Criminal Law 2 penalty should be prison mayor for in his opinion there is no complex crime of

rebellion.
TITLE III. Crimes Against Public Order
ISSUE:
Art. 134 – Rebellion or insurrection Is Geronimo guilty of the crime charged in the information?
1. People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26 (Resolution), [July 18, 1956], 99
PHIL 515-583) RULING:
FACTS: NO. All the overt acts charged in the information were committed for political ends
Hernandez was charged with rebellion as being members of the PKP a Communist or in furtherance to the rebellion. Those were done for the furtherance of the
Party which was then engaged in an armed rebellion against the government of the felonious intent. If it is done without political motivation, it may be considered as a
Philippines. He was charged with complex crime and was sentenced to life separate offense but it does not appear in the present case for the constituted acts
imprisonment. Hernandez contended that rebellion cannot be a complex crime with and intent are related to commit rebellion and is done in in preparation and
murder, arson and robbery. furtherance of rebellion. The common crimes committed were necessary means to
commit the crime of rebellion, and those overt acts are essential ingredients of the
ISSUE: single crime of rebellion (People vs Hernandez).
Is the contentions of Hernandez correct? Hence Geronimo is guilty of the rebellion and not of the complex crime in the
information.
RULING:
YES. Court ruled that murder, arson and robbery are mere ingredients of the crime 3. People v. Cruz, 3 SCRA 217
of rebellion. Rebellion constitutes only one crime. It is substantial that an action to
overthrow the government by means of rebellion must be evident. Membership is Paterno Cruz and Benito Cruz of "rebellion with robbery with homicide," and
not considered a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed into an action of appellant Fermin Tolentino of "rebellion with arson, with murder and robbery.
controversy, in the case at bar we find this of no binding. Benito Cruz together with a band of men staged a raid by the HUKs in the province
Hernandez Doctrine – rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such as of Bataan, more particularly in the Makabulos massacre and has committed
killings or/and destruction of property committed in the occasion and in the multiple crimes of arson, robbery and murder on civilians and even to the
furtherance thereof Philippine constabulary.

2. People v. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, [October 23, 1956], 100 PHIL 90-124) ISSUE:
Whether Benito Cruz et al is guilty of the crime charged of complex
FACTS: crime of rebellion with robbery and homicide
Geronimo, a member of the CPP, HUKS was charged with complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies and kidnaping. Defendant feloniously ambush, RULING:
attack, assault and fired upon soldiers of the Philippine constabulary. Has NO. It has been held as stated in the brief for the Government, appellants herein are
committed robbery of the Treasury Vault and killed a barrio lieutenant. He was guilty of simple rebellion (People vs. Nava, L-9483, January 30, 1960; People vs.
then found guilty and was sentenced with life imprisonment. He contended that Hernandez, 52 Off. Gaz., 4612), inasmuch as the information alleges, and the
records show that the acts imputed to them were performed as a means to commit These acts do not carry or prove any criminal intent of helping the HUKS. This
the crime of rebellion and in furtherance thereof. does not precisely conclude that the performed criminal intent of helping in the
Following the Hernandez Doctrine, Benito Cruz is guilty only of simple rebellion. execution or the carrying out of rebellion or insurrection.
For the crime of rebellion constitutes only that of a single crime. Therefore, the judgement is reversed and Carino is absolved from the charge
contained in the information.
4. Carino v. People, 7 SCRA900
5. Buscayno v. Military Commission, 109 SCRA 273
FACTS
In an information dated April 28, 1952, filed in the Court of First Instance of FACTS:
Manila, the accused was charged with the crime of rebellion with murders, arsons, Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante and Jose Ma. Sison alias Amado
robberies and kidnappings, for having, as a high ranking officer and/or member of Guerrero, alleged subversives classified as "PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and
the Communist Party of the Philippines and of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Traditional Armed Group personalities.
Bayan otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (Huks), agreed in conspiracy with 31 It was alleged that as ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines
others who were charged with the same crime in other criminal cases then pending and its military arms, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan and the New People's
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, for the purpose of overthrowing the Army, constituting an organized conspiracy to overthrow the government by force
Government and disrupting its activities. Acts pf rebellion were committed in or placing it under the control of an alien power.
conspiracy with other members of the communist party. Accused provided It was alleged that on or about February 4, 1972 and for some time prior or
accommodation for the night, giving cigarettes to the members of communist and subsequent thereto the ninety two accused as officers and leaders of the Communist
helping in opening of bank accounts to the members of the communist party. Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New People's Army, and as
conspirators rose publicly and took up arms against the government in Navotas,
ISSUE Rizal and elsewhere in the Philippines for the purpose of removing from the
Carino contended that his acts does not constitute him as an accomplice to the allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part
crime of rebellion. thereof or of its armed forces by organizing the Karagatan Fishing Corporation and
operating the M/V Karagatan a fishing vessel, to procure firearms and ammunition
RULING for the CPP and NPA as in fact war materials and armanents were landed at Digoyo
NO. Carino’s acts were not that of rebellion. Article 8 provides that an accomplice Point, Palanan, Isabela on July 2, 1972 from Communist China and were used
is one who cooperate in the execution of the offense by simultaneous or previous against the army.
acts relating to the previous acts: 1. Take part in the execution of the crime, 2. Buscayno contended that rebellion is an element for the crime of subversion and
Cooperated with the intention of supplying aid in the execution of the crime. CA held the defense of double jeopardy.
held that the acts constituted acts of cooperation and contributed to some extent in
the promotion of rebellion. HOWEVER, the Supreme Court held otherwise. ISSUE:
The sending of food supplies and cigarettes does not prove intention to help in Whether or not Buscayno is correct with his contentions that rebellion is an
committing rebellion. Neither is the opening of the bank accounts for the work of element of subversion
petitioner is an officer of the bank which is a part of his function as an employee.
RULING:
NO. The contention is not correct because subversion does not necessarily include ISSUE
rebellion. Subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security. Rebellion is Enrile contested to maintain the Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all
a crime against public order. other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission
Rrebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against or in furtherance thereof.
the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said RULING
Government or its laws, Philippine territory or any part thereof, or any body of YES, Enrile was favored. The primary ruling of the Court, which is that
land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Hernandez, remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
Rebellion is distinct from participation or membership in an organization means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
committed to overthrow the duly constituted government (People vs. Hernandez, constitutes rebellion. The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a
120 Phil. 191, 220). crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the
In the instant case, the rebellion charge against the petitioners embraced the acts Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed
committed by them on or about February 4, 1972 and during the period from on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric.
August, 1973 to February, 1974. The subversion charge against Buscayno involved The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez,
his acts committed in 1965, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1971. The subversion charge the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
against the Sison spouses referred to their acts committed in 1968 and for sometime spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion
prior and subsequent thereto. The common denominator of the rebellion and only.
subversion charges is that the petitioners committed overt acts as alleged Supreme Court low pitched the Congress that there is an apparent need to
communists or leftists. The overt acts in the two charges are different. restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly
Rebellion is an offense that has existed in the Penal Code for a long time. It may be define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that
committed by non communists without collaborating with the agents of an alien it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
power. In contrast, the crime of subversion came into existence when the undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can
communists sought to dominate the world in order to establish a new social only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
economic and political order interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the
initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
6. Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217
7. People v. Romagosa, G.R. No. L-8476, [February 28, 1958], 103 PHIL 20-27)
FACTS
Enrille was charged with rebellion with murder and was detained for the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during This appeal is related to the case of People vs. Federico Geronimo alias Comdr.
the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Oscar, et al., G.R. No. L-8936, decided by this Court on October 23, 1956 (100
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz. No. 1, 68).
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information
and none fixed in the arrest warrant. He then filled for a petition for habeas corpus Herein appellant Abundio Romagosa alias David was, in all information filed by
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights. the Provincial Fiscal, accused in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur of the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, under three and public property and plotted the liquidation of government officials, to create
counts that are the last three of the five counts charged against Federico Geronimo, and spread disorder, terror, confusion, chaos and fear so as to facilitate the
et al., in said case No. G.R. L-8936, supra: accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, among which are follows to wit:

That on or about May 28, 1946 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto and 1. That on or about the years 1951 to 1952 in the municipality of,
continuously up to the present time in the province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, a group of Armed Huks under
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and in other municipalities, Commander Rustum raided the house of one Nemesio Palo, a Police
cities and provinces and other parts of the country where they have chosen to carry sergeant of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and as a result, said HUKS were
out their rebellious activities, the above-named accused being then ranking officers able to capture said Nemesio Palo and once captured with evident
and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the premeditation, treachery and intent to kill, stab, shot and cut the neck of
Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise said Nemesio Palo thereby causing the instantaneous death of Nemesio
known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of said Palo.
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) having come to an agreement and
decide to commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and 2. That on or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita, Del Gallego,
confederating among themselves with all of the thirty-one accused in criminal case Camarines Sur a group of HMBS with Federico Geronimo alias
Nos. 14071, 14282, 14315, 14270, 15344 and with all the accused in criminal case Commander Oscar ambushed and fired upon an Army Patrol headed by
number 19166 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with the other members, CPL Bayrante, resulting in seriously wounding of PFC Pancracio Torrado
officers and/or affiliates of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the and Eusebio Gruta, a civilian.
Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan and with many others whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in 3. That on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San Fernando,
furtherance thereof, and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, Camarines Sur, Abundio Romagosa, one of a group of four HMBS led by
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, help support, promote, maintain, direct accused Commander Oscar with evident premiditation, willfully,
and/or command the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) or the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng unlawfully and feloniously killed one Policarpio Tipay, a barrio
Bayan (HMB), to rise publicly and take arms against the government of the lieutenant.
Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such public armed uprisings
for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to
the government and laws thereof, as in fact the said Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) pursuant to such conspiracy, have risen
publicly and taken arms against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
to attain said purpose, by then and there making armed raids, sorties, and
ambuscades, attacks against the Philippine Constabulary, the civilian guards, the
Police and the Army Patrols and other detachments as well as upon innocent
civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of Rebellion, in connection
therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed wanton acts of
murder, pillage, looting, plunder, kidnappings and planned destructions of private
As in the case of Federico Geronimo, appellant Romagosa, upon arraignment, with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and in imposing upon him the penalty
entered a plea of guilty to the information. In view of the voluntary plea of guilty, for such crime.
the prosecution recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed on
the accused, on the ground that the charge being a complex crime of rebellion with As in the Geronimo case, there is the further question of whether, in view of
murders, robberies, and kidnappings, the penalty provided for by law is the appellant's plea of guilty to the information, he should be deemed to have admitted
maximum of the most serious crime which is murder. Counsel for the accused, on the commission of the simple crime of rebellion alone, or of rebellion and other
the other hand, argued that the proper penalty imposable upon the accused was only separate crimes, if any of the counts of the information charges crimes independent
prision mayor, since there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders, of and not constituting essential acts or ingredients of the rebellion charged. As
robberies, and kidnappings, because the latter being the natural consequences of the already stated, the three counts of the information against herein appellant
crime of rebellion, the crime charged against the accused should be considered only Romagosa are exactly the same as the last three of the five counts charged against
as simple rebellion. Federico Geronimo (G.R. No. L-8936). As ruled the majority in the preceding case,
the first count under the present information (the third count against Geronimo)
On October 13, 1954, the lower court rendered judgment finding accused does not charge appellant's participation and can not, therefore, be taken into
Romagosa guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and consideration in this case; the second (the fourth count against Geronimo) alleges
kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of essential act of rebellion and is absorbed by that crime; while the third (the fifth
voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; count against Geronimo) charges the murder of one Policarpio Tipay, a barrio
to pay a fine of P10,000; to indemnify the heirs of the two persons killed named in lieutenant, which killing, though committed within the jurisdiction of the lower
the information, in the sum of P6,000 each; and to pay the cost of the proceedings. court, does not appear to be related to the rebellion and hence constitutes an
independent offense in itself.
From the judgment accused Romagosa appealed to this Court, insisting that there is
no crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and that he should The same majority of six justices of this Court maintain their view express in the
have been convicted only of simple rebellion and imposed the penalty of prison Geronimo case that by his plea of guilty, appellant has admitted the commission of
mayor in its minimum period, in view of his voluntary plea of guilty. the independent crime of murder alleged in count 3 of the information, the
averment that said crime was perpetrated "in furtherance" of the rebellion being a
The question of whether there is a complex crime of rebellion with murder, mere conclusion and not a bar to appellant's conviction and punishment for said
robbery, and kidnapping under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, is exactly the offense, appellant having failed, at the arraignment, to object to the information on
same question raised and decided in the cases of People vs. Hernandez, et al., * 52 the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged. Therefore, appellant must be held
Off. Gaz., No. 11, 5506, and People vs. Geronimo, supra. None of the members of guilty, and sentenced for the commission, of two separate offenses, simple
this Court has found reason to change his respective stand on the matter as rebellion and murder.
expressed in the Geronimo case, wherein the majority of this Court held that where
the crimes of murders, robberies, and kidnappings are committed as a means to or Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that appellant
in furtherance of the rebellion charged, they are absorbed by, and form part and Abundio Romagosa alias David is convicted of the crimes of simple rebellion and
parcel of, the rebellion, and that therefore, the accused can be convicted only of the murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, appellant is
simple crime of rebellion. Consistently with that precedent, we hold that the lower sentenced for the rebellion: to suffer 8 years of prison mayor and to pay a fine of
court erred in holding appellant Romagosa guilty of the complex crime of rebellion P10,000 (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to Article 38 of the Revised
Penal Code), and for the murder: to an indeterminate sentence of not less than 10 9. People v. Dasig, G.R. No. 100231, [April 28, 1993])
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum and not more than 18 years of
reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tipay in the Facts:
sum of P6,000 solidarily with Federico Geronimo, alias Commander Oscar, (G.R.
No. L-8936), and other adjudged guilty of having participated in the slaying of said Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuñez and 6 others were charged together of
deceased; and to pay the costs. So ordered. shooting Redempto Manatad, a police officer, as he died while performing duties.
Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of "not guilty."
However, after the prosecution had presented its first witness, accused Nuñes
8. People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-13981, [April 25, 1960],
changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in
107 PHIL 659-664)
abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the prosecution
Facts: had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez died on
On October 30, 1956, Elias Rodriguez was charged with illegal March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
possession of firearm and ammunition. The accused filed a motion to quash on the
ground that the crime with which he is charged is already alleged as a component At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one
element or ingredient of the crime of rebellion with which he was charged in of whom he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of
Criminal Case No. 16990 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. On August
16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a
suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu
Issue: City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes
Whether or not illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and confiscated
absorbed in the crime of rebellion? a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt.
Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot
on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended while a .38 caliber revolver
Held: with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him. Thereafter, Dasig was
Yes. The Court held that, "any or all of the acts described in Art. 135, when
brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in Art.
Metrodiscom for investigation. Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin
134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be regarded or
penalized as distinct crimes in themselves; and cannot be considered as giving rise Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nuñes were members
to a separate crime that, under Art. 48 of the code, would constitute a complex one of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively.
with that of rebellion" (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz., 68), the
conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page thereof
present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him. However,
would be to place him in double jeopardy. Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken
was legally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends
that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted
at most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault. Appellant also FACTS:
claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and
consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential
serious offense. Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a "State of National Emergency", police
officers arrested Beltran without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform
Issue: Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was
subjected to an (first) inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the Sedition based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on
deceased and participated in the act of rebellion? the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. 

Held: A second inquest was conducted by the DOJ, this time for Rebellion. The inquest
was based on two letters implicating Beltran, San Juan, and several others
Yes. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion as "leaders and promoters" of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo
beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of government supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party
imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which
Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. have formed a "tactical alliance."

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not The RTC indicted Beltran and San Juan as leaders/ promoters of Rebellion.
applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the
insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes ISSUE:
the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person Whether or not there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion (NO)
who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is
no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter HELD:
of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving There is no probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion.
instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed – by rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or
imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS powers or prerogatives.
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving
10. Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76 & 175013, [June 1, crowd action done in furtherance of a political end.
2007], 551 PHIL 313-338)
None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, suffice.
maintaining, or heading a rebellion. Beltran’s alleged presence during the 1992 - The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no
CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion. Assuming contribution to the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were
that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere no known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA.
membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion. Likewise, attendance in - Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the N.P.A was
meetings to discuss plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion.
HELD:
11. People vs. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389)
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated
FACTS OF THE CASE: September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in
toto.
Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while
Lucilo was walking along Burgos St. away from Daraga, Albay Public Market. The
victim died on the same day from massive blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Art. 134-A – Coup d’etat
Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder, and subsequently found guilty.
Lovedioro then appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of - Gonzales v. Abaya, 498 SCRA 445, 476 (concurring opinion of Callejo, J.)
rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecution’s principal witness that Lovedioro
was a member of the New People’s Army.
Indeed, the service-connected punitive acts defined and penalized under the
ISSUES OF THE CASE: Articles of War are sui generis offenses not absorbed by rebellion perpetrated, inter
alia, by the officers and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead (AFP) or coup d’etat. This is so because such acts or omissions are merely
of rebellion? violations of military discipline, designed to secure a higher efficiency in the
military service; in other words, they are purely disciplinary in their nature, and
- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of have exclusive regard to the special character and relation of the AFP officers and
rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not enlisted personnel. Laws providing for the discipline as well as the organization of
exist. the AFP are essential to the efficiency for the military service in case their services
- Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common should ever be required. "Deprive the executive branch of the government of the
crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty- could power to enforce proper military regulations by fine and imprisonment, and that,
benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. If no too, by its own courts-martial, which from time immemorial have exercised this
political motive is established or proved, the accused should be convicted of the right, and we at once paralyze all efforts to secure proper discipline in the military
common crime and not of rebellion. service, and have little left but a voluntary organization, without cohesive force." 8
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself
It bears stressing that for determining how best the AFP shall attend to the business Victory in battle is the ultimate aim of every military commander, and he knows
of fighting or preparing to fight rests with Congress and with the President. Both that victory cannot be attained, no matter how superior his forces may be, in men
Congress and this Court have found that the special character of the military and materials, if discipline among the rank-and-file is found wanting. For, "if an
requires civilian authorities to accord military commanders some flexibility in Army is to be anything but an uncontrolled mob, discipline is required and must be
dealing with matters that affect internal discipline and morale. In construing a enforced." For this reason, in order to set an effective means of enforcing
statute that touches on such matters, therefore, courts must be careful not to discipline, all organized armies of the world have promulgated sets of rules and
circumscribe the authority of military commanders to an extent never intended by regulations and later, laws as embodied in the articles of war, which define the
Congress. Under these and many similar cases reviewing legislative and executive duties of military personnel and distinguish infractions of military law and impose
control of the military, the sentencing scheme at issue in this case, and the manner appropriate punishment for violation thereof. 10
in which it was created, are constitutionally unassailable. 9
Every officer, before he enters in the duties of his office, subscribes to these
Officers and enlisted personnel committing punitive acts under the Articles of War articles and places himself within the powers of courts-martial to pass on any
may be prosecuted and convicted if found guilty of such acts independently of, and offense which he may have committed in contravention thereof. 11
separately from, any charges filed in the civilian courts for the same or similar acts
which are penalized under the Revised Penal Code, under special penal laws or It is said that conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman is a uniquely military
ordinances; and prescinding from the outcome thereof. offense. 12 In order to constitute the said offense, the misconduct must offend so
seriously against the law, justice, morality or decorum as to expose to disgrace,
At this point, it is well to have a basic understanding of the Articles of War under socially or as a man, the offender, and at the same time must be of such a nature or
Commonwealth Act No. 408, which was essentially copied from that of the United committed under such circumstances as to bring dishonor or disrepute upon the
States, which, in turn, had been superseded by the Uniform Code of Military military profession which he represents. 13 The article proscribing conduct
Justice. Our Articles of War has since been amended by Republic Act Nos. 242 and unbecoming an officer and a gentleman has been held to be wholly independent of
516. other definitions of offenses, and the same course of conduct may constitute an
offense elsewhere provided for and may also warrant a conviction under this
The Articles of War is the organic law of the AFP and, in keeping with the history provision; it is not subject to preemption by other punitive articles. 14
of military law, its primary function is to enforce "the highest form of discipline in
order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency." The following The administration of military justice under the Articles of War has been
commentary is enlightening: exclusively vested in courts-martial whether as General Courts-Martial, Special
Courts-Martial or Summary Courts-Martial. 15 Courts-martial pertain to the
History points out the fact that nations have always engaged in wars. For that executive department and are, in fact, simply instrumentalities of the executive
purpose, bodies of men have been organized into armed forces under a power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him
commander-in-chief who, through his subordinate commanders, enforces the in properly commanding the army and navy, and enforcing discipline therein. 16
highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military
efficiency. As enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, "the military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society. It has, again by necessity,
developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history. The differences
between the military and civilian communities result from the fact that it is the the fold of the law. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel
primary business of armies and navies to fight or ready to fight wars should the succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives
occasion arise." 17 Further, the US Supreme Court quite succinctly stated that "the placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline to their barracks.
from that of the civilian." 18 A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.
RTC held that the acts committed by petitioners are not service oriented and that
I wish to emphasize, however, a caveat: not all service-connected punitive acts they are not to be court martialed. Hence, respondents raised the suit invoking that
under the Articles of War may be prosecuted before the courts-martial these acts are service oriented and is triable by a court martial and is not absorbed
independently of a crime defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code by the crime of coup d ‘etat.
against the same accused based on the same set of delictual acts. Congress may
criminalize a service-connected punitive offense under the Articles of War. ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can be court martialed.
A review of the deliberations in the Senate or the Report of the Conference
Committee of Senate Bill 1500 will readily show that coup d’etat was incorporated RULING:
in the Revised Penal Code in Article 134-A precisely to criminalize "mutiny" under YES. RA 7055 is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule that
Article 67 of the Articles of War and to penalize the punitive act of mutiny, under members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members
the Articles of War as coup d’etat. Article 67 of the Articles of War reads: of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition. – Any person subject to military law who attempts to laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides
create or who begins, excites, causes, or joins in any mutiny or sedition in any the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has
company, party, post, camp, detachment, guard, or other command shall suffer determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be
death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e.,
where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court. The
- Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, [August 10, 2006], 530 PHIL second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected
189-255 crimes or offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to
92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified
FACTS: Articles are triable by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports civil courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed by military
that some members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their personnel.
designated places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The
President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, member
and arrest them. of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed
dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to from the service. We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles
of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second
paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo
petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend before RTC Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged
the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Obviously, there is no merit in with murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under
petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. The
for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been RTC found him guilty in Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him to suffer the
declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC.
but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat,".
The doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting
applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25unlike here where different Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have
statutes are involved. Further, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance
jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National
of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the
of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case. National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his
The Court has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the political beliefs.
offense charged ‘is absorbed and in furtherance of’ another criminal charge
pending with the civil courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense charged Issue:
is not one of the service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055.
Such is not the situation in the present case. What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that herein respondents have the authority appellant?
in convening a court martial and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96
of the Articles of War. Held:

Art. 135 – Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other
-Amnesty and Pardon: Effects and difference high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the
subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations.
- People v. Patriarca, Jr., G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000 Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person
The person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
as though he had committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal Code, offense.
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and
all its effects are thus extinguished. Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability
is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and
Facts:  all its effects.
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant uprising for the purposes expressed in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and
Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an the overt acts of violence described in the first paragraph of Article 135. That both
end to the appeal. purpose and overt acts are essential components of one crime, and that without
either of them the crime of rebellion legally does not exist, is shown by the absence
Patriarca was acquitted  of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 while of any penalty attached to Article 134. It follows, therefore, that any or all of the
Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672 were ordered dismissed acts described in Article 135, when committed as a means to or in furtherance
of the subversive ends described in Article 134, become absorbed in the crime
of rebellion, and cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in
Art. 136 – Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion or themselves. In law they are part and parcel of the rebellion itself, and cannot
Insurrection be considered as giving rise to a separate crime that, under Article 48 of the
Code, would constitute a complex one with that of rebellion.
- People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 Not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion
solely because it happens to be committed simultaneously with or in the course
FACTS: of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or
Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately
murders, robberies, and kidnapping. The accused are ranking officers/ or members punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion.
of CCP and Huks. In the information it alleged 5 instances including an ambush on Conceding the absence of” a complex crime of rebellion with murders, etc.,
Mrs. Aurora Quezon’s convoy and ending where Geronimo killed PolicarpioTipay still, by his plea of guilty, the accused-appellant has admitted all the overt acts
a Barrio Lieutenant. In sum the information charges Geronimo of the crime of described in the information; and that if any of such acts constituted an
rebellion complexed with the crime kidnapping, murder and robbery. Geronimo independent crime within the jurisdiction of the lower court, then the
pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court found him guilty of the complex averment in the information that it was perpetrated in furtherance of the
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, sentencing him to rebellion, being a mere conclusion, cannot be a bar to appellant’s conviction
reclusion perpetua. The case was appealed the SC via automatic review, raising the and punishment for said offense, he having failed, at the arraignment, to
sole question of whether the crime committed by him is not the complex crime of object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged.
rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision mayor.
DECISION:
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused
convicted for the simple (noncomplex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the
ISSUES: Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; and considering the
Whether or not the information for murders, robberies and kidnapping is absorbed mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-appellant Federico Geronimo is
in the crime of Rebellion? hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000,
(without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the
RULING: rebellion; and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate
Yes. The Supreme Court held that as in treason, where both intent and overt act are Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prisión mayor and not more
necessary, the crime of rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed
than 18 years of reclusión temporal; to indemnify the heirs of PolicarpioTibay in Where it was not shown that the contributions received by the accused from
the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs. So ordered. Communist Party members were received around the year 1950 when the Central
Committee of said Party agreed to go underground and support the Huk rebellion, it
- People v. Hernandez, 11 SCRA 223 is held that the accused cannot be found guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.

FACTS: - People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72

This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for
Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies; the appellants are Amado FACTS
V. Hernandez et. Al.,G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders, Jose Lava, being then high ranking officers or otherwise members of the
arsons and kidnappings; the accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) of which the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya
Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal. ng Bayan" (HMB) otherwise or formerly known as the Hukbalahap (Huks), with
After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. the primordial objective of the Communist Party of the Philippines and of its armed
Hernandez, the following: (1) that he is a member of the Communist Party of the force, the HMB, was to overthrow the Philippine Government by armed struggle
Philippines and as such had aliases, namely, Victor or Soliman; (2) that he was was caught by the Philippine constabulary for his criminal acts consisting of
furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as other publications attacks against Philippine Constabulary, murders, robberies, kidnapping, arson
of the Party; (3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor which indicted by the trial court the complex crime of the complex crime of
Organizations; etc. rebellion with murders, robberies and arsons, enumerating therein eight counts
regarding specific acts of murder, robbery and arson and penalty of reclusion
ISSUES perpetua.
Whether or not Hernandez was guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion? Lava, the appellants also contend that the informations against them charge more
than one offense.
RULINGS:
No. The Supreme Court held that the Congress of Labor Organization (CLO) had ISSUE
no function but that of indoctrination and preparation of the members for the Should the trial court decision stating that Lava is guilty of the complex crime of
uprising that would come. It was only a preparatory organization prior to a rebellion with murders, robberies and arsons be modified?
revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of the CLO, therefore, cannot be
considered as a leader in actual rebellion, where after the party had decided to go RULING
underground he refused to do so, preferring to engage in what they considered the Yes. The appeal of Lava should be upheld. The question, of whether or not a
legal battle for the cause. person may be prosecuted and held guilty of the crime of rebellion complexed with
Membership in the Communist Party per se was not punishable as conspiracy to murder, arson, robbery and/or other common crimes, is now settled. In the case of
commit rebellion before the passage of Rep. Act No. 1700 in 1957, unless coupled People vs. Hernandez, etc., et al., the Court held that the crime of rebellion cannot
with action or advocacy of action of rebellion. be complexed with other common crimes. The accused in the Hernandez case were
The giving of speeches favoring Communism will not make the speaker guilty of charged, as are appellants in the instant cases, "with the crime of rebellion with
conspiracy to commit rebellion in the absence of evidence that his audience then multiple murder, arsons, and robberies.
and there agreed to rise up in arms to overthrow the government
Court has held that acts of murder, arson, robbery, physical injuries, etc. are province, but he did not do so, nor did he take any steps toward pursuing or
absorbed by, and form part and parcel of, the crime of rebellion if committed as a denouncing the insurgents or to protect the people from their probable
means to or in furtherance of the rebellion charged. depredations.
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we repeat, one single
crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of ISSUE:
Article 48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, Whether or not the accused were guilty of the crime of insurrection?
this court has never in the past, convicted any person of the "complex crime of
rebellion with murder". What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of
rebellion published in the Philippine Reports, the defendants were convicted of RULING:
simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons, sometimes peace No. The Supreme Court held thatAct No. 292 of the Civil Commission defines and
officers. (U.S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 472; U.S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil. 509; U.S. vs. specifies the acts which shall be punished as insurrection, but among those acts the
Ayala, 6 Phil. 151; League vs. People, 73 Phil. 155). silence of the defendant as regards the existence of some insurgents in a certain
Hence, the decision appealed from is modified. Appellant, Jose Lava is found place is not enumerated; however reproachful the silence of the defendant may be,
guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion and is it does not in itself constitute the crime of insurrection.
sentenced of prision mayor, and a fine of P20,000, with the accessories provided by There being no evidence showing that the defendant had promoted, encouraged, or
law. aided any insurrection or that he in any way participated in the same, he can not be
punished for the crime of insurrection.
The fact that the defendant sold rice in great or small quantities to persons who
afterwards appeared to be insurgents is not in itself conducive to criminal liability;
and therefore that fact alone cannot make the defendant guilty of the crime of
insurrection, if it is not shown that he sold the rice to the insurgents knowing that
they were such and with the deliberate purpose of aiding the insurrection.
Art. 137 – Disloyalty of public officers or employees
,
- People v. Ravidas, 4 Phil. 271 Art. 139 – Sedition

FACTS: - People v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 17755, March 4, 1922

The complaint in this case charges the defendants with the crime of insurrection.
The counsel for the Government in this case prays for the acquittal of both FACTS:
defendants, as "it is not proven", he says with respect to AlejoRavidas, " that he As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of the Philippine
permitted or encouraged insurrection or engaged in the same by abetting them Constabulary to inflict revenge upon the police of the city of Manila, charges of
directly or indirectly." The only fact disclosed by the evidence adduced in the case sedition were filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the
is that AlejoRavidas knew that there were insurgents in a place called Manila, participants in the public disturbance. Convicted in the trial court of a violation of
jurisdiction of the town of Agusan, of which he was municipal president, and his Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
duty as such president required him to report this fact to the senior officer of the
The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila and they It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act,
want to inflict revenge for the following reasons: each is responsible for all the acts of the others done in furtherance of the common
(1) On December 13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of design; and "the result is the same if the act is divided into parts and each person
the household of a constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said proceeds with his part unaided."
policeman. Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and
(2) Private Macasinag of the Constabulary was shot by a Manila police and was circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be
mortally wounded. A day after the incident, a rumor spread among the proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing
Constabulary that the Police who shot Macasinag was back to his original duties one part and another another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to
while Macasinag was declared dead. There were also rumors that the said shooting the attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they
was ordered. were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.
On the night of December 15 some members of the Constabulary escaped their
barracks through a window (the saw out the window bars). They had rifles and
ammunitions and were organized in groups under the command of their sergeants
and corporals. They attacked some Manila policemen in these specific instances:
(1) On Calle Real, Intramuros, a group of the Constabulary shot and killed an - U.S. v. Nery, G.R. No. 1989, [January 23, 1905], 4 PHIL 158-160
American Policeman and his friend. The defendant in this case was charged with the crime of sedition and was tried in
(2) The Constabulary indiscriminately shot at a passer-by, causing a death and the Court of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija. After hearing the
wounding most of the passengers. testimony in the case and the arguments of the counsel for the State and the
(3) While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain William E. defendant, the court found that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
Wichman(asst. chief of police in Manila) was shot and killed together with Saplala charge of sedition, but did find that the evidence was sufficient to find the
defendant guilty of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 619, and sentenced him to
ISSUE: five years de presidio and to pay the costs.
Are the accused properly convicted of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law?
The evidence shows that the defendant, in the month of February, 1903, was a
RULINGS: Constabulary soldier, and was stationed in the pueblo of San Jose, in said province;
Yes. The Supreme Court held that sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising that the Constabulary were attacked by the band of Felipe Salvador, called "Santa
of commotions or disturbances in the State. Iglesia," composed of about one hundred armed persons; that at the time of the
In order or there to be a violation of paragraph 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292, it is attack the defendant was acting as corporal of the guard; that the band was armed
not necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a with firearms, bolos, and clubs; that the object of the said band was to capture the
public functionary. arms of the Constabulary; that when the said band retired from the attack the said
The declaration of the trial court that there was a conspiracy between the accused defendant retired with them; that he was the only member of the Constabulary who
in the instant case held not to constitute reversible error. It is incontestable that all was captured or went away with said band; that later the accused was captured in
the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which was to avenge company with said band of Felipe-Salvador.
themselves on the police force of the city of Manila.
The defendant offered no defense whatever.
 with a crime under the provisions of General Orders, No. 58, and the evidence does
The evidence adduced in this case clearly fails to show that the defendant was not show that he is guilty of the crime charged, but does show that he is guilty of
guilty of the crime of sedition, as defined in section 5 of Act No. 292 of the some crime or other lesser offense, the court may sentence him for the other lesser
Commission, and the question is whether or not a Court of First Instance, where a offense, provided the lesser offense is a cognate offense and is included in the
person is charged with the crime of sedition, can find the defendant guilty of the complaint with the court.
crime defined in Act No. 619, an act entitled "An act to promote good order and
discipline in the Philippines Constabulary."cralaw virtua1aw library An offense against the "superior authority in the Constabulary" is not a cognate
offense to an offense against the sovereignty or laws of the State and the court
Section 1 of Act No. 619 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph could not under a complaint for sedition, defined in section 5 of Act No. 292, find
the defendant guilty of the crime defined in section 1 of Act No. 619. Therefore the
"Any member of the Constabulary who begins, excites, causes, or joins in any sentence in this case is reversed and the provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to
opposition or resistance to, or defiance of, any superior authority in the present a complaint against the defendant for a violation of the provisions of Act
Constabulary with intent to usurp, subvert, or override the same, or who, being No. 619 of the Philippine Commission within ten days after this cause is received
present, does not use his utmost endeavor to suppress all such opposition, by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of said province. The clerk of the Court
resistance, or defiance, or who, having knowledge of any such opposition, of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija is hereby directed, upon receipt of
resistance, or defiance being intended, does not, without delay, give information this decision, to give the fiscal of said province immediate notice of the foregoing
thereof to such superior authority, shall be fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars decision.
or imprisoned not exceeding ten years, or both."cralaw virtua1aw library

Act No. 619 is an act to promote good order and discipline in the Philippines Art. 141 – Conspiracy to commit sedition
Constabulary. Section 1 of said act punishes the members of the Constabulary who
in any way manifest or excite or join in any opposition or resistance or defiance of - U.S. v. Planas, G.R. No. 6867, December 23, 1911
"any superior authority in the Constabulary" with intent to usurp, subvert, or
override such authority; or who, being present, does not use his utmost endeavor to FACTS:
suppress such opposition or resistance or who does not give information to such That the defendant, MaximinoPlanas, was the president of the town of Bambang,
"superior authority" Nueva Vizcaya, duly elected, qualified, and acting as much on during all the dates
and times mentioned in the complaint. That on the 3d day of September, 1910, the
Act No. 292 of the Civil Commission, creating the punishment for the crime of said MaximinoPlanas called together the policemen of the said town of Bambang
sedition, was enacted for the purpose of punishing resistance to the lawful authority and ordered to surrender their arms and join the insurrection and kill some
and laws of the Government American persons.
The defendant was found guilty of the crime of conspiring to commit sedition.
Act No. 619 is purely disciplinary in its operation, enacted for the purpose of
preserving the loyalty and obedience of the members of the Constabulary to the ISSUE:
"superior authority in the Constabulary." The offense created by Act No. 619 is not Whether or not the defendant was guilty of conspiracy to commit the crime of
a cognate offense to the crime of sedition. When a person is charged in a complaint sedition?
 Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or
RULING: note containing scurrilous libel against the Government.
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under the facts, as stated in the opinion, Held:
That the defendant is guilty of conspiracy to commit the crime of sedition, as ISSUE:
defined by section 7 of Act No. 292. Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the said crime?
As repeatedly held by this court, when no objection is made in the court below to
the sufficiency of the complaint, such an objection will not be considered when RULINGS:
made for the first time on appeal. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the essence of seditious libel is its immediate
DECISION: tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses or to induce
After a careful reading of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause and people to resort to illegal methods in order to redress the evils which press upon
brought to this court, we are of the opinion that the findings of fact made by the their minds.
lower court are in accordance with such evidence, and show that the defendant was A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest
guilty of the crime charged beyond peradventure of doubt, and that the sentence persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a
imposed. by the lower court is in accordance with the law. (Sec. 7, Act No. 292.) tendency toproduce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the digposition to
The sentence of the lower court is, therefore, hereby affirmed remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government.
Any citizen may criticize his government and government officials and submit his
criticism to the "free trade of ideas." However, such criticism should be specific
and therefore constructive specifying particular objectionable actuations of the
Art. 142 – Inciting to sedition government; it must be reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous
- Espuelas v. People, G.R. No. L-2990, December 17, 1951 condemnation of the entire government set-up.
DECISION:
FACTS: The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the Court of question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be
First Instance of Bohol of a violation Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code affirmed with costs.Moreover, the subject of this prosecution does not reveal
punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the personal malice or hatred. Except for the "Juez de Cuchillo" item which, like words
Government of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or coming from a babe's mouth, did not have the weight or chance to sway the
which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the listeners, the article was but a statement of grievances against offlcial abuses and
people againts the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community. misgovernment that already were of common knowledge and which more
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were influential and responsible speakei's and writers had denounced in terms and ways
hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, more dangerous and revolutionary.
when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies
of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and - Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71
weeklies of general circulation. Not only in the Province of Bohol but also
throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or FACTS:
letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted
ValerianoFugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner requested for a order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public
permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”. However, the respondent refused to meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful
issue such permit because he found “that there is a reasonable ground to believe, assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit cannot be given any
basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially on the consideration. It does not make comfort and convenience in the use of streets or
part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be parks the standard of official action. It enables the Mayor to refuse the permit on
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly
government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.” Respondent assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary
based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense suppression of free expression of viewson national affairs, for the prohibition of all
against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, speaking will U' doubtedly prevent such eventualities. (Hague vs. Committee on
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496; 83 Law. ed., 1423.)
other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet
any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, DECISION:
Free use of Public Place. But the Court asserts that if the meaning of section 2434 (m) is what this Court said
in the Evengelista-Earnshaw case, then that section is void. I do not think that that
provision is void—at least not yet. Until it is invalidated in the proper case and in
ISSUE: the proper manner, the mayor's authority in respect of the issuance of permits is to
Whether or not the contention of the respondent refusing the issuance of the permit be measured by section 2434 (m) and by the municipal. Ordinance in so far as the
due to seditious character of the meeting were correct? ordinance does not conflict with the law. The validity of that provision is not
challenged and is nowhere in issue. It is highly improper, contrary to the
RULINGS: elementary rules of practice and procedure for this Court to say or declare that that
No. The Supreme Court held thatas there is no express andseparate provision in the provision is void. Moreover, Article VIII, section 10, of the Constitution provides
Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila regulating the holding of public meeting that "all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be heard and
or assembly at any streets or public places, the provision of section 1119 of said decided by the Supreme Court in banc, and no treaty or law may be declared
Ordinance to the effect, among others, "that the holding of any parade or unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the
procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is Court." Only seven members voted in favor of the resolution
first secured from the Mayor, who shall, on every such occasion, determine or
specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such Art. 143 – Acts tending to prevent the meeting of the Assembly and similar
parade or procession," may be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any Bodies
street or public places.
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that - People v. Alipit, 44 Phil. 910
there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon
the fact that passions, especially on the part of the losing groups, remain bitter and The information herein is as follows:
That on or about the 30th of May, 1920, in the municipality of Cabuyao, Province From the record the following antecedents appear:
of Laguna, Philippine Islands, the defendants Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D.
Alemus, being the municipal president and the chief of police respectively of the The accused Exequiel Alipit had been elected municipal president of Cabuyao,
said municipality of Cabuyao, did willfully, unlawfully, maliciously and acting Laguna. Agustin Dedicatora and others petitioned the Executive Bureau not to
under a previous agreement and conspiracy entered into between themselves and confirm said election, because said president-elect was a minor. The matter was
assisting and cooperating with each other, after the accused Exequiel Alipit had referred by the Executive Bureau to the provincial board of Laguna for
fired his revolver in the air, enter the session room of the municipality building of investigation. The provincial board in turn transmitted the papers to the municipal
Cabuyao wherein the municipal council of Cabuyao was holding a meeting council of Cabuyao, which proceeded to make an investigation, three meetings
presided over by the vice-president, Manuel Basa, and once in said room, the having held for the purpose, which were presided over by president Alipit, who left
aforesaid accused Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus, abusing their authority the chair to vice-president Manuel Basa as soon as the aforesaid investigation came
as municipal president and chief of police respectively, the former with a revolver up for discussion.
in his hand, and both using violence and intimidation not only upon the person of
said vice-president Manuel Basa, but also upon those of the councilors present at On the 30th of May, 1920, the municipal council held an extraordinary meeting
the aforesaid meeting, and without any justifiable motive or legal authority and by which was presided over by vice-president Basa because the hour fixed had come
means of force, arrested said vice-president Manuel Basa and compelled him to without the president being present. While the meeting was being held, the accused
submit himself to the arrest against the latter's will and over his protest and that of Victorio Alemus, then the chief of police of that municipality, entered the room,
each and everyone of the councilors and took him to the jail of the municipal saying that he had an order from the president to arrest vice-president Basa. Basa
building of Cabuyao, the accused Victorio D. Alemus taking at the same time answered that he had not committed any crime. Dominador Delfino, one of the
possession of all the papers concerning the meeting that was being held by the councilors present, succeeded in persuading the chief of police to wait until the
municipal council of Cabuyao, by which acts the defendants succeeded in meeting was over. A few minutes thereafter president Alipit arrived at the
interrupting and dissolving the aforesaid meeting. municipal building and after taking one of the revolvers in the police office, fired a
shot in the air, entered immediately the room where the meeting was being held
After the usual proceedings, the trial court found the defendant guilty of coercion and said in a loud voice to the chief of police who was there: "Arrest him, arrest
through illegal detention and sentenced them, under articles 497, in connection him," pointing out the vice-president. The chief of police obeyed the order, holding
with article 89, of the Penal Code, to five months of arresto mayor and fine of the vice-president by the arm and taking him to the jail, president Alipit following
1,500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the accessory them with the revolver in his hand.
penalties and costs. From this judgment the defendants appealed, assigning eleven
errors which raise these points, to wit, the illegality of that meeting of the Shortly afterwards, councilor Delfino asked president Alipit if they could continue
municipal council; the fact of the vice-president presiding over it; the finding of the the meeting to the end, to which Alipit answered: "Whoever dare continue holding
trial court that the act committed by the accused constitutes coercion; and the the meeting will be arrested." the councilors then dispersed, leaving the premises.
conviction of the accused Victorio D. Alemus, who, according to the defense, acted Alipit ordered the taking of the books and documents used in the meeting and went
by virtue of an obedience due another; and from this defendants conclude that the to Calamba where he asked and obtained from the Constabulary three armed
appellants should have been acquitted. soldiers to protect him against any possible attack from the vice-president Basa. By
his order, the three soldiers watched vice-president Basa and held him
The Attorney-General asks for the affirmance of the judgment.
incommunicated in the jail until about two o'clock in the evening, when he was defendants and the aforesaid presumption was effective as to them. Let it not be
released by the provincial governor who had come there. said that the presumption of legality did not operate as to the accused Exequiel
Alipit for the reason that he did in fact receive no notice of said meeting. The law
One of the points whereupon great stress is laid by the appellants is that that (sec. 2220, Administrative Code) does not require personal services of the notice; it
meeting of May 30, 1920, was unlawful. The evidence shows that that special is sufficient if the same be left in the domicile of the member of the council.
meeting of the council was called at the instance of two councilors and that notices Besides said president Alipit was personally interested in the matter to be
had been prepared for all the members of the council, although those addressed to transacted in the meeting, and so the notice sent to him was, according to the
the municipal president and some councilors were not delivered to the addresses. witness, Dominador Delfino, as if it were to a party respondent. Said accused
Alipit could not take part in the determination of the matter as a member of the
There were five councilors present at the meeting in question, who constituted a council.
quorum, with vice-president Manuel Basa as chairman. The record shows that the
president, as well as the other councilors, was absent from the municipality when It is universally recognized that it is improper and illegal for a member of
an attempt was made to deliver to them the notice of that meeting, the notices to the a municipal council to vote upon any question brought before the council
councilors who were in Manila having been placed in the hands of Agustin in which he is personally interested. . . . When the council is acting in a
Dedicatora who was coming to Manila. In American jurisprudence it is a doctrine quasi judicial capacity, for a member to pass upon a question in which he
frequently followed that where the members of a council are absent from the is interested renders the judgment void, even if his vote was not necessary
municipality, the necessity of notice is dispensed with. (Russell vs. Wellington, 157 to a decision. Thus the action of the common council of a city in
Mass., 100; Lord vs. City of Anoka, 36 Minn., 176.) determining an election contest according to the weight of conflicting
evidence is judicial in its nature, and a contestant is disqualified to sit as a
But it must be noted that the question here is not concerned with the legality of any member of the council in the determination of the contest. His
resolution adopted by the council at that special meeting. The question is whether participation makes the proceedings invalid even if the decision reached
or not that meeting of the council in which there was a quorum of the absence or did not depend upon his vote. (19 R. C. L., 897 and cases cited.)
inability of the municipal president on account of the absence or inability of the
municipal president (or of both causes) was a meeting the disturbance and We find no valid excuse, exempting the defendants from the criminal responsibility
interruption of which should be punished. This is, in our opinion, the point at issue arising from the acts committed by them. With regard to the accused Victorio
in this case. Alemus, it is no valid justification for him to have acted by virtue of an order
received from is coaccused, because said order was unlawful..
The legality of that meeting is attacked on the ground of lack of notice to some
members of the council. Nobody has the right to dissolve, through violence, the We find no error in the judgment appealed from, except as regards the
meeting of a council under the present of the existence of such a legal defect which denomination of the crime and the imposition of the penalty.
was not apparent, but required an investigation before it could be determined. Any
stranger, even if he be the municipal president himself or the chief of the municipal The information charges the accused with the crime of coercion and the trial court
police, must respect the meeting of the municipal council which for the time being, found them guilty of arbitrary detention as a means to commit coercion. We are of
at least, raises the presumption that no defect exists to render it illegal. That the opinion that the law violated by the accused is Act No. 1755, which in its
meeting of the municipal council was entitled too this respect on the part of the section 1, says:
 Any person who willfully or by force or fraud prevent or attempts to 828)
prevent the meeting of the Philippine Commission or the organizing or
meeting of the Philippine Assembly or of any Insular legislative body of
the Philippine Islands hereafter established, or the meeting or organizing FACTS:
of any provincial board or municipal or township council, and any person The question raised in this case is the scope to be accorded the constitutional
who willfully disturbs the Philippine Commission or the Philippine immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the
Assembly, or in Insular legislative body of the Philippine Islands hereafter sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of
established, or any provincial board or municipal or township council, treason, felony and breach of the peace.
while in session, or who is guilty of any disorderly conduct in the
immediate view or presence of any such body tending to interrupt the Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista are facing criminal
proceedings of such body or to impair the respect due to its authority, prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of a public document before
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos or by the sala of Judge Morfe. The basis of the case against him was his statement under
imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both, in the discretion of oath that he was born on June 20, 1945 instead of June 20, 1946. On the other
the court. hand, Bautista was charged for violation of the Revised Election Code. Bautista
was accused to be in violation of Section 51 of the RPC when he gave and
And in view of the allegations contained in the information herein, the accused distributed free of charge food, drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings. Thus,
may, and must, be convicted of a violation of said section 1 of this Act and the petitioners, as delegates of the 1972 Constitutional Convention invoke what
punished accordingly. they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if
considered in connection with Article 145 of the RPC penalizing a public officer or
Regard being had of the gravity of the act committed, as well as the respective employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, “arrest or search any member
condition and position of the accused, Exequiel Alipit is hereby sentenced to three thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under the
years' imprisonment and Victorio Alemus to one years' imprisonment, with the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
costs against them. The judgment appealed from being thus modified, the
defendants are found guilty of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 1755 and The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent judges in the case at bar,
punishable with the penalty thereby provided. So ordered disputed such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not
cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil
cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal
Art. 144 – Disturbance of proceedings Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very
least inoperative.
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669. April 14, 2004||| (Decena v. Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-
02-1669 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 00-961-RTJ] (Resolution), April 14, 2004, 471  
PHIL 52-65
Art. 145 – Violation of parliamentary immunity ISSUE:  Whether Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.

Martinez y Festin v. Morfe, G.R. No. L-34022, [March 24, 1972], 150 PHIL 809-  
HELD: Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan Taguit, Rizal. 2 It was then mentioned that Alonto,
No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides that immunity from arrest Jr., a grantee of a fellowship to pursue post graduate studies as a candidate for the
does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Philippines, Los Baños,
exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies majoring in Community Development, 3 was not under investigation, much less
giving them aid and comfort. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether indicted for any offense. The petition was not filed until after the lapse of 203 days,
defined by the RPC or any special statute. but still no charges of any nature whatsoever had been filed against him. 4
Moreover, on December 15, 1979, "respondent Minister of National Defense issued
Any person who acted against public peace is susceptible to prosecution. There is a an order releasing from military custody one hundred fifty-five (155) of the original
full recognition of necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates group of detainees" and subsequently twenty-four (24) more, thus leaving Alonto,
to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to Jr. as the sole individual arrested on that occasion remaining in detention. 5
discharge their vital responsibilities.
The version of respondents, as could be expected, was quite different. They
In this case, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista were arrested fall under the justified his detention for having taken part in "an illegal assembly and
category of “breach of peace,” therefore, they cannot invoke the privilege from demonstration at the Luneta on November 30, 1979, without the necessary permit,"
arrest provision of the Constitution. purportedly to voice their support to the stand of the Iranians against President
Jimmy Carter of the United States. 6 It was the refusal to disperse, there being no
permit, that led, accordingly, to their being arrested and thus confined at Camp
Art. 146 – Illegal assemblies Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila, "pursuant to Commitment Orders dated
December 1, 1979 issued by Lt. Col. Julian A. Alzaga, PC Metrocom Staff Judge
Alonto v. Enrile, G.R. No. 54095, [July 25, 1980], 187 PHIL 509-518 Advocate, who found, after investigation, that they committed the crime of illegal
assembly ..." 7 Thereafter, an arrest, search and seizure order against Ahmad
It is a noteworthy feature of this application for a writ of habeas corpus that when, Alonto, Jr. and the other persons detained was issued by respondent Minister of
presumably, the attention of the President of the Philippines was invited to a National Defense. 8 It was then set forth that "for purely humanitarian
possible unfairness being committed that may give rise to a question of denial of considerations, it appearing that majority of the detainees are students of various
equal protection where all other individuals arrested on the same occasion had been universities/colleges in Metro Manila, all the others except the leader of the
freed, he acted expeditiously. The temporary release was ordered, hence imparting demonstration, Ahmad Engracia Alonto, J.," were released. 9 In their prayer for
a moot and academic aspect to the matter. dismissal of the petition for the writ, reliance was ultimately placed on the issuance
of an arrest, search and seizure order, which had the effect, so it was contended,
It was alleged in the petitioner that Ahmad Alonto, Jr. was, on November 30, 1979, that the persons arrested would remain in detention until otherwise ordered released
one of those along with 179 other Muslim youths assembled in front of the Quirino by the President or the Minister of National Defense. 10
Grandstand in Luneta, Rizal Park, Manila, for the purpose of discussing matters of
common interest to all followers of Islam, more specifically, as they may be The petition was filed on June 23, 1980. The next day was a holiday for Metro
affected by government policies. 1 It was then set forth that military personnel Manila. The next session en banc did take place on June 26, 1980, on which
carrying out the instructions of respondent Minister of National Defense, placed occasion this Court issued the writ, respondents being ordered to make a return on
them under arrest and brought them for confinement in the detention premises of or before July 1, 1980, with the hearing set for Thursday, July 3, 1980.
Accordingly, the parties were heard and the matter argued. Thereafter, the petition
was submitted for decision. People v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 36278, [October 26, 1932], 57 PHIL 375-380

Then came on July 15, 1980, this Manifestation signed by Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza. 11 It reads as follows: "1. Upon orders of the President, Crisanto Evangelista, Jacinto G. Manahan, Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P.
petitioner Ahmad Alonto, Jr. was temporarily released from detention at 11:00 in Balgos, Enrique Torrente, Urbano Arcega, Catalino Monroy, Francisco Rafael,
the morning on July 11, 1980 and entrusted to the custody of his brother, Albert Sotero Senson, Remigio Tolentino, Dominador B. Reyes, Emilio S. Juan, Alberto
Alonto; 2. With this development, the petition for habeas corpus seeking the release Santos, Juan Lagman, Andres Santiago, Angel Mesina, Felipe Cruz, Maximo M.
of petitioner from the custody of respondent has become academic." 12 Gutierrez, Dominador J. Ambrosio, Cenon Lacanienta, Mateo del Castillo,
Norberto Nabong, Sixto Estrada, Augusto David, Doroteo Cahumban, Jose Ilagan,
The prayer was for the petition being dismissed for being academic. There is and Liboro Natividad were accused in the Court of First Instance of the City of
justification for such a plea. Manila of a crime against the fundamental laws of the State, it being alleged in the
information as follows:
This is the the first occasion that a petition of this character has been rendered moot
and academic after the person detained was released. Herrera v. Enrile 13 is the That on or about the 30th day of May, 1931, and for some time prior thereto, the
first of such decisions. Certainly, it reflects credit on the Executive that a plea for above named accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one
freedom is accorded the most serious consideration and that the policy pursued in another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affiliate to,
case of doubt is one of according it deference. It may be understandable if uner the compose and become members of, the so-called Communist Party of the
circumstances obtaining in this case, the exercise of the right of peaceable Philippines (Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas), an illegal association, whose
assembly could have been susceptible to an interpretation that removed such principal purposes and objects are to bring about, by the use of force, the downfall
gathering from the mantle of constitutional protection. Zeal in the performance of of the present form of government and establish in place thereof another patterned
their function could thus explain if it did not fully justify the arrest of persons after the Soviet Government of Russia and run by those affiliated to and in
whose acts could have been equivocal in character and thus possibly violative of sympathy with said association; to incite a revolt of the laboring class, advocating
the Revised Penal Code provision on illegal assemblies. Considering, however, that and urging struggle between said laboring class and the so-called capitalists, and
the prosecuting arm of the government has been quite alert in the discharge of its other similar objects tending to combat the fundamental basis of the present social
responsibility, it is desirable that the civil process be resorted to. At any rate, it order and alter the regularity of its functions and to the commission of violations of
would not be redundant to reiterate that the response of the President, once his the existing laws, which above-mentioned association was formed and organized
attention was called, is indeed gratifying. Thus the writ of habeas corpus has once without the local authorities having been informed of its aforesaid objects and
again proven its worth. 14 purposes as well as of the by-laws thereof; and that at the time and place
hereinabove mentioned, in the furtherance of their conspiracy and in utter disregard
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic of the notice or warning given by the authorities that they could not hold any
meeting anywhere, the said accused assembled, gathered and congregated under the
name and auspices of the Katipunan ng mga Anak pawis sa Pilipinas (Association
of the Sons of the Sweat of the Philippine Islands), another association having the
Art. 147 – Illegal association
same illegal aims and purposes as the said Communist Party of the Philippines, at The appellants have not denied being members of the Communist Party of the
El Retono Building, in said City of Manila." Philippines; on the contrary, Crisanto Evangelista admitted expressly at the trial
that he was affiliated to the said party. As witness for the defense, he testified that
After trial the court below convicted the said accused, with the exception of the objects and purposes of the Communist Party of the Philippines are set out in its
Norberto Nabong, Sixto Estrada, Augusto David, Doroteo Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, constitution and by-laws which purposes and objects, according to said constitution
Liboro Natividad, and Mateo del Castillo, who were acquitted. and by-laws, are to overthrow the present form of government by any means
necessary, especially armed revolution.1awphil.net
Thereafter the convicted accused appealed to this court.
The appellant, Catalino Monroy, admitted having gone to Russia as delegate of the
The accused were charged with the crime of illegal association in the Court of First Kapisanan nang mga Anak pawis to the Red International Labor Union Congress.
Instance of the City of Manila in that on or about the 30th day of May, 1931, and
for some time prior thereto, the said accused affiliated to, and became members of, From the foregoing it is clear that the twenty appellants herein are or were
the so-called Communist Party of the Philippines whose principal purposes and members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, for all of them, with the
object were to bring about by force the downfall of the present form of government exception of Balgos and Lacanienta, presented themselves as candidates in the last
and establish in its place another patterned after the Soviet Government of Russia, general elections as communists, and said Balgos and Lacanienta, as well as many
and to incite a revolt of the laboring class. of those mentioned, delivered speeches at several meetings held under the auspices
of the said Communist Party, advocating communism and urging the laborers to
After the trial the court below convicted the said accused, with the exception of affiliate to the said party. If any one of these appellants were not a member of the
Norberto Nabong, Sixto Estrada, Augusto David, Doroteo Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, Communist Party, it would have been very easy for him to deny it, but no one has
Liboro Natividad, and Mateo del Castillo, who were acquitted. so done.

It appears that the appellants, Evangelista, Manahan, Capadocia, Torrente, Arcega, The principal defense set up by the appellants is that the Communist Party of the
Monroy, Rafael, Senson, Tolentino, Reyes, San Juan, Santos, Lagman, Santiago, Philippines is not an illegal association in that it preaches only a social but not an
Mesina, Cruz, Gutierrez, and Ambrosio, presented themselves as candidates of the armed revolution, but a mere reading of the constitution of the Communist Party
Communist Party for different offices — insular, provincial and municipal — in will show that such a pretense is obviously useless. Neither is there any merit in the
the last elections; that the accused Mariano P. Balgos, Cenon Lacanienta and some appellant's argument that communism is not prohibited in any part of the civilized
of those who campaigned for their candidacies as members of the Communist world. And as to the validity of the law prohibiting communism, the Supreme
Party, delivered speeches at several meetings of the Communist Party, advocating Court of the United States upheld the law of California prohibiting the display of
the ideas and principles of the said Communist Party and urging the laborers to join the communist red flag as a sign inciting sedition and disorderly opposition to the
it. government.

It also appears that the appellant Enrique Torrente appears in the newspaper known Under the law of the Philippine Islands, the association formed by the appellants is
as Titis, an organ of the Communist Party, as the editor thereof. clearly illegal. Article 188 of the Penal Code, as substituted by article 24 of the
Royal Decree of September 12, 1897 (Alcubilla, Diccionario de Administracion,
Apendice de 1897, p. 454), says that illegal associations are those the object of
which is against public morals, to commit some crime, or to attack the fundamental That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, at
basis of the social order or alter the regularity of its functions. Now, according to Barangay Nailon, Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
appellant Crisanto Evangelista and the constitution and by-laws of the Communist the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and
Party of the Philippines, the purpose of the party is to incite class struggle and to there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, employ force and
overthrow the present government by peaceful means or by armed revolution; seriously intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom teacher of Nailon
therefore the purpose of the party is to alter the social order and to commit the Elementary School while in the performance of official duties and functions as
crimes of rebellion and sedition. An association having such an object must such which acts consequently caused the unintentional abortion upon the person of
necessarily be illegal (decision of Oct. 8, 1884, of the Supreme Court of Spain, 7 the said Gemma S. Micarsos.
Hidalgo, Cod. Pen., 531-532.) The report submitted by Secretary Hughes to the
Senate of the United States, as well as that made by Hamilton Fish, after an CONTRARY TO LAW.
investigation of communism, leads to the same conclusion, namely, that force and
violence are inseparable from communist programs. Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The last point made by the appellants is relative to the penalty imposed. The trial The Prosecution’s Version
court imposed the penalty of confinamiento for the period of eight years and one
day, as provided by paragraph 5, article 190 of the old Penal Code, as substituted Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school
by article 26 of the Royal Decree of September 12, 1897, in connection with teachers at the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydia’s son,
articles 28 and 114 of the same Code. The appellants contend that this is erroneous Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to this case.
because the Revised Penal Code has eliminated this kind of penalty. But there is no
merit in this argument, because the act took place under the sanction of the old On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Lydia confronted
Code, and the penalty of confinamiento, therein provided for, is lighter than that Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in
provided by the new Code in its article 147, which is prision correccional and class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to
arresto mayor and fine. fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia’s violent assault, Gemma suffered a
contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate 5 issued by a
doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience
abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28,
Art. 148 – Direct assaults 1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her
surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate 6
1. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, [July 28, 2010], 640 was issued.

Factual Antecedents The Defense’s Version

On June 6, 1982, an Information4 was filed charging Lydia with Direct Assault Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain from calling
with Unintentional Abortion committed as follows: her son names, so that his classmates will not follow suit. However, Gemma
proceeded to attack her by holding her hands and kicking her. She was therefore Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
forced to retaliate by pushing Gemma against the wall. shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. The maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is
committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or
Issues when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these
circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the following as errors: and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.1avvphi1

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against
Slight Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arresto menor minimum of ten days. who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
convicted of Slight Physical Injuries under the information charging her for Direct shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority
Assault with Unintentional Abortion.12 or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on
occasion of such performance.14
Our Ruling
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of
The petition lacks merit. assault. Its elements are:

When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his 1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
for appellate review. We are then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate in the exercise of our concomitant authority to review and sift 2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
through the whole case to correct any error, even if unassigned. 13
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is
assault with unintentional abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized under assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision reads as follows:
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
 4. That there is no public uprising.15 functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they
could talk properly,17 but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the invectives. When Lydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely
performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the
supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider while
classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered she was going to the principal’s office. No fault could therefore be attributed to
the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to be Gemma.
pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that
enraged the victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principal’s office but Lydia The prosecution’s success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct
followed and resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall assault does not necessarily mean that the same physical force she employed on
divider. The violent act resulted in Gemma’s fall to the floor. Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence
on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical
expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The certificate of Gemma’s attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was
pertinent portion of the provision reads as follows: presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the
document to prove that her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority – Who shall be 17, 1981 incident.18 It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca
deemed as such. – since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydia’s assault and
Gemma’s abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact
xxxx effect of the assault on Gemma’s abortion.

In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981
private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus
their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and
persons in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not substantiated by proof
12, 1985).16 other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been
the result of other factors.
Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be The Proper Penalty
consequently overruled in setting aside the trial court’s verdict. It erred in declaring
that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
person in authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly descended to the of direct assault, she must suffer the penalty imposed by law. The penalty for this
level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the crime is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official exceeding ₱1,000.00, when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when
the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. 19 Here, Lydia is a public officer drenched in his own blood.The accused expressly waived his right to present
or employee since she is a teacher in a public school. By slapping and pushing evidence in his defense.
Gemma, another teacher, she laid her hands on a person in authority.1avvphi1
ISSUE:
The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence of mitigating or Whether the appellant have the knowledge that the victim is in person in authority?
aggravating circumstances.20 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 21 the
petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is RULING: No.
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., arresto mayor in its As correctly mandated by the defense and the Solicitor General, the crime of direct
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, and the maximum assault upon an agent of a person in authority has not been established by evidence
of which is that properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision beyond reasonable doubt. The record is bereft of any proof even remotely
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. suggesting that the accused herein knew that the victim was then performing his
official functions as police sergeant. The victim was not in uniform at the time. As
shown by pictures,the deceased was then wearing dark pants and a polo shirt
PHIL 109-120,G.R. tucked inside his waistline. While the deceased then had his service firearm
No. L-28574. October 24, 1970. buttoned inside its holster hanging by his right waist, and was then with two of his
policemen, these facts alone do not indicate that he was then in the performance of
2. People v. Villaseñor y Cordero, G.R. No. L-28574, October 24, 1970 his police duties. And there is no showing that the accused appellant personally
knew of the entry in the police blotter that deceased was then on twenty-four-hour
FACTS: duty as field sergeant. Much less is there proof that the assault on the victim was
provoked, or by reason of an act performed, by the victim in his official capacity.
In 1964, he was detailed as field sergeant of a twenty-four-hour duty, which detail
was recorded in the police blotter. At about eight o'clock in the evening of April 26, 3. People v. Vibal, Jr. y Uayan, G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018
1964, Sergeant Madla, together with patrolmen Serafin Sebua and Lope Jimena,
was patrolling the market place of Boac. They were seated in a row with their Version of the Prosecution
backs to and near the wall of the Salvo drugstore.
While the three were conversing between 8:00 and 8:30 that evening, the accussed The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the prosecution in
suddenly appeared about three feet in front of them with a drawn gun, asked this wise:
Sergeant Madla whether he was still mad at him, and lately fired four shots at On May 10, 2005, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, PO3 Wilfredo
Madla before the latter could reply and before anyone of them could do anything Almendras, together with PO2 Binmaot and PO2 Erwin Rivera, and two (2) other
fearing that they might be hit, policemen Jimena and Sebua ran away, with civilian escorts, was with Mayor Leon Arcillas at the 2nd floor of the Municipal
patrolman Sebua seeking cover in a refreshment parlor. Patrolman Sebua heard City Hall of Sta. Rosa City. The police officers were assigned as security escorts of
three more shots. Thereafter, he saw the accused fleeing towards the direction of the Mayor. Mayor Arcillas was then solemnizing marriages. The ceremony ended
the Municipality of Mogpog. After the accused had gone, patrolman Sebua and at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning. The Mayor then proceeded to the Office of
Jimena returned to the place of the incident, and Sergeant Madla lying on his back the Commission on Audit (COA) located at the same floor. While they were going
out of the room where the ceremony was conducted, PO3 Almendras noticed that
they were being followed by two (2) young kids. After spending a moment in the were members of the gang called Royal Blood Gangsta.
COA office, the group then proceeded to the Office of the Mayor. On their way to
said Office, gunshots were fired on them. PO3 Almendras was not able to pull out Dr. Roy A. Camarillo, the medico-legal officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory
his gun since there was a rapid fire coming from their front and back. He, PO2 at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, conducted the autopsy of the cadaver[s]
Rivera and the Mayor sustained gunshots wounds. The three (3) fell to the ground. of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera. Based from the medico-legal report, Mayor
While on the floor, PO3 Almendras heard three (3) more gunshots before he felt Arcillas sustained three (3) gunshot wounds, the fatal of which are the 2 gunshots
dizzy. Thereafter, PO3 Almendras and Mayor Arcillas were brought to the hospital. in his head. PO2 Rivera, on the other hand, sustained two (2) gunshot wounds, on
the nape and chest, the latter being the fatal one that caused the death of the victim.
At that time, SPO1 Victoriano Peria, received a call from an unknown caller
reporting that a shooting incident took place inside the Municipal building. PO3 Almendras was examined and found to have fracture at the left forearm and
weakness of the right hand.3
Upon reaching the municipal hall, he saw Mayor Arcillas bloodied and being Version of the Defense
carried out by several men and was put inside the vehicle. In the second floor, he
saw PO2 Erwin Rivera lying near the door already dead, while the other victim The defense, on the other hand, relates its version of the facts in this manner:
PO3 Almendras was brought to the hospital. On 10 May 2005 at 10:00 o'clock a.m., accused ARNOLD DAVID was at Tanay,
Rizal, where he has been staying since October 2004 as requested by his father
The team searched the whole building of the City Hall for possible apprehension of because he was accused of murder in a gang war that happened at GMA, Cavite.
the culprits, but to no avail. Thus, Regional Director P/Chief Supt. Jesus Versoza
He was then arrested on 19 December 2006 in connection with a case in GMA,
created a special investigating task force composed of the NBI, CIDG, Regional
Intelligence Unit, SOCO and Laguna Investigation Division to conduct an Cavite, where he was brought somewhere blindfolded. On 2 January 2007, SPO1
investigation to ascertain the identity of the assailants. Peria arrived and showed him photographs of the gang, but he denied he was in
these. He denied knowing Cipriano Refrea, Jr. prior to his arrest, knowing only the
During the investigation, Cipriano Refrea appeared and told SPO1 Peria that latter at the police station.
accused-appellants Vibal and David were his companions when the killing
transpired. Refrea pointed to them as the gunmen. After knowing from Refrea the Accused HERMINIO VIBAL, JR. likewise denied participation in the incident that
identity of accused-appellant Vibal, SPO1 Peria asked his whereabouts. He came to
happened on 10 May 2005. He claimed that on that date, at 10:30 o'clock a.m., he
know that accused-appellant Vibal was presently detained at the Trece Martirez.
SPO1 Peria, together with the other policemen visited Vibal, and when asked about was at GMA, Cavite, with his family, including his sister, LORELYN CORONEL,
his participation on the shooting incident, he at first denied his participation, but and did not leave until afternoon. In February 2006, he was arrested and detained at
later on admitted to his participation. the Cavite Provincial Jail in relation to prior cases. In December 2006, SPO1 Peria
visited him and asked about the death of Reynaldo Cesar, to which Vibal denied.
With respect to the identity of accused-appellant David, they came to know that he SPO1 Peria later took Vibal's photograph and left. He was visited again by SPO1
was detained at GMA, Cavite. Peria and asked if he had any participation in the death of Mayor Arcillas. Again,
Vibal denied. SPO1 Peria once again visited Vibal, this time with PO3 Almendras.
In his investigation, SPO1 Peria was able to ascertain that Vibal, David and Refrea
The latter asked Vibal if he knew him, but Vibal could not answer as he was sick at
the time. He was again photographed. In January 2007, he was again visited by The cause of the prosecution draws its strength on the positive identification by
SPO1 Peria and PO3 Almendras, who were now with Cipriano Refrea, Jr. and who PO3 Almendras, pinpointing to appellants Vibal and David as the perpetrators of
the gruesome killing of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera and who inflicted gunshot
was asked to point at Vibal. Another photograph was taken of Vibal. Prior to this
wounds upon him. PO3 Almendras vividly recounted before the RTC the
meeting, Vibal did not know who Refrea was.4 appellants' respective positions and participation in the shooting incident, having
been able to witness closely how they committed the crime, more so because the
The Court's Ruling
crime happened in the morning when conditions of visibility are very much
favorable. He had a close and unobstructed view of the incident and was able to
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence adduced by take a good glimpse and recognize the faces of the gunmen as the same two young
the parties, the Court finds this appeal to be absolutely without merit. males he saw earlier in the day following his group. Hailed to the witness stand,
PO3 Almendras stuck to the essentials of his story, and without any hesitation,
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things: (1) the fact pointed to Vibal and David as the two culprits, which thus eliminated any
of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the possibility of mistaken identification. Jurisprudence recognizes that victims of
accused stands charged, and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime have a penchant for seeing the faces and features of their attackers, and
crime.11 When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the remembering them
identity of the perpetrator of the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no Here, Mayor Arcillas was a duly elected mayor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna and thus, was
conviction even if the commission of the crime is established. 12 Apart from a person in authority while PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almendras were agents of a
showing the existence and commission of a crime, the State has the burden to person in authority. There is no dispute that all of the three victims were in the
correctly identify the author of such crime. Both facts must be proved by the State performance of their official duties at the time of the shooting incident. Mayor
beyond cavil of a doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the Arcillas was inside the Sta. Rosa City Hall officiating a mass wedding, and
weakness of the defense.13 thereafter, while he was walking along the hallway from the COA office to his
office, he was shot and killed. Victim PO2 Rivera and private complainant PO3
Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt Almendras were likewise performing their duty of protecting and guarding Mayor
before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty or Arcillas at the time of the shooting incident. Appellants' conduct of attacking the
even property. As every crime must be established beyond reasonable doubt, it is victims inside the Sta. Rosa City Hall clearly showed their criminal intent to assault
also paramount to prove, with the same quantum of evidence, the identity of the and injure the agents of the law.
culprit. It is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless
an accused has been positively identified. When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in authority for
that matter, there arises the complex crime of Direct Assault with murder or
In the case at bench, the RTC and the CA were one in declaring that the homicide.23 Here, treachery qualified the killing of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera
identification of appellants Vibal and David as the gunmen based on the to murder. Treachery also attended the shooting of PO3 Almendras. There is
recognition of PO3 Almendras was clear, worthy of credence and has met the treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz.: (a) at the time of
requirements of moral certainty. The Court agrees, and finds no cogent reason to the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused
disturb this conclusion of the RTC as affirmed by the CA. consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of
attack employed by him.24 The essence of treachery lies in the suddenness of the FACTS:
attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional
chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring the commission of the offense Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of
might make.25 Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended
In the case at bench, the shooting was deliberate and without a warning, done in a by Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide.
swift and unexpected manner. Mayor Arcillas, PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almendras The following information was provided by the prosecution:
were absolutely unaware of the imminent deadly assaults, and were for that reason
in no position to defend themselves or to repel their assailants. Vibal and David, 1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen
who were armed with guns, suddenly appeared in front and at the back of Mayor proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when
Arcillas, PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almedras and shot the three victims. The gunshots they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from the second floor of the said
that came from the front of the victims were fired by Vibal, while those that came house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards them.
from behind them were fired by David. 26 Said manner of attack clearly revealed 2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor
appellants' deliberate design to thereby ensure the accomplishment of their purpose where they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the
to kill or injure the three victims without any possibility of their escape or of any appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. He was
retaliation from them. subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellant’s house. Also
Conspiracy is very much evident from the actuations of the appellants. They were found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each
synchronized in their approach to shoot Mayor Arcillas and his group. The containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
concerted efforts of the appellants were performed with closeness and coordination, 4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant
indicating a single criminal impulse - to kill the victims. Conspiracy may be yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates.
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or 5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when these point to a joint purpose firearm and ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.
and design, concerted action and community of interest. 27 The ascertainment of
who among appellants actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims ISSUE:
already becomes immaterial. Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
the present case, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the aggravating circumstance.
extent and character of their participation because, in contemplation of law, the act
of one is the act of all.28 HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall
unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other
crime was committed”. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is committed with the
4. People v. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, [September 19, 2000], use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered
as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and
not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an requested an extension of time to do so, which expired on September 18, 1975.
aggravating circumstance.
The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1915 duly observed that" (I)t
is patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There is want
5. Velbes y Aquino v. People, G.R. No. 213747 (Notice), [October 22, 2014 of factual finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have been
based."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. ||| People v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, G.R. No. L-41045
(Resolution), November 28, 1975, 160-A PHIL 959-962 It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal’s contention, the information
was deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime of direct
assault that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority held by
The petition filed by the provincial fiscal of Quezon on behalf of the People seeks a the person attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a
review on certiorari of the "decision" of respondent court dated June 17, 1975, person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
acquitting private respondents as accused in the information filed against them for Republic Act No. 1978). 1
direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority "not for any other reason than
the fact that the information under which they are being tried charges no offense at What was held in People v. Balbar, 21 SCRA, 1119, 1123, cited by the fiscal is that
Honorable Filemon O. Juntereal (now deceased) then presiding judge of respondent it is sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the position of
court, after summarizing in his "decision" the testimonies of the prosecution and authority, held by the offended party, in that case a public school teacher, then
defense witnesses expressly held in his "decision" that. engaged in the performance of her official duties, and that it is not necessary to
allege further that the accused also knew that such position was that of a person in
"This case need not be decided on the merits of the respective contentions of the authority, since "this is a matter of law" thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
prosecution and the defense. No attempt will be made on this point.
"Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused
"Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of
information that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and that her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by
such fact was known to the accused. The absence of such allegation is fatal in this specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is not
case."cralaw virtua1aw library expressly alleged, complainant’s status as a person in authority being a matter of
law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his
and issued his verdict above quoted that the information charges no offense at all. part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws,
whether civil or penal (De Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15 and whether substantive or
The trial judge correctly cited People v. Austria, 94 Phil. 900, in support of his remedial (Zulueta v. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and
action, but failed to follow the correct procedure indicated therein of simply necessity." (emphasis furnished)
dismissing the information for failure to charge an offense, so that the fiscal could
properly file a valid information charging the offense. Since the "decision" of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for
failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with factual
Private respondents failed to comment on the petition despite their counsel having findings as per the trial judge’s own disavowal, it is patent that the fiscal’s proper
course is not the present petition but the refiling of a valid information against the scene; and that when they saw him and learned that the men who had entered
respondents-accused, as herein indicated. the house in plain clothes were police officers, they promptly surrendered and
offered no further resistance.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed, without prejudice to the refiling of a
valid information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated. The witness for the prosecution and for the defense contradict each other in
practically every detail of their accounts of what occurred, except that all of the
Art. 152 – Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority witnesses agree that the two Constabulary soldiers entered the house in plain
clothes; that immediately thereafter a violent altercation arose; and that all of the
1. U.S. v. Alvear, G.R. No. 11941, [December 7, 1916], 35 PHIL 626-630 accused promptly surrendered and offered no further resistance when the third
Constabulary soldier in uniform came up into the house and put them under arrest.
Each of the five appellants in this case, two of whom are women, was convicted in
the court below of the crime of atentado contra los agentes de la autoridad (assault Upon a careful examination of all the evidence of record we think that there is at
upon agents in authority) and sentenced to one year eight months and twenty-one least a reasonable doubt that these accused knew or had reason to know that the
days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of five hundred pesetas. two Constabulary soldiers who first entered the house in plain clothes were police
officers until the third soldier entered in uniform.
The prosecution undertook to prove that a Constabulary sergeant and a soldier, who
were duly provided with a search warrant, entered the house where the accused The police officers claim that they read, or at least began to read a search warrant
were arrested for the purpose of searching for opium; that immediately upon immediately after they entered the house; but upon the whole record, and having in
entering the house, the sergeant proceeded to read the search warrant to those mind the fact that they entered the house in plain clothes evidently for the purpose
whom he found within; that the occupants of the house fell upon the two soldiers, of surprising the occupants, we think the weight of the evidence tends to disclose
violently assaulted them, snatched the search warrant from the sergeant while he that whatever may have been their intentions as to the reading of the search
was reading it, threw the soldier out of one of the windows, and only desisted from warrant, they attempted, before disclosing their authority to enter the house, to
their assault upon the sergeant when a uniformed Constabulary soldier, armed with compel the occupants to stay still, lest they might conceal or get rid of the opium
a gun, who had been left on guard outside, came up into the house and arrested the for which the search was made; that to this end they used physical force and threats
participants in the assault. with a revolver against two of the accused, one of whom was a woman; that the
cries of the woman brought her son and others to her rescue; and that as a result the
The accused and their witnesses testifying for the defense swore that the two police fight was precipitated before the police officers had time to make themselves
officers entered the house in plain clothes; that the moment they entered one of known as such.
them seized and held one of the accused women, at the same time drawing and
brandishing a revolver, while the other threw himself upon another of the accused A conviction of the grave offense of atentado (assault upon or resistance offered to
who was sitting in a chair near by; that the woman cried loudly for help; that her persons in authority or their agents) cannot be sustained in any case in which a
son and some others came to her rescue; that a fight followed, which was reasonable doubt arises as to whether the accused knew or ought to have known
terminated by the arrival of a uniformed Constabulary soldier who put the accused that the persons assaulted or resisted were in fact persons in authority or their
under arrest; that they did not know that the two Constabulary soldiers who first agents; provided that the assault or resistance offered would have been justifiable in
entered were police officers until the uniformed Constabulary soldier appeared on the event that the persons assaulted or resisted had not been persons in authority or
their agents. (Art. 1, Penal Code.)
"That on or about September 30, 1932, in the municipality of San Fernando,
That these accused assaulted and resisted the police officers who entered the house Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Ricardo Mendoza,
in plain clothes is not denied; but the assault and resistance would have been being a pupil of the teacher Iluminada Tinio, did then and there willfully,
wholly justifiable if these men had been what they seemed to be to the occupants of unlawfully and criminally attack and lay hands upon her person, to wit: slapped
the house; that is to say, two strangers, who without lawful authority had entered said Iluminada Tinio on one of her cheeks, while she was engaged in the
the house and physically assaulted the first man and woman they found there, at the performance of her duties as such teacher and while she was within the premises of
same time threatening their victims with a revolver if they moved or gave an alarm. the high school building exercising the functions inherent in such capacity."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The exemption from criminal liability which is extended to anyone who acts in Upon motion of the appellee, as accused in the aforesaid case, the trial court
defense of his own person or rights from unlawful aggression, under article 8 of the dismissed the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
Penal Code must be held to include one who assaults or resists a police officer constitute a crime but simply a misdemeanor or light felony. The present appeal
under circumstances which would justify the assault or resistance, if the person was taken by the fiscal for the purpose of setting aside the order of dismissal in
assaulted were not a police officer in the lawful performance of his duties, when it question.
further appears that the person making the assault did not know, and had no
reasonable grounds to believe, that the person assaulted was a police officer acting The question to decide, therefore, is whether or not the facts as alleged in the said
in the performance of his duties as such. (U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. Rep., 488.) information really constitute the crime of assault upon a person in authority or at
least an assault upon an agent of authority, or any other grave or light felony.
The judgment convicting and sentencing the appellants should be reversed, and
they should be acquitted of the crime with which they are charged in the The fiscal bases his appeal on the findings of this court in the cases of People v.
information and their bail exonerated, with the costs of both instances de officio. Villacenda (G.R. No. 32596, promulgated April 26, 1930, not reported); People v.
So ordered. Lagrimas (G.R. No. 33529, promulgated April 8, 1931, not reported); and People v.
Tacud (56 Phil., 800) wherein a question similar to the one under consideration was
[G.R. No. 39275. December 20, 1933.] discussed and decided, claiming that the facts as alleged in the information
Prior amendment of Article 152 constitute an assault upon a public officer and agent of authority at the same time.

2. People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 39275, [December 20, 1933], 59 PHIL 163-173) In the three cases above-cited, this court, in modifying one and affirming two of the
judgments rendered by the courts a quo, really held that the acts committed by the
In criminal case No. 4851 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the defendants therein constituted the crime of assault upon a public officer and,
provincial fiscal thereof filed an information against the herein appellee, which therefore, they should be sentenced to the penalty prescribed in article 251 of the
reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph old Penal Code. The reason for such doctrine is base on the fact that the said
article, as explained in the case of People v. Mijares (44 Phil., 684), provided as
"The undersigned provision fiscal accuses Ricardo Mendoza of the crime of assault follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
upon a person in authority committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The maximum degree of the penalty prescribed in the last paragraph of the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property,
preceding article shall be imposed upon those who shall have employed the force and those who come to the aid of persons in authority.
or the intimidation mentioned in No. 1 of article 249 for the object indicated in No.
1 of article 229 or who shall have placed hands upon persons coming to the It is true that Viada said that by implication and in accordance with the final section
assistance of authority or upon its agents or upon public officers."cralaw virtua1aw of article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code, which corresponds to the aforesaid article
library 251 of our old Penal Code, it may be affirmed that for the purposes of said article,
public officers are also entitled to be considered as agents of authority. However,
Inasmuch as the afore-cited article was in force at the time the decisions in the such consideration was due to the fact that assault upon public officers was
three cases were promulgated and the acts complained of therein had been penalized likewise in the said article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code.
committed long before the present Revised Penal Code went into effect, it was
necessary that the defendants and appellants in the aforesaid cases be convicted of A teacher is not a person in authority on the ground that he does not possess the
the crimes with which they had been charged and sentenced later to the penalty necessary requisite therefor prescribed by law. Article 152 of the Revised Penal
prescribed in the afore-cited article. The reason is obvious because said acts Code defines a person in authority as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
constituted a violation of the article in question, as held by this court.
"In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any
However, the truth is that said article 251 was not fully reproduced in the Revised person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of
Penal Code as shown by article 149 thereof. The article in question now reads as some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph person in authority."cralaw virtua1aw library

"The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine The word "authority" has been given a restricted meaning in the case of United
not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon an person who shall make use of States v. Smith (39 Phil., 533), so as to include only persons who perform some of
force or intimidation upon any person coming to the aid of the authorities or their the functions of the Government of the Philippine Islands and who, according to
agents on occasion of the commission of any of the crimes defined in the next the aforesaid article, are directly vested with jurisdiction. By "directly vested
preceding article."cralaw virtua1aw library jurisdiction" is meant "the power or authority to govern and execute the laws,
particularly the authority vested in the judges to administer justice, that is, to try
It will be noted that the Legislature suppressed and omitted all reference to public civil or criminal cases or both, and to render judgment thereon in accordance with
officers in the article just cited, which necessarily conveys the idea that it did not the law" (Escriche, Rational Dictionary of Legislation and Jurisprudence, p. 1154);
intend to make the same applicable to cases of assault upon public officers who are and "authority" as well as "directly vested jurisdiction" are two things which should
not persons in authority or agents thereof. And there cannot be the least shadow of be conferred by law.
a doubt that a teacher is not a person in authority in the strict sense of the phrase, as
employed in article 148, on the ground that he does not exercise a directly vested The Administrative Code, which creates the Executive Department and the bureaus
jurisdiction. Neither is he an agent of authority on the ground that, as has been held and offices dependent on it, for the purpose of exercising the executive functions of
in the case of United States v. Fortaleza (12 Phil., 472), wherein Viada was cited in the Government of the Philippine Islands, is silent with regard to powers had or
support thereof, agents of authority are only those persons who, by direct provision which may be had by high school teachers, in defining those vested in functionaries
of law, or by appointment by competent authority, are charged with the of the aforesaid offices. The Code in question only defines the duties and powers of
the Director of Education and of the division superintendents. Nothing is said about
principals, except that their authority should be determined by the Director of "Are public officers agents of persons in authority? If not, may they be the subject
Education, and much less about high school teachers. The powers granted to the of assault although they are not included in article 263 which describes and defines
said Director of Education and division superintendents are very limited and are not said crime? And if they should be so, in the case stated in the last paragraph of
for purposes of government nor execution of any law, but only as provided for in article 264, shall it be understood that may also be, in all the cases relative to
section 910 et seq. of the aforesaid Code. persons in authority and their agents as stated in article 263? To decide these
questions, it is necessary to know beforehand who are public officers. Article 416
There can be no doubt that a teacher is not a person in authority not only on the defines them as: those who, by direct provision of law, popular election, or
grounds already stated but also because the distinction between the two may be appointment by competent authority, take part in the performance of public
inferred clearly from the very provisions of article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. functions. From the above-cited provision, it follows that ever agent of authority is
After defining less serious physical injuries, the law provides as a public officer but not every public officer is an agent of authority. The officers of
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph a ministry and those of provincial governments are public officers inasmuch as they
perform functions intended for the preservation and government of the State, yet in
"Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender’s parents, spite of it, they are not persons in authority nor agents thereof. They are not persons
ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers, or persons of rank, or persons in in authority on the ground that they are not directly vested with jurisdiction either
authority, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium individually or as members of some court or public corporation. They are not
periods, provided that, in the case of persons in authority, the deed does not agents of authority because, as subordinate officers, they are not charged with the
constitute the crime of assault upon such persons."cralaw virtua1aw library task of executing the orders of any such person. This important difference should
be borne in mind so as not to mistake offices for functions.
If the Legislature had not intended to exclude teachers from the category of persons
in authority or agents thereof, it would have omitted them from the enumeration of "The same Code, speaking of the laying of hands upon agents of authority or upon
those against whom the act, as defined therein, may be committed and for which a public officers defines the difference between one and the other. Therefore, an
heavier penalty is provided. agent of authority cannot be confused with a public officer when the legislator
himself speaks of them separately.
There is no question that a teacher is a public officer inasmuch as it is an actual fact
that he performs part of the public functions of the Government. Furthermore, the "Therefore, inasmuch as public officers are not agents of authority, it seems that,
same ruling has been established in the afore-cited cases of Villacenda, Lagrimas generally speaking, they cannot be the subject of the crime of assault, as defined in
and Tacud. However, this cannot be construed to mean the every public officer is at article 263, on the ground that said article considers assault as only those acts
the same time an agent of authority. committed upon persons in authority and their agents, it being silent with regard to
public officers.
Commenting on articles 263 and 264 in connection with article 416 of the Spanish
Penal Code, which correspond to articles 249, 250 and 401, respectively, of our old "It is true that there is a manifest contradiction between the generic doctrine of
Penal Code and from which articles 148, 149 and 203 of the Revised Penal Code article 263 and the specific statement of article 264 relative to penalty. It is true that
had been taken, with slight alterations, although assault upon public officers has if there can never be any crime of assault upon mere public officers for want of one
been omitted in the latter Code, Groizard has said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph of the essential requisites thereof as stated in article 263, neither can the last
paragraph of article 264, relative to public officers, have any application even if the
guilty parties lay hands on them. Yet, what can we do? There is conflict in the law Let it not be said that we did not take into consideration the doctrine laid down in
and it is useless to pretend not to notice it." (Groizard, Penal Code, vol. 3, p. 468.) the case of Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga v. Rosauro (G.R. No. 39289) 1 , for we
had it before us in considering the case at bar. The truth is that there is no similarity
It is for the specific purpose of clarifying the law and eliminating such conflict that between the former and the present case on the ground that although the crime
the Legislature suppressed the phrase "public officers" in enacting article 149 of the alleged therein was "direct assault upon a person in authority" and the offended
Revised Penal Code, which is a reproduction of the afore-cited article 264 of the party therein was a public elementary school teacher acting in the performance of
Spanish Penal Code. It therefore becomes clear that the crime of assault cannot be his duties as such, nevertheless, it was clearly alleged in the body of the complaint
committed against a public officer unless he is a person in authority or agent that the defendant therein gravely intimidated and threatened said teacher. There is
thereof at the same time. no question that, in accordance with the provisions of article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code, the jurisdiction to try cases of grave threats belongs to Courts of First
For further elucidation of the matter, it was held in three decisions of the Supreme Instance by reason of the penalty prescribed therein. Prescinding from the title of
Court of Spain: one of May 7, 1874, another of November 16, 1889, and the other the offense stated in the information under consideration, it is observed from the
of October 8, 1901, that a teacher of a public primary school, a professor in a allegations contained in the body of said pleading that the crime committed is slight
higher school for teachers, and instructors in public primary schools, are public in nature, the trial of which falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
officers. (Jose Garcia and Romero de Tejada, Penal Monographs on Assaults upon court.
Persons in Authority and Their Agents, Resistance and Disobedience, p. 80;
Alcubilla, Dictionary of Spanish Administration, vol. I, p. 742; and Viada, Revised Wherefore, we are of the opinion and so hold that the order of dismissal appealed
Penal Code of 1870, Fourth Supplement, p. 281.) from is in accordance with the law and should therefore be sustain

The afore-cited reasons show that a teacher in neither a person in authority nor an
agent thereof but merely a public officer, and therefore, the assault committed upon Art. 155 – Alarms and scandals
him while he is engaged in the performance of his duties as such does not
constitute assault upon a person in authority nor an agent thereof.
Caliwan v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 183270, [February 13, 2009], 598 PHIL 962-970)
There is no question that the acts complained of, as alleged in the complaint,
constitute light felony, whether they be considered under the provisions of article
359 (Slander by Deed), or of article 266 (Maltreatment) of the Revised Penal Code. The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Secretary of
However, inasmuch as the complaint does not alleged the motive of the defendant Justice are as follows:
in maltreating the aforesaid teacher, in the manner he had so done, nor the fact that
the act was committed publicly, it is more proper and more in accordance with the Rufina Caliwan presents her evidence as follows: On September 4, 2004, at about
law to consider the aforesaid acts as merely constituting light felony as defined and 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while she was singing inside her house and hosting a
penalized in the said article 266, with the third aggravating circumstance. In such party on the occasion of her birthday, stones were thrown on the roof of her house
case, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to try the case by reason of the penalty coming from the direction of SPO4 Mario Ocampo’s house, her neighbor. She
therefor as prescribed by law. reported the incident to the barangay officials, which called the parties for
conciliation. However, the Ocampos refused to appear at the barangay hall. In the evidence, and recommended that petitioner be charged with light threats and slight
evening of that date, Rhodora Pasilona and Ofelia Ocampo, presumably irked by physical injuries. Two separate Informations for light threats and slight physical
her complaint in the barangay, shouted at her defamatory words like "pokpok, puta, injuries were filed against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay
bobo, sira ulo, tarantada" in the presence of her guests, who were still attending the City.
party. Days later, and after the dismissal of the Ocampo’s complaint filed before
the DECS against her, SPO4 Mario Ocampo would make it a point to intercept her Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which issued a Resolution 9
whenever she passes by in front of their house. With threatening looks, he usually dated March 2, 2006 finding a prima facie case and/or probable cause for the
places his hand in the position of drawing his service firearm. offense of light threats against SPO4 Mario Ocampo, and for the offenses of grave
oral defamation and slight physical injuries against Ofelia Ocampo and Rhodora
The Ocampo’s, on the other hand, gave their version of the incident as follows: At Pasilona, and consequently ordered the filing of corresponding informations against
about 10:30 in the morning of the (sic) September 4, 2004, they noticed the loud the respondents.10 The DOJ also ordered the dismissal of the rest of the charges, as
voices, laughing and singing of Rufina Caliwan and her guests, which they later well as the withdrawal of the Informations for light threats and slight physical
came to know was due to her on going birthday celebration. SPO4 Mario Ocampo injuries against petitioner.11
was on duty at the police precinct at that time. Despite the fact that they were being
disturbed by the noise, they did not anymore reacted (sic) to it just to avoid any Consequently, a Motion for Withdrawal of Information 12 was filed seeking the
misunderstanding with Rufina Caliwan. Around 10:30 in the evening of the same withdrawal of the Informations charging petitioner with light threats and slight
day, Rufina Caliwan went out of her house with her visitors. Apparently drunk, she physical injuries.
suddenly shouted the following: "Hoy bumaba kayong lahat dyan. Anong gusto
nyo, barilan o bugbugan? Tama ang sabi ni Dahlia na mga inggetera kayo. Mga However, the motion was denied by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City,
pangit kayo. Mga putang ina nyo. Masama ang mga ugali nyo. Bukas paglabas nyo Branch 47,13 in its Order dated June 6, 2006,14 thus:
pagpapatayin ko kayo." To prevent any untoward incident, they just waited when
Rufina Caliwan went inside her house and just reported the matter to the barangay. A perusal of the records and a careful evaluation of the factual allegations in the
A conciliation proceeding was set by the barangay regarding the matter on October information including the supporting documents attached thereto will show that
14, 2004 at the barangay hall of Barangay 201 Kalayaan Village. After the there exists probable cause to continue with the proceedings of the case. The
conciliation proceedings, Ofelia Ocampo and Rhodora Pasilona were about to go matters raised by the accused are evidentiary in nature which should be properly
home at about 12 noon, when Rufina Caliwan suddenly assaulted Rhodora threshed out in a full blown trial. The findings of the Department of Justice is not a
Pasilona, while uttering "Tarantada, Putang ina mo. Hayop kang bata ka!" The rubber stamp for the court to follow.
barangay officials who were present witnessed the whole incident. Rhodora
Pasilona, thereafter, went to the Pasay City General Hospital to seek medical xxxx
attendance for the injuries she sustained. 71avvphi1
As correctly pointed to by the private prosecutor, the instant motions failed to
The charges and counter-charges being interwoven were consolidated and comply with the three-day notice rule provided for under Sections 4 and 5 (Rule
investigated jointly. In its February 24, 2005 Resolution, 8 the Office of the City 15) of the Rules of Court. These motions are considered litigated motions as the
Prosecutor of Pasay City, through Assistant City Prosecutor Eva C. Portugal- rights of the private complainant may be clearly impaired, hence they cannot be
Atienza, recommended the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner for lack of
heard ex-parte. As the requirement for notice was not followed, the same is fatal point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. 20 Interlocutory
and the motion is just a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect. orders merely rule on an incidental issue and do not terminate or finally dispose of
the case as they leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay merits.21
City which granted the petition, thus:
The June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court is an interlocutory order.
WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ERRED IN Similar to an order denying a motion to dismiss, an order denying a motion for
DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TO THE withdrawal of information is interlocutory as it does not finally dispose of the case
WITHDRAWAL OF THE INFORMATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE nor does it determine the rights and liabilities of the parties as regards each other.
MOTION FILED WAS DEFECTIVE, AND WITHOUT CONSIDERATION TO
THE RIGHTS OF THEREIN NAMED ACCUSED. The June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court being interlocutory and the
case falling under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Regional
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari despite the clear
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND UPHOLDING THE prohibition in Section 19.
DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.
Indeed, as held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Estoque, 22 there can be no mistaking the clear
The petition lacks merit. command of Section 19 (e) of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and
judges have no option but to obey. When the law is clear, there is no room for
The charges against petitioner are light threats 17 and slight physical injuries,18 to interpretation.
which the applicable rule is the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Section 19 thereof provides: Instead of filing a petition for certiorari, petitioner could ventilate her defenses
before the Metropolitan Trial Court during the trial of the case. In the event that the
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings, motions, or Metropolitan Trial Court’s decision is adverse to her cause, she could avail of the
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: remedy of appeal as provided in Section 21 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.23
xxxx
The 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. 24 It was conceptualized to
issued by the court; facilitate the immediate resolution of cases. Respect for the Rule on Summary
Procedure as a practicable norm for the expeditious resolution of cases like the one
An interlocutory order is one that does not finally dispose of the case and does not at bar could have avoided lengthy litigation that has unduly imposed on the time of
end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their the Court.25
rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court. 19 The word "interlocutory" refers to something We need not discuss whether the Metropolitan Trial Court erred in denying the
intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some Motion for Withdrawal of Information because to entertain said issue would, in
effect, give due course to the prohibited petition for certiorari. Suffice it to say that HELD: The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond
although the institution of criminal actions depends on the sound discretion of the question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
fiscal, once a case is filed in court, it can no longer be withdrawn or dismissed Certification from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO
without the court’s approval. Moreover, while the Secretary of Justice has the shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22.
power to alter or modify the resolution of his subordinate and thereafter direct the Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions
withdrawal of the case, he cannot, however, impose his will on the court. 26 corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested
in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal
Indeed, once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
case, i.e., its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them – the Sandiganbayan
of the prosecution of the criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The determination of the case is within
the court’s exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which Art. 157 – Evasion of service of sentence
has the option to grant or deny the same.
1. Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, [December 18, 2002], 442
PHIL 442-448)
Art. 156 – Delivering prisoners from jail
Facts:
Ambil, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 175457 & 175482, [July 6, 2011], 669
PHIL 32- Del Castillo was charged for violation of Section 178(nn) of the 1978 Election
59 Code. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him
to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3
FACTS: An information was filed before the Ombudsman against herein years as maximum. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. During the
petitioners Ambil and Apelado, then governor of Eastern Samar and Provincial Jail execution of judgment on October 14, 1987, petitioner was not present. The
Warden of Eastern Samar ,respectively, for allegedly ordering and causing the presiding Judge issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond.
release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim in Petitioner was never apprehended. 10 years later, petitioner filed a motion to quash
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. At the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the the warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had already
allegations in the Information reasoning however that Adalim’s transfer was prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court.
justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed
by his detention at the provincial jail. After trial, the Sandiganbayan found them Issue:
guilty of the offense charged.
Whether the penalty imposed upon Del Castillo had prescribed
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioners?
Held: No. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of petitioner, while serving the sentence of reclusion perpetua for the crime of murder
penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run above mentioned, escaped from prison on October 21, 1945, and for said evasion
from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 he was prosecuted and sentenced on March 22, 1946, by the Court of First Instance
of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those of Manila in case no. 73820, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his of prision correccional; that on April 8, 1946, the petitioner again escaped and
sentence. evaded the service of the same sentence, and for the second evasion he was
prosecuted and sentenced on August 20, 1946, to two (2) years, four (4) months
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for and one (1) day of prision correccional in case No. 14862 by the Court of First
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner Instance of Rizal; and that on May 24, 1946, the petitioner was prosecuted for
from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison illegal possession of firearm, convicted and sentenced by the Court of First
cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. Instance of Manila, in case No. 74312, to six (6) months of imprisonment, and to
pay a fine of three hundred pesos (P300), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the insolvency.
execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life Under the commitment orders issued by the respective Courts of First Instance in
of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his said cases Nos. 73820, 14862, and 74312, the petitioner is confined in the New
sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords Bilibid Prisons to serve a total of six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21)
compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond days of imprisonment, commencing with the date of his pardon of the crime of
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is murder above mentioned.
therefore not to be rewarded therefor. (
The petitioner could have successfully set up the defense of double jeopardy in
2. Alvarez y Cortes v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-1809, [January 23, 1948], case No. 14683 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where he was prosecuted
80 PHIL 43-52) again for the first evasion of sentence of which he had already been convicted by
the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 73820; but petitioner did not set
up said defense, and was convicted on August 8, 1946, by the Court of First
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner against the Director of Instance of Rizal in case No. 14683 and sentenced two (2) years, four (4) months
Prisons on the ground that he is being illegally detained in the New Bilibid Prisons, and one (1) day of prision correccional. And petitioner could also have
notwithstanding the fact that the President of the Republic of the Philippines, successfully alleged the same defense in case No. 74311 of the Court of First
through the recommendation of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, granted the Instance of Manila, where he was prosecuted for the second time for the evasion of
petitioner on December 23, 1946, absolute pardon of the crime of murder which he which the petitioner had already been convicted by the Court of First Instance of
committed and of which he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua on Rizal in case No. 14862; but the petitioner did not set up said defense, and he was
June 5, 1945, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in criminal case no. 70022. convicted on May 16, 1946 by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal
Case No. 74311 and sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
The Director of Prisons, in his return, which according to section 13, Rule 102, is prision correccional. As the petitioner has not yet completed the service of the total
considered prima facie evidence of the cause of the restraint, alleges that the penalty of six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of imprisonment, to
which he was sentenced in cases Nos. 73820, 14862, and 74312, it is not necessary 1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under
for us to decide now whether or not he has to serve also the sentences rendered in article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of
the above mentioned cases Nos. 14683 and 74311. service of "destierro."

The penalties imposed upon the petitioner for evasions of service of sentence have Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a
not been affected by the absolute pardon granted to him remitting the unserved sentence of destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised
penalty to which he was finally sentenced for the crime of murder; because Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article
petitioner was convicted of evasions of service of sentence before the pardon and 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely
while he was serving said sentence of conviction for murder, which was then still deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used
in full force. in the English text of said article which in part reads as follows:

Petition is therefore denied. So ordered. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who
shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
3. People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, [November 26, 1948], 82 PHIL 172-179) imprisonment by reason of final judgment.

The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with Penal Code been in the English language, then the theory of the appellant could be
evasion of service of sentence under the following information: uphold. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt. The
Spanish text of article 157 in part reads thus:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el sentenciado que
not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion
virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in de libertad por sentencia firme; . . . .
criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was
limits made against him and commit vagrancy. originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs (People vs.
Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the
Contrary to law. English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion
de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the
law and to pay the costs. He is appealing from that decision with the following appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City
assignment of error: of Manila. This view has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No.
36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as quoted in the brief February 16, 1924 His Excellency the Governor-General pardoned him on
of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is condition that he should never again be guilty of any misconduct. A few weeks
suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty later the appellee was introduced by Captain Panopio to Godofredo Dancel of the
when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was ratified by this Governor-General's Office, indicating thereby that he accepted the conditional
Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz. pardon. On October 6, 1928 the appellee was charged with the violation of section
Supp. to No. 9, p. 370) 1, where it was held that one evades the service of his 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code of illegal possession of a number of
sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area specified in the judgment cartridges and a chip for an automatic pistol, and having pleaded guilty, was
of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence sentenced to pay a fine of P25.
Law which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence. On June 7, 1930, Assistant Fiscal F.B. Albert, of the City of Manila, revived
criminal case No. 40135 of said court and filed an information against the appellee
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of charging him with the violation, as aforesaid, of the conditional pardon granted him
sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during and by him accepted, praying the after the proper investigation he be compelled to
the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was serve the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment. After due hearing, the
prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City. court dismissed the information on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to order
the remedy sought by the prosecution. The Government, represented by the
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby Attorney-General, appealed.
affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
This appeal raises two question: First, whether the decision is applicable; and
second, whether the court had jurisdiction to order the appellee to serve the
4. Alvarez y Cortes v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-1809, [January 23, 1948], unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment inasmuch as he had violated the
80 PHIL 43-52) condition of his pardon.

Art. 159 – Other cases of evasion of service of sentence Act No. 1524 which provides the manner of enforcing the conditions imposed by
the Governor-General in the exercise of his power to grant conditional pardons,
- People v. Ponce de Leon, 56 Phil. 386 does not establish the right to appeal from the order or judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance denying or dismissing a petition for the enforcement of said
This is an appeal taken by the Government, represented by the Attorney-General, conditions. For this reason counsel for the appellee contends that the judgment
from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, from which the Attorney-General has appealed is not open to such a recourse. But
dismissing the information filed against the accused Miguel Ponce de Leon y section 44 of General Orders, No. 58 as amended by section 4 of Act No. 2886
Ballesteros, for the violation of a conditional pardon. recognizes the right of the Government to appeal from others sustaining a demurrer
or dismissing a complaint or information. Of course there is no question that no
On March 13, 1923 the appellee was found guilty of parricide by the Court of First appeal can be taken from an order dismissing an information, when the accused is
Instance of Manila, and sentenced to three years of banishment from within a thereby acquitted or set at liberty. Inasmuch as the law cited above is silent with
radius of 25 kilometers from the Roman Catholic Church in Santa Ana. On reference to appeals by the State, we see no good reason why the general
provisions of section 44, General Orders, No. 58, should not also applicable to the imposed is not commitment but banishment, for example, he will not be ordered to
order in question. The ground upon which rest the principle prohibiting an appeal suffer or serve imprisonment, but merely that period of banishment from which he
from a judgment or order of acquittal, is that the accused is placed in double was relieved by his acceptance of the conditional pardon. To place another
jeopardy of conviction for one and the same offense. This fundamental reason does interpretation upon the law would be to thwart its purpose which is, as we have
not exist in the present case: the appellee was not placed in double jeopardy of said, to enforce the conditions of the pardon, as its very title clearly declares, and to
conviction for one and the same offense, for what the prosecution sought was that restore the accused to the same status in which he was before the
he be compelled to serve out the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment pardon.lawphil.net
from which he had been relieved by a conditional pardon. In case it is finally
decided that he must serve out the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment, In United States vs. Ignacio (33 Phil., 202), this court said:
he is not sentenced to a new penalty or found guilty of the same crime of which he
was convicted, but he is merely restored to the status in which he was before being The defendant accepted the conditional pardon and thereby secured his
pardoned. release from imprisonment. Having accepted the conditional pardon, he is
bound by its terms. The record shows that he had been guilty of
With reference to the second question, we find that section 4 of Act No. 1524 is misconduct after his conditional pardon. By such misconduct, he forfeit
applicable. It reads as follows: his pardon and his right to liberty thereunder. When a pardoned person
violates the conditions of his pardon, he is left in the exact situation in
SEC. 4. If the Court shall find from said investigation that one or more of which he was when the pardon was granted, and the original sentence
the conditions of such pardon, heretofore or hereafter grated, has been may be enforced against him.(Ex parte Wells, 18 Howard [U.S.] 307; Ex
violated by the person so pardoned, the court shall order the parte Hawkins, 61 Ark., 321; 30 L.R.A., 736; 54 Am. St. Rep., 209;
recommitment and confinement of such person in the proper prison for Kennedy's Case, 135 Mass., 48; Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal., 29.)
the unexpired portion of his original sentence. Such order of the court
shall be sufficient authority to the custodian of any public prison If the condition of the pardon upon which the accused secures his release
designated therein to receive and safely keep the body of the person so from imprisonment has been violated by him, after his release, the pardon
conditionally pardoned during the unexpired potions of his original thereby becomes void and the petitioner may be arrested and compelled to
sentence. undergo so much of the original sentence as he had not suffered at the
time of his release. (Ex parte Alvarez vs. State of Florida, 50 Fla., 24; 111
In dismissing the information presented in this case, the court relied upon the Am. St. Rep., 102; Fuller vs. State, 122 Ala., 32; 45 L.R.A., 502; Ex parte
phrase employed in the law, "shall order the recommitment and confinement of Marks, supra; State vs. Horne, 7 L.R.A. [N.S.], 719.)
such person." It was argued that since the appellee could not be reimprisoned
because he had been sentenced to banishment, the law was inapplicable and the The law is well settled that where the criminal accepts the pardon he
court had no jurisdiction to grant the fiscal's petition. We are convinced that the accepts it subject to all its valid conditions and limitations, and will be
legal precepts and legislative intention have been misinterpreted. What is meant in held bound to compliance therewith. (Ex parte Alvarez vs. State of
that section is that if the investigation shows the accused be recommitted or Florida, supra.)
confined with a view to serving that portion of his sentence which has remained
unextinguished on account of the conditional pardon. Of course, if the penalty
If the purpose of the action taken by the prosecution was but to restore the appellee ACTS:
to the status he was in before receiving and accepting the conditional pardon, and if 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/
the principal penalty imposed upon him in the criminal case for parricide was the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this condition
banishment and not imprisonment, it stands to reason that he must now extinguish be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.
the unexpired portion of the former penalty, and not of any other penalty to which Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from
he has not been sentenced. And to this end, there is no doubt that Courts of First confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986,
Instance have plenary power and jurisdiction, under said section 4, Act No. 1524. Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president
cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the
Our attention has been called to the fact that the procedure established by Act No. Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon
1524 cannot be followed in cases where the condition was violated after the period because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they
of the defendant's sentence had expired. In view of the provisions of Act No. 1524, were still on appeal.
we believe this objection has no legal weight. This law contains no exception or
limitation of the time within which the action provided for may be instituted, and ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
we do not see how the objection can stand. Of course, we do not mean to apply this necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for
decision to a case where the offense has already prescribed by express provision of violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
the law. balance of his original sentence.

On forfeiture of a pardon by a breach of its conditions, a convict becomes HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and
liable to serve the balance of his unexpired term, although the time for who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
which he was sentenced has expired, the essential part of the sentenced Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
being the punishment, and not the time when it shall begin and end. (State a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the
vs. Horne, 52 Fla., 125; 42 S., 338; 7 L.R.A. [N. S.], 719; [rehden 52 Fla., Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation
143; 42 S., 714]; State vs. Yates, 183 N.C., 753; 111 S.E., 337.) (46 C.J., of a conditional pardon.
1203.)
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Wherefore the appealed judgment is reversed, and let the accused Miguel Ponce de Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
Leon y Ballesteros serve the period of banishment to which he was sentenced and necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that
which remained unextinguished by reason of the conditional pardon granted him, a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
with the costs of this instance against said appellee. So ordered.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated
the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment
before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under
- Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was
conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his
constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner
carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a
condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other
department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted.