A Tripartite Analysis of Online Healthcare Platforms:

Evidence from Spring Rain Doctor in China

Xia Cao 
Harbin Engineering University
Lanting Zhang  (  [email protected] )
Harbin Engineering University https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3693-203X
Dan Lv 
Harbin Engineering University
Weijia Li 
Harbin Engineering University
Zeyu Xing 
Harbin Engineering University

Research article

Keywords: online healthcare platform, evolutionary game theory, tripartite stakeholders

Posted Date: October 14th, 2020

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-39724/v2

License:   This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.  
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A Tripartite Analysis of Online Healthcare Platforms:
Evidence from Spring Rain Doctor in China

Xia Cao, Lanting Zhang*, Dan Lv, Weijia Li and Zeyu Xing

Prof. Xia Cao, Email: [email protected]

School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University

Dr. Lanting Zhang (Corresponding author), Email: [email protected]

School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University

Dr. Dan Lv, Email: [email protected]

School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University

Dr. Weijia Li, Email: [email protected]

School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University

Dr. Zeyu Xing, Email: [email protected]

School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University
A Tripartite Analysis of Online Healthcare Platforms:

Evidence from Spring Rain Doctor in China

Xia Cao 1, Lanting Zhang 1,*, Dan Lv 1, Weijia Li 1 and Zeyu Xing 1
1 School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China.
* Correspondence: [email protected]

Abstract

Background: Online healthcare platform (OHP) is a new form of medical treatment, which solves the

problems of unbalanced distribution of medical resources and expensive medical treatment in China.

Especially under the epidemic of COVID-19, OHP has greatly reduced the medical pressure of the

hospital and the risk of cross infection.

Methods: This paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyze behavioral strategies and their dynamic

evolution in the promotion of OHP, and then numerical simulations are carried out with the help of

program compilation.

Results: The results demonstrate that: (1) both the stricter qualification inspection of doctors and the

more investment in information protection promote the participation of doctors and the use of patients;

(2) with a higher initial probability of doctors joining, the possibility for patients in using OHP and

platforms to provide standardized online healthcare services becomes higher; (3) if the initial probability

of patients using is higher, the possibility for doctors to join OHP and platforms to provide standardized

online healthcare services raises; (4) the trend of doctors joining the platform is affected by factors, such

as registration cost, time cost, reputation loss; (5) the tendency of patients in using online healthcare is

mainly decided by the cost.

Conclusions: Based on theoretical analysis, this article takes the Spring Rain Doctor OHP as an example

to verify the game results. Therefore, OHP should attach importance to the inspection of doctors and the

protection of privacy information, and strengthen the publicity in remote places. At the same time OHP

can promote the active participation of grassroots doctors, and set a reasonable evaluation mechanism,

so as to popularize online medical treatment among patients further.

Keywords: online healthcare platform; evolutionary game theory; tripartite stakeholders

Background

The OHP can use information technology to express the medical ecosystem in the form of a

community network. This medical ecosystem involves doctors, patients and hospitals. OHP provides

patients and doctors with a communication platform which is centered on medical information. It also

provides medical search and evaluation, registration, health consultation and other services [1]. Unlike

traditional medical services, OHP provides a special form of service which allows doctors to directly

deliver medical service information to patients with medical needs [2]. In 2020, due to the outbreak of

the COVID-19, the public are mostly anxious about going to the hospital, especially for patients with

mild cold symptoms. Therefore, the OHP has received unprecedented attention due to its benefits such

as convenience, cost, flexibility and time savings [3,4]. According to a report by Apple Inc, there are

more than 5000 e-health applications worldwide that can provide online health services [5]. OHP (e.g.,

haodf.com, chunyuyisheng.com, zocdoc.com etc.) are increasingly popular among patients in China and

the U.S. [6].

Global online health care originates in the United States. Teladoc is the earliest and largest Internet

medical enterprise in the United States which was listed in 2015. Its main business is online consultation

service. At present, Teladoc has more than 10,000 corporate customers, including more than 300 Fortune

1000 companies. These large clients brought their total membership to 23.2 million, which brought in

revenue of $197.5 million. Teladoc data shows that after 15 years of development, it has completed more

than 2 million initial consultations, saving users 493 million dollars.

In China, due to the huge population and uneven distribution of medical resources, a large number

of hospitals are severely crowded [7]. Due to the increase in medical demand and government policies,

OHP is developing rapidly in China [8]. As early as July 2015, the State Council formally issued the

"Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the “‘Internet+’ Action”, which clearly proposed the

promotion of a new model of online health care and the development of Internet-based health care. In

2018, the General Office of the State Council issued the “Guiding Opinions on Promoting the

Development of Internet + Medical” to optimize resource allocation and meet the growing medical needs.

In 2020, the National Health Commission issued the “Notice of the General Office of the National Health

Commission on Doing a Good Job in Internet Diagnosis and Consultation Services in the Prevention and

Control of Epidemic Situations”, which clearly stated that it is necessary to give full play to the
advantages of Internet medical services and vigorously develop Internet diagnosis and treatment services,

especially Internet consultation service for fever patients. In early 2020, after the outbreak, due to safety

considerations, Chinese users have a great demand for online healthcare services. As of February 13,

industry leaders Ali Health, Pingan Good Doctor, and Wei Ning Health have increased by 58%, 34%,

and 48% since the beginning of the year. During the Spring Festival of 2020, the highest daily activity

of independent apps in the online healthcare field reached 6.712 million, with a maximum increase of

close to 1.6 million, or an increase of 31.28%. It shows that OHP has great potential for development.

For patients, OHP can reduce transaction costs brought by geographical and time constraints, while

improving convenience [9,10]. OHP can support patient self-health management by promoting the

sharing of health-related knowledge with patients [6]. By browsing the doctor’s homepage on the

platform, patients can view the doctor’s information and understand the doctor’s training,

professionalism and the effectiveness of the treatment [11]. As for doctors, they can improve the

utilization of their time by answering patients’ questions in their spare time through OHP [7]. Doctors

can also actively use OHP to obtain economic and social benefits [12]. At the same time, OHP can

promote doctor-patient communication to a certain extent, reduce the pressure of hospital diagnosis and

treatment, and resolve medical resource shortages and doctor-patient disputes [13,14]. However, the

rapid development of online healthcare has also brought many problems. Series of problems are caused

owing to the imperfection of relevant laws and regulations for OHP in China, such as the lack of effective

supervision of platform, the uneven quality of online medical platforms, the low barriers to entry and the

low degree of specialization [15]. Some platforms have underinvested in information maintenance,

leading patients face the risk of leakage of private information [16]. The OHP lacks strict inspection of

doctors’ qualifications, lacks training for doctors’ practice and the quality of doctors’ medical services

varies, leading to misdiagnosis and reducing patient satisfaction [17]. These problems not only cause

hidden dangers to the health and privacy of patients, but also restrict the further development of online

healthcare in China. Therefore, it is necessary for us to conduct further research on OHP.

Scholars usually study OHP from the perspectives of patients, doctors and platforms. From the

perspective of patients, existing literature mainly focuses on patients' willingness to use and patients’

satisfaction with OHP. In terms of the influence factors of willingness to use, scholars founded that

perceived value, attitude, perceived behavior control, technology anxiety, and self-actualization need

positively affected the behavior intention of older users [18]. The disease risk can moderate the
relationship between physicians’ service quality and patient choice [19]. The performance expectations,

social influence and credibility of network health information are also the key factors that affect patients’

acceptance and use of OHP [20]. The level of education effects the willingness to use of patients, too

[21]. And the response time, the depth of interaction and the service content of the first consultation have

a significant impact on the patients’ follow-up consultation behavior [6]. Jung and Padman founded that

primary physicians are of critical importance in encouraging patients to use virtualized healthcare

delivery [22]. In terms of the influence factors of patients’ satisfaction with OHP, scholars founded that

distributional fairness, procedural fairness and interpersonal fairness in OHP exert significant direct

effects on patients’ trust, and patients' trust has significant effects on satisfaction [23]. Some scholars

also verified that social support, information quality, and service quality exert significant direct effects

on perceived usefulness and patient satisfaction [24], and the patient satisfaction with OHP is positively

affected by perceived usefulness [25]. At the same time, service prices also affect satisfaction, and they

show an inverted U-shaped relationship [9]. In addition, Amin believed that the hospital information

system (HIS) can improve the efficiency of doctors, reduce the waiting time of patients, provide patients

with convenient services and useful information and improve the patients’ satisfaction [26].

Most studies have been conducted from the perspective of patients. While it is imperative to

understand how patients benefit from OHP, OHP will be viable only when participating doctors also gain

returns from OHP [27]. OHP requires significant engagement from doctors, as they provide doctor-

driven services [28]. In OHP, doctors provide consultation services, knowledge and information to help

patients understand their diseases and obtain treatments [29]. Doctors’ contributions, such as providing

consultation service and healthcare information, promote the development of such platforms in the long

term [30]. Therefore, from the perspective of doctors, some scholars concerned about the influencing

factors of doctors joining OHP. Guo studied the impact of status capital and decision capital on the social

and economic returns of different doctor groups. The results show that doctor’s decision capital is a

professional component which is important to platform maintaining exchange returns [27]. Chen

combined the expectancy theory and the Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Basuroy (BDB) model, the results show

that extrinsic motivations(i.e., extrinsic rewards, expected relationships, and image) and intrinsic

motivation (i.e., a sense of self-worth) significantly influence the desire to serve patients well, which in

turn positively affects the willingness to offer free services and the willingness to offer paid services [31].

Ma founded that performance expectations, effort expectations, social impact and convenience
conditions have a positive impact on doctors' willingness to use and the usage behavior [32]. Yang and

Zhang thought that doctors would obtain social support from interaction with patients, and those supports

could promote doctors’ behaviors in OHP [33]. Yang founded that reputation, monetary rewards and

doctor–patient interaction positively influence doctors to contribute to OHP, and the doctor’s

professional status moderates the relationship between motivators and the resulting contribution [30].

Liu put forward that doctors participate in OHP in order to provide healthcare services to patients and

become popular among users [34]. Doctors delivers heightened reputation and other returns while

improving the provision of healthcare services [35].

From the perspective of platforms, scholars usually study the impact of platforms on society. Liu

and Yang founded that OHP can solve the problem of information asymmetry between doctors and

patients [36]. Mcgeady studied the information transfer between patients and doctors and founded that

the OHP can increase the communication between patients and doctors and improve the quality of care

[37]. Goh studied the social value of OHP services. He believed that the OHP can make medical

information break through geographical boundaries and pass from the city to the countryside, which

greatly improve the rural medical environment and achieved social value [38]. Venkatesh founded that

the emergence of Internet medical services could help rural pregnant women obtain online healthcare

information. It can alleviate the problem of uneven distribution of medical resources in urban and rural

areas and greatly reduce the infant mortality rate [39]. Wu founded that the OHP can use the Internet to

promote the flow of high-quality doctor resources and medical information services across regions,

which is beneficial to improve the uneven distribution of medical resources in China [40].

To sum up, in existing research, online healthcare research mainly focuses on the willingness and

motivation of patients and doctors. Although some scholars study the impact of platforms on society,

few studies focus on the influencing factors of platforms’ behaviors. This paper makes three different

contributions. Firstly, we analyze the influencing factors of platform’ behaviors. At the same time, from

the perspective of economic benefit and social benefit, this paper analyzes the behaviors of the tripartite

stakeholders simultaneously. Secondly, few studies have focused on the dynamic evolution and mutual

influence of the behaviors of different subjects in online healthcare. This paper builds an evolutionary

game model, analyzes the evolutionary stabilization strategy of online healthcare stakeholders, and uses

program compilation for numerical simulation. Thirdly, this paper verifies the simulation results through

the case analysis of Spring Rain Doctor platform. We put forward feasible suggestions to the promotion
of online medical treatment. This work is of great importance to improving the imbalance of medical

resources. The research framework of the whole paper is shown in figure 1.

A Tripartite Analysis of Online Healthcare Platform：

Evidence from Spring Rain Doctor in China Model specification Model simulation

Method
The hypothesis of the tripartite evolutionary game model
Background Simulation
Payoff matrix of the tripartite evolutionary game in OHP
Replicator dynamics equation of the tripartite evolutionary game
Theoretical basis

Discussion & Conclusion An example of Spring Rain Doctor platform

Empirical analysis

Figure 1. The research framework of the whole paper

Methods

Evolutionary Game Theory in Healthcare

Evolutionary game theory is derived from the concept of evolutionary stability strategy [41]. It was

originally developed in the economics field to study the social interactions [42]. This method takes the

group of participants with limited rationality as the research object, and examines the evolution trend of

group behavior from the point of view of system theory. Over the last few decades, the evolutionary

game theory has been widely adopted by economists, sociologists, social scientists, as well as the

philosophers [43].

The concept of evolutionary game theory also has been used among the access to the healthcare.

Chen et al. leveraged the evolutionary game theory to build a novel model to capture the behaviors of

hospitals and patients in mHealth, then they analyzed the payoff matrix between hospitals and patients

such that a replicator dynamic system can be built [44]. Li et al. proposed a new prediction model of

infectious diseases with new vaccination strategies based on network structures and dynamic replicator

[45]. Antoci et al. analyzed the relations between defensive medicine, medical malpractice insurance and

litigious behaviors, by an evolutionary game between physicians and patients [46]. Mary et al.

constructed a theoretical model in which physicians’ treatment choices depend on patients’

characteristics and on the recent choices of nearby peers-either because there are local knowledge

spillovers or because physicians want to conform to local practice patterns [47]. Yu used evolutionary

game theory to analyze behavioral strategies and their dynamic evolution in the implementation and
operation of telemedicine [48]. Through these studies, game theory has the possibility to provide a new

theoretical basis for future research on the healthcare.

Evolutionary stable strategy

Maynard Smith formulated a central concept of evolutionary game theory called the evolutionary

stable strategy (ESS) [49]. ESS is the strategy when game players continuously learn and imitate successful

strategies in the evolution process and finally reach a stable state after improving their own strategies. The

replication dynamic equation is a dynamic differential equation, which is used to express the frequency that

a particular strategy is selected by a class of groups. It can be expressed by formula:

dxi
= xi ( usi − u ) ,
dt

where xi denotes the frequency of strategy si , usi denotes the expected return of strategy si selected by this

group, u denotes the average expected return of this group. When interference factors make x smaller than

x* , dx dt needs to be bigger than 0. And when x is bigger than x* , dx dt needs to be smaller than 0, so

as to achieve a stable state.

In summary, evolutionary game theory based on the assumption of bounded rationality, considering

the interaction between game players. Through multiple games, players constantly learn and improve their

strategies, and finally reach an evolutionary stable state.

The Hypothesis of the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

In China, the enterprise-based mode is the main mode of online healthcare, accounting for 70% of

the total. Internet companies build OHP and cooperate with doctors. The platforms need to contact

doctors and inspect the qualifications of doctors. During this time, the platforms need to pay more costs.

Also, the platform needs to invest in information protection. The higher platforms invest, the higher the

risk of cost recovery that platforms confront.

From the perspective of doctors, doctors can obtain economic and social benefits by joining OHP

[27]. Specifically, doctors can obtain additional income and build a reputation by providing good online

healthcare services [23,31]. In OHP, reputational reward obtained by doctors mainly comes from the

patients’ feedback such as their ratings and reviews [50]. The reputation reward is especially crucial for

doctors to enhance their own career and occupational influence [33,50]. At the same time, doctors need
to pay the time costs and registration costs. When the platforms do not strictly inspect doctors, doctors

will face reputation loss due to misdiagnosis and low patient satisfaction. When the platforms’

investment in information protection is insufficient, doctors will face the risk of leakage of private

information.

From the patients’ perspective, patients can save time and money by using OHP. However, patients

may face the risk of being misdiagnosed and divulged of privacy.

The relationship among the three stakeholders is shown in Figure 2.

Patient

Health management and

counseling

Provide a platform
for doctors and
patients
Platform Doctor

Get word of mouth and attention Get word of mouth and

Complete user economic benefits
consultation

Figure 2. The relationship among the three stakeholders

The following hypotheses were tested in this study:

(1) The promotion of OHP is influenced by three groups: doctors, patients and online healthcare

platforms. All the groups with bounded rationality can alter their own strategies by imitating and

learning proven behaviors to obtain maximum revenues.

(2) Doctors take two courses of action: One strategy is to join OHP (join), while the other is not to join

OHP (not join). Thus, the strategy space of doctors is S1{join, not join}. Patients take two courses

of action: One strategy is to use OHP, while the other is not to use OHP. Thus, the strategy space of

patients is S2{use, not use}. Online healthcare platforms take two courses of action: One strategy

is to provide standardized online healthcare services, while the other is not to provide standardized

online healthcare services. Thus, the strategy space of platforms is S3{provide, not provide}.

(3) The assumptions are that doctors may with x probability adopt the ‘join’ strategy, and with (1-x)

probability adopt the ‘not join’ strategy. Patients may with y probability adopt the ‘use’ strategy,

and with (1-y) probability adopt the ‘not use’ strategy. Platforms may with z probability adopt the
 ‘provide’ strategy, and with (1-z) probability adopt the ‘not provide’ strategy, in which 0 < x < 1, 0

< y < 1, and 0 < z < 1, respectively.

(4) When the doctors join and the patients use OHP, the doctor’s incomes are r1, and the costs of the

doctor’s OHP registration and qualification certification are c1. Meanwhile, the doctor’s time costs

are c2. The platforms’ qualification inspect strength coefficient (QISC) is α and information

protection investment strength coefficient (IPISC) is β. When the platforms do not provide

standardized online healthcare services, the QISC of platforms is less than 1. It may lead to

misdiagnosis or low patient satisfaction. The reputation loss suffered by the doctor is (1-α)c3. At the

same time, the IPISC of platforms is less than 1, and the information leakage loss suffered by

doctors is (1-β)c4.

(5) The health benefit of patients using OHP is e1. When patients choose to go to hospital instead of

using OHP, the health benefit which they obtain is e2, e1<e2. The time and money saved by patients

using OHP is e3. When doctors join OHP, patients use OHP and platforms provide standard online

healthcare services, a solid trust relationship is established between patients, doctors, and platforms.

At this time, the patients obtain an additional benefit of L. The costs of patients using OHP are h1.

When doctors join OHP, patients use OHP and the platforms do not provide standardized online

healthcare services, the health loss of patients is (1-α)h2, and the loss of patients’ disease information

leakage is (1-β)h3. Regardless of whether doctors join OHP, when patients use OHP and the

platforms do not provide standardized online healthcare services, the loss of the patient’s identity

information leakage is (1-β)h4.

(6) When the platforms provide standardized online healthcare services, doctors join OHP and patients

use OHP, the economic benefit obtained by the platform is w1. At this point, the social reputation

incomes that the platforms get are M. When the platforms provide standardized online healthcare

services, the platforms’ qualification inspect coefficient for doctors is 1, and the platforms’

information protection investment intensity coefficient is 1. The costs of platforms inspect doctors’

qualification are t1, and the costs of platforms’ information protection investment are t2. When the

platforms do not provide standardized online healthcare services, the costs of inspecting doctor

qualification are αt1, and the costs of information protection investment is βt2, 0<α<1, 0<β<1. When

the platforms do not provide standardized online healthcare services, the compensation for the

patients’ health loss is (1-α)F1 and the compensation for the patients' disease information leakage is
 (1-β)F2. The compensation for the patients’ identity information leakage is (1-β)F3. The

compensation for the doctors’ information leakage is (1-β)G. When patients use OHP, doctors join

OHP and the platforms do not provide standardized online healthcare services, the social reputation

loss suffered by the platforms is N.

Payoff Matrix of the tripartite Evolutionary Game in OHP

Based on the above assumptions, a tripartite evolutionary game model including doctors, patients,

and platforms under bounded rationality was constructed. The payoff matrix of the three groups is shown

in Table 1 and Table 2.

Table 1. Payoff matrix when the platforms provide standardized healthcare services (z)

join (x) not join (1-x)

r1-c1-c2 0
use (y) e1+e3-h1+L e2
w1-t1-t2+M -t1-t2
-c1 0
not use (1-y) e2 e2
-t1-t2 -t1-t2

Table 2. Payoff matrix when the platforms do not provide standardized healthcare services (1-z)

join (x) not join (1-x)

r1-c1-c2-(1-α)c3-(1-β)c4 0
use (y) e1+e3-h1-(1-α)h2-(1-β)(h3+h4) e2-(1-β)h4
w1-αt1-βt2-(1-α)F1-(1-β)(F2+F3+G)-N -αt1-βt2-(1-β)F3
-c1-(1-β)c4 0
not use (1-y) e2 e2
-αt1-βt2-(1-β)G -αt1-βt2

Replicator Dynamics Equation of the Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Under the aforementioned assumption, the marginal expected revenue when doctors implement the

‘join’ strategy is P11:

P=
11 yz ( r1 − c1 − c2 ) + y (1 − z )  r1 − c1 − c2 − (1 − α ) c3 − (1 − β ) c4  +
.
(1 − y ) z ( −c1 ) + (1 − y )(1 − z )  −c1 − (1 − β ) c4 

The marginal expected revenue when doctors implement the ‘not join’ strategy is P12:

P=
12 yz ( 0 ) + y (1 − z )( 0 ) + (1 − y ) z ( 0 ) + (1 − y )(1 − z )( 0 ) .

The expected revenue of the doctors is P1:

 P1 ( x )= xP11 + (1 − x ) P12 .

Thus, the replicator dynamics equation of doctors can be written as P1 ( x ) in Formula (1):

P1 ( x ) =
dx
dt
{
= x (1 − x ) y  r1 − c2 − (1 − α ) c3  − c1 − (1 − β ) c4 + z (1 − β ) c4 .} (1)

The marginal expected revenue when patients implement the ‘use’ strategy is P21:

P=
21 xz ( e1 + e3 − h1 + L ) + x (1 − z ) e1 + e3 − h1 − (1 − α ) h2 − (1 − β )( h3 + h4 ) 
.
+ (1 − x ) z ( e2 ) + (1 − x )(1 − z ) e2 − (1 − β ) h4 

The marginal expected revenue when patients implement the ‘not use’ strategy is P22:

P22 xz ( e2 ) + x (1 − z )( e2 ) + (1 − x ) z ( e2 ) + (1 − x )(1 − z )( e2 ) .
=

The expected revenue of the patients is P2:

P2 ( y )= yP21 + (1 − y ) P22 .

Thus, the replicator dynamics equation of patients can be written as P2 ( y ) in Formula (2):

P2 ( y ) =
dy
dt
{
= y (1 − y ) x e1 − e2 + e3 − h1 − (1 − α ) h2 − (1 − β ) h3 
(2)
.
+ xz (1 − α ) h2 + (1 − β ) h3 + L  − (1 − β ) h4 + z (1 − β ) h4 }

The marginal expected revenue when platforms implement the ‘provide’ strategy is P31:

P31 xy ( w1 − t1 − t2 + M ) + x (1 − y )( −t1 − t2 )
=
.
+ (1 − x ) y ( −t1 − t2 ) + (1 − x )(1 − y )( −t1 − t2 )

The marginal expected revenue when platforms implement the ‘not provide’ strategy is P32:

P32 xy  w1 − α t1 − β t2 − (1 − α ) F1 − (1 − β )( F2 + F3 + G ) − N  + x (1 − y )  −α t1 − β t2 − (1 − β ) G 
.
+ (1 − x ) y  −α t1 − β t2 − (1 − β ) F3  + (1 − x )(1 − y )( −α t1 − β t2 )

The expected revenue of the platforms is P3:

P3 ( z )= zP31 + (1 − z ) P32 .

Thus, the replicator dynamics equation of platforms can be written as P3 ( z ) in Formula (3):

P3 ( z ) =
dz
dt
{
= z (1 − z ) xy  M + (1 − α ) F1 + (1 − β ) F2 + N 
(3)
.
− (1 − α ) t1 − (1 − β ) t2 + x (1 − β ) G + y (1 − β ) F3 }
Stability Analysis

The above three replication dynamic equations describe the dynamic adjustment process of the

strategy selection of doctors, patients and platforms. When the three groups continue to learn and imitate

to reach the Nash equilibrium, it shows that the game system has reached a stable state. In order to find

the stability point of the evolutionary game among the three stakeholders, we assume:

 dx
 dt = 0

 dy
 =0.
 dt
 dz
 dt = 0


Then within the range of the equilibrium solution domain

=
W {( x, y, z ) 0 ≤ x ≤ 1; 0 ≤ y ≤ 1; 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 } , there are 8 special equilibrium solutions: V0(0,0,0),

V1(1,0,0), V2(1,1,0), V3(1,0,1), V4(0,1,0), V5(0,1,1), V6(0,0,1), V7(1,1,1). Another equilibrium point

E ( x* , y* , z * ) is also in the above solution domain and satisfies:

y  r1 − c2 − (1 − α ) c3  − c1 − (1 − β ) c4 + z (1 − β ) c4 =
0, (4)

x e1 − e2 + e3 − h1 − (1 − α ) h2 − (1 − β ) h3 
, (5)
+ xz (1 − α ) h2 + (1 − β ) h3 + L  − (1 − β ) h4 + z (1 − β ) h4 = 0

xy  M + (1 − α ) F1 + (1 − β ) F2 + N 
. (6)
− (1 − α ) t1 − (1 − β ) t2 + x (1 − β ) G + y (1 − β ) F3 =0

Differentiate the three equations above to get:

P1′( x )= (1 − 2 x )  y ( r1 − c2 − (1 − α ) c3 ) − c1 − (1 − β ) c4 + z (1 − β ) c4  ,

P2′ ( y )= (1 − 2 y ) { x e1 − e2 + e3 − h1 − (1 − α ) h2 − (1 − β ) h3 
,
+ xz (1 − α ) h2 + (1 − β ) h3 + L  − (1 − β ) h4 + z (1 − β ) h4 }
{
P3′ ( z ) = (1 − 2 z ) xy  M + (1 − α ) F1 + (1 − β ) F2 + N 
.
− (1 − α ) t1 − (1 − β ) t2 + x (1 − β ) G + y (1 − β ) F }
 According to the stability theorem of the evolutionary game, when P1′ ( x ) < 0 , P2′ ( y ) < 0 ,

P3′ ( z ) < 0 in the above three formulas, x*, y*, and z* represent the stable strategies that doctors, patients,

and platforms should adopt in the evolution process.

According to equation (4)

y  r1 − c2 − (1 − α ) c3  − c1 − (1 − β ) c4 + z (1 − β ) c4 =
0.

This equation represents the boundary of the steady state. When the following conditions are met:

y  r1 − c2 − (1 − α ) c3  − c1 − (1 − β ) c4 + z (1 − β ) c4 > 0 .

Then, we get:

P1′ ( 0 ) > 0 , P1′ (1) < 0 .

This indicates that joining OHP is stable, and not joining OHP is unstable.

In contrast, when the following conditions are met:

y  r1 − c2 − (1 − α ) c3  − c1 − (1 − β ) c4 + z (1 − β ) c4 < 0 .

Then, we get:

P1′ ( 0 ) < 0 , P1′ (1) > 0 .

This indicates that not joining OHP is stable, and joining OHP is unstable. When x ∈ ( 0,1) ,

P1 ( x ) > 0 . The phase evolution diagram of its stability depends on the shape of the quadratic curve of

equation (4).

According to equation (5)

x e1 − e2 + e3 − h1 − (1 − α ) h2 − (1 − β ) h3 
.
+ xz (1 − α ) h2 + (1 − β ) h3 + L  − (1 − β ) h4 + z (1 − β ) h4 = 0

This equation represents the boundary of the steady state. When the following conditions are met:

x e1 − e2 + e3 − h1 − (1 − α ) h2 − (1 − β ) h3 
.
+ xz (1 − α ) h2 + (1 − β ) h3 + L  − (1 − β ) h4 + z (1 − β ) h4 > 0

Then, we get:

P2′ ( 0 ) > 0 , P2′ (1) < 0 .

This indicates that using online medical treatment is stable, and not using online medical treatment

is unstable.
 In contrast, when the following conditions are met:

x e1 − e2 + e3 − h1 − (1 − α ) h2 − (1 − β ) h3 
.
+ xz (1 − α ) h2 + (1 − β ) h3 + L  − (1 − β ) h4 + z (1 − β ) h4 < 0

Then, we get:

P2′ ( 0 ) < 0 , P2′ (1) > 0 .

This indicates that not joining online medical treatment is stable, and joining online medical

treatment is unstable. When x ∈ ( 0,1) , P2 ( x ) > 0 . The phase evolution diagram of its stability depends

on the shape of the quadratic curve of equation (5).

According to equation (6)

xy  M + (1 − α ) F1 + (1 − β ) F2 + N 
.
− (1 − α ) t1 − (1 − β ) t2 + x (1 − β ) G + y (1 − β ) F =0

This equation represents the boundary of the steady state. When the following conditions are met:

xy  M + (1 − α ) F1 + (1 − β ) F2 + N 
.
− (1 − α ) t1 − (1 − β ) t2 + x (1 − β ) G + y (1 − β ) F > 0

Then, we get:

P3′ ( 0 ) > 0 , P3′ (1) < 0 .

This indicates that using OHP is stable, and not using OHP is unstable.

In contrast, when the following conditions are met:

xy  M + (1 − α ) F1 + (1 − β ) F2 + N 
.
− (1 − α ) t1 − (1 − β ) t2 + x (1 − β ) G + y (1 − β ) F < 0

Then, we get:

P3′ ( 0 ) < 0 , P3′ (1) > 0 .

This indicates that not joining OHP is stable, and joining OHP is unstable. When x ∈ ( 0,1) ,

P3 ( x ) > 0 . The phase evolution diagram of its stability depends on the shape of the quadratic curve of

equation (6).

Results
 In order to explore the evolution of OHP under different parameter values, based on the established

evolutionary game model, the platforms’ QISC, IPISC, the initial state of doctors and patients, and the

doctor’s registration costs, time costs, reputation loss, and online healthcare costs of patients. We refer

to the relevant data on the Spring Rain Doctor platform, consult experts who study simulation in related

fields, and combine relevant literature research to determine the simulation parameters. These simulation

parameters can reflect the general trend to some extent.

The Influence of QISC α on the OHP Evolutionary Game Behavior

α takes 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 respectively for low QISC, medium QISC and high QISC.

As shown in Figure 3, due to the platforms’ QISC is medium and low, doctors doubt the credibility

of the platform. Finally, doctors will tend to the strategy of not joining OHP, and the lower the QISC,

the faster the rate of evolution to the strategy of not joining. When the platform has a higher degree of

QISC, doctors tend to believe the operation level of the platform. Therefore, OHP can improve the

healthcare efficiency of doctors and their additional income. At last, doctors will tend to join OHP.

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5
x

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15

Figure 3. The evolution path of doctors’ strategy under different QISC

As shown in Figure 4, when the platforms’ QISC is low, patients doubt the healthcare level of the

doctors on the platform and the reliability of the platform based on the doctors’ information on the

platform. Due to the fear of misdiagnosis, the patients’ behavior will tend to the strategy of not using

OHP. When the platforms’ QISC is moderate, the patients will initially tend to not using OHP due to the

psychology of observation. After that, patients can accurately judge the qualifications of doctors through

the patient and peer evaluation mechanism on the platform, and tend to use OHP.
 1

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

y
0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15

Figure 4. The evolution path of patients’ strategy under different QISC

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5
z

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15

Figure 5. The evolution path of platforms’ strategy under different QISC

When the platforms’ QISC is high, patients can learn about the doctors’ healthcare level through

the doctor-related information published on the platform, such as the medical institution, region, and

professional title. Because patients can save time and money by using OHP, at the same time, they can

enjoy healthcare resources that were not previously available due to factors such as region and income

level. Therefore, patients will tend to use OHP.

As shown in Figure 5, when the platforms’ QISC is low, the platforms’ inspection of doctors and

the construction of the platform are relatively negative. Finally, the platform will tend to the strategy of

not providing standardized online healthcare services.

When the platforms’ QISC is moderate, because the platforms consider reputation, they will invest

part of the funds to build the platforms’ qualification inspection and information protection mechanism.

However, over time the platforms’ revenue is not as expected, and the platforms do not pay much
attention to the brand and popularity. At last, platforms tend to the strategy of not providing standardized

online healthcare services.

When platforms have a high degree of QISC, they pay more attention to its own construction, social

reputation and long-term development. They invest heavily in doctor qualification inspection and

information protection, and they are willing to take certain risks. Thus, the platforms eventually tend to

provide standardized online healthcare services.

The Influence of IPISC β on OHP Evolutionary Game Behavior

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5
x

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15

Figure 6. The evolution path of doctors’ strategy under different IPISC

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5
y

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15

Figure 7. The evolution path of patients’ strategy under different IPISC

β takes 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 respectively for low IPISC, medium IPISC, and high IPISC.

As shown in Figure 6, when the platforms’ IPISC is low, doctors concern about their own

information security, which will lead to the evolution of not joining OHP.
 When the platforms’ IPISC is moderate, doctors will choose to join OHP for a period of time to

observe the quality of the platforms’ operation. However, the platforms’ investment in information

protection cannot meet the needs of doctors for their information security protection. Thus, the doctors

finally choose not to join the OHP.

When the platforms invest heavily in information protection, doctors elect to trust the platforms’

information protection mechanism and join OHP. And the greater the IPISC, the faster doctors elect to

join OHP.

As shown in Figure 7, when the IPISC is low, patients concern about the leakage of private

information and identity information, and they tend to elect not using OHP. The lower the platforms’

IPISC, the faster the patients choose not to use it. When the platforms’ IPISC is moderate or high, patients

elect to trust the platforms’ information protection mechanism and choose to use OHP.

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5
z

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15

Figure 8. The evolution path of platforms’ strategy under different IPISC

As shown in Figure 8, when platforms’ IPISC is low, they lack attention to the construction of

information protection mechanisms. Thus, the platforms ultimately choose not to provide standardized

online healthcare services.

In the case of moderate investment in platform information protection, because the platforms want

to attract doctors and patients, the platform initially elect to provide standardized online healthcare

services. Over time, after a large number of doctors and patients join and use, the platform thinks there

is no need to invest heavily in doctor qualification inspection and information protection because of the

cost. Thus, platforms ultimately choose not to provide standardized online healthcare services.

When the platforms’ IPISC is high, they pay more attention to the protection of doctors’ and

patients’ privacy information and invest more funds to protect it. At this time, the platforms care more
about long-term interests, so they choose to provide standardized online healthcare services. The higher

the platforms’ IPISC, the faster they choose to provide standardized online healthcare services.

The Influence of Different Initial States of Doctors on the OHP Evolution Game Behavior

As shown in Figure 9, when the probability that the doctors initially choose to join the OHP is 0.2,

doctors’ attitude towards joining the OHP is negative. Therefore, patients concern about OHP and doubt

the reliability of the platform. Eventually the patients elect not to use OHP. Because doctors do not join

OHP, platforms cannot attract patients, and they quickly choose not to provide standardized online

healthcare services.

When the probability that the doctors initially choose to join OHP is 0.9, the doctors’ willingness

to join OHP is relatively strong, and there are a lot of doctors signing contracts with the platform at this

time. The platform has very rich medical resources. These resources enable patients to trust the platforms,

so they choose to use OHP. At this time the platform has a good thinking and they choose to provide

standardized online healthcare services much faster than patients choose to use OHP.

0.5 1

0.45 0.95

0.4 0.9

0.35 0.85

0.3 0.8

0.25 0.75

0.2 0.7

0.15 0.65

0.1 0.6

0.05 0.55

0 0.5
0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15

x (1) = 0.2 x (1) = 0.9

Figure 9. The evolution track of three-party strategy selection under different initial states of doctors

The Influence of Different Initial States of Patients on the OHP Evolution Game Behavior

As shown in Figure 10, when the probability that the patients initially choose to use OHP is 0.2, at

this time, due to the platforms’ operation, publicity and other factors, the patients’ willingness to use

OHP is low. OHP has not been popularized in the society. The platform lacks a large number of users.

At this time, the platform is reluctant to spend too much cost on operating online healthcare services and

tend to not provide standardized online healthcare services.

When the probability that patients initially choose to use OHP is 0.9, most patients choose to use

OHP. This form of OHP is popular among the public. At this time, a large amount of online medical
resources is required. When a large number of patients choose to use OHP, the medical efficiency of

doctors will be improved, and the pressure on hospitals will be reduced. Doctors can also obtain

additional income. Therefore, doctors choose to join OHP. When a large number of users are registered

on the platform, the platforms have the opportunity to obtain huge profits. They further improve the

quality of platform services for their reputation and patients, strictly inspect the qualifications of doctors

and actively protect the safety of patient information. At last, platforms tend to provide standardized

online healthcare services.

0.5 1

0.45 0.95

0.4 0.9

0.35 0.85

0.3 0.8

0.25 0.75

0.2 0.7

0.15 0.65

0.1 0.6

0.05 0.55

0 0.5
0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15

y (1) = 0.2 y (1) = 0.9

Figure 10. The evolution track of three-party strategy selection under different initial states of patients

The Influence of Different Registration Costs on the Evolutionary Behavior of Doctors

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5
x

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15

Figure 11. Evolutionary trajectory of doctor’s strategy selection under different registration costs

As shown in Figure 11, when the qualification registration costs are high, doctors tend not to join

OHP. Doctors are generally faced with the difficulty of registration. When inspecting the qualifications

of doctors, the platforms require doctors to upload qualification certificates and work certificates. Some

doctors think that the registration and cancellation procedures are very cumbersome. Therefore, they
ultimately tend to not to join OHP. When the qualification registration costs are low, doctors tend to join

OHP. This reflects that doctors' satisfaction and joining costs are important to the joining behavior of

doctors.

The Influence of Different Time Costs on the Evolutionary Behavior of Doctors

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5
x

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15

Figure 12. Evolutionary trajectory of doctors’ strategy selection under different time costs

As shown in Figure 12, when the time costs are low, doctors are willing to use free time to join

OHP to increase their income and reputation. Doctors can have online medical treatment at any time,

which is one of the reasons why doctors choose to join OHP. When the time costs are medium, doctors

try to choose to join at first, and then because of lack of time and energy, they finally elect not to join

OHP. When the time costs are high, doctors tend to do their jobs in the hospital. At this time, they are

unwilling to spend too much time on OHP, and ultimately choose not to join OHP.

The Influence of Different Reputation Loss on the Evolutionary Behavior of Doctors

As shown in Figure 13, when the reputation loss of doctors among patients is small, it is because

the evaluation mechanism of patients on doctors set by the platforms is more reasonable and objective,

and the professional level and working attitude of doctors can be fairly evaluated. At this time, the doctor

has a greater willingness to join OHP. When the doctors’ reputation is greatly lost, in addition to the

medical level, the patients’ requirements for the doctors’ service level are also higher, and the doctor is

more likely to receive negative evaluations about communication skills, timeliness and service attitudes.

For example, the experience mechanism of doctors will be questioned by patients; patients are more

willing to trust the opinions of doctors in offline hospitals than OHP; due to the availability of online

knowledge, patients’ psychological expectations for OHP are too high, which will lead to patients giving
negative comments. Initially, doctors choose to join OHP. Over time, negative online reviews will put

pressure on doctors, and they ultimately choose not to join OHP.

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5
x

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15

Figure 13. Evolutionary trajectory of doctors’ strategy selection under different reputation loss

The Influence of Different Online Healthcare Costs on the Evolutionary Behavior of Patients

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5
y

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 5 10 15

Figure 14. Evolutionary trajectory of patient’s strategy selection under different online healthcare costs

As shown in Figure 14, when the online healthcare costs are low, since a large number of patients’

conditions can be solved by simple diagnosis and treatment, using OHP can save patients time and money

to go to the hospital for medical treatment. Especially, patients can reduce the costs of useless

consultation through using OHP, and OHP can solve the problems of difficult and expensive medical

treatment.

When the online healthcare costs are moderate, patients choose not to use OHP at the beginning.

Because at the beginning people’s awareness of paying for knowledge was not strong. However, with

the passage of time, people’s health concepts and consumption concepts have improved. The concept of
obtaining high-quality healthcare services by paying lower medical expenses than that of hospitals has

gradually become popular among patients. Eventually patients elect to use OHP.

When online healthcare costs are high, although OHP have been rapidly promoted and patients have

gradually accepted this medical method due to the convenience, patients have not yet established trust in

the platforms and doctors. Many factors make patients doubt the professionalism of doctors and the

reliability of platforms. When OHP cannot help patients save the cost of seeing a doctor, patients tend

not to use OHP.

Case Analysis: An Example of Spring Rain Doctor Platform

Spring Rain Doctor which has been developing for nearly 8 years since 2011 is the first Internet

enterprise in China to try online healthcare. More than 300 public hospitals have settled in the platform.

By the end of August 2020, the platform has 630,000 Chinese practicing doctors from all departments.

The cumulative number of users of the platform is 130 million, and its daily consulting times exceeds

300,000. It is the world’s largest mobile doctor-patient communication platform. Doctors could converse

with patients through the website, pictures, mobile phones, and even video format. In addition, doctors

could observe timely feedback and service assessments of patients [31].

Table 3. The proportion of users in each province

Province The proportion of users in each province(%)

Guangdong 11.2%
Shandong 7.16%
Hebei 6.05%
Jiangsu 5.85%
Sichuan 5.45%
Zhejiang 4.94%
Henan 4.94%
Liaoning 4.54%
Heilongjiang 4.04%
Hubei 3.43%

According to the data provided by Artery Network, the Table 3 shows the proportion of platform

users in each region. Guangdong has the largest number of users, accounting for 11.2%, far more than

other regions; followed by Shandong, accounting for 7.16%. The reason for this phenomenon may be

that Guangdong is a young city, and people are more interested in new things and are willing to try new
medical methods. Moreover, the per capita income in the region is relatively high, and people’s time and

opportunity costs are huge. If users can consult online at any time and save the time and cost of going to

the hospital, they will be more willing to pay for consultation on the platform. Combining the population

numbers of each province in 2018 in Table 4, eight of the top ten provinces with the number of users of

Spring Rain Doctor platform are among the top ten provinces by population. It can be inferred that the

population of Spring Rain doctors is evenly distributed across the country, and the population of platform

users is not restricted by region. This shows that various regions have the problem of lack of medical

resources. Different regions have different problems. For example, developed regions have more medical

resources, but the number of patients is large and it is difficult to see a doctor. In rural areas, medical

resources are scarce and it is expensive for patients to see a doctor.

Table 4. The top 10 provinces in population in 2018

Province Population(million)
1 Guangdong 111.69
2 Shandong 100.05
3 Henan 95.59
4 Sichuan 83.02
5 Jiangsu 80.29
6 Hebei 75.19
7 Hunan 68.60
8 Anhui 62.54
9 Hubei 59.02
10 Zhejiang 56.57

Online healthcare services are one of the “standard configurations” of various mobile medical

enterprises. This is also one of the most competitive areas. However, only the most reliable and reliable

medical resources are the most powerful competitive forces. In response, Dr. Wang Jianguo, Vice

President of Spring Rain Doctor, released the "Online Diagnosis and Treatment Ability Report" at the

meeting. Spring Rain Doctor solves more than 330,000 health problems daily, with an average response

time of about 3 minutes. The source of doctors covers all provinces (autonomous regions, municipalities

directly under the Central Government) except Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Most doctors are

between the ages of 25-45, senior doctors account for 24%, and other doctors are 38%. In terms of doctor

qualifications, Spring Rain Doctor has a strict inspect mechanism. First, it requires four cards, namely

real-name information such as a doctor’s qualification certificate, a practicing qualification certificate,

an ID card, and a bank card. Then there will be staff to confirm the doctor’s work by phone or offline to

confirm that the doctor is indeed a working doctor. At the same time, the most active and largest group

of Spring Rain Doctor comes from the upper first-class hospitals. According to the data provided by

Artery Network, the figure 15 shows the number of online doctors from the upper first-class hospitals

was 4,680, accounting for 62.3% of the online doctors. This means that the Spring Rain Doctor platform

has a large number of high-quality medical resources. In addition, when the doctor serves online, there

will also be a strict evaluation mechanism. This shows that the platform’s inspection of doctor

qualifications is an important factor affecting the platform’s online healthcare competitiveness. The

conclusions in Figure 3 to Figure 5 are verified.

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

Figure 15. Number of online doctors at all levels

On the protection of privacy information, the general Office of the State Administration for Market

Regulation (SAMR), the Secretariat of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry

and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China (MIIT) and the General Office of the

Ministry of Public Security (MPS) jointly issued the Method for Determining the Illegal Collection and

Use of Personal Information by APPS on December 30, 2019. Spring Rain Doctor and 10 other apps

were reported for illegally collecting and using personal information, because they didn’t make clear to

the users to apply for all privacy rights. Users ask about privacy diseases on the Spring Rain Doctor

platform to avoid being discovered by acquaintances. After that, the Spring Rain Doctor APP launched

a privacy policy. Therefore, the protection of the platform's information is an important factor for patients
to choose to use OHP. If the platform violates the privacy of patient users, it will result in the loss of a

large number of users. The conclusions in Figure 6 to Figure 8 are verified.

In 2016, as the largest online consultation platform in the country, Spring Rain Doctor set up the

online consultation service function of Spring Rain Doctor for hardware manufacturers, APPs, websites,

WeChat accounts, etc. who have this demand for free. After the opening of Spring Rain Doctor’s online

consultation platform, Spring Rain Doctor uses this borderless online consultation portal to dig deeper

into the platform’s online consultation capabilities, strengthen the "foundation" role of this service for

mobile healthcare, and strive to become the second entrance to health issues of Chinese. By expanding

Spring Rain Doctor’s online healthcare portal, patients can use online healthcare functions more

conveniently and the popularization of Spring Rain Doctor online healthcare functions can be promoted

consequently. This shows that Spring Rain Doctor promotes online healthcare as much as possible to

increase the probability of patients using OHP. The conclusions in Figure 10 are verified.

Spring Rain Doctor initially interviewed doctors through the offline team to obtain medical

resources one by one. After the brand is be promoted, the number of doctors added through the brand

effect exceeded the number of doctors promoted. In order to obtain a large number of doctor resources,

so that patients no longer have the problem of shortage of medical resources, Spring Rain Doctor provides

different patients for doctors by layering the needs of users, or puts doctors with different capabilities

and different services on different platforms. So that the doctor and patient can get a good match. At the

same time, in order to make doctors more likely to join, Spring Rain Doctor reduces the registration cost

of doctors. Spring Rain Doctor’s registration and auditing are more user-friendly, especially auditing,

supporting everyone to use badges, work permits to replace qualification certificates and some

complicated proofs. This reduces the doctor's registration costs and difficulty of using, while ensuring

the authenticity of the doctor's qualifications. This shows that reducing the registration costs of doctors

is also a way for the platform to attract doctors to join. The conclusions in Figure 11 are verified.

According to the data provided by Artery Network, as of September 2014, the income of doctors on the

Spring Rain Doctor platform is shown in Table 5. The doctor’s income is divided into two parts. One

part is the income obtained by answering users’ free consultations, and this part of the income is paid by

Spring Rain Doctor platform. The platform paid the doctor 1.5 yuan for each reply. The second part is

the dynamic pricing part of doctors, and all the income of this part is paid by users. It should be noted

that since the dynamic pricing part of doctors’ income has been changing, there may be a large gap
between the data and the doctor's actual income. But it can be seen that the Spring Rain Doctor platform

attracts more doctors to join through subsidies to doctors. This will make the Spring Rain Doctor

platform’s doctors more active and attract a large number of users. In summary, the Spring Rain Doctor

platform uses various methods to increase the probability of doctors joining. The conclusions in Figure

9 are verified.

Table 5. Income of each department on Spring Rain Doctor platform

Department Income(million)
Pediatrics 2.48
Otolaryngology 0.56
Obstetrics and Gynecology 2.98
Orthopedics 0.68
Stomatology 0.34
Male Urology 1.56
Cranial Nerve 0.85
Endocrinology 0.45
Internal Medicine 3.84
Dermatology 1.48
Surgery 2.30
Psychology 0.54
Cardiovascular 0.75
Ophthalmology 0.42
Nutritional 0.14
Plastic Surgery 0.40
Chinese Medicine 0.52
Oncology 0.46
Grand Total 20.76

The most important purpose for doctors to join OHP is to increase economic and reputational

benefits. Through research, the doctors on the platform of Spring Rain Doctor report that the platform

arbitration is biased towards users when disputes occur between doctors and patients; Spring Rain

Doctor’s doctor evaluation system drop more points than other platforms; It is often the case that doctors

didn’t respond in time and receive bad reviews. These problems have dampened the enthusiasm of

doctors. The common point of these problems is that they damage the reputation of doctors. Therefore,

the loss of the reputation of doctors is an important factor for doctors to consider whether to join OHP.

The conclusions in Figure 13 are verified.

 According to the data in Figure 16, the users of Spring Rain Doctor platform are concentrated in

the middle of the consumption level. This shows that OHP is more acceptable to the general public.

However, users below the medium consumption level account for more than 50% of all users. This shows

that online healthcare costs are still a key factor for patients to use the Spring Rain Doctor platform. The

conclusions in Figure 14 are verified.

According to the user survey report of Spring Rain Doctor platform (data from

www.woshipm.com), the website interviewed doctors in depth. A part of survey questions and interview

results are shown in Table 6. Table 6 shows that income and word of mouth are the main motivations for

doctors to join OHP, and time cost is the main factor affecting doctors' joining behavior. The conclusions

in Figure 12 are verified.

High Low
consumer(%), consumer(%),
11.7 10.7

Low and
mediumconsumer(%),
Medium and high 17.3
consumer(%),
30.6

Medium
consumer(%),
29.7

Figure 16. Analysis on the consumption ability of Spring Rain Doctor’s users

Table 6. A part of survey questions and interview results

Question Result
Do you provide private doctor We can provide the services of a private doctor when we
services? have the time and energy. But we do not want to take up
too much working time.
What is your motivation for online We can use our free time to increase revenue and
health services? reputation.
Have you ever received negative The main reason we received bad reviews was that we
reviews when providing online health did not respond in time.
services?
What are your requirements and Users can clearly explain the complete symptoms at one
suggestions for the platform? time during consultation, thereby saving time.
Discussion

This paper establishes a game model for the evolution of the players in the online medical field

based on the premise of the bounded rationality of the game party. Through the analysis of the three-

party evolution game model and the numerical simulation analysis of the evolutionary behavior of

doctors, patients and platforms, we found that the higher the platforms’ inspection of doctor

qualifications, the more it can strengthen the trust of doctors and patients to the platform, and promote

the participation and use of doctors and patients. Low and medium intensity scrutiny will cause doctors

and patients to choose not to join or use it because of fear of misdiagnosis. In the existing literatures,

some scholars have mentioned that OHP employ doctors to answer patient questions, and high quality

OHP are more likely to be acknowledged by patients [27]. Therefore, for patients, they can easily and

quickly obtain high-quality medical resources such as doctors in the third-class hospital by using OHP.

The lack of medical resources and the uneven distribution are important reasons for patients to use OHP.

The greater the platforms’ inspection of medical resources, the better the quality of doctors can be

guaranteed, which improves the patients’ trust in the platforms, avoids misdiagnosis and other issues,

and improves the platforms’ credibility, thereby forming a benign circulatory system. In addition, the

high inspection strength of the platform also has an incentive effect on the platform itself, making the

platform unwilling to give up sunk costs and promoting the high-quality development of the platform.

When the platforms’ privacy information protection is moderate or low, doctors and patients tend

to choose not to join or use OHP. The greater the protection of the platforms’ information, the more able

to promote doctors and patients to join and use OHP. Indeed, there has been evidence in the literature

indicating that patients may hesitate to disclose their personal information online so they switch doctors

frequently or switch to an offline hospital visit [6]. Thus, the platforms’ information protection

mechanism is an important factor in whether the doctors and patients choose OHP. The competent

government department should clarify the entry threshold for OHP as soon as possible, improve the

information security management system, ensure user information security and privacy, and better play

the role of OHP.

For doctors, the stronger the patients’ willingness to use OHP, the more inclined the doctors to join

OHP, thereby obtaining more benefits. At the same time, registration costs, time costs, and reputation

loss all affect whether doctors join OHP. It is proved that if a doctor provides a satisfactory service online,

it may help his/her simultaneously gain reputation from both online and offline channels through word
of mouth communication [31]. Rather, when doctors decide to offer online counseling services in their

free time, the number of consultations and extra devoted time are considered to be negative factors

affecting doctors’ initiatives [31]. Without proper stimulating motivators, joining in OHP is stressful for

doctors because they have a heavy work in hospitals [30].

For patients, the richer the medical resources and the higher the quality of the platforms, and the

lower the costs of OHP, the more they can encourage patients to use OHP, saving more time and money

costs. Previous studies have confirmed that online consultation can provide patients with convenient

access to physicians at low cost [11]. Therefore, the platforms should vigorously promote OHP, so that

more doctors can actively join in, thereby attracting more patients. There are many ways to promote

OHP, but grassroots doctors are the entrance with the highest conversion rate. Grassroots doctors can

connect medical resources and patients to a certain extent, which will be a key part of the cross-border

integration of the Internet and the medical industry. The platform should concentrate high-quality

resources on grassroots doctors, provide them with certain training opportunities and room to learn, and

increase the income of grassroots doctors. At the same time, the platform should improve the doctors’

review and evaluation mechanism, such as simplifying the review and registration process, making the

process more user-friendly and more convenient; optimizing the operation process function, and adding

online and offline to the doctor in the graphical consultation interface Status setting function, so that

patients will not give bad reviews to doctors because of the long waiting time; adding the functions of

message withdrawal, message copy, sending small video, voice to text, service end countdown,

remaining number of conversations, and the other party’s reply status in the dialog box between the two

parties, so that the upper limit of the number of conversations in the service time limit can be reduced;

using technology to improve the communication efficiency of doctors and patients, reduce the reputation

loss and time cost of doctors, and make reasonable use of limited and precious medical resources. In

addition, the core of OHP promotion is the patient. For China, remote cities and township residents are

the largest customer groups of OHP. The OHP is just a new form of service in the medical industry.

Promoting the popularization of OHP in remote and township residents can make the value of OHP form

truly reflected, thus promoting the development of the entire mobile medical industry. Therefore, the

platforms should increase publicity and advertising in remote cities and rural township residents to attract

more medical workers to join the OHP field.

 Although we found some implication of OHP promotion, there still work need to do in the future.

For example, we can study the behavior of OHP subjects from the perspective of government regulation,

and whether free consultation will affect the enthusiasm of doctors. In the future, we need to include the

government into the scope of OHP subjects to further study the promotion of OHP.

Conclusion

In this paper, through the establishment of an evolutionary game model of OHP stakeholders, we

found that the platforms’ qualification inspection of doctors, investment in information protection, initial

probability of doctors joining, initial probability of patients using, doctors’ registration costs, time costs,

reputation loss, and the online healthcare costs of patients have an impact on the three parties’ strategic

choices. The three stakeholders influence each other’s behavior. Therefore, the platforms should pay

attention to doctor qualification and information protection, improve the platform function and patient

evaluation mechanism, and set reasonable prices of online healthcare treatment. At the same time, the

government should increase supervision, regulate the behavior of the platform, clarify the distribution of

responsibility for online healthcare legal issues, and promote the healthy development of OHP.

Abbreviations

OHP: Online Healthcare Platform

QISC: Qualification Inspect Strength Coefficient

IPISC: Information Protection Investment Strength Coefficient

Ethics approval and consent to participate

Not applicable

Consent for publication

Not applicable

Availability of data and materials

The datasets generated and analyzed during the current study are not publicly available due individual

privacy but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

Funding
This research was supported by three funds: 1) National Natural Science Foundation of China: Evolution

Mechanism, Model and Policy of Industry-University-Research Cooperation Innovation Network (grant

number: 71473055); 2) Heilongjiang Province Philosophy and Social Science Research Project:

Research on Responsible Innovation Mechanism of Emerging Technologies and Its Adaptive

Governance (grant number: 19GLH045); 3) Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities:

Research on Artificial Intelligence Technology Responsibility Innovation Mechanism and

Governance(grant number: 3072020CFW0902); 4) The Ph.D. Student Research and Innovation Fund of

the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (3072019GIP0909).

Authors’ contributions

Conceptualization, Cao, X.; methodology, Zhang, L.T.; software, Lv, D. and Xing, Z.Y.; data curation,

Li, W.J.; writing, Zhang, L.T. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the participants for their contribution to this work.

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Figure Legends

Figure

Figure 1 None None None

Figure 2 None None None

Figure 3 α=0.1 α=0.5 α=0.9

Figure 4 α=0.1 α=0.5 α=0.9

Figure 5 α=0.1 α=0.5 α=0.9

Figure 6 β=0.1 β=0.5 β=0.9

Figure 7 β=0.1 β=0.5 β=0.9

Figure 8 β=0.1 β=0.5 β=0.9

Figure 9 x(1)=0.2 x=0.2 y=0.5 z=0.5

Figure 9 x(1)=0.9 x=0.9 y=0.5 z=0.5

Figure 10 y(1)=0.2 x=0.5 y=0.2 z=0.5

Figure 10 y(1)=0.9 x=0.5 y=0.9 z=0.5

Figure 11 c1=5 c1=10 c1=15

Figure 12 c2=5 c2=10 c2=15

Figure 13 c3=10 c3=15 c3=20

Figure 14 h1=3 h1=9 h1=15

Figure 15 Private doctor Text and picture Telephone Outpatient None

consultation consultation appointment

Figure 16 Low Low and Medium Medium and High

consumer(%) medium consumer(%) high consumer(%)

consumer(%) consumer(%)
 Figure title

Figure Title

Figure 1 The research framework of the whole paper

Figure 2 The relationship among the three stakeholders

Figure 3 The evolution path of doctors’ strategy under different QISC

Figure 4 The evolution path of patients’ strategy under different QISC

Figure 5 The evolution path of platforms’ strategy under different QISC

Figure 6 The evolution path of doctors’ strategy under different IPISC

Figure 7 The evolution path of patients’ strategy under different IPISC

Figure 8 The evolution path of platforms’ strategy under different IPISC

Figure 9 The evolution track of three-party strategy selection under different initial states of doctors

Figure 10 The evolution track of three-party strategy selection under different initial states of patients

Figure 11 Evolutionary trajectory of doctor’s strategy selection under different registration costs

Figure 12 Evolutionary trajectory of doctors’ strategy selection under different time costs

Figure 13 Evolutionary trajectory of doctors’ strategy selection under different reputation loss

Figure 14 Evolutionary trajectory of patient’s strategy selection under different online healthcare costs

Figure 15 Number of online doctors at all levels

Figure 16 Analysis on the consumption ability of Spring Rain Doctor’s users

Figures

Figure 1

The research framework of the whole paper

Figure 2

The relationship among the three stakeholders

Figure 3

The evolution path of doctors’ strategy under different QISC

Figure 4

The evolution path of patients’ strategy under different QISC

Figure 5

The evolution path of platforms’ strategy under different QISC

Figure 6

The evolution path of doctors’ strategy under different IPISC

Figure 7

The evolution path of patients’ strategy under different IPISC

Figure 8

The evolution path of platforms’ strategy under different IPISC

Figure 9

The evolution track of three-party strategy selection under different initial states of doctors
Figure 10

The evolution track of three-party strategy selection under different initial states of patients

Figure 11

Evolutionary trajectory of doctor’s strategy selection under different registration costs

Figure 12

Evolutionary trajectory of doctors’ strategy selection under different time costs

Figure 13

Evolutionary trajectory of doctors’ strategy selection under different reputation loss

Figure 14

Evolutionary trajectory of patient’s strategy selection under different online healthcare costs
Figure 15

Number of online doctors at all levels

Figure 16

Analysis on the consumption ability of Spring Rain Doctor’s users