Policy Sci

DOI 10.1007/s11077-011-9137-3

Science, technology and innovation in a 21st century

John H. Marburger III

Ó Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2011

This editorial essay was prepared by John H. ‘‘Jack’’ Marburger for a workshop on
the ‘‘science of science and innovation policy’’ held in 2009 that was the basis for this
special issue. It is published posthumously.

Linking the words ‘‘science,’’ ‘‘technology,’’ and ‘‘innovation,’’ may suggest that we know
more about how these activities are related than we really do. This very common linkage
implicitly conveys a linear progression from scientific research to technology creation to
innovative products. More nuanced pictures of these complex activities break them down
into components that interact with each other in a multi-dimensional socio-technological-
economic network. A few examples will help to make this clear.
Science has always functioned on two levels that we may describe as curiosity-driven
and need-driven, and they interact in sometimes surprising ways. Galileo’s telescope, the
paradigmatic instrument of discovery in pure science, emerged from an entirely pragmatic
tradition of lens-making for eye-glasses. And we should keep in mind that the industrial
revolution gave more to science than it received, at least until the last half of the nineteenth
century when the sciences of chemistry and electricity began to produce serious economic
payoffs. The flowering of science during the era, we call the enlightenment owed much to
its links with crafts and industry, but as it gained momentum science created its own need
for practical improvements. After all, the frontiers of science are defined by the capabilities
of instrumentation, that is, of technology. The needs of pure science are a huge but poorly
understood stimulus for technologies that have the capacity to be disruptive precisely
because these needs do not arise from the marketplace. The innovators who built the World
Wide Web on the foundation of the Internet were particle physicists at CERN, struggling to
satisfy their unique need to share complex information. Others soon discovered ‘‘needs’’ of
which they had been unaware that could be satisfied by this innovation, and from that point
the Web transformed the Internet from a tool for the technological elite into a broad
platform for a new kind of economy.

John H. Marburger III—deceased

J. H. Marburger III (&)

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Necessity is said to be the mother of invention, but in all human societies, ‘‘necessity’’ is
a mix of culturally conditioned perceptions and the actual physical necessities of life. The
concept of need, of what is wanted, is the ultimate driver of markets and an essential
dimension of innovation. And as the example of the World Wide Web shows, need is very
difficult to identify before it reveals itself in a mass movement. Why did I not know I
needed a cell phone before nearly everyone else had one? Because until many others had
one I did not, in fact, need one. Innovation has this chicken-and-egg quality that makes it
extremely hard to analyze. We all know of visionaries who conceive of a society totally
transformed by their invention and who are bitter that the world has not embraced their
idea. Sometimes we think of them as crackpots, or simply unrealistic about what it takes to
change the world. We practical people necessarily view the world through the filter of what
exists, and fail to anticipate disruptive change. Nearly always we are surprised by the rapid
acceptance of a transformative idea. If we truly want to encourage innovation through
government policies, we are going to have to come to grips with this deep unpredictability
of the mass acceptance of a new concept. Works analyzing this phenomenon are widely
popular under titles like ‘‘The Tipping Point’’ by Gladwell (2000) or more recently the
book by Taleb (2007) called The Black Swan, among others.
What causes innovations to be adopted and integrated into economies depends on their
ability to satisfy some perceived need by consumers, and that perception may be an artifact
of marketing, or fashion, or cultural inertia, or ignorance. Some of the largest and most
profitable industries in the developed world—entertainment, automobiles, clothing and
fashion accessories, health products, children’s toys, grownups’ toys!—depend on per-
ceptions of need that go far beyond the utilitarian and are notoriously difficult to predict.
And yet these industries clearly depend on sophisticated and rapidly advancing technol-
ogies to compete in the marketplace. Of course, they do not depend only upon technology.
Technologies are part of the environment for innovation, or in a popular and very
appropriate metaphor—part of the innovation ecology.
This complexity of innovation and its ecology is conveyed in Chapter One of a currently
popular best-seller in the United States called Innovation Nation by the American inno-
vation guru, Kao (2007), formerly on the faculty of the Harvard Business School:
‘‘I define it [innovation],’’ writes Kao, ‘‘as the ability of individuals, companies, and
entire nations to continuously create their desired future. Innovation depends on har-
vesting knowledge from a range of disciplines besides science and technology, among
them design, social science, and the arts. And it is exemplified by more than just
products; services, experiences, and processes can be innovative as well. The work of
entrepreneurs, scientists, and software geeks alike contributes to innovation. It is also
about the middlemen who know how to realize value from ideas. Innovation flows from
shifts in mind-set that can generate new business models, recognize new opportunities,
and weave innovations throughout the fabric of society. It is about new ways of doing
and seeing things as much as it is about the breakthrough idea.’’ (Kao 2007, p. 19).
This is not your standard government-type definition. Gurus, of course, do not have to
worry about leading indicators and predictive measures of policy success. Nevertheless,
some policy guidance can be drawn from this high level ‘‘definition,’’ and I will do so later.
The first point, then, is that the structural aspects of ‘‘science, technology, and inno-
vation’’ are imperfectly defined, complex, and poorly understood. There is still much work
to do to identify measures, develop models, and test them against actual experience before
we can say we really know what it takes to foster innovation. The second point I want to
make is about the temporal aspects: all three of these complex activities are changing with

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time. Science, of course, always changes through the accumulation of knowledge, but it
also changes through revolutions in its theoretical structure, through its ever-improving
technology, and through its evolving sociology. The technology and sociology of science
are currently impacted by a rapidly changing information technology. Technology today
flows increasingly from research laboratories but the influence of technology on both
science and innovation depends strongly on its commercial adoption, that is, on market
forces. Commercial scale manufacturing drives down the costs of technology so it can be
exploited in an ever-broadening range of applications. The mass market for precision
electro-mechanical devices like cameras, printers, and disk drives is the basis for new
scientific instrumentation and also for further generations of products that integrate hun-
dreds of existing components in new devices and business models like the Apple iPod and
video games, not to mention improvements in old products like cars and telephones.
Innovation is changing too as it expands its scope beyond individual products to include all
or parts of systems such as supply chains and inventory control, as in the Wal-Mart
phenomenon. Apple’s iPod does not stand alone; it is integrated with iTunes software and
novel arrangements with media providers.
With one exception, however, technology changes more slowly than it appears because
we encounter basic technology platforms in a wide variety of relatively short-lived
products. Technology is like a language that innovators use to express concepts in the form
of products, and business models that serve (and sometimes create) a variety of needs,
some of which fluctuate with fashion. The exception to the illusion of rapid technology
change is the pace of information technology, which is no illusion. It has fulfilled Moore’s
Law for more than half a century, and it is a remarkable historical anomaly arising from the
systematic exploitation of the understanding of the behavior of microscopic matter fol-
lowing the discovery of quantum mechanics. The pace would be much less without a
continually evolving market for the succession of smaller, higher capacity products. It is
not at all clear that the market demand will continue to support the increasingly expensive
investment in fabrication equipment for each new step up the exponential curve of Moore’s
Law. The science is probably available to allow many more capacity doublings if markets
can sustain them. Let me digress briefly on this point.
Many science commentators have described the twentieth century as the century of
physics and the twenty-first as the century of biology. We now know that is misleading. It
is true that our struggle to understand the ultimate constituents of matter has now
encompassed (apparently) everything of human scale and relevance, and that the universe
of biological phenomena now lies open for systematic investigation and dramatic appli-
cations in health, agriculture, and energy production. But there are two additional frontiers
of physical science, one already highly productive, the other very intriguing. The first is the
frontier of complexity, where physics, chemistry, materials science, biology, and mathe-
matics all come together. This is where nanotechnology and biotechnology reside. These
are huge fields that form the core of basic science policy in most developed nations. The
basic science of the twenty-first century is neither biology nor physics, but an interdisci-
plinary mix of these and other traditional fields. Continued development of this domain
contributes to information technology and much else. I mentioned two frontiers. The other
physical science frontier borders the nearly unexploited domain of quantum coherence
phenomena. It is a very large domain and potentially a source of entirely new platform
technologies not unlike microelectronics. To say more about this would take me too far
from our topic. The point is that nature has many undeveloped physical phenomena to
enrich the ecology of innovation and keep us marching along the curve of Moore’s Law if
we can afford to do so.

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I worry about the psychological impact of the rapid advance of information technology.
I believe it has created unrealistic expectations about all technologies and has encouraged a
casual attitude among policy makers toward the capability of science and technology to
deliver solutions to difficult social problems. This is certainly true of what may be the
greatest technical challenge of all time—the delivery of energy to large developed and
developing populations without adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. The challenge
of sustainable energy technology is much more difficult than many people currently seem
to appreciate. I am afraid that time will make this clear.
Structural complexities and the intrinsic dynamism of science and technology pose
challenges to policy makers, but they seem almost manageable compared with the chal-
lenges posed by extrinsic forces. Among these are globalization and the impact of global
economic development on the environment. The latter, expressed quite generally through
the concept of ‘‘sustainability’’ is likely to be a component of much twenty-first century
innovation policy. Measures of development, competitiveness, and innovation need to
include sustainability dimensions to be realistic over the long run. Development policies
that destroy economically important environmental systems, contribute to harmful global
change, and undermine the natural resource basis of the economy are bad policies. Sus-
tainability is now an international issue because the scale of development and the glob-
alization of economies have environmental and natural resource implications that
transcend national borders.
From the policy point of view, globalization is a not a new phenomenon. Science has
been globalized for centuries, and we ought to be studying it more closely as a model for
effective responses to the globalization of our economies. What is striking about science is
the strong imperative to share ideas through every conceivable channel to the widest
possible audience. If you had to name one chief characteristic of science, it would be
empiricism. If you had to name two, the other would be open communication of data and
ideas. The power of open communication in science cannot be overestimated. It has
established, uniquely among human endeavors, an absolute global standard. And it
effectively recruits talent from every part of the globe to labor at the science frontiers. The
result has been an extraordinary legacy of understanding of the phenomena that shape our
existence. Science is the ultimate example of an open innovation system.
Science practice has received much attention from philosophers, social scientists, and
historians during the past half-century, and some of what has been learned holds valuable
lessons for policy makers. It is fascinating to me how quickly countries that provide
avenues to advanced education are able to participate in world science. The barriers to a
small but productive scientific activity appear to be quite low and whether or not a country
participates in science appears to be discretionary. A small scientific establishment,
however, will not have significant direct economic impact. Its value at early stages of
development is indirect, bringing higher performance standards, international recognition,
and peer role models for a wider population. A science program of any size is also a link to
the rich intellectual resources of the world scientific community. The indirect benefit of
scientific research to a developing country far exceeds its direct benefit, and policy needs to
recognize this. It is counterproductive to base support for science in such countries on a
hoped-for direct economic stimulus.
Keeping in mind that the innovation ecology includes far more than science and
technology, it should be obvious that within a small national economy innovation can
thrive on a very small indigenous science and technology base. But innovators, like sci-
entists, do require access to technical information and ideas. Consequently, policies
favorable to innovation will create access to education and encourage free communication

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with the world technical community. Anything that encourages awareness of the mar-
ketplace and all its actors on every scale will encourage innovation.
This brings me back to John Kao’s definition of innovation. His vision of ‘‘the ability of
individuals, companies, and entire nations to continuously create their desired future’’ implies
conditions that create that ability, including most importantly educational opportunity (Kao
2007, p. 19). The notion that ‘‘innovation depends on harvesting knowledge from a range of
disciplines besides science and technology’’ implies that innovators must know enough to
recognize useful knowledge when they see it, and that they have access to knowledge sources
across a spectrum that ranges from news media and the Internet to technical and trade
conferences (2007, p. 19). If innovation truly ‘‘flows from shifts in mind-set that can generate
new business models, recognize new opportunities, and weave innovations throughout the
fabric of society,’’ then the fabric of society must be somewhat loose-knit to accommodate the
new ideas (2007, p. 19). Innovation is about risk and change, and deep forces in every society
resist both of these. A striking feature of the US innovation ecology is the positive attitude
toward failure, an attitude that encourages risk-taking and entrepreneurship.
All this gives us some insight into what policies we need to encourage innovation.
Innovation policy is broader than science and technology policy, but the latter must be
consistent with the former to produce a healthy innovation ecology. Innovation requires a
predictable social structure, an open marketplace, and a business culture amenable to risk
and change. It certainly requires an educational infrastructure that produces people with a
global awareness and sufficient technical literacy to harvest the fruits of current technol-
ogy. What innovation does not require is the creation by governments of a system that
defines, regulates, or even rewards innovation except through the marketplace or in
response to evident success. Some regulation of new products and new ideas is required to
protect public health and environmental quality, but innovation needs lots of freedom.
Innovative ideas that do not work out should be allowed to die so the innovation com-
munity can learn from the experience and replace the failed attempt with something better.
Do we understand innovation well enough to develop policy for it? If the policy addresses
very general infrastructure issues such as education, economic, and political stability and the
like, the answer is perhaps. If we want to measure the impact of specific programs on
innovation, the answer is no. Studies of innovation are at an early stage where anecdotal
information and case studies, similar to John Kao’s book—or the books on Business Week’s
top ten list of innovation titles—are probably the most useful tools for policy makers.
I have been urging increased attention to what I call the science of science policy—the
systematic quantitative study of the subset of our economy called science and technol-
ogy—including the construction and validation of micro- and macro-economic models for
S&T activity. Innovators themselves, and those who finance them, need to identify their
needs and the impediments they face. Eventually, we may learn enough to create reliable
indicators by which we can judge the health of our innovation ecosystems. The goal is well
worth the sustained effort that will be required to achieve it.

References

Gladwell, M. (2000). The tipping point: How little things can make a big difference. Boston: Little, Brown
and Company.
Kao, J. (2007). Innovation nation: How America is losing its innovation edge, why it matters, and what we
can do to get it back. New York: Free Press.
Taleb, N. N. (2007). The black swan: The impact of the highly improbable. New York: Random House.

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