31lepublit of tbe ~bilippine.

s
~upreme <1Court
;fflanila

'fHIRD DIVISION

PEOPLIE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 242889

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

LEONEN, J., Chairperson,

versus LAZARO-JAVIER,
LOPEZ, M.,
LOPEZ, J., and
KHO,JJ
LENG HAIYUN, DANG HUIYIN,
LIU WEN XION a.k.a. "Lill XIN," Promulgated:
and LEI GUANG FENG,
March 14 2022
Accused-Appellants. ""-. '
x--------------------------------------------------------' s.-l(~t..e,&____________x

LOPEZ, J., J.:

To come within the purview of a "hot pursuit" arrest, a police

officer's personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be
anested has committed the offense must be judged based on a confluence of
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create probable cause.

In this case, several circumstances, namely, the police officer's

reasonable suspicion, coupled with the immediacy of their investigation, the
presence of the police officers at the gasoline station that caused accused-
appellants to flee, and their chase of accused-appellants' vehicle and
subsequent interception at the checkpoint of the Commission on Elections
( COMELEC), sufficiently support the existence of probable cause to justify
the warrantless anest of accused-appellants.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 242889

This resolves an appeal 1 of the Decision2 dated February 20, 2017 and
the Resolution3 dated December 12, 2017 rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07690, which affirmed the Joint Judgment4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 14, Laoag City dated July 30, 2015
in Criminal Case Nos. 2131-19, 2132-19 and 2133-19. The RTC found
accused-appellants Leng Haiyun, Dang Huiyin, Liu Wen Xion a.k.a. "Lui
Xin" and Lei Guang Feng (accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violations of Section 3, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.1866, and
Section 1, CO11ELEC Resolution No. 9561-A, in relation to Section 32 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166, 5 and Sections 261(q) and 264 of Batasang
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines.

Leng Haiyun, et al. 's conviction by the RTC and CA stemmed from
three separate Amended Informations 6 quoted as follows:

Criminal Case No. 2131-19

That on or about May 28, 2013 in the municipality of Pasuquin,

province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in their possession, control and custody eight (8) live
hand grenade PRB 423; one magnet plate; four (4) explosives main
charge; four (4) packs of alleged explosives; one sim card; one
Initiator/Power Supply; without first securing the necessary license or
authority to possess the same from the appropriate government agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2132-19

That on or about May 28, 2013 in the municipality of Pasuquin,

province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in their possession, control and custody three (3) MKE
MP5KA4 with Serial Numbers TO624-OBY00096; TO624-O9Y00129 &
TO624-10D00197; one [I] cal. 45 Commando; M1911-AICS (Citadel);
one caliber 45 M1911-AICS with silencer (no markings); one [I] 9mm
glock 17 with Serial Number AADW113; one [I] 9mm Seretta, no serial
number; one [I] walther P99 cal. 40 with serial number 405435; seven (7)
magazines for MPS (30 rds); two (2) short magazines for glock 17 (17
rounds); two [2] magazines for walther P99, cal. 40; sixty eight (68)

Rollo, p. 15.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Francisco, with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas,
Jr. and Danton Q. Bueser, concurring; id at 2- I4.
3 Id at 98-99.
4
Penned by Presiding Judge Francisco R. D. Quilala; CA rollo, pp. 52-75.
5
An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations therefor, and for other Purposes.
6
CA rollo, pp. 53-54.
 Decision 3 G.R. No. 242889

ammumt10ns for cal. 45; twenty (20) ammunitions for cal. 40; one
hundred one (101) ammunitions for cal 9mm; one [1] silencer for
unknown caliber; without first securing the necessary license or authority
to possess the same from the appropriate government agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2133-19

That on or about May 28, 2013 in the municipality of Pasuquin,

province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly carry in a public place and outside of their residence during the
election period three (3) MKE MP5KA4 with Serial Numbers TO624-
OBY00096; TO624-O9Y00129 & TO624-10D00197; one [I] cal. 45
Commando; Ml 911-AICS (citadel); one [1] cal. 45 Ml91 l-AICS with
silencer (no markings); one [I] 9mm glock 17 with Serial Number
AADWI 13; one [1] 9mm Seretta, no serial number; one [1] walther P99
cal. 40 with serial number 405435; seven (7) magazines for MP5 (30 rds);
two (2) short magazines for glock 17 (17 rds); two (2) magazines for glock
17 (30 rds); tlu·ee (3) magazines for cal. 45 (7 shooters) two (2) magazine
for Beretta, 9mm; two (2) magazines for walther 99, cal. 40; sixty eight
(68) ammunitions for cal. 45; twenty (20) ammunitions for cal. 40; one
hundred one (101) ammunitions for cal. 9mm; three (3) silencer for MP5;
one (1) silencer for beretta, 9mm; one [1] silencer for unknown caliber;
eight (8) live hand grenade PRB 423; one magnet plate; four (4)
explosives main charge; four (4) packs of alleged explosives; one [I] sim
card; one [1] Initiator/Power Supply; without first securing the written
authority or pe1mit from the Commission on Elections, Manila,
Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Leng Haiyun et al. pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. 7 After termination of the pre-trial, trial on merits ensued.

The Antecedents

On May 28, 2013, at around 6:30 in the evening, Michael Claveria

(Claveria), a gasoline boy on duty at the North Metro Oil Gasoline Station at
Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, noticed a silver gray Toyota Previa parked at the
southern portion of the gasoline station. Around 30 minutes later, Claveria
saw someone alight from the Toyota Previa and break two bottles at the
driver's side. 8 Thereafter, Claveria proceeded to the police station to report
the incident. 9 In their patrol car, the police officers followed Claveria back
to the gasoline station. 10 Upon arrival at the gasoline station, the police
officers spotted the Toyota Previa, but Leng Haiyun et al. noticed the
7
Records, p. 70.
s Id. at 292.
9
Id
10
Id
Decision 4 G.R. No. 242889

police officers' presence. 11 As a result, Leng Haiyun, et al. fled toward the
north direction, 12 and the police officers gave chase. 13 In tum, Police
Inspector Joseph Tayaban (Pl Tayaban) contacted the police officers at the
CO:tvffiLEC checkpoint in Barangay Davila, Pasuquin, and requested
them to intercept the Toyota Previa. 14 When the vehicle stopped at the
COMELEC checkpoint, the police officers alighted from the patrol car. PI
Tayaban and Police Senior Inspector Joseph Baltazar (PSI Baltazar)
approached the driver's side of the Toyota Previa and signaled the driver to
lower the tinted window. 15 Upon the driver's compliance, PI Tayaban saw
four foreigners later identified as Leng Haiyun, et al. PI Tayaban also saw
around six pieces of plate numbers scattered on the floor behind the driver.
When asked, Leng Haiyun, et al. failed to show their passports or other
documents pertaining to their entry and stay in the country. 16

Thereafter, the driver of the Toyota Previa handed a mobile phone

to PI Tayaban. On the other end of the line was a female who identified
herself as "Candy." She asked PI Tayaban what the transgression of those
aboard the Toyota Previa was. PI Tayaban answered that it was just for a
light offense - they caused alarm at the gasoline station when they broke
bottles. When Candy asked PI Tayaban to release the foreigners, PI Tayaban
insisted that Candy should instruct them to go with the police officers, as
only a light offense was involved. The occupants of the Toyota Previa
complied, and they followed the patrol car. While approaching the police
station, PI Tayaban stepped out of the patrol car and boarded the Toyota
Previa to prevent the escape of Leng Haiyun, et al. 17

Upon reaching the police station, PI Tayaban instructed Leng Haiyun,

et al. to alight from the vehicle. While tbey were alighting, PI Tayaban and
other people saw, ih plain view, several butts and barrels of different
firearms under the chair of the second row of the car. Thereafter, the police
officers cordoned the area and handcuffed Leng Haiyun, et al. Upon PSI
Baltazar's request, personnel of the Provincial Police Office headed by
Police Superintendent Jerico Baldeo (PS Baldeo) and Police Chief Inspector
Jay De Guzman (PC! De Guzman) arrived. 18

Thereafter, PCI De Guzman began the search and in the presence of

Leng Haiyun, et al., barangay officials, and members of the media, and with
the assistance of Pasuquin police officers, Police Officer 2 Ruel Llamelo
(P02 Llamelo) and Police Officer 3 Lumiowel Bulosan (P03 Bulosan),
opened the sliding door of the right side of the vehicle. 19
II TSN, September 16, 2013, p. 5.
12
Id.
13
Id., at 6.
14
Records, p. 292.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 293.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 293-294.
 Decision 5 G.R. No. 242889

PCI De Guzman saw an Iv1P5 submachinegun on the floor of the

vehicle and found several other firearms, pieces of explosives, and plate
numbers on the floor of the second and third rows of the Toyota Previa. PCI
De Guzman handed them to P02 Llamelo, who listed each item. P03
Bulosan, in tum, marked each item. 20

For their part, Leng Haiyun, et al. denied the allegations against them.
They averred that no firearms and explosives were found inside the Toyota
Previa. They maintained that they saw the subject firearms and explosives
for the first time on top of a table outside the police station. They also belied
the police officers' claim that several plate numbers were found scattered on
the floor of the Toyota Previa.21

After trial, the RTC convicted Leng Haiyun, et al. for illegal
possession of explosives and violation of the election gun ban but dismissed
the case for illegal possession of firearms. The dispositive portion of the
Decision dated July JO, 2015 states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

'
(1) . _: In Crimip.al Case No. 2131~19, the accused Leng Hai yun,
Dang Huiyin, Liu Wen Xion a.k.a. "Lui Xin", and Lei Quang Feng are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
explosives penalized under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as
amended by Republic Act No. 9516 and are hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetya.

. (2) In Criminal Case No. 2133-19, the accused Leng Haiyun,

Dang Huiyin, Liu Wen Xion a.k.a. "Lui Xin", and Lei Guang Feng are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the election offense of
violation of Section 261 (q) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
COMELEC Resolution No. 9561-A and are hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from two years as
minimum to five years as maximum;

(3) Crim. Case No. 2132-19 is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to

Agate v. Lorenzo and Madrigal v. People.

The firearms, ammunitions, explosives, and other contraband

recovered from the accused are hereby FORFEITED and CONFISCATED
in favor of the Government.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 22

The RTC ruled that the warrantless arrest of Leng Haiyun, et al.
and the subsequent search of the subject vehicle are valid. It held that the
20 Id. at 294.
21
Id. at 296.
22
id. at 311-312. (Emphasis omitted)
Decision 6 G.R. No. 242889

warrantless arrest effected by the police officers was justified under Section
5 (a) of Rule 113. As a consequence of the an·est, the police officers were
authorized to search the vehicle where the firearms were seen. Further, even
assuming that the police officers should be deemed to have already effected
an arrest when they asked Leng Haiyun, et al. to proceed from the
checkpoint to the Pasuquin police station, there was a justification for such
warrantless arrest. Leng Haiyun, et al. were committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers because the presence of several plate numbers
inside the Toyota Previa is a violation of Section 18 of the Land
Transportation Code.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Leng Haiyun, et al. in

its Decision dated February 20, 2017, which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated

May 27, 2015 of the Court a quo is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 23

The CA held that contrary to the claims of Leng Haiyun, et al., the
report of the gasoline boy was not the sole basis for their warrantless arrest.
The warrantless arrest was made pursuant to Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Given that the arrest was valid, the police officers were
therefore authorized to search the entire vehicle where the firearms were
seen. Verily, since the warrantless search was legally conducted, all the
pieces of evidence obtained as a result of such search were admissible in
evidence and sufficient to prove Leng Haiyun, et al.'s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. 24

Hence, the instant appeal.

In the Resolution25 dated February 13, 2019, this Court notified both
parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs. On May 14,
2019, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation26 stating that
it no longer intends to file a supplemental brief as its Appellee's Brief27
sufficiently contained a summation of the facts of the case, the issues to be
resolved, the arguments in support of its position, the relief sought and the
authorities to support its arguments. On October 29, 2019, accused-
appellants filed a Manifestation28 stating that they intend to file their
supplemental brief. On February 4, 2020, accused-appellants filed their

23
CA rollo, p. 139. (Emphasis omitted)
24
Id. at 137.
25 Rollo, p. 21.
26
ld at 38-41.
27
CA rollo, pp. 93-106.
28
!d. at 30-32.
 Decision 7 G.R. No. 242889

supplemental brief, 29 while on February 21, 2020, they.filed an addendum to

their supplemental brief. 30

The Issue

The essential issue in the instant case is whether there was a valid
warrantless arrest, and search, and seizure conducted by the police officers.

Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

Accused-appellants first contend that they cannot be convicted of the

offenses of illegal possession of explosives and violation of Section 261 (q)
of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to COMELEC Resolution No.
9561-A, because such will violate their right against double jeopardy; and,
second, the prosecution failed to prove animus possidendi.

We disagree.

There is no double jeopardy and the

prosecution has proven accused-
appellants' animus possidendi

Section 3 ofR.A. No. 9516, amending P.D. No. 1866, provides:

SECTION 3-D. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double

Jeopardy. - Subject to the provisions of the Rules of Court on double
jeopardy, if the application thereof is more favorable to the accused, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case for
violation of this Decree shall be a bar to another prosecution of the same
accused for any offense where the violation of this Decree was a necessary
means for committing the offense or in furtherance of which, incident to
which, in connection with which, by reason of which, or on occasion of
which, the violation of this Decree was committed, and vice versa.

Accused-appellants insist that under this provision, they can no longer

be convicted of the offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives
since the possession of such contraband is a necessary means of committing
the offense of violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9561-A. 31

29
Rollo, pp. 50-84.
30
Id. at 105-108.
JI
Id. at 64.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 242889

Their interpretation is skewed. The foregoing provision presupposes

that there is a conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case for violation of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 9516. The prior
conviction or acquittal, therefore, must be for illegal possession of firearms
and explosives, which shall bar the prosecution for another offense. Even
assuming that accused-appellants asked for the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 2133-19 charging them for violation of COJ\IBLEC Resolution No.
9651-A, this Court does not see how the offense of illegal possession of
explosives was a necessary means of committing the COJ\IBLEC gun ban
violation. The charge under Criminal Case No. 2133-19 was for violation of
the COMELEC gun ban, which accused-appellants could be convicted of, as
in fact they were, by their mere illegal possession of firearms during a gun
ban.

Needless to say, the charge under Criminal Case No. 2131-19 was for
illegal possession of explosives under Section 3-A of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 9516. It would appear, however, that the argument of
accused-appellants is anchored on Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended
by R.A. No. 8294, where the law expressly states that the accused cannot be
convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms if the person arrested has
committed another crime. As the offenses differ, and taking off from Agate
v. Hon. Lorenzo, 32 it is only the charge for illegal possession of firearms
filed against accused-appellants that was dismissed by the RTC in Criminal
Case No. 2132-19.

Accused-appellants likewise maintain their lack of animus possidendi.

They claim that the prosecution failed to prove that they were aware of the
firearms and ammunitions inside the vehicle, considering that their use
thereof was limited to 10-20 minutes only. 33 True, animus possidendi "is a
state of mind, the presence or determination of which largely depends on the
attendant events in each case. " 34 In determining the presence of animus
possidendi, this Court is guided by the "prior or contemporaneous acts of the
accused and the surrounding circumstances."35 "What exists in the realm of
thought is often disclosed in the range of action." 36

In this case, when the accused-appellants spotted the police officers'

vehicle, "they rode up and fled towards the north direction." 37 This
suspicious actuation only reveals that accused-appellants had a reason to be
on edge. Besides, this Court can hardly believe that accused-appellants were
oblivious to the presence of the firearms and ammunitions inside the Toyota
Previa. Indeed, the police officers did not just seize one or two firearms.
They seized several high-powered firearms, three loaded submachineguns,
32
502 Phil. 318 (2005).
33
Rollo, p. 66.
34
Jacaban v. People, 756 Phil. 523, 532 (2015).
35
Id.
36
People v. De Gracia, 304 Phil. 118, 131 ( 1994).
37
TSN, September 16, 2013, p. 5.
 Decision 9 G.R. No. 242889

over I 00 ammunitions, five silencers, eight hand grenades, and a bomb. 38 In

fact, the police officers immediately noticed the existence of the butts and
barrels of several firearms as soon as one of the accused-appellants slid open
the vehicle's door and alighted therefrom. 39 Remaining ignorant about the
presence of the dangerous weapons, especially considering their visibility, is
contrary to logic and reason. To be sure, accused-appellants' act of entering
a car loaded with deadly weapons and contraband for "touring purposes" 40
smacks of concoction rather than a narration of the truth.

There was a valid warrantless arrest

under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court

Accused-appellants vehemently assert that the root cause of the search

of the vehicle and the arrest was the report of the gasoline boy that one of
the accused-appellants was breaking bottles and causing a commotion. 41
They posit that breaking bottles is not per se a crime, since the same may be
done negligently. 42 Accused-appellants also controvert the CA's finding that
the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest43 because there was
no valid warrantless arrest in the first place. 44

While this Court agrees with the CA's Decision over the validity of
the warrantless arrest, certain factual circumstances lead Us to depart from
its reasoning.

Contrary to the CA' s ruling, the circumstances of the case do not fall
within the purview of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, but of Section 5 (b ). Section 5, Rule 113 provides:

SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace

officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or

3S
Id. 16-18.
39
Id. at 12.
40
Rollo, p. 69.
41
Id at 72.
42
Id. at 73.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 76.
Decision G.R. No. 242889

is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while

being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 112.45

Also known as "hot pursuit" arrest, Section 5 (b) requires the

following to be valid: "(1) the offender has just committed an offense; and
(2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." 46

In Abelita III v. P/Supt. Doria, 47 this Court found that there was a
valid warrantless arrest under the foregoing provision. There, P/Supt. Doria
received a report about an alleged shooting incident. He thereafter instructed
SP03 Ramirez to investigate. SP03 Ramirez reported that the accused
therein, who was also implicated, just left the place of the incident. P/Supt.
Doria looked for the accused and when he found the latter, P/Supt. Doria
informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested the accused to
go with him to the police headquarters, but the accused suddenly sped up his
vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and other police
officers chased the accused and accordingly arrested him. This Court ruled
that the police officers' investigation of the incident report and the
petitioner's act of trying to get away were "enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable
cause." 48 Thus:

Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause,

which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does

not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of
the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a
report about the alleged shooting incident. SP03 Ramirez investigated the
report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the
incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the
police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed
then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase.
Petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report

45
Emphasis supplied.
46
Abelita l/1 v. P/Supt. Doria, 612 Phil. 1127, l 134 (2009).
47
Id.
4S
Id at 1135.
 Decision 11 G.R. No. 242889

which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the

part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. 49

In the present case, an offense had just been committed and the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellants
have committed it. It must be remembered that Claveria, a gasoline boy, saw
one of the accused-appellants alight from the Toyota Previa and break two
bottles at the driver's side. While accused-appellants argue that "the
complaint of breakage of bottles from the gasoline boy is not in itself a
crime," 50 it cannot be denied that such act alarmed the personnel of the
gasoline station. When accused-appellant Liu Wen Xion took the witness
stand, he admitted the bottle-breaking incident, thus:

Q Now, Mr. witness when one of the police officers in the person of
Police Inspector Tayaban testified last September 16, 2013 he said
the following that they went to the gasoline station because there
was a report made regarding this bottle breaking incident
perpetrated or authored by one of the occupants of a Toyota Previa,
are you aware of that bottle incident, Mr. witness?
A At the time we were are at the gasoline station it is only our vehicle
that was parked there. About the throwing of bottle it is my friend
who threw out a bottle of a drink that he consumed, sir.

Q What drink is that, Mr. witness if you recall?

A A Red Bull, after drinking he just absent mindlessly threw out,
sir. 51

At that point, the act of the friend of Liu Wen Xion may be classified
as unjust vexation, a crime "broad enough to include any human conduct
which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, could
unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. " 52 The distress felt by the
gasoline personnel was precisely the reason why they reported accused-
appellants' acts to the police station.

From that moment on, the police officers lost no time in investigating
the incident. Upon receipt of the report, their chief of police, PSI Baltazar,
formed a team, together with three others and PI Tayaban, and immediately
responded to the place of the reported incident. 53 Upon arrival, the police
officers spotted the vehicle, but accused-appellants noticed their
presence, causing the latter to ride up and flee toward the north direction. 54
The police officers immediately chased them and contacted Davila's Public
Safety Company, who were conducting a COMELEC checkpoint, to
intercept the fleeing vehicle. 55 All these circumstances, taken together, point

49 Id. at 1134-1135. (Citations omitted)

50
Rollo, p. 76.
51
TSN, May 20, 2015, p. 16.
52 Maderazo v. People, 534 Phil. 338, 353 (2006).
53
TSN, September 16, 2013, p. 5.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 6.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 242889

to no other conclusion than that the police officers had personal knowledge
that a crime had been committed.

While the accused-appellants impress upon this Court that there "was
no testimony by the police authorities that indeed they saw the broken
bottles," 56 Abelita 11151 is an authority for the rule that the arresting officers
need not have personally witnessed the commission of the offense "with
their own eyes." 58 To this Court's mind, PI Tayaban's reasonable suspicion, ·
coupled with numerous circumstances, such as the immediacy of the police
officers' investigation, their presence at the gasoline station that caused
accused-appellants to flee, and their chase of accused-appellants' vehicle
and subsequent interception at the COMELEC checkpoint, sufficiently
support the existence of probable cause to justify accused-appellants'
warrantless arrest.

In fact, the police officers' reasonable suspicion about the existence of

probable cause was further raised when PI Tayaban saw six plate numbers
scattered on the vehicle's floor behind the driver's seat59 and accused-
appellants' lack of any means of identification or even official travel
°
documents. 6 Curiously, accused-appellants allege that the Toyota Previa
was only being used "to tour around the province," 61 yet they could not
even present their passports to the police officers, if only to accord such
allegation with a semblance of legitimacy. In truth, PI Tayaban was able to
verify from the Bureau of Immigration that accused-appellants "passed
through the back door" 62 and had no papers to show the legality of their
entry into the country.

More importantly, owing to PI Tayaban's apprehension that accused-

appellants might escape, he disembarked from their mobile patrol and
transferred to the Toyota Previa to ensure that accused-appellants would
reach the precinct. 63 In sum, what is important is that PI Tayaban had
knowledge of facts that he personally gathered in the course of his
investigation, pointing to accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.

True, when PI Tayaban invited accused-appellants to the precinct and

they acceded, 64 they were already under arrest. Yet, pursuant to the
foregoing discussion, this Court is satisfied that the police officers conducted
a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5 (b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

56
Rollo, p. 77.
57
Supra note 46.
58
Id. at I 135.
59
TSN, September 16, 2013, pp. 7-8.
60
Id.at 10.
61
Rollo, p. 69.
62
TSN, September 16, 2013, p. 29.
63
Id. at 8.
64
Id.
 Decision 13 G.R. No. 242889

The police officers seized the

contraband in "plain view" and as
an incident to a lawful arrest

Accused-appellants argue that the warrantless search and seizure are

illegal since the wanantless an·est was unlawful at the inception. 65
Accordingly, the evidence yielded are inadmissible in evidence for being
fruits of the poisonous tree. 66

We disagree.

We find that the police officers' seizure of the evidence was in "plain
view." The general rule presupposes a valid search warrant before a law
enforcer can validly search or seize a person's house, papers, or effects.
There are, however, eight instances of a valid search and seizure despite the
absence of a search Wai.Tant, thus:

(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of

vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws;
(4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or
constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;"
(7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and
building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations. 67

The plain view doctrine authorizes the seizure and presentation as

evidence of objects that fall in the "plain view" of an officer "who has a
right to be in the position to have that view." 68 For the successful invocation
of the doctrine, the prosecution must satisfy the following requirements: "(a)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which [they] can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the item [they observe] may be
evidence of a crime, contraband[,] or otherwise subject to seizure." 69

Here, all the foregoing requirements are present. PI Tayaban had a

prior justification for the intrusion because accused-appellants were legally
arrested in accordance with Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
They already arrived at the precinct and PI Tayaban merely asked them
to alight from the vehicle. 70 It was when accused-appellants were in the
process of disembarking from the vehicle that PI Tayaban and the other

65
Rollo, p. 79.
66
Id.
67
People v. Agulay, 588 Phil. 247, 272-273 (2008).
68
People v. Lagman, 593 Phil 617, 628 (2008).
69
Id.
70
TSN, September 16, 2013, p. 12.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 242889

police officers "saw in plain view several butts and barrels of different
firearms. " 71 PI Tayaban testified:

Q And after that what happened?

A So I alighted from that vehicle and instructed them to also alight
from that vehicle, ma'am.

Q Who were present when you alighted the vehicle?

A There were already media personalities at that time, ma'am. ABS-
CBN, the TV broadcaster and while they were disembarking at
that vehicle, ma'am we saw in plain view several butts and
barrels of different.firearms, ma'am.

Q Where did you see those butts and barrels of firearms?

A Under the chair oftlzat second layer of the car, ma'am.

Q Could you describe the door of the van?

A The van Toyota Previa is like a Revo style but the difference is just
that the side of that door is sliding. You can push that so that they
can come out, ma'am. So that's the thing, ma'am. They opened
that door so very wide so that we can view the inside of that
vehicle, ma'am.

XXX

THE COURT

Q How were you able to see it, did you use flashlight or what? Or
when it was opened in the sense that the car would be
automatically lighted?
A Upon opening the car it will light and at that time there's a light
in front of our station and exactly the place is lighted, your
Honor.

Q So even without the aid of any flashlight you would be able to see
what is inside the van?
A Yes, your Honor. 72

Certainly, PI Tayaban and the other police officers were strategically

positioned in a such that they could see the inside of the vehicle. Being in
that lawful position and during such lawful intrusion, PI Tayaban
inadvertently discovered the butts and barrels of different arms, which the
police officers have undoubtedly observed as contraband. As a continuation
of the search conducted in "plain view" and in the course thereof, the police
officers likewise discovered explosives. PI Tayaban further testified:

Q So when you saw those butts and barrels of firearms inside the van
which were under the chair which you said a while ago, what did
you do next?
A We immediately cordoned that area and contained also these four
(4) male persons and handcuffed them and I informed them of their

71
Id.
72
Id. at 12-13. (Emphases and italics supplied)
 Decision 15 G.R. No. 242889

constitutional rights in the English language even though they are

Chinese people and I informed them that they have the right to
remain silent and told them that they can have a counsel preferably
of their own choice and that if they cannot afford the services of a
counsel our government will provide them for free.

XXX

Q So after you secured the vehicle containing the firearms what did
you do next?
A Police Senior Inspector Baltazar, our Chief of Police summoned
the Provincial Office for assistance, ma'am and personnel from
Provincial Police Office (PPO) came.

Q Who in particular came?

A Headed by Police Superintended Baldeo with Police Chief
Inspector Jay de Guzman, ma'am.

Q So do we understand from you that you waited for them before

confiscating or did anything with those firearms inside the van?
A Yes, ma'am.

Q So when they arrived what did they do, if any?

A Police Chief Inspector Jay de Guzman commenced the search of
that vehicle, ma'am, with the presence of the media people and the
barangay officials and the police officers around there, ma'am.

Q Do you know what are those confiscated items inside the van?
A Yes, ma' an1.

Q What are those?

A There were eight (8) different types of firearms witlz three (3)
submaclzine guns and several ammunitions and also there were
eiglzt (8) hand grellade explosives and one (1) improvised
explosive device, a bomb, ma'am. 73

In the same case of Abelita 111,74 the police authorities, after catching
up with the petitioner, saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the
driver's seat as the accused opened the door. During their search, they also
saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. Since a shooting incident just
happened and the petitioner was implicated, the police officers seized the
firearms under the plain view doctrine because the firearms may be evidence
of a crime. Thus, just like Abelita 111, PI Tayaban and the police officers in
this case were justified in seizing the firearms and explosives.

In addition, the seizure made by PCI de Guzman of the firearms and

explosives from accused-appellants also qualify as a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. Section 13, Rules 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:

73
TSN, September 16, 2013, pp. 14-16. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
74
Supra note 46.
Decision 16 G.R. No. 242889

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person lawfully

arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.

The foregoing is authorized because accused-appellants "may reach

for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property
found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish them
with the means of escaping or committing violence." 75 It is well-settled that
the police officers must have effected a lawful arrest before the search
because the "precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search." 76

In Miclat, Jr. v. People, 77 the petitioner therein was caught in the act
of arranging heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of the police officer,
who thereafter searched the petitioner after the latter's valid warrantless
arrest. This Court, in ruling that the seizure made by the police officer was
not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but also fell within the purview of the
plain view doctrine, declared:

It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging

the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of P03 Antonio and he
voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police
officer. The seizure made by P03 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from
the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls
within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.

xxxx

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object

itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioner's arrest is among the
exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the
evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the
arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were
admissible in evidence to prove petitioner's guilt of the offense charged. 78

Indeed, as a consequence of accused-appellants' arrest, the police

officers were authorized to search the Toyota Previa, "on the ground that a
contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected and may
extend to areas that are within [their] custody and immediate control." 79
Needless to say, the Toyota Previa was within accused-appellants'
immediate control. More importantly, in establishing the primordial
requirement to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the prosecution

75 Macalat v. Court ofAppeals, 347 Phil. 462,480 (I 997).

76
ld.
77
672 Phil. 191 (20 l I).
78
Id. at 206-207.
79
People v. Mi/ado, 462 Phil. 411, 417 (2003).
 Decision 17 G.R. No. 242889

has shown that PO 1 Tayaban arrested accused-appellants first prior to the

search. This was brought about by the bottle breaking incident at the
gasoline station. Since accused-appellants were already arrested pursuant to
the police officers' probable cause that accused-appellants committed an
offense, the arrest can, in no way, be considered a mere pretext for the police
officers' conduct of the search.

Having established that accused-appellants' arrest falls among the

instances for a valid warrantless arrest and the evidence seized from
accused-appellants was the result of a search of evidence in "plain view" and
as an incident to accused-appellants' lawful arrest, the contraband seized
were admissible in evidence to prove their guilt.

In a last-ditch attempt to secure their acquittal, accused-appellants

stress that serious doubts exist as to the existence of the firearms,
ammunitions, and grenades inside the vehicle. 80 Suffice to state that PCI De
Guzman categorically testified that he personally conducted the search and
positively identified the seized items. 81 PO2 Llamelo likewise testified that
PCI De Guzman handed the seized items to him, and he listed them down in
the inventory sheet. 82 PO2 Llamelo also painstakingly identified all the
contraband seized in the present case. 83 While accused-appellants take issue
regarding the bulletproof vests not included in the inventory, PO2 Llamelo
has explained that these vests were used to cover the explosives inside the
supply room. 84 Moreover, We do not see how the conduct of the search was
illegal, 85 as accused-appellants would have it.

Accused-appellants point out that Barangay Kagawad Annando

Aguinaldo (Kagawad Aguinaldo), one of the witnesses to the search, did not
witness an actual search being done because he merely witnessed the
taking out of the firearms from the vehicle. 86

We do not agree. Kagawad Aguinaldo testified that he was only a

little behind PCI De Guzman, or by his side. 87 Upon opening the vehicle,
Kagawad Aguinaldo even declared that he "saw a gun. " 88 On cross-
examination, Kagawad Aguinaldo admitted that his attention was only
focused on the items being brought out. 89 For all intents and purposes, We
find that Kagawad Aguinaldo witnessed the search as he was able to view
the inside of the vehicle from where he was standing and observe the seized

so Rollo, p. 80.
81 TSN, October 14, 2013, pp. 13-14.
82
TSN, September 30, 2013, pp. 11-12.
83
Id. at 17-22.
84
TSN, October 7, 2013, pp. 7-8.
85 Rollo, p. 81.
86
Id. at 80.
87
TSN, December 2, 2013, p. 7.
88
Id. at 8.
89 Id. at 16.
Decision 18 G.R. No. 242889

items as they were being taken out. 90 In effect, what accused-appellants

were questioning is the fact that nobody else aside from PCI De Guzman
was admitted inside the vehicle. This is only natural, as the police officers
must protect the seized items from being contaminated by outside sources.

Finally, accused-appellants aver that there is no evidence to prove

their presence during the search. 91 This allegation is belied by the testimony
of P02 Llamelo, who admitted during cross-examination that accused-
appellants witnessed the search. Hence:

Q That's why because of your intention to protect these four (4)

Chinese nationals you ensure that they were inside the station all
the while because of the many people around, correct?
A They were just near us, sir, they witnessed the search. 92

Accused-appellants boldly invoke this Court's compassion and

sympathy by declaring how they "are Chinese Nationals in a foreign land" 93
and "sentenced to life in prison effectively removing them from their
families and homeland. " 94

Inasmuch as this Court sympathizes with their plight, their present

circumstance is something they could have thought about twice, thrice, and
even many times over, considering their equally bold and deliberate
disrespect of Philippine immigration laws when they employed extralegal
means to enter the country.

Given the foregoing, there is no reason for this Court to reverse the
RTC's ruling, which the CA Decision affirmed.

Penalties

For Criminal Case No. 2131-19, We find the penalty imposed by the
RTC proper. Section 3 95 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 9516,
provides that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall willfully and unlawfully possess, among others, any

90
Id. at 14-16.
91
Rollo, p. 81 .
92 TSN, October 7, 2013, p. 9.
93
Rollo, p. 83.
94
Id.
95 Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition, Disposition, Importation or Possession ofan
Explosive or Incendiary Device. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall willfully and unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose, import or possess any
explosive or incendiary device, with knowledge of its existence and its explosive or incendiary character,
where the explosive or incendiary device is capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects
or causing injury or death to any person, including but not limited to, hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s),
'pillbox bomb', 'molotov cocktail bomb', 'fire bomb', and other similar explosive and incendiary devices.
XXX
 Decision 19 G.R. No. 242889

explosive or incendiary device, with knowledge of its existence and its

explosive or incendiary character.

We likewise find the penalty imposed by the R TC for Criminal Case

No. 2133-19 proper. Article 26496 of the Omnibus Election Code states that
any person found guilty of any election offense under the Code shall be
punished with imprisonment of not less than one ( 1) year but not more than
six (6) years. Thus, the RTC correctly meted an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from two years as minimum to five (5) years as
maxunum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED.

The February 20, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 07690, which affirmed the July 30, 2015 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Laoag City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2131-19 and
2133-19, and its Resolution dated December 12, 2017 are AIFJFIRMED.
Thus:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 2131-19, the accused-appellants Leng

Haiyun, Dang Huiyin, Liu Wen Xion a.k.a. "Liu Xin," and
Lei Guang Fang are found GUU-''fY beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of explosives penalized under
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by
Republic Act No. 9516 and are hereby sentenced to
reclusion pe1petua;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 2133-19, the accused-appellants Leng

Haiyun, Dang Huiyin, Liu Wen Xion a.k.a. "Liu Xin," and
Lei Guang Feng are found Gill:L'fY beyond reasonable
doubt of the election offense of violation of Section 261 (q)
of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to COMELEC
Resolution No. 9561-A, and are hereby sentenced to an
indete1minate penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2)
years as minimum to five (5) years as maximum; and

(3) Criminal Case No. 2132-19 is DI§Ml§§E]).

96 Section 264. Penalties. - Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be
punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject
to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office
and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall
be enforced after the prison term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay
a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos, which shall be imposed upon such party after criminal action has
been instituted in which their corresponding officials have been found guilty.
XXX
Decision 20 G.R. No. 242889

The firearms, ammumt10ns, explosives, and other

contraband recovered from the accused are hereby
FORJFEITIED and CONFISCATED in favor of the
Government.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

JHOSE~PEZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice

AMY ,~-JAVIER
Associate Justice

~~KHo~
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

.,,,,.,.-
---
ss Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
Decision 21 G.R. No. 242889

CJER 1'IFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.