POLICY BRIEF | MARCH 2023

FARMER, WHERE ART THOU?

EXPLORING AGRICULTURAL TRENDS IN IRAQ AMIDST ECONOMIC AND

ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES

The rural districts in the north-center and south of Iraq provide a useful entry point to analyze
the decline of the agriculture sector due to conflict, economic, and environmental factors
in the country. Utilizing recent microdata, this brief seeks to describe this phenomenon
in more detail and the impacts and implications of this recession on rural communities.
This then lays the basis to articulate key considerations, rooted in the local and national
dynamics found in rural Iraq, to transition to a more sustainable agriculture sector.

Iraq is not an agrarian society—and has not been for many decades now. Even in the most
rural areas, agriculture is not a predominant economic sector in terms of employment and
wealth generation. The sector does however feature prominently in the emerging narratives
in the country around the climate-displacement and climate-security nexuses, respectively.
This is because agriculture is indeed a key steppingstone between environmental degradation
and social and economic disruption.

Thus, while it is a relatively small productive sector in Iraq, it is an important one to evaluate in
this context. Agriculture remains a strategic sector within any country’s national development
plan including Iraq’s, particularly now as global food supply chains are restructuring. It is
also crucial in shaping life and voice in rural communities, contributing to populating and
cultivating the landscapes that would otherwise be left empty and fallow. Finally, and most
critically, agriculture is a sector that is in clear recession in Iraq due to a confluence of
conflict, economic, and climate factors over the last years.

It is this recession that we explore in detail in this brief, drawing on recent large-scale original
datasets collected in the north-central and southern parts of the country. This data indicates
that most farmers and livestock owners across these areas are facing severe impacts originating
from different sources and many are gradually abandoning these activities as a result. A
particular concern is that less harvests and smaller herds significantly lower revenue for
households, thus impacting their prospects for wellbeing. The persistence of these dynamics
run the risk of triggering negative coping strategies among households (e.g., depleting other
assets or moving to other informal livelihood options such as daily labor) and, eventually,
may affect their capacity to sustainably remain where they currently reside and force them to
move elsewhere. Mitigating these impacts requires a political, economic, and social approach
to transition to a more sustainable agriculture sector.
Figure 1. Map of top agricultural districts assessed
POLICY BRIEF | FARMER, WHERE ART THOU?

TECHNICAL FACTSHEET

The data for the maps, figures, and tables generated in this brief comes from the following datasets, where the
same question modules pertaining to agriculture and economic activities were asked:

– IOM and Social Inquiry (2022), A Climate of Fragility: A Household Profiling of the South of Iraq. This is a
statistically representative profiling of households and individuals for each of the 18 districts in Basra, Thi-
Qar, and Missan governorates.
– IOM and Social Inquiry (2022), Reimagining Reintegration: An Analysis of Sustainable Return After Conflict.
This is a statistically representative sample of households in the top 14 districts of return across the north-
central governorates most affected by the ISIL conflict, namely, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Anbar.

We combined these datasets, using population weights, across comparable relevant questions. We then identified
the top agricultural districts across geographies based on whether at least 20% of the district-level population
reported either currently engaging in agricultural activities or having done so and stopped within the last 5 to
8 years. This helps keep the focus on areas with enough depth of data to ensure findings are representative
of agricultural trends. The resulting 16 districts, from north to south, are: Sinjar (Ninewa), Tal Afar (Ninewa),
Hamdaniya (Ninewa), Hawija (Kirkuk), Shirqat (Salah al-Din), Baiji (Salah al-Din), Balad (Salah al-Din), Hit (Anbar),
Ali al-Gharbi (Missan), Kahla’a (Missan), Maimouna (Missan), Al-Majir al-Kabir (Missan), Shatra (Thi-Qar), Rifaai
(Thi-Qar), Suq al-Shuyukh (Thi-Qar), and Chibayish (Thi-Qar).

Finally, we classified these districts by geography and context, North-Central Districts and South Districts, for
ease of analysis and to better highligh trends by region. Districts within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the
Center-South of the country are not included here as comparable, granular data from these areas is not available.

A SECTOR IN RECESSION

The 16 selected districts with large agricultural activity span Iraq, ranging from Sinjar in
the north to Chibayish in the south and encompassing different contexts. With very few
exceptions, however, engagement in agriculture even in these selected rural areas is relatively
low. Only around one-fifth of households overall across these districts remain involved in
farming or livestock rearing, with many other households reporting having abandoned these
activities altogether over the last decade (see the circular graphs in Figure 2). Even for those
households still engaged in the sector, less than half report agriculture as their only source
of earned income; most rely on other income sources as well to get by, primarily public
employment and membership in security forces.

Further underscoring this noted recession in the sector is the inability of agricultural
households to sustain productivity and yields in such activities over time. As depicted in the
bar charts in Figure 2, the vast majority of households still engaged in farming or livestock
rearing report a diminished harvest or smaller livestock herd compared to a few years ago.
While these responses are admittedly subjective and qualitative given their self-reported
nature, their consistency across districts indicates a general negative trend in this sector and
in this type of livelihood.

The context in which households engage in agriculture is challenging across these areas in different
ways. The ISIL conflict has directly affected households in the north-central districts, with most
having displaced to flee the violence and only in recent years returning and seeking to resume
activities. For those in the south, historical development neglect and an erosion of local institutions,
rather than direct recent conflict experience per se, shape the prevailing socio-economic landscape.

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 POLICY BRIEF | FARMER, WHERE ART THOU?

What is common across this wide geographic swath is that environmental change is a growing
concern and is having an increasing impact on agriculture.1 It is the combination of these factors
and where and how they intersect that we will turn to next.

Figure 2. Proportion of households currently or previously engaged in agricultural activities

Currently engaged in activity
Abandoned activity 5-8 years ago
Never engaged in activity

21% How would you describe the quantity of crops produced

from your latest harvest compared to 5-8 years ago?
A Alotlotmore
more 1%

9% More
More 5%
Same
Sameamount
amount 12%

70% Less
Less 41%
A Alotlotless
less 41%

Farming land
Created with Datawrapper

Created with Datawrapper

How would you describe the quantity of animals you have

21%
now compared to 5-8 years ago?
AAlot
lot more
more 1%
More
More 4%
8%
Same
Sameamount
amount 18%
Less
Less 40%
71%
AAlot
lot less
less 37%

Livestock ownership Created with Datawrapper

Created with Datawrapper

ON THE FORCES AND SHOCKS PULLING AGRICULTURE APART

To ground the evolution of agriculture in Iraq into the historical legacies and emerging dynamics
described above, we rely on the impacts to agricultural livelihoods that these households themselves
report in each of the 16 rural districts analyzed. Overall, key common themes appear—conflict,
economy, and environment—to explain their gradually lower agricultural production (or
abandonment altogether), though their narratives differ by region (Table 1).

1
World Bank, Iraq Country Climate and Development Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2022).

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 POLICY BRIEF | FARMER, WHERE ART THOU?

Table 1. Typologies of impacts to farming by district and geography

ir
atr -Kab

kh

l
tra
i
rb

yu
ya

na

en
l
ha

ish
ra

Sh
ni

ou

-C
ar

l- G

aji
da

ay
at

al-
ja

a
a'
f

th

h
ar

aim
lad

ai
irq
lA

wi

ib
-M
ia
m

ut
hl
iji

or
q
nj

fa

Ch
Ha

Ha

So
Sh

Sh

Su
Ba

Ba

Ka
Hi
Ta

Al

Al
M
Si

Ri

N
Environmental Not enough water 4% 53% 81% 12% 6% 64% 3% 19% 81% 73% 88% 57% 78% 87% 79% 64% 31% 78%
factors
Unpredictable and bad weather 74% 41% 74% 3% 92% 0% 4% 3% 8% 10% 15% 16% 21% 16% 18% 11% 41% 17%

Salinization 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 12% 0% 3% 57% 35% 57% 50% 51% 51% 66% 27% 2% 52%

Too hot 19% 7% 0% 0% 16% 7% 0% 3% 12% 16% 3% 16% 31% 22% 19% 11% 7% 21%

Too much water / flooding 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 3% 7% 0% 0% 16% 0% 3%

Economic High increase in the price of inputs 10% 10% 35% 49% 26% 82% 47% 71% 16% 12% 15% 16% 24% 13% 5% 20% 35% 15%
/ cannot afford inputs
factors
Lack of government support and 11% 8% 24% 1% 29% 12% 51% 60% 11% 24% 24% 7% 10% 19% 8% 8% 21% 13%
public funding
Not profitable 8% 3% 5% 2% 3% 5% 39% 3% 33% 15% 5% 5% 6% 10% 13% 35% 8% 11%

Sold land out of need 0% 0% 0% 0% 27% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0%

No functioning markets to sell goods 7% 1% 0% 0% 3% 0% 35% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0%

Other Diseases and pests 4% 1% 0% 2% 0% 0% 39% 5% 31% 14% 18% 8% 21% 26% 22% 18% 6% 21%
factors
Land has UXOs and land mines 0% 0% 0% 0% 44% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0%

Cannot access land due to issues 3% 0% 4% 0% 2% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%

with government or security actors
Shifted crops or left the land fallow 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 0% 4% 2% 3% 3% 0% 10% 0% 0% 4% 3%

Arson 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Found a different job 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%

Note: Percentages represent the proportion of farming households that report their production is negatively impacted by these factors.

The legacy of the recent ISIL conflict in Iraq is inseparable in this discussion for those districts
in the north-central part of the country in particular. In each of them for the last five years, large
return movements of internally displaced families to their cities and villages of origin have taken
place, with relatively few families remaining displaced in other parts of the country. This has not
translated into a full-scale resumption of agricultural activities and productivity to pre-conflict
levels. Affordability and lack of financial resources play a crucial role in explaining the sluggish
recovery in this sector here. Recovery of farming equipment and reinvestment in inputs like seeds,
fertilizers, or pest control, require an investment capacity that may not be readily available to
families after having spent resources in the act of returning home. Additionally, the restarting
of activities and programs of local agriculture and livestock directorates in many districts, in
terms of staff or support capacity, may still lag behind pre-conflict levels.2 This last element is
especially important given that the public sector has traditionally provided a strong support for the
agricultural sector, either in facilitating subsidized inputs, crop planification, loans, or in directly
purchasing the produce at above global market prices.3

These drivers are much less prominent in the southern districts. First, farmers here were
not affected by the ISIL conflict, so the displacement and return narrative and its associated
disruption is absent. Second, while the economic capacity of these farmers has also been put

2
Laila Barhoum and Elise Nalbandian, Unfarmed Now. Uninhabited When? Agriculture and Climate Change in Iraq (Oxford: Oxfam,
2022); and Roger Guiu and Sogand Afkari, “Post-Conflict Political Economy in Sinjar: What the Aftermath of Conflict and Historical
Neglect Mean for Recovering the Local Economy,” Policy Brief (Erbil: Social Inquiry, 2019).
3
Paolo Lucani, Iraq Agriculture Sector Note (Rome: FAO / World Bank, 2012).
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 POLICY BRIEF | FARMER, WHERE ART THOU?

to the test in line with the steady impoverishment of the south of Iraq since 2003,4 it has been
so to a lesser degree than those in the north-center.

Beyond economics, the environment seems to be a common factor limiting farming. The ways
in which it does so, however, is dependent on geography and specific local systems therein.
The northernmost districts depend heavily on rainfall for farming and thus do not have
steady access to water. As a result, changes in weather patterns have the capacity to disrupt
harvests here more significantly than in other areas of Iraq. Even in some centrally located
districts, unpredictable and poor weather conditions and thus lack of sufficient rainfall are
the primary reasons for lower production over any other financial or conflict-related factor.
In others, however, little negative impact from climate is reported. Even so, given that climate
variability has indeed intensified in recent years5 and is expected to continue to do so in the
mid-term, these impacts are likely to expand in across north-central districts over time.

Contrary to the north, farming in the south mostly relies on intensive irrigation facilitated by
a vast network of canals flowing southwards or diverted from rivers. As such, the quantity and
quality of water resources in these districts are highly vulnerable to the environmental issues
currently impacting the whole river basin, both climate-triggered (e.g., decreasing rainfall at
the origin of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, pushing neighboring countries to build dams to
preserve their own supply, and increasing temperatures causing evapotranspiration) and man-
made (e.g., lack of wastewater treatment along the river and poor investment and maintenance
in the canal network). Almost no southern district appears without widespread issues in terms
of lack of water flow combined with water salinization impacting the ability to farm crops.

AN INTERTWINED FATE FOR LIVESTOCK ACTIVITIES

Although we put a focus on farming in this section, livestock rearing and herding is a key related sector
embedded in similar dynamics and challenges. The significance of this sector is variable, in the sense that it
is often a side activity to farming and not always oriented to the market. In the southern districts there tends
to be more dedicated livestock herders than farmers, especially in those districts bordering the marshes like
Chibayish, Suq al-Shyukh, and Maiomouna, while the prevalence of this activity in the north-central districts is
lower.
The impacts reported differ between the two regions even more drastically than in the case of farming. Livestock
in the south is highly dependent on water being available in the canals and rivers given that water buffalo rearing
is the principal livestock activity. Livestock owners that have been affected by lower herd size or have abandoned
the activity mostly report lack of water as well as food for their animals as the major cause. These environmental
stressors therefore also affect the financial sustainability of livestock herding in these areas, making it less
profitable and thus most households in the sector also report resorting to selling their livestock out of financial
need.
The majority of livestock herders in the north-central districts, for their part, seem to have had their livestock
stolen during the ISIL conflict period or have been forced to sell livestock as a coping strategy. As a result,
livestock herders have smaller herders and are unable to increase their size due to limited financial capacity.
The inconducive weather conditions for farming and the related lower harvest production in these areas, in turn,
reduces the availability of local fodder for livestock, driving its prices up and making livestock rearing a more
expensive endeavor, and limits the availability of grazing land for herds after harvesting.

4
IOM and Social Inquiry, A Climate of Fragility: Household Profiling in the South of Iraq (Baghdad: IOM, 2022).
5
FAO, GIEWS Earth Observation for Iraq, available at: https://www.fao.org/giews/earthobservation/country/index.jsp?code=IRQ

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POLICY BRIEF | FARMER, WHERE ART THOU?

Other challenges and stressors seem to play a lesser role in the changes in this sector overall.
Security issues linked with the presence of mines or interference by security actors, for example,
are not significantly reported. The same holds true for the absence of physical markets to sell or
buy produce.

Up to here, we have discussed the varied impacts households that are or were engaged in farming
face at present. But, to what extent does being affected by these impacts drive farmers to abandon
their activities? The data available also allows us to estimate the propensity of abandonment based
on the impacts reported, as a sort of measurement of how much more “deadly to farming” one
impact is over another. In this sense, environmental factors in the southern districts are extremely
critical, in that almost one of every two farmers that report experiencing an impact related to the
environment, be it lack of water or salinization, has abandoned agriculture within the last five to
eight years (Figure 3). The reliance on water-intensive cultivation may explain this ratio. This does
not seem to be the case in the northern and central districts, where the ratio of environmental
impacts to abandonment is significantly lower. This may imply that farmers in these districts do
attempt (and are able) to adapt to challenging climate conditions for a time before fully abandoning
these activities and seeking livelihoods in other sectors.

While the propensity of abandonment due to environmental factors vary by geography, landscape,
and type of farming, there is no such difference when it comes to abandonment due to economic
impediments. Almost one of every two farmers in both north-central and south districts will
abandon farming if it is not profitable and almost one of every three will do so if they do not
receive support or cannot afford inputs, respectively.

Figure 3. Propensity of abandonment by impacts

Abanonded farming Still farming

Farmers affected
by:
North-Central Districts South Districts

Not enough water 23% 77% 45% 55%

Unpredictable and bad

15% 85% 40% 60%
weather

Salinization N/A 45% 55%

Lack of government
31% 69% 33% 67%
support and funding
Lack of affordability of
inputs 30% 70% 37% 63%

Not profitable 41% 59% 41% 59%

Disease and pests 10% 90% 27% 73%

Note: Only the most prevalent impacts from Table 1 are reported. Percentages by impact represent the proportion of farmers that reported
abandoning farming due to that impact or that are having less harvest due to that impact.

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 POLICY BRIEF | FARMER, WHERE ART THOU?

WHERE IS THIS HEADING?

Even though climate-induced migration features prominently in ongoing policy discussions in

Iraq, available estimates for this type of migration point to a relatively contained situation. The
significant environmental and economic impacts on agriculture as well as its abandonment may
not have translated, so far, in large population movements. For example, IOM Iraq’s Displacement
Tracking Matrix identified and monitors slightly more than 68,000 individuals from the central
and southern governorates who migrated because of environmental degradation and livelihoods
loss.6 This is a quite small ratio within a total population of around 12 million people in the region.
Similarly, the recent household profiling of Basra, Thi-Qar and Missan governorates estimates
that just around 3% of the population are internal migrants that moved within the last decade,
with this migration most prevalent from urban areas due to joblessness than from rural ones.7
Movements elsewhere in the country remain largely anecdotical. It is important to note, however,
that the nature of climate-induced migration in this context makes measurement a complicated
effort. Its movement trajectories and locations are difficult to track and map—frequently it occurs
very locally within the subdistrict, or into scattered farmlands that offer seasonal work, or into
informal urban neighborhoods. These movements also tend to lack a single immediate trigger,
unlike conflict-related displacement, and rather result in a trickle of families moving over time
rather than a steady flow all at once.

The broader policy discussions so far have thus centered more around the risks that could trigger
this migration more rapidly rather than the current movements per se. The situation depicted here
in terms of conflict, financial, and environmental impacts put families that depend on agricultural
livelihoods at significant economic risk and indeed raises questions in terms of their capacity to
remain in their current locations long-term. One illustration of this comes from the reintegration
dynamics of rural households displaced by the ISIL conflict in the north-central districts analyzed
here (Figure 4). When asked about their future prospects now that they returned, non-agricultural
households tend to be split between those who think they will not be able to reintegrate given
existing conditions and so will have to migrate/displace again, and those who are confident and
feel able to effectively remain home. Agricultural households present quite a different picture, in
that their situation is considerably more unsure and could go either way—stay or leave. For the
most part, this could be dependent on their ability to cope with the impacts highlighted above and
continue pursuing their agricultural livelihoods for the time being though at a reduced scale. Under
such precarity, were these impacts to persist or worsen, then we would probably see a gradually
higher proportion of agricultural households considering leaving their homes for elsewhere.

Figure 4. Likelihood of leaving place of origin given its current conditions

Agricultural households
Agricultural
Agricultural households households Non-agricultural
Non-agricultural
Non-agricultural households
households
households

Verylikely
Very likelytotoleave
leave
Very likely to leave 16%
16% 24%
24%

We
Weare
areconsidering
considering leaving
leaving
We are considering leaving 5%
5% 8%
8%

Not sure
Not sure what
what to
todo
Not do
sure what to do 51%
51% 29%
29%

Notlikely
Not likelytotoleave
leave atattoall
Not likely all
leave at all 29%
29% 39%
39%

Note: Results only available for the eight districts in the north-central region assessed here (see Technical Factsheet).
Created with Datawrapper
6
IOM DTM, Emergency Tracking Climate-Induced Displacement--Southern Iraq, December 1-15, 2022 (Baghdad: IOM, 2022).
7
IOM and Social Inquiry, A Climate of Fragility.

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POLICY BRIEF | FARMER, WHERE ART THOU?

Furthermore, the idea of migration indeed seems to pervade the public consciousness of rural
communities. Depopulation and outmigration are major concerns households report in the
agricultural districts in the south of Iraq analyzed here in particular. Almost one of every three
households in these communities signal depopulation as among the top five social concerns these
locations face—coming only after related issues including unemployment and lack of adequate
wellbeing linked to neglect, poor service provision, and tribal conflicts, respectively (Figure 5).
Many seem to feel that their communities are hollowing out (or at risk of doing so) as eventually
more people, particularly the young, are attracted elsewhere.8 While available data from multiple
sources presented here suggests this movement is not taking place at great frequency yet, it is
perhaps being discussed in daily life as an existential threat to rural communities given that as
more people start to leave, it becomes harder for others to justify remaining behind. Concerns
about depopulation are also frequently associated with a loss of voice vis-à-vis the authorities, in
that they will matter (even) less in decision-making.9

Figure 5. Most important social issues in the community among agricultural households

81% Unemployment 54% Tribal conflicts 52% Problems created by lack of services

29% Depopulation of the area 24% Problems created by environmental degradation

Note: Results only available for the eight districts in the south region assessed here (see Technical Factsheet).

Addressing this precarity in rural districts is a priority not only for sustaining their populations
and the agricultural sector, but also, and more critically, for building less fragile rural communities
overall.

TIME TO TILL RIGHT

The analysis presented here puts into context the fact that a significant proportion of
agricultural households across north-central and southern Iraq are struggling to continue or
restart these livelihoods, either in farming or livestock herding. For those households who still
engage in these activities, their levels of production and revenues generated are considerably
lower now than in the recent past. This is due to a confluence of conflict, economic, and
environmental factors whose severity depend on geography—conflict and economic factors
are more predominant in the north-central parts of the country and environmental factors in
the south. Likely because agriculture is not a particularly large economic sector even in rural
areas, its recession has not yet triggered large-scale population movements out of them. It
has however bred considerable uncertainty and fear of further isolation among agricultural
communities across this geography.

These dynamics in the agriculture sector intersect directly with other pressing issues in Iraq
including the need to adapt to climate change, to reduce sources of instability and violence,
and to strengthen state presence and functioning. The following points seek to place these
findings more squarely into this wider context of priorities.

8
For analysis of existing migration trends and their implications for Basra City, see, IOM and Social Inquiry, Migration into a Fragile
Setting: Responding to Climate-Induced Informal Urbanization and Inequality in Basra (Baghdad: IOM, 2021).
9
Roger Guiu, When Canals Run Dry: Displacement Triggered by Water Stress in the South of Iraq (Geneva: IDMC, 2020).

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 POLICY BRIEF | FARMER, WHERE ART THOU?

On politics and governance. On the surface, solutions to agricultural decline seem purely
technocratic in nature. It is true, as noted in Table 1, that some of the most detrimental
impacts farmers and livestock herders face is the lack of state support for the sector, public
funding, issues in the broader agricultural value chain, and poor water management. It is
often assumed, with reason, that this stems from a lack of technical capacity or know-how
by relevant public administrators and the ensuing response is then capacity-building in this
regard.10 This should not however come at the expense of understanding that technical
mismanagement and regulatory non-compliance may also originate from maleficent
behavior by political actors, both state and sub-state. The current governance landscape
of Iraq is one of institutional capture by political factionalism which often leads to lack of
compliance with centrally issued directives and regulations, lack of cooperation between
(or even within) governorates, diversion of funds, and biased interventions, among others.11
As such, interventions in agriculture as well as in climate and related fields need not only
technocratic expertise, but in-depth contextual awareness to map out how institutions work,
who the spoilers are, and where the incentives (or disincentives) are to operate in the public
interest. In short, these efforts need to also connect to those that seek to strengthen the state
and build legitimate governance that works for the public good.

On economic sense and environmental limits. It is important to recognize that the loss of
agriculture in many parts of the country has reasonably crossed a point of no-return and will
not be able to fully recover. This is especially true for areas significantly impacted by the lack
of water12 such that nearly no one is farming anymore. Basra Governorate is one such example
where cultivated land there currently represents less than 0.5% of the total active farmland in
the country13 due in part to repressive policies, sanctions, and environmental damage and to
which so much investment is placed on its revival. At the same time, the fact that there is little
information on the health of agriculture in the center-south of the country, where the sector
is intensive and productive and attracts a seasonal migrating workforce, underscores this lack
of economic sense in responding to agricultural recession. Rather, it should be imperative to
evaluate how prepared the center-south is to withstand potential environmental impacts ahead
and act accordingly from there. Similarly, the focus on intervention should be on the districts
highlighted in this analysis where agriculture is still taking place but is slowly diminishing. This
means approaching agriculture as a productive sector that needs modernization rather than
taking a somewhat nostalgic approach to reviving an agrarian lifestyle in rural areas from which
people shifted away long ago.

On those left behind. The above realization implies accepting that there are “economic losers”
in the agricultural sector. In the recent past, when people lost livelihoods, the state served as
a buffer by expanding public employment and payroll which allowed people to sustain life in
rural areas even if they could no longer earn an income from agriculture. These compensation
mechanisms are not sustainable in general and certainly are not now in Iraq, leaving people,
particularly the rural and the young, out in the cold in the absence of alternative opportunities
in the places where they live. Without the state as a buffer and without other options, migration
and urbanization are becoming more prominent trends, having earlier emerged due to the

10
Tobias von Lossow et al., Water Governance: Enabling a Gamechanger (The Hague: WPS / Clingendael, 2022).
11
Mac Skelton, Competing Over the Tigris: The Politics of Water Governance in Iraq (Sulaimani: IRIS / KAS, 2022).
Bassam Yousif, Omar El-Joumayle, and Jehan Baban, “Challenges to Iraq’s Environment: Applying the Water-Engery-Food Nexus Frame-
12

work,” Working Paper No. 1564 (Giza: Economic Research Forum, 2022).
13
This is estimated from 2021-2022 data from the Iraqi Central Statistical Organization.

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POLICY BRIEF | FARMER, WHERE ART THOU?

legacy of conflict and developmental neglect. Even some active farmers are opting for a mixed
migration approach, living elsewhere in cities for most of the year and coming back seasonally
to farm if there is enough water available (e.g., a year with good rainfall).14 To avoid continuing
down this path of “disorganized transition,” to reign in the physical, social, and political
hollowing out of rural communities and culture, and to ensure there are no losers, two types of
interventions are needed: public investment and material development in these areas, and the
revitalization and empowerment of civic institutions and community structures that peacefully
advocate for these communities’ interests. Agriculture may recede, but the state and civic space
should not be allowed to do so.

On conflict. Finally, in terms of what conflict and security implications this recession in agriculture
may bring, it is important to ground analysis in the dynamics of Iraq as a middle-income country
rather than extrapolate what may happen based on climate-security frameworks developed in
more agrarian contexts. It is an overstretch to expect that economic and environmental impacts
to agriculture will lead to the type of direct conflict or violence generated by competition of
individuals and communities, including raids and farmer-herder clashes, over access to water
and agricultural resources. These factors are absent from what farmers and livestock herders
report as impacts. Rather, the decline in agriculture is a force multiplier to the underlying
restive and destabilizing social and political dynamics in the country: people cannot succeed in
farming anymore as in many other facets of daily life now and do not seem to receive adequate
responses from institutions to help them. It highlights a gap between people’s—farmers and
non-farmers, urban and rural—expectations and the realities they face. This in combination
with a context where the state is receding and civic space is shrinking, cedes the ground to sub-
state actors and illicit networks to take their place in providing opportunities, dispute resolution,
and representation.15 Central to addressing issues linked to conflict and security is making
progress on the preceding elements above: good governance, economic rationality, and social
and political representation and accountability.

14
Guiu, When Canals Run Dry.
15
See, for example, Social Inquiry and WFP, Prospect for Resilience Amid Fragility: Conflict Analysis of Al-Qurna and Al-Dair Districts
in Basra Governorate (Baghdad: WFP, 2022); and EPC, “Maysan and the Cycle of Violence in Southern Iraq,” Emirates Policy Center,
March 23, 2022.

ABOUT SOCIAL INQUIRY

Social Inquiry is a not-for-profit research organization examining the ties that bind us and
the forces that pull us apart. Our aim is to improve the impact and effectiveness of public
policies and interventions that seek to address the root causes of conflict and fragility related
to governance, civic trust, and inequality.

This brief is authored by Roger Guiu with contributions from Nadia Siddiqui and Aaso Ameen
Shwan.

E: [email protected]
W: https://www.social-inquiry.org
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T: @inquiry_org