this
popular man in a dishonouring way, so that he would be remembered as a
criminal rather than as a martyr.
Only one clause, the most important one it seems, is known to us; it pro-
vided for the testing and withdrawal of the debased plated coins.30 To what
extent the state exchanged the "false" coins at their face value is uncertain.
But one must doubt wlhether in view of the above-mentioned difficulties a full
exchange was attempted. The currency must have become very unstable since,
as well as the plated coins of Drusus' law, illegal debasements had come into
circulation. One related instance shows how the remission and payment of debt
and the reinstitution of a true silver coinage were enacted together as was in-
tended.31 Thus one can assume that the measures balanced each other and the
27 Frank I p. 271. 28 Broughton II p. 57; Cic. de off. III 80/i.

29 RE s.v. M. Marius Gratidianus no. 42; Sen. de ira III I8, T; Asc. in or. in toga can-
dida p. 84 ed. Clark; Schol. in Luc. ed. Usener II I.73 p. 62; Sydenham I p. XLIV.
30 It can only be one clause, otherwise it would not have needed the whole college;
I'lin. n. h. 33, 132. Sydenham (Num. Chron. 20, 1940, p. I97 s.) holds that the method
consisted in a sideway incision into the coin. It certainly was not the serration, as Mat-
tingly (JRS 1922, p. 234) suggested.
31 Cic. pro Quinctio 17. Though the passage is much discussed: propter aerariam ra-
tionem non satis erat in tabulis inspexisse (cf. Loeb Edition ad l.c.) makes otherwise no
sense. A debt in kind, not money need not be concerned about aeraria ratio. A contract
between two Romans in foreign currency sounds as unlikely. If aeraria ratio referred only

193.52.141.254 on Fri, 17 Mar 2023 08: Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC
336 CHIRISTOPH MEINIIAID BULST (t)
latter encouraged the cnactment of the former. True silver money that may
have been hoarded so far would come back into circulation. Until then the
payment of larger sums may have presented difficulties as apparently not
everybody was prepared to take the plated coins at full value without tedious
examination. We have no evidence to show that this was to stop an oncoming
rise of prices and perhaps of interest as well. But a trend towards that in the
years preceding can be expected.
Although it might lead to wrong associations to term the economic legis-
lation under Cinna "democratic," it can at least be said that it displays a more
genuine concern for private enterprise and commerce than that of the senate
in general and that of Drusus in particular. Cinna like Caesar must have been
pressed for more radical measures by some of his less reputable followers whose
help he may have accepted while in exile. We do not know how Cinna met
these obligations but lhe does not seem to have resorted to any large scale con-
scriptions and extortions as Sulla did. Moreover, Cinna can no more be accused
of seeking personal gain than Caesar; lhere if ever the negative evidence is con-
clusive. It is the more remarkable and gives credit to the attempt of Cinna and
his associates to rule the state in their way, that he refrained from more drastic
action although he was not handicapped as Caesar was by the anticipating
fears and previous experiences of the Romans. Grand scale conscriptions and
land assignations would have lhad the same effect as they were to have for
Sulla - and Octavian. One could say that ultimately Cinna in this respect was
more successful than Sulla. Cinna's legislation did not create a social upheaval,
though more radical measures might have increased the number of hiis decided
supporters.
Since Cinna at least in the beginning made a bid for the support of all classes
one should not try to find any preferences in tlhese laws. L. Philippus, the consul
of 91 B.C., is termed by Mommsen "entschiedeiner Anhanger der Kapitalisten-
partei."32 If said without undue prejudice this can be accepted as the basis of
co-operation between Philippus, who was by no means the only senator withi
this attitude, Cinna and the equestrian order. Cinna, and that probably won
him hiis support, consented to a laissez-faire-laissez-aller policy in the provinces
and in general in the field of economics, after having taken care that there was
a basis for a normal development. The policy Scaevola lhad adopted in Asia
could only lead to collision with the equestrian order. It is well to remember
that the pliglht of Asia did not result from equestrian taxations so much as
to Valerius' law, the division for a fourth of the originial sum should have presented no
difficulties.
32 Mommsen R.G. II p. 213; H. Hill, The Roman Middle Class, Oxford 1952, p. 135
holds that Philippus was opposed in principle to any concessions to the Middle Class and
makes that the reason for his resistance to Drusus. But "on principle" is a bad argument.
And men with principles rarely survive two proscriptions.

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"Cinnanum l empus" 337
from Sulla's enormous tribute. On the other hand the equestrian order is not
known to have objected to senatorial financial enterprise. This was not as the
courts a bone of contention between the two orders. But the equites wanted the
protection of the government which, as in the case of Narbo, sometimes had to
be forced from the senate.
Sulla's lex Cornelia de falsis is assumed to have terminated the obligation
of the state to withdraw its own false coins. But Paulus only makes it bear on
that, because in his own day most money was plated and had to be accepted
at a prescribed value.33 It lent credit to the imperial lawyers and legislation if
they could father this practice on republican times, but this does not tell us
anything about the original meaning of the law. Sulla largely codified existing
laws34 and the very name of the law suggests that it forbade the circulation of
forgeries.35 Thus the conclusion from it about the fundamental difference in the
management of the coinage by optimates and populares does not find con-
firmation here.
Heidelberg CIIRISTOIPH MEINHARD BULST (t)
33 Paulus, Sententiac (Collectiolibrorum lurisAnteiustiniianill) 5,25, i: lege Cornelia

testamentaria tenentur qui ... quive vultu principum signatam monetam, praeter adul-
terinam, reprobaverit.
34 Cic. Verr. II i, io8.
35 Digesta 48, io, 9.
22 Historia XIII, 3

193.52.141.254 on Fri, 17 Mar 2023 08:32:20 UTC

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"Cinnanum Tempus": A Reassessment of the "Dominatio Cinnae"

Author(s): Christoph Meinhard Bulst

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4434843

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a reassessment of the "Dominatio Cinnae"

The Consulate of Cinna

1 Cic. Brutus 179; Plut. Sulla 10, 4. 2 Cass.Dio fr. 102, I.

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in doing so, whom Appian proceeds to describe as ro' xa6mp"repoV WXAog.

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due to some hope of reconciliation.31 Oro

The victims of Marius and Cinna

3' App. I (69) 315. 32 Oros. V I9, Io. 33 Veil. II 21.

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53 App. I (73) 336/37. 54 RE no 64 by Klebs. 55 Cic. pro Rab. perd. 21.

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64 Badian, Historia 6, 1957, p. 329.

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The relations between Rome and Sulla 87-83

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and attempted: auvcXXMe&tv oUTrov -roZq eX&poZq regarding itself as arbiter

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suJectus26 and then hindered Carbo in co

Collapse of Party and System

26 App. I (78) 358-59.

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assertions of the epitomator of Livy omnem quae in urbe erat nobilitatem

42 RE i8. 43 Plut. Pomp- 4- 44 Plut. Pomp. 9, 2. 45 Vell. II 26, 3.

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traditional battle-cry of the opposition, to defend the Roman people against

Finance and Economics from 9I to 83

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5 Cic. de leg. agr. II 8o.

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The proposed procedure at once found determined resistance. A tribune,

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But it remains to be determined how far this picture is representative of the

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27 Frank I p. 271. 28 Broughton II p. 57; Cic. de off. III 80/i.

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Heidelberg CIIRISTOIPH MEINHARD BULST (t)

33 Paulus, Sententiac (Collectiolibrorum lurisAnteiustiniianill) 5,25, i: lege Cornelia

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