St.

Bonaventure University - Franciscan Institute Publications

OCKHAM, JOHN XXII AND THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD

Author(s): Eugenio Randi
Source: Franciscan Studies, Vol. 46, William of Ockham (1285-1347) Commemorative Issue
Part III (1986), pp. 205-216
Published by: St. Bonaventure University - Franciscan Institute Publications
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41975071
Accessed: 06-06-2019 21:39 UTC

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 OCKHAM, JOHN XXII
AND THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD

Although still debated, Paul Vignaux's interpretation of the mean

of the distinction between potentia Dei absoluta and ordinata acco
ing to Ockham seems to have defeated the 'skeptical' or 'outrageo
view of many older scholars, W.J.Courtenay's interpretation has
come a classical one: Ockham conceived potentia Dei absoluta as
whole possibilities "initially open to God." From such an establish
standpoint, it was subsequently possible to reckon with the prope
meaning of a key concept like ' pactum, ' and furthermore to free
ham from the heavy burden of having conceived God as an arbit
tyrant. Also, it became possible to reconsider the so-called 'outrage
view,' just discarded inasmuch as it referred to Ockham. Ockham
no more regarded as maintaining, as Gordon Leff previously argu
that God can actually intervene de potentia absoluta on this world;
many 'ockhamists' undoubtedly seemed to equate his potentia ordin
to the lex statuta , the communis cursus rerum. Conversely, they equat
or gave the impression of equating Goďs action de potentia absolu
to miracles. When Leff revised his own interpretation, he happen
to attribute his former misinterpretation of Ockham's thought to
misleading character which the distinction assumed in the later Xl
and during the XVth century.1 But if we may call LefFs older po

* This paper represents part of a research supported, from January 1

on, by the Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione of Italy. I am grateful to P
Mariateresa Beonio-Brocchieri for many kind suggestions and her const
help; and to Dr. Michael Dunne, who kindly read the English text.
See P.Vignaux, Nominalisme au XlVe siècle (Paris: Vrin 19
repr.1982) 22-28; P. Vignaux, "Nominalisme," Dictionnaire de Théologie Ca
lique, 11-1, 717-84; W. J. Courtenay, "Nominalism and Late Medie

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2O6 EUGENIO RANDI

tion a 'misunderstanding', I do not thin

term to those medieval authors, Ockham
er, who actually mantained what LefF
stood as Ockham's position. I will try in
characters of another, non-ockhamistic
theory which is closer than Ockham's t
try to support the thesis that in the ea
Universities did not simply face the dev
of Goďs absolute power, but were shake
manifold meanings of the idea of poten

i. Ockham's Polemical Statements

In his political works, William of Ockham deals insistently with

the definition of the distinction between potentia absoluta and ordina-
ta. He stresses particularly three points:
1.1 INSANE INTELLECTA. Ockham underlines vigorously the neces-
sity of a correct understanding of the distinction absoluta/ordinata ;
which is, in his opinion, sometimes wrongly understood. The distinc-
tion, Ockham claims, is quite a difficult matter; nevertheless, if cor-

Religion," in H. A. Oberman, Ch. Trinkhaus, eds., The Pursuit of Holiness

in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion (Leiden: Brill, 1975) 26-59; G. LefF,
Bradwardine and the Pelagians (Cambridge, 1957); G. LefF, Gregory of Rimini
(Manchester, 1961); G. LefF, William of Ockham. The Metamorphosis of Scholas-
tic Discourse (Manchester, 1975); L. Moonan, "St.Thomas on Divine Power,"
in Atti del Congresso Internazionale per il VII centenario di san Tommaso (Roma-
Napoli, 1974), vol. III, 366-407; H. A. Oberman, Masters of Reformation (Cam-
bridge, 1981); E. Borchert, Der Einfluß des Nominalismus auf die Christologie
der Spätscholastik (Münster, 1940, Beiträge 35, 4-5); W. J. Courtenay, "Neces-
sity and Freedom in Anselm's Conception of God," in Wirkungsgeschichte An-
selms von Canterbury , Analecta Anselmiana 4/2 (1975): 39-64; R. P. Desharnais,
The History of the Distinction between the Absolute and the Ordained Powers of
God and its Influence on Martin Luther (Washington: Catholic University of
America, unpublished PhD thesis, 1966); B. Hamm, Promissio. Pactum. Or-
dinano. Freiheit in Selbstbindung Gottes in der scholastischen Gnadenlehre (Tübin-
gen, 1977); E. Randi, "Potentia Dei conditionata. Una questione di Ugo di
saint-Chér sulla onnipotenza divina," Rivista di Storia della Filosofiay n.s., 39
(1984): 521-36.

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 Ockham , John XXII and the Absolute Power of God 207

rectly taken, it is perfectly orthodox. It is of great relevance not to

conceive the distinction as a description of two different ways of ac-
tion of God-2
1.2 ACERBE PROSEQUITUR. According to Ockham, Pope John
XXII on the contrary refuses to concede the distinction, in every sense
it could assume; he even harshly persecutes someone (maybe Ockham
himself?) who held that God could do de potentia absoluta things he
can not de potentia ordinata .3

2 Ockham, Contra Benedictumy lib.III, c.3: "Unde et distinctionem com-

munem theologorum, quae sane intellecta est fidei consona orthodoxae . . .
erroneam reputai et absurdam, secundum omnem intellectum, quem de ipsa
theologi habere noscuntur. . . (OP III, 230); "Ad cuius evidentiam ad praes-
ens breviter est sciendum, quod ad recte intelligendum distinctionem de poten-
tia Dei absoluta et ordinata . . (OP III, 233); "Qu aliter autem ... sit dicendum
quod Deus posset aliqua de potentia absoluta, quae numquam faciet, non
posset verbis brevibus explicar i, nec illi, qui in scient iis philosophicis et the-
ologicis minime sunt sufficienter instructi, faciliter valerent intelligere

(OP III, 234); Opus Nonaginta Dierum , c.95: ". . .non est in
tinctio, sicut quidam ignari putant, quasi realiter in Deo
tia

absoluta, quae non potest de potentia ordinata, n

tellectum recte intelligentium, quam dicere qu
tarnen minime ordinavit se facturum; quae tarnen
dinata faceret ipsa; quia si faceret ea, ordinaret se
ut dicunt isti, iste impugnatus nescivi videre aeq
"potest", ideo male intellexit illam distinctionem
in hac materia catholice et secure loqui voluerit, n
tiones de possibili et de impossibili et de necessari
diversos sensus illarum de modo sciat distinguer
vel negabit una pro alia et incidet in errorem. Q
est in logica et theologia excellenter instructus, e
tacere quam loqui preter ilia, quae in scripturis r
II, 728).
3 Ockham, Contra Benedictumy lib.III, c.3: "Quare non omnia de neces-
sitate eveniunt, ut publice praedicavit et docuit Ioannes XXII, appellans quen-
dam tenentem contrarium propter hoc haereticum" (OP III 233); Opus
Nonaginta Dierum c.95: "Unde quendam istorum impugnatorum propter il-
lam distinctionem et ilia, quae sequuntur ex ipsa principaliter, acerbe prose-
quitur" (OP II 719).

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2O8 EUGENIO RANDI

1.3 OMNIA DE NECESSITATE EVENIU

according to Ockham, John XXII is to b
of heresy, of a terrible one: without the t
tia Dei absoluta, Ockham claims, the po
that everything happens by necessity.4
These three points have been differe
While the attack against the detestable
to confirm the deep link between Temp
the idea of potentia absoluta , what Ock
jection of the distinction (1.2) was acce
that potentia absoluta was an 'ockhamist
warnings (1.1) admittedly witness to th
of potentia absoluta; Ockham explicitly
ror by refusing all the meanings of pot
Ockham's correct and orthodox one).
warnings; then I will examine the suppo
soluta , and finally John's position.

2. Who is Ockham attacking?

These statements may help us to interprete the debate about the

idea of potentia Dei absoluta that took place early in the XlVth centu-
ry. The first question raised by Ockhanťs texts seem to be: who was
responsible, in Ockhanťs view, for the 'crime' of misunderstanding the
only orthodox meaning of the distinction? As William J.Courtenay
already noted, Ockham's target was probably John Duns Scotus as
well as the pope.5 In fact, concerning the definition and the use of the

4 Ockham, Contra Benedictum , lib.III, c.3: "Ista doctrina- that is, the
one the pope would have maintained in his sermon Tulerunt- patenter as-
serii, non latenter, quod Deus non potest aliquid facere de potentia absolu-
ta, quod non facit de potentia ordinata, quia omnia sunt ordinata a Deo.
Ex quo sequitur evidenter quod nulla creatura potest aliquid facere, quod
non facit; et ita omnia de necessitate eveniunt et nihil penitus contingeret,
sicut quamplures infideles et antiqui haeretici docuerunt, et adhuc occulti
haeretici et laici et vetulae tenent

5 W. J. Courtenay, "The Dialectic of Omn

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 Ockham , John XXII and the Absolute Power of God 209

notion of absolute power, Ockham had facing him two different,

and in some way related, kinds of opponents: Scotists and Papa-
lists.
2.1 THE SCOTISTS. The position, contrasted by Ockham, conceiv-
ing the absolute and the ordained power as 'different powers' or 'ways
of action* in God, can be referred to Scotus* definition: the distinction
is applied by the doctor subtilis not only to God, but to every rational
creature. Moreover, Scotus admittedly claims that potentia absoluta
is greater, or wider, than potentia ordinata (excedit); and that every subject
having power over a law or a system of laws can choose between act-
ing de iure (as Scotus says, that is de potentia ordinata) according to
it, and modifying or trespassing it de facto (that is, by his absolute pow-
er).6 This juridical character of Scotus* definition, as I have shown
elsewhere, met less critical but forceful developments among his disci-
ples.7 It introduced, slightly but evidently, the concept of an 'opera-

Middle Ages," in T. Rudavsky, ed., Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in

Medieval Philosophy (Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster: Reidel, 1985) 243-69:
". . .despite the parallel uses of the distinction in Scotus and Ockham and
the occasional parallels in language, Ockham's repeated and lenghty insis-
tence on the proper meaning of the distinction was directed as much at Sco-
tus' juridical formulation as at John XXIFs misunderstanding and rejection
of the distinction" (254). See also J. Miethke, Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969); K. Bannach, Die Lehre von der doppelten Macht
Gottes bei W. von Ockham (Wiesbaden, 1975); M. Dal Pra, "Sul fondamento
della critica di Occam alla dottrina teocratica," in Mt. Beonio-Brocchieri, ed.,
La chiesa invisibile . Progetti di riforma politico-religiosa nel basso Medioevo (Milano:
Feltrinelli, 1978) 229-42; M. A. Pernoud, "Innovation in Ockham's Refer-
ences to the potentia Dei " Antonianum 45 (1970): 65-97; Pernoud, "The The-
ory of the Potentia Dei According to Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham,"
Antonianum 47 (1972): 69-95.
6 Scotus, Ordinatio , lib.I, d.44, q.un. (ed. Vatic., VI, 364). See Courte-
nay, "The Dialectic," 253-54; F. Oakley, Omnipotence , Covenant and Order.
An Excursion in the History of Ideas from Abaelard to Leibniz (New York: Cor-
nell University Press, 1984) 93-1 18; E. Randi, "La vergine e il papa. Potentia
Dei absoluta e plenitudo potestatis papale nel XIV secolo," History of Political
Thought V (1984): 425-45.
7 See e.g. John of Bassoles, Super I Sententiarum, d.44, q.un. (Parisiis
1517, fols 213vb-241ra); Antonius Andreae, Super IV libros Sententiarum opus}
lib. I, d.44, q.un. (Venetiis: Zenarum, 1578, fol.46r-v); Hugh of Novocastro,

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21 0 EUGENIO RANDI

tionalization' (to use Oberman

Ockham admittedly felt nece
in mind, it is hard to under
the Scotist Hugh de Novocas
can be considered as absolutas,
tia ordinabilis stands for the
solute power. The position o
Meyronnes, who, while rejec
tion, in which he introduces
dinata , that seems indeed to

Super I Sententiarum} d.42, q.2

IV Sententiarurriy lib. I, d.43, q
tentiarum Scriptum , d.44, q.un
980-83); and E. Randi, "A Scotis
solute and the Ordained Power
Ockham to Wyclif, (Proceedings
in Church History , Subsidia 5); "
dell'idea scotista di potentia abs
la volta del mundo . Onnipotenza
Proceedings of the Workshop o
8 In I Sent. y d.42, q.2: "Utrum
tum mundum adnihilare. . . . A
prius de potentia divina, secund
dum quod licet potentia divina
gui tripliciter secundum ration
ordinatam. Potentia absoluta
contradictionem non includit. E
dum illud quod contradictionem
in Deo secundum quam si fieret
quia est determinata per aliquam
ciendum hoc determinate et n
patet." This text is established
B.Nat, lat. 15864, Firenze Laur.
edited the ten questions of Hug
44) as an appendix to my study
nel dibattito sulVidea di potentia
Italia, 1987).
9 Francis of Meyronnes, Super I Vor Sententiarum , lib.I, d 43, q 6, dub. 2
(f.l37ra-b): "Utrum sit in Deo distinguere tertiam potentiam ab istis

dici quod sic, sicut videmus quod aliqua potest de potenti

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 Ockham , John XXII and the Absolute Power of God 211

2.2 THE PAPAUSTS. Hugh of Novocastro was modifying Scotus' dis-

tinction in a manner that Ockham could not accept; also, maybe, be-
cause the 'scotisť 'operationalization' of Goďs absolute power was closer
than Ockham's 'methodological* view to the papalists' claim for an ab-
solute power of the pope. In his political works, Ockham never em-
ploys the distinction; he only uses it when accusing the pope of heresy,
as recalled above, or to attack his opponents' use of potentia absoluta
as synonymous with plenitudo potestatis. There are in fact, as I have
shown elsewhere, several cases of an hierocratical use of the distinc-
tion, intended to support papal claims for direct power of interven-
tion in casibus.10 Here I will therefore only recall that this extension
of the concept of potentia absoluta to the pope can be found also in
treatises, like the one written by Opicinus de* Canistris around 1329,
dedicated to the pope John XXII; as well as in the writings of theologians
very close to the Curia.11

determinatione habita, aliqua de potentia absoluta, aliqua vero de potentia

ordinabili. Tarnen forte nihil continetur in potentia divina virtualiter quin
illud sit ordinabile et sic secunda et tertia non videntur distingui, nisi dicatur
quod absoluta potentia dicatur ilia, ut prescindit ab ordinata alia autem ter-
tia dicatur absoluta cum illa ordinante." It may be useful to recall that Hugh
of Novocastro was among the Franciscans attending the General Chapter
of Perouse, in 1322; see L.Amoros, "Hugo von Novo Castro OFM und sein
Kommentar zum ersten Buch der Sentenzen," Franziskanische Studien 20 (1933):
177-222; V. Heynck, "Der Skotist Hugo de Novocastro OFM. Ein Bericht
über den Stand der Forschung zu seinem Leben und zu seinem Schrifttum,"
Franziskanische Studien 43 (1961): 244-70; A. Teetaert, "Newcastle (Hughues
de)," in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique 11-1, 326-27.
10 See E. Randi, "La vergine e il papa," part. 435-39. W.J.Courtenay,
"The King and the Leaden Coin: the Economic Background of the "Sine Qua
Non' Causality," Traditio 28 (1972): 185-209; J. Holub, "Ordinaria potentia-
absoluta potentia," Revue ďHistoire du Droit Français et Etranger 28 (1950):
92-99; J. Marrone, "The Absolute and Ordained Powers of the Pope: A Quod-
libetal Question of Henry of Ghent," Mediaeval Studies 35 (1974): 7-27; Oak-
ley, "Jacobean Political Theology: The Absolute and Ordinary Powers of the
King," Journal of the History of Ideas 29 (1968): 323-46.
11 Opičino de' Canistris, De preeminentia spiritualis imperii , edited in
Scholz, Unbekannte politische Streitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwig des Bayern , II
(Roma 1914) 97; see also Ockham, Dialogus , pars II, lib.l, c.16 (Lugduni 1494,
f. 188 v a-b).

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212 EUGENIO RANDI

3. A CONDEMNATION O

Ockham affirms that som

ed because of the distincti
as referred to Ockham him
dence of a condemnation o
refer to a couple of instan
difficulties by employing t
considering the distincti
3.1 THE AVIGNON TRIAL.
by Pelzer, of the magistři
tion of 51 articles coming,
whole question of the Avig
Professor Knysh's new disco
Pelzer and others gave 13
ham in Avignon; this sta
But at all events, what ma
that the commission not o
ment about the distinction
offered thanks to the supp
seems to confirm that ther
against a supposed theory

12 Opus XC Dierumy c.95:

propter illam distinctionem et
prosequitur" (OP II, 719); see
and n.58; C. K. Brampton, "Pe
Avignon, 1324-26," Francisc
13 F. Pelzer, "Les 5 1 article
non en 1326," Revue ďHistoir
tři. Dicimus quod iste longu
erroneus et sapit heresim Pel
rationem meriti nobis in prese
facto cum caritate

de potentia dei absoluta, quia argumentum suum proce

cione sicut cum illa". The same can be noted about the
artt. 4 (p.253), 10 (p.255-6), 48 (p.269), 50 (p.269) : "Item
quantum ad positivům et affirmativum potest redire id
tiam divinam et forte per naturam in motu locali. Ma
articulus iste est mere philosophicus et conclusionem

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 Ockharriy John XXII and the Absolute Power of God 213

Knysch's discoveries, moreover, seem to demonstrate that the well-

known pestifera doctrina , the fight against which forces John Lutterell
to stay in Avignon (as it is said in a letter sent by the pope to the
king of England)14 can not be the theory of the potentia Dei absoluta ,
as Brampton believed,15 nor is it probably Ockham's doctrine at all.
3.2 DURANDO CASE. My next example concerns the examination
of a group of theses by Durandus of St.Pourcain, made by a number
of magistři during the well-known controversy about the beatific vi-
sion. Two of the magistři have put on record a solution based on the
concept of the potentia absoluta,16

and to the art. 46 (pp. 268-69: "Item dicit quod videns essentiam divinam et
carens per potentiam divinam absolūtam dilectione dei, potest nolle eum

Magistři. Dicimus quod articulus iste potest transiré sicu

do nolle deum sub aliqua speciali ratione, si tamen suppo
quod videns divinam essentiam possit car er e dilectione
14 The letter, edited by Pelzer, 246 n.3, is directed
II, and dated August 26, 1325. The pope states that J
in returning to England is due to the fact that "quam
quandam doctrinam pestiferam in nostra presencia pros
ipsum quem pro huiusmodi et aliis certis negociis usque
(Reg. Vat. 113 fol 24r). According to Brampton, this doct
much difficulty can be identified with the potentia Dei
suggests it could generically be " l'enseignement profe
bachélier Guillaume ďOckham, notamment dans son
des Sentences."
15 Brampton, 17; but see F. Bottin, La scienza degli occamisti (Rimini:
Maggioli, 1983); Courtenay, "John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini On
Whether God can Undo the Past," Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et
Médiévale 39 (1972): 224-256 and 40 (1973): 147-174.
16 CUP, III, n.975, p.419: "Ad secundum articulum qui talis est: 'Utrum
catholicum an hereticum vel erroneum sit dicere quod Christus non potuit
liberare animas sanctorum de lacu inferni et de vinculis, nisi dando eis ciaram
visionem divine essentie/ responderunt dieti maģistri et dixerunt ipsum ar-
ticulum esse erroneum ut jacet. Dominus autem archiepiscopum Rothomagen-
sis et decanus Lincolniensis predicti dicunt ipsum articulum erroneum, si
intelligatur de potentia absoluta; item si in comparatione ad dicent em vel
argumentum, nichil valet; et insuper dixerunt eum erroneum in compara-
tione ad articulum precedentem. De potentia autem ordinata dicunt quod
non est erroneus. Alii autem magistři non obstante dicta distinctione nichil
voluerunt addere, pro eo quia dicunt articulum istum negare omnem poten-

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214 EUGENIO RANDI

Such examples cannot cancel Oc

someone- Ockham, or someone else- ha
of his own view about Goďs absolute p
evidence to accept Ockhanťs claims, sin
to have been considered as suspect by th

4. THE POSITION OF THE POPE.

These facts could suggest that the pope should not have been so
worried by the distinction, and more importantly, that the distinc-
tion should have not been at all identified with Ockhanťs 'heretical'
theology. Ockham describes John's position as a radical one; but he
bases his account on a sermon (that would begin Tulerunt iusti spolia
impiorum) now lost, that Ockham seem to read in the Chronica of his
confrere Nicholas.17
John's opinion can be found with more certainty in a sermon
preserved in a manuscript of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, a
sermon that can be dated to around 1330. 18 In this sermon, the pope
refuses, as a matter of fact, to admit that the distinction is in any way
meaningful; but it is interesting to note that he authoritatively confirms
its use by the papalists to support papal power. Moreover, his argu-
ments for rejecting the distinction are not exactly the same that Ock-

tiam." The two referred masters were Petrus Rothomagensis and Anselmus
Bee; among others, members of the commission were Geraldus Odonis, Chat-
ton and Lutterell himself.
17 Ockham, Contra Benedictumy lib.III, c.3 (OP III, 230-1); see Offler's
introduction, p. xviii, and Valois, "Jacclues Duèse," Histoire Littéraire de la
France 34 (1914), 549-51; C. Dolcini, Il pensiero politico di Michele da Cesena
(Faenza, 1977) 13.
18 This sermon is published by E. Randi, "Il rasoio contro Ockham? Un
sermone inedito di Giovanni XXII," Medioevo 11 (1983): 179-98; see also J.
Dykmans, Sermons sur la vision béatifique (Roma, 1973) 23 and n.2; 32; 76;
N. Valois, "Jacques Duèse," 537-8; A. Maier, "Annotazioni autografe di
Giovanni XXII in codici vaticani" (now in Ausgehendes Mittelalter . Gesam-
melte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14 . Jahrhunderts , Roma 1967, II, 81-96);
G. Mollat, "Jean XXII," Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique 8-1, 638-40; E.
Pasztor, "Una raccolta di sermoni di Giovanni XXII," Bollettino delVArchivio
Paleografico Italiano 2 (1956-7): 265-81.

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 Ockharriy John XXII and the Absolute Power of God 215

ham attributes to him in the Contra Benedictum. Actually, the pope

seems to have seen potentia absoluta as an empty, useless tool; and to
be afraid (almost in an ockhamist way. . .) of the dangers of its eventu-
al 'operationalization'.19

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS: A PROBLEM, NOT A THEORY

This short survey of the debate obviously gives room for further
discussion. Yet what seems to me to be clear, is the fact that Ock-
ham^ polemical warnings were not directed to an hypothetical oppo-
nent, nor just to the pope: rather, they were aimed against those
interpretations of the concept of potentia absoluta that Ockham used
to call 'misunderstandings*. But from an historical point of view, these
'misunderstandings* constituted as a matter of fact a different position,
having its own revenge: the 'operationalization' of Goďs potentia ab-
soluta will survive Ockham's insults and will appear even in the works
of philosophers aiming to be considered 'ockhamists'.

19 Randi, "Il rasoio" 191: "Aliqui dicunt quod in Deo est dupplex poten-
tia, quedam absoluta et quedam ordinata. Loquendo de potentia ordinata
dicunt quod non potuit impedir i; loquendo vero de potentia absoluta dicunt
quod Deus potuit hoc impedire. Ego quero adhuc de utraque potentia, quid
est, scilicet de potentia absoluta et ordinata. Quidam dicunt: intelligimus
potentiam ordinatam illam que operatur secundum regulas generales institu-
ías a Deo et sequitur illas, ut quod ex viro et muliere homo generetur. Ab-
solūtam vero intelligimus illam que operatur secundum leges speciales et
sequitur illas, ut quod mulier sine viro concipiat aut virgo pariat. Frater, istud
non intelligo, quia sicut leges communes ordinant, ita leges speciales ordinant,
ymo multo melius. Alii dicunt: intelligimus ordinatam potentiam illam qua
Deus ordinavit ab eterno fienda; absolūtam vero illam qua potest suspen-
dere illa que ab eterno sint ordinata; sicut est de papa, ut dicunt, qui de pleni-
tudine potest atis potest immutare ilia que ab aliis ordinata sint, maxime si
non tangant fidem. Frater, nec istud intelligo, nec verum credo, unde quod
papa possit immutare ilia que ab aliis ordinata sunt hoc est propter defectum
humane providentie, que non potest omnia previdere; et ideo quando veniunt
casus et necessitates improvise oportet quod aliter ordinetur in multis. Et ita
patet quod illud non fit propter potentiam, sed magis propter defectum potent-
ie: sed in Deo est e contrario qui omnia previdet infallibiliter, ymo omnia
sunt sibi presentía, et ita ordinavit ab eterno omnia fienda." But see also pp.
192-95.

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 2I6 EUGENIO RANDI

In my opinion, we should then avoid

theory of potentia Dei absoluta , as it on
a mental climate moving in one and on
reckon with the fact that, at least in th
tinction was a problem, which almost
which were offered very different solu

Università di M ilanõ Eugenio Randi

Milano, Italy

20See e. g. G. Gài, "Petrus de Trabibus on the Absolute and Ordinate

Power of God," in R. S. Almagno, C. L. Harkins, eds., Studies Honoring I.
C. Brady OFM (New York: The Franciscan Institute St. Bonaventure, 1976):
283-92; Courtenay, "The Critique of Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun
and Nominalism," Harvard Theological Review 66 (1973); A. De Muralt,
"Epoché-Malin génie -théologie de la toute-puissance divine," Studia
Philosophica 26 (1966): 159-91; W. Dettloff, Die Entwicklung der Akzeptations-
und Verdienstlehre von Duns Scotus bis Luther (Münster 1963, Beiträge 40-2);
J.- F. Genest, "Pierre de Ceffons et l'hypothèse du Dieu trompeur," in Z.Kaluza,
P. Vignaux, eds., Preuve et raisons à VUniversité de Paris. Logique, ontologie et
théologie au XlVe siècle (Paris: Vrin, 1984) 197-214; E. Grant, "The Condem-
nation of 1277, Goďs Absolute Power and Physical Thought in the Late Mid-
dle Ages," Viator 10 (1979): 21 1-44; Grant, Much Ado About Nothing. Theories
of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1981); T. Gregory, "Dio ingannatore e genio maligno. Nota
in margine alle Meditationes di Descartes," Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana
55 (1974): 477-516; T. Gregory, "La tromperie divine," Studi Medievali 3rd
series, 23 (1982): 519-27; S. Knuuttila, "Time and Modality in Scholasticism,"
in S. Knuuttila, ed., Reforging the Great Chain of Being (Dordrecht, Boston,
Lancaster: Reidel, 1981), 163-258 (with the review of A. De Libera, "Bulletin
ďhistoire de la logique," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 69
(1985): 273-309); F. Oakley, "Pierre ďAilly and the Absolute Power of God:
Another Note on the Theology of Nominalism," Harvard Theological Review
56 (1963): 59-73; H. A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology : Gabriel
Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1967, II ed.); H.
A. Oberman, "The Shape of Late Medieval Thought: the Birthpangs of the
Modern Era," in H. A. Oberman, Ch. Trinkhaus, eds., The Pursuit of Holi-
ness, 3-25; H. A. Oberman, "Reformation and Revolution: Copernicus's Dis-
covery in an Era of Change," in J. E. Murdoch, E. D. Sylla, eds., The Cultural
Context of Medieval Learning , Proc. of the 1st Intern. Colloquium on
Philosophy, Science and Theology in the Middle Ages, Sept. 1973 (Dordrecht,
Boston: Reidel, 1975) 397-429; discussion , 429-35.

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