VOL.

17, JUNE 30, 1966 559

De la Cruz vs. Capital Ins. & Surety Co., Inc.

No. L-21574. June 30, 1966.

SIMON DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff and appellee, vs. THE

CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY Co., lNC., defendant
and appellant.

Insurance; Meaning of “accident” and “accidental".—The

terms “accident” and “accidental”, as used in insurance contracts,
have not acquired any technical meaning. They are construed by
the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the
terms have been taken to mean that which happens by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is
unexpected, unusual and unforeseen. An accident is an event that
takes place without one’s foresight or expectation—an event that
proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a
known cause and, therefore, not expected. (29A Am. Jur., pp. 308–
309.)
Same; Tendency to eliminate distinction between the terms
“accidental” and “accidental means."—The tendency of court
decisions in the United States in recent years is to eliminate the
fine distinction between the terms “accidental” and “accidental
means” and to consider them as legally synonymous. (Travelers’
Protective Association vs. Stephens, 185 Ark. 660. 49 S.W. [3d]
364; Equitable Life Assurance Company vs. Hemenover, 100 Colo.
231, 67 P. [2d] 80, 110 ALR 1270).
Same; Rule as to death or injury resulting from accident or
accidental means.—The generally accepted rule is that death or
injury does not result from accident or accidental means within
the terms of an accident-policy if it is the natural result of the
insured’s voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen
except the death or injury. (Landress vs. Phoenix Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 291, 78 L. ed. 934, 54 S. Ct 461, 90 ALR
1382; Davis vs. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co:, 73 F. [2d] 330, 96
ALR 599.) There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed
unless some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen
happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of
injury or death. (Evans vs, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 26
Wash. [2d] 594, 174 P. [2d] 1961.) In other words, where the death
or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured’s
voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of
the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within
the protection of policies insuring against death or injury from
accident.
Same; Application of the rule.—Where the participation. of
the insured in the boxing contest was voluntary, but the injury
was sustained when he slid, giving occasion to the infliction

560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De la Cruz vs. Capital Ins. & Surety Co., Inc.

by his opponent of the blow that threw him to the ropes of the
ring and without this unfortunate incident, perhaps he could not
have received that blow in the head and would not have died, and
his death may be regarded as accidental, although boxing is
attended with some risks of external injuries.
Same; Liability for risks not enumerated in the contract.—The
failure of the defendant insurance company to include death
resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the
prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to
limit or exempt itself from liability for such death. (Brams vs.
New York Life Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 11, 148 Atl. 855; Jolley vs.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 95 Wash. 683, 294 Pac. 585.)

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of

Pangasinan. Bacani, /.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

          Achacoso, Nera and Ocampo for defendant and
appellant.
     Agustin M. Gramata for plaintiff and appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal by the Capital Insurance & Surety

Company, Inc., from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan (in Civ. Case No. U-265), ordering
it to indemnify therein plaintiff Simon de la Cruz for the
death of the latter’s son, to pay the burial expenses, and
attorney’s fees.
Eduardo de la Cruz, employed as a mucker in the
Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. in Baguio, was the holder of an
accident insurance policy (No. ITO-BFE-170)
underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co.,
Inc., for the period beginning November 13, 1956 to
November 12, 1957. On January 1, 1957, in connection
with the celebration of the New Year, the Itogon-Suyoc
Mines, Inc. sponsored a boxing contest f or general
entertainment wherein the insured Eduardo de la Cruz, a
non-professional boxer, participated. In the course of his
bout with another person, likewise a non-professional, of
the same height, weight, and size, Eduardo slipped and
was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the
head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the
rope of the ring. He was brought to the Baguio General
Hospital unconscious, where the insured expired on the
following day. The cause of death was reported as
hemorrhage, intracranial, left.
561

VOL. 17, JUNE 30, 1966 561

De la Cruz vs. Capital Ins. & Surety Co., Inc.

Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and who was

named beneficiary under the policy, thereupon filed a
claim with the insurance company for payment of the
indemnity under the insurance policy. As the claim was
denied, De la Cruz instituted the action in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan for specif ic performance.
Defendant insurer set up the defense that the death of the
insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest,
was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by
insurance. After due hearing, the court rendered the
decision in favor of the plaintiff which is the subject of the
present appeal. It is not disputed that during the ring fight
with another non-professional boxer, Eduardo slipped,
which was unintentional. At this opportunity, his opponent
landed on Eduardo’s head a blow, which sent the latter to
the ropes. That must have caused the cranial injury that
led to his death. Eduardo was insured “against death or
disability caused by accidental means”. Appellant insurer
now contends that while the death of the insured was due
to head-injury, said injury -was sustained because of his
voluntary participation in the contest. It is claimed that
the participation in the boxing contest was the “means”
that produced the injury which, in turn, caused the death
of the insured. And, since his -inclusion in the boxing card
was voluntary on the part of the insured, he cannot be
considered to have met his death by “accidental means”.
 The terms “accident” and “accidental”, as used in
insurance contracts, have not acquired any technical
meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary
and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken
to mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously,
without. intention and design, and which is unexpected,
unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that
takes place without one’s foresight or expectation—an
event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an
unusual 1effect of a known cause and, therefore, not
expected.
Appellant, however, would like to make a distinction
between “accident or accidental” and “accidental means”,
which is the term used in the insurance policy involved
here. It is’ argued that to be considered within the pro-

________________

1 29A Am. Jur. pp. 308–309, and cases cited therein.

562

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De la Cruz vs. Capital Ins. & Surety Co., Inc.

tection of the policy, what is required to be accidental is

the means that caused or brought the death and not the
death itself. It may be mentioned in this connection, that
the tendency of court decisions in the United States in
recent years is to eliminate the fine distinction between
the terms “accidental” and “accidental 2
means” and to
consider them as legally synonymous. But, even if we take
appellant’s theory, the death of the insured in the case at
bar would still be entitled to indemnification under the
policy. The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury
does not result from accident or accidental means within
the terms of an accident-policy if it is the natural result of
the insured’s voluntary act, unaccompanied
3
by anything
unforeseen except the death or injury. There is no accident
when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional,
unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs
which 4 produces or brings about the result of injury or
death. In other words, where the death or injury is not the
natural or probable result of the insured’s voluntary act, or
if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act
which produces the injury, the resulting death is within
the protection of policies insuring against death or injury
from accident.
 In the present case, while the participation of the
insured in the boxing contest is voluntary, the injury was
sustained when he slid, giving occasion to the infliction by
his opponent of the blow that threw him to the ropes of
the ring. Without this unfortunate incident, that is, the
unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps he could
not have received that blow in the head and would not
have died. The fact that boxing is attended with some risks
of external injuries does not make any injuries received in
the course of the game not accidental. In box-

________________

2 Traveler’s Protective Association v. Stephens, 185 Ark. 660, 49 S.W.

(2d) 364; Equitable Life Assur. v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P. (2d) 80,
110 ALR 1270; see cases cited in 29A Am. Jur. sec. 1166.
3 Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 291, 78 L. ed. 934, 54
S. Ct. 461, 90 ALR 1382; Davis v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 73 F
(2d) 330, 96 ALR 599, and others.
4 Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Wash. (2d) 594, 174 P. (2d) 961

563

VOL. 17, JUNE 30, 1966 563

Yap vs. Republic

ing, as in other equally physically rigorous sports, such as

basketball or baseball, death is not ordinarily anticipated
to result. If, therefore, it ever does, the injury or death can
only be accidental or produced by some unforeseen
happening or event as what occurred in this case.
Furthermore, the policy involved herein specifically
excluded from its coverage—

"(e) Death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging

in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, poloplaying,
racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling.” Death or
disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was
not declared outside of the protection of the insurance contract.
Failure of the defendant insurance company to include death
resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the
prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did
5
not
intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the

decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against. appellant. so ordered.
 Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P. Bengzon, Zaldivar and
San-chez, concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Note.—Two other cases regarding accident insurance

are Calanoc vs. Court of Appeals, 98 Phil. 79 and Kanapi
vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 94 Phil. 397.

——————

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