JD306: PUBLIC I NTERNATIONAL LAW

Saturday 6:00 PM to 9:00 PM

1 s t Semester SY 202 2 - 2023

Cover age:
II. Sources of International Law Case Digests

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 TA B L E O F CO N TE NT S
M AR Y G R A C E N ATI V I DA D S . PO E - L L AM A N ZA R E S v . CO M E L EC ............................. 1

TH E P AQ U ET E H A B A NA ........................................................................................... 2

MI LI T AR Y A ND P AR A MI LI T AR Y A CT I VIT I E S IN AN D A G A IN S T NI C AR A G U A ........... 3

IS A B E LI T A C. V IN U Y A v . E X E CU TI V E S E CR ET A R Y A L BE RTO G . RO M U LO ............ 4

INT E R PR ET AT IO N O F P E A C E T R E AT IE S C A S E ...................................................... 5

L EO VI L LO C. AG U ST I N v . RO M E O F . E DU ............................................................... 6

IN R E E S TA T E O F M A RCO S H UM A N RIG HT S L ITIG A TIO N ................................ ...... 7

TH E CHO RZO W F AC T O R Y C AS E (G E RM A N Y V S . PO L AN D) ................................ .... 8

TE M P LE O F PR E A H V IH E AR C A S E (C A M BO DI A V S . T H AI L A ND) ............................. 9

CO RF U CH A NN E L C A S E ........................................................................................ 10

B AR C EL O N A TR A CT I O N, L IG HT A ND PO W ER C O M P A N Y C AS E ........................... 11
SO UTH - W E S T AF RI C A C A S E S ( ET HI O P I A V S. SO U TH AFR IC A ; LI B E RI A V S .
SO UTH AF RI CA ) ................................ ................................................................ ..... 12

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 1 -

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE- LLAMANZARES v. COM ELEC

GR No. 221697, 08 March 2016

FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe - Llamanzar es (Petit ioner) was found
abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo and was
later on adopted by celebrity spouses Fenando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roce s
through a petit ion for adoption . Years later, she married Teodoro Misael Daniel
V. Llamanzares who was a dual cit izen of the Philippines and the US. Petit ioner
then opted to be wit h her husband in the US a nd where she later became a
naturalized Amer ican citizen.
During the May 2004 elect ions, she came back to the Philippines to
support her father’s candidacy for President. After the elections, she went back
to the US but returned upon learning of her fathe r’s deter ior ating medical
condition who later on passed. To be wit h her grieving mother, the Petit ioner
along with her family decided to move and reside permanent ly in the
Philippines.
The Petit ioner was able to re -acquire her Philippine cit izenship along with
her children after renouncing their American cit izenship. Petit ioner then ran and
was elected as Senator of the Philippine Senat e dur ing the M ay 2013 Elect ions .
Poe-Llamanzares then filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections trigger ing t he filing of several COMELEC cases against her candidacy
on the ground particular ly, among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents
or either of them wer e Filipinos. The C O MELEC En Banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she was lacking the cit izenship and residence
requirements and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

ISSUE:
Whether Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe -Llamanzares is a natur al-born
Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe - Llamanzar es may be considered a natural -
born Filipino.
In previously decided cases by the Supr eme Court, it had said, to wit:
Generally accept ed principles of inter nat ional law, by virtue of the incor porat ion
clause of the Const it ution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligat ions. Generally accepted principles of international
law include international custom as evidence of a general pr actice accepte d as
law, and general pr inciples of law recognized by civilized nations.
The pet itioner being found abandoned in Jaro, Iloilo and lat er on legally
adopted by spouses Poe, therefor e proves that foundlings ar e citizens under
international law as t his is sup ported by some treaties, adher ing to the
customary rule to pr esume foundlings as having bor n of the country in which
the foundling is found.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 2 -
THE PAQUETE HABANA
175 US 677, 08 January 1900

FACTS:
The United States im posed a blockade of Cuba and declared war against
Spain.
Two fishing smacks, The Paquete Habana, a sloop with a crew of 3 men, and
the other, The Lola, a schooner with a cr ew of 6 men, were regularly engaged
in fishing on the coast of Cuba, sailing under the Spanish f lag, and each owned
by a Spanish subject , residing in Havana; her crew, who also r esided ther e, had
no int erest in the vessel, but were entit led to shares, amounting in all to two
thirds, of her catch, the other third belon ging to her owner, and her cargo
consisted of fresh f ish, caught by her crew from the sea, put on boar d as they
were caught, and kept and sold alive. Each vessel left Havana on a coast
fishing voyage, and sailed along the coast of Cuba about two hundred mi les to
the west end of the island .
While they were out to sea, fishing along the coast of Cuba and near
Yucatan, the two Spanish vessels engaged in f ishing off the coast of Cuba were
captured by blockading squadrons of the United Stat es. Unt il t he time they were
stopped by the blockading squadron, the fishing vessels had no knowledge of
the existence of the war, or of any blockade. They had no arms or ammunit ion
on boar d, and made no attempt to run the blockade after they knew of its
existence, nor any r esi stance at the t ime of the capture.
When both vessels r eturned with their catches of fresh fish, they wer e
seized and a libel of condemnation of each vessel as a prize of war was filed
against the vessel in court. The district court entered a f inal decree o f
condemnation and public sale at auct ion. Claimants (owners and crew)
appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether the Distr ict Court has jur isdict ion to issue the decree of
condemnation and auction the fishing vessels

HELD:
The Flor ida District Court had no jurisdiction to issue the decree of
condemnation and to auction the fishing vessels.
The US Supreme Court ruled that under t he law of nat ions, in each case
the capture was both unlawful and without probable cause. It has been a rule of
international law that coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching
and br inging in fresh fish, were exempt, with their car goes and crews from
capture as prize of war. The Paquete Havana and The Lola were fishing vessels
with no ammunition on boar d and had m ade no attempt to escape the blocking
squadr ons, except ions must be mentioned and applied as universal custom.
Fishing vessels which belong to the adjacent coast, and whose business yields
only a necessary livelihood, are, f rom considerat ions of humanity, universally
excluded from captur e. Therefore, a lthough not reduced to treaty or statutory
law, courts wer e obligated to take notice of and give effect to th e exception.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 3 -
MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA
NICARAG UA v. UNITED STATES OF AM ERICA
Judgement of 27 June 1986

FACTS:
Nicaragua brought a suit to the International Court of Just ice (ICJ)
against the United States on the ground t hat the United States was responsible
for illegal military and paramilitary act ivities in and against Nicaragua.
The act ion was based on the alle gat ion that the United States had
supported by its policy and act ions a mer cenary army, the Contras, in launching
attacks on the terr itory of Nicar agua, wit h the purpose of overt hrowing the
Government of Nicar agua. By funding and assisting, covert ly and ov ertly, the
"Contra" movement, the United States was using, accor ding to Nicaragua,
armed force against the latter in violation of the international obligations of the
United Stat es under general international law as well as under the Unit ed
Nations Charter , the Organization of American States Charter and the bilateral
United Stat es-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship and Commerce.
It was also averred by Nicaragua that the United Stat es was violat ing the
prohibition of the use of force in international relations and the parallel rule on
prohibition of int ervention.
Having lost the in the jurisdict ion and admissibility phase of t he suit, the
US continued to cont est the jurisdict ion of the ICJ and decided not to appear
and part icipate in the proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether the Unit ed States was in violation of its customary international
law obligat ion not to intervene in the affairs of another Stat e

HELD:
Supporting and aiding the Contras by financing, arming and tr aining the
United Stat es violated the principles of customary int ernat ional law.
The ICJ appreciat ed the case with the question of the lawfulness of the
use of force and the alleged justif icat ion of the US’ act ion under the right of
self-def ense and appraised the facts as prove n by the available evidence to
commit violat ions of the principle of non - use of force, unless justified by
circumstances which exclude their unlawf ulness. The l aying of mines in the
internal waters and t erritorial sea of Nicaragua, the attacks on Nicaraguan
ports, oil installations and naval bases directly imputable to t he United States ,
as well as the arming and training of the Contras were judged by the Court t o
be a prima facie violation of the prohibition of the use of force, unless these
actions could be just ified as an exercise of the right of self -defense.
Therefore, the United States not only violated the customary international
law obligat ion not to inte rvene in the affairs of another Stat e but also the
treaties it signed with Nicaragua.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 4 -
ISABELITA C. VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO
GR No. 162230, 28 April 2010

FACTS:
Petit ioners are all members of the Malaya Lolas , a non-stock, non-prof it
organizat ion register ed with the Secur ities and Exchange Commission,
established for the purpose of pr oviding aid to the vict ims of rape by Japanese
military forces in the Philippines dur ing t he Second Wor ld War.
The pet itioners averr ed that sin ce 1998, t hey have appr oached the
Execut ive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance
in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and milit ary officers who ordered
the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippi nes. However,
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the posit ion that the individual claim s of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan's com pliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

ISSUE:
Whether the Execut ive Department erred in not advocat ing petitioners’
claims for official apology and other form s of reparations against Japan.

HELD:
The Supreme Court found the petit ion without merit and the Execut ive
Department did not err in its inact ion towards the prayers of the Malaya Lolas.
It is well-settled in Philippine jur isprudence that in the int ernational
sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim
within the int ern at ional legal system has been when the individual is able to
persuade a governm ent to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up
the case of one of it s subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in r eality asserting its
own r ight to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes
obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have no t shown that the
crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the
time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute per petrators
of international crim es is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of
jus cogens. Therefor e, the term “jus cogens” which lit erally m eans “compelling
law” refers to norms that command per emptory author ity, superseding
conflict ing treat ies and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered perempt ory in
the sense that they are manda tory, do not admit derogat ion, and can be
modif ied only by general international nor ms of equivalent aut hority .

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 5 -
INTERPRETATION OF PEACE TREATIES CASE
(Second Phase, Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports, 1950, 221

FACTS:
This case concer ns the procedure adopted in regard to the settlement of
disputes between the States signatories of the Peace Treat ies of 1947 between
Bulgar ia, Hungary and Romania and the Allied States.
There were two advisories issued. The first advisory dated March 30th,
1950, the Court answered the first two questions by saying t hat diplomatic
exchanges disclosed the exist ence of disputes subject to the Treaty provisions
for the settlement of disputes and that the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania were under obligat ion to appoint their representatives to the
Treaty Comm issions.
A second Advisory Opinion dated 18 July 1950 answers the third and
fourth quest ions . The quest ion at issue is whether the provision empower ing the
Secretary-General to appoint the third member of the Commission applies to
the present case, in which one of the par ties refuses to appoint its own
represent ative to the Commission. T he ICJ replied that this m ethod could not be
adopted since it would result in creat ing a commission of two members,
whereas the Treaty provided for a commission of three members, reaching its
decision by a major it y.

ISSUE:
Whether the Secretary -General of the UN could appoint the member to
the Treaty Commission which had not been appointed due to the refusal by the
party to that Treaty.

HELD:
The Secretary-General's power to appoint a third member cam e solely
from the agreement of the parties, as stated in the disputes clause of the
treaties, however, it cannot do so.
Nevertheless, such a refusal could not alt er the condit ions contemplated
in the Tr eaties for the exercise of the Secretary -General's power of
appointment. These conditions were not present in this case and their lack was
not supplied by the: fact that their absence was due to the br each of a Treaty
obligation. The failur e of machinery for settling disputes by r eason of the
practical impossibility of creating the Commission provided f or in the “trea t ies
was one thing; international responsibility another”. One could not remedy the
breach of a Tr eaty obligat ion by creat ing a Commission which was not the kind
of Commission int ended by the Treat ies. It was the Court's duty to interpret
treaties and not to r evise them.
Therefore, the legal principle of ut res magis valeat quam per eat , as
applied by the ICJ and often used as basis for rule of effectiveness, cannot
justify the ICJ in attr ibut ing to the provisions for the settlement of disputes in
the Peace Treat ies , would be contrary to their letter and spir it.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 6 -
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN v. ROMEO F. EDU
GR No. L-49112, 02 Februar y 1979

FACTS:
Leovillo Agustin who is the is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car,
Model 13035, alr eady proper ly equipped when it came out from the assembly
lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early
warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of In structions
No. 229, as amended, as well as the implement ing rules and regulations in
Administrat ive Order No. 1 issued by the Land Tr ansportation Commission.
Agust in also assailed the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229
which requir es an early wa r ning device to be carried by users of motor vehicles
as a violation of the constit utional guarantee of due process and disobeys the
fundament al pr inciple of non -delegat ion of legislat ive power.
On the other hand, Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transpor tation
Commissioner set forth the implement ing rules and regulations of the said
instruct ion.
Letter of Instructions No. 229 was signed by President Marcos on
December 2, 1974, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways,
including expr essways or lim ited access roads caused by the presence of
disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles without appropr iat e early warning
devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety.
The Philipp ines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convent ion on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nat ions Organizations and the said Vienna
Convention was ratif ied by the Philippine Government under PD 207.

ISSUE:
Whether Letter of Instructions No. 229 was a val id imposit ion of police
power

HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed that Letter of Instructions No. 229, as
amended as well as the implement ing rules and regulations were valid and
constit utional as a valid measure of imposition of police power.
It is well-settled that police power is a st ate au thor ity to enact legislation
that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. For the case at bar, the particular exercise of police power was clear ly
intended to pr omote public safety. The Vienna Convent ion on Road signs and
signals and the Unit ed Nat ions Organization was ratif ied by t he Philippine local
legislat ion for the installat ion of road saf ety signs and devices translat ing in the
State adopting the internationally accepted rule defined by the said convention.
Therefore, the Declaration of Principle found in the Const itution
possesses relevance, between the International law and municipal law in
applying the rule municipal law prevails and stands.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 7 -
IN RE ESTATE OF MARCOS HUMAN RI GHTS LITIGATION
910 F. SUPP. 1460 (D. HAW. 1995) 30 November 1995

FACTS:
Vict ims of torture, summary execution and disappearance filed suits for
damages, in the for m of a class act ion as well as individual direct act ions,
against the Estate of the former President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E.
Marcos for human rights violations of which were alleged to have occurred
during the period in which Marcos, as Pr esident of the Philippines, declared
martial law, from September 21, 1972 to Februar y 25, 1986.
In 1986 Marcos fled the Philippines and arrived in the State of Hawaii.
Marcos was a resident of Hawaii at the time he was served with the complaints
that are the subject of this case but died during the pendency of these actions.
Pragmat ically, the jury could not hear testim ony of nearly 10, 000
plaint iffs in this action within any practicable and reasonable time, to do justice
to the class member s. The individual plaintiffs who opted out of the certif ied
class action each pr esented his or her individual claim for compensatory
damages to the jury in a separate part of the Trial.

ISSUE:
Whether the use of random sample of plaint iffs, violates Marcos’ due
process r ights.

HELD:
The use of an aggregate procedure for t he case at bar, random sampling,
for determining compensat ory damages, under the procedures followed in this
lit igation, was neit her a violat ion of the parties' due process r ights nor their
right to a jury trial under the Sevent h Am endment.
It is a gener ally accepted principle of public int ernat ional law that in the
interest of just ice, due process must be uphold and that all of the nations of the
world, including the United Stat es and the Philippines, are in agreeme nt that
human rights victims should have enforceable rights to fair and adequate
compensation. Marcos was given its day in court with the jury, though
unconvent ional, ut ilizing presentation of evidence by use of random sampling in
an aggr egate damage trial .
Therefore, with the belief of the Distr ict Court of Hawaii, individual
testimony from each of the plaintiffs, i.e., testimony of all 9,541 plaintiffs, could
well have been repet itive, random sampling and the aggr egat ion of
compensatory damage claims vin dicates important federal and international
policies, permits just ice to be done without unduly clogging the court system,
and was shown to be fair to Marcos.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 8 -
THE CHORZOW FACTORY CASE (GERMANY VS. POLAND)
PCIJ, SER. A, NO. 9, 1927

FACTS:
On March 5th, 1915, a contract was concluded bet ween the Chancellor of
the German Empir e, on behalf of the Reich, and the Bayer ische Stickstoffwerke
A.-G. of Trostberg, Upper Bavar ia, by which contract this Company undertook
"to establish for the Reich and to begin forthwith the construction of", amongst
other things, a nitrat e factory at Chor zow in Upper Silesia. The necessary lands
were to be acquired on behalf of the Reich and entered in its name in the land
register.
The machinery and equipment wer e to be in acc ordance with t he patents
and licenses of the Company and the experience gained by it , and the Company
undertook to manage the factory unt il M arch 31st, 1941, making use of all
patents, licenses, experience gained, innovations and impr ovements, as also of
all supply and delivery contracts of which it had the benef it.
In pursuance of the same it was decided that another company would be
created which was to a certain extent be subject to the supervision of the Reich
which would have the right to the surplus profit that arose each financial year.
The Reich had the power to terminate the contract for the management of the
factory by Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A. - G by serving a fifteen months’ notice if
it the Reich’s surplus did not reach a f ix level.
The Government of the German Reich, has subm itted to the Permanent
Court of Internat ional Just ice a suit concerning the reparation which, in the
content ion of the Government of the Reich, is due by the Polish Government for
the damage suffered by the Oberschlesisch e St ickstoffwerke and the
Bayer ische St ickstof fwerke in consequence of the attitude adopted by that
Government towards those Companies in taking possession of the nitrate
factory situated at Chorzow .
Upon receipt of the German Government ’s Case in the suit, the Polish
Government raised a preliminary object ion denying the Court’s jurisdiction to
hear the suit brought before it and subm it ting that the Court should, "without
entering into the mer its, declare that it had no jurisdiction".

ISSUE:
Whether a nat ion is r esponsible for acts of Government organs or
officers.

HELD:
It is a gener al conception of inter national law that every violat ion of an
engagement bet ween two independent st ates ensue an obligation to make
reparat ion. The principle that ther e is an internationally wrongf ul act of a state
when conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the state
under international law and const itutes a breach of an inter national obligat ion
of the state has been affirmed in this case. Therefor e, it is international law that
determines what constitutes an inter nationally unlawful act, irr espect ive of any
provisions of international law, irrespective of any provisions of municipal law.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 9 -
TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR CASE (CA MBODIA VS. THAILAND)
ICJ REPORTS, 15 JUNE 1962

FACTS:
Cambodia complained that Thailand had occupied a piece of its territory
surrounding the ruins of the Temple of Preah Vihear, a place of pilgr image and
worship for Cambodians, and asked the Court to declar e that territorial
sovereignty over the Temple belon ged to it and that Thailand was under an
obligation to withdraw the armed detachment stationed there since 1954.
Thailand f iled preliminary object ions to t he Court’s jur isdiction, which
were rejected in a Judgment given on May 26, 1961. In its Judgment on the
merits, the Court noted that a Franco -Siamese Treaty of 1904 provided that, in
the area under consideration, the front ier was to follow the watershed line, and
that a map based on the work of a Mixed Delim itation Commission showed the
Temple on the Ca mbodian side of the boundary.
Thailand asserted various ar guments aim ed at showing that the map had
no binding charact er. One of its content ions was that the map had never been
accepted by Thailand or, alternatively, that if Thailand had accepted it, it h ad
done so only because of a mistaken belief that the frontier indicated
corresponded to the watershed line.
The Court found that Thailand had indeed accepted the map and
concluded that the Temple was situated on Cambodian terr itory. It also held
that Tha iland was under an obligat ion to withdraw any militar y or police force
stationed there and t o restore to Cambodia any objects removed from the ruins
since 1954.

ISSUE:
Whether the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated on terr itory under the
sovereignty of Cambodia

HELD:
According to the legal pr inciple, Qui tacet consent ire videtur si loqui
debuisset ac potuisset (He who keeps silent is held to consent if he must and
can speak), the ICJ r uled that Thailand was bound by the delimitation of t he
frontier as f ixed in the “Annex I map” because it had kept silent although it
knew very well that this map was not consistent with Articles 1 and 3 of the
1904 boundary treat y, and also had the opportunity to disagr ee and object to it.
It is a principle of int ernational law that a State is held to be bound to the
expectat ions it arouses by its own behavior and on which other States can,
according to the principle of bona f ide, rely (so -called “estoppel”). Ther efore,
the Temple of Preah Vihear is under t he sovereignty of Cambodia.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 10 -
CORFU CHA NNEL CASE
ICJ REPORTS, 09 APRIL 1949

FACTS:
This dispute gave r ise to three Judgment s by the Court. It arose out of
the explosions of mines by which some Brit ish warships suffered damage while
passing through the Corfu Channel in 1946, in a part of the Albanian waters
which had been previously swept. The ships were severely damaged and
members of the crew were killed.
The United Kingdom seized the Court of the dispute by an Applicat ion
filed on May 22, 1947 and accused Albania of having laid or allowed a third
State to lay the mines after mine -clear ing operations had been carried out by
the Allied naval authorities. The case had previously been br ought before the
United Nations and, in consequence of a r ecommendat ion by the Security
Council, had been referred to the Court.
In a first Judgment, rendered on March 25, 1948, the Court dealt with the
quest ion of its jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Applicat ion, which
Albania had raised. The Court fo und, int er alia, that a comm unication dat ed
July 2, 1947, addressed to it by the Government of Albania, constitut ed a
voluntary acceptance of its jurisdict ion. It recalled on that occasion that the
consent of the parties to the exercise of its jurisdiction was not subject to any
particular condit ions of form and stated that, at that juncture, it could not hold
to be irregular a proceeding not precluded by any pr ovision in those texts.
A second Judgment, rendered on 9 April 1949, related to the merits of the
dispute.

ISSUE:
Whether Albania should be held accountable for the explosions

HELD:
The Court found that Albania was responsible under international law for
the explosions that had taken place in Albanian waters and for the damage and
loss of lif e which had ensued. It did not accept the view that Albania had itself
laid the mines or the purported connivance of Albania with a mine - laying
operat ion carried out by the Yugoslav Navy at the request of Albania. It held
that the mines could not have been laid without the knowledge of the Albanian
Government and indicated in part icular that the exclusive cont rol exer cised by a
State within its front iers might make it im possible to furnish direct proof of facts
incurring its internat ional responsibility.
The State which is t he vict im must be allowed a more liber al recourse to
inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence; such indirect evidence must be
regarded as of especial weight when based on a ser ies of facts, linked together
and leading logically to a s ingle conclusion. Albania, had submitted a counter -
claim against the United Kingdom , accusing the latter of having violated
Albanian sovereignty by sending warships into Albanian terr itorial waters and of
carrying out minesweeping operat ions in Albanian wa ters aft er the explosions.
The Court did not accept the first of these complaints but found that the United
Kingdom had exercised the right of innocent passage through internat ional
straits. It found that the minesweeping had violated Albanian sovereignty,
because it had been carried out against the will of the Albanian Government.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 11 -
BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY CASE
ICJ REPORTS, 1970

FACTS:
The Barcelona Tract ion, Light and Power Company, Lim ited, was
incorporated in 1911 in Toronto , Canada where it has its head office. For the
purpose of creat ing and developing an electric power product ion and
distr ibut ion system in Catalonia , Spain it formed a number of subsidiary
companies, of which some had their registered offices in Canada and th e others
in Spain. In 1936 the subsidiary companies supplied the major part of
Catalonia's electricit y requir ements.
Belgium had ceased pursuing the aforem entioned case on account of
efforts to negot iate a friendly sett lement. The negot iations broke down,
however, and Belgium filed a new Application on June 19 , 1962.
The following March, Spain filed four preliminary object ions to the Court ’s
jurisdiction, and on 24 July 1964 the Court delivered a Judgment dism issing the
first two but joining t he others to the mer its. After the filing, within the t ime -
lim its requested by the Part ies, of the pleadings on the mer its and on the
objections joined thereto, hearings were held from April 15 t o July 22, 1969.
Belgium sought com pensat ion for the damage claimed to have been
caused to its nat ionals, shareholders in t he Barcelona Tr action, Light and
Power Company, Ltd., as the result of act s contrary to internat ional law said to
have been comm itted by organs of the Spanish St ate. Spain, on the other hand,
submitted t hat the Belgian claim should be declared inadm issible or unfounded.

ISSUE:
Whether Belgium has the legal standing to protect stakeholders of a
Canadian company

HELD:
In a Judgment delivered on February 5 , 1970, the Court found that
Belgium had no legal standing to exercise diplomat ic protect ion of shareholders
in a Canadian company in respect of measures taken against that company in
Spain.
The Court took cognizance of the great amount of documentary and other
evidence subm itted by the Part ies and fully appr eciated the importance of the
legal pr oblems raised by the allegat ion which was at the root of the Belgian
claim and which concerned denials of justice allegedly committed by organs of
the Spanish State. However, the possession by the Belgian Go vernment of a
right of protection was a prerequisite for the examinat ion of such problems.
Since no jus st andi before the Court had been established, it was not for the
Court to pronounce upon any other aspect of the case.
It also point ed out that the adopt ion of the theory of diplomat ic protection
of shareholders as such would open the door to compet ing claims on the part of
different States, which could create an atmosphere of insecur ity in inter national
econom ic relat ions. Accordingly, and in so far as the company’s nat ional State ,
Canada, was able to act, the Court was not of the opinion that jus standi was
conferred on the Belgian Government by considerat ions of equity. The refore,
the Court accordingly rejected Belgium ’s claim.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL

 JD 3 0 6: P UB LI C INT E R NA TIO NA L LA W
- 12 -
SOUTH-WEST AFRI CA CASES ( ETHIOPIA VS. SOUTH AFRICA;
LIBERIA VS. SOUTH AFRICA)
SECO ND PHASE, 18 JULY 1966

FACTS:
The Applicants (Ethiopia and Liberia ), acting in the capacity of States
and as former States Members of the League of Nations, instit uted separate
proceedings against South Africa in a case concer ning the continued existence
of the League of Nations Mandate for South West Africa and the duties and
performance of Sout h Africa as m andator y Power.
The Court was requested to make declar ations to the effect that South
West Africa remained a territory under a Mandate, that South Africa had been in
breach of its obligat ions under that Mandate, and that the Mandate and hence
the mandator y authority were subject to t he supervision of the United Nat ions.
On May 20, 1961, the Court made an Order finding Ethiopia and Liber ia
to be in the same int erest and joining the proceedings each had instituted.
South Africa f iled four preliminary object ions to the Court’s jurisdiction.
After pleadings on the merits had been filed within the time - limits fixed at
the request of the Parties, the Court held public sitt ings from 15 March to 29
November 1965 in order to hear oral arguments and test imony, and j udgment in
the second phase was given on 18 July 1966.
The Court found that Ethiopia and Liber ia could not be considered to
have est ablished any legal r ight or interest appertaining to them in the subject -
matter of their claim s, and accordingly decided to reject those claims.

ISSUE:
Whether Ethiopia and Liberia have the legal r ight or interest t o assert
their respective contentions

HELD:
The Court recalled t hat the mandat es system was institut ed by Article 22
of the Covenant of t he League of Nations. There were three categor ies of
mandates, 'A', 'B' and 'C' mandates, which had, however, various features in
common as regar ds their structur e. The principal element of each instrument of
mandate consisted of the articles def ining the mandatory' s p owers and its
obligations in respect of the inhabit ants of the territory and towards the League
and its organs. The Court referred to these as the "conduct" provisions. In
addition, each instrument of mandate contained articles conferring certain
rights re lat ive to the mandated terr itory directly upon the mem bers of the
League as individual States, or in favor of their nat ionals. The Court referred to
rights of this kind as "special inter ests", embodied in the "special interests"
provisions of the mandates.
In addition, every m andate contained a jurisdict ional clause, which, with
a single exception, was in ident ical terms, providing for a ref erence of disputes
to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which, the Court had found in
the first phase of the proceedings, was now, by virtue of Art icle 37 of the
Court's Statute, to be construed as a ref erence to the present Court.
Therefore, the Court decided to reject the claims of the Empire of
Ethiopia and the Republic of Liberia and declared that the App licants have no
legal r ight or interest to assert their respective content ions and/or claims.

© 2020, TOMAS CLAUDIO COLLEGES, COLLEGE OF LAW; TAGHANGIN MORONG, RIZAL