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TORTS
INTRODUCTION

AND

DAMAGES
breach of contract is a violation of an obligation assumed by agreement of the parties. To determine the form of action to pursue (whether from tort or from breach of contract), one must look at the origin or source of the right/obligation. If it arises from the consent of the parties, it is a breach of contract. If the right or duty arises from or is independent from the consent of the parties (for example, a contract of carriage is a contract but it is imposed by law), the action is in tort.

ATTY. HOWARD CALLEJA (BLOCK 3A, 2010-2011)

What is a tort? (Is there always injury?)

Tort comes from the Latin word tortus and it means twisted or wrong. Calleja: It is the violation of an obligation, a right or omission of a duty which causes damage to another. o It does not necessarily always cause damage or injury, because the word tort refers to the negligence/fault, NOT the damage. Purpose of making people liable for torts: Based on the concept that every person who causes damage to another must do something about it in the form of reparation.

NOTES/OTHER SOURCES ON VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF TORTS: Difficulty of defining tort stems from the fact that there is no one definition encompassing all the aspects of torts. Each particular tort may be defined in itself but the term tort also denotes wrong in general.

Philippine law on torts: Tort law is largely founded on common law principles while civil law contributes the laws governing quasi-delicts (a derivative of Roman civil law and assimilated into Spanish civil law). This resulted in a blending of common and civil law concepts. The concepts of fault and negligence, however, are found to be based on civil law concepts. Problem of civil and common law jurisdictions: The main difference between civil and common law is that a tort in common law jurisdictions has a broader scope (akin to a catch-all) while in civil law jurisdictions, there must be a substantive legal basis before an action for tort can prosper. This is where Arts. 1156 to 1162 come in, because they form the civil law basis for recovery from what we consider as a tort, which is a quasi-delict. This was deliberate on the part of the Code Commission, in placing a name for an obligation arising not from the first four. It was thought that quasi-delict would encompass non-contractual negligence because intentional and malicious acts were to be governed by the RPC.

Sangco: Liability in tort may be predicated upon an injury resulting from an unlawful or illegal act or omission, whether on property or person. Jarencio: Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages. Tort is a field that encompasses the entire law. Not a crime: Although they share many characteristics, a tort is not a crime. The distinction lies in the interests affected and the remedy afforded by law. A crime is an offense against the public, the purpose of bringing proceedings is to vindicate the interests of the public as a whole and to punish the offender. A civil action for tort, on the other hand, is commenced by the injured person himself, to compensate him for the damage done at the expense of the wrongdoer. Can be one act: One act may be both a crime against the State and a tort against an individual. But since the interests to be protected and the objects to be accomplished are not the same, there may be a criminal prosecution and a civil action for tort arising from the same act. Not a breach of contract: A tort consists in the violation of a right given or an omission to perform a duty imposed by law, while a

Classes of torts:

Art. 1156: An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do, or not to do. Art. 1157: Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasicontracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasidelicts. Art. 1158:Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. Art. 1159: Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

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family (DGFF) in the selection and supervision of its employees. Appellants failed to prove extraordinary diligence. Such liability with its employee is solidary. (Also: contract of carriage Court need not make an express finding of fault for negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for payment of damages.)

Art. 1160: Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book. Art. 1161: Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. Art. 1162: Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book and by special laws.

Damage and Damages: Distinctions

Damage is the harm or injury suffered by property or by a person. Damages denote monetary compensation awarded by a court of competent authority for damage suffered.

Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. CA: The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owners dock or after he has had a reasonable opportunity to leave (including a time to see after his baggage and prepare for departure). The common carrier is presumed to have acted negligently because they are bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can manage it, and therefore they failed to prove that they had exercised extraordinary diligence. Dangwa Transportation Co., et al v. CA: By stepping on the platform of the bus, the victim was already considered a passenger, and a contract of carriage was established. By failing to fulfill its obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely, fault or negligence is immediately attributable to the carrier as an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved. Imson v. CA: In a suit covering many parties, when there is a Compromise Agreement between one party and the insurer, and the insurer is thereafter dropped from the Complaint, it does not mean that the action does not survive. The insurer is not an indispensable party to the case. To determine whether a plaintiff has a cause of action is found in the averments in the pleadings pertaining to the acts of the defendant. Whether such acts give him a right of action is determined by substantive law. Which do you file, an action for quasi-delict or a criminal action? (Factors) o What do you need to prove? o Who are you really after? o What defenses may be available? Criminal action (with reservation) Civil action (separate and independent)

Culpa Aquiliana/Contractual/Criminal: Distinctions

Culpa means fault.

ON

NOTES/OTHER SOURCES

CULPABILITY:

Fault (General): That which results from a voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to repair the damage. o Culpa Criminal: When the act is done with intent to cause damage (dolo). o Culpa Contractual: Fault as an incident in the performance of a pre-existing contract. It is governed by Arts. 1170, 1172 and 1173 of the Civil Code. o Culpa Aquiliana: Fault referred to in Art. 2176, that fault usually arising from a quasi-delict. It is fault substantive and independent and is a source of obligations in itself, governed mainly by Art. 2176. Difference from negligence: Liability is incurred by either an act or an omission. Fault generally results from a positive act while negligence is the result of an omission. This is not a strict definition, however.

Case Doctrines:

What is a quasi-delict?

QUASI-DELICTS

BLTB Bus Co., et al v. IAC: Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if, at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation (Art. 2156). In driving the truck, the driver is primarily liable. But the liability of the employer is considered also primary, direct and immediate, considering that the damage was done through the negligence of its driver. Such liability does not cease even if the employer showed that he exercised diligence of a good father of the

Art. 2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

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Acquittal under the criminal case does not bar recovery for civil liability.

Governing principle: Man should subordinate his acts to precepts of prudence, and in failing to do so and causing damage to another, he must repair the damage done. (Jarencio) Elements: (a) Damage or prejudice which must be proven by the party claiming it; (b) Unlawful act or omission amounting to fault or negligence; and (c) direct and causal connection between the damage done and the act or omission. (Andamo v. IAC) Case Doctrines:

Jarantilla v. CA: The same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. This is because the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or a crime or to a quasi-delict or a tort, with either being enforceable against the offender, subject to the double recovery rule. Atlantic Gulf v. CA: There is no double recovery when the offender is guilty of two separate culpable transgressions on property rights (in this case, for ruination of agricultural property as well as unauthorized use of property). The two awards of damages are for different culpable acts. Cancio, Jr v. Isip: An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, the first being civil liability ex delicto (Article 100, RPC) and the second being independent civil liabilities, such as those not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony (culpa contractual, intentional torts under Art. 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Art. 2176) or those where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action (Art. 33.) Independent civil actions (Art. 31-34, Art. 2176) may be filed separately and prosecuted even without reservation in the criminal action.

Vergara v. CA: A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. Lack of cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, determined from the allegations of the complaint alone. Andamo v. IAC: A civil suit based on quasi-delict can proceed independently from the criminal case. Fault or negligence covers not only acts not punishable by law, but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional, voluntary or negligent. The independence of the civil action is described in Art. 2177, which states that responsibility for fault or negligence is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability. FGU Insurance Corp. v. CA: There is no relationship between the lessee and the lessor other than that the lessor is the owner of the vehicle to make the lessor liable for the negligent act of its lessee. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, et al: The registered owner of the vehicle is liable even if he sold the vehicle to another because of his negligence in transferring the title to the new owner.

What is negligence?

NEGLIGENCE

No Double Recovery Rule

Art. 1173: (1) The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply. (2) If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. NOTES/OTHER SOURCES ON VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF NEGLIGENCE: Various definitions of negligence:

Art. 2177: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from the negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Case Doctrines:

Virata, et al. v. Ochoa: In negligence cases, aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the RPC or under quasi-delict. What is prohibited is recovering twice for the same negligent act. If two awards are granted, one under quasi-delict and another under civil liability ex delicto, whichever is higher of the two will be imposed.

Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose.

Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

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Negligence is conduct, not a state of mind or the use of sound judgment. The existence, therefore, of negligence is not determined by reference to the personal judgment but by the behavior of the character.

Negligence is also an omission to do something that a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

Far East Bank & Trust Co. v. Querimit: Bank deposit certificates must be shown before the bank pays its amount. It acts at its peril when it pays deposits evidenced by a certificate of deposit without its production and surrender. As a rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The bank is therefore negligent. Reyes v. CA: While the highest degree of diligence is required from banks in handling deposits, the bank is not required to exert more than DGFF in the sale and issuance of the foreign exchange demand drafts because it does not involve the handling of a clients deposit with the bank. Adzuara v. CA: Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term, and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Bayne Adjusters & Surveyors, Inc. v. CA: Negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation renders him liable for damages for any resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as the nature of the obligation so demands. Samson Jr. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands: There is no contributory negligence on the part of the depositor if he only reported his missing check deposit after three weeks because the injury resulted from the denial of his withdrawal, an injury he suffered before knowing that his check deposit had been lost. United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ramos: The business of a bank is vested with public interest, for which reason the bank should guard itself against loss due to negligence or bad faith. By approving loans, the bank should concern itself with acquiring the proper information about its debtors, including their identities. Far East Bank & Trust Co. v. Marquez: The mortgagee-in-goodfaith rule does not apply when the mortgagee has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in the vendor, or that he was aware of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the property in litigation. Having been wanting in care and prudence, the latter cannot be deemed to be an innocent mortgagee.

In negligence, the actor does not desire to bring about the consequences which follow, nor does he know that they are certain to occur. There is merely a risk of such consequence that a reasonable man in his position would anticipate and guard against. Negligence is not neglect. Neglect implies a failure to do something, and such failure can be intentional or unintentional. Intentional omissions are not cases of negligence.

The reasonable and prudent man: There is an implied uniform standard of conduct which society imposes. It is external and objective rather than individual. Courts deal with this by creating a fictitious person, the reasonable man of ordinary prudence. Every actor is required to act in accordance to what this ideal individual would do in the same circumstances. This is the test of due care. Case Doctrines:

Picart v. Smith: Conduct is negligent when a prudent man would have foreseen harmful effect to dissuade him from doing the same. In the case, a prudent man would have recognized that the course he was pursuing was fraught with risk and would cause foreseeable harm as a reasonable consequence of that course. Citytrust Banking Corp. v. IAC: A person indicates his name on a deposit slip but mistakenly leaves out a number. This causes several postdated checks to become dishonored. The bank is negligent because having accepted a deposit in the course of its business transactions, it behooves upon the bank to see to it that the depositor is accurately credited therefor. To post the money in another account when there is a name indicated is sheer negligence. A depositor expects the bank to treat his account with fidelity, being a business affected with public interest. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. CA: The dishonoring of checks were committed through the banks negligence because the bank was remiss in its duty and obligation to treat the clients account with the highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. (Also in this case: moral damages and temperate damages were initially awarded, but temperate damages were deleted because it was not part of the relief prayed for in the complaint.)

Negligence as Proximate Cause

Sangco: Statutory language using the term proximate cause means near or immediate. Legal responsibility is placed on the last culpable human actor in point of time and all persons antecedent to him are exempt. It is the cause which sets the other causes in operation. Only when they are independent of each other that the nearest is to be charged with the disaster.

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cause thereof. If the harm which occurred is one of the particular risks which made defendants conduct negligent, it is a consequence for which the actor must be made legally responsible.

Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of common sense, policy and precedent.

Jarencio: In order that civil liability for negligence may arise, there must be a direct causal connection between the damages suffered by the plaintiff and the act or omission of the defendant. The act must be the proximate cause of the loss or damage of the plaintiff.

Vda de Bataclan v. Medina: (most often-quoted definition of proximate cause) The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probably result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Cause and condition: It assesses the difference between the active cause and existing conditions upon which that cause operated. If the defendant only created a passive, static condition, he is not liable. Natural and probable consequences: Most often usedthe defendant is liable if the harm suffered is the natural and probable consequence of his wrongful conduct. A natural consequence of an act is the consequence which ordinarily follows it. A probable consequence is one that is more likely to follow than fail to follow its supposed cause, but it need not be the one which necessarily follows such cause. Both naturalness and probability need to be proven to form a causal relationship. The test is designed to limit the liability of a negligent actor only for injuries which are the probable consequences for his conduct as distinguished from consequences which are merely possible.

Difficulty in determining proximate cause: There is no exact rule for determining whether a cause is sufficiently proximate or too remote to be considered as the foundation of the action. There are various tests crafted in American jurisprudence which the Supreme Court has applied in certain cases.

Ordinary and natural or direct consequence test: The extent of the actors liability is for all consequent damage naturally flowing from such conduct, whether such damage were reasonably to be anticipated or not, provided they are not too remote.

Cause in fact: An actual cause in fact relation must exist between defendants conduct and plaintiffs injury before liability arises. But for or the sine qua non rule: The injurious act is the proximate cause if injury would not have resulted but for the negligent act of the defendant. The defendants conduct is not the cause of the event if it could have occurred without it. Applies in most cases except when two causes concur to bring about an event and either one, operating alone, would cause identical results.

Intervening Cause: An intervening cause is one which comes into active operation in producing the result after the actors negligent act or omission had occurred. It normally relieves the defendant of liability if the unforeseen and abnormal intervening cause produces the harm or injury. This is because when negligence is established, liability attaches for all the injurious consequences that flow therefrom until diverted by the intervention of some other efficient cause that seizes the injury as its own. Case Doctrines:

In this case, the substantial factor rest applies, the defendants conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.

Subido, et al. v. Custodio: The carrier and its driver are considered negligent for allowing the victim to ride on the running board of the bus in violation of Act No. 3992. This negligence is considered the proximate cause of the victims death, although the victim is also found to be contributorily negligent. The negligence of the other parties would not have produced the result without the negligence of the carrier and the driver. Ridjo Tape & Chemical Corp. v. CA: MERALCOs negligence to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective meter is the proximate cause of the dispute between the parties. Public

Foreseeability test: Where the particular harm sustained was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendants misconduct, his act or omission is the legal

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competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden of proving the existence of the same, otherwise his action must fail.

utilities should be put on notice that if they completely disregard their duty of keeping their electric meters in serviceable condition. If they are not made liable for their negligence, it might encourage them to continue to the detriment of the general public.

Raynera v. Hicetas: Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, the visibility of the truck, its moderated speed and use of the service road instead of the highway passed the burden of negligence onto the victim because he then had the duty to avoid bumping the vehicle in front of him. Ermitano v. CA: The contract between the credit card holder and the bank is one of adhesion. If the victim already did her part and informed the bank of the loss of the card, the bank must perform its obligation to inform all its member establishments about the fact of loss. Otherwise, it was negligent. BPI Express Card v. Olalia: There are two requirements before getting an extension credit card, none of which were complied with to assert responsibility on the plaintiff to pay for it. The bank failed to explain why the extension card was irregularly issued. The banks negligence absolves the original card holder from responsibility. Benguet Electric Cooperatives, Inc. v. CA: A public utility is vested with public interest and is required to comply with all the regulations imposed on it. Its non-compliance with the required height of vertical clearance endangered the public and caused the death of the meat vendor, rendering them negligent and liable. St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos: The school was not negligent even if they were exercising special parental authority because they were not the proximate cause of the injury. The proximate cause of the injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, without which the result would not have occurred. Adriano v. Pangilinan: Being in the real estate business, including the grant of loans secured by real property mortgages, the defendant is expected to ascertain the status and condition of the properties offered to him as collateral, and to ascertain the identity of persons he transacts with. This is one exception to the rule that one who deals with registered lands need not go beyond the certificate of title. A purchaser or a mortgagee cannot close his eyes to the facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard then claim that he acted in good faith.

Food Terminal, Inc. v. CA: When defendant admitted its failure to exercise the required standard of care, he practically admitted his liability for the damage caused. German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC: If it appears that negligence not only exists but was deliberately perpetrated by arbitrariness, the parties at fault must be made liable. Tan v. Northwest Airlines: Nothing in the conduct of respondent showed that they were motivated by bad faith or malice; they were only exercising the standard of diligence required of them as an air carrier, which is extraordinary diligence. Bad faith does not only connote bad judgment or negligence, but it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Their liability for damages, therefore, is only to the extent of the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation which parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. Morris v. CA: The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees could give ground for an action for damages. However, the parties troubles stemmed from their failure to check in on time. There was no fraud or bad faith in their refusal to accommodate them on their flight. Crisostomo v. CA: The attribution of the standard of care required by law to common carriers cannot be imputed to the respondent in this case because they are not common carriers but simply an agency tasked to make travel arrangements in their behalf.

Presumption of Negligence: Res Ipsa Loquitur

Proof of Negligence
Case Doctrines:

Res Ipsa Loquitur (The thing speaks for itself) According to Sangco, unless there is a statutory provision that given certain circumstances the fact of injury is prima facie evidence of negligence, or there is a contractual relation between the parties which raises such a presumption, mere injury does not give rise to a presumption of negligence on anyones part. However, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, if the facts or circumstances attending an injury may be such as to raise a presumption or permit an inference of negligence, negligence may be presumed to exist.

PLDT v. CA: A person claiming negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constituting negligence must be affirmatively established by

Jarencio: There arises a presumption of negligence which is described as a case in which the thing speaks for itself, or as expressed in Latin, res ipsa loquitur. In such a case, all that is

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burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of care. The doctrine can only be invoked when, under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

necessary for the plaintiff to do is to prove the fact of the harm and the circumstances under which it occurred.

Rule of evidence: The doctrine of RIL is not substantive law but a rule of evidence. Some courts describe it as something which takes the place of evidence as affecting the burden of proof, but is not in itself evidence, or that it is an evidential presumption. This is a doctrine peculiar to the law on negligence, an exception to the rule that negligence must be proved. Thereafter, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to establish that he had observed due care and diligence.

Application of the doctrine: The test of applicability is not whether a particular injury rarely occurs but when it occurs, whether it is ordinarily the result of negligence. Elements: (1) That the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) that the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Case Doctrines:

Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital: Under the doctrine of RIL, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. If a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn. All the patient has to do is prove a nexus of between the particular act/omission and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the physician without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish standard of care.

Presumption of Negligence: Respondeat Superior

Let the master/employer be responsible: It is a common law principle that mostly applies in cases concerning common carriers and the liability of the employer with regard to the selection and supervision of its employees. It is a rebuttable presumption.

Africa v. Caltex Philippines: Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as is in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from want of care. (Formal statement of res ipsa loquitur doctrine)

Sangco: Responsibilities of a common carrier cannot be lessened or dispensed with by stipulation on the ticket or by posting of notice. Reduction of fares does not justify any limitation of a common carriers liability, but a stipulation for limited liability for negligence is valid if a passenger is carried gratuitously, as long as there are no willful acts or gross negligence.

F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. CA: Because the furniture shop had combustible materials within it, the doctrine of RIL applies to make the owners of the shop negligent. Even without the application of the doctrine of RIL, the failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.

Art. 1732: Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. Art. 1733: Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Ma-Ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. CA: Petitioner should have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence. The doctrine of RIL applies because the absence of an essential part of the train alone, regardless of however it was lost, is enough to render the petitioners liable.

Art. 1755: A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Art. 1756: In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.

Batiquin v. CA: The doctrine of RIL, as a rule of evidence, is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for a specific proof of negligence. It is a mode of procedural convenience. It determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitated the

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proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.

City of Manila v. IAC: Acting in its proprietary capacity, the government may be held liable under contract or under delict, as well as tort. In the case of the latter, the doctrine of respondeat superior makes the City of Manila liable for the tortuous acts of its agents who failed to verify the correct duration of the contract.

Manuel v. CA: Regardless of evidence that the driver was not duly licensed, petitioners liability cannot be ignored because they were parties at fault for encroaching on the scout cars lane. Aguilar v. Commercial Savings Bank: The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not for public service, is primarily responsible to third persons for deaths, injuries and damages it caused. This is true even if the vehicle is leased to third persons. This is because the main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, responsibility can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.

Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos: It is not necessary to state whether or not the carrier was negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees, as its negligence is presumed by operation of law. As the employers of the bus driver, the bus company is directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption of their negligence flows from the negligence of their employee, because the obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for actors acts or omissions but also for those persons for whom one is responsible.

Presumption of Negligence: Common Carriers

Calalas v. CA: In case of death or injuries to passengers of common carriers, the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Articles 1733 and 1755.

Pestano v. Sps. Sumayang: Owners and managers are responsible for the damages caused by their employees. The presumption of negligence of respondeat superior is only overcome if it is shown that the employer exercised the DGFF in the selection and supervision of its employees.

Art. 1734: Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Case Doctrines:

Ramos v. CA: As the captain of the ship, the doctor is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. He was the attending physician or the primary doctor of the patient, and he was the one who suggested the expertise of the anesthesiologist who caused the patients death.

Presumption of Negligence: Violation of traffic rules

Art. 2184: In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

DSR-Senator Lines, et al. v. Federal Phoenix Assurance Co.: Since the peril of fire is not comprehended within the exceptions in Art. 1734, then the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. Common carriers are required to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. They are also presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or have deteriorated.

Art. 2185: Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Case Doctrines:

Mallari, Sr. v. CA: The act of overtaking is a clear violation of RA 4136. The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his

Delsan Transport Lines v. C & A Construction: A captain who does not avoid a storm is held to have shown an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation. The employer is also liable because DGFF must be used not only in the selection but also in the supervision of employees. Due diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions, as well as the actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance.

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Singapore Airlines v. Fernandez: When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, a contract of carriage arises. It is the common carriers obligation to observe extraordinary diligence in carrying its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, with due regard for all the circumstances, as long as it is within its area of control. In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that needs to be proven is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier. (However, it must be noted that a contract of carriage also has reciprocal duties; in the earlier case of the passengers missing their flight because they missed the check-in time, there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier because it was the negligence of the passenger in not arriving on time that caused injury.)

Art. 2179: When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Case Doctrines:

Presumption of Negligence: Dangerous weapons or substances

Art. 2188: There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms or poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. Case Doctrines:

Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific: Although the defendants negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of, an action for such injury cannot be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured. The contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured partys negligence.

Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja: While knowing that they were carrying chemical cargo, the officers of the vessel failed to take the necessary precautions to prevent accidents. The owner or the person in possession and control of the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons and property by reason of negligent management or navigation.

Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.: There is no contributory negligence, or the doctrine does not apply, if it is found that the plaintiffs negligence is not merely contributory but is the proximate and efficient cause intervening between the wrong caused by the defendant and the injury as the real producing reason.

Phoenix Construction v. IAC: While the legal and proximate cause of the accident was the wrongful parking of the dump truck, petitioner is also negligent in a contributory manner because he was driving faster than he should have been at the hour.

Defenses are those which can be relied upon by the defendant when negligence is imputed to him/her.

LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. CA: The negligence of the motorcycle driver is, at best, contributory because he was speeding closely behind the vehicle he was following. It was because of this and the cloud of dust that he failed to see defendants vehicle executing a turn, leading to his death.

DEFENSES: CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Jarencio: Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection and which is legally contributing cause, cooperating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiffs harm. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff will bar his right to recover damages if his negligence contributes to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors. Where, however, his negligence, in conjunction with the occurrence, contributes only to his own injury, he may recover from the defendant less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

Jarco Marketing Corp., et al. v. CA: There was no contributory negligence. It is reasonable and usual for a mother to let go of her child when signing for a credit card slip. The time and the distance were both significant, because the child was pinned down a foot away from her mother in the time it took for her mother to sign the slip.

Ilusorio v. CA: Plaintiff is negligent in entrusting his secretary with his checkbook filled with blank checks and his credit cards, as well as the verification and reconciliation of his account. He did not bother to check his statements of account. Therefore, his negligence in failing to check his bank statements is the proximate cause of the injury.

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Emergency ruleGan v. CA: The emergency rule provides that one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is requested to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

ELEMENTS (a) Plaintiff must know that the risk is present; (b) Understand the nature of the risk; and (c) Chooses to incur the risk, freely and voluntarily. IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF RISK (Assumption of risk as a defense may be invoked when these are present) 1. Dangerous conditions, 2. Dangerous activities,

Estacion v. Bernardo: Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. To hold a person as such, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.

3. 4.
Case Doctrines:

Existence of contractual relations, and Awareness of risk created by defendants negligence.

Cadiente v. Macas: When the party was standing where he, as a pedestrian, is designated to stand, he is not guilty of contributory negligence when a car suddenly swerves onto the pavement, hitting him.

Napocor v. Heirs of Casionan: Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. The fact that the victim was not a licensed miner has nothing to do with his injury, because the hazard was in a public area that anyone could have passed through. DEFENSES: ASSUMPTION
OF

Afialda v. Hisole: Animal owners are only liable for harm done to third persons. Liability only attaches for injury caused to a third person, but not when the person injures is the caretaker of the animal. This is because there was an assumption of risk in taking the position to care for such animals.

Sps. Ong v. Metropolitan Water District: The lifeguard and the pool place are not guilty of negligence because there is sufficient evidence to show that they took all the necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause death.

RISK

Jarencio: The assumption of risk principle is that one who voluntarily assumed the risk of injury from a known danger is debarred from recovery. As stated, a plaintiff who, by his conduct, has brought himself within the operation of the maxim volenti non fit injuria cannot recover on the basis of the defendants negligence. In the words of the maxim as translated, that to which a person assents is not esteemed in law an injury.

Co v. CA: The repair shop cannot escape liability by saying that the car under their care and supervision was carnapped. Carnapping is not per se a fortuitous event. Even assuming that it is considered a fortuitous event, the shop is still liable because the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. Carnapping is a normal business risk for those engaged in the repair of motor vehicles.

The defense of assumed risk may exist independently of the relation of master and servant. It applies in a proper case independently of any contract relation. One cannot deliberately incur an obvious risk of personal injury, especially when preventive measures are at hand, and then hold the author of the danger for the ensuing injury.

Erquiaga v. CA: The doctrine of caveat emptor or buyer beware does not apply when the basic premise of that doctrine that there be no false representationsis not present in this case. DEFENSES: LAST CLEAR CHANCE/SUPERVENING NEGLIGENCE/DISCOVERED PERIL

Art. 1174: Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

Jarencio: The negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recover for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant by exercising reasonable care and prudence might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. Case Doctrines:

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Bustamante v. CA: Negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care produce, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. The person with the last clear chance to avoid the accident but who did not do so is considered in law as the one solely responsible for the consequences for the accident. The doctrine applies in a suit between owners and drivers, and not as between passenger and carrier when the former seeks to enforce contractual obligations. As to joint tortfeasors, the doctrine cannot be extended as a test as to whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of discovery of latters peril.

Glan Peoples Lumber and Hardware v. IAC: The driver of the jeepney, before plowing into a truck that was at a full stop, had the last clear chance of avoiding the injury, considering he was at an appreciable distance from the location of the accident.

Pantranco North Express v. Sps. Baesa: The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply when the person who allegedly had the last chance to avoid injury was not aware that there was any impending harm. The last clear chance can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is discovered.

McKee v. IAC: No negligence can be imputed to defendant because his entry into the lane of the truck was done to avoid what was in his mind as the greater perilinjury to the two boys. Any reasonable and prudent man would have swerved to avoid hitting the two boys. The emergency rule applies here. Moreover, it was the driver of the truck who had the last clear chance here because had he heeded the emergency signals, he would have avoided crashing into the other car. The last clear chance doctrine states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party.

Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corp. v. Angala: Since both parties are at fault, the last clear chance doctrine applies. The one who could have avoided the injury has the burden of bearing the loss.

Austria v. CA: That the driver had no chance to avoid the truck is the result of his own negligence. Having the last clear chance of seeing the truck before bumping into it, he should have avoided the injury by properly exercising diligence.

Consolidated Bank & Trust Corp. v. CA: A bank has the fiduciary duty to exercise diligence higher than that of DGFF. By giving the passbook to another person instead of the authorized representative, the client suffered loss. DEFENSES: PRESCRIPTION

Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA: By not following the procedure for validating and signing all the deposit slips, the bank was negligent and caused damage by not exercising due care and spotting the fraud perpetrated by the spouses. An antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the harm by exercising due diligence.

Art. 1146: The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff; (2) Upon a quasi-delict. However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year. Doctrine: Raised by: Applies when: Case Doctrines:

Sps. Canlas v. CA: While the other party is negligent in entrusting the care of his certificate of title to his supposed business partner, the bank was also negligent and, having the last clear chance of avoiding injury, must suffer the loss. Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose negligence brought out the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.

Anuran v. Buno: The doctrine of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and the drivers of two colliding vehicles, not from a suit where a passenger demands responsibility to carry out its contractual obligations.

Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling: The prescriptive period for quasi-delict was not stalled by the filing of the criminal action. While it chose to pursue intervention in the criminal case and was denied, it only filed a civil complaint for damages after the lapse of more than five years.

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Callanta v. Carnation Philippines: Dismissal without just cause is a violation of the Labor Code, but does not an offense under Art. 291 of the same code, which describes the prescription period. Illegal dismissal prescribes in four years, while money claims under the Labor Code prescribe in three.

Allied Banking Corp. v. CA: The action for damages must be filed within four years from the time the cause of action accrues, from the day of the act or omission violative of the right of a party.

De Los Reyes v. CA: The cause of action arises from the act or omission constituting the transgression. Reliance on the imprescriptibility of void contracts is misplaced. Sps. Ferrer v. Ericta: A failure to specifically plead prescription does not constitute a waiver of the defense. The four year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or from the date of the accident.

Napocor v. CA (1992): The defense of fortuitous event does not apply in this case. Napocor cannot escape liability by claiming force majeure. Acts of God are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable events that could not have been foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. No person is responsible for the Acts of God. Although the typhoon was an Act of God, the opening of the floodgates were done without sufficient warning and was the proximate cause of the loss and damage. There was sufficient warning before the typhoon arrived to lessen the water levels, which Napocor did not do.

Napocor v. CA (1988): Same doctrine and similar facts as above case. If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.

Kramer, Jr. v. CA: From the date the cause of action arises until four years thereafter, an aggrieved party can seek judicial relief before an administrative body determines that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party. The filing of a marine protest does not toll the running of the prescriptive period. The findings of the marine board are not binding on the court. DEFENSES: FORTUITOUS EVENTS Doctrine: Fortuitous events, or acts of God, may be asserted as a type of intervening cause, the lack of which would have avoided the cause or diminished the result of liability. No person is to be made responsible for an act of God. A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. Case Doctrines:

PAL v. CA: PALs refusal to provide hotel accommodations by reason of cancellation of their connecting flight due to force majeure was negligent on their part. A contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty, and force majeure does not excuse the carriers employees from neglect or malfeasance.

Cipriano v. CA: Violation of a statutory duty (in this case, to insure his rustproofing business and vehicles received) is negligence per se. While the fire may be a fortuitous event, the circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for loss.

Yobido v. CA: A common carrier cannot be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone. It still must prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident.

Japan Airlines v. CA: Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the standards of care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers. However, they are not absolutely responsible for all injuries or damage even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. Airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel, which include adverse weather conditions or climatic changes. Common carriers are not insurers of all risks.

Bayasen v. CA: Physical tact will reveal that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control over the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. The skidding is an unforeseen event.

Gotesco Investment Corp. v. Chatto: The collapse of the ceiling of the theater is not considered force majeure. Having interposed it as a defense, he who invokes it has the burden of proving that there was force majeure. The collapse was due to construction defects. The theater owner is liable for gross negligence. DEFENSES: DILIGENCE

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valid it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a waiver on a right to claim any damages under certain circumstances dilutes and weakens the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law on common carriers.

When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been negligent either in the selection of his employees (culpa in eligiendo) or in the supervision over their acts (culpa in vigilando). This presumption is, however, only a disputable presumption and not a conclusive one. Consequently, such presumption of negligence may be rebutted by Art. 2180.

Art. 2180 (last paragraph): The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Case Doctrines:

Walter Smith & Co., Inc. v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co.: The presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and selection of its employees. This absolves the defendant from all liability.

Philippine Carpet Employees Association v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corp.: Quitclaims executed by laborers are valid in this jurisdiction. Not all waivers are against public policy. If it was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement of claims, it is binding on the parties. However, if it was not voluntarily entered into by the laborer, the law looks upon them disfavorably. Consent may be vitiated not only through intimidation or violence but also by mistake, undue influence or fraud. Mistake may invalidate consent when it refers to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract.

Dapar v. Biascan: There was no usurpation of name (and therefore, no mistake) because the use thereof was authorized. Its authorized use does not make Z liable for damages. OTHER DEFENSES

Sps. Fabre, Jr. v. CA: The finding that the driver drove the bus negligently also resulted in the finding that the owners of the vehicle did not exercise the DGFF in the selection and supervision of its employees. The facts attending the circumstances (that the driver was driving fast in bad rainy weather and on slippery roads) constituted gross negligence. Due diligence is not satisfied by the finding that the applicant possessed a drivers license alone. A drivers qualifications, experience and record of service must also have been examined. There must also be a formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of the employees. DEFENSES: MISTAKE
AND

Case Doctrines:

WAIVER

MISTAKEAccording to Tolentino, the concept of error must include: (a) ignorance, which is the absence of knowledge with respect to a thing; and (b) mistake, which is the wrong conception about the said thing.

Privileged communicationSison v. David: No civil action for libel or slander may arise out of a Petition for Bond since the latter is absolute privileged communication, unless the contents of the petition are irrelevant to the subject matter. Absolutely privileged communication is one for which, by reason of the occasion on which it is made, no remedy is provided for the damages in a civil action for slander or libel. Qualified privileged communication relates to private interests and only comprehends communications made in good faith, without actual malice, with reasonable or probable grounds for believing them to be true, on a subject matter which the author of the communication has an interest in. For it to be free from libel, there must be an occasion of privilege and the use of that occasion in good faith.

WAIVERTo be effective and valid, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. It may not be casually attributed to him when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such a person. Case Doctrines:

Slander in judicial proceedingsMalit v. People: Parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander cases for words otherwise defamatory in the course of judicial proceedings provided the statements are relevant to the case. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency, courts are liberal.

Sps. Theis v. CA: Contracts where consent is vitiated by mistake are voidable. Gatchalian v. Delim: Since the waiver concerns a common carrier, it must be construed strictly against it. For a waiver to be

Malicious prosecutionProline Sports Center, Inc. v. CA: There are two elements to the crime of malicious prosecution: absence of probable cause and legal malice. Probable cause is the existence of facts as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the person charged was guilty of the

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crime. Recourse to judicial proceedings is not per se evidence of ill will upon which a claim for damages may be based.

Damnum absque injuriaAmonoy v. Gutierrez: The maxim means damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons rights is a loss without injury for which the law gives no remedy. It is a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. This maxim does not apply in this case.

Litis pendenciaMariscal v. CA: For the ground of litis pendentia to be validly raised, the following requisites must concur (a) identity of parties, or at least, representing the same interests; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. (There is litis pendentia in this case)

Lawful exercise of a rightSycip, Jr. v. CA: While B.P. 22 punishes issuers of bouncing checks, the issuance of the stop payment orders were pursuant to the lawful statutory right of S. It is a valid defense against the purported violations of B.P. 22.

No basis for claimSps. Lim v. Uni-Tan Marketing Corp.: Any person who seeks damages are presumed by law to seek them in good faith. Therefore, any person seeking damages because of the tortuous acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive.

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