Before the

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20554

In the Matter of )
)
Kuiper Systems LLC ) IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20211207-00186
)
Application for Modification of )
Authorization to Launch and )
Operate an NGSO Satellite System )

REPLY OF VIASAT, INC.

Jarrett S. Taubman
VIASAT, INC.
901 K Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20001
July 22, 2022
 Summary

The Commission conditioned its provisional authorization of Kuiper’s NGSO system on

Kuiper submitting and obtaining approval of an updated and more detailed orbital debris

mitigation plan that evaluates and effectively mitigates the collision risks posed by its NGSO

system “as a whole.” The Commission imposed this condition after recognizing that:

(i) Kuiper’s NGSO system has the potential to greatly exacerbate risks to space safety and

sustainability; and (ii) Kuiper had failed to address those risks fully or adequately at the time its

system was provisionally authorized.

As Viasat noted in its initial comments, Kuiper has ignored the Commission’s directive

and failed to provide a fulsome analysis of the orbital safety risks posed by its planned

operations. Kuiper’s Response does nothing to address these deficiencies. To the contrary,

Kuiper’s Response makes it even more apparent that Kuiper has willfully ignored its obligations

under the Commission’s rules, the Kuiper NGSO system authorization, and the broader public

interest standard. In short, Kuiper still fails to evaluate material space safety risks posed by its

planned operations, and still fails to identify effective strategies for mitigating those risks.

Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable basis upon which the Commission

could approve Kuiper’s application; the public interest does not permit the Commission to

endanger space safety while Kuiper “figures it out.” Accordingly, the Commission should seek

additional information from Kuiper on its plans for orbital debris mitigation and should hold

Kuiper’s application in abeyance until Kuiper thoroughly addresses these matters.

 Table of Contents

I. KUIPER’S RESPONSE REFLECTS A FUNDAMENTAL MISUNDERSTANDING

OF ITS OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ORBITAL SAFETY MATTERS... 2

II. KUIPER’S RESPONSE UTTERLY IGNORES ITS OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS

ORBITAL SAFETY RISKS POSED BY THE KUIPER SYSTEM “AS A WHOLE”
............................................................................................................................................. 4

III. KUIPER’S ATTEMPTS TO EXCUSE OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES

IN ITS ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION PLAN ARE UNAVAILING .................. 5

A. RISKS FROM LETHAL NON-TRACKABLE (“LNT”) DEBRIS ....................................... 6

B. INTRA-SYSTEM COLLISION RISKS ............................................................................ 6
C. INTER-SYSTEM COLLISION RISKS ............................................................................ 7
D. RESIDUAL RISKS ...................................................................................................... 8
E. UNCERTAINTY WITH RESPECT TO PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF KUIPER
SATELLITES.............................................................................................................. 9
F. RISKS DUE TO THE EVOLUTION OF LEO ................................................................ 10
IV. KUIPER’S RESPONSE FAILS TO ADDRESS THE SIGNIFICANT FLAWS IN
THE COLLISION RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES PRESENTED IN ITS
UPDATED ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION PLAN ............................................. 11

A. ONBOARD PROPULSION ......................................................................................... 11

B. SCREENING ............................................................................................................ 12
C. REENTRY OF FAILED SATELLITES .......................................................................... 12
D. ORBITAL SEPARATION ........................................................................................... 13
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 14
 Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20554

In the Matter of )
)
Kuiper Systems LLC ) IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20211207-00186
)
Application for Modification of )
Authorization to Launch and )
Operate an NGSO Satellite System )

REPLY OF VIASAT, INC.

Viasat, Inc. replies to the consolidated opposition and response filed by Kuiper Systems

LLC (“Kuiper”) on July 12, 2022 in the above-captioned proceeding (“Response”).1

The Commission has already recognized that: (i) Kuiper’s NGSO system has the

potential to greatly exacerbate risks to space safety and sustainability; and (ii) Kuiper had failed

to address those risks fully or adequately at the time its system was provisionally authorized. 2

For these reasons, the Commission conditioned that provisional authorization on Kuiper

submitting and obtaining approval of an updated and more detailed orbital debris mitigation plan

that evaluates and effectively mitigates the collision risks posed by its NGSO system “as a

whole.”3 But as Viasat noted in its initial comments, Kuiper has ignored this directive and failed

to provide a fulsome analysis of the orbital safety risks posed by its planned operations.4

Kuiper’s Response does nothing to rectify this failure. Instead, Kuiper suggests that it

need only address the subset of potential risks that are explicitly discussed in the Commission’s

1
Consolidated Opposition and Response of Kuiper Systems LLC, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-
20211207-00186 (July 12, 2022) (“Kuiper Response”).
2
See Kuiper Systems LLC, 35 FCC Rcd 8324, at ¶ 32 (2020) (“Kuiper Authorization Order”).
3
Id.
4
Comments of Viasat, Inc., IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20211207-00186 (June 27, 2022)
(“Viasat Comments”).
rules—and then only as they relate to individual satellites, as opposed to the Kuiper system “as a

whole.” As Viasat has already demonstrated, this approach is manifestly deficient (as it would

leave material sources of collision risk entirely unaddressed) and inconsistent with Kuiper’s

obligations under its NGSO system authorization, the Commission’s rules, and the broader

public interest standard. Viasat therefore reiterates its request that the Commission hold

Kuiper’s application in abeyance until Kuiper adequately addresses these matters.

I. KUIPER’S RESPONSE REFLECTS A FUNDAMENTAL MISUNDERSTANDING

OF ITS OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ORBITAL SAFETY MATTERS

As Viasat explained in its comments, Kuiper’s updated orbital debris mitigation plan:

(i) fails to provide a detailed evaluation of all material orbital safety risks that the Kuiper system

is likely to generate; (ii) fails to answer many critical questions about the planned operations of

that system; and (iii) fails to identify effective mechanisms for mitigating those risks to within

acceptable limits. More specifically, Kuiper’s plan fails to address material sources of collision

risk at all—let alone offer any plan for mitigating that risk.5 In short, Kuiper’s plan is both

incomplete and ineffectual.

In its Response, Kuiper asserts that it is under no obligation to examine these risk factors

because they are not explicitly discussed in the Commission’s orbital debris rules.6 This position

is misguided for several reasons. As an initial matter, the Commission’s rules broadly require

NGSO applicants to provide a fulsome description of “the design and operational strategies that

will be used to mitigate orbital debris,” which necessarily requires an applicant to: (i) evaluate, in

comprehensive fashion, the ways in which planned operations could generate orbital debris; and

5
See id. at 6-13.
6
Kuiper Response at 6.

2
(ii) develop effective strategies for mitigating the risks associated with that debris, regardless of

its source.7 This obligation is not negated simply because the Commission’s rules do not provide

an exhaustive list of all potential sources of orbital safety risk (which would be impossible).

Furthermore, Kuiper is subject to specific license conditions requiring it to “address in greater

detail, for the system as a whole, the collision risk” associated with its planned system.8 Kuiper

utterly ignores the broad obligations that flow from those conditions.

More fundamentally, Kuiper incorrectly assumes that its compliance with the explicit

requirements of the Commission’s orbital debris rules would necessarily render that plan

complete and otherwise satisfy the public interest standard. That simply is not true as a matter of

fact or law. To the contrary, compliance with the Commission’s explicit rules (e.g., addressing

the matters specifically discussed in those rules) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to

approval of its updated orbital debris mitigation plan. Section 25.156(a) makes this crystal clear,

plainly stating that the Commission must evaluate not only an applicant’s compliance with “all

applicable rules, regulations, and policies,” but also whether “grant of the application will serve

the public interest, convenience and necessity.”9 And critically, in conducting that inquiry, the

Commission is obligated to address concerns raised by interested parties—including by seeking

“additional information” as necessary to assist it in evaluating the sufficiency of that plan.10

7
47 C.F.R. § 25.114(d)(14).
8
Id.
9
See 47 C.F.R. § 25.156(a). Section 309(a) of the Communications Act likewise directs the
Commission to determine “whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be
served” by grant of an application. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).
10
47 C.F.R. § 25.111(a).

3
II. KUIPER’S RESPONSE UTTERLY IGNORES ITS OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS
ORBITAL SAFETY RISKS POSED BY THE KUIPER SYSTEM “AS A WHOLE”

As Kuiper itself has acknowledged, the Commission has directed it to submit an updated

orbital debris mitigation plan that “address[es] in greater detail the collision risk for the [Kuiper]

system as a whole . . . .”11 Notwithstanding this clear directive, the plan submitted by Kuiper

evaluates each Kuiper satellite in isolation, considering only the per-satellite collision probability

associated with each such satellite and ignoring the aggregate collision risks posed by Kuiper’s

system “as a whole.” Consequently, Kuiper’s plan is not only fundamentally at odds with the

conditions to its NGSO system authorization, but also leaves material collision risks entirely

unaddressed; as Viasat has demonstrated, these risks scale with the size of Kuiper’s satellites and

constellation and are considerable in the case of the 3,236-satellite Kuiper system.12

Kuiper makes no attempt to justify its decision to ignore the Commission’s explicit

directive to analyze the collision risks associated with its system “as a whole.” Instead, Kuiper

asserts that the Commission’s rules do not explicitly require an applicant to evaluate aggregate

risk.13 But as discussed above, the Commission’s rules broadly require NGSO applicants to

evaluate material collision risks in comprehensive fashion and, in any event, the obligations

11
See IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20211207-00186, Legal Narrative at 3 (emphasis added).
12
Viasat Comments at 3-6.
13
See Kuiper Response at 6-7. Kuiper’s suggestion that the Commission has “declined” to
apply the 0.001 collision probability limit on an aggregate basis is factually incorrect. The
Commission merely deferred action until a later stage in the Orbital Debris proceeding. See
Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, 35 FCC Rcd 4156, at ¶ 157 (2020) (“Is
assessing the total probability of collision on a system-wide basis consistent with the public
interest? Assuming that the Commission should consider collision risks on a system-wide
basis as part of its licensing process, we seek comment on the process through which such
collision risks should be considered.”).

4
generally imposed by the Commission’s rules do not supersede the conditions specifically

imposed on Kuiper under its NGSO system authorization.

This obligation is particularly pronounced in Kuiper’s case as there is significant record

evidence indicating that its planned system would pose material and unacceptable levels of

aggregate collision risk. Notably:

• Viasat has submitted technical analysis demonstrating that there are significant
aggregate risks associated with Kuiper’s planned operations notwithstanding Kuiper’s
alleged compliance with a 0.001 per-satellite collision risk threshold;14

• In applying for its NGSO system authorization, Kuiper submitted technical analysis
indicating that, under the most generous assumptions, the aggregate collision risk
associated with the Kuiper system would be more than 60 times the 0.001 collision
probability threshold.15

• Kuiper’s Response argues that large NGSO systems (like Kuiper’s) pose materially
different and greater collision risks than smaller NGSO systems because of the
number of satellites they contain—i.e., that “smaller systems . . . pose fewer risks.”16

In light of this record evidence and Kuiper’s failure to address aggregate collision risks more

broadly, there simply is no basis upon which the Commission could find that Kuiper’s updated

plan would safeguard space safety or otherwise serve the public interest.

III. KUIPER’S ATTEMPTS TO EXCUSE OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES

IN ITS ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION PLAN ARE UNAVAILING

Viasat’s comments also identify other material deficiencies in Kuiper’s updated orbital

debris mitigation plan, including its failure to evaluate or address: (i) risks related to lethal non-

trackable (“LNT”) debris; (ii) risks related to potential collisions between Kuiper satellites;

(iii) risks related to potential collisions with other satellites in overlapping, intersecting, or

14
Viasat Comments at 5.
15
Id. at 5-6.
16
Kuiper Response at 20.

5
nearby orbits; (iv) residual risks associated with conjunctions that do not result in collision

avoidance maneuvers; (v) risks related to fundamental uncertainty about the basic physical

characteristics of Kuiper’s satellites; and (vi) risks relating to the evolution of LEO. Nothing in

Kuiper’s Response excuses these deficiencies.

A. Risks from Lethal Non-Trackable (“LNT”) Debris

Viasat’s comments note that Kuiper’s updated orbital debris mitigation plan does not

evaluate the risks associated with LNT, which includes objects in the 1-10 cm range that cannot

be tracked (and hence cannot be avoided) yet are capable of fragmenting satellites with which

they collide.17 In its Response, Kuiper suggests that it need not evaluate LNT-related risks

because it has already addressed the probability of satellites “becoming a source of debris by

collisions with small debris or meteoroids that could cause loss of control and prevent post-

mission disposal.”18 But as Viasat has already explained, this is a fundamentally different

inquiry that does not address ongoing collision risk during the period before the satellite

ultimately demises into the Earth’s atmosphere. And, in any event, “small debris” generally

refers to debris less than 1 cm in diameter—meaning that Kuiper has provided no assessment

whatsoever of the risk of collision with debris objects in the 1 cm to 10 cm range.19 Kuiper

simply ignores these points.

B. Intra-System Collision Risks

Viasat’s comments note that Kuiper’s updated orbital debris mitigation plan fails to

account for intra-system collision risk even though: (i) intra-system collision risk is a significant

17
Viasat Comments at 7-8.
18
Kuiper Response at 8.
19
Viasat Comments at 8.

6
component of the total collision risk posed by an NGSO system (particularly one as large as

Kuiper’s); and (ii) the Commission explicitly identified intra-system collision risk as an area that

Kuiper had not adequately addressed prior to the provisional authorization of its system.20

Notwithstanding this clear direction, Kuiper’s Response asserts in perfunctory fashion that

“[a]ny intra-system risk is substantially mitigated by the fact that [its] satellites will be

maneuverable and working in concert as part of a coordinated system.”21 This argument is

circular and nonsensical; the risk of collisions between satellites operating within Kuiper’s

system is not mitigated, and cannot be ignored, simply because those satellites are operating

within the same system (otherwise, intra-system collision risk would never be a factor). Nor can

intra-system collision risks be ignored simply because Kuiper’s satellites are nominally

maneuverable. As Viasat has explained, maneuvering capability does not obviate the need to

carefully evaluate collision risks that may still be material given the potential for: (i) Kuiper’s

satellites to lose maneuverability, in which case they would pose significant collision risk for as

long as they remain in orbit; and (ii) significant residual risks to be generated where intra-system

conjunctions are predicted but avoidance maneuvers are not initiated.22

C. Inter-System Collision Risks

Viasat’s comments note that Kuiper’s updated orbital debris mitigation plan limits its

evaluation of inter-system collision risk to a small subset of operational space stations in other

NGSO systems even though: (i) the Commission’s rules require Kuiper to demonstrate that it has

fully “assessed and limited the probability of the space station becoming a source of debris by

20
See id. at 8-9 (citing Kuiper Authorization Order ¶ 31 n.72).
21
Kuiper Response at 7.
22
See Viasat Comments at 10-12; see also infra, Section III.D.

7
collisions with large debris or other operational space stations;”23 (ii) the Commission has

indicated that satellites in other orbits—including circular and near-circular orbits within the

altitude range for the Kuiper constellation—are a potential source of inter-system collision risk

that should be evaluated by Kuiper;24 and (iii) Kuiper has acknowledged that inter-system

collision risks extend from operations in all manner of orbits and will increase “with the addition

of more satellites” in LEO.25 Kuiper ignores this analysis completely. As such, there is no basis

upon which the Commission could conclude that Kuiper has adequately addressed the inter-

system collision risk associated with its planned NGSO operations.

D. Residual Risks

Viasat’s comments note that Kuiper’s updated orbital debris mitigation plan fails to

evaluate or account for the “residual risks” that accumulate in connection with large numbers of

predicted conjunction events that do not necessarily result in the initiation of avoidance

maneuvers (e.g., because the calculated probability of collision is small in each individual case)

but nevertheless add up to significant risk and an expected number of collisions over time.26 In

response, Kuiper asserts that the Commission’s rules do not explicitly require applicants to

address residual risks—a position that ignores Kuiper’s broader obligation (discussed above) to

comprehensively evaluate and mitigate potential collision risks so as to safeguard the public

23
47 C.F.R. § 25.114(d)(14)(iii). The Kuiper Authorization Order also broadly requires Kuiper
to provide a detailed assessment of collision risk. See Kuiper Authorization Order ¶ 32.
24
See Letter from FCC to Kuiper, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20211207-00186, at 1-2 (May 19,
2022) (“FCC Letter”).
25
Id.
26
See Viasat Comments at 10-12. Kuiper also fails to account for: (i) the risk that maneuvering
to avoid one particular collision could result in a collision with another space object; and (ii)
residual risks associated with the collision avoidance process (e.g., human error and
miscommunication).

8
interest. Kuiper also claims (incorrectly) that residual risks can simply be ignored because the

Commission has allegedly “found a zero-risk assumption for maneuverable satellites like the

Kuiper Satellites to be warranted.”27 This simply is not true; to the contrary, the Commission is

actively evaluating whether that assumption is appropriate in the case of multi-satellite

systems—including those with nominal maneuvering capabilities.28 Notably, NASA has

explained that, in light of the increase in the number and size of NGSO constellations, “the

assumption of zero risk from a system-level standpoint lacks statistical substantiation.”29

E. Uncertainty with Respect to Physical Characteristics of Kuiper Satellites

Viasat’s comments note that Kuiper has failed to provide information about the basic

physical characteristics of its planned NGSO satellites. As Viasat explained, this information is

critical to allow the Commission and other parties to: (i) fully and accurately assess the collision

risks associated with Kuiper’s planned operations; (ii) validate assertions made in Kuiper’s

updated orbital debris mitigation plan; and (iii) establish a requisite baseline to ensure that

Kuiper makes no further changes to its satellite design absent separate authorization from the

Commission (which, among other things, could undermine the effectiveness of any orbital debris

mitigation plan approved by the Commission).30 Viasat therefore urged the Commission to

require Kuiper to clarify the basic physical characteristics of its satellite design for the record.31

27
Kuiper Response at 10.
28
Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, 35 FCC Rcd 4156, at ¶ 160 (2020).
29
Comments of NASA, IBFS File No. SAT-AMD-20210818-00105, at 3 (Feb. 8, 2022).
30
Viasat Comments at 13. Notably, Kuiper has indicated that it plans to “continue to improve
on satellite design . . . over time.” See Kuiper Letter at 5.
31
Viasat Comments at 13.

9
 Kuiper asserts that it is not necessary to establish such a baseline because Kuiper would

seek a modification in the event of any “material” change in its satellite design.32 This ignores

that Kuiper’s view of what is “material” may not align with the Commission’s understanding of

that term. For obvious reasons, the Commission cannot simply trust Kuiper to appropriately

determine when additional authority is necessary—particularly in the absence of any viable

means of detecting changes in Kuiper’s satellite design.33 Moreover, Kuiper ignores that the

“baseline” information requested by Viasat is also necessary to evaluate the orbital safety risks

posed by Kuiper’s planned operations and validate Kuiper’s claims with respect to those risks.

F. Risks Due to the Evolution of LEO

As Viasat explained in its comments, Kuiper’s system was authorized as part of the

Commission’s 2020 NGSO Processing Round, in which operators have collectively proposed to

deploy tens of thousands of additional satellites into NGSO orbits. The deployment of even a

fraction of these satellites would represent an exponential increase in the total number of

satellites in LEO in particular—and create new challenges for the sustainability of satellite

operations in all orbits. As Viasat noted, Kuiper’s updated orbital debris mitigation plan fails to

acknowledge or account for this reality and the pressure that the Kuiper system and other NGSO

systems would place on the “carrying capacity” of LEO.34 Kuiper utterly ignores this analysis

and fails to consider the broader dynamics that are characterizing the evolution of LEO and the

32
Kuiper Response at 4.
33
Contrary to Kuiper’s suggestion, the requested baseline is fully compatible with, and need
not impede, the ability of NGSO system operators to refine the design of their systems over
time as technology improves. See Kuiper Response at 5. The requested baseline would
merely allow the Commission and other interested parties to hold Kuiper accountable should
it wish to innovate in ways that require Commission consent.
34
Viasat Comments at 20-22.

10
resulting risks to space safety and sustainability. Accordingly, Viasat urged the Commission to

carefully evaluate these matters before acting on Kuiper’s application.

IV. KUIPER’S RESPONSE FAILS TO ADDRESS SIGNIFICANT FLAWS IN THE

STRATEGIES IT INTENDS TO USE TO MITIGATION COLLISION RISK

Viasat’s comments establish that the mitigation strategies presented in Kuiper’s updated

orbital debris mitigation plan (onboard propulsion, screening, reliance on atmospheric reentry

after failures, and orbital separation) would be ineffective and contrary to the public interest.

Nothing in Kuiper’s Response alters that conclusion. Indeed, Kuiper largely ignores the analysis

presented in Viasat’s comments. Under these circumstances, the Commission cannot reasonably

conclude that Kuiper’s plan would effectively mitigate risks to orbital safety and sustainability.

A. Onboard Propulsion

Kuiper plans to utilize onboard propulsion to mitigate the risk of conjunctions posing a

predicted collision risk larger than 1 in 100,000. As Viasat has explained, the effectiveness of

this approach is entirely dependent on the reliability of the relevant subsystems that enable

maneuverability.35 This is precisely why the Commission asked Kuiper to quantify the reliability

of its collision avoidance systems on a component-level and system-wide basis.36 Yet Kuiper

has failed to provide this information for the record and has otherwise failed to establish that its

onboard propulsion systems would be sufficiently reliable to be part of an effective debris

mitigation plan.37 And, notably, Kuiper does not dispute Viasat’s technical analysis, which

35
Id. at 14-17.
36
See FCC Letter at 2.
37
See Kuiper Letter at 3. Not only did Kuiper fail to quantify reliability as requested by the
Commission, Kuiper also stated that “[p]ropulsion system reliability testing is ongoing and
will continue throughout the next year.” Id. This statement strongly implies that Kuiper may

11
demonstrates that there would be significant collision risks associated with non-maneuverable

Kuiper satellites.38

B. Screening

As Viasat explained in its comments, Kuiper’s plan to limit the number of on-orbit

failures through the use of a vague “screening” regime ignores the fact that various subsystem

components that are important for collision avoidance—like other satellite components—tend to

fail over time (whether as the result of manufacturing defects or parts “wearing out” over time).39

Consequently, screening is a wholly inadequate means of ensuring the reliability of collision

avoidance capabilities over the expected lifetime of a given satellite.40 Viasat also noted that the

altitude at which Kuiper intends to screen its satellites (~400 km) creates unnecessary risk given

its proximity to the International Space Station and the locations in which commercial space

destinations can be expected. Kuiper fails to offer any response to this analysis.

C. Reentry of Failed Satellites

Kuiper plans to rely on atmospheric reentry to mitigate the collision risks associated with

non-maneuverable Kuiper satellites. As Viasat explained in its comments, this mitigation

strategy is inherently flawed because those satellites would continue to pose considerable

collision risks while they remain in orbit (which Kuiper notes could be up to 9 years).41 Kuiper

responds by suggesting that its non-maneuverable satellites would not pose material risk because

not have finalized its satellite design, despite such finalization being necessary for Kuiper to
demonstrate compliance with Condition 64.
38
See Viasat Comments at 15-16.
39
Id. at 17.
40
See Letter from Viasat to FCC, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20200417-00037, at 2-3 (Apr. 12,
2021).
41
Viasat Comments at 17-18.

12
each such satellite would satisfy a per-satellite collision probability limit of 0.001 as calculated

using DAS.42 This argument ignores the aggregate risks associated with Kuiper’s planned

NGSO system “as a whole,” which would be well over the 0.001 threshold. It also ignores the

fact that fragments caused by collisions involving Kuiper satellites would stay in orbit for much

longer than 9 years and potentially have decades-long, or even centuries-long, consequences

across a large swath of LEO altitudes. Kuiper’s updated orbital debris mitigation plan includes

no strategy for mitigating these risks, and nothing in Kuiper’s Response changes that fact.

D. Orbital Separation

Kuiper’s plans for mitigating inter-system collision risk depend on the Commission

mandating and maintaining orbital separation between Kuiper and other “large” NGSO

systems.43 More specifically, Kuiper is effectively suggesting that it should be given exclusive

rights to use the region of LEO between 580 km to 640 km in altitude. Considering the presence

of SpaceX’s system in the 510 km to 580 km altitude range, this approach would sharply limit

the ability of other operators authorized by the Commission to safely and reliably access physical

space from 510 km to 640 km on a shared basis, regardless of frequency band. As Viasat

explained in its comments, this approach would: (i) foreclose other NGSO operators from

accessing shared spectrum and orbital resources on an equitable basis, undermining competition

and innovation; while (ii) still failing to mitigate the significant collision risks associated with

42
Kuiper Response at 11.
43
See Kuiper Letter at 3 (noting that “conjunction risk grows with the addition of more
satellites, and is unnecessarily exacerbated when large constellations overlap” and asserting
that a “safe space operating environment requires large constellations to avoid overlap to the
extent possible”).

13
Kuiper’s system.44 Among other things, this approach would incent operators to deploy

unnecessarily large systems—with unnecessarily large orbital tolerances—by rewarding them

with exclusive rights to orbits that they are able to “occupy.” This would greatly exacerbate the

collision and other space safety risks that Kuiper claims it is attempting to mitigate. Kuiper fails

to provide any meaningful response to this analysis.45

V. CONCLUSION

The Kuiper system is one of the largest NGSO systems provisionally authorized by the

Commission to date, and consequently has the potential to greatly exacerbate risks to space

safety and sustainability. Kuiper again fails to fully evaluate those risks or offer an effective

plan for mitigating them. As such, the Commission should hold Kuiper’s application in

abeyance until such time as Kuiper has addressed these matters fully.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Jarrett S. Taubman
VP & Deputy Chief Government Affairs and
Regulatory Officer

VIASAT, INC.
901 K Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20001
July 22, 2022

44
Viasat Comments at 18-20.
45
Kuiper does attempt to respond (in a footnote) to Viasat’s related point that orbital separation
would do nothing to address the risks posed by NGSO constellations licensed by foreign
administrations. See Kuiper Response at 20 n.77; see also Viasat Comments at 20. Kuiper
suggests that orbital separation is not intended to be a complete solution and is, essentially,
better than nothing. Kuiper ignores that there are other, more effective ways to mitigate
risk—e.g., by requiring Kuiper to deploy a safer, more efficient system in the first instance.

14
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Brad Bourne, hereby certify that on this 22nd day of July, 2022, I caused to be served a

true copy of the foregoing Comments via first-class mail upon the following:

Carrie Gage John L. Flynn

Julie Zoller Camillie Landrón
Kuiper Systems LLC Jenner & Block LLP
an Amazon subsidiary 1099 New York Avenue, NW
410 Terry Avenue N. Suite 900
Seattle, WA 98109 Washington, DC 20001
Counsel for Kuiper Systems LLC

David Goldman William M. Wiltshire

Space Exploration Technologies Corp. Paul Caritj
1155 F Street, NW Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis, LLP
Suite 475 1919 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004 Suite 800
Washington, DC 20036
Counsel to SpaceX

Nickolas G. Spina Josephine Arnold

Kepler Communications Inc. National Telecommunications and
196 Spadina Avenue, Suite 400 Information Administration
Toronto M5T 2C2 Herbert C. Hoover Building
Canada 1401 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20230

Jonathan Williams Samantha Johnson

Ashley VanderLey National Aeronautics and Space
National Science Foundation Administration
2415 Eisenhower Avenue 300 E Street, SW
Alexandria, VA 22314 Washington, DC 20546

/s/
Brad Bourne