Mandarin Vs CA
Mandarin Vs CA
Mandarin Vs CA
FIRST ISSUE: The Court found that petitioner's restaurant is affiliated with BANKARD as evidenced by an Agremeent entered into between
the said parties wherein it was mentioned therein that "the Merchant shall honor validly issued PCCCI credit cards presented by their
corresponding holders provided that the card expiration date has not elapsed. While private respondent, may not be a party to the said
agreement, the above-quoted stipulation conferred a favor upon the private respondent, a holder of credit card validly issued by BANKARD.
This stipulation is a stipulation pour autri and under Article 1311 of the Civil Code private respondent may demand its fulfillment provided he
communicated his acceptance to the petitioner before its revocation. In this case, private respondent's offer to pay by means of his
BANKARD credit card constitutes not only an acceptance of the said stipulation but also an explicit communication of his acceptance to the
obligor. In addition, the record shows that petitioner posted a logo inside Mandarin Villa Seafood Village stating that "Bankard is accepted
here. This representation is conclusive upon the petitioner which it cannot deny or disprove as against the private respondent. SECOND
ISSUE: As to the issue of its negligence, the Court also took note of the Point of Sale Guidelines wherein it enumerated the steps to be taken
by petitioner in credit card issues, such as if such was declined, it should check expiry date embossed in the card and if unexpired, petitioner
should honor the card provided it is not invalid, cancelled or otherwise suspended, None of those circumstances was present on the part of
de Jesus, thus, petitioner did not use the reasoable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same
situation and as such petitioner is guilty of negligence. THIRD ISSUE: While it is true that private respondent did not have sufficient cash on
hand when he hosted a dinner at petitioner's restaurant, this fact alone does not constitute negligence on his part. Neither can it be claimed
that the same was the proximate cause of private respondent's damage. We take judicial notice of the current practice among major
establishments, petitioner included, to accept payment by means of credit cards in lieu of cash. Neither can we conclude that the remark of
Professor Lirag was a supervening event and the proximate cause of private respondent's injury. The humiliation and embarrassment of the
private respondent was brought about not by such a remark of Professor Lirag but by the fact of dishonor by the petitioner of private
respondent's valid BANKARD credit card. If at all, the remark of Professor Lirag served only to aggravate the embarrassment then felt by
private respondent, albeit silently within himself.