Case Name: Stephens v.

Myers
(1830)
January19,2016Cloud

Case Name: Stephens v. Myers (1830)

Fact:
The plaintiff was in chair at a parish meeting. The defendant who sat at the same
table some six or seven places away from the plaintiff because vociferous and
interrupted the proceeding of the meeting. By majority it was resolved that he
expelled. He said he would rather pull the plaintiff out of the chair them be
ejected and he advanced with a clenched fist at the plaintiff but was stopped by
the churchwardens who were sitting next but one to the plaintiff.
Fact in Issues:
Whether the act of defendant was liable for assault or not?
Decision:
It was held that defendant was liable for assault plaintiff must be entitled to have
remedy.
Reasoning:
It is the fear of immediate violence is reasonable created in the mind of the
plaintiff the fact that the defendant was stopped does not affected actionability
for the wrong is already done.

ST EPH EN S V MY ER S; CCP 17 JUL 183 0

July2,2015 dls 0 Torts Ot her,

References: (1830) C & P 349, [1830] EWHC KB J37, [1830] 172 ER 735
Links: Bailii
Coram: Tindal CJ
In a turbulent parish council meeting, the meeting voted to have the defendant
ejected. He refused, and advanced toward the chairman waving his clenched fist
and saying he would rather throw him from the chair. He was stopped before
getting within striking distance, but the chairman sued for assault.
Held:
The claim succeeded. Tindal CJ said: It is not every threat, when there is no
actual personal violence, that constitutes an assault, there must, in all cases, be
the means of carrying the threat into effect.
This case is cited by:

Cited Mbasogo, President of the State of Equatorial Guinea and Another

-v- Logo Ltd and others CA (Bailii, [2006] EWCA Civ 1370, Times 27-Oct-06,
[2007] 2 WLR 1062)
The claimant alleged a conspiracy by the defendants for his overthrow by
means of a private coup detat. The defendants denied that the court had

jurisdiction. The claimants appealed dismissal of their claim to damages.

Held: The claims were . .

Cited Mbasogo, President of the State of Equatorial Guinea and others -vLogo Ltd and others QBD (Bailii, [2005] EWHC 2034 (QB))
The court was asked whether a crime, which was not an actionable tort,
constituted unlawful means for the purposes of the tort of conspiracy to
injure by unlawful means. . .

Read v. Coker
Common Bench
13 C.B. 850, 138 Eng. Rep. 1437 (1853)

Facts
Read (plaintiff) was a paper-stainer who rented premises from Coker
(defendant). After Read fell 16 weeks behind in rent, Coker employed Holliwell to
obtain the past-due amount. Because Read did not have the amount due, he
suggested that Holliwell purchase most of the fixtures Read used in his trade as
collateral. Holliwell agreed and subsequently sold the items to Coker. Thereafter,
Read and Coker came to an agreement by which Read would be able to continue
using his trade fixtures in his employment and Coker would pay Reads rent.
Coker became dissatisfied with the arrangement and ousted Read. Days later,
Read came back to the premises and refused to leave when ordered by Coker.
Coker and some of his workmen surrounded Read, rolled up their sleeves, and
threatened to break Reads neck if he did not leave. Fearing that the men would
injure him, Read left and subsequently filed an action for assault against Coker.
The trial judge left it to the jury to determine whether Coker had an intent to
assault Read. The jury found for Read and Coker appealed.

https://archive.org/details/selectionofcases00amesuoft

BATTERY
Tort of battery is committed by the intentional application of force to another
person by direct means or through an unwelcome physical contact,
irrespective of the presence of an intent to harm or hostility.
Elements of Tort
1. Direct act of defendant
2. Act complained of must be voluntary
3. State of mind of defendant
4. There must be physical contact with the person of plaintiff
5. Lack of Consent
6. Positive act not omission

Direct act of defendant

Cases:

SCOTT V SHEPHERD contact must be a

Brief Fact Summary.

Defendant threw a lighted squib, made of gunpowder, from the street into the
marketplace where large groups of people were assembled. The lighted squib
landed near Yates. To prevent injury to himself and Yates, Willis threw the quid
across the marketplace. The squib landed next to Ryal. To save his own goods
from being injured, Ryal picked up the squib and threw it to another part of the
marketplace. The squib then struck Plaintiff in the face. The combustible matter
of the lighted squib injured Plaintiffs eyes. Plaintiff lost the use of his eye. Plaintiff

sued Defendant for trespass and assault for throwing, casting, and tossing the
lighted squib. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appealed.
Issue. Did the injury received by Plaintiff arise from the force of the original act of
Defendant, or from a new force by a third person?
Held
Yes. Judgment for Plaintiff affirmed.
* (C.J. DeGrey) The question here is whether the injury received by Plaintiff
arises from the force of the original act of Defendant, or from a new force by a
third person. Here, the injury is the direct and immediate act of the Defendant.
Throwing the squib was an unlawful act. Mischief was originally intended not
any particular mischief, but mischief indiscriminate and wanton. Defendant is the
author of whatever mischief thereafter that follows. All that was done subsequent
to the original throwing was a continuation of the first force and first act, which will
continue until the squib was spent by bursting.
* Any innocent person removing the danger from himself to another is justifiable.
The blame falls upon Defendant, the first thrower. Willis and Ryal were acting
under a compulsive necessity for their own safety and self-preservation. Their
throwing of the squib was not a separate trespass, but a continuation of
Defendants original trespass.
Dissent.
(J. Blackstone) An action did not lie for Plaintiff against Defendant.
* The lawfulness or unlawfulness of the original act is not the criterion. For an
action of trespass to lie, the injury must be immediate, not merely consequential.
The only determination should be whether the injury to Plaintiff was immediate or
consequential. In this case, Defendants tortious act was complete when the
squib landed near Yates. Yates can protect himself from the squib, but should do
so in a manner as not injury others. Defendant is not liable for the new motion
and new direction given to the squib.
* It is said that the act is not complete, nor the squib at rest, until after it is spent
or exploded. A stone that has been thrown against the window has the ability of
doing fresh mischief. If any person gives that stone a new motion and does
further mischief, trespass will not lie against the original thrower. If a man tosses
a football into the street and, after being kicked about by one hundred people, it
at last breaks a tradesmans window, the man who gave it that mischievous
direction is the only one liable.
* In this case, trespass would lie against Ryal, the immediate actor. Ryal did not

use sufficient care in removing the danger from himself. Throwing the squib,
instead of brushing it down, was unnecessary and incautious. Defendant is
answerable in trespass for all the direct and inevitable effects caused by his own
immediate act the throwing the squib at Yates.
Concurrence. (J. Nares) The natural and probable consequence of the act done
by Defendant was injury to somebody, and therefore the act was illegal at
common law. Being unlawful, Defendant was liable to answer for the
consequences, be the injury mediate or immediate.

Discussion.
The decision in this case depends on how far the Court wants to extend liability.
Defendants are liable for direct injuries. A direct injury is an injury that is the
cause in fact of Plaintiffs damage and is not too far remote in the chain of
causation. Conversely, Defendants are not liable for consequential injuries. A
consequential injury is an injury that is the cause in fact of Plaintiffs damage but
is not closely enough tied to the damage in the chain of cause action. The
difference between the two is arbitrary and decided by the courts. Both direct
injuries and consequential injures are injuries that did in fact cause the damage
complained of. The difference between the in the number of steps required in the
chain of events. A direct injury will be one that requires only a few causal steps to
go from the breach of the duty to the damage that resulted. A consequential
injury will be one that requires more casual steps.

NB: The Defendants act was direct and not consequential. Willis and
Ryalls acts were merely a continuation of the defendants act.
The acts of intermediaries arising directly and naturally out of the first act
are a continuation of the defendants initial act.

'The terror impressed upon Willis and Ryall excited self-defence

and deprived them of the power of recollection. What they did was
therefore inevitable consequences of the defendants unlawful act'.

Leame v Bray
Throwing a log on a highway which later trips someone is not direct a direct act
Covell v. Laming

D steered his boat into that of P thereby causing injury to P. It was argued that
unless plaintiff could show that D intended to bring his ship into P and did so
willfully action in trespass must fail. (Lord Ellenborough)
D was at the helm and guided the motion of his vessel. The winds and the
waves were only instrumental in carrying him along in the direction, which he
communicated. The force therefore proceeded from him, and the injury which the
P sustained was the immediate effect of that force.
NB: from the cases the defendants conduct must have caused the basis of P
complaint. in the case of battery that would be physical contact.

2. Act must be Voluntary

This focuses on controllability and not whether the act was done
willfully or not.
Gibson v Pepper
D rode a horse which took fright and sped off with D. D couldnt stop
the horse and so raised an alarm for pedestrians to move away. P
wasnt fast enough to move away and was run over by the horse. The
D tried to show that accident was inevitable.
Held: If P rides a horse and A whips the horse so it runs away with P
and runs over another, A and not P would be liable to battery. But if P
spurs on the horse which leads to the accident P would be liable.
Similarly if, A takes Ps hand and strikes the horse, A will still be
liable.

3. State of mind
To succeed P must establish that D acted intentionally or negligently.

There must be a thing like negligent trespass or a battery. However this was
doubted in the case letang v. Cooper ( Lord Denning observed)
Letang v Cooper
Facts and Decisions
A woman was sunbathing in a hotel area, which was close to the carpark. The defendant
accidentally reversed, crushing her legs. There was no intention to hurt her, but she could
have sued for negligence. She decided she wanted to sue after the limitation period (3 years),
so choose battery to get compensation. Lord Denning felt there could be no overlap for
trespass and negligence; Lord Diplock felt there may be.
Held: The Court of Appeal, consisting of Lord Denning MR, Diplock LJ and Danckwerts LJ,

held unanimously that since Mr Cooper's actions were negligent rather than intentional, the
statute of limitations barring claims actions for damage caused by negligence applied. Mrs
Letang could not recover her damages because her claim was late.

Wilson v Pringle
Theplaintiffandthedefendantweretwoschoolboysinvolvedinanincidentina
schoolcorridorastheresultofwhichtheplaintifffellandsufferedinjuries.The
plaintiffissuedawritclaimingdamagesandallegingthatthedefendanthad
committedatrespasstothepersonoftheplaintiff.Inhisdefencethedefendant
admittedthathehadindulgedinhorseplaywiththeplaintiffandonthebasisofthat
admissiontheplaintiffappliedforsummaryjudgmentunderRSCOrd14.The
registrarrefusedtoenterjudgmentbutonappealbytheplaintiffthejudgeheldthat
thedefendanthadadmittedthathisacthadcausedtheplaintifftofallandinthe
absenceofanyallegationofexpressorimpliedconsentthedefenceamountedtoan
admissionofbatteryandconsequentlyanunjustifiedtrespasstotheperson.He
accordinglygavetheplaintiffleavetoenterJudgment.Thedefendantappealedtothe
CourtofAppeal,contendingthattheessentialingredientsoftrespasstotheperson
wereadeliberatetouching,hostilityandanintentiontoinflictinjury,andtherefore
horseplayinwhichtherewasnointentiontoinflictinjurycouldnotamounttoa
trespasstotheperson.Theplaintiffcontendedthattheremerelyhadtobean
intentionalapplicationofforce,suchashorseplayinvolved,regardlessofwhetherit
wasintendedtocauseinjury.
HeldAnintentiontoinjurewasnotanessentialingredientofanactionfortrespass
totheperson,sinceitwasthemeretrespassbyitselfwhichwastheoffenceand
thereforeitwastheactratherthantheinjurywhichhadtobeintentional.However,
theintentionalact,intheformofanintentionaltouchingorcontactinsomeform,had
tobeprovedtobeahostiletouching,andhostilitycouldnotbeequatedwithillwill
ormalevolence,orgovernedbytheobviousintentionshowninactslikepunching,
stabbingorshootingorsolelybyanexpressedintention,althoughthatcouldbestrong
evidence.Whethertherewashostilitywasaquestionoffactineverycase.Sincethe
defencedidnotadmitahostileactonthepartofthedefendanttherewereliableto

judicialtrialissueswhichpreventedtheentryofsummaryjudgment.Theappeal
wouldthereforebeallowed,andthedefendantsgivenunconditionalleavetodefend.

4.Theremustbephysicalcontactwiththepersonofplaintiff
Thiscanbepersontopersonorthroughaninstrument.
Cases
DumbellvRoberts
PwhileonhiswayhomefromworkinhisemployersuniformwasstoppedbyDfor
questioningonsomesoapflakeshewascarrying.DissatisfiedwithPsanswers,D
arrestedanddetainedP,butmadenoenquiriesastohisnameoraddress.Inactionfor
FalseimprisonmementScottLJmadehisstatementthatitistrespasstotakethe
fingersofapersonincustodybutnotyetconvictedorevencommittedfortrial
withouthisorherconsent.
Faganv.MetropolitanPoliceCommissioner
A policeman was directing the defendant to park his car. The defendant
accidentally drove onto the policeman's foot. The policeman shouted at
him to get off. The defendant refused to move. The defendant argued
at the time of the actus reus, the driving onto the foot, he lacked
the mens rea of any offence since it was purely accidental. When he
formed the mens rea, he lacked the actus reus as he did nothing.
Where there is a battery it does not matter whether the battery is
inflicted directly by the body of the offender or through the medium of
some weapon or instrument controlled by the action of the defendant.
Dodwell v. Burford
DstruckahorsewhichtheplaintiffwasridingandPwasthrownoffandgotinjuredin
theprocess.Heldthatitwasbattery.

6.LACKOFCONSENT
Pmustprovethatheorshedidnotconsenttothecontact.Thiscanbeprovedinthree
ways.
I.

ExpressConsentitsnotbatteryifDprovesPexpresslyagreedor
submittedtocontract.Christpherv.BarryDsuggestedthatPwas
assaultedwithconsent.Itwasheldthatanassaultmustbeagaintthewill
ofthepartassaulted,thusitcantbesaidthatapartyhasbeenassaulted
withhispermission.Nashv.SheenPaskedahairdresserforapermanent
wave.DdyedPshairinunpleasantcolourandcausedhimrashallover.

II.

III.

Held:DyewasappliedwithoutPsexpressconsent.Expressconsentwas
givenforapermanentwave.Thustherewasbattery.
PresumptionofConsentthereispresumptioningeneralofconsentto
allnonhostilecontactsmerelyincidentaltolivinginacommunity.Thusin
Colevturner,HoltCJsaid,iftwoormoremeetinanarrowpassageand
withoutanyviolenceordesignofharm,onetouchestheothergently,no
battery.Butoneinadesiretogainadvantageshovesanotherasideinan
inordinateandviolentmanner,thisisatrespass.
PrivilegedContact:

7. Positive act or omission

In battery liability depends on an act, not a failure/omission/ refusal to act. The
maxim is Not doing is Not Trespass
Innes v. Wylie :
Facts

A police officer was blocking a doorway

The claimant ran into him and bounced off, suffering personal
injury

Issue

Could a claim in either battery or false imprisonment succeed?

Decision

No
Reasoning

In the battery claim, there was no intent, nor an act; the act was
of the claimant

In the false imprisonment claim, the officer had just omitted to

move, so had again not acted

Both claims therefore failed

ASSAULT

This tort provides relief for a mere emotional disturbance unaccompanied by

external physical contact. Assault seeks to protect the plaintiffs interest in
freedom from being subjected to mental anxiety.