People v. Peralta, G.R. No.

128116, 24 January 2001

FACTS
Gilbert Peralta was charged with the crime of murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information
that reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the 3rd day of July, 1991, in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of one LOUISE RIMANDO Y MEDINA, by then
and there, shooting him with a gun, hitting him twice in the body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which was the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the said offended part (sic) in such amount as may be awarded
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that prosecution witnesses
Crizaldo Esguerra, Delfin Soriano, and Danilo Gaa were schoolmates of the
victim, Louise Rimando, at The Technological Institute of the Philippines
and fraternity brothers in Tau Gamma Fraternity. After watching a
basketball game in Pasig City in the evening of July 2, 1991, Louise
Rimando together with Crizaldo Esguerra, Delfin Soriano and Danilo Gaa,
proceeded to Quezon City "to pick up" prostitutes. When they reached the
Aberdeen Court Hotel along Quezon Avenue in Quezon City, Rimando
alighted from their owner type jeep that was being driven by Esguerra and
talked to a gay pimp named Roberto Reyes. Rimando introduced himself
as an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation apparently to avail of a
discount for the services of the prostitutes. Reyes agreed to introduce
certain young girls to Rimando and proposed to pick them up in front of
the Aberdeen Court Hotel. When the jeep reached the hotel, Reyes together
with two (2) of the girls and another gay named Sandro Lim suddenly
boarded the jeep. Reyes told Rimando, "Mamang NBI, tulungan ninyo
kami. Andiyan iyong CAPCOM na nanghihingi sa amin ng pera." Upon
Rimando’s instructions, the jeep sped away with eight (8) persons on
board. 2
While driving along Quezon Avenue in Quezon City, one of the
pimps noticed that they were being followed by appellant in a taxi cab.
Rimando instructed Esguerra to park the jeep in front of Dunkin Donuts at
the corner of Quezon and West Avenues in Quezon City. Rimando ordered
the two gays to alight from the jeep. Meanwhile, the taxi parked behind the
jeep. One of the ladies also got off the jeep for fear of being arrested. The
appellant who was holding a .38 caliber firearm alighted and approached
Rimando who was then seated beside the driver’s seat. Appellant inquired
if they were policemen, but Rimando replied in the negative. Rimando
stated that he was an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation and
showed the appellant his N.B.I. Identification Card. The appellant said,
"N.B.I. ka pala" and suddenly grabbed Rimando’s identification card before
he shot Rimando twice in the body. Appellant went back to his taxi and
left.

ISSUE
Whether or not the accussed-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime homicide.

RULING
Yes. This Court also rules out the presence of evident premeditation.
For the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation to be appreciated,
the following requisites should be proved: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that
the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 28 In the case at bar, there was no proof of the time
when appellant allegedly determined to commit the crime against the
victim. The appellant did not even know the victim and vice versa prior to
their confrontation at the place of the shooting incident. The Solicitor
General correctly pointed out that appellant’s act of tailing the victim’s
group is not an overt act that reflects appellant’s determination to kill
Rimando. Appellant followed the jeep in order to effect an arrest of women
whom he suspected to be prostitutes.
Appellant claims that he shot the victim while he was in the
performance of his police duties. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty does not incur
any criminal liability. Two (2) requisites must concur before this defense
can prosper: (1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) the injury caused or the
offense committed should be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty. We find the requisites absent in the case at bar.
Appellant was not in the performance of his duties at the time of the
shooting for the reason that the girls he was attempting to arrest were not
committing any act of prostitution in his presence. If at all, the only person
he was authorized to arrest during that time was Roberto Reyes, who
offered him the services of a prostitute, for acts of vagrancy. Even then, the
fatal injuries that the appellant caused the victim were not a necessary
consequence of appellant’s performance of his duty as a police officer. The
record shows that appellant shot the victim not once but twice after a
heated confrontation ensued between them. His duty to arrest the female
suspects did not include any right to shoot the victim to death.
As there is reasonable doubt on the alleged attendance of treachery
and evident premeditation in the case at bar, the crime committed by the
appellant was only homicide. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ARTICLE 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any
other circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be
deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
Inasmuch as the appellant is a detention prisoner, the period of his
preventive imprisonment shall be credited to the service of his sentence.
 Baxinela v. People, G.R. No. 149652, 24 March 2006

FACTS
The witness for the defense on October 19, 1996 Insp. Joel Regimen
and Baxinela were walking along Reyes Street when they were approached
by a civilian named Romy Manuba who informed them of a drunken
person drawing a gun and creating trouble inside the Playboy Disco Pub
They immediately proceeded to the reported place and, upon arrival,
recognized a former colleague, SPO4 Legarda, who was with a companion
invited them to his table and the two obliged they saw someone with a
handgun visibly tucked at the back of his waists he passed by their table.
As Baxinela stood up, introduced himself as a policeman and asked the
man why he had a gun with him, the man did not respond and, instead,
suddenly drew out his gun. Baxinela then drew his sidearm and was able
to fire first, hitting the man on his upper left arm. When the man fell down,
Baxinela took his gun and wallet and handed them over to Regimen.
Enlisted the services of the pub's security guard to bring the
wounded man to the hospital report the matter to the Officer-in-Charge,
Col. Bianson.

ISSUES
That the CA and RTC erred in not considering the qualified
mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused.

RULING
The Court now proceeds to determine if, following the prosecution's
version of what happened, Baxinela can claim the justifying circumstances
of self-defense and fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office.
The first requisite is an indispensable requirement of self-defense. It
is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete. On this requisite alone, Baxinela's defense
fails. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack on the life and limb of a person.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified. The conviction of
appellant Eduardo Baxinela for the crime of homicide is affirmed.
The Court now proceeds to determine if, following the prosecution's
version of what happened, Baxinela can claim the justifying circumstances
of self-defense and fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office.
The first requisite is an indispensable requirement of self-defense. It
is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete. On this requisite alone, Baxinela's defense
fails.
we consider the alternative defense of fulfillment of a duty.
The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense of
fulfillment of a duty as a privileged mitigating circumstance.
The Court commiserates with our policemen who regularly thrust
their lives in zones of danger in order to maintain peace and order and
acknowledges the apprehensions faced by their families whenever they go
on duty. But the use of unnecessary force or wanton violence is not
justified when the fulfillment of their duty as law enforcers can be effected
otherwise.
 Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 103501-03, 17 February 1997

FACTS
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to
pay directly to the president’s office and in cash what the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985
memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin.
Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-
Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum
dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction.
In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum,
Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused
the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3)
withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25
Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao
requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of
MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to
Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch.
Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after
which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was
delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did
not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances
surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another
P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was
made on 31 January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-
signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s check for this amount.
Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena
requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the
money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with
Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office. It was only upon
delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the
amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January
30,1986. Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds,
while Dabao remained at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan
actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the
accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more the
combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate
petitions for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12
October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.
 
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation. 
HELD
Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of
malversation. Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS
Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President and
bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land.
It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its
face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of
an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its
execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Records show that
the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense
witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in
the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing
and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an
error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such
matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an
appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of
the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment
appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error
or no.
People v. Genosa, G.R. No. G.R. No. 135981, 15 January 2004
“Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense – complete of
incomplete – on the part of the victim.”

FACTS
Appellant was married to the victim Ben Genosa. In their first year of
marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but soon thereafter, the couple
would quarrel often and their fights would become violent. Ben, a habitual
drinker, became cruel to Marivic; he would provoke her, slap her, pin her
down on the bed or beat her. These incidents happened several times and
Marivic would often run home to her parents. She had tried to leave her
husband at least five times, but Ben would always follow her and they
would reconcile.
On the night of the killing, appellant, who was then eight months
pregnant, and the victim quarreled. The latter beat her, however, she was
able to run to another room. Allegedly there was no provocation on her
part when she got home that night, and it was her husband who began the
provocation. Frightened that her husband would hurt her and wanting to
make sure she would deliver her baby safely, appellant admitted having
killed the victim, who was then sleeping at the time, with the use of a gun.
She was convicted of the crime of parricide. Experts opined that Marivic
fits the profile of a battered woman syndrome and at the time she killed her
husband, her mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the
trauma, together with the imprint of all the abuses that she had
experienced in the past.
ISSUES
Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman
Syndrome as constituting self-defense;
Whether or not treachery attended the killing.
RULING
No, the Court ruled in the negative on both issues.
1.) The Court held that the defense failed to establish all the elements
of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) each
of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized
at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner; (b) the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of
an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed
to use force in order to save her life; and (c) at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable not necessarily immediate and actual
grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the case, however, not all of these were duly
established. Here, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. In fact, she had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
children’s bedroom. The attack had apparently ceased and the reality or
even imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. Ben was no
longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
2.) The Court ruled that when a killing is preceded by an argument or
a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to
appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might
be put up by the party attacked. Here, there is no showing that appellant
intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband
without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. It
appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the
same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. Thus, in the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately
employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure
its execution, the Court resolved the doubt in her favor.