G.R. No. 74886 December 8, 1992 PRUDENTIAL BANK, petitioner, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, PHILIPPINE RAYON MILLS, INC. and ANACLETO R. CHI, respondents. FACTS: Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. (PRMI)applied for a commercial letter of credit with Prudential bank for the importation of textile machinery with Nissho Co., Ltd. of Japan. Prudential Bank executed a trust receipt signed by the President of PRMI.PMRI received the machinery and installed the same at its factory. PMRI ceased business sometime in 1967 without paying his obligation arising from the letters of credit and trust receipt. Repeated demands for the payment of the said trust receipt were made and to no avail. Hence, action for collection of money was filed to the trial court. ISSUE: Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust receipt? HELD: Paragraph 8 of the Trust Receipt which reads: "My/our liability for payment at maturity of any accepted draft, bill of exchange or indebtedness shall not be extinguished or modified" does not, contrary to the holding of the public respondent, contemplate prior acceptance by Philippine Rayon, but by the petitioner. Acceptance, however, was not even necessary in the first place because the drafts which were eventually issued were sight drafts And even if these were not sight drafts, thereby necessitating acceptance, it would be the petitioner and not Philippine Rayon which had to accept the same for the latter was not the drawee. Presentment for acceptance is defined as the production of a bill of exchange to a drawee for acceptance. The trial court and the public respondent, therefore, erred in ruling that presentment for acceptance was an indispensable requisite for Philippine Rayon's liability on the drafts to attach. Contrary to both courts' pronouncements, Philippine Rayon immediately became liable thereon upon petitioner's payment thereof. Such is the essence of the letter of credit issued by the petitioner. A different conclusion would violate the principle upon which commercial letters of credit are founded because in such a case, both the beneficiary and the issuer, Nissho Company Ltd. and the petitioner, respectively, would be placed at the mercy of Philippine Rayon even if the latter had already received the imported machinery and the petitioner had fully paid for it. Commercial letters of credit have come into general use in international sales transactions where much time necessarily elapses between the sale and the receipt by a purchaser of the merchandise, during which interval great price changes may occur. Their purpose is to insure to a seller payment of a definite amount upon presentation of documents. The bank deals only with documents. It has nothing to do with the quality of the merchandise. Disputes as to the merchandise shipped may arise and be litigated later between vendor and vendee, but they may not impede acceptance of drafts and payment by the issuing bank when the proper documents are presented. A letter of credit is defined as an engagement by a bank or other person made at the request of a customer that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit. Through a letter of credit, the bank merely substitutes its own promise to pay for one of its customers who in return promises to pay the bank the amount of funds mentioned in the letter of credit plus credit or commitment fees mutually agreed upon. In the instant case then, the drawee was necessarily the herein petitioner. It was to the latter that the drafts were presented for payment. In fact, there was no need for acceptance as the issued drafts are sight drafts. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL).

G.R. No. 105395 December 10, 1993 BANK OF AMERICA, NT & SA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, INTER-RESIN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FRANCISCOTRAJANO, JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, respondents. FACTS: Bank of America received an Irrevocable Letter of Credit issued by Bank of Ayudhya for the Account of General Chemicals Ltd., Inc. for the sale of plastic ropes and agricultural files with Bank of America as advising bank and Inter-Resin Industrial Corp. as beneficiary. Upon receipt of the letter advice with letter of credit by Inter- Resin told Bank of America to confirm said letter of credit, but the bank did not confirm such. Bank of America explained that there was no need for confirmation. Inter-Resin made a partial availment of the Letter of Credit after presentment of the required documents to Bank of America. After confirmation of all the documents BA issued a check in favor of IR. BA advice Bank of Ayudhya of IRs availment under the letter of credit and asked for the corresponding reimbursement.IR presented documents for the second availment under the same LC but BA stopped the processing of such after they received a telex from Bank of Ayudhya declaring that the LC fraudulent. BA sued IR for the recovery of the first LC payment. ISSUE: Whether or not Bank of America may recover what it has paid under the letter of credit to InterResin? HELD: In fine, we hold that First, given the factual findings of the courts below, we conclude that petitioner Bank of America has acted merely as a notifying bank and did not assume the responsibility of a confirming bank; and Second, petitioner bank, as a negotiating bank, is entitled to recover on InterResin's partial availment as beneficiary of the letter of credit which has been disowned by the alleged issuer bank. A letter of credit is a financial device developed by merchants as a convenient and relatively safe mode of dealing with sales of goods to satisfy the seemingly irreconcilable interests of a seller, who refuses to part with his goods before he is paid, and a buyer, who wants to have control of the goods before paying. To break the impasse, the buyer may be required to contract a bank to issue a letter of credit in favor of the seller so that, by virtue of the latter of credit, the issuing bank can authorize the seller to draw drafts and engage to pay them upon their presentment simultaneously with the tender of documents required by the letter of credit. The buyer and the seller agree on what documents are to be presented for payment, but ordinarily they are documents of title evidencing or attesting to the shipment of the goods to the buyer. There would at least be three (3) parties: (a)the buyer who procures the letter of credit and obliges himself to reimburse the issuing bank upon receipts of the documents of title; (b)the bank issuing the letter of credit, which undertakes to pay the seller upon receipt of the draft and proper document of titles and to surrender the documents to the buyer upon reimbursement; and, (c) the seller, who in compliance with the contract of sale ships the goods to the buyer and delivers the documents of title and draft to the issuing bank to recover payment. The number of the parties, not infrequently and almost invariably in international trade practice, may be increased. Thus, the services of an advising (notifying) bank may be utilized to convey to the seller the existence of the credit; or, of a confirming bank which will lend credence to the letter of credit issued by a lesser known issuing bank; or, of a paying bank, which undertakes to encash the drafts drawn by the exporter. Further, instead of going to the place of the issuing bank to claim payment, the buyer may approach another bank, termed the negotiating bank to have the draft discounted. It cannot seriously be disputed, looking at this case, that Bank of America has, in fact, only been an advising, not confirming, bank, and this much is clearly evident, among other things, by the provisions of the letter of credit itself, the petitioner bank's letter of advice, its request for payment of advising fee, and the admission of Inter-Resin that it has paid the same. That Bank of America has asked Inter-Resin to submit documents required by the letter of credit and eventually has paid the proceeds thereof, did not obviously make it a confirming bank. The fact, too, that the draft required by the letter of credit is to be drawn under the account of General Chemicals (buyer) only means the same had to be presented to Bank of Ayudhya(issuing bank) for payment. It may be significant to recall that the letter of credit is an engagement of the issuing bank, not the advising bank, to pay the

draft. As an advising or notifying bank, Bank of America did not incur any obligation more than just notifying Inter-Resin of the letter of credit issued in its favor, let alone to confirm the letter of credit. The bare statement of the bank employees, aforementioned, in responding to the inquiry made by Atty. Tanay, Inter-Resin's representative, on the authenticity of the letter of credit certainly did not have the effect of novating the letter of credit and Bank of America's letter of advice, nor can it justify the conclusion that the bank must now assume total liability on the letter of credit. Indeed, Inter-Resin itself cannot claim to have been all that free from fault. As the seller, the issuance of the letter of credit should have obviously been a great concern to it. It would have, in fact, been strange if it did not, prior to the letter of credit, enter into a contract, or negotiated at the very least, with General Chemicals. In the ordinary course of business, the perfection of contract precedes the issuance of a letter of credit. G.R. No. L-24821 October 16, 1970 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DE RENY FABRIC INDUSTRIES, INC., AURORA T. TUYO and AURORA CARCERENY alias AURORA C. GONZALES, defendants-appellants.

CHARLES LEE, ET AL VS COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONSGR NO. 117913 & 117914, February 1, 2002 375 SCRA 579 FACTS: MICO Metals Corporation, through its President, Charles Lee requested from Philippine Bank of Communication a discounting loan/credit line in the amount of P3,000,000.000 for the purpose of carrying out MICOs line of business as well as to maintain its volume of business, and another discounting loan/credit line for the purpose of opening letters of credit and trust receipts. Both requests were supported by a resolution that the President, Charles Lee, and the Vice President and General Manager, Mr. Mariano Sio, are authorized and empowered to apply for, negotiate and secure the approval of commercial loans x x x x x but not limited to discount loans, letters of credit, trust receipts, lines for marginal deposits on foreign and domestic letters of credit x x x x for a total amount of not to exceed P10,000,000.00.The request was approved by the Bank PBCom, and first availment in the amount of P1,000,000.00 was made on March 26, 1979. Total availment has reached P3,000,000.00, which upon maturity, were rolled-over or renewed. As security to the loan, a Real Estate Mortgage over MICOs properties was executed by its VP Mariano Sio. Further, Charles Lee, Chua Siok Suy, Mariano Sio, Alfonso Yap and Richard Velasco, executed in their personal capacity a Surety Agreement in favor of PBCom in the amount of P3,000,000.00. Another P4,0000,000.00 was requested by the President Charles Lee from PBCom for the purpose of expansion and modernization of the companies machineries. The request was consequently approved and availed in full. Another surety agreement was executed by the same set of officers-persons in favor of PBCom and their liability shall not at any one time exceed the sum of P7,500,000.00/ Later, MICO furnished PBCom a copy of its notarized certification issued by its corporate secretary stating therein that Chio Siok Suy was the duly authorized person, unanimously approved by the Board of Directors, to negotiate with PBCom on behalf of MICO for loans and other credit availments. After the receipt of this secretarys certificate, foreign letters of credits, domestic letter of credits and loans were further requested, approved and availed. Upon maturity of all the credit availments, PBCom demanded for payment but MICO failed to settle despite repeated demands, reason for the Bank to foreclose extrajudicially the properties, and later sold them in public auction. The price however, was not sufficient to fully pay the total outstanding. PBCom demanded from the petitioners-sureties the deficiency, which the latter refused to acknowledge. Thus, the filing with the court of the complaint and for attachment on the properties of the petitioners-sureties contending that MICO is no longer in operation and it has no other properties to settle for the deficiency. The trial court denied the complaint for failure on the part of the Bank to prove that the proceeds of the loans were ever delivered to MICO, which the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition. ISSUES: 1) 2) Whether or not the proceeds of the loans and letters of credit transactions were ever delivered to MICO; and Whether or not the individual petitioners, as sureties, may be held liable under the 2 Surety Agreements executed.

FACTS: De Reny Fabric Industries, Inc. applied to the Bank for four (4) irrevocable commercial letters of credit to cover the purchase by the corporation of goods from its American supplier, the J.B. Distributing Company. As each shipment arrived in the Philippines, the De Reny Fabric Industries, Inc. made partial payments to the Bank amounting. Further payments were, however, subsequently discontinued by the corporation when it became established, as a result of a chemical test conducted by the National Science Development Board, that the goods that arrived in Manila were colored chalks instead of dye stuffs. The corporation also refused to take possession of these goods, and for this reason, the Bank caused them to be deposited with a bonded warehouse paying therefor the amount of P12,609.64 up to the filing of its complaint with the court. ISSUE: Whether or not De Reny fabrics is liable under the letter of Credit? HELD: Under the terms of their Commercial Letter of Credit Agreements with the Bank, the appellants agreed that the Bank shall not be responsible for the "existence, character, quality, quantity, conditions, packing, value, or delivery of the property purporting to be represented by documents; for any difference in character, quality, quantity, condition, or value of the property from that expressed in documents," or for "partial or incomplete shipment, or failure or omission to ship any or all of the property referred to in the Credit," as well as "for any deviation from instructions, delay, default or fraud by the shipper or anyone else in connection with the property the shippers or vendors and ourselves [purchasers] or any of us." Having agreed to these terms, the appellants have, therefore, no recourse but to comply with their covenant. But even without the stipulation recited above, the appellants cannot shift the burden of loss to the Bank on account of the violation by their vendor of its prestation. It was uncontrovertibly proven by the Bank during the trial below that banks, in providing financing in international business transactions such as those entered into by the appellants, do not deal with the property to be exported or shipped to the importer, but deal only with documents. The existence of a custom in international banking and financing circles negating any duty on the part of a bank to verify whether what has been described in letters of credits or drafts or shipping documents actually tallies with what was loaded aboard ship, having been positively proven as a fact, the appellants are bound by this established usage. They were, after all, the ones who tapped the facilities afforded by the Bank in order to engage in international business.

RULING: The SC AFFIRMED in toto the decision of the Court Appeals. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence, which can be established by the operation of presumption or by the probative value, which the law attaches to a specific state of facts, thereby creating a prima facie case. If there is no proof to the contrary, the prima facie case or evidence will prevail. The Negotiable Instruments Law clearly provides that every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for valuable consideration and every person whose signature appears thereon are also presumed to have become a party for value. Negotiable instruments include promissory notes, bills of exchange and checks. Letters of credit and trust receipts are however, not negotiable instruments, but drafts issued in connection with letters of credit are negotiable instruments. All documents presented by PBCom have not merely created a prima facie case but have actually proved the solidary obligation of MICO and the petitioners-sureties. While the presumption found under the

Negotiable Instruments Law may not necessarily be applicable to trust receipts and letters of credit, the presumption that the drafts drawn in connection with the letters of credit have sufficient consideration. The fact that the letters of credit show that the pertinent materials/merchandise have been received by MICO and with drafts signed by the beneficiary/suppliers proved that there was a consideration for value. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the contracts on loans and letters of credits were not binding on the premise that there were no consideration for value and if there was, the Bank failed to present evidence as to the crediting of the proceeds to its account is untenable. It was the petitioner who has been preventing the Bank in presenting the evidence. But from the fact itself that MICO has requested for an additional loan of P4M, impliedly, is a prima facie case which showed that the proceeds of the earlier loans were delivered to MICO. The court also found no merits on the latters contention that the contracts were executed fraudulently by the unauthorized person Chua Siok Suy. The fact that it was MICO which furnished PBCom the Secretarys Certificate, notarized by its own corporate secretary suffices for the PBCom to believe that it was valid and binding, hence the granting of the request for further availments. Anent petitioners-sureties contention that they obtained no consideration whatsoever on the surety agreements, the Court pointed out that the consideration for the surety is the very consideration for the principal obligor, MICO, in the contracts of loan. In the case of Willex Plastic Industries Corporation vs. CA, it ruled that the consideration necessary to support a surety obligation need not pass directly to the surety, a consideration moving to the principal alone being sufficient. For a guarantor or surety is bound by the same consideration that makes the contract effective between the parties thereto. It is not necessary that a guarantor or surety should receive any part or benefit, if such there be, accruing to his principal. FEATI BANK VS. CA FACTS: Note: Feati as a notifying bank is only obliged to notify and transmit to the seller the LC. Bernardo Villaluz (seller) agreed to sell to Christiansen (buyer) 2,000 cubic meters of lauan logs at a price of $27 per cubic meter FOB. Security Pacific National Bank of LA (Security) issued an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. Said letter of credit was mailed to FEATI bank and one of the documents required to be submitted by the seller to the bank is the Certification from Han Axel Christiansen that the logs have been approved prior to shipping in accordance with terms and conditions of corresponding purchase order. Also incorporated by reference in the letter of credit is the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP). The logs were thereafter loaded on the vessel Zenlin Glory which was chartered by Christiansen. It was certified to be in good condition and exportable. The logs arrived at Korea and were received by the consignee Hanmi Trade Devt Comp. and were subsequently sold to another party. However Christiansen failed and refused to issue the certificate despite repeated demands by Villaluz. Due to the absence of the said certificate, Feati Bank refused to advance the payment on the letter of credit. because of the situation of Villaluz, Central Bank issued a memorandum declaring that the requirement of CERTIFICATION is not allowed. However such memo only came out after the letter of credit has already lapsed. RTC ruled in favor of Villaluz and held Feati Bank and Christiansen solildarily liable, it held that: 1. Feati Bank is liable because it failed to negotiate the letter of credit in the absence of the certification even if the Central Bank held such requirement as void. 2. That because the LC is irrevocable, the issuing bank, Security, is deemed to honor the LC upon presentment. And by accepting the instructions from the issuing bank Feati assumed the same undertaking. 3. Under the principles and laws on both trust and estoppels. When Feati Bank accepted its role as the notifying and negotiating bank in behalf of the issuing bank, it in effect accepted a trust reposed on it and became a trustee in relation to Villaluz. CA affirmed and further held:

1.

The LC was a confirmed LC in which the notifying bank gives its assurance also that the opening banks obligation will be performed. The notifying bank in such a case will not simply transmit but will confirm the opening banks obligation by making it also its own understanding, commitment or guaranty or obligation.

2. ISSUE: 1. RULING: NO, Feati Bank is not liable. It is already a settled rule in Commercial transaction involving letter of credit that the documents tendered must strictly conform to the terms of the LC. In this case, the mere fact that the certification was required by the LC means that the document is of vital importance to the buyer and therefore must be submitted before the notifying bank is compelled to honor the LC. Thus failure of Villaluz to surrender the Certification is fatal. Under the UCP the bank may negotiate, accept or pay, if the documents tendered to it are on their face in accordance with the terms and conditions of the documentary credit. And since Feati Bank deals only with documents, the absence of any document required in the LC justifies the refusal by the correspondent bank to negotiate, accept, or pay the beneficiary, as it is not its obligation to look beyond the documents. It merely has to rely on the completeness of the documents. SC also held that the decision of the TC was wrong in holding that irrevocable and confirmed credit is synonymous. It held that an irrevocable credit refers to the duration of the LC. On the other hand confirmed letter pertains to the obligation assumed by the bank, in this case, the correspondent bank gives an assurance to the beneficiary that it will undertake the issuing banks obligation as its own according to the terms and conditions of the credit. Hence it does not mean that the mere fact that a LC is irrevocable imply that the Correspondent bank in accepting the instructions of the issuing bank has also confirmed the LC. The SC also held that in this case Feati Bank was merely a notifying bank and not a negotiating bank nor a confirming bank . In this case the LC merely provided Feati Bank forward the enclosed original credit to Villaluz. As a notifying bank, its responsibility was solely to notify and/or transmit the documentary of credit to Villaluz and its obligation ends there. There is neither proof that Feati Bank confirmed the letter, the $75,000 loan granted by Feati Bank to Villaluz was not in anticipation of the loan but was an isolated transaction, the logical conclusion is that the LC was merely a collateral. By extending the loan it assumed the character of a negotiating bank but even then Feati bank was still not liable because there was no contractual relationship between Feati and Villaluz. Neither was there a trust between Feati Bank (trustee) and Villaluz (beneficiary). the mere opening of a LC does not involve a specific appropriation of a sum of money in favor of the beneficiary. It only signifies that the beneficiary may be able to draw funds upon the letter of credit up to the designated amount specified in the LC. The correspondent bank does not receive in advance the sum of money from the issuing bank. On the contrary, when they accept the tender and pays the amount, it gets the money from its own funds and then later seeks reimbursement from the issuing bank. Also as notifying bank it cannot be held liable even if there is a trust created. Neither was there a guarantee. It is fundamental that an irrevocable credit is independent not only of the contract between the buyer and the seller but also of the credit agreement between the issuing bank and the buyer. Feati Bank has no business with the relationship of Christiansen and Security it merely being a notifying bank. Feati Bank was only following instruction of the issuing bank. But even if all of this argument existed (trust, guarantee, and confirming bank, Feati Bank cannot be compelled to pay because there was a failure on the part of Villaluz to comply with the terms of the LC W/N Feati Bank can be held liable for the LC absence the certification required by the LC.

which is the absence of the certificate. It cannot be argued that such a requirement is illegal because such pronouncement by the Central Bank was only done after the issuance of the LC, when the LC was issued there was still no such prohibition. G.R. No. 146717 November 22, 2004

petitioner; and [2) whether LHC had the right to terminate the Turnkey Contract for failure of petitioner to complete the Project on target date. Meanwhile, foreseeing that LHC would call on the Securities pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the Turnkey Contract,12 petitionerin two separate letters13 both dated 10 August 2000advised respondent banks of the arbitration proceedings already pending before the CIAC and ICC in connection with its alleged default in the performance of its obligations. Asserting that LHC had no right to call on the Securities until the resolution of disputes before the arbitral tribunals, petitioner warned respondent banks that any transfer, release, or disposition of the Securities in favor of LHC or any person claiming under LHC would constrain it to hold respondent banks liable for liquidated damages. As petitioner had anticipated, on 27 June 2000, LHC sent notice to petitioner that pursuant to Clause 8.214 of the Turnkey Contract, it failed to comply with its obligation to complete the Project. Despite the letters of petitioner, however, both banks informed petitioner that they would pay on the Securities if and when LHC calls on them.15 LHC asserted that additional extension of time would not be warranted; accordingly it declared petitioner in default/delay in the performance of its obligations under the Turnkey Contract and demanded from petitioner the payment of US$75,000.00 for each day of delay beginning 28 June 2000 until actual completion of the Project pursuant to Clause 8.7.1 of the Turnkey Contract. At the same time, LHC served notice that it would call on the securities for the payment of liquidated damages for the delay.16 On 5 November 2000, petitioner as plaintiff filed a Complaint for Injunction, with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, against herein respondents as defendants before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.17 Petitioner sought to restrain respondent LHC from calling on the Securities and respondent banks from transferring, paying on, or in any manner disposing of the Securities or any renewals or substitutes thereof. The RTC issued a seventy-two (72)-hour temporary restraining order on the same day. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1312 and raffled to Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati. After appropriate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order on 9 November 2000, extending the temporary restraining order for a period of seventeen (17) days or until 26 November 2000.18 The RTC, in its Order19 dated 24 November 2000, denied petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction. It ruled that petitioner had no legal right and suffered no irreparable injury to justify the issuance of the writ. Employing the principle of "independent contract" in letters of credit, the trial court ruled that LHC should be allowed to draw on the Securities for liquidated damages. It debunked petitioner's contention that the principle of "independent contract" could be invoked only by respondent banks since according to it respondent LHC is the ultimate beneficiary of the Securities. The trial court further ruled that the banks were mere custodians of the funds and as such they were obligated to transfer the same to the beneficiary for as long as the latter could submit the required certification of its claims. Dissatisfied with the trial court's denial of its application for a writ of preliminary injunction, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.20 Petitioner submitted to the appellate court that LHC's call on the Securities was premature considering that the issue of its default had not yet been resolved with finality by the CIAC and/or the ICC. It asserted that until the fact of delay could be established, LHC had no right to draw on the Securities for liquidated damages. Refuting petitioner's contentions, LHC claimed that petitioner had no right to restrain its call on and use of the Securities as payment for liquidated damages. It averred that the Securities are independent of the main contract between them as shown on the face of the two Standby Letters of Credit which both

TRANSFIELD PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION, AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED and SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: Subject of this case is the letter of credit which has evolved as the ubiquitous and most important device in international trade. A creation of commerce and businessmen, the letter of credit is also unique in the number of parties involved and its supranational character. Petitioner has appealed from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61901 entitled "Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Oscar Pimentel, et al.," promulgated on 31 January 2001.2 On 26 March 1997, petitioner and respondent Luzon Hydro Corporation (hereinafter, LHC) entered into a Turnkey Contract3 whereby petitioner, as Turnkey Contractor, undertook to construct, on a turnkey basis, a seventy (70)-Megawatt hydro-electric power station at the Bakun River in the provinces of Benguet and Ilocos Sur (hereinafter, the Project). Petitioner was given the sole responsibility for the design, construction, commissioning, testing and completion of the Project.4 The Turnkey Contract provides that: (1) the target completion date of the Project shall be on 1 June 2000, or such later date as may be agreed upon between petitioner and respondent LHC or otherwise determined in accordance with the Turnkey Contract; and (2) petitioner is entitled to claim extensions of time (EOT) for reasons enumerated in the Turnkey Contract, among which are variations, force majeure, and delays caused by LHC itself.5 Further, in case of dispute, the parties are bound to settle their differences through mediation, conciliation and such other means enumerated under Clause 20.3 of the Turnkey Contract.6 To secure performance of petitioner's obligation on or before the target completion date, or such time for completion as may be determined by the parties' agreement, petitioner opened in favor of LHC two (2) standby letters of credit both dated 20 March 2000 (hereinafter referred to as "the Securities"), to wit: Standby Letter of Credit No. E001126/8400 with the local branch of respondent Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ Bank)7 and Standby Letter of Credit No. IBDIDSB-00/4 with respondent Security Bank Corporation (SBC)8 each in the amount of US$8,988,907.00.9 In the course of the construction of the project, petitioner sought various EOT to complete the Project. The extensions were requested allegedly due to several factors which prevented the completion of the Project on target date, such as force majeure occasioned by typhoon Zeb, barricades and demonstrations. LHC denied the requests, however. This gave rise to a series of legal actions between the parties which culminated in the instant petition. The first of the actions was a Request for Arbitration which LHC filed before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) on 1 June 1999.10 This was followed by another Request for Arbitration, this time filed by petitioner before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)11 on 3 November 2000. In both arbitration proceedings, the common issues presented were: [1) whether typhoon Zeb and any of its associated events constituted force majeure to justify the extension of time sought by

provide that the banks have no responsibility to investigate the authenticity or accuracy of the certificates or the declarant's capacity or entitlement to so certify. In its Resolution dated 28 November 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining LHC from calling on the Securities or any renewals or substitutes thereof and ordering respondent banks to cease and desist from transferring, paying or in any manner disposing of the Securities. However, the appellate court failed to act on the application for preliminary injunction until the temporary restraining order expired on 27 January 2001. Immediately thereafter, representatives of LHC trooped to ANZ Bank and withdrew the total amount of US$4,950,000.00, thereby reducing the balance in ANZ Bank to US$1,852,814.00. On 2 February 2001, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari. The appellate court expressed conformity with the trial court's decision that LHC could call on the Securities pursuant to the first principle in credit law that the credit itself is independent of the underlying transaction and that as long as the beneficiary complied with the credit, it was of no moment that he had not complied with the underlying contract. Further, the appellate court held that even assuming that the trial court's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction was erroneous, it constituted only an error of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari, unlike error of jurisdiction. Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review raising the following issues for resolution: WHETHER THE "INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE" ON LETTERS OF CREDIT MAY BE INVOKED BY A BENEFICIARY THEREOF WHERE THE BENEFICIARY'S CALL THEREON IS WRONGFUL OR FRAUDULENT. WHETHER LHC HAS THE RIGHT TO CALL AND DRAW ON THE SECURITIES BEFORE THE RESOLUTION OF PETITIONER'S AND LHC'S DISPUTES BY THE APPROPRIATE TRIBUNAL. WHETHER ANZ BANK AND SECURITY BANK ARE JUSTIFIED IN RELEASING THE AMOUNTS DUE UNDER THE SECURITIES DESPITE BEING NOTIFIED THAT LHC'S CALL THEREON IS WRONGFUL. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WILL SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IN THE EVENT THAT: A. LHC IS ALLOWED TO CALL AND DRAW ON, AND ANZ BANK AND SECURITY BANK ARE ALLOWED TO RELEASE, THE REMAINING BALANCE OF THE SECURITIES PRIOR TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTES BETWEEN PETITIONER AND LHC. B. LHC DOES NOT RETURN THE AMOUNTS IT HAD WRONGFULLY DRAWN FROM THE SECURITIES.21 Petitioner contends that the courts below improperly relied on the "independence principle" on letters of credit when this case falls squarely within the "fraud exception rule." Respondent LHC deliberately misrepresented the supposed existence of delay despite its knowledge that the issue was still pending arbitration, petitioner continues. Petitioner asserts that LHC should be ordered to return the proceeds of the Securities pursuant to the principle against unjust enrichment and that, under the premises, injunction was the appropriate remedy obtainable from the competent local courts. On 25 August 2003, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Petition22 and Supplemental Memorandum,23 alleging that in the course of the proceedings in the ICC Arbitration, a number of documentary and testimonial evidence came out through the use of different modes of discovery available in the ICC Arbitration. It contends that after the filing of the petition facts and admissions were discovered which demonstrate that LHC knowingly misrepresented that petitioner had incurred delays notwithstanding its knowledge and admission that delays were excused under the Turnkey Contractto be able to draw

against the Securities. Reiterating that fraud constitutes an exception to the independence principle, petitioner urges that this warrants a ruling from this Court that the call on the Securities was wrongful, as well as contrary to law and basic principles of equity. It avers that it would suffer grave irreparable damage if LHC would be allowed to use the proceeds of the Securities and not ordered to return the amounts it had wrongfully drawn thereon. In its Manifestation dated 8 September 2003,24 LHC contends that the supplemental pleadings filed by petitioner present erroneous and misleading information which would change petitioner's theory on appeal. In yet another Manifestation dated 12 April 2004,25 petitioner alleges that on 18 February 2004, the ICC handed down its Third Partial Award, declaring that LHC wrongfully drew upon the Securities and that petitioner was entitled to the return of the sums wrongfully taken by LHC for liquidated damages. LHC filed a Counter-Manifestation dated 29 June 2004,26 stating that petitioner's Manifestation dated 12 April 2004 enlarges the scope of its Petition for Review of the 31 January 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals. LHC notes that the Petition for Review essentially dealt only with the issue of whether injunction could issue to restrain the beneficiary of an irrevocable letter of credit from drawing thereon. It adds that petitioner has filed two other proceedings, to wit: (1) ICC Case No. 11264/TE/MW, entitled "Transfield Philippines Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation," in which the parties made claims and counterclaims arising from petitioner's performance/misperformance of its obligations as contractor for LHC; and (2) Civil Case No. 04-332, entitled "Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation" before Branch 56 of the RTC of Makati, which is an action to enforce and obtain execution of the ICC's partial award mentioned in petitioner's Manifestation of 12 April 2004. In its Comment to petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Addendum to Petitioner's Memorandum, LHC stresses that the question of whether the funds it drew on the subject letters of credit should be returned is outside the issue in this appeal. At any rate, LHC adds that the action to enforce the ICC's partial award is now fully within the Makati RTC's jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 04-332. LHC asserts that petitioner is engaged in forum-shopping by keeping this appeal and at the same time seeking the suit for enforcement of the arbitral award before the Makati court. Respondent SBC in its Memorandum, dated 10 March 200327 contends that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari. Invoking the independence principle, SBC argues that it was under no obligation to look into the validity or accuracy of the certification submitted by respondent LHC or into the latter's capacity or entitlement to so certify. It adds that the act sought to be enjoined by petitioner was already fait accompli and the present petition would no longer serve any remedial purpose. In a similar fashion, respondent ANZ Bank in its Memorandum dated 13 March 200328 posits that its actions could not be regarded as unjustified in view of the prevailing independence principle under which it had no obligation to ascertain the truth of LHC's allegations that petitioner defaulted in its obligations. Moreover, it points out that since the Standby Letter of Credit No. E001126/8400 had been fully drawn, petitioner's prayer for preliminary injunction had been rendered moot and academic. At the core of the present controversy is the applicability of the "independence principle" and "fraud exception rule" in letters of credit. Thus, a discussion of the nature and use of letters of credit, also referred to simply as "credits," would provide a better perspective of the case. The letter of credit evolved as a mercantile specialty, and the only way to understand all its facets is to recognize that it is an entity unto itself. The relationship between the beneficiary and the issuer of a letter of credit is not strictly contractual, because both privity and a meeting of the minds are lacking, yet strict compliance with its terms is an enforceable right. Nor is it a third-party beneficiary contract, because the issuer must honor drafts drawn against a letter regardless of problems subsequently arising in the underlying contract. Since the bank's customer cannot draw on the letter, it does not function as

an assignment by the customer to the beneficiary. Nor, if properly used, is it a contract of suretyship or guarantee, because it entails a primary liability following a default. Finally, it is not in itself a negotiable instrument, because it is not payable to order or bearer and is generally conditional, yet the draft presented under it is often negotiable.29 In commercial transactions, a letter of credit is a financial device developed by merchants as a convenient and relatively safe mode of dealing with sales of goods to satisfy the seemingly irreconcilable interests of a seller, who refuses to part with his goods before he is paid, and a buyer, who wants to have control of the goods before paying.30 The use of credits in commercial transactions serves to reduce the risk of nonpayment of the purchase price under the contract for the sale of goods. However, credits are also used in non-sale settings where they serve to reduce the risk of nonperformance. Generally, credits in the non-sale settings have come to be known as standby credits.31 There are three significant differences between commercial and standby credits. First, commercial credits involve the payment of money under a contract of sale. Such credits become payable upon the presentation by the seller-beneficiary of documents that show he has taken affirmative steps to comply with the sales agreement. In the standby type, the credit is payable upon certification of a party's nonperformance of the agreement. The documents that accompany the beneficiary's draft tend to show that the applicant has not performed. The beneficiary of a commercial credit must demonstrate by documents that he has performed his contract. The beneficiary of the standby credit must certify that his obligor has not performed the contract.32 By definition, a letter of credit is a written instrument whereby the writer requests or authorizes the addressee to pay money or deliver goods to a third person and assumes responsibility for payment of debt therefor to the addressee.33 A letter of credit, however, changes its nature as different transactions occur and if carried through to completion ends up as a binding contract between the issuing and honoring banks without any regard or relation to the underlying contract or disputes between the parties thereto.34 Since letters of credit have gained general acceptability in international trade transactions, the ICC has published from time to time updates on the Uniform Customs and Practice (UCP) for Documentary Credits to standardize practices in the letter of credit area. The vast majority of letters of credit incorporate the UCP.35 First published in 1933, the UCP for Documentary Credits has undergone several revisions, the latest of which was in 1993.36 In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. De Reny Fabric Industries, Inc.,37 this Court ruled that the observance of the UCP is justified by Article 2 of the Code of Commerce which provides that in the absence of any particular provision in the Code of Commerce, commercial transactions shall be governed by usages and customs generally observed. More recently, in Bank of America, NT & SA v. Court of Appeals,38 this Court ruled that there being no specific provisions which govern the legal complexities arising from transactions involving letters of credit, not only between or among banks themselves but also between banks and the seller or the buyer, as the case may be, the applicability of the UCP is undeniable. Article 3 of the UCP provides that credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other contract(s) on which they may be based and banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such contract(s), even if any reference whatsoever to such contract(s) is included in the credit. Consequently, the undertaking of a bank to pay, accept and pay draft(s) or negotiate and/or fulfill any other obligation under the credit is not subject to claims or defenses by the applicant resulting from his relationships with the issuing bank or the beneficiary. A beneficiary can in no case avail himself of the contractual relationships existing between the banks or between the applicant and the issuing bank. Thus, the engagement of the issuing bank is to pay the seller or beneficiary of the credit once the draft and the required documents are presented to it. The so-called "independence principle" assures the seller or the beneficiary of prompt payment independent of any breach of the main contract and precludes the issuing bank from determining whether the main contract is actually accomplished or not.

Under this principle, banks assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any documents, or for the general and/or particular conditions stipulated in the documents or superimposed thereon, nor do they assume any liability or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the goods represented by any documents, or for the good faith or acts and/or omissions, solvency, performance or standing of the consignor, the carriers, or the insurers of the goods, or any other person whomsoever.39 The independent nature of the letter of credit may be: (a) independence in toto where the credit is independent from the justification aspect and is a separate obligation from the underlying agreement like for instance a typical standby; or (b) independence may be only as to the justification aspect like in a commercial letter of credit or repayment standby, which is identical with the same obligations under the underlying agreement. In both cases the payment may be enjoined if in the light of the purpose of the credit the payment of the credit would constitute fraudulent abuse of the credit.40 Can the beneficiary invoke the independence principle? Petitioner insists that the independence principle does not apply to the instant case and assuming it is so, it is a defense available only to respondent banks. LHC, on the other hand, contends that it would be contrary to common sense to deny the benefit of an independent contract to the very party for whom the benefit is intended. As beneficiary of the letter of credit, LHC asserts it is entitled to invoke the principle. As discussed above, in a letter of credit transaction, such as in this case, where the credit is stipulated as irrevocable, there is a definite undertaking by the issuing bank to pay the beneficiary provided that the stipulated documents are presented and the conditions of the credit are complied with.41 Precisely, the independence principle liberates the issuing bank from the duty of ascertaining compliance by the parties in the main contract. As the principle's nomenclature clearly suggests, the obligation under the letter of credit is independent of the related and originating contract. In brief, the letter of credit is separate and distinct from the underlying transaction. Given the nature of letters of credit, petitioner's argumentthat it is only the issuing bank that may invoke the independence principle on letters of creditdoes not impress this Court. To say that the independence principle may only be invoked by the issuing banks would render nugatory the purpose for which the letters of credit are used in commercial transactions. As it is, the independence doctrine works to the benefit of both the issuing bank and the beneficiary. Letters of credit are employed by the parties desiring to enter into commercial transactions, not for the benefit of the issuing bank but mainly for the benefit of the parties to the original transactions. With the letter of credit from the issuing bank, the party who applied for and obtained it may confidently present the letter of credit to the beneficiary as a security to convince the beneficiary to enter into the business transaction. On the other hand, the other party to the business transaction, i.e., the beneficiary of the letter of credit, can be rest assured of being empowered to call on the letter of credit as a security in case the commercial transaction does not push through, or the applicant fails to perform his part of the transaction. It is for this reason that the party who is entitled to the proceeds of the letter of credit is appropriately called "beneficiary." Petitioner's argument that any dispute must first be resolved by the parties, whether through negotiations or arbitration, before the beneficiary is entitled to call on the letter of credit in essence would convert the letter of credit into a mere guarantee. Jurisprudence has laid down a clear distinction between a letter of credit and a guarantee in that the settlement of a dispute between the parties is not a pre-requisite for the release of funds under a letter of credit. In other words, the argument is incompatible with the very nature of the letter of credit. If a letter of credit is drawable only after settlement of the dispute on the contract entered into by the applicant and the beneficiary, there would be no practical and beneficial use for letters of credit in commercial transactions.

Professor John F. Dolan, the noted authority on letters of credit, sheds more light on the issue: The standby credit is an attractive commercial device for many of the same reasons that commercial credits are attractive. Essentially, these credits are inexpensive and efficient. Often they replace surety contracts, which tend to generate higher costs than credits do and are usually triggered by a factual determination rather than by the examination of documents. Because parties and courts should not confuse the different functions of the surety contract on the one hand and the standby credit on the other, the distinction between surety contracts and credits merits some reflection. The two commercial devices share a common purpose. Both ensure against the obligor's nonperformance. They function, however, in distinctly different ways. Traditionally, upon the obligor's default, the surety undertakes to complete the obligor's performance, usually by hiring someone to complete that performance. Surety contracts, then, often involve costs of determining whether the obligor defaulted (a matter over which the surety and the beneficiary often litigate) plus the cost of performance. The benefit of the surety contract to the beneficiary is obvious. He knows that the surety, often an insurance company, is a strong financial institution that will perform if the obligor does not. The beneficiary also should understand that such performance must await the sometimes lengthy and costly determination that the obligor has defaulted. In addition, the surety's performance takes time. The standby credit has different expectations. He reasonably expects that he will receive cash in the event of nonperformance, that he will receive it promptly, and that he will receive it before any litigation with the obligor (the applicant) over the nature of the applicant's performance takes place. The standby credit has this opposite effect of the surety contract: it reverses the financial burden of parties during litigation. In the surety contract setting, there is no duty to indemnify the beneficiary until the beneficiary establishes the fact of the obligor's performance. The beneficiary may have to establish that fact in litigation. During the litigation, the surety holds the money and the beneficiary bears most of the cost of delay in performance. In the standby credit case, however, the beneficiary avoids that litigation burden and receives his money promptly upon presentation of the required documents. It may be that the applicant has, in fact, performed and that the beneficiary's presentation of those documents is not rightful. In that case, the applicant may sue the beneficiary in tort, in contract, or in breach of warranty; but, during the litigation to determine whether the applicant has in fact breached the obligation to perform, the beneficiary, not the applicant, holds the money. Parties that use a standby credit and courts construing such a credit should understand this allocation of burdens. There is a tendency in some quarters to overlook this distinction between surety contracts and standby credits and to reallocate burdens by permitting the obligor or the issuer to litigate the performance question before payment to the beneficiary.42 While it is the bank which is bound to honor the credit, it is the beneficiary who has the right to ask the bank to honor the credit by allowing him to draw thereon. The situation itself emasculates petitioner's posture that LHC cannot invoke the independence principle and highlights its puerility, more so in this case where the banks concerned were impleaded as parties by petitioner itself. Respondent banks had squarely raised the independence principle to justify their releases of the amounts due under the Securities. Owing to the nature and purpose of the standby letters of credit, this Court rules that the respondent banks were left with little or no alternative but to honor the credit and both of them in fact submitted that it was "ministerial" for them to honor the call for payment.43 Furthermore, LHC has a right rooted in the Contract to call on the Securities. The relevant provisions of the Contract read, thus:

4.2.1. In order to secure the performance of its obligations under this Contract, the Contractor at its cost shall on the Commencement Date provide security to the Employer in the form of two irrevocable and confirmed standby letters of credit (the "Securities"), each in the amount of US$8,988,907, issued and confirmed by banks or financial institutions acceptable to the Employer. Each of the Securities must be in form and substance acceptable to the Employer and may be provided on an annually renewable basis.44 8.7.1 If the Contractor fails to comply with Clause 8.2, the Contractor shall pay to the Employer by way of liquidated damages ("Liquidated Damages for Delay") the amount of US$75,000 for each and every day or part of a day that shall elapse between the Target Completion Date and the Completion Date, provided that Liquidated Damages for Delay payable by the Contractor shall in the aggregate not exceed 20% of the Contract Price. The Contractor shall pay Liquidated Damages for Delay for each day of the delay on the following day without need of demand from the Employer. 8.7.2 The Employer may, without prejudice to any other method of recovery, deduct the amount of such damages from any monies due, or to become due to the Contractor and/or by drawing on the Security."45 A contract once perfected, binds the parties not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage, and law.46 A careful perusal of the Turnkey Contract reveals the intention of the parties to make the Securities answerable for the liquidated damages occasioned by any delay on the part of petitioner. The call upon the Securities, while not an exclusive remedy on the part of LHC, is certainly an alternative recourse available to it upon the happening of the contingency for which the Securities have been proffered. Thus, even without the use of the "independence principle," the Turnkey Contract itself bestows upon LHC the right to call on the Securities in the event of default. Next, petitioner invokes the "fraud exception" principle. It avers that LHC's call on the Securities is wrongful because it fraudulently misrepresented to ANZ Bank and SBC that there is already a breach in the Turnkey Contract knowing fully well that this is yet to be determined by the arbitral tribunals. It asserts that the "fraud exception" exists when the beneficiary, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the confirming bank, documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material representations of fact that to his knowledge are untrue. In such a situation, petitioner insists, injunction is recognized as a remedy available to it. Citing Dolan's treatise on letters of credit, petitioner argues that the independence principle is not without limits and it is important to fashion those limits in light of the principle's purpose, which is to serve the commercial function of the credit. If it does not serve those functions, application of the principle is not warranted, and the commonlaw principles of contract should apply. It is worthy of note that the propriety of LHC's call on the Securities is largely intertwined with the fact of default which is the self-same issue pending resolution before the arbitral tribunals. To be able to declare the call on the Securities wrongful or fraudulent, it is imperative to resolve, among others, whether petitioner was in fact guilty of delay in the performance of its obligation. Unfortunately for petitioner, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the issue of defaultsuch issue having been submitted by the parties to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals pursuant to the terms embodied in their agreement.47 Would injunction then be the proper remedy to restrain the alleged wrongful draws on the Securities? Most writers agree that fraud is an exception to the independence principle. Professor Dolan opines that the untruthfulness of a certificate accompanying a demand for payment under a standby credit may qualify as fraud sufficient to support an injunction against payment.48 The remedy for fraudulent abuse is an injunction. However, injunction should not be granted unless: (a) there is clear proof of fraud; (b) the fraud constitutes fraudulent abuse of the independent purpose of the letter of credit and not only

fraud under the main agreement; and (c) irreparable injury might follow if injunction is not granted or the recovery of damages would be seriously damaged.49 In its complaint for injunction before the trial court, petitioner alleged that it is entitled to a total extension of two hundred fifty-three (253) days which would move the target completion date. It argued that if its claims for extension would be found meritorious by the ICC, then LHC would not be entitled to any liquidated damages.50 Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive right or interest; it is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights of a party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, the only limitation being that this discretion should be exercised based upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law.51 Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right.52 It must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.53 Moreover, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.54 In the instant case, petitioner failed to show that it has a clear and unmistakable right to restrain LHC's call on the Securities which would justify the issuance of preliminary injunction. By petitioner's own admission, the right of LHC to call on the Securities was contractually rooted and subject to the express stipulations in the Turnkey Contract.55 Indeed, the Turnkey Contract is plain and unequivocal in that it conferred upon LHC the right to draw upon the Securities in case of default, as provided in Clause 4.2.5, in relation to Clause 8.7.2, thus: 4.2.5 The Employer shall give the Contractor seven days' notice of calling upon any of the Securities, stating the nature of the default for which the claim on any of the Securities is to be made, provided that no notice will be required if the Employer calls upon any of the Securities for the payment of Liquidated Damages for Delay or for failure by the Contractor to renew or extend the Securities within 14 days of their expiration in accordance with Clause 4.2.2.56 8.7.2 The Employer may, without prejudice to any other method of recovery, deduct the amount of such damages from any monies due, or to become due, to the Contractor and/or by drawing on the Security.57 The pendency of the arbitration proceedings would not per se make LHC's draws on the Securities wrongful or fraudulent for there was nothing in the Contract which would indicate that the parties intended that all disputes regarding delay should first be settled through arbitration before LHC would be allowed to call upon the Securities. It is therefore premature and absurd to conclude that the draws on the Securities were outright fraudulent given the fact that the ICC and CIAC have not ruled with finality on the existence of default. Nowhere in its complaint before the trial court or in its pleadings filed before the appellate court, did petitioner invoke the fraud exception rule as a ground to justify the issuance of an injunction.58 What petitioner did assert before the courts below was the fact that LHC's draws on the Securities would be premature and without basis in view of the pending disputes between them. Petitioner should not be allowed in this instance to bring into play the fraud exception rule to sustain its claim for the issuance of an injunctive relief. Matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.59 The lower courts could thus not be faulted for not applying the fraud exception rule not only because the

existence of fraud was fundamentally interwoven with the issue of default still pending before the arbitral tribunals, but more so, because petitioner never raised it as an issue in its pleadings filed in the courts below. At any rate, petitioner utterly failed to show that it had a clear and unmistakable right to prevent LHC's call upon the Securities. Of course, prudence should have impelled LHC to await resolution of the pending issues before the arbitral tribunals prior to taking action to enforce the Securities. But, as earlier stated, the Turnkey Contract did not require LHC to do so and, therefore, it was merely enforcing its rights in accordance with the tenor thereof. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.60 More importantly, pursuant to the principle of autonomy of contracts embodied in Article 1306 of the Civil Code,61 petitioner could have incorporated in its Contract with LHC, a proviso that only the final determination by the arbitral tribunals that default had occurred would justify the enforcement of the Securities. However, the fact is petitioner did not do so; hence, it would have to live with its inaction. With respect to the issue of whether the respondent banks were justified in releasing the amounts due under the Securities, this Court reiterates that pursuant to the independence principle the banks were under no obligation to determine the veracity of LHC's certification that default has occurred. Neither were they bound by petitioner's declaration that LHC's call thereon was wrongful. To repeat, respondent banks' undertaking was simply to pay once the required documents are presented by the beneficiary.

At any rate, should petitioner finally prove in the pending arbitration proceedings that LHC's draws upon the Securities were wrongful due to the non-existence of the fact of default, its right to seek indemnification for damages it suffered would not normally be foreclosed pursuant to general principles of law. Moreover, in a Manifestation,62 dated 30 March 2001, LHC informed this Court that the subject letters of credit had been fully drawn. This fact alone would have been sufficient reason to dismiss the instant petition. Settled is the rule that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined have already become fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated act.63 In Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, Inc.64 this Court ruled that where the period within which the former employees were prohibited from engaging in or working for an enterprise that competed with their former employerthe very purpose of the preliminary injunction has expired, any declaration upholding the propriety of the writ would be entirely useless as there would be no actual case or controversy between the parties insofar as the preliminary injunction is concerned. In the instant case, the consummation of the act sought to be restrained had rendered the instant petition mootfor any declaration by this Court as to propriety or impropriety of the non-issuance of injunctive relief could have no practical effect on the existing controversy.65 The other issues raised by petitioner particularly with respect to its right to recover the amounts wrongfully drawn on the Securities, according to it, could properly be threshed out in a separate proceeding. One final point. LHC has charged petitioner of forum-shopping. It raised the charge on two occasions. First, in its Counter-Manifestation dated 29 June 200466 LHC alleges that petitioner presented before this Court the same claim for money which it has filed in two other proceedings, to wit: ICC Case No. 11264/TE/MW and Civil Case No. 04-332 before the RTC of Makati. LHC argues that petitioner's acts constitutes forum-shopping which should be punished by the dismissal of the claim in both forums. Second, in its Comment to Petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Addendum to Petitioner's Memorandum dated 8 October 2004, LHC alleges that by maintaining the present appeal and at the same time pursuing Civil Case No. 04-332wherein petitioner pressed for judgment on the issue of whether the funds LHC drew on the Securities should be returnedpetitioner resorted to forum-shopping. In both instances, however, petitioner has apparently opted not to respond to the charge.

Forum-shopping is a very serious charge. It exists when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court.67 It may also consist in the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon the other party.68 To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum-shopping, the test applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.69 Forumshopping constitutes improper conduct and may be punished with summary dismissal of the multiple petitions and direct contempt of court.70 Considering the seriousness of the charge of forum-shopping and the severity of the sanctions for its violation, the Court will refrain from making any definitive ruling on this issue until after petitioner has been given ample opportunity to respond to the charge. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner. Petitioner is hereby required to answer the charge of forum-shopping within fifteen (15) days from notice. SO ORDERED.