Philosophical Review

Spinoza and Language Author(s): David Savan Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Apr., 1958), pp. 212-225 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2182614 Accessed: 20/10/2010 10:45
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SPINOZA AND LANGUAGE1

I
PHILOSOPHICAL analysts have made a number of moves
toward a reassessment of the history of philosophy. It might be expected that such historical studies would consider how the views which philosophers have held on language, mathematics, and logic have affected their thought and its formulation. Any such expectations have so far been largely disappointed. In his recent and lucid exposition of Spinoza, Mr. Stuart Hampshire points out that Spinoza hoped to emulate the example of the geometers in freeing language of its intimate connection with the imagination so that it might be employed to express clearly and distinctly the ideas of a true philosophy.2 Spinoza's interest in language and in the bearing of language upon philosophy is, however, considerably more important in the shaping of his thought and writings than Hampshire indicates. It is not just that Spinoza wrote a treatise on a natural language, or that nearly every one of his writings attempts some analysis of language and mathematics. Nor is it just that he experimented with a variety of literary forms in the exposition of his thought, using dialogue, autobiography, aphorism, historical and Biblical criticism, as well as the method of geometrical demonstration. Nor again is it just that he occasionally formulates philosophical theses in syntactical terms. It is also that Spinoza holds that both language and mathematics are fundamentally inadequate to the formulation or direct expression of philosophical truths. Hampshire's view, widely shared-that Spinoza thought words could divorce the imagination in order to marry true philosophy-is, I believe, wrong. I shall argue that Spinoza's views on words and
1 A version of this paper was read to the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, held at Boston University, December 27-29, 1955. 2 Spinoza (London, 23-24, 93I95I), pp. I8-20,
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language make it impossible for him to hold that his writings (or anyone else's) can be a direct or literal exposition of philosophical truth. I shall conclude with a suggestion as to what Spinoza intended his writings to accomplish and how he thought they could do it. II Spinoza states clearly enough that imagination or opinion, knowledge of the first and lowest kind, is of two species: (i) "vague experience," or images proper, and (2) "signs" or "hearsay," as "when we hear or read certain words."3 His theory of words is in its outlines a familiar one. Words are nothing more than bodily motions. These motions are the responses of the human body to the action upon it of external bodies. The idea of such a motion will be mutilated, confused, and inadequate, since it can be properly understood only in conjunction with the ideas of the external motions which induced it. Since we do not know its cause we will either suppose it to be uncaused or to be induced by some final cause. Bodily motions which have once occurred together will tend to recur together, in company with their attendant circumstances. These attendant circumstances include our purposes, desires, and interests. In this way words arise from experience and refer to experience. They express the constitution of our own body rather than the nature of external bodies. The soldier may connect with the word "horse" the image of a war horse, armored, and in battle, while the farmer will call up the image of a slow and heavy animal plowing the fields. Further, the limitations of the human body ensure that as a word is associated with a growing number of images the differences among the images will increasingly be overlooked. The number and significance of the differences thus canceled out will vary directly with the number of images with which a word is asso3Ethics, II, XL, S. 2. The following account of words is based primarily on Book II of the Ethics, but substantially the same views are to be found in the Improvementof the Understanding. In later citations the following abbreviations will be used for Spinoza's titles: Ethics, E.; Improvementof the Understanding, TdIE; Tractatus theologico-politicus, Tr. Theol.-pol.; Cogitata metaphysica, C. m.; Letters, Ep.
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DAVID SAVAN

ciated. Such transcendental terms as being, thing, and something are associated with every image without exception. Hence, in these cases, all differences will be canceled, all images will be conflated, and the terms will be utterly confused. A lesser degree of the same confusion is illustrated by universal terms like man, horse, dog, and so forth. In the case of universals the selection of differences to be overlooked and resemblances taken into account will vary from individual to individual, according to the desires and interests which each person imagines. So some will imagine man as a featherless biped, some as an animal capable of laughter, and some as a rational animal. Such definitions are not so much true or false as well- or ill-adapted to the purposes of those who frame them. The imaginative, general, and confused character of words is, in Spinoza's view, not contingent or accidental. It is not the result of ignorance and cannot be eliminated by knowledge. It is rather the necessary consequence of the action of external bodies upon our body. In the same way we necessarily continue to imagine the sun as near even after we know its true distance. No purgative can eliminate the imaginative and confused generality of words. Hovering in the wings, only just off stage, when Spinoza speaks of words, is the image of sleeping and dreaming. While words are joined through syntax, the material flow of language in speech is conceived by him as a kind of dreaming. Speech, fiction, error, and madness are ranges-perhaps there are others-of a dream madness continuum. In the lower ranges of this continuum-in and dreams proper-we are almost entirely unaware of the external motions which stimulate our own bodily motions and their images. In the upper ranges-in error, fiction, and speech-we are aware of the external motions in a confused way but wrongly attribute our own images to them. It is easiest to fall into the error of supposing our motions and images to be true of the external world when we speak a language which, like Hebrew, tends to treat adjectives as nouns. All languages, however, exhibit this same tendency to some extent, and it is the task of the philosopher to reverse the process as far as possible. To do this properly he must have some knowledge of the factors determining memory
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and recollection, upon which speech in part depends. Without this knowledge he is like an amanuensis who reproduces a book written in a script and language which he does not understand.4 In nearly every important respect, Spinoza opposes true ideas to words. An idea is not an image and does not consist of words. A true idea can neither arise from experience of words and images nor can it be verified through such experience, for experience can give no know edge of essences.5 Whereas ideas and their ideata are singular and unique,6 rds are inherently general and applicable to an indefinite multitude. Whereas an idea is certain, words are uncertain. Whereas "that true Word of God which is in the mind ... can never be depraved or corrupted,"7 words are corruptible. And whereas it is of the nature of reason to consider things as necessary and under a certain form of eternity, words are connected with contingency and time. So sharply does Spinoza separate words from adequate ideas that it is difficult to make out for language any useful philosophical function at all. It is no more possible for us to discover and express true knowledge through language than it is for a somnambulist to communicate intelligently with the waking world. Spinoza explicitly rejects the semantic theory of truth. If Peter exists and without knowing this I happen to assert, "Peter exists," my assertion is not true.8 Now suppose that Peter exists, that I know that he exists, and that while I am sound asleep I either say, "Peter exists" or dream that I say, "Peter exists." It is clear that on Spinoza's view the sentence "Peter exists" is in these circumstances not true. Now, in this example, substitute "God" for "Peter." This is the situation to which the writings of the philosopher are condemned by the imaginative and dreamlike character which, on Spinoza's view, is necessary to language. It is one thing to know that God exists and quite another to dream that I know, to imagine that I know, or to say that I know that
4Ep. 40. 5 Ep. io and TdIE, par. 25; cf. also Ep. 37; E., II, XLIII, S; E., V, XXVIII. 6 Although common motions, common notions, and properties are in a sense general, they are nevertheless either singular modes, whether finite or infinite, or real properties of such modes. 7Ep. 76. Cf. also Tr. Theol.-pol., ch. xv. 8 TdIE, par. 69. Cf. Ep- 40.
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God exists. How then can language represent, express, or formulate the clear and distinct ideas of the true philosophy? After separating the two so radically Spinoza appears to show no interest in explaining how they may be brought together. If he was aware of this situation, then he cannot have intended that the Ethics should be a simple and straightforward exposition of his philosophy.9 III Was Spinoza aware that his views made it difficult to accept any verbal account as a direct exposition of the true philosophy? It would be strange if he were not, in view of the evidence of his writings. It should be noted first, however, that this difficulty is hardly a novel one. Its lineage can be traced at least to the Parmenidesof Plato. The radical inadequacy of words is something which Spinoza points out emphatically and repeatedly in most of his writings. The most telling evidence that Spinoza was aware of this difficulty is to be found in the contradictions which abound in his Ethics, as well as in his other writings. If Spinoza were trying to catch the clear, distinct, and unique ideas of a true philosophy in the net of a language which is inherently vague and general, he would expect contradictory statements to appear in his exposition. Many such statements do occur in the Ethics, often in such close proximity to one another that it is hardly believable that so careful a writer as Spinoza was not aware of them. Since he allows the contradictions to stand it is to be presumed that he did not intend the Ethics to be a simple exposition of truth. The contradictions to which I refer may be classified as follows: (a) those arising from the attempt to define in words the nature of the unique entity, substance; (b) those arising from the attempt to define or describe the unique properties of substance; and (c) those arising from attempts to define or describe modes or modal essences.
9 The inadequacy of Spinoza's theory of language will be obvious to the reader today, and of course the particular difficulty with which I am concerned will not arise in a more adequate theory of language. 2i6

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(a) Are the definitions of substance and God10 intended by Spinoza as adequate formulations of our knowledge? Yet he disowns the terms used in these definitions. Substance "is in itself and conceived through itself." The term being, however, together with the other transcendental, is called by Spinoza "in the highest degree confused."1 The term conceiveis a universal term only somewhat less general and confused than being. For by conceivehe wishes "to express the action of the mind," that is to say, understanding.12 But, he writes, "In the mind there exists no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. These and the like faculties, therefore, are either altogether fictitious, or else are nothing but metaphysical or universal entities, which we are in the habit of forming from individual cases.'"13As to being conceived throughitself, the purity of this notion is at least compromised by Spinoza's repeated attempts to conceive the activity of substance through something else-namely, through geometry. God is defined as "being absolutely infinite." It has already been pointed out that Spinoza rejects the term being.By "infinite," the other important word in this definition, is meant "absolute affirmation of existence of some kind."'14But he equates existence with the transcendental, being. Like being, existence is general, abstract, and confused.15 It is obvious that Spinoza wishes to refer his readers to a being and an existence which is concrete, singular, and unique. It is clear also, however, that he is willing to use language which he regards as radically inadequate. When he writes that "the reason why we do not possess a knowledge of God as distinct as that which we have of common notions is .. . [that] we have attached the name God to the images of things which we are in the habit of seeing, an error we can hardly avoid,"16 he is speaking of philosophical as well as of popular uses of the word "God." (b) A second and more obvious set of contradictions occurs in
10 E., 12 E.,
13

1 E., II,

I, def. 3, 6.
XL, S. 1.

II, def. iii, and E., IV, xxiii if. E., II, XLVIII, S.
XLV,

14 E., I, viii, S. 1. 15 TdIE, par 55; cf. E., II,

S.

16

E.) II,

XLVII, S.
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DAVID SAVAN

the discussion of the properties of substance or God. In the Ethics unity, love, joy, will, intellect, and perfection, are all both explicitly affirmed and explicitly denied of substance. The demonstration that God is one-both single and simpleis listed by Spinoza in the Appendix to Book I of the Ethics as a major conclusion. Nevertheless, in Book I he also writes that "a definition does not involve or express any certain number of individuals."17 What this means in regard to substance or God is as stated more explicitly in the early Cogitata metaphysical well as in a letter written late in Spinoza's life. "It is certain that he who calls God one or single has no true idea of God, or is speaking of him inappropriately."'18 Again, he writes that "properly speaking, God loves no one."19 Yet, a few propositions later, he attempts to demonstrate that "God loves himself," and that "God . . . loves men."20 Since he has defined love as involving pleasure, he attempts to demonstrate that God "cannot be affected with any affect of joy or sorrow." But he goes on to contradict himself by writing that "the nature of God delights in infinite perfection" and that God's love "is joy [granting that it is allowable to use this word], accompanied with the idea of Himself."21 With respect to will and intellect, we are offered a demonstration that they can no more be ascribed to God than flesh and blood can be ascribed to the constellation of the Dog. Nevertheless, he continues, and in the same book of the Ethics, to speak of God's intellect and will.22 Although Spinoza follows tradition in calling God perfect, when he discusses the origin and meaning of the word in the Preface to Book IV of the Ethics, he identifies it as only a mode of thought, an ens rationis formed through the comparison of particular things and sharing the generality and confusion previously ascribed to "being." Other properties of God, such as freedom
17
18

19 20
21

E., I, VIII, S. 2. Ep. 50, and C. m., I, 6. E., V, xvii, C.

22

E., V, xxxv and xxxvi, C. E., V, XVII, xxxv, and xxxvi, S. E., I, xvii, S.; E., I, xxxiii, S. 2.
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and eternity, are explained through the notion of existence, already discussed above. (c) In discussing modes and natura naturataSpinoza's theory of words leads him into two kinds of difficulties. First, he ascribes to some modes properties previously defined by him as applicable only to natura naturans. So he speaks of man as free and man's mind as an "eternal mode of thought." He speaks also of necessary, infinite, and eternal modes which exist under every attribute of God.23 Nevertheless, it is evident from the definitions of the words "free," "eternal," "infinite," and "necessary," given at the beginning of the Ethics, that these words can apply only to God as naturanaturals. He demonstrates, indeed, that "God alone is a free cause" and that he differs radically in essence and existence from every mode.24 To apply to a mode a term which applies to natura naturansis like expecting the constellation of the Dog to bark. Second, when Spinoza applies to modes terms which are proper to natura naturatahe again contradicts himself. Desire, he states, is the essence of man, and desire which springs from reason is the essence of the human mind insofar as it acts. This in turn is nothing other than the effort to understand.25 But we have pointed out above that Spinoza regards desire, understanding, and will as either altogether fictitious or else as metaphysical or universal entities. Furthermore, insofar as they designate characteristics which are common to a number of modes, they cannot form the essence of any individual mode.26 Consider next the word "good." Spinoza speaks of knowledge of good (and of evil) which is true, adequate, and certain.27 Nevertheless, he writes also that the notion good is an "entity of the imagination," "indicates nothing positive in things considered in themselves," and is general or universal.28 In fact, "if men were
23 25 26 27 28

24 E., XXVI.

E., IV, LXVI ff.; E., V, XL, S.; E., I, xxi-xxIIi. , Xvii. E., III, ix, S., and Appendix, def. 1; E., IV,
E., II, xxxvii. E., IV, xiv ff.; E., IV,
xxvii ff. E., I, App.; E., IV, Pref.; E., IV,

LIX, LXI;

E., IV, xxiii,

LXII, S.

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born free [and were led by reason alone], they would form no conception of good and evil."29 A similar difficulty arises in Spinoza's discussion of the passions. Although these are inadequate and confused ideas, we can nonetheless form some clear and distinct conception of them. They follow with the same natural necessity as do other modes, they may be understood through their causes and properties, and the method pursued in the discussion of God and the mind is to be applied to them. It would appear, then, that the discussion of the passions in Book III of the Ethics is a direct statement of our knowledge of the passions. Spinoza writes, however, that "there are as many kinds of each affect as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected; . . . men are affected in different ways by one and the same object . . .; and, finally . . . one and the same man is affected in different ways towards the same object."30 His analyses and definitions must, therefore, overlook and confuse together the specific differences among the actual affects. That is to say, Spinoza's discussion is in terms of words which are abstract, general, and confused. Finally, it is to be noted that Spinoza admits that even in his discussion of the third and highest kind of knowedge he must speak in terms of time and change-that is to say, in terms of the imagination-"in order that what we wish to prove may be more easily explained and better understood."'31 Yet only three propositions earlier Spinoza had written that "ideas which are clear and distinct in us . . . cannot follow from mutilated and confused ideas, which are related to the first kind of knowledge." In sum, then, in Spinoza's discussions of substance, its properties, and its modes, contradictions and difficulties occur so frequently and so clearly that it is probable that Spinoza was aware of them. He allowed them to stand, I suggest, because his theory of language led him to believe that no simple, direct, precise, and consistent verbal account of the true philosophy was possible.
29 30 31

E., IV, LXVIII; cf. E., IV, LXIV. E., IV, xxxiii; cf. E., III, LI, LVI,
E., V, xxxi, S.

LVII.

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IV
How is the Ethics to be understood? Spinoza's theory of language is inadequate. He is so concerned to associate words and language with imagination that he offers no theoretical account of how words can convey ideas (in his sense of "idea") or of the proper function of language in the communication of philosophical truth. The fact that Spinoza makes no attempt to deal with this question in the Ethics is, perhaps, the strongest argument against the thesis of the first part of this paper, that Spinoza was aware of the difficulties in which he was involved through his theory of language. Be that as it may, I wish to point out briefly that Spinoza does explicitly hold a general theory of entities of reason and that it is this theory of entia rationis which underlies his method in the
Ethics.32

An entity of reason is "a mode of thought which serves to make what has been understood the more easily retained, explained, and imagined."33 Such an entity has no existence outside the intellect. Since it has no extramental object which could be clearly and distinctly conceived, Spinoza denies that it is an idea or that it can be called true or false. It is a characteristic error that philosophers, misled by the words associated with entities of reason, hypostatize them and ascribe to them some reality outside of the mind. They are of use to us only if they function as tools or mental aids and are not treated as if they had some independent status.34 Entities of reason originate because it is easier for our minds to imagine things abstractly than to conceive things as they are, in their specific connection with substance. So we find it easier to remember things if we can group them together in such classifications as genus and species. So too we imagine extension
32

physica, Epp.
33 C.

The following account of entia rationis is based upon the Cogitata meta12, 19, 50, 83 and E., I, App.; E., IV, Pref. be assimilated to ratio, or knowledge of the

M., I, Is 34 Hence entia rationiscannot

second kind.
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abstractly-that is, apart from the substance of which it is an attribute-and then try to explain this abstract extension by comparing one part of it with another through the aid of measure and geometrical figures. Or again we may abstract finite modes from the substance, attributes, and infinite modes upon which they depend and then try to explain the resultant images by using factitious instruments like time and numbers to assist us in comparing the images. When these aids are clearly understood to be abstractions, existing only in the intellect-as they are by all good mathematicians-they can assist us to discover and formulate such truth as is proper to the imagination. I shall return to this point in a moment, for it is the clue to the correct understanding of the Ethics, as well as of Spinoza's writings on natural science, Hebrew grammar, and Biblical criticism. Since entities of reason are, like words, functions of the imagination, words have a proper role to play in their formulation. In particular, philosophical entities of reason such as the distinction of God's essence from God's existence, power, and other properties, genus and species, the transcendental, the modalities, the notions of nonbeing, opposition, order, relation, conjunction, accident, perfection, good, and evil all these arise through verbalcomparisons of modes given to us through the imagination. Philosophers have been particularly prone, therefore, to two kinds of error: (a) they have often given unsuitable or misleading verbal descriptions of their entities of reason; (b) even worse, through not distinguishing the imagination from the intellect clearly enough, they have supposed that the words they used were names of entities existing outside the intellect. When he encounters this latter confusion, Spinoza prefers to speak of "entities of the imagination" rather than of "entities of reason." Properly defined and properly understood as abstractions, however, the entities of reason may serve the philosopher (as they do the mathematician) as eyes, as it were, through which the intellect may see more clearly what is presented confusedly in the imagination. Correctly employed, then, entities of reason may assist the philosopher in at least three ways. (i) When one image is compared with another they may enable the intellect to discover that
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truth which is resident in imagination. (2) By constructing certain general models or exemplars we may see how a collection of things whose detailed natures we do not understand may nevertheless in general exemplify our adequate ideas of infinite modes and attributes of substance. (3) By recognizing the abstract character of such negative entities of reason as nonbeing,limit, and falsehood we may hold more firmly to the positive content of the clear ideas which are native to the intellect. We will not then confuse them with the verbal entities and verbal distinctions of the traditional philosophers. (i) By comparing our experiences, and with the assistance of mathematical and philosophical entities of reason, scientists have discovered the true size and distance of the sun. We are thereby enabled to see that our image of the sun as small and near is our response to external motions and thus a sign of our native strength and power. So too in his discussion of the passions Spinoza compares a variety of experiences in order to show the limitations and the positive strength of the passions. Spinoza's resort to a posteriori argument is not an inconsistency but an integral part of his method. (2) In the Preface to Book IV of the Ethics Spinoza states that he wishes to form an idea of man which can serve as a model or exemplar of human nature. In other places in the Ethics Spinoza speaks of this idea of man as universal and of the proofs concerning it as general.35 In a letter of i665 he points out that the abstract and general definition of man by which all who have a similar external appearance are classed together is an entity of reason.36 To construct this universal idea of man he has used such entities of reason as good and evil and such "metaphysical" entities (i.e., entities of reason) as understanding, desire, and will.37 The value of this method, which occupies a major part of the Ethics, is that these entities of reason, corresponding to nothing outside the intellect, enable us to use words correctly in comparing the experiences which our imagination provides us. They enable us to see how our adequate ideas of substance, thought, extension,
35 36 37

E., III,

Ep.

LV,

S., and E., V,

S.

XXXVI,

S.

i9.
XLVIII,

E., II,

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motion and rest, and so on, ideas which are native to the intellect, operate within our experience. This, I would suggest, is what Spinoza means when he writes that "demonstrations are the eyes of the mind by which it sees and observes things."38 In a letter of i664 he puts it thus: "We see that the imagination is also determined to a great extent by the constitution of the soul; for, as we know from experience, in all things it follows the traces of the intellect and concatenates its images and words in a certain order, and interconnects them, just as the intellect does with its demonstrations."39 In the Preface to Book IV of the Ethics Spinoza also gives a detailed account of the genesis and growth of another entity of reason, perfection. He seeks to show how, through the comparison of our experiences and with the mediation of words, we confuse perfection with the final cause of a thing. When we come to see, however, that perfection is an entity of reason, existing nowhere outside the mind, we recognize it as an aid to the consideration of the specific reality, essence, and action of every mode which we experience. Every individual thing, considered in terms of its own essence and activity, is perfect.40 (3) Finally, there is a third way in which entities of reason can assist the philosopher. Negation, limitation, determination, and falsehood cannot be ascribed to God, for they are only entities of reason. Without introducing negation or determination in some form, however, we cannot distinguish one substance from another, essence from existence, power from action, or necessity from freedom. Hence God is unique, and in God essence, existence, power, necessity, and freedom are one and the same. They can be distinguished only verbally. As Spinoza puts it, to distinguish God's essence from his existence is to confuse truth with falsehood.4'

Philosophers and theologians have been confused by words into supposing these distinctions in God's nature to be real. A large part of the task of the Ethics is to show the philosophers how
38

39
40

E., V, xxiII, S. Ep. 17.

41

Ep. i9; cf. also Epp. E., I, ViII, S. 2.

2i

and

23,

and E., I,

XXXIII,

S. 2.

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many of their errors originate in the confusion of entities of reason with entities existing outside the intellect, that is, in confusing the intellect with the imagination. The positive task of the Ethics is to show that once the limitations of language are recognized we can conceive of substance and its modes through their own living ideas. Language may indeed express philosophic truth, just as one may dream of gray elephants as well as of pink elephants. But in order to know what is true and what is false in one's dreams one must first wake and understand that dreams have their own laws. They cannot be read as simple, straightforward prose narratives. The several arguments in demonstration of a single proposition are different ways of deploying the entities of reason. The definitions of substanceand modedo not involve reference to any positive ideas. A comparison of the rules for defining created and uncreated things (given in the Improvement the Understanding)with of the definitions of the Ethics will show that the latter simply translate the formal rules into the material mode. It is Spinoza's view, then, that "a thing is understood when it is perceived simply by the mind without words and images."42 So far is he from supposing that words can be disengaged from the imagination in order to represent true ideas. Spinoza concludes the Ethics with the warning that he has shown us a road which is difficult to travel. If, however, anyone "had acquired new ideas in the proper order, according to the standard of the original true idea, he would never have doubted of the truth of his knowledge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown, makes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as it were, spontaneously toward him."43
DAVID SAVAN

Universityof Toronto

42

Tr. Theol.-Pol.,ch. iv.

dIE, par- 44.
225

43