University of the Philippines Garcia vs.

BOI
College of Law
Facts:
Constitutional Law II
Midterms Reviewer  Original application of Bataan
Prof. Harry Roque Petrochemical Corp (BPC) (Taiwanese owned) to
BOI specified that:
Dean Pangalangan’s Syllabus
Transcribed and compiled by: Paulyn Duman a. it’s going to build a plant in Limay Bataan,
Digests by Mike Ocampo (2011) and Batch 2008 where the Petrochemical Industrial Zone (run by
PNOC) and the Bataan Refining Corp (producer of
I. RIGHT-BASED DISCOURSE: NORMS, the 60% of the Phil’s naptha output and a GOCC)
RIGHTS AND THE PLACE OF JUDICIAL are located.
POWER
b. It’s going to use naptha cracker and naptha as
A. General fuel for its plant

Consti. Art. VIII, sec. 1  BPC tried to amend its application by changing
the site to Bataan and the fuel from naptha to
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one naptha and/or LPG. Shell Phil operates an LPG
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be depot in Batangas. (reason for the amendment:
established by law. insurgency in Bataan and unstable labor
situation)
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to  Several quarters objected to the transfer but BOI
settle actual controversies involving rights which are asserted that thought it preferred the Bataan site,
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine it recognizes that the final decision/choice is with
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion the proponent who will provide funding or risk
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of capital. It approved the amendments.
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Issue:
Consti. Art. VIII, sec. 2
Should the plant remain in Bataan or be moved to
Batangas? Did BOI commit grave abuse of discretion in
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, agreeing with the wishes of the investor?
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its Held: BOI committed grave abuse of discretion. The
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. original application is reinstated.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it Ratio:

undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
 In this decision, the court asserted that its powers
Consti. Art. VIII, sec. 4.2 under Art 8 sec 1(2) of the 1987 Consti provides it
with the duty to address this controversy. It said
Section 4. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a that the position of the BOI to give absolute
treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which freedom to the investors is a repudiation of the
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all independent policy of the government with regard
other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to to national interest expressed in numerous laws:
be heard en banc, including those involving the a. Sec. 10 of ART XII of the Consti: duty of the state
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential to regulate and exercise over foreign investments
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, within its national jurisdiction in accordance with
and other regulations, shall be decided with the its national goals and priorities
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually b. Sec. 19, Art II: The State shall develop a self-
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and reliant and national economy effectively controlled
voted thereon. by Filipinos.
c. Art 2. Omnibus Investment Code: It is the goal of
the government to have “the sound development of
Consti. Art. VIII, sec. 5.2.a the national econ in consonance with the
principles and objectives of economic nationalism”
Section 5. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may Dissent: Carino-Aquino and Melencio Herrera: The court
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: should not delve on matters beyond its competence.

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of

any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
 dismissing the suit.

Held:
Oposa vs Factoran
 They have standing
 The judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
Facts: dismissing the suit as the petitioners have a cause
of action
 Minors represented by their parents sued the Ratio:
DENR asking it to repudiate existing TLAs (timber
license agreements) and ceased issuing them. 1. Their standing arise from “intergenerational
 The Complaint is a taxpayers’ suit and the responsibility” in so far a balanced an healthful
complainants stated that they were pursuing it in ecology is concerned.
behalf of all Filipino citizens as well as J. Feliciano (separate concurring) explains/clarifies the
“generations yet unborn”, who all have a right to implication of this point
enjoy the country’s rain forests.
 They cite section 15 and 16 of Art.2 in saying that a. appears to give standing to everyone who maybe
it is the duty of the State to advance the “right of expected to benefit from the petitioner’s actions;
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in hence the court appears to be recognizing a
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature” “beneficiaries’ cause of action” in the filed if
and promote “the right to health of the people” environmental protection.
(Sec. 15). b. Whether it applies in all situation or whether
 As their cause of action in the case they filed with failure to act on the part of the govt agency must
the Makati RTC Branch 66, petitioners asserted be shown, is subject to future determination of the
the ff: court.
a. The continuing unhampered destruction of rain 2. The lower court is wrong in saying that the
forests will/is caus/causing adverse effects and complaint failed to point out a specific legal right
serious injury and irreparable damage that the violated.
present and future generations will bear. a. sec. 26 of the charter, the right to a healthful,
b. Plaintiffs have a constitutional right to a balanced balanced ecology is a specific fundamental legal
and healthful ecology and are entitled to be right. Even if it is not in the bill of rights, “it does
protected by the State in its capacity as the parens not follow that is less important than any of the
patriae. Based on this, they have a right to civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. “
demand the cancellation of TLAs. Such a right belongs to a different category of
c. They have exhausted all available administrative rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
remedies but respondents failed to cancel the self-preservation and self-perpetuation..the
TLAs which is contrary to the Philippine advancement of which may even predate all
Environment Policy: government and constitutions”. They nned not
- to develop, maintain and improve conditions even be written in the Constitution for they are
under which man and nature can thrive in assumed to exist from the inception of mankind.
productive harmony with each other b. The right involves a correlative duty to refrain from
- to fulfill the social, economic, and other impairing the environment, which is a clear
requirements of present and future Filipinos mandate of DENR under EO 192 (Reorganizing the
- to ensure the attainment of an environmental DENR) and the Admin Code of 1987).
quality that is conducive to the life and dignity and c. This, this is not a political question but an issue of
well being. enforcing a right vis-à-vis policy formulated.
And which continue to cause serious damage and Nevertheless, political question is no longer
prejudice to the plaintiffs. insurmountable in view of Art. 8 sec. 1(2).

d. Violative of the Consti policy of the State: Feliciano submits that the declaration of the court that the
- effect a more equitable distribution of petitioner cited a “specific legal right” does violence to the
opportunities, income and wealth and make full language of the constitutional provision cited. In fact, they
efficient use of natural resources (Sec. 1, Art. XII) are too broad and too comprehensive (i.e. right to balanced
- protect the nation’s marine wealth (sec. 2) and healthful ecology). What the Court is saying, according
- conserve and promote the nation’s cultural to Feliciano, in granting the petition is that “there may be
heritage and resources (sec. 14, Art. XIV) a more specific legal right in our laws considering that
- sec. 16, Art. II general policy principles are found in the constitution and
e. contrary to the highest laws of man and natural elsewhere, which the petitioners could have pointed out if
law-the right to self-preservation and perpetuation only the lower court gave them an effective opportunity to
 The DENR Sec asked the Makati RTC to dismiss do so rather than aborting the proceedings (Hence, there
for lack of cause which the judge granted; hence was abuse of discretion).
the petition:
Feliciano further suggests that petitioners should therefore
Issue: cite a more specific legal right to serve as basis for their
petition, now that the Court has granted them
1. Procedural Issue: locus standi continuance, for two reasons:
2. WON pet have a cause of action and whether the a. defendants to may very well unable to
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in mount an effective/intelligent defense if
 the complaint points to a broad right. 1. Art12, Sec10, Par.2: merely a statement of
b. If no such specific right is cited, policy/principle; requires enabling legislation
petitioners are expected to fall back on 2. Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
sec. 8(2) of the Constitution. When patrimony; prohibition is against the State, not
substantive standards as general as “the the GSIS as a separate entity
right to a balanced and healthful ecology”, 3. the constitutional provision is inapplicable as since
and the “right to health” are combined what is being sold are outstanding shares, not
with remedial standards as broad ranging the place itself or the land; 50% of equity is not
as “grave abuse of discretion”, the result part of national patrimony.
will be “to propel the court to unchartered 4. the reliance of the petitioners on the bidding rules is
ocean of social and economic policy misplaced; the condition/reason that will deprive
making. the highest bidder of the award of shares has not
yet materialized hence the submission of a
matching bid is premature
Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS, 02/03/97] 5. prohibition should fail for respondent GSIS did not
exercise its discretion in a capricious manner, did
Bellosillo, J. not evade duty or refused to d a duty as enjoined
by law. Similarly mandamus should fail since
Facts: respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization they have no clear legal right to demand anything
program under Proclamation No. 50 dated December 8,
1986, decided to sell through a public bidding 30-51% of Issue:
the shares of respindent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). 1. Whether or not the constitutional provision is self-
The winning bidder "is to provide management expertise executory-YES
and/or an international marketing/reservation system, 2. Whether or not the term "national patrimony"
and financial suppport to strengthen the profitability and applies to the Manila Hotel-YES
performance of the Manila Hotel. 3. Whether or not the term "qualified Filipinos"
Sept 18, 1995- two bidders participated in the auction; applies to the MPH-YES
one was petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corp, who wanted 4. Whether or not the GSIS, being a chartered GOCC,
to buy 51% of the shares at Php41.85 each, and Renong is covered by the constitutional prohibition-YES
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number
of shares at Php44 each Held:
*pertinent provisions of bidding rules: 1. admittedly, some constis are merely declarations of
- if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be policies and principles. But a provision which is
awarded the Block of shares, GSIS may offer this complete in itself and becomes operative w/o the aid
to other Qualified bidders of enabling legislation , or that which supplies
- the highest bidder will only be declared the sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
winner after 1) execution of the necessary may be enjoyed or protected is self-executing.
contracts with GSIS/MHC and 2)securing the Modern constis are drafted upon a different principle
requisite approvals of the GSIS/MHC, Committee and have often become extensive codes of law
on Privatization and Office of the Govt Corporate intended to operate directly. If the consti provisions
Counsel are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
Sept 28, 1995-pending the declaration of Renong Berhad executing, the legislature would have the power to
as the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
price of the Malaysian firm fundamental law, which can be cataclysmic. In case
Oct 10, 1995-petitioner sent a manager's check issued by of doubt, the Consti should be considered self-
Philtrust Bank as bid security executing rather than not. Though this presumption
Oct 17, 1995-petitioner, wishing to stop the alleged is in place, the legislature is not precluded from
"hurried" sale to the foreign firm, filed the case in enacting further laws to enforce the consti provision
the SC so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Oct 18, 1995-Court issues TRO consti. Also a consti provision may be self executing
on one part and not on the other/s.
Petitioner: (Manila Prince Hotel) Respondents also rely on jurisprudence that are
1. invokes Art12, Sec10, Par.2, and argues that the "simply not in point"-Basco v PAGCOR, Tolentino v
Manila Hotel was covered by the phrase "national Sec of Finance, Kilosbayan v Morato. A reading of
patrimony" and hence cannot be sold to the provisions involved in these cases clearly shows
foreigners; selling 51% would be tantamount to that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional
owning the business of a hotel which is owned by rights but guidelines of laws, manifested in the very
the GSIS, a GOCC, the hotel business of terms of the provisions. Res ipsa loquitur. As
respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism opposed to Art12, Sec10, Par.2 which is a
industry which undoubtedly is part of the mandatory, positive command, complete in itself,
national economy. needing no further guidelines, creating a right where
2. petitioner should be preferred over its Malaysian none existing before, that right being that qualified
counterpart after it has matched the bid, since Filipinos shall be preferred. And where there is a
the bidding rules state 'if for any reason, the right, there is a remedy.
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of 2. in plain language, patrimony means heritage,
shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified referring not only to natural resouces but to the
bidders, namely them cultural heritage of Filipinos as well. Manila Hotel
Respondents:(Govt Service Insurance System, Manila has become a landmark-a living testament of
Hotel Corp, COP, OGCC) Philippine heritage.
 3. "qualified" according to the Consti commission as the petitioners claim because though the cases
refers to 1)companies whose capital or controlling involved the same parties, the cases are not the
stock is wholly owned by citizens of the Phil, 2) the same. (The contracts are subtantially different
fact that the company can make viable contributions according to the Court). Moreover, the 7-6 ruling
to the common good, because of credible granting the standing in the 1st case is a « tenous
competency and efficiency. By giving preferrence to one that is not likely to be maintained in
Phil comapnies or entities it does not mean that they subsequent litigation ».
should be pampered; rather they should indeed  In this case, strictly speaking, the issue is not
"qualify" first with the requirements that the law standing but WON the petitioners are real-party-
provides before they can even be considered as in-interest as required by Rule 3 sec. 2 of the
having the preferential treatment of the state Rules on Civil Procedure.
accorded to them.In the 1st place, MPH was selected  Stading is a constitutional law concept which
as one of the qualified bidders, which meant that requires a « partial consideration of the merits as
they possessed both requirements. "in the granting well as broader policy concerns relating to the
of economic rights, privileges and concessions, when proper role of the judiciary in certain areas ». It is
a choice is between a "qualified foreigner " and a a question on whether parties « alleged such a
"qualified Filipino", the latter shall be chosen" personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
4. the sale of the 51% of MHC could only be carried to assure the concrete adverseness, which
out with the prior approval of the State through the sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
COP. the court so largly depends for illumination of
"state action" refers to 1)when activity engaged in is difficult constitutitonal questions »
a public function, 2)when govt is so significantly - A party must show (citing Valmonte vs PCSO)
involved in the actor as to make the govt responsible that :
for his action 3)when govt has approved or a. not only the law is invalid but also that he has
authorized the action. Act of GSIS selling the shares sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
falls under the 2nd and 3rd categories. Also, when some direcy injury as a result of its enforcement,
the Consti refers to state it refers not only to the and not only in an indefinite way.
people but also to govt as elements of the state. - now, in this case, the petitioners suing as
Hence, the GSIS, being part of govt, although taxpayers failed to allege that taxes have been
chartered, is still covered by the provision. misspent. The Senators did not show « that their
prerogatives as legal have been curtailed ».
(the rest is obiter)  Neither are they real parties in interest. A real-
party in interest is the party who would be
Petition dismissed. benefitted or injured by the judgment or the
« party entitled to the avails of the suit ».
- the parties only cited provisions under Art II of the
Kilosbayan vs. Morato
Constitution such as : sec. 5 (general welfare
clause) ; sec. 12 (that the right of the parents in
J. Vicente Mendoza : the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the
Facts : support of the govt, « sec. 13. State recognition for
the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
 In a previous decision, the Court invalidated a promotion of their physical, moral, spritual,
contract of lease bet PCSO and the Phil Gaming intellectual and social well-being.
Mgt Copr on the ground that it was made in - These are not self-executing provisions, the
violation of the PCSO’s charter disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
 Hence, the PCSO and PGMC entered into a new action. They do not embody judially enforceable
equipment lease agreement (ELA). constitutional rights but for guidance for
 Petitioners in the 1st case again came to Court legislations.
seeking to nullify the ELA in the ground that it is - This is actually a case for annulment of a contract
substantially the same as the nullified contract. such as the real parties in interest can only be :
 PCSO/PGMC questioned the standing of the a. parties to the contract
petitioners and argued that they lack cause of b. parties which are principally or subsidiarily to one
action. of the parties or whose rights with respect to that
party are prejudicial
Issue : c. have a right to be part of the public bidding but
have been illegally excluded from it.
1. WON petitioners have standing and cause of action
2.WON the contract of sale should be nullified. 2. No cause.

Held : Ratio :

1. No Standing.  The features of the 1st contract that made it

actually a joint enture agreement are not present
Ratio : herein. There is only a lease contract in the form
of the ELA which is not against the PCOS’s
 The grant of standing in the 1st case (Kilosbayan charter.
vs. Guingona) does not bar the SC from looking  Actively, the PCSO is not absolutely prohibited
into the issue again. That is not the law of the case from entering into joint ventures so long as it itself
 holds or conducts the lottery. It is however Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
prohibited from investing in companies offering Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
the same games. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of he
 E.O. 301 requires public bidding only for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
purchase of supply and not lease agreements. 1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al.. vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
et al. Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating
Measures
Facts Agreement on Safeguards
Note: Justice Panganiban provides a brief historical Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and
background on the development of the WTO (see p28-34) Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Intellectual
Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry, Property Rights
representing the Government of the Republic of the ANNEX 2
Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of the Settlement of Disputes
Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity). (Note: This ANNEX 3
act makes the Philippines one of the founding members of Trade Policy Review Mechanism
the WTO)
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate signed the Instrument of Ratification, declaring the
received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and
of the Philippines, stating among others that "the Uruguay the agreements and associated legal instruments included
Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) ratified and
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the confirmed
Constitution."
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate President of the Philippines is composed of the
received another letter from the President of the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal
Philippines likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and
among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the thereof."
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary
hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution." its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. The Solicitor General describes these two latter documents
1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification as follows:
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization." The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are
twenty-five declarations and decisions on matters
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted such as measures in favor of least developed
Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby countries, notification procedures etc.
resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in
the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the The Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." Services dwell on, among other things, standstill
or limitations and qualifications of commitments
The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et to existing non-conforming measures, market
seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of access, national treatment etc.
Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various
agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. The
the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course
collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, to the petition. The court also requested the Hon. Lilia R.
for brevity) as follows: Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations
stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper,
ANNEX 1 hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper,", (1) providing a
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods historical background of and (2) summarizing the said
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 agreements.
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the
Phytosanitary Measures Court directed the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the
transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and the or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in
Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine
adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from 2. WON The WTO Agreement contravenes the Phil.
Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume Constitution
WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the
Final Act. No.
The "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec
Issues: 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the
1. WON the petition presents a justiciable Constitution, which are worded as follows:
controversy
2. WON the provision of the WTO agreement and its Article II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND
three annexes contravene sec. 19, article 2 and STATE POLICIES
sec. 10 and 12, article 12 of the Philippine Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
Constitution independent national economy effectively
3. WON the provisions of said agreement and its controlled by Filipinos.
annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by congress Article XII NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
4. WON said provisions unduly impair or interfere PATRIMONY
with the exercise of judicial power by this court in Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures
promulgating rules on evidence that will encourage the formation and operation of
5. WON the concurrence of the senate in the WTO enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
agreement and its annexes are sufficient and/or Filipinos.
valid, considering that it did not include the final In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
act, ministerial declarations and decisions, and covering the national economy and patrimony, the
the understanding on commitments in financial State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
services
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential
Holding: the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
Ratio: locally produced goods, and adopt measures that
help make them competitive.
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles
Yes. are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters their memorandum:
raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution, as follows: a) In the area of investment measures related to
trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual
of justice to settle actual controversies property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
involving rights which are legally demandable Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
and enforceable, and to determine whether or Members treatment no less favourable than that it
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion accords to its own nationals with regard to the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on protection of intellectual property. . . (par. 1 Article
the part of any branch or instrumentality of 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of
the government. Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as supplied)
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in
ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in Services:
holding that this petition should be given due course
and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or "declaration of principles and state policies." The
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is
executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation. called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over intended to be self-executing principles ready for
this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the enforcement through the courts. They are used by the
decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
liberalization as a policy espoused by said international enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of
body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles
government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other sections of Article XII are not "self-executing
import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a
constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision
guidelines for legislation." itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the
grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering
In general, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be national economy and patrimony" and not to every
self-executing principles ready for enforcement through aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions
the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the rather than the rule.
executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the
legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
the available remedy was not judicial but political. The policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
electorate could express their displeasure with the services in the development of the Philippine economy.
failure of the executive and the legislature through the While the Constitution does not encourage the
language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2). unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit
It seems to me important that the legal right which is them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis
an essential component of a cause of action be a of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
specific, operable legal right, rather than a competition that is unfair.
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons: WTO Recognizes Need toProtect Weak Economies

1. That unless the legal right claimed to have been WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise,
violated or disregarded is given specification in decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General
operational terms, defendants may well be unable Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast,
to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or
in other words, there are due process dimensions waiver of the obligation of a member which would require
to this matter. three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds
vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the
2. Where a specific violation of law or applicable Amendments provision will require assent of all members.
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can Any member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the
be expected to fall back on the expanded expiration of six months from the date of notice of
conception of judicial power in the second withdrawals.
paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other through one-on-one negotiations with developed
Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can
Development of Economy form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. This is
Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, should be read and not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
understood in relation to the other sections in said negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic
article. principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines
The Constitution ordains the ideals of economic to "share in the growth in international trade
nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of commensurate with the needs of their economic
qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and development." These basic principles are found in the
concessions covering the national economy and preamble of the WTO Agreement. (see case for preamble of
patrimony" and in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic WTO)
materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating
the State to "adopt measures that help make them Specific WTO Provisions Protect Developing Countries
competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to
controlled by Filipinos." In similar language, the and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the
Constitution takes into account the realities of the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more
outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all some protection from the rush of foreign competition.
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential
equality ad reciprocity"; and speaks of industries treatment is given to developing countries in terms of
"which are competitive in both domestic and foreign the amount of tariff reduction and the period within
markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically,
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36%
trade practices." for developed countries to be effected within a period
of six (6) years while developing countries — including
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. the Philippines — are required to effect an average
Government Service Insurance System, et al., this Court tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural
implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only
very words the provision does not require any 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10)
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially years. In regard to export subsidy for agricultural
products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices.
their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and Consequently, the question boils down to whether
export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at
period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, large.
the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for
developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and
within which to effect such reduction. Contingencies

Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence
unfair foreign competition and trade practices including when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987.
anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and That does not mean however that the Charter is
safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not
are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of
Philippines can avail of these measures. There is business.
hardly therefore any basis for the statement that
under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all It is not difficult to answer this question.
be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of Constitutions are designed to meet not only the
control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
weaker situations of developing nations like the interpreted to cover even future and unknown
Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a
would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and
respondents have gravely abused their discretion. infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing
winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition one eminent political law writer and respected jurist
explains:
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant
and independent national economy" does not 3. WON the WTO Agreement restricts or limits the
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, Legislative Power of Congress
goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic
seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international No.
community." As explained by Constitutional The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
constitutional policy: administrative procedures with its obligations as provided
in the annexed Agreements." Petitioners maintain that this
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing undertaking "unduly limits, restricts and impairs
country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power
assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines.
mendicancy in the international community.
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the
treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot Congress. And while the Constitution allows Congress to
be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and
rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based duties or imposts, such authority is subject to "specified
on "equality and reciprocity," the fundamental law limits and . . . such limitations and restrictions" as
encourages industries that are "competitive in both Congress may provide, as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of
domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating the Tariff and Customs Code.
a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties
development of robust industries that can compete
with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed
managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level,
and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a
of laissez faire. hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of
the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted
Enterprises principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the
bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino generally accepted principles of international law, which
companies should be pampered with a total proscription of are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.
foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino international law is pacta sunt servanda —
consumer the best goods and services obtainable international agreements must be performed in good
faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as
the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides
international obligations is bound to make in its a similar presumption in cases of infringement of
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to patented design or utility model.
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the with our disposition of the third issue — derogation of
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, legislative power — will apply to this fourth issue also.
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than
in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides,
a convention or pact. Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden,
consistent as it is with due process and the concept of
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial
in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions system. So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to
enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the most international conventions on patents,
very nature of membership in the family of nations trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in
and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. legislation and rules of procedure will not be
substantial.
UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty
5. WON Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and
When the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act are
its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its binding
sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation." Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll Yes.
members shall give the United Nations every assistance in Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO
any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, Agreement and its annexes — but not in the other
and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
enforcement action." Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services — is
defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into discretion. They contend that the second letter of the
many other international pacts — both bilateral and President to the Senate which enumerated what
multilateral — that involve limitations on Philippine constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of
sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General concurrence of the Senate.
in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996 (see case for list
of bilateral treaties) The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
In such treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the
to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of Senate in the WTO Agreement.
taxation, eminent domain and police power. The
underlying consideration in this partial surrender of The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were
sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other deemed adopted without need for ratification. They
contracting states in granting the same privilege and were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of
citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the the members can meet "to give effect to those
Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT. provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint
action, and generally with a view to facilitating the
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a operation and furthering the objectives of this
portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating Agreement."
the Constitution, based on the rationale that the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles The Understanding on Commitments in Financial
of international law as part of the law of the land and Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to
adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members
with all nations." which "have indicated in their respective schedules of
commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly,
4. WON WTO Agreement impairs Judicial Power expansion of operation of existing financial service
suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer
No. and processing of information, and national treatment
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General with respect to access to payment, clearing systems
Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade- and refinancing available in the normal course of
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) business.”
intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. (See (Note: Justice Panganiban ends with an epilogue that acts
case for scope and meaning of Article 34, Process Patents as a summary. It is about 2 pages in length.)
and Burden of Proof, TRIPS)

There exists a similar burden of proof required in the

current patent law. The foregoing should really present
 demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed
Santiago vs. Bautista « winners » (citing a decision regarding an oratorical
contest).

Facts : PEOPLE vs. FERRER

 Teodoro Santiago Hr. Was awarded 3rd honors in Facts:

their grade Six graduating class by the Comm on On May 5, 1970 a criminal complaint was filed against
the Rating of Students for Honor. (Hereon referred respondent FELICIANO CO charging him as a ranking
as Comm). leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, in
 He, represented by his parents, sought the violation of RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law). On May 25,
invalidation of the results thru a writ of certiorari 1970 a criminal case against NILO TAYAG and others was
claiming that the teachers : filed for subversion – respondent was a member of the
- violated the Service Manual for Teachers of the Kabataang Makabayan, a subversive group, and tried to
Bureau of Public Schools which states that the invite others to revolt against the government. On July 21,
comm should be made up of grede 5 and grade 6 1970, TAYAG moved to quash, arguing that RA 1700 is:
teachers not just the latter. 1. a bill of attainder;
- Committed grave abuse of discretion by chaning 2. vague;
the grades of the 1st/2nd honors recipients. 3. with more than one subject expressed in title;
 Respondents moved for dismissal because 4. a denial of equal protection of laws.
certiorari was improper and the issue became
moot and academic since graudation was over On September 15, 1970, the statute was declared void
 Court agreed with respondents pointing out that on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder, vague, and
- no written or formal judgment made by the overbroad.
respondent was submitted for correction so
certitori cannot issue. Issues:
- Admin remedies not exhausted. 1. WON RA 1700 is a bill of attainder
- There was abuse of discretion only errors 2. WON RA 17700 is overbroad and vague (due
 Santiago appealed. The respondents further raised process)
that the comm being impleaded is not a « tribunal
board or officer exercising judicial function » Held:
agains which an action for certiorari apply under 1. No, it is not a bill of attainder. The act does not
sec. 1 rule 65 of the Rules of Court. specify which CPP members are to be punished.
The focus is not on individuals but on conduct
Issue : relating to subversive purposes. The guilt of CPP
members must first be established, as well as their
The Court thought it is most important to settle WON the cognizance as shown by overt acts. Even if acts
committee can be a proper subject of certiorari specified individuals, instead of activities, it shall
not be a bill of attainder – not unless specific
Held : individuals were named. The court has
consistently upheld the CPP’s activities as inimical
Certiorari cannot apply to public safety and welfare. A bill of attainder
must also reach past conduct and applied
Ratio : retroactively; Section 4 of RA 1700 expressly
states that the act will be applied prospectively to
 To answer this case, the court had to first define give members time to renounce their affiliations.
« judicial power ». The legislature is with reasonable relation to
 Generally, is the authority to determine what the public health, morals, and safety – and the
law is and what legal rights of parties are, with government is with right to protect itself against
respect to a matter in controversy. In short, it subversion.
implies the « construction of laws and the
adjudication of rights ». It is not the office that 2. No, the statute is not overbroad and vague. The
matters but the nature of the action taken to respondents’ assertion that the term “overthrow” is
determine WON there was a discharge of judicial overbroad is likewise untenable, since it could be
or quasi-judicial functions. achieved by peaceful means. Respondents
 Following such definition, the court said that for disregarded the terms “knowingly, willingly, and
judicial or quasi-judicial acts to be exercised, there by overt acts,” overthrow is understood to be by
must be : violent means. Whatever interest in free
a. a law that gives rise to some specific rights of speech/associations that is infringed is not
persons or property, enough to outweigh considerations of national
b. adverse claims are made resulting in a controversy security and preservation of democracy. The title
c. same controversy is brought before a body of of the bill need not be a catalogue of its contents –
officer clothed with authority to make a it is valid if it is indicative in broad but clear terms
determination of law and adjudication of rights. the nature, scope, and consequences of proposed
* Based on that definition, the Court ruled that the comm law and operation.
is neither a judicial or quasi-judicial body. Notable, the
petitioner cannot claim a right that has been violated.
There is no right to a prize until it is awarded. There is
only a privilege to compete that did not ripen into a Guidelines Set Forth by the Supreme Court:
 1. In the case of any subversive group Issue:
a. establish purposes to overthrow and
establish totalitarian regime under foreign WON the decision of the CA should be modified.
domination;
b. accused joined organization; Held: Yes.
c. knowledge, will and overt action.
2. in CPP case Ratio:
a. pursuit of objectives decried by the
government;  Recommendatory powers of judges are limited to
b. accused joined organization; these expressly provided by law such as that in
c. knowledge, will, and overt action. the RPC sec. 5 on the commutation of sentence;
penalizing acts etc.
WHEREFORE, Resolution set aside, cases remanded to  It is improper for the CA to make a
court a quo for trial on merits. recommendation suggesting a modification of an
act, which they said was aptly a prerogative of the
Fernando, dissenting: Pres. It would thus amount to political
RA 1700 must be appraised in light of meaning interference.
prescribed to increasing complexity of subversive  It is better practice for courts to keep their
movements in the country. A taint of invalidity is seen opinions to those relevant to the questions
even in the title of the Act, which state the specific presented before them.
name of an organization and create presumption of  J. Fernando (concurring) said that “it is not for
guilt. The right to dissent is constitutionally protected, any occupant of any court to play the role of
even if it contains a subversive tinge. Dissent is not adviser to the President”. To do so well not only be
disloyalty. A line is drawn when words amount to an infringement on the separation of powers
incitement to sedition or rebellion. Other means could concept but it would also grossly endanger the
have been taken to stem the issue and spread of the “duty of the courts to assure compliance with
CPP. constitutional mandates”. The court should
“ignore the limits of its own authority”.
 However, no majority vote was acquired to
Director of Prisons vs. Ang Chio Kho overturn the CA recommendation, hence it stands.

 Ang Cho Kio had been previously convicted of JM TUASON & CO. vs. LAND TENURE
various crimes and sentenced to more than 45 ADMINISTRATION
years of jail time. However while serving his
sentence he was given pardon on the condition -an appeal from COFI, Rizal
that he’ll voluntarily leave the Phil and never to
return. He was released and left for Taipei in 1959. June 30, 1970
 In 1966, Ang Chio Kho under the name of Ang
Ming Huy arrived at the MIA en route Honolulu. Ponente: Justice Fernando
The stopover in Manila was about 72 hours (3
days). While staying at a hotel he contacted 2 Petioner (appellee): JM Tuason & Co. Inc
friend s who convinced him to stay longer. They Respondent (appellant): Land tenure Administration,
went to the Bureau of Immigration to ask for a 14- Solicitor General & Auditor General
day extension of his stay. However his identity was
discovered. For petitioner-appellee: Araneta, Mendoza & Papa
 He was then arrested. By authority of the For respondent-appellant: Besa, Aguilar & Garcia,
President, Exec. Sec. Rafael Salas, then ordered Solicitor General Felix Makasiar, Asst. SG Frime
him to be recommitted to the National Penitentiary Zaballero, Solicitor Rosalio de Leon &
to serve his unexpired prison term. Special Attorney Magno Pablo
 Ang Chio Kio filed a petition for a write of habeas
corpus but was denied by both trial court and CA Facts:
on the ground that the president, in recommitting
him to prison exercised his prerogatives under the Feb 18, 1970- Court rendered judgment reversing the
Revised Penal Code. It is settled in jurisprudence lower court’s decision that RA 2616 is
that the Pres by himself can determine if the unconstitutional.
conditions of a pardon were violated, a prerogative March 30, 1970 – motion for reconsideration was filed by
which the Courts may not interfere with, however appellee invoking his rights to due process & equal
erroneous the findings may be. protection of laws
 However, the CA decision contained a May 27, 1970 – detailed opposition to the reconsideration
recommendation that Ang Chio Kho be allowed to was filed by SG Felix Antonio
leave the country. The Sol. Gen. thus come to the June 15, 1970 - a rejoinder of petition was filed. Petitioner
SC to ask that the recommendation be deleted contends that the expropriation of Tatalon Estate
saying that it was beyond the issue raised by the in Quezon City is unconstitutional (by virtue of its
petition of Ang Chio Kho and that it is not denial of due process for landowners) pursuant to
inherent or incidental to the exercise of judicial RA 2616 sec 4. *the statute prohibits suit for
functions. It is political in character, courts should ejectment proceedings & continuance of
not interefere.
 proceedings after expropriation proceedings have
been initiated.
Issue:
ISSUES:
WON conferring such jurisdiction is within the power of
1. WON sec4 RA2616 is unconstitutional by virtue of Congress.
its denial of due process & equal protection
2. WON procedural mistakes invalidate the statute Held:

HELD: It is not within the authority of the Court to take

cognizance of the claims of Muskrat; hence the grant of
1. No. jurisdiction is invalid.
Ratio: The statute is held to be constitutional
given the opportunity and protection it affords to Ratio:
land owners in recognizing their right to evict
subject to expropriation proceedings and just  Although in the beginning of the govt, the right of
compensation. RA 3453 amended sec4 of RA 2616 Congress to give original jurisdiction in cases not
in order to address this precise problem (sec4 of enumerated in the Constitution have been
RA 3453 previously held to be unconstitutional.) entertained. However, further examination has led
The amendment was drafted in light of this Court to consistently decline powers that are
Cuatico vs. Court of Appeals where the strictly judicial in their nature.
landowner’s right to due process was impaired by  That exercise of that power is limited to cases and
tenants’ invocation of as-yet-to-be instituted controversies which imply the existence of present
expropriation proceedings. or possible adverse parties whose contentions are
submitted to the court for adjudication. The court
2. No. has no veto power over leg. acts. The court cant
Ratio: Inaccuracies committed by Congress in declare an act unconstitutional unless a proper
determining who owns the land does not invalidate case between opposing parties is submitted.
the statute. Dominical rights cannot be conferred  In this action, the US is made defendant but it has
on those obviously not entitled to them. Appellee’s not adverse interest against them. The objective is
fears are without legal basis. The government will not to assert a property right as against the govt or
only compensate rightful owners. demand compensation for alleged wrongs. Thus
the decision that court will render if the actions
Wherefore, were allowed to proceed will be nothing more than
Judgement AFFIRMED. an expression of opinion upon the validity of the
acts in question. Conferring advise to the leg was
Ex Post Facto Laws never contemplated in the constitution as a
function of the court.
(The parties have not cited a right violated by the Act
Consti. Art. III, sec. 22 of Congress. Congress, by allowing them to sue the
govt, only allowed the Court to settle the doubtful
character of the leg in question not actual conflicts.)
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall
be enacted.
Consti. Art. VII, sec. 18, par. 3

B. Case or Controversy Requirement: Elements

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
STANDING proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
Muskrat vs. US suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
 An act of Congress that provide for the allotment
of lands of Cherokee Nation, which increased the
number of persons entitled to share in the final
distribution of lands and funds of the Cherokees Philippine Assoc. of Colleges and University vs. Sec. of Educ.
beyond those enrolled in Sept. 1902 in accordance
with the act of Congress passed in July 1902. It
had the effect of permitting the enrollment of
children who were minors living in March 1906, Facts:
whose parents had theretofore been enrolled as
members of the Cherokee tribe or had applications  PACU assails the constitutionality of Act 2706 “An
pending for that purpose. act making the inspection obligatory for the Sec. of
 The Congress brought to this Court with an appeal Public Instructions.
to test the constitutionality of prior acts of a. The power of the Sec. of Education to require prior
Congress. permit before they operate deprive them of liberty
and property without due process.
 b. The act involved undue delegation of leg. powers 1. where the question in dispute is purely a
when it allowed the Sec. of Educ. Unlimited legal one, or
powers and discretion to prescribe rules and 2. where the controverted act is patently
standards. The act does not provide guidelines for illegal or was performed without
this. This. There has been abuse on the part of the jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or
school inspectors “bullying”. 3. where the respondent is a department
c. The act imposes a tax on a right (i.e. to operate secretary, whose acts as alter-ego of the
schools) President bear the implied or assumed
d. Regulation of books of instruction amounts to approval of the latter, unless actually
censorship. disapproved by him or
4. where there are circumstances indicating
 Govt asserts that the petitioners have not brought the urgency of judicial intervention.
a justiciable controversy and should be dismissed. The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing
Nevertheless, the gov’t can state that the act is not exceptions to the general rule.
unconstitutional.
Main function of Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Issue: Congress, not to defeat the same. –Under the Constitution,
the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
WON there is a justiciable controversy with regard to enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
permits. performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of the veto power. He may not defeat
Held: legislative enactments that have acquired the status of
law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
No there is none. agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.
Ratio:
Jurisdiction; Power to invalidate treaties:--The
In the 1st place, there is no justiciable controversy bec Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled the
none of them have been closed down in fact. It was not question of whether an international agreement may be
shown either that the Sec. of Education has threatened to invalidated by our courts in the affirmative, by providing in
revoke their permits. Section 2 of Article VIII thereof that the Supreme Court
may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions. reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ or
Nevertheless, in view of decisions of US SC quoted error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
apparently outlawing censorship, the Court decided to look judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) all cases in
into the merits, otherwise it might be alleged that the which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, not
Court failed to act in the face of a clear violation of only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also
fundamental personal rights of liberty and property. when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

Gonzales vs. Marcos

Gonzales vs. Hechanova
** no digest for this case so I copied the digest from
** no digest for this case so I copied the digest from another reviewer.
another reviewer.
Petitioner assails an EO creating a trust for the
Petitioner assails respondent’s authorization of the construction of the CCP on the ground that it is an
importation of rice by the govt from private sources on the impermissible encroachment by the President on the
ground that said act is violative of an Act prohibiting such legislative prerogative. The SC held here that petitioner has
importation by the RCA or any govt agency. Resp contends no sufficient standing as the funds administered by the
that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give President came from donations and contributions not from
him sufficient interest to file the instant petition. The SC public funds raised through taxation. Accordingly, there is
held that petitioner has standing since in light of the polict absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest. A
of the govt underlying the Act, which is to engage in the taxpayer’s suit will only prosper if involves the use of
purchase of basic foods directly from tenants, farmers, public funds.
growers in the Phil, petitioner is entitled to a chance to sell
to the govt the rice it now seeks to import. Said act of Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust
respondent thus deprives petitioner of this opportunity, may be concurrently exercised by the President and the
amounting to an actual injury to petitioner. Moreover, Congress. –While to the Presidency under the 1935
public funds will be used to effect the purchase. Petitioner, Constitution was entrusted the responsibility for
as taxpayer, has sufficient interest and personality to seek administering public property, the then Congress could
judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he provide guidelines for such a task. Relevant in this
believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said connection is the excerpt from an opinion of Justice
funds. Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. vs. Sawyer
“When the president acts in absence of either a
Exhaustion of administrative remedies: exceptions congressional grant or denial of authority =, he can only
applicable to case at bar: The principle requiring the rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not of twilight in which he and Congress may have a
applicable: concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as practical matter, and the issue of constitutionality is the very lis
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential mota of the case which is the case here.
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is
likely to depend on the imperatives of events and Ratio:
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law”. To vary the phraseology, to recall Thomas  Right remedy sought. Although question of
Reed Powell, if Congress would continue to keep its peace unconstitutionality are usually raised in ordinary
notwithstanding the action taken by the executive action in the lower courts. However, if the very
department, it may be considered as silently vocal. In basis for the jurisdiction of the lower court, is
plainer language, it could be an instance of silence accused of constitutional infirmities, a writ of
meaning consent. prohibition is issued.
 Public Party have standing.
a. Private party- gen. rule: only parties to the suit
People vs. Vera can question the validity of a law (in this case only
the govt is the party bec it’s a probation
proceeding).
Facts: b. Public party-the people, rep by Sol. Gen., is a
proper party. Indeed the proper party-to bring the
 Cu Unjieng was found guilty and sentenced to action. If act 4221 indeed violates the constitution,
imprisonment then the state has a substantial interest to set it
 C.U. applied for probation under Act 4221 in aside. Not only does its implementation result in
Manila CFI (Tuason presiding), which referred it ti the illegal expenditure of public funds, it also
the probation which in turn denied it. inflicts “a mortal wound upon the fundamental
 However, another branch, held by herein law”.
respondent Vera granted a hearing, denied the c. The people is not estopped from impinging the law
application. However, the judge failed to rule on just because it is already implemented. It is not a
the execution of the sentence of C.U. bec the latter valid ground because fiscals etc will naturally
asked for a recon and a group of lawyers asked to implement Act 4221 as long as it is not declared
intervene in his favor. void by the Court.
 But before Judge Vera could rule on this, HSBC,  Mootness: not moot
later joined by Sol. Gen. filed an action for As a general rule, question of constitutionality must be
certiorari and prohibition before the SC asking it raised at the earliest opportunity so that if it is not
to put a stop on the hearing and execute the raised in the pleading, ordinarily it may not be raised
sentence of CU. at the trial, and if not in the trial courts, in will not be
 They argued that the judge lack jurisdiction in as considered on appeal.
much as his basis, the Probation Law is
unconstitutional on 3 grounds: However, courts can grant exception through the
a. infringed on the executive prerogative to grant exercise of its sound discretion such as in:
pardon and reprieves a. crim cases, it may be raised at any stage of the
b. undue delegation of leg power proceedings
c. violates equal protection clause b. when the constitutionality of the jurisdiction of the
 Respondents argue: lower court is assailed, the issue can be
a. case is premature since the same issues being considered any time by an appellate court.
raised by petitioners are still pending before the  Lis Mota: There is no doubt that the
trial court. They have also a pending appeal before constitutionality is the issue here bec Cu Unjien
the said court. The SC should not impair the draws his purported privilege from the assailed
latter’s jurisdiction. law.
b. The private petitioner may not intervene in a  Liberality Doctrine (of Judicial Review):
probation case. While the Sol Gen is estopped However the Court said that despite the foregoing
from questioning a law which govt promulgated. discussion on justiciability, the court can still overrule the
c. Act. 4221, is constitutional but even it is not, the defense of want of jurisdiction bec “there is an
assailed parts can be excluded while the others extraordinary situation which calls for the relaxation of the
can be maintained (separability). general rule” on justiciability.
Considering the…
Issues: “importance of the case”, “to prevent the multiplicity of
suits”, strong reasons of public policy and that the issue
A. Justiciability be resolved”.
B. Constitutional Issues Raised
C. Separability  Constitutionality: Act 4221 is unconstitutional
- WON it a usurpation of pardon powers. NO
Held: a. Probation is not pardon. A pardon removes both
guild and punishment. It releases punishment and
1. The petitioners raised an issue of constitutionality blots out of existence the guilt so that in the eye of
in a proper case the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed an offense. It removes the
 Courts willonly make a determination with regard penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all
to constitutionality if raised in the appropriate his civil rights.
cases (i.e. requisites for judicial review are present) b. A probation, unlike pardon, does not relieve
penalty. It is in fact a penalty of lesser degree.
 During the probation period, the convict is still Facts:
under legal custody, under the control of the
probation of the officer and the Court; he may be  Appellants filed a suit in a N.Y. district court
rearrested if he violates the conditions of his seeking to invalidate secs of the Elementary and
probation and it rearrested, may be committed to Secondary Education Act of 1965.
prison to serve out his original sentence.  The act allegedly vitiates the establishment and
c. Congress is the branch where in the power to the exercise clause of the 1 st amendment of the US
define crimes and their penalties is reposed. Since consti as it provides funding for
probation is a “new mode of penalty, in sectarian/religious schools.
substitution of imprisonment and tire”, therefore,  They sued as taxpayers but the NY Court, citing
the leg did not overstep its bounds when it passed Frothingham vs Mellon, did not grant them
Act 4221. standing. Frothingham, it was stated that the int
of a federal taxpayer in the funds of the Treasury
BUT was “comparatively minute and indeterminable”
and the “effect on future taxation” of the
 It is an undue delegation of leg powers. expenditures for the assailed maternity Act of
 General Rule: A delegated power cannot be 1921 was “remote, fluctuating and uncertain”.
redelegated. Hence the direct injury test was not met
Exceptions: (Frothingham case).
a. delegation of leg power to the LGUs to prescribe
local ordinances Issue: WON appellants have locus standi
b. delegation of leg power directly to the people (eg.
Referendum) Held: Yes
c. delegation of leg power by the Consti itself (eg.
Emergency powers of the pres to leg.) Ratio:
 The case at hand does not fall within the
exception. It must be subjected to a test: was the  Govt is wrong in saying that standing should not
statute complete in itself when it left the hands of be granted bec this taxpayers’ suit involves mere
the legislative so that nothing was left to judgment disagreement with the uses of the tax and the
of any other delegate of the leg. Quoting Judge issue should belong to other branches of govt.
Ranney, it is quite different to give discretion, it is  In deciding question of standing, it is not relevant
quite different to give discretion as to what it (the whether or not the substantive issues are
law) shall be and conferring an authority or justiciable. The main question is WON the party
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised seeking reliefe has “alleged such a personal stake
under and in pursuance of the law. Hence, it is in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
valid for Congress, to let the delegate make a concrete adverseness which sharpens the
determination of facts, upon presence of which a presentation of issues upon which the court so
law becomes executable. largely depends for illumination of difficult consti
 But Sec. 11 of the Act 4221, allows discretion to issues”. (Baker vs Carr)
the provinces to implement or not implement the  Hence, a party may be granted standing but the
law. Said sec. 11 gives the provincial board court won’t pass on the subs issues bec they are,
arbitrary discretion. The Act becomes applicable for instance, political questions.
only if provincial boards appropriate. The salary  In the case of a taxpayer’s suit, the court will look
for the probation officer of the province. at the substantive issues to decide on the issue of
 Act violates equality clause. standing for another purpose, which is to
- person X in province A may benefit from the Act establish the “logical nexus” between the status
bec province A provided for the salary of the asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.
probation officer whereas person Y may not in  Establishing that “logical nexus” involves 2 things:
province B that did not do the same. It permits the a. a logical link bet a taxpater (i.e. the status) and
denial of equal protection which is not different the type of legislative enactment attacked. Thus,
from a direct denial of equal protection. the latter must involve the exercise of
 Separability. Sec. 11 is invalid, the whole law is congressional power under the taxing and
invalid. How can the law be implemented without spending clause and not merely an incidental
probation officers (which is the subject matter of expenditure of tax funds in the admin of
said sec. 11). Enough must remain (in the essentially regulatory statute.
impugned statute) to make a complete, intelligible, b. A nexus bet status and the nature of
and valid statute which carries out the leg constitutional infringement alleged.
interest. This is not the case here.  The petitioners herein alleged that their tax money
is being used in violation of a specific
constitutional protection against abuses of leg
powers. This met the logical nexus. The Educ Act
involves the spending power of Congress (direct
spending) and they alleged that the Act violates
the establishment and free exercise clauses. This
constitutional amendment was put there exactly to
prevent taxation in favor of any religious
establishment.
Flast vs. Cohen
Sierra Club vs. Morton
 its legality violated the National Environment
Policy Act (NEPA) since it failed to attach an
 Sierra Club, a long standing org advocating environmental impact statement with its order
preservation/conservation of environment sued which allegedly have a significant impact on the
the Forest Service to prevent the dev;t of a ski environment.
resort at Mineral King Area of Sequoia National
Park.  The petitioner sought to have it dismissed on the
 The Sierra Club invoked the Admin. Procedure Act gournd that the standing of the petitioner was
which states that any person suffering legal wrong based on “vague unsubstantial and insufficiend
bec of agency action or adversely affected or pleadings” i.e. failing to assert injury in fact as set
aggrieved by the same within the meaning or a in Sierra Club vs Morton.
relevant statute is entitled to judicial review. They
argue that the Forest Service violated fed  The district court granted standing since the
laws/regulations re: preservation in approving the petition alleged more than a “gen interest in seeing
Mineral King Devt. Hence, they sought a that the law is enforced. It is also found in favor of
restraining order against it. petitioner with regard to the merits and issued an
 District Court granted them standing but CA injunction. It said that the NEPA implicitly confers
reversed saying that the Sierra Club had not made authority to federal courts to enjoin any federal
an adequate showing of inseparable injury to merit action taken in violation of NEPAs procedural
a judgment of the court. requirements. The court refused to reconsider,
hence this appeal.
Issue:
Issue:
WON Sierra has standing to sue
1. Standing
Held: None. 2. Jurisdiction of the court to issue the injunction

Ratio: Held:

 Rule: Where no specific statue authorizaing the 1. SCRAP has standing.

invocation of judicial review, personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy must be asserted to Ratio:
ensure adverseness.
 However, if there is that statute, the question is  Their petition is distinguishable from the failed
does the case at hand fall within the purview of petition of the Sierra Club.
said law. a. Unlike in Sierra Club, petitioners herein alleged
 The change in aesthetics and ecology of the that their members used the forests, streams,
Mineral King area, (even though non-economic in mountains, and other resources in the
nature) may be considered injury-in-fact and Washington Metropolitan area. Their activities,
sufficient to merit judicial review under Sec. 10 of they claim will be disturbed by the use of non-
the APA. Except that the party invoking said sec recyclable material which had become more
must still show that he is among the injured party. expensive as a result of the increase rates of
 In this case, the Sierra Club has failed to allege transportation. Hence, more timber and other
that any of its members may be affected in their natural resources will be used/destroyed in lieu of
past times or recreation if the ski resort is built. the recyclables.
An org may indeed represent its members in a suit b. Unlike Sierra Club, were the effect of the assailed
provided that it can show that said members are project is limited to a special geographic area, the
injured parties. In claiming standing, public federal action complained here is applicable to all
interest as the issue is not enough otherwise, any railroads in the country and therefore its alleged
group or individual with special interest in the environmental impact is nationwide.
issue can be given standing which may undermine c. It is correct that pleadings must be more than
adverseness requisites of judicial review. academic exercise. The harm claimed by SCRAP
should indeed be perceptible rather than merely
conceivable. However, the recourse is not an
appeal to the SC but a motion for summary
US vs. SCRAP judgment in the lower courts so that they cam
assail the claims of SCRAP.
 A group of 4 law students  The suspension of rates is an exclusive prerogative
of the ICC so the court had no authority to issue
 Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate the injunction. The NEPA cannot be construed as
Commerce Commission, the railroads still have having repealed that exclusive grant by Congress
the initiative to increase their fees, provided they because there was never such an intention. In fact
give 30 days prior notice to the ICC. Within the in passing the NEPA, Congress instructs that the
30-day period, the Comm may suspend the Act shall not in any way affect the specific
operation of the proposed rate within 7 months statutory obligation of any federal agency.
pending review of the legality of the raise.

 SCRAP alleged in a district court that the failure of

the ICC to suspend a surcharge while investigating Kilosbayan vs. Guingona
 Consti, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes,
which was sufficient in form but dismissed for being
** no digest for this case so I copied the digest from another insufficient in substance
reviewer.  Oct 23: 2nd impeachment complaint was filed with the
Sec Gen of the House on the basis of the alleged
Petitioner corporation composed of citizens suing in their results of the legislative inquiry of the abovementioned
capacities as senators, taxpayers, and concerned citizens, Resolution
opposed the Contract of Lease between PCSo and PGMC  Petitioners’ main argument: 2nd impeachment
which sets up an on-line lottery system on the basis or complaint is unconstitutional bec it violates Sec 5, Art
serious moral and ethical considerations. The SC ruled XI of the Consti, stating that “no impeachment
that a party’s standing is a procedural technicality which proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
the courts may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside more than once within a period of one year”
in view of the importance of the issues raised in this  Petitioners’ allegations of Legal Standing:
petition. The court brushed aside this technicality because o Duty as members of the legal profession or of the
the transcendental importance to the public of these cases Integrated Bar of the Philippines or of the
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, Philippine Bar Association
brushing aside the technicalities of procedure. Insofar as o As citizens of the Philippines, with an obligation to
taxpayers’ suit are concerned, the Court has declared that protect the SC, the Chief Justice, and the integrity
it is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should of the Judiciary
be entertained or that it enjoys an open discretion to o As taxpayers, with a right to be protected against
entertain the suit or not. all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers’
money
Steffel vs. Thompson o As a class suit, in behalf of all citizens, citing
Oposa v Factoran, which was filed in behalf of
succeeding generations of Filipinos
** no digest for this case so I copied the digest from another o As members of the House of Reps, with the duty of
reviewer.
ensuring that only constitutional impeachment
proceedings are initiated
Petioner was threatened with arrest for distributing anti-
o As professors of law, with an interest in the
war handbills and further threatened with future arrest if
subject matter as it pertains to a constitutional
her returned and such being stipulated as unlawful in the
issue “which they are trying to inculcate in the
Criminal Trespass Law. This is a petition for declaratory
minds of their students”
relief. The SC held that the court incorrectly dismissed the
o Legal standing should be brushed aside for
pet when no state criminal proceeding is pending, federal
intervention will not result in the disruption of the state consideration of issues of national and
criminal justice system. Rather, non-action would result in transcendental importance and of public
the individual’s not knowing that by continuing his interest
activities, he is violating the law, or that by desisting from
the same, he is depriving himself of a constitutional right. Issues/Held:
Further, Congress clearly intended that a declaratory relief 1. WON the power of judicial review extends to those
be more available when an injunction is not in order to arising from impeachment proceedings – YES
test the constitutionality of state criminal statutes. 2. WON the essential prerequisites for the exercise of the
Although a declaratory relief will not make an power of judicial review have been fulfilled
unconstitutional law disappear, it is nevertheless useful  WON petitioners have legal standing – YES
since a declaration of full unconstitutionality will result in  WON the issue is ripe for adjudication – YES
the reversal of previous convictions and a declaration of  WON the issue is justiciable – YES
partial unconstitutionality will limit the statute’s  WON the issue is the lis mota of the case – YES
applicability. In declaratory relief, irreparable injurt is not 3. WON the 2nd impeachment complaint is
a prerequisite since what is required is an injunction. unconstitutional – YES
Declaratory relief has been assigned by Congress to
protect constitutional rights where an injunction is not Ratio:
available, which is when no case has been filed.
1. The Consti itself has provided for the instrumentality
of the judiciary as the rational way to determine the
FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF REPS nature, scope and extent of the powers of government.
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert superiority over the
(Nov. 10, 2003) other departments; it only asserts its solemn and
Ponente: J. Carpio-Morales sacred obligation to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Consti and to establish for the
Facts: parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
 July 22, 2002: House adopted a Resolution directing instrument secures and guarantees to them. In case of
the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, conflict, only the judicial arm can be called upon to
in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements determine the proper allocation of powers between the
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Judiciary several departments and among the integral or
Development Fund (JDF) constituent units thereof.
 June 2, 2003: Erap filed an impeachment complaint 2. Locus standi: a personal and substantial interest in
(1st impeachment complaint) against the Chief Justice the case such that the party has sustained or will
and 7 Associate Justices for culpable violation of the sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged
SolGen: petitioners have standing bec procedural Ripeness: for a case to be considered ripe for
matters are subordinate to the need to determine adjudication, something should have been
WON the other branches of gov’t have not accomplished or performed by either branch before a
exceeded the constitutional limits of their powers court may come into the picture (Tan v Macapagal)
Dean Pangalangan: rule exception that when the The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e.
real party in interest is unable to vindicate his the 2nd impeachment complaint had been filed
rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the with the House of Reps and the 2001 Rules have
case of the CJ who, for ethical reasons, cannot already been promulgated and enforced, the
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the prerequisite above has been complied with.
courts will grant petitioners’ standing Dean’s persuasion that wasn’t taken: even if the
Difference bet rule on real-party-interest and petitions are premature (since Articles of
rule on standing: former is a concept of civil Impeachment haven’t been transmitted to the
procedure while the latter has constitutional Senate), the CJ can still raise issue of
underpinnings. Standing restrictions require a constitutional infirmity through a Motion to
partial consideration of the merits, as well as Dismiss  withdrawal of signatories would not, by
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of
of the judiciary in certain areas. The question re: infirmity and it would not obliterate the 2 nd
real party in interest is WON he is the party who impeachment complaint
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or 3. Sec 5, Art XI of the Consti – y’all know the
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. discussion here 
When suing as a citizen: interest of the
petitioners must be direct and personal; he must
show that he sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of any gov’tal act; party should
appear to have been or is about to be denied some SANLAKAS vs. EXEC SEC
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens (02/03/2004)
or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. Tinga, J.
As a taxpayer: where there is a claim that public Facts:
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that -Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a
there is a waste of public funds through the "state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion.
a party is allowed to sue. He should prove that he -by evening, soldiers agreed to return to barracks.
has sufficient interest and that he would sustain GMA, however, did not immediately lift the
direct injury as a result. declaration of a state of rebellion, only doing so on
As a legislator: he is allowed to sue to question August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.
the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Petitioners:
As an association: while an association has legal 1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to
personality to represent its members, the mere assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights,
invocation by the IBP or any member of the legal interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine
society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert
and nothing more, although true, does not suffice human rights, including political and civil rights, of the
to clothe it with legal standing bec its interest is citizens freedom of speech and of expression under
too general. However, the Court chooses to relax Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle
the rules on standing bec of advanced to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate
constitutional issues raised in the petitions. demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the
In the case of class suits: persons intervening same; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the the declaration of state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert
interests of all concerned to enable the court to further that there exists no factual basis for the
deal properly with all interests involved in the suit declaration, mutiny having ceased.
bec a judgment in a class suit , whether favorable
or not, is binding on all members of the class WON 2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs
they were before the court. & bar reviewers"; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does
In the case of transcendental importance: J. not require the declaration of the state of rebellion,
Feliciano’s instructive determinants: declaration a "constitutional anomaly" that misleads
a. The character of the funds or other assets because "overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to
involved in the case such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate
b. The presence of a clear case of disregard of a the constitutional right of private citizens"; proclamation is
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the a circumvention of the report requirement under the same
public respondent agency or instrumentality of S18, Art7, commanding the President to submit a report to
the gov’t Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial
c. The lack of any other party with a more direct law; presidential issuances cannot be construed as an
and specific interest in raising the questions exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not
being raised delegated any such power to the President
 declared a state of rebellion) prove that it can be repeated.
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as
Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, 3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the President, as Commander-in-
powers and functions were allegedly affected by the Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most
declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration of a state to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the
of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
emergency powers, such exercise, it is contended, corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the
amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires
by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual
invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the
4. PImentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject exercise of such power. However, as we observed in
presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal and Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese
abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling
under the Constitution; petitioner fears that the out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
for the crime of rebellion rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7
does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a
Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the
by the lifitng of the proclamation; questions President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but,
standing of petitioners first and foremost, with Executive powers. The ponencia
then traced the evolution of executive power in the US
Issues: (Jackson and the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and
1. whether or not petitioners have standing teh 'war powers', Cleveland in In re: Eugene Debs) in an
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by effort to show that "the Commander-in-Chief powers are
the lifting of the proclamation broad enough as it is and become more so when taken
3. whether or not the proclamation calling the together with the provision on executive power and the
state of rebellion is proper presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the
powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the
Held: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the means to
House and Sen Pimentel have standing. Sanlakas & PM address exigencies or threats which undermine the very
have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez existence of government or the integrity of the State." This,
"… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself plus Marcos v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev
which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of the
juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot Pres to declare a certain status, argue towards the validity
of the proclamation. However, the Court maintains that
claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it the declaration is devoid of any legal significance for being
alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of
being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally
the crime of rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend
relief, which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend
assuming that Sanlakas & PM are "people's organizations" the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with
in the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of the Consti, they are more reason that a simple declaration of a state of
still not endowed with standing for as in Kilosbayan v rebellion could not bring about these conditions.
Morato "These provisions have not changed the traditional Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may
rule that only real parties in interest or those with resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded.In
standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that
power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities
involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule
lies at the very heart of the judicial function." SJS, though 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so
alleging to be taxpayers, is not endowed with standing warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is,
since "A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of
of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person may be subjected to
derived from taxation.No such illegal disbursement is a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or
alleged." Court has ruled out the doctrine of not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long
"transcendental importance" regarding constitutional as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are
questions in this particular case. Only members of present.The argument that the declaration of a state of
Congress, who's (?) powers as provided in the Consti on rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and,
giving the Pres emergency powers are allegedly being therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is
impaired, can question the legality of the proclamation of a leap of logic. There is no illustration that the President
the state of rebellion. has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law
powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imagination can
2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of
judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant
controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the
otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading Constitution.The petitions do not cite a specific instance
review."19 The case at bar is one such case, since prior where the President has attempted to or has exercised
events (the May 1, 2001 incident when the Pres also powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as
Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of           A petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. [6]  We have held
powers, vested on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as that to be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of
by Section 23 (2), Article VI. any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully
excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right.  The
petitioner in every case must therefore be an aggrieved party in
the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced
Pimentel vs. Exec. Sec. and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed. [7]
The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the
case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing
** no digest for this case so I just copied the whole case to raise the constitutional or legal question.  “Legal standing”
since this is Prof. Roque’s case which is of course a favorite. means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
PUNO J.: of the government act that is being challenged.  The term
“interest” is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
           This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[8]
compel the o ffice of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the           The petition at bar was filed by Senator Aquilino
Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Pimentel, Jr. who asserts his legal standing to file the suit as
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.     member of the Senate; Congresswoman Loretta Ann Rosales, a
member of the House of Representatives and Chairperson of its
Committee on Human Rights; the Philippine Coalition for the
          The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Establishment of the International Criminal Court which is
Court which “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction composed of individuals and corporate entities dedicated to the
over persons for the most serious crimes of international Philippine ratification of the Rome Statute; the Task Force
concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national Detainees of the Philippines, a juridical entity with the avowed
criminal jurisdictions.” [1]  Its jurisdiction covers the crime of purpose of promoting the cause of human rights and human
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of rights victims in the country; the Families of Victims of
aggression as defined in the Statute. [2]  The Statute was opened Involuntary Disappearances, a juridical entity duly organized
for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had and existing pursuant to Philippine Laws with the avowed
remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the purpose of promoting the cause of families and victims of
United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines human rights violations in the country;  Bianca Hacintha Roque
signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d’ and Harrison Jacob Roque, aged two (2) and one (1),
Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the respectively, at the time of filing of the instant petition, and
United Nations.[3] Its provisions, however, require that it be suing under the doctrine of inter-generational rights enunciated
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory in the case of Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.;[9] and a group of fifth
states.[4]  year working law students from the University of the Philippines
College of Law who are suing as taxpayers.
          Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the
respondents — the Office of the Executive Secretary and the           The question in standing is whether a party has alleged
Department of Foreign Affairs — to transmit the signed text of such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification. assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
          It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [10]
treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a
function of the Senate.  Hence, it is the duty of the executive           We find that among the petitioners, only Senator
department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to Pimentel has the legal standing to file the instant suit.    The
the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to other petitioners maintain their standing as advocates and
ratification of treaties.  Moreover, petitioners submit that the defenders of human rights, and as citizens of the country.  They
Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute have not shown, however, that they have sustained or will
under treaty law and customary international law.  Petitioners sustain a direct injury from the non-transmittal of the signed
invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining text of the Rome Statute to the Senate.  Their contention that
the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object they will be deprived of their remedies for the protection and
and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior enforcement of their rights does not persuade.  The Rome
to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not Statute is intended to complement national criminal laws and
to become parties to the treaty.[5]   courts.  Sufficient remedies are available under our national
laws to protect our citizens against human rights violations and
          The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the petitioners can always seek redress for any abuse in our
respondents, questioned the standing of the petitioners to file domestic courts.
the instant suit.  It also contended that the petition at bar
violates the rule on hierarchy of courts.  On the substantive As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that “to
issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power
executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
to the Senate for concurrence.  participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.”[11]  Thus, legislators have the standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the           In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power
the validity of any official action which they claim infringes to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate.
their prerogatives as legislators.  The petition at bar invokes
the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence to           We disagree.
a treaty entered into by the executive branch, in this case, the
Rome Statute.  The petition seeks to order the executive
branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow           Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law,
it to exercise such authority.  Senator Pimentel, as member of describes the treaty-making process in this wise:
the institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such
authority of the Senate. The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: 
negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the
          We now go to the substantive issue. instruments of ratification.  The treaty may then be
submitted for registration and publication under the U.N.
Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity
          The core issue in this petition for mandamus is whether of the agreement as between the parties.
the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs  
have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of           Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the
the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his
to the United Nations even without the signature of the authorized representatives.  These representatives are
President. provided with credentials known as full powers, which
they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the
          We rule in the negative. formal discussions.  It is standard practice for one of the
parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which,
          In our system of government, the President, being the together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis
head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in of the subsequent negotiations.  The negotiations may be
external relations and is the country’s sole representative with brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved,
foreign nations.[12]  As the chief architect of foreign policy, the and may even “collapse” in case the parties are unable
President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to to come to an agreement on the points under
international affairs.  Hence, the President is vested with the consideration.
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend  
or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter           If and when the negotiators finally decide on the
into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. 
relations.[13]  In the realm of treaty-making, the President has This step is primarily intended as a means of
the sole authority to negotiate with other states. authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of
symbolizing the good faith of the parties;  but,
significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is
to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a required.  The document is ordinarily signed in
limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several
all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he
entered into by him.  Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 will bring home to his own state.
Constitution provides that “no treaty or international  
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at           Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”  The 1935 act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions
and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the of a treaty concluded by its representatives.  The
legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive.  purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting
Section 10 (7), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided: states to examine the treaty more closely and to give
them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should
          Sec. 10. (7)  The President shall have the power, they find it inimical to their interests.  It is for this
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of reason that most treaties are made subject to the
the Senate, to make treaties xxx. scrutiny and consent of a department of the
government other than that which negotiated them. 
Section 14 (1) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution stated:  
xxx
 
          Sec. 14.  (1)  Except as otherwise provided in this The last step in the treaty-making process is the
Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective unless exchange of the instruments of ratification, which
concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a
Batasang Pambansa. different date has been agreed upon by the parties. 
Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity
           The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty- clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is
making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the deemed effective upon its signature. [16]  [emphasis
executive in the field of foreign relations. [14]  By requiring the supplied]
concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by
the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty
checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political by the Philippine representative with ratification.  It should be
maturity and growth.[15] underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification
are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making
process.  As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily
intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a representatives of the states be subject to ratification,
symbol of the good faith of the parties.  It is usually performed acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is
by the state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
mission.  Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by confirmed and approved by a State.  By ratifying a treaty signed
which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by
concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the
executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the state’s representative, the President, being accountable to the
government.[17] Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they
guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. 
its ratification.  It mandates that after the treaty has been Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of
signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall be the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to
transmitted to the  Department of Foreign Affairs.  The ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of
ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the head of states.  If that were so, the requirement of
the President for ratification.   After the President has ratified ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has
the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify
same to the Senate for concurrence.  Upon receipt of the a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. [18]
concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes
shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to render it without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial
effective.  Section 7 of Executive Order No. 459 reads: grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. 
Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense.
[19]
Sec. 7.  Domestic Requirements for
the Entry into Force of a Treaty or an
Executive Agreement. — The domestic           It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the
requirements for the entry into force of a power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
treaty or an executive agreement, or any concurrence of the Senate.  The role of the Senate, however, is
amendment thereto, shall be as follows: limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
  concurrence, to the ratification. [20] Hence, it is within the
A.      Executive Agreements. authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
  Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse
          i.        All executive agreements shall be transmitted to to ratify it.[21] Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty
the Department of Foreign Affairs after their signing for the which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should
preparation of the ratification papers.  The transmittal shall not be taken lightly,[22] such decision is within the competence
include the highlights of the agreements and the benefits of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this
which will accrue to the Philippines arising from them. Court via a writ of mandamus.  This Court has no jurisdiction
  over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance
          ii.       The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to of his official duties.[23]  The Court, therefore, cannot issue the
the endorsement by the concerned agency, shall transmit the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond
agreements to the President of the Philippines for his its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the
ratification.  The original signed instrument of ratification government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the
shall then be returned to the Department of Foreign Affairs Senate.
for appropriate action.
            IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.
B.      Treaties.
 
          i.        All treaties, regardless of their designation,
shall comply with the requirements provided in sub- RIPENESS
paragraph[s] 1 and 2, item A (Executive Agreements) of this :
Section.  In addition, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall
submit the treaties to the Senate of the Philippines for TAN vs. MACAPAGAL
concurrence in the ratification by the President.  A certified
true copy of the treaties, in such numbers as may be required
by the Senate, together with a certified true copy of the
ratification instrument, shall accompany the submission of
the treaties to the Senate.
 
          ii.       Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate,
the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the
provision of the treaties in effecting their entry into force.

  POE VS. ULLMAN

          Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound

under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty
which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not This case deals with the statute as in Griswold vs.
signify the final consent of the state to the treaty.  It is the Connecticut where, in this case, two couples and their
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof.  In physician sued the State and its Attorney-General,
fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the Ullman, asking the Court to declare the Connecticut
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives He wrote to the Government Printing Office and requested
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.. that he be provided with the documents published by the
Government in compliance with Art I, sec 9, cl (7) of the
Facts: Paul and Pauline Poe had three consecutive US Constitution:
pregnancies terminating in infants with multiple "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
congenital abnormalities resulting in their death shortly but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
after birth. Because of the great emotional and Law; and a regular Statement and Account of
psychological stress resulting from these deaths, it is Dr. the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Buxton’s opinion that the best and safest medical Money shall be published from time to time."
treatment is to prescribe contraceptives in order to insofar as that clause requires a regular statement
preserve the health of petitioner. On the other hand, Mrs. and account of public funds.
Doe recently underwent a pregnancy which caused her
critical physical illness such that another pregnancy would The Fiscal Service of the Bureau of Accounts of the
be exceedingly perilous to her life. Also, their doctor, Dr. Department of the Treasury replied, explaining that it
Buxton, also joined them in saying that the statute published the document known as the Combined
deprived them of liberty and property without due process. Statement of Receipts, Expenditures, and Balances of the
US Gov’t. Several copies of the monthly and daily reports
Issue: W/N the allegations raised by petitioners regarding of the office were sent with the letter. Respondent also
the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute raise a inquired as to how he could receive further information on
justiciable question before the Court. the expenditures of the CIA. The Bureau of Accounts
replied stating that it had no other available information.
Held: No. Petitioners do not allege that appellee, Ullman
threatens to prosecute them for their use of or for giving Respondent asked the federal court to declare
advice regarding contraceptives. The allegations merely unconstitutional a provision of the CIA Act which permits
state that in the course of his public duty he intends to the CIA to account for its expenditures "solely on the
prosecute any violation of Connecticut law. There is thus certificate of the Director ". The only injury alleged by
no imminent or impending threat of arrest on the respondent was that he cannot obtain a document that
petitioners. The Court goes on to say that in the over 75 sets out the expenditures and receipts of the CIA but on
years of its existence, prosecutions for violation of the the contrary was asked to accept a fraudulent document.
statute seems never to have been initiated according to District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing.
counsel nor the researchers of the Court. Judicial notice
was also taken of the fact that contraceptives are readily The CA en banc with three judges dissenting, reversed,
available in drug stores which invite more the attention of holding that the respondent had standing. The majority
enforcement officials. Given the fact that federal judicial relied on Flast v. Cohen, and its two-tier test.
power is to be exercised to strike down legislation, whether
state or federal, only at the instance of one who is himself While noting that the respondent did not directly attack an
immediately harmed or immediately threatened with harm, appropriations act, as did the plaintiff in Flast, the CA
by the challenged action, the circumstances of the case do concluded that the CIA statute challenged by the
not justify the exercise of judicial power as it lacks the respondent was "integrally related," to his ability to
requisites for “case” and “controversy”. challenge the appropriations since he could not question
an appropriation about which he had no knowledge. The
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. CA seemed to rest its holding on an assumption that this
case was a prelude to a later case challenging, on the basis
Public clinics dispensing birth-control information has of information obtained in this suit, some particular
been closed down by the State as well as others following appropriation for or expenditure of the CIA; respondent
the Nelson case which the ponente cited as the test case stated no such an intention in his complaint.
for the statute. The Court failed to take notice of the fact
that several prosecutions for violations of this statute had ISSUES: WON respondent is a proper and appropriate
been initiated in the minor courts. In failing to answer the party to invoke federal judicial power with respect to the
question of the constitutionality of the statute, in effect the issues raised.
court is asking the people to violate the law and hope that
it is not enforced, that they don’t get caught which is not a
proper choice under the present constitutional system. He
then goes on to repeat the arguments in Griswold
regarding the application of the statute reaching into the HELD: NO, he has no standing. (case is not ripe for
intimacies of the marriage relationship forcing search adjudication)
warrants for private bedrooms for its enforcement since
what it prohibits is not the sale or manufacture but the RATIO:
use of contraceptives.
Standing Issue:

Precedents:
U.S vs. RICHARDSON
Flast v. Cohen is a starting point in an
examination of respondent's claim to prosecute this suit as
BURGER, C. J., +4 concurring, 4 dissented a taxpayer, that case must be read with reference to its
principal predecessor, Frothingham v. Mellon.
FACTS:
Respondent attempted to obtain from the Gov’t
information concerning detailed expenditures of the CIA.
Frothingham: Denied standing on the "comparatively not sufficient by itself to render the organization `adversely
minute, remote, fluctuating and uncertain" impact on the affected' or `aggrieved' within the meaning of the APA.”
taxpayer, and the failure to allege the kind of direct injury
required for standing. In the absence of any particular individual or class to
litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the
Flast: held that a "taxpayer will have standing consistent subject matter is committed to the surveillance of
with Art III to invoke judicial power when he alleges that Congress, and ultimately to the political process.
congressional action under the taxing and spending clause
is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which The Constitution created a representative Government, not
operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending an Athenian Democracy, with the representatives directly
power." responsible to their constituents during election periods.

Court made clear it in Flast that it was reaffirming the

principle of Frothingham precluding a taxpayer's use of "a
federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized
grievances about the conduct of government or the MOOTNESS S
allocation of power in the Federal System."
DEFUNIS vs. ODEGAARD
Application of Doctrines:

It is held in Flast that a "fundamental aspect of standing" FACTS:

is that it focuses primarily on the party seeking to get his Marco Defunis applied for admission at University of
complaint before the federal court rather than "on the Washington Law School of w/c Charles Odegaard is
issues he wishes to have adjudicated," it made equally president. DeFunis was denied admission. He then
clear that in ruling on taxpayer standing, it is necessary to commenced with this suit contending that the procedures
look to the substantive issues to determine if there is a and criteria will be employed by the admissions committee
logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim discriminated against him because of race in violation of
sought to be adjudicated.   the Equal Protection clause. He brought the suit on behalf
of himself alone and not as a representative of any class.
Status Asserted -(nexus)- Claim Sought: He asked and the trial court gave a mandatory injunction
The recital of the respondent's claims and an examination commanding the Univ to allow to enroll him. He began
of the statute under attack demonstrate how far he falls studies in 1971. On appeal, the Washington SC reversed
short of the standing criteria of Flast and how neatly he the trial courts decision. He was in his 2nd year. DeFunis
falls within the Frothingham. Although the status he rests then petitioned the United States SC for a writ of
on is that he is a taxpayer, his challenge is not addressed certiorari. The WSC's decision was stayed until final
to the taxing or spending power, but to the statutes dispostion by the USSC. In the 1st term of his final year,
regulating the CIA. That section provides different the USSC considered his petition and requested both
accounting and reporting requirements and procedures for parties to make a brief on the question of mootness.
the CIA, as is also done with respect to other governmental Respondent claimed that the petitioner had another term
agencies dealing in confidential areas. for him to enroll therefore the question was not moot.
USSC granted petition. The case was finally heard during
Respondent makes no claim that funds are being spent in DeFunis' final term. Counsel for Respondent made it clear
violation of a specific constitutional limitation upon the that the petitioners registration will not be abrogated
taxing and spending power. Rather, he asks the courts to regardless of USSC determination.
compel the Government to give him information on
precisely how the CIA spends its funds. Thus there is no
"logical nexus" between the asserted status of taxpayer
Issue: Is the case moot?
and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the
Executive to supply a more detailed report.
Ratio:
"Federal courts are w/o power to decide questions that
Ripeness Issue:
cannot affect the right of litigants before them" (this
doctrine stems from Consti that judicial power can only be
Respondent's claim: without detailed information on CIA
exercised when there exists an actual case or controversy)
expenditures, he cannot intelligently follow the actions of
All parties agree that DeFunis will be allowed to complete
Congress or the Executive, nor can he properly fulfill his
his term and graduate.
obligations as a member of the electorate in voting for
Therefore, the case is moot.
candidates seeking national office.

SC says: This is surely the kind of a generalized grievance Rationale:

described in both Frothingham and Flast since the impact A USSC deision would no longer be necessary to compel
on him is plainly undifferentiated and common to all the result nor prevent it. The controvrsy between the
members of the public. He has not alleged that, as a parties is no longer "definite and concrete" and "no longer
taxpayer, he is in danger of suffering any particular touches the legal relations of parties having adverse
concrete injury as a result of the operation of this statute. interests".
Defunis suit is not a class action; his only remedy was that
Sierra Club v. Morton: "A mere `interest in a problem,' no he be admitted. He already had that remedy and is in his
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how final term. It does not matter that there admission policy
qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is issues involved. DeFunis will no longer be affected.
Doctrine of "mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal STREET, J +4 concurred, 1 dissent
conduct does not moot case" is irrelevant because
mootness arose from the fact that Defunis is in his final FACTS: (note: not in Bernas)
term, not the unilateral change in admissions procedure. This action was instituted by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino"
to foreclose a mortgage upon property situated in the city
Doctrine of "capable of repetition, yet evading review" also of Manila. The mortgage was executed by the original
irrelevant because Defunis will never again be required to defendant herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, as
enter admission processes. The issue will never be raised security for a debt owing by him to the bank.
again in review. If admissions procedures are left
unchanged, there is no reason to suppose that a After the execution of this instrument by Tanquinyeng, he
subsequent case will not come to court. This is not returned to China and he there died.
exception to doctrine in Southern Pacific Terminal Co v
ICC; actual controversy must exist at stages of appelate or As Tanquinyeng was a nonresident at the time, it was
certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is necessary for the bank in the foreclosure proceeding to
initiated. give notice to Tanquinyeng by publication pursuant to sec
399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Publication was made
DISPOSITION: WSC decision vacated, case remanded for in a newspaper of Manila. The court also directed the clerk
such poceedings necessary of court to deposit in the post office a copy of the
summons and complaint directed to Tanquinyeng at his
DISSENTS: last place of residence, the city of Amoy, China pursuant
Douglas: does not address issue of mootness directly. to the same provision.
Discusses admissions policy. Argues for remanding of case
to determine if LSAT exam should be eliminated for racial Sec. 399,Code of Civil Procedure:
minorities because of it's inherent discriminatory white
man viewpoint In case of publication, where the residence of a
nonresident or absent defendant is known, the
Brennan: case is not moot bec something might happen to judge must direct a copy of the summons and
cause Defunis to miss final term, thus he will have to enter complaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk
admission processes again. "Voluntary cessation" doctrine in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to
relevant bec university implied no concession that the person to be served, at his place of residence
admission policy is unlawful. university allowed only that
petitioner will be allowed to complete this term. Whether the clerk complied with this order does not
respondent did not demonstrate that there was not even a affirmatively appear.
mere possibility that the petitioner would once again be
subject to the challenged admissions policy. respondent The case proceeded in the CFI, and the defendant not
free to return to their old ways (the challenged policy). having appeared, judgment was taken against him by
default.
Requirements for ripeness present because of case's July 3, 1908, decision was rendered in favor of the bank.
history (procedural facts). Reqirements are "questions are
framed with necessary specificity, issues will be contested It was ordered that the Tnaquinyeng should deliver
with necessary adverseness, litigation will be pursued with amount owed to the clerk of the court, and it was declared
necessary vigor, to assure that the constitutional that in case of failure to satisfy the judgment, the
challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be mortgage property should be exposed to public sale. The
capable of judicial resolution. payment contmeplated in said order was never made.

Court ordered the sale of the property which was bought in

Mooting the case disserve public interest. Many people are
by the bank.
affected and are involved with 26 amicus curiae briefs.
This issue will be raised again and again until SC decides.
7 years after confirmation of sale, motion was made by
Avoidance of repetitious litigation serves public interest,
Vicente Palanca, as administrator of Tanquinyeng,
and this case's inevitability counsels that SC should
requesting the court to set aside the order of default and
decide
the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate
on it now.
all the proceedings subsequent thereto.

II. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE Basis of motion: that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the
Consti. Art. III, sec. 1 subject of the action.

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or The motion was denied.
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws. ISSUES:
Assume that the clerk of court failed to mail the papers
which he was directed to send to the defendant in Amoy
A. Procedural Due Process
1) WON the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction
to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the
BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO vs. PALANCA mortgage. YES
2) WON those proceedings were conducted in such In a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings
manner as to constitute due process of law. YES to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within
which appearance must be made is essential.
RATIO:
To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for:
1. (note: not in Bernas) 1) publication
"jurisdiction," may have reference 2) personal notice thru mail, if his residence is
(1) to the authority of the court to entertain a known
particular kind of action or to administer a
particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the Personal Notice
power of the court over the parties, or (aka constructive or substituted service)
(2) over the property which is the subject to the  Such notification does not constitute a service of
litigation. process in any true sense.
 It is merely a means provided by law whereby the
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary owner may be admonished that his property is the
appearance of a party in court and his submission to its subject of judicial proceedings and that it is
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit
process exerted over the person. to protect it.
 This mode of notification does not involve any
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the absolute assurance that the absent owner shall
litigation may result either from a seizure of the property thereby receive actual notice.
under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual  The provision of our law relative to the mailing of
custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice
legal proceedings wherein the power of the court over the unconditionally and in every event, but only in the
property is recognized and made effective. case where the defendant's residence is known.

In this Case: In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice
Tanquinyeng is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the
range of the personal process of the court, refuses to come law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over
the person at all. This, however, is not essential. Assumption in recognizing the effectiveness of a means of
notification which may fall short of actual notice is:
The property itself is the sole thing which is impleaded and Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its
is the responsible object which is the subject of the owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held,
exercise of judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge
the court is based exclusively on the power which it that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation
possesses over the property. and sale.

The jurisdiction over the property based upon the Right to due process has not been infringed.
following:
(1) that the property is located within the district; (further discussion on the irregularity of the non-
(2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the performance of the clerk of court of delivering the notice is
property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by discussed in the case, but Bernas no longer includes.
the mortgage; and Procedural crap na ito…)
(3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings
takes the property into custody, if necessary, and
expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the
mortgage debt.
ANG TIBAY vs. COURT of INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
Given that jurisdiction is exlusively over property, the relief
granted by the court must be limited to such as can be
enforced against the property itself. Justice Laurel:

2. (this is the only issue included in Bernas) A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Sol-Gen in
Requirement of due process is satisfied if; behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations on
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with the case of National Labor Union Inc. praying that their
judicial power to hear and determine the matter labor case be remanded to the CIR for a new trial.
before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the Petitioner, Ang Tibay has filed an opposition for both the
person of the defendant or over the property which motion for reconsideration of CIR and the motion for a
is the subject of the proceeding; new trial by the National Labor Union.
(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and The National Labor Union’s case:
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.  they alleged that Toribio Teodoro, who dominated
Issue in this case concerns (3). the National Workers’ Brotherhood of Ang Tibay,
made a false claim that there was a shortage of
Opportunity to be heard: leather soles in ANg Tibay that made it necessary
for him to lay off workers, however, claim was
unsupported by records of the Bureau of Customs
& the accounts of native dealers of leather. Such
 was just a scheme adopted to systematically 4. evidence must be "substantial." - such relevant
discharge all the members of the NLU, inc., from evidence as a reasonable mind accepts as adequate to
work. support a conclusion." The statute provides that "the
 unfair labor practice for discriminating against the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
the National Workers' Brotherhood. similar provisions is to free administrative boards from
the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed
 That the exhibits hereto attached are so
incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not
inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance
exercise of due diligence they could not be
of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does
expected to have obtained them and offered as
not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
 That the attached documents and exhibits are of evidence
such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence
modification and reversal of the judgment
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
rendered herein.
record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
HELD: motion for reconsideration denied, motion for new disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
trial granted. their right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to
Discussion of the Nature of the CIR to emphasize certain see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use
guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and
cases brought before it. informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy.
Court of Industrial Relations – an administrative court
- exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of
the determination of disputes between employers and investigating and determining the facts in any given case,
employees but their report and decision are only advisory, such
- has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, any of its powers.
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and 6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in therefore, must act on its or his own independent
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
103 (section 1). not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that
There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial it is literally Relations personally to decide all
functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of controversies coming before them.
the separation of governmental powers.
8.The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from
by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it
the authority conferred upon it.
to "act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities The court observed that, except as to the alleged
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not
manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
Therefore, in the interest of justice, a new trial should
commence giving the movant the opportunity to present
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of
new evidence.
an administrative character.

1. right to a hearing, which includes the right of the

party interested or affected to present his own case and PHILCOMSAT vs. ALCUAZ
submit evidence in support thereof.

2. tribunal must consider the evidence presented. Facts:

3. have something to support the decision  By virtue of R.A No. 5514, philcomsat was granted
a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and
 operate in the Philippines, at such places the limited by the requirements of public safety, public
grantee may select, station or stations and or interest, reasonamle feasibility and reasonable rates,
associated equipment and international satellite which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a
communications. under this franchise, it was valid delegation of legislative power.
likewise granted the authority to "construct and
operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver 2. a)The function involved in the rate fixing power of the
telecommunications services from the NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi
communications satellite system and the ground legislative; thus hearings are necessary and the abscence
terminals. thereof results in the violation of due process.
 The satellite service thus provided by petitioner
enable international carriers to serve the public b)The Centrak Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribal "In
with indespensible communications service so far sa generalization is possible in view of the great
 Under sec. 5 of RA 5514, petitioner was exempt variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a
from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service general rule that the notice and hearing are not essential to
commission. now respondent NTC the validity of administrative action where the
 Pursuant EO 196 petitioner was placed under the administrative body acts in the excercise of executive,
jurisdiction and control and regulation of the administrative, or legislative functions; but where public
respondent NTC adminitartive body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial
 Respondent NTC ordered the petitoner to apply for matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather
the requisite certificate of public convenience and than general and prospective, the person whoe rights or
ncessity covering its facilities and the services it property may be affected by the action is entitiled to notice
renders, as well as the corresponding authority to and hearing"
charge rates
 September 9, 1987, pending hearing, petitioner c)Even if respondents insist that notice of hearing are
filed with the NTC an application to continue not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental
operating and maintaining its facilities including a to the entire proceedings and therefore temporary in
provisional authority to continue to provide the nature, it is still mot exempt from the statutory procedural
services and the charges it was then charging requirements of notice and hearing as well as the
 September 16, 1988 the petitioner was granted a requirement o reasonableness.
provisional authority and was valid for 6 months,
when the provisional authority expired, it was d.) it is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing,
extended for another 6 months. respondent has no authority to make such order without
 However the NTC directed the petitioner to first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order the be
charge modified reduced rates through a temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial wheter the
reduction of 15% on the authorized rates same is made upon a complaint, a summary ivestigation,
or upon the comissions own motion.

Issues: 3. a.) What the petitioner has is a grant or privelege

1. WON EO 546 and EO 196 are unconstitutional on the granted by the State and may revoke it at will there is no
ground that the same do not fix a standard for the question in that, however such grant cannot be
excercise of the power therein conferred? NO unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination
2. WON the questioned order violates Due process because of the opeartion of said utility is required by common good.
it was issued without notice to petitioner and without the The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the
benefit of a hearing? YES conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the
3. WON the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the
implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its utility, or clothed with the general power of management
opeartions and eventual closure of business? YES incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership
to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the
Held: regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to
1. a) Fundamental is the rule that delegationof legislative destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power
power may be sustained only upon the ground that some to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due
standard for its exercise is provided and that the regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public,
legislature in making the delegation has prescribed tha then of the utility and its patrons. any regulation,
manner of the execise of the delegated power. Therefore, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
when the administrative agency concerned, respondent private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
NTC in this case, establishes a rarte, its act must be both unreasonable infringerement of property rights is void,
non-confiscatory and must have been established in the because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of
manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise , in the due process and equal protection of the laws.
absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power
becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate- b.) A cursory persual of the assailed order reveals
fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative initial evaluation made on the financial statements of
authority is that the rate be reasonable and just . petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an has several other sources. Further more, it did not as
express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at
may be implied. the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that
based on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate
b) under Sec. 15 EO 546 and Sec. 16 thereof, reduction without any elucidation on what implifications
Respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is and conclutions were necessariy inferred by it from said
staements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the
reflected in the financial statements influenced its decision trial court's decision was initially reversed and set aside.
to impose rate reduction. The complaint was dismissed.

c.) The challenged order, particularly on the rates However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the
proprovide therin, being violative of the due process clause Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its decision and set
is void and should be nullified. it aside through a special division of five. In the resolution
issued by the appellate court, the lower court's decision
was reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to be
referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to
reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote
ATENEO vs. COURT of APPEALS of the regular division having become 2 to 1.

The petitioner now asks to review and reverse the

Facts resolution of the division of five
Carmelita Mateo, a waitress inside the university charged
Juan Ramon Guanzon, a boarder and first year student of Issues:
the university with unbecoming conduct committed on 1. WON Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due
December 12, 1967 at about 5:15 in the evening at the process of law
Cervini Hall's cafeteria 2. WON respondent’s complaint for recovery of
damages was premature because administrative
"Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini … was asking for remedies have not yet been exhausted
'siopao.' I was at the counter and I told him that the 3. WON private respondents are entitled to damages
'siopao' had still to be heated and asked him to wait for a
while. Then Mr. Guanzon started mumbling bad words Holding:
directed to me, in the hearing presence of other boarders. I No, he was accorded due process
asked him to stop cursing, and he told me that was none No, complaint was not premature
of my business. Since he seemed impatient, I was going to No, there is no basis for recovery of damages
give back his money without any contempt. He retorted Petition granted in favor of Ateneo. CA ruling reversed.
that he did not like to accept the money. He got madder
and started to curse again. Then he threatened to strike Ratio
me with his fist. I tried to avoid this. But then he actually 1.
struck me in my left temple. Before he could strike again, Exceptions to the rule on finality of factual findings of
his fellow boarders held him and Dr. Bella and Leyes trial courts and administrative agencies
coaxed him to stop; I got hold of a bottle so I could dodge
him. It was then that Fr. Campbell arrived. The incident The appellate court resolution invoked the rule that
was hidden from Fr. Campbell by the boarders. I could not findings of facts by administrative officers in matters
tell him myself as I had gone into the kitchen crying falling within their competence will not generally be
because I was hurt." reviewed by the courts, and the principle that findings of
facts of the trial court are entitled to great weight and
The university conducted an investigation of the slapping should not be disturbed on appeal.
incident. Based on the investigation results, Juan Ramon
was dismissed from the university. This triggered the filing The court does not agree. The statement regarding the
of a complaint for damages by his parents against the finality given to factual findings of trial courts and
university in the then Court of First Instance of Negros administrative tribunals is correct as a general principle.
Occidental at Bacolod City. The complaint states that Juan However, it is subject to well established exceptions.
Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair Factual findings of trial courts are disregarded when - (1)
trial in violation of his right to due process and that they the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations,
are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are
with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a
them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as grave abuse of discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension of
attorney's fees. facts; and (5) the court, in arriving at its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to
In its answer, the university denied the material the admissions of the parties or the evidence presented.
allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of
Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior A similar rule applies to administrative agencies. By
is contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and civility, reason of their special knowledge and expertise, we
that such behavior subjected him as a student to the ordinarily accord respect if not finality to factual findings
university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction of administrative tribunals. However, there are exceptions
and that the university has the sole prerogative and to this rule and judicial power asserts itself whenever (1)
authority at any time to drop from the school a student the factual findings are not supported by evidence; (2)
found to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition, or
its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its collusion; (3) where the procedure which led to the factual
existence as an institution of learning. findings is irregular; (4) when palpable errors are
committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
After due trial, the lower court ruled in favor of the arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest
Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them P92.00
(actual damages); P50,000.00 (moral damages); P5,000.00 Why he is deemed to have been accorded due process
(attorney's fees) and to pay the costs of the suit.
(note: for 9 steps taken by school are enumerated in p. (Exhibit 19), this offense constituted a ground for dismissal
106-107) from the college. The action of the petitioner is sanctioned
by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
When the letter-complaint was read to Juan Ramon, he Schools recognizes violation of disciplinary regulations as
admitted the altercation with the waitress and his slapping valid ground for refusing re-enrollment of a student
her on the face. Rev. Welsh (Dean of men) did not stop (Tangonan v. Paño, 137 SCRA 245).
with the admission. He interviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go,
Roberto Beriber, and Jose Reyes, friends of Juan Ramon Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1)
who were present during the incident. the College of Arts and Sciences Handbook containing the
general regulations of the school and the 1967-1969 catalog
The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished of the College of Arts and Sciences containing the
members of the faculty -Fr. Francisco Perez, Biology disciplinary rules and academic regulations and (2) a copy
Department Chairman; Dr. Amando Capawan, a of the Rules and Regulations of the Cervini-Elizo Halls of the
Chemistry professor; Assistant Dean Piccio of the College; petitioner university one of the provisions of which is as
and Dr. Reyes of the same College. There is nothing in the follows: under the title "Dining Room" -"The kitchen help and
records to cast any doubt on their competence and server should always be treated with civility." Miss Mateo
impartiality insofar as this disciplinary investigation is was employed as a waitress and precisely because of her
concerned. service to boarders, not to mention her sex, she deserved
more respect and gracious treatment.
Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious
Discipline. He admitted the slapping incident, then begged error of law in the appellate court's ruling on due process.
to be excused so he could catch the boat for Bacolod City.
Juan Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the 2.
proceedings; he actually appeared to present his side; the The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of
investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all administrative remedies" in view of its pending appeal from
requisites of administrative due process were met. the decision of the Ministry of Education to the President
of the Philippines. It argues that the private respondents'
The claim that there was no due process because the complaint for recovery of damages filed in the lower court
private respondents, the parents of Juan Ramon were not was premature.
given any notice of the proceedings will also not stand.
Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was The issue raised in court was whether or not the private
already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to respondents can recover damages as a result of the
know his responsibilities. In fact, in the interview with Rev. dismissal of their son from the petitioner university. This
Welsh, he even asked if he would be expelled because of is a purely legal question and nothing of an administrative
the incident. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the nature is to or can be done. The case was brought
offense he committed. When informed about the December pursuant to the law on damages provided in the Civil
19, 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil
to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or courts.
parents. Juan Ramon is assumed to have reported this
serious matter to his parents. The fact that he chose to 3.
remain silent and did not inform them about his case was There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon
not the fault of the petitioner university. was afforded due process of law. The penalty is based on
reasonable rules and regulations applicable to all students
Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the guilty of the same offense. He never was out of school.
private respondents, the university, as stated earlier, Before the decision could be implemented, Juan Ramon
undertook a fair and objective investigation of the slapping asked for an honorable dismissal which was granted. He
incident. Due process in administrative proceedings also then enrolled at the De la Salle University of Bacolod City
requires consideration of the evidence presented and the and later transferred to another Jesuit school. Moreover,
existence of evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court his full and complete tuition fees for the second semester
of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112). were refunded through the representation of Mr. Romeo
Guanzon, Juan Ramon's father.
Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless for what
happened to her because she also shouted at Juan Ramon There was no bad faith on the part of the university. In
and tried to hit him with a cardboard box top, but this did fact, the college authorities deferred any undue action
not justify Juan Ramon's slapping her in the face. The until a definitive decision had been rendered. The whole
evidence clearly shows that the altercation started with procedure of the disciplinary process was get up to protect
Juan Ramon's utterance of the offensive language "bilat ni the privacy of the student involved. There is absolutely no
bay," an Ilongo phrase which means sex organ of a indication of malice, fraud, and improper or wilful motives
woman. It was but normal on the part of Mateo to react to or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University
the nasty remark. Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of in this case.
Juan Ramon who was present during the incident told
Rev. Welsh during the investigation of the case that Juan
Ramon made threatening gestures at Mateo prompting her
to pick up a cardboard box top which she threw at Juan ALCUAZ vs. PSBA
Ramon. The incident was in public thus adding to the
humiliation of Carmelita Mateo. There was "unbecoming Justice Paras:
conduct" and pursuant to the Rules of Discipline and Code
of Ethics of the university, specifically under the 1967-1969 Facts:
Catalog containing the rules and academic regulation  Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and
barricaded the school because they wanted to
 admin to hear their grievances with regards to “not Standards of procedural due process are:
being able to participate in the policy-making of
the school”, despite the regulations set by the a. the students must be informed in writing of the nature
admin with regards to protest actions and cause of any accusation against them;
 During the regular enrollment period, petitioners b. they shall have the right to answer the charges
and other students similarly situated were against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the c. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
second semester of school year 1986-1987. d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf and
 court ordered the school authorities to create a e.the evidence must be duly considered by the
special investigating committee to conduct an investigating committee or official designated by the school
investigation, who made recommendations which authorities to hear and decide the case.
the school adopted
3. Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. were
 a lot of procedural crap, petitioners and distributed at the beginning of each school
respondents filing and answering the complaints
Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature
 petitioners claim that they have been deprived of and upon admission to the School, the Student is
due process when they were barred from re- deemed to have agreed to bind himself to all
enrollment and for intervenors teachers whose rules/regulations promulgated by the Ministry of
services have been terminated as faculty members, Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he
on account of their participation in the agrees that he may be required to withdraw from the
demonstration or protest charged by respondents School at any time for reasons deemed sufficiently
as "anarchic" rallies, and a violation of their serious by the School Administration.
constitutional rights of expression and assembly.
Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school
 Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of with regard to the protest actions. Necessary action was
procedural due process which requires that there taken by the school when the court issued a temporary
be due notice and hear hearing and of substantive mandatory injunction to accept the petitioners for the first
due process which requires that the person or sem & the creation of an investigating body.
body to conduct the investigation be competent to
act and decide free from bias or prejudice. 4. The Court, to insure that full justice is done both to the
students and teachers on the one hand and the school on
ISSUE: the other, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the
school authorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986.
A. Whether or not there has been deprivation of due
process ? Findings of the investigating committee:
B. WON there was contempt of Court by the
respondents 1. students disrupted classes
2. petitioners involved were found to be academically
HELD: deficient & the teachers are found to have
committed various acts of misconduct.
A. NO. there was no deprivation of due process.
5. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of
students for academic delinquency and violation of
1. There is no existing contract between the two parties. disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by
Par 137 of Manual of Regulations for Private Schools this Court Thus, the Court has ruled that the school's
states that when a college student registers in a school, it refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of
is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs as
contracts" required for college teachers are for 'one valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The
semester. after the close of the first semester, the PSBA- opposite view would do violence to the academic freedom
QC no longer has any existing contract either with the enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the
students or with the intervening teachers. It is a time- Constitution.
honored principle that contracts are respected as the law
between the contracting parties The contract having been
terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual
school cannot be compelled to enter into another findings of administrative tribunals, unless :
contract with said students and teachers. "The courts,
be they the original trial court or the appellate court, have 1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence;
no power to make contracts for the parties." 2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion;
2. The Court has stressed, that due process in 3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings is
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail irregular;
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed 4. when palpable errors are committed; or
for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. 5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.
investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and Facts:
adequate.  The question for decision is whether a State that
terminates public assistance payments to a
.B. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to particular recipient without affording him the
cite respondents in contempt of court is likewise opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to
untenable. termination denies the recipient procedural due
process in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the 14th Ammendment
1. no defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz
 Complainants (appellees): NY residents receiving
respondent school explained that the intervenors were
financial aid under the program Aid to Families
actually reinstated as such faculty members after the
with Dependent Children (AFDC) under NY’s Home
issuance of the temporary mandatory injunction.
Relief Program. Their complaint: NYC officials
terminated aid without prior notice and hearing
2. respondent school has fully complied with its duties thereby denying them due process of law.
under the temporary mandatory injunction The school  Prior to the filing of complaints, no prior notice or
manifested that while the investigation was going on, the hearing of any kind was required before
intervenors-faculty members were teaching and it was only termination. The state however adopted
after the investigation, that the recommendations of the procedures for notice and hearing after suits were
Committee were adopted by the school and the latter brought and the plaintiffs challenged the
moved for the dismissal of the case for having become constitutional adequacy of said procedures
moot and academic  Procedure No. 68-18: a caseworker sees the
recipient and then reports to the unit supervisor to
make an official review abt ineligibility and
NON vs. JUDGE DAMES whether or not aid should be stopped.
 Appellee’s challenge to this procedure emphasizes
the absence of any provisions for the personal
Holding: appearance of the recipient before the reviewing
School authorities may limit students’ exercise of official, for oral presentation of evidence, and
constitutional rights w/in the school. The exercise of these for confrontation and cross-examination of
rights does not make school authorities virtually powerless adverse witnesses. However, they are afforded
to discipline students. post-termination “fair hearing” for redress when
the can appear personally, offer oral presentation
Ratio: of evidence, and for confrontation and cross-
1. Tinker v Des Moines Community School District: If examination of adverse witnesses. If they win,
a student’s conduct materially disrupts classwork or they get what was withheld from them and if not,
invades the rights of others, he/she is not immunized they can avail of judicial review.
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.  District Court found for the complainants and only
2. Malabanan case: School authorities can apply the Commissioner of Social Services appealed
sanctions in cases wherein students permitted to hold Issue:
a rally violated the terms of the permit by holding the  Whether the due process clause requires that the
demonstration in a place other than that specified & recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before
longer than the period allowed. the termination of benefits.
3. Guzman case: imposition of disciplinary sanctions Held:
must undergo procedural due process:  Yes. SC affirmed the decision of the District Court.
a. inform the students in writing of the Ratio:
nature & cause of accusation vs them  Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient
b. students should have the rt to answer the in the face of a brutal need without prior hearing
charges w/the assistance of a counsel, if desired of some sort is unconscionable, unless
c. students shall be informed of the evidence overwhelming consideration justify it.
against them  The need to protect tax revenues is not
d. they shall have the rt to adduce evidence “overwhelming consideration”. It does not justify
in their own behalf denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards
e. evidence must be duly considered by the of due process.
investigating committee/official designated by the  Due process requires an adequate hearing before
school authorities to hear & decide case termination of welfare benefits
4. Penalty must be proportionate to the offense  Such benefits are a matter of statutory
committed lest there be arbitrariness. entitlement. The constitutional challenge
cannot be answered by an argument that public
assistance benefits are a privilege and not a
right.
 Due process is influenced by the extent to which
GOLDBERG vs. KELLY
one may be condemned to suffer grievous loss and
depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in
avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental
Jack Goldberg, Commissioner of Social Services of the City
interest in summary adjudication
of New York, Appelant
 Consideration of what procedures due process
V
may require under any given set of circumstances
John Kelly et al
must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of government function involved as well as
 of the private interest that has been affected by him to travel by car to cover three rural Georgia
governmental action. communities
 What will serve due process in this case is pre-  Nov. 24, 1968 petitioner was involved in an
termination evidentiary hearing accident when 5 year old Sherry Capes rode her
 Crucial factor: is that the termination of aid bicycle into the side of his automobile
pending resolution may deprive an eligible  the childs parents filed an accident report withthe
recipient of the very means by which to live while director of the Georgia Department of Public
he waits (immediately desperate) Safety, indicating that their daughter had suffered
substantial injuries for which they claim damages
 Appellant’s argument: these are outweighed by amounting to $5000
countervailing governmental interests in  Petitioner was informed by the director that
conserving fiscal and administrative resources unless he was covered by a liability insurance
 SC: these governmental interests are not policy in effect at the time of the accident, or
overriding in the welfare context present a notarized release from liabiltity, plus
 Pre-termination hearing need not take the form of proof of future financial responsibilities or
a judicial or quasi-judicial trial, just a full suffer the suspension of his drivers license.
administrative review  after an administrative hearing, the director
 The fundamental requisite of due process of law is rejected the petitoner proffer of evidence on
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time liability. Superir court on the other hand upheld
in a meaningful manner the constitutional contention by the petioner but
 The seven-day notice, the letter, and the personal was later reversed by the Court of appeals.
conference with a caseworker (of above mentioned  the Georgia CA rejected petitioners contention
procedure) are not constitutionally sufficient per that the states statutory scheme, in failing
se. insufficiency is in not permitting welfare before suspending the license to afford him a
recipients to appear personally before the official hearing on the question of his fault or liability.
who determines eligibility  the Clergymans license remained suspended
 Informal procedures will suffice. In this context,
due process does not require a particular order of Issue:
proof or mode of offering evidence WON the Georgia Motor Vehicle Safety
 Jurisprudence says: where governmental action Responsibilty Act deny the petitioner due process in
seriously injures an individual, and violation of the 14th Amendment for the suspension of his
reasonableness of the action depends on fact license wothout a hearing? YES
findings, evidence used to prove govt’s case must
be disclosed to the individual so that he has an Held:
opportunity to show that it is untrue. This is true a) once licenses are issued, as in petitioners case,
not only in crim proceedings but also for admin their continued possession may become essential in the
actions pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus
Dissent of J. Black: involvels state action that adjudicates important interests
 Federal judges uses this judicial power for of the licensees. In such cases the license are not to be
legislative purposes taken witout that procedural due process required by the
Fourth Amendment.
 I do not think that the 14th amendment should be
b) It is fundamental that except in emergency
given such an unnecessarily broad construction. situations (and this is not one) due process requires that
Court in effect is saying that failure to pay an when a state seeks to terminate an interest such as here
individual deprives him of his own property. involved, it must afford "notice and opportunity for
 That due process clause forbids any conduct that hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."
the majority of the court believes unfair DOES
NOT appear anywhere in the due process clause. If
they did, they would leave the majority of justices
free to hold any conduct unconstitutional that UP vs. HON. LIGOT-TELANN
they should conclude on their own to be unfair or
shocking to them. If that view of due process is
correct, the due process clause could easily
swallow up all other parts of the constitution (Oct 21, 1993)
Ponente: J. Romero

Facts:
BELL vs. BURSON  Ramon Nadal (isang malaking kupal), a student
from the College of Law, applied for a scholarship
under the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance
Facts: Program (STFAP) a.k.a. Iskolar ng Bayan program. A
precautionary measure to ensure the integrity of the
 Georgias Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act program included the falsification or suppression of
provides that motor vehicle registration and any material information as a punishable act under
drivers license of an uninsured motorist invovlved Sec 2(a) of the Rules and Regulations on Student
in an accident shall be suspended unless he posts Council Discipline of the University. Also, a fact-
security to cover the amount of damages claimed finding team was created to visit the applicants’ homes
bby aggrieved parties in reports of accident. and verify the truth of the info provided in their
application/sworn statement. Accordingly, Ramon
 petitioner is a clergyman whose ministry requires
 Nadal’s home in BLUE RIDGE, QC was visited. Upon preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread
such visitation, the team found out that he withheld upon legally forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the
information about his ownership of a 1977 Toyota writ, the UP’s exercise of academic freedom was
Corolla and that his mom worked in the US to support peremptorily curtailed. If Nadal had his way, it would
his brothers’ schooling (in other words, mayaman pala not only undermine the authority of UP to discipline
siya). its students who violate its rules and regulations, but
 The UP charged Nadal before the Student would subvert the very concept and lofty intent to give
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT), which found him not financial assistance to poor but deserving students
guilty for withholding info about the car, but finding (unlike him).
him guilty regarding his mom’s income. This charge
was tantamount to acts of dishonesty, which had the
penalty of expulsion from the Univ. Upon automatic DBP vs. NLRC
review of the UPDil Exec Comm, the SDT’s decision
was affirmed, whereupon Nadal appealed to the Board ** Unfortunately, we don’t have a digest for this case.
of Regents (BOR). On March 28, 1993, the BOR ruled
that they would stay the decision upon learning that
Nadal was also a recipient of a scholarship grant in ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Ateneo HS. They would rule on a decision once this
new info was affirmed.
 March 29: ADMU issued a certification that Nadal (11/19/2001)
was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant before. Bellosillo, J.
That night, in a special meeting and without Nadal to
witness such, the BOR found Nadal “guilty”, with a Facts: Estrada was charged of the violation of the Anti-
penalty of a 1-year suspension, non-issuance of Plunder Law (RA 7080, amended by RA 7659.) on April 4
certificate of good moral character, and 2001. Petitioner filed Omnibus Motion initially alleging the
reimbursement of STFAP benefits. lack of a preliminary investigation,
 April 22: Nadal filed with the RTC of QC a petition reconsideration/reinvestigation of offense, and opportunity
for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer to prove lack of probable cause, all of which were quashed.
for TRO against the BOR and other UP officers, stating On June 14, petitioner moved to quash the Informations
that he was denied due process since he was not filed against him. Sandiganbayan denied motion, hence
present during the March 29 meeting. The preliminary appeal to SC.
injunction was granted. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner: 1. Anti-plunder Act is unconstitutional under
Issue/Held: the “void for vagueness” doctrine which
1. WON Nadal was denied due process in the states that a statute establishing a criminal
administrative disciplinary proceedings against him  offense must define the offense with
NO sufficient definiteness that persons of
2. WON respondent judge gravely abused her discretion ordinary intelligence can understand what
in issuing the preliminary injunction  YES conduct is prohibited by the statute.
2. Anti-Plunder act in unconstitutional for
Ratio: being overbroad, which states that a
I would like to mention that Nadal actually had the gall to government purpose may not be achieved
question the standing of private petitioner Dr. Caoili who, with means which sweep unnecessarily
not having been authorized by the BOR as a collegial body broadly and thereby invade the area of
to file the petition, and Dr. Abueva (UP Pres), not being the constitutionally protected freedoms
“Board of Regents” nor the “Univ of the Phils” – hence, they 3. Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for it
are not real parties in interest. Kupal talaga ‘tong hayup dispenses with due process since the terms
na ‘to. And so, the SC said that Nadal was estopped from in S1, par. D and S2 (“combination”,
questioning the petitioners’ personality bec he already “series”, “pattern”) are precisely vague &
named them as respondents in his petition in the RTC. overbroad, which denies the petitioner of the
Tanga talaga. Anyway… right to be informed of the nature & cause of
the accusation against him.
1. Admission to the UP falls under the ambit of the 4. Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for it
school’s academic freedom; hence, the “process that is dispenses with due process since the S4
due” is that which is governed under the UP’s rules. thereof sets a lower standard for the
UP’s rules do not necessitate “the attendance in BOR modicum of evidence required to convict
meetings of individuals whose cases are included as person than that which is required for
items on the agenda of the Board.” Besides, in the criminal cases, which is proof beyond
March29 meeting, they were only supposed to reasonable doubt.
reconsider their previous decision, so Nadal’s
attendance was indeed unnecessary. Thus, he was not Issues: 1. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder Law is
denied due process. Mwehehehehe. Moreover, since unconstitutional for being vague and
the issue falls within the school’s academic freedom, it overbroad
is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. As a result, 2. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder Law lowers the
they won’t be able to give him any legal remedy threshold for evidence in violation of due process
regarding the matter. 3. Whether or not Plunder as defined is malum
2. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a prohibitum, which means that criminal intent
showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the need not be proved in order to convict person.
petitioner being required. Hence, by issuing the writ of
Held: 1. NO. There are several levels of reasoning which procedural & does not define a substantive right in
the SC used. favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance
a. presumption of constitutionality of a of a remedy.
statute- basic principle that a legislative 3. NO. Plunder is mala in se which requires proof of
enactment is presumed to be in harmony criminal intent. Mens rea must be proven. Again,
with the Consti. Every intendment of the law this only means that the Anti-Plunder Law does not
must be adjudged by the courts in favor of establish a lower level of evidence. P
its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. Petition dismissed for lack of merit. RA 7080
b. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains held to be constitutional.
ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused
to determine the nature of his violation. **We don’t have digests for the Hamdy and
Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its Velasquez Rodriguez cases.
description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and B. “Old” Substantive Due Process: Protection for
prescribes the elements of the crime with Property Interests
reasonable certainty and particularity.
1. words of a statute will be interpreted Calder vs. Bull
in the natural, plain & ordinary
acceptation, except in cases where it
is evident that the legislature
intended a technical & special legal
meaning Doctrine: prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to
2. a statute is not rendered uncertain penal/criminal statues not civil.
& void merely because general Chase, J
terms are used, or because it Facts
employed terms that were not  1779 Normand Morrison executed a will in favor of
defined. There is no statutory or Bull and wife, his grandparents.
constitutional command that the  1793 The Court of Probate of Hartford disapproved
Congress needs to define every word of the will and refused its recording.
it uses. Inability to so define the  Calder and Wife claim their rights as the wife is
words employed in a statute will not heiress to N. Morrison as a physician after the
necessarily result in the vagueness disapproval of the will. By existing laws of
or ambiguity of the law so long as Connecticut, wife is said to have the rights as
the legislative will is clear, or at heiress(not explained how).
least, can be gathered from the  1795 The Legislature of Connecticut passed a
whole act, which is distinctly resolution or law(May) setting aside the first negative
expressed in the Plunder Law. decree of the court of Probate for Hartford, granting a
3. challenge of a statute for being new hearing and appeal within 6 months. The new
“vague” can only be applied for hearing in the Court of Probate now, approved the will
those laws which in the face are and ordered its recording(July) .
utterly vague and cannot be clarified  1795 (Aug) An appeal was had in the Superior
by a saving clause or by Court of Hartford, and in 1796, The superior court of
construction. Hartford affirmed the decree of the Court of Probate.
c. the overbroad and vagueness doctrines,  And still in 1796, An appeal was gained in the SC
according to the SC, have a special of errors of Connecticut who in June of that year,
application for free-speech cases & are inapt adjudged, that there were no errors.
for testing the validity of penal statutes.  Since it was more than 18 months since the
Therefore, the Anti-Plunder law does not violate due decree of the Court of Probate, Caleb Bull and Wife
process since it defines the act which it purports to were barred of all right of appeal by a statute of
punish, giving the accused fair warning of the Connecticut. But their will was indeed affirmed so why
charges against him, and can effectively interpose a bother?
defense on his behalf.  But the plaintiffs Calder and wife had a reason
2. NO. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in to appeal because the effect of the resolution was
all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor divest the right that accrued to Calder and wife
the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed when the court of Probate denied the will of
by the Bill of Rights. The petitioner’s contention that Norman Morrison. (remember: the new hearing
the language of the law which states that not every approved the will affirmed by the superior court and
act of amassing wealth needs to be proven, but only SC of Errors)
a pattern or series of acts, dispenses with the  The plaintiffs Calder and wife petitioned the SC
requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is and contended that the resolution made by
unfounded. The prosecution still has to prove Connecticut was an ex post facto law, prohibited by
beyond reasonable doubt that the acts constituting the constitution, therefore, void. The court then had
plunder (though not all) occurred, and these power to declare such law void.
predicate acts form a pattern. Hence it does not
lower the level of evidence from “beyond reasonable The court will answer the contention of the plaintiffs but
doubt” to “mere preponderance”. Further, S4 on “for whether the Legislature of any of the States can revise and
the purposes of establishing the crime of plunder”, a correct, by law, a decision of any of its Courts of Justice
will not be answered now as the case doesn’t go that far.  The restriction against ex post facto law was to
This is only important if the state’s constitution does not secure the person of the subject from injury from such
prohibit the correction or revision. But the ponente gave law, enumerated to be laws that:
his opinion. 1. makes an action, which was innocent when
done, criminal; and punishes it
Plaintiffs argue that the Legislature of Connecticut had no 2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
constitutional power to make the resolution (or law) in was, when committed
question, granting a new hearing, etc 3. changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
 The ponente said that without giving opinion at punishment, than the law annexed to the
this time, whether the court had jurisdiction to decide crime, when committed
that any law made by Congress contrary to the 4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives
constitution is void. He is fully satisfied that this court less, or different, testimony, than the law
has no jurisdiction to determine that any law of any required at the time of the commission of the
state legislature contrary to the consti is void.(before offence, in order to convict the offender
Marbury cguro to!) And if they had problems with the  Every ex post facto law must necessarily be
laws contrary to State charters or consti, it is within retrospective(this is the prohibited); but every
the state court’s jurisdiction. retrospective law is not an ex post facto law.
 Every law that takes away, or impairs, rights
Issue vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective and
WON the resolution of the Connecticut Legislature is unjust, but not all, take for example a pardon. There is
an ex post facto law. NO a difference in making an unlawful act lawful and one
 It is accepted that all the people-delegated powers making it a crime. ( ex post facto meaning taken by
of the Fed. Gov’t are defined, and it has no ponente from Wooddeson, Blackstone; Massachusetts’,
constructive powers. So, all the powers that remain Maryland’s and North Carolina’s Constitutions, or
in the State Gov’t are indefinite(trivia:except in forms of Government same as one or two of the
Masachusetts). (ex. establishment of the courts of enumerated)
justice and justices)  The prohibition contemplated the fact not to be
 But the Constitution was established for justice, affected by subsequent law, was some fact to be done
gen. welfare, liberty and protection of their persons by a Citizen, or Subject. Citing Justice Raymond
and property from violence. These purposes and calling stat. 7 Geo. 1st. stat. 2 par 8, ex post facto
determinants of the nature and terms are the reasons because it affected contracts for South Sea Stock made
why the people enter into the social compact. Although before the statute.
not expressly said, they restrain the absolute power of  In the present case there is no fact done by the
the legislature(nature of free Republican gov’t). Any act plaintiffs, that is affected by the resolution of the
in violation of the social compact is not a rightful Connecticut. The 1st decree of the court of probate
exercise of legislative authority. was given before the resolution and in that’s sense,
 That no man should be compelled to do what the they lost what they were entitled to were it not for
laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the the resolution. And the decree was the only fact
laws permit.1 that which the resolution affected, this is not
 The prohibition against their making any ex post within the intention of the law to be prohibited.
facto laws was introduced for greater caution because  The framers of the prohibition didn’t intend to
when they were under Great Britain, laws under the include vested rights, or else the provision “that
denomination of bills of attainder or bills of pains and private property should not be taken for public use
penalties were passed. These acts were legislative and without just compensation” is
judicial power. (ex. treason when they aren’t in other superfluous/unnecessary. Why need specific
times and one witness even when the law required prohibition?
two, all for the “safety of the kingdom”). SECs 9 and 10  Anyway, the resolution (or law) alone had no
of the US Consti provided this prohibition(see manner of effect on any right whatever vested in
patterson below for text). Calder and wife. The Resolution combined with the
 The prohibition is not to pass any law concerning, new hearing, and the decision, in virtue of it, took
and after the fact; but that the Legislatures of the away their right to recover the property in question.
several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done by But when combined they took away no right of
a subject, or citizen, which shall have relation to such property vested in Calder and wife; because the 1 st
fact, and shall punish him for having done it. decree against the will did not vest in or transfer any
 This is an additional bulwark in favour of the property to them. Because a vested right means that,
personal security of the subject, to protect his that person has the power to do certain actions,
person from punishment by legislative acts, having possess things according to the law of the land.
a retrospective operation. BUT NOT to secure the  If any one has a right to property such right is a
citizen in his private rights, of either property, or perfect and exclusive right; but no one can have such
contracts. If the prohibition of ex post facto laws right before he has acquired a better right to the
included personal rights then why the need for other property, than any other person in the world: a right,
prohibitions in making only gold and silver the legal therefore, only to recover property cannot be called a
tender and not to pass laws impairing obligations in perfect and exclusive right. (I think the will was more
contracts which are retrospective. (Wouldn’t it be excl and perfect as it was valid)
superfluous?)
Then Justice Chase is of the opinion that the petition is
1 The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases, but they can’t
void. Judgment affirmed.
change innocence to punishable guilt or violate the rights in contracts and private property.(I don’t know why the ponente said this, when he debunked it anyway)

Patterson, J.
 The Connecticut Consti is made up of usages.(I think Lochner vs. New York [1905]
this means ancient and uniform practice) He recognizes
that eversince the Connecticut Legislature had been able
to do judicial acts(like granting of new trials. Even though
Facts:
in 1762 they imparted this to the courts, they still retained
this right. The imparting didn’t annihilate their power,
 Plaintiff in error is charged for violating Sec. 110,
instead it only shred the jurisdiction. So the resolution
Art. 8, Chapter 415, Laws of 1897 otherwise known as
could be seen both ways, either a judicial or legislative act.
the Labor Law of the State of New York in wrongfully
But for the purpose of answering the petition of the
& unlawfully requiring & permitting an employee
plaintiffs, WON the resolution was an ex post facto law.
working for him to work more than 60hrs. in one
We will look at this as a judicial act(remember ex post are
week. Plaintiff in error runs a bakery business &
legislative).
employee involved is a baker.
Using Judge Blackstone’s description 2 and the
 Statute provides that “no employee shall be
constitutions of Masachussets3 ,Delaware4 , North
required/permitted to work more than 10hrs. per day.”
Carolina5 and Maryland6, we see that the prohibition of
Such is equated to “no employee shall contract/agree
ex post facto laws applies only in penal statutes.
to work more than 10hrs./day.” It’s mandatory in all
The 1st Art. in Sec 9 of the US Consti says “No state
instances. Statute prohibits such even if an employee
shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or
wants to do so to earn extra money.
law impairing the obligations of contracts.” The
framers couldn’t have intended it to include the laws
on obligation of contracts since they had needed to Issue: WON the statute is unconstitutional. – YES
specify it too. Ratio: It interferes w/the liberty of person or the right of
free contract between employer & employees by
Iredell, J. determining the hours of labor in the occupation of a
He concurs in the result. He dissents only to the baker without any reasonable ground for doing so.
reasons used. He argues that the act of the resolution  Gen. right to make a contract in relation
granting a new hearing couldn’t be legislative. It is to one’s business is a liberty protected by the 14 th
definitely judicial. But supposing it is legislative, it still amendment7 w/c also protects the rt to purchase or to
falls in the prohibition. And even if the court can’t sell labor.
adjudged it to be void, because they can claim that  However, states have police power w/c
they acted within their constitutional power contrary relates to the safety, health, morals & gen. welfare of
to natural justice. And even if they acted out of their the public. This power enables the states to regulate
authority, which is entirely void, the court won’t act on both property & liberty and to prevent the individual
such a delicate and awful nature until it is clearly and from making certain kinds of contracts and in these
urgently needed. instances, the 14th amendment cannot interfere. And
when the state’s legislature in its exercise of its police
He also subscribes to the belief that the prohibition power enacts a statute such as the one challenged in
only applies to criminal/penal statues. Because this case, it’s impt to determine w/c shall prevail – rt
apparently the framers of the constitution intended for of individual to work at the time of his choice or rt of
Private civil rights to succumb to Public use. state to prevent the individual from laboring beyond
Still he also finds that there is no case. Because, 1st. the time prescribed by law.
if the act of the Legislature of Connecticut was a  But then, there is a limit to the valid
judicial act, it is not within the words of the exercise of the police power of the state. The question
Constitution; and 2nd. even if it was a legislative act, asked to test the validity of the exercise: “Is this a fair,
it is not within the meaning of the prohibition. reasonable & appropriate exercise of the police power
of the state or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, &
arbitrary interference w/the rt of the individual to his
Cushing, J. personal liberty, or to enter into those contracts in
There is no problem in the case, in whichever way, relation to labor w/c may seem to him
they didn’t commit any wrong. If the resolution is appropriate/necessary for the support of himself & his
taken to be a judicial act then it is not touched by the family?”
FEDERAL constitution. IF it seen as a legislative act,  This law does not in any way affect any
it is within the ancient and uniform practice of the other portion of the public so it can’t be said that it’s
state of Connecticut. done in the interest of the public. It’s a law pertaining
to the health of the individual as a baker. But clean &
wholesome bread does not depend on the length of
hours a baker spends at work. Limiting their working
Judgment Affirmed. hours does not come w/in the police power of the
state.
 Mere assertion that a law slightly relates
2 'There is, says he, a still more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws, ex post facto, when after an action, indifferent in itself, is committed, the to public health can’t make it valid automatically. It
Legislator, then, for the first time, declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it. Here it is impossible, that the party
must have a more direct relation as a means to an end
could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had, therefore, no cause to abstain from it; and
& the end itself must be appropriate & legitimate
all punishment for not abstaining, must, of consequence, be cruel and unjust.

3 'Laws made to punish for actions done before the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and
before it can be held to be valid w/c interferes w/a
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of a free government.'
personal liberty.
4 'That retrospective laws punishing offences committed before the existence of such laws, are oppressive and unjust, and ought not to be made.'  The trade of a baker is not an alarmingly
5 'That retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with
unhealthy one that would warrant the state’s
liberty; wherefore no ex post facto law ought to be made.' interference w/rts to labor & contract. As a matter of
6 'That retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with
7
liberty; wherefore no ex post facto law ought to be made.' No state can deprive any person of life, liberty or property w/o due process of law.
 fact, it’s never been regarded as an unhealthy one. differing views. And not because we find an opinion
Besides, almost all occupations more or less affect the novel or shocking, we can already conclude that it’s
health. There must be more than the mere possibility conflicting with the US Consti.
of some small amount of unhealthiness to justify  General propositions don’t decide concrete cases.
legislative interference. To say that a man who’s not The decision will depend on a judgment/intuition
overworked is more likely to be clean and thus subtler than any articulate major premise. Every
producing clean output would be unreasonable & opinion tends to become a law.
arbitrary considering that it’s quite impossible to  “Liberty” in the 14th amendment is perverted if we
discover the connection between the no. of working use it to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
hours & the healthful quality of the bread made by the opinion (the statute in this case) unless a rational &
baker. fair man would admit that the statute would infringe
fundamental principles as we traditionally understand
Holding: Petition dismissed. Decisions of lower courts them. A reasonable man might think that the statute
reversed. Case remanded to the County Court for further is a proper measure on the score of health.
proceedings not inconsistent w/this opinion.  My take: he thinks the statute is reasonable & he
believes any reasonable man would see that. Ergo,
Harlan, dissenting (White & Day join him): unreasonable yung majority. Hehe…please read the
 Liberty of contract may, w/in certain limits, be dissent since Dean Pangalangan mentioned that it’s
subjected to regulations to promote gen. welfare or to one of the most important dissenting opinions in US
guard the public health, morals or safety. history.
 A Federal/state legislative enactment can only
disregarded/held invalid if it plainly, palpably &
beyond question in excess of legislative power. People v. Pomar
Otherwise, any doubt as to its validity must be
resolved in favor of its validity & the courts must keep
their hands off, leaving the legislature to meet the
responsibility for unwise legislation. The burden of The Prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed a
proof is upon those who assert the statute to be complaint against defendant Julio Pomar for violation of
unconstitutional. sec. 13, in connection of sec. 15 of Act. No. 3071 of the
 This statute aims to protect the physical well- Philippine Legislature which essentially orders employers
being of workers in bakery & confectionery to give pregnant women employees 30 days vacation with
establishments. Working beyond 60hrs/week may pay before & after confinement.
endanger their health. The court cannot inquire on the  Defendant was found guilty of violating said statute by
wisdom of the legislation. The court can only inquire refusing to pay his pregnant employee, Macaria
whether the means devised by the state have a Fajardo, P80.
real/substantial relation to the protection of health. In  Pomar demurred the complaint alleging that the facts
this case, the Justice believes that the means used is therein complained did not constitute an offense. As
related to the end it seeks to accomplish. He believes it the demurrer was overruled, he answered and
does not invade constitutionally mandated rights. admitted all the allegations trial but contended that
Court goes beyond its functions in annulling this the provisions of Act No. 3071 were illegal,
statute. unconstitutional and void
 Remember that statute is limited to workers in  The lower court convicted him of crime as charged
bakery & confectionery establishments. The air they
constantly breathe is not as pure & healthful as that Issue: WON said Act was adopted in the reasonable
to be found in other establishments or outdoors. He and lawful exercise of the police power of the state
cites Prof. Hirt’s treatise on the “Diseases of the  NO. Said section 13 was enacted in the exercise of its
Workers” and the paper of another writer w/c support supposed police power for the purpose of safeguarding
his belief that the trade of a baker is an unhealthy the health of pregnant women laborers in “factory,
one. (see p. 100-101 for text) shop or place of labor of any description,” and insuring
 State is not amenable to the judiciary in respect of to them reasonable support for 1 month before and 1
its legislative enactments unless clearly inconsistent month after their delivery.
w/the US Constitution.  Definitions of police power are generally limited to
particular cases and examples, which are as varied as
Holmes, dissenting: they are numerous. But from all the definitions, the
 Case is decided upon an economic theory w/c a SC concluded that it is much easier to perceive and
large part of the country does not entertain. realize the existence and sources of police power than
 State constitutions & laws may regulate life in to exactly mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to
many ways w/c some may find as injudicious its exercise by the legislative department of the
(unwise), tyrannical & w/c interfere w/the liberty to government.
contract. Ex. Sunday laws, usury laws, prohibition of  The Court in this case has to choose between police
lotteries. The liberty of a citizen to do as he likes so power and the liberty to contract, much like in the
long as he does not interfere w/liberty of others to do case of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of
the same is interfered w/by school laws, Post office, Columbia. In that case, the court held that the
every state/municipal institution w/c takes his money Minimum Wage Act was void on the ground that the
for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or right to contract about one’s own affairs was a part of
not. the liberty of the individual under the constitution,
 But a Constitution is not intended to embody a and while there was no such thing as absolute
particular economic theory such as paternalism or freedom of contract, and it was necessarily subject to a
laissez faire. It’s made for people of fundamentally great variety of restraints, yet none of the exceptional
 circumstances, which at times justify a limitation o Exercise of legislative power was a
upon one’s right to contract for his own sevices, violation of the principle of separation of
applied in the particular case. Such may be said in the powers
case at bar and the SC so holds. o Impaired the obligation of contracts
 The right to liberty includes the right to enter into o Violated the equal protection clause
contracts and to terminate contracts. The statute
violates liberty of contract w/o due process. It takes Issues:
into account only the welfare of the employee but fails 1. WON PD 1717 violates the due process and equal
to consider periods of distress in the business. protection clause of the constitution?
 It further fails to consider the fact that payment for  Petitioner argues that property rights are subject
labor depends upon the type of labor. to regulation under the police power for the
 The statute prescribes a sum of money to insure promotion of the common welfare. They contend
subsistence, health and morals of pregnant employee. that the inherent power of the state may be
The statute creates a mandatory term in any contract exercised at any time for this purpose as long as
entered into by employer. It violates right to enter into the taking of the property right, even is based on
contract upon terms which parties may agree to. contract, is done with due process of law.
 The court further explained that the state, under the  The court held that a legislative act based on the
police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
with all matters relating to the general health, morals, subject and a lawful method.
and safety of the people, so long as it does not a. The interest of the public should justify
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law the interference of the state
and providing that such power is not exercised in such b. Means employed are reasonably necessary
a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to for the accomplishment of the purpose
prevent positive wrong and oppression. The legislature and not unduly oppressive upon
has no authority to pronounce the performance of an individuals.
innocent act criminal when the public health, safety,  In this case the public are not sufficiently involved
comfort, or welfare is not interfered with. to warrant the interference of the government with
 Sec. 13 has deprived every person, firm or corporation the private contracts of Agrix. the record does not
owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of state how many here are of such investors, and
any description w/in the Philippine Islands, of his who they are, and why they are being preferred to
right to enter into contracts of employment upon such the other creditors of Agrix with vested property
terms as he and the employee may agree upon. rights.
 The state, when providing by legislation for the  Public interest has not been shown. It has not
protection of the public health, the public morals or been shown that by the creation of the New Agrix
the public safety, is subject to and is controlled by the and the extinction of the property rights of the
paramount authority of the constitution of the state, creditors of, Agrix the interests of the public as a
and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or whole, as distinguished from those of a particular
guaranteed by that instrument or interfere w/ the class, would be promoted or protected.
execution of the powers and rights guaranteed to the
 The decree is oppressive. The right to property in
people under the Constitution.
all mortgages, liens, interests, penalties and
charges owing to the creditors of Agrix is
arbitrarily destroyed.
 The right to property is dissolved by legislative fiat
NDC v. Phil. Veterans without regard to the private interest violated
 In extinguishing the mortgage and other lien, the
decree lumps the secured creditors with the
Facts: unsecured creditors and places them on the same
 Involves the constitutionality of PD 1717, which level in the prosecution of their respective claims.
ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of  Under the equal protection clause, all persons of
Companies to be administered mainly by the things similarly situated must be treated alike,
National Development Company. both in the privileges conferred and the obligations
 Section 4(1) of PD 1717 provides that all imposed. In this case, persons differently situated
mortgages and other liens presently attaching to are similarly treated, in disregard of the principle
any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are that there should be equality among equals.
hereby extinguished. 2. WON PD 1717 violates section 10 of the bill of
 July 7, 1978 – Agrix execute in favour of private rights? YES
respondent Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) a real  It is true that the police power is superior to the
estate mortgage over 3 parcels of land situated in impairment clause, the principle will apply only
Los Banos. During the existence of the mortgage where the contract is so related to the public
Agrix went bankrupt. welfare that it will be considered congenitally
 PVB filed a claim with the Agrix Claims Committee susceptible to change by the legislature in the
for the payment of itts loan credit. New Agrix and interest of the greater number.
National Development Company invoked Sec. 4(10)  The contract of loan and mortgage executed by the
of PD 1717. Agrux are purely private transactions and have
 PVB took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the not been shown to be affected with public interest,
mortgage, prompting the petitioners to file a
second case with the same court to stop the PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not
foreclosure. being in conformity with the traditional requirements of a
 Trial court – annulled the entire PD 17171. lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the
mortgage and other liens constitutes taking without due not of the same nature—it is not a public utility or
process of law and violation of the equal protection clause. a public good.
 Note 3 instances when the exercise of police power
by local govt are invalid:
a. violates the consti
b. violates the act of Congress of the leg
c. against public policy or is unreasonable,
oppressive, discriminating or in derogation
of common rights.

Balacuit vs. CFI People vs. Nazario

 Movie tickets for children

Plaintiff: People of the Phils.
 An ordinance was passed by the municipal board of Accused-appellant: Eusebio Nazario
Butuan ordering that the price of the admission of
children in movie houses and other places of Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Quezon
amusements should be half that of adults. Sarmiento, J.

 Owners of 4 theaters (petitioners) maintain that Facts:

Ordinance 640 violates the due process clause for it is Petitioner is charged with violation of municipal
unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and amounts to a ordinances in Pagbilao, Quezon. He refuses to pay taxes
restraint of trade and violative of the right of persons on the operation of the fishponds he leased from the gov’t.
to enter into contracts. asserting that said tax measures are 1) ambiguous and
uncertain, 2) unconstitutional for being ex post facto laws
 Municipality: a valid exercise of policy under the gen and 3) applies only to owners or overseers of fishponds of
welfare clause in their charter. private ownership and not to lessees of public land.

Issue: Said ordinances, Ordinance # 4 (1955), Ordinance # 15

(1965) and Ordinance # 12 (12 (1966) provides as follows:
Is Ordinance 460 a valid exercise of police power?
Ord. # 4: Sec. 1. “Any owner or manager of fishponds …
Held: It is not. within … Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in
the amount of Php 3 per hectare of fishpond on part
Ratio: thereof per annum.”

Not lawful subject/ no lawful purpose Ord. # 15: Sec. 1(a) “For … owners or managers of
fishponds within … this municipality, the date of payment
 The ordinance is not justified by any necessity of of municipal tax … shall begin after the lapse of three (3)
public interest. The evidence purpose of it is to years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by
reduce the loss in savings of parents, in turn the Bureau of Fisheries.”
passing the buck to the theater owners. The
contention of the city that they are preventing the Ord. # 12: Sec 1: “Any owner or manager of fishponds …
movie houses from exploiting children is not within … Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount
tenable (they are given the same quality of of Php 3 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum
entertainment). Besides, the city said that movies beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the
are attractive nuisance, so why are they fishpond started operating before the year 1964.”
encouraging it.
 The means are clearly unreasonable. How can the The trial court held that the appellant violated the assailed
theater operators distinguish bet a 13-year old an ordinances. So this appeal.
an 11-year old child. The city said that the movie
operators can ask the children to bring their birth Issue:
certificates but that is impractical, said the court 1) WON the Pagbilao municipal ordinances are
(why?) unconstitutional (vague or ex post facto)? No
 A theater ticket is an evidence of a contract bet the 2) WON the ordinances apply to the accused? Yes
movie house and its patrons. It may also be
considered a license, allowing the purchases to Ratio:
enjoy the entertainment being provided. In either The Court finds that Eusebio Nazario violated Pagbilao’s
case, the ticket is a species of property. The tax ordinances.
operators, as the owners thereof, have the right to 1) A statute or act may be said to be vague if it lacks
dispose of it at a price it wants and to whom he comprehensible standards that men “of common
pleases. intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
 The courts have declared valid laws regulating the differ as to its application.” It is repugnant to the
prices of food and drugs during emergency; Constitution because 1) it violates due process because it
limiting the act profit of utilities. But the theater is fails to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid,
2) it gives law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying it
out.
Agustin vs. Edu
But the act must be utterly vague on its face and not
just an imprecisely phrased
legislation, which can still be saved by proper construction
or a legislation, which may appear to be ambiguous, but is Action: Action for prohibition
applicable if taken in the proper context or applied to
certain types of activities (ex. US Uniform Code of Military Facts:
Justice prohibits “conduct unbecoming an officer and Petitioner assails Letter of Instruction No. 229 which
gentleman”, such a phrase, taken in a military context, is provides for the mandatory use of early warning
not ambiguous because there are already military devices for all motor vehicles. Petitioner owns a
interpretations and practices in place that provide enough Volkswagen Beetle equipped with blinking lights that
standards on what is permissible conduct.) The assailed could well serve as an early warning device. He alleges
ordinances cannot be said to be tainted by vagueness that the statute:
because it clearly provides what activity is to be avoided
1. violates the provision against
and to whom the law applies.
delegation of police power
2. immoral – will only enrich the
As evident from the provisions themselves, the appellant
manufacturer of the devices at the car owner’s
falls within its coverage. As the operator and financier of
expense
the fishponds and employer of the laborers therein he
3. prevents car owners from finding
comes within the term “manager.” Though the gov’t owns
alternatives
the land, it never had a share in the profits so it is only
Petitioner prays for a declaration of nullity and a
logical t hat he shoulders the burden of the tax.
restraining order in the meantime.
As to the appellants claim that the imposition of the tax
has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be
determined (“3 years after the approval of the fishpond” by On the other hand, respondents’ answers are
the Bureau of Fisheries) and upon an uncertain event (“if based on case law and other authoritative decisions of the
the fishpond started operating before 1964”), it is merely a tribunal issues.
problem in computation.

The liability for the tax accrues on Jan. 1, 1964 for Issues:
fishponds already in operation, this amendment (Ord # 12) 1. WON LOI 229 is constitutional (due process)
to the earlier ordinances served only as an amnesty to 2. WON LOI 229 is an invalid delegation of legislative
delinquent fishpond operators and it did not repeal the power, as far as implementation is concerned
mother ordinances (Ords. # 4 & 15). For fishponds not yet
in operation on Jan. 1, 1964, Ord # 15 applies, and it
provides that for new fishpond operators, the tax accrues 3 Held:
years after their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries. 1. Yes. Respondents assert that LOI 229 is backed
by factual data & statistics, whereas petitioner’s
The contention that the ordinances were ex post facto laws conjectural assertions are without merit. The
because Ord # 12 was passed on Sept 19, 1966 and yet it statute is a valid exercise of police power in so far
takes effect and penalizes acts done from the year 1964 as it promotes public safety, and petitioner failed
has no merit. As explained in the previous paragraph, Ord to present factual evidence to rebut the presumed
# 12 merely served as an amnesty to delinquent taxpayers, validity of the statute. Early warning devices have
it did not repeal the mother ordinance (Ord # 4) which was a clear emergency meaning, whereas blinking
already in effect since May 14, 1955 and as the act of non- lights are equivocal and would increase accidents.
payment of the tax was already penalized since 1955 it is The petitioner’s contention that the devices’
clear that Ord # 12 does not impose a retroactive penalty. manufacturers may be abusive does not invalidate
the law. Petitioner’s objection is based on a
Appellant also assails the power of municipal gov’ts to tax negative view of the statute’s wisdom-something
“public forest land.” As held in Golden Ribbon Lumber Co. the court can’t decide on.
Inc v City of Butuan local gov’ts taxing power do not extend
to forest products or concessions under RA 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act), which also prohibits municipalities from 2. No. The authority delegated in the implementation
imposing percentage taxes on sales. is not legislative in nature. Respondent Edu was
merely enforcing the law forms part of Philippine
But the tax in question is not on property, though it is law. PD 207 ratified the Vienna Convention’s
based on the area of the fishponds, they are actually recommendation of enacting road safety signs and
privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. devices. Respondents are merely enforcing this
They are not charged against sales, which goes against the law. Moreover, the equal protection under the laws
decision in Golden Ribbon Lumber Co. Inc but on contention was not elaborated upon.
occupation, which is allowed under RA 2264. Also
fishponds are not forest lands although they are
Wherefore: Petition is dismissed. Judgment immediately
considered by jurisprudence as agricultural lands so
executory.
necessarily do not produce the forest products referred to
in the prohibition of RA 2264.

Held: Appeal is DISMISSED. Teehankee, dissenting:

 The rules and regulations outlined by the LTO refining influence of culture, has become
Commission does not reflect the real intent of LOI229. more sensitive to publicity, so that
solitude and privacy have become more
1. Effectivity and utility of statute not yet
essential to the individual; but modern
demonstrated. enterprise and invention have, through
2. public necessity for LOI not yet shown
invasions upon his privacy, subjected him
3. big financial burden on motorists to mental pain and distressl far greater
4. no real effort shown to illustrate less burdensome
than could be inflicted by mere bodily
alternative to early warning device injury.
5. imperative need to impose blanket requirement on
all vehicles B. PURPOSE: whether existing laws afford a principle
-people still drive dilapidated vehicle
which can be properly invoked to protect the privacy of the
-need for sustained education campaign to instill person; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such
safe driving protection is.

The exercise of police power affecting the life , liberty, and I. Law on Slander and Libel
property of any person is till subject to judicial inquiry. o The wrongs and correlative rights
recognized by the law of slander and liver
are in their nature material rather than
C. “New” Substantive Due Process: Protection for spiritual  injure him in his intercourse
“Liberty” Interests in Privacy with others, subject him to ridicule,
hatred, etc.
o The law does not recognize any principle
upon which compensation can be granted
WARREN & BRANDEIS: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY for mere injury to the feelings.
 However, it is viewed that the common
law right to intellectual and artistic
A. EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW property are but instances of a general
I. Full protection in person and in property is a right to privacy
principle as old as the common law  Under the American system of
o From time to time it has been necessary to government, one can never be
redefine the exact nature and extent of such compelled to express his thoughts,
protection and even as far as to recognize new sentiments and emotions and even if
rights in order to meet the demands of the he has chosen to give them
political, social and economic changes in expression, he generally retains the
society. power to fix the limits of the publicity
o Law gave a remedy only for physical which shall be given them
interference with life and property in early  Existence of the right does not depend
times upon the particular method of
o Recognition of man’s spiritual nature, of his expressions adopted but rather each
feelings and his intellect led to protection even individual is given the right to
of mere attempts to do injury  assault. decide whether that which is his
 Right to life = the right to enjoy life  the shall be given to the public.
right to be let alone - The right is only lost when the
 Right to liberty = the right to the exercise author himself communicates
extensive civil privileges his production to the public
 Right to property – encompasses every
form of possession, intangible and II. right of property
tangible o What is the basis of this right to prevent
o Regard for human emotion extended the scope the publication of manuscripts and works
of personal protection beyond the body of the of art? Right of Property
individual – reputation and his standing  But where the value of the production is
among his fellow-men were considered. found not in the right to take the profits
 the law on slander and libel. arising from publication, but in the
peace of mind or the relief afforded by
II. The right “to be let alone” the ability to prevent any publication at
o Recent inventions and business methods all, it is difficult to regard the right as
entail taking the necessary steps for the one of property
protection of the person and the individual of  The belief that the idea of property in its
their “right to be let alone” narrow sense was the basis of the
 Desirability and even necessity of such protection of unpublished manuscripts
protection can be seen in the way the led an able court to refuse, in several
press is overstepping in every direction the cases injunctions against the
obvious bounds of propriety and of publication of private letters, on the
decency. ground that “letters not possessing the
 “The intensity and complexity of life attributes of literary compositions are
attendant upon advancing civilization, not property entitled to protection…”
have rendered necessary some retreat o These decisions have, however, not been
from the world, and man, under the followed and it may not be considered that
 the protection afforded by the common law arising from contract or from special trust, but
is independent of its pecuniary value or are rights as against the world… The principle
intrinsic merits, etc.  “a man is entitled which protects personal writings and any
to be protected in his exclusive use and other productions of the intellect or of the
enjoyment of that which is exclusively emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law
his.” has no new principle to formulate when it
 “but if privacy is once recognized as a extends this protection to the personal
right entitled to legal protection, the appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal
interposition of the courts cannot relation, domestic or otherwise.
depend on the particular nature of the
injuries resulting” IV. Limitations of Right to Privacy
 conclusion that protection afforded to thoughts, 1.The right to privacy does not prohibit any
sentiments and emotions as far as it consists in publication of matter which is of public or general
preventing publication, is merely an instance of interest.
the enforcement of the more general right of the o Design of the law is to protect those persons
individual to be let alone. whose affairs the community has no legitimate
- In each of these rights there is a quality concern
of being owned or possessed and o Others such as those in public positions have,
(distinguishing attribute of property) in varying degrees, renounced their right to
there may be some propriety in speaking live their lives screened from public
of those rights as property. observation.
- The principle which protects personal  General object is to protect the privacy of
writings and all other personal private life, and to whatever degree an in
productions, not against theft and whatever connection a man’s life has
physical appropriation, but against ceased to be private, before the
publication in any form, is in reality not publication under consideration has been
the principle of private property, but made, to that extent the protection is to be
that of an inviolate personality. withdrawn.
o therefore, the existing law affords a principle which
can be invoked to protect the privacy of the 2. The right to privacy does not prohibit the
individual communication of any matter, though in its nature
 distinction between deliberate thoughts and private, when the publication is made under
emotions and the casual and involuntary circumstances which would render it a privileged
expression cannot be made because: communication according to the law of slander
 test of deliberateness of the act – a lot of the and libel.
casual correspondence now given protection o Right to privacy not invaded by any publication
will be excluded made in a court of justice, in legislative bodies,
 amount of labor – we will find that it is much etc.
easier to express lofty sentiments in a diary
than in the conduct of a noble life. 3.The Law would probably not grant any redress for
the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the
III. The Right to Privacy absence of special damage.
o No basis is discerned upon which the right to
restrain publication and reproduction can be rested 4.The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of
except the right to privacy, as a part of the more the facts by the individual or with his consent.
general right to the immunity of the person – the
right to one’s personality. 5.The truth of the matter published does not afford
 Court has also seen in some instances to grant a defense.
protection against wrongful publication not on the o It is not for injury to the individual’s character
ground or not wholly on the ground of property that redress or prevention is sought, but for
but upon the ground of an alleged breach of an injury to the right of privacy.
implied contract or of a trust or confidence.
 Useful only for cases where there is 6.The absence of malice in the publisher does not
participation by the injured party such as a afford a defense.
misuse by the photographer of photograph
taken of you with your consent. V. Remedies for an invasion of the right of
privacy
o Advance of technology has made it possible to take 1. An action of tort for damages in all cases
pictures, etc. surreptitiously and therefore the 2. An injunction, in perhaps a very limited class of
doctrine of contract and of trust are inadequate to cases
support the required protection and therefore the o Legislation is required to give added protection
law of tort must be resorted to. to the privacy of the individual in criminal law.
 Right of property embracing all possession (e.g  Protection of society must
the right to an inviolate personality) affords come mainly through a
alone that broad basiss upon which the recognition of the right of
protection which the individual demands can be the individual.
rested.
 We there conclude that the rights, so protected,
whatever their exact nature, are not rights
 In the Phil., privacy as privacy independent of any other
specific constitutional guarantee was rarely invoked. As in
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVACY: Arnault v. Nazareno where there is privacy- in the light of
the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
Only in Morfe v. Mutuc where inquiry into private
This article by Cortes starts off by introducing concepts individuals spending chores would violate privacy which is
regarding privacy such as “the right to be let alone” which implicit in unreasonable searches and seizures and right
is an assertion by the individual of his inviolate against self-incrimination, where it was recognized as a
personality. Westin in his book entitled “Privacy and constitutional right.
Freedom” illustrates an individual as he creates zones of
privacy which at the center is the “core self”. Even Privacy and Mass Media
anthropologists deal with the notion of privacy and say The public law inquiry is to determine whether there are
that even animals seek periods of individual seclusion or constitutional limitations on the acts of government
small group intimacy. Religion has stories regarding Adam encroaching upon zones of privacy. With respect to public
and Eve’s shyness and the story of Noah’s son which figures, Warren and Brandeis comment “matters of which
reveal moral nature is linked with privacy. Since privacy publication should be repressed are those which concern
varies with every culture, even in the Philippines, there are the private life, habits, acts and relations of an individual”.
gaps about the notion of privacy: Filipino culture is In our local setting privacy issues are lax: the more
accustomed to public life but still keeps to himself certain prominent a person, the more unrelenting the publicity.
hopes and fears. Regarding news matters, its gathering and dissemination
would be completely hampered if individuals claim
The right of privacy gives a person the right to determine invasion of privacy and would want to recover damages for
what, how much, to whom and when info about himself some inaccuracies. When a person becomes a public
shall be disclosed. This is where Science and Technology figure, he relinquishes a part of his privacy.
may play a role, either positively or negatively. One
example given is polygraph tests: that while it is true that Privacy and residential picketing
a person gives his consent, he seldom realizes how much It was recommended that some legislation be done about
more the test discloses then he may intend. residential picketing where high regard is accorded to the
Computerization, without adequate regulation of the input, privacy of an individual’s home.
output and storage of data, can also cause harms since it
can deprive individuals the right to control the flow of CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
information about himself. In addition, Miller says the In the US, the concept developed first in private law where
psychological impact on the citizenry is that many may it was later used in public law in relation to other specific
begin to base their personal decisions on what is to be constitutional guarantees. It was not until Griswold v.
reflected on the databases. Connecticut (anti-contraceptive statute) that for the 1 st
time the right of privacy as an independent constitutional
Privacy as a Legal Concept right (Bill of Rights have penumbras which create zones of
Privacy has been equated with phrase “right to be let privacy). Other cases were mentioned where differences
alone” but it is in Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis “The were not attributed to differences in consti provisions but
Right to Privacy” that it was described as “the right to life to ideas of privacy particularly individual beliefs. In the
has come to mean the right to enjoy life- the right to be let Phil, the privacy of communication and correspondence
alone”. Originally, the right of privacy was asserted in forestalled problems caused by its omission in the US
private cases where it was seen to be derived from natural consti. This “communication and correspondence” can be
law (characterized as immutable since no authority can relaxed if public safety and order requires it bit this too
change or abolish it). In the Philippines, it provides for can be restricted by legislation such as the Anti-Wire
“privacy of correspondence and communication” where it tapping Act.
is recognized by the Civil Code and other special laws.
Searches and Seizure
Privacy as a Tort The constitutional convention added safeguards to the
According to Prosser violations of privacy create 4 different requisites in the issuance of warrants (1. probable cause
kinds of tort. 1) intrusion upon plaintiff’s seclusion or to be supported by oath 2. particular description of the
solitude 2) public disclosure of private embarrassing facts place to be searched and persons to be seized) and that a
3) publicity that places one in a bad light 4) appropriation, judge should determine them and must examine under
for the defendant’s advantage of the plaintiff’s name or oath the complainant and other witnesses . The guarantee
likeness. Interesting is the privacy of letters in the against unreasonable search and seizure require both
Philippines where it the recipients which are considered physical intrusion and seizure of tangible property and it
the owners and have the right. In Europe, writing verses or extends to both citizens and aliens. Also it makes no
dabbling in painting where privacy is asserted is based on distinction in criminal or administrative proceedings (as
the property right over an unpublished manuscript. mentioned in the cases).
Another aspect is that privacy is a personal right where an
injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the parties Regarding the decisions of the US SC that in regulating
involved is the basis. Thus the decisions that creditors are business enterprises a warrant is required before
infringing upon the privacy of their debtors if the make it inspections can be made, the author says that it is
public just to compel them to fulfill. Courts usually deal intriguing if the doctrines are invoked here given the petty
with this problem involving the reconciliation of graft situation in all levels of the government.
constitutionally protected rights- the right of the public to
know, the freedom of the press against the right to privacy. Administrative Arrest
The constitutionality of the grant of power to the Comm. of
Immigration to issue warrants of arrest (since a judge was
the additional safeguard) was challenged in several cases. 4) the proposal by Congress rendering extra-judicial
The SC while distinguishing between warrants in criminal confessions and admissions inadmissible may be the
cases and administrative warrants, suggested a distinction answer to the problem of coerced confessions.
between warrants issued for the purpose of taking a
person in custody so that he may be made to answer
charges against him and a warrant to carry out a final
order based on a finding of guilt. Because of this, the OLMSTEAD vs. U.S.
“probable cause” does not extend in deportation
proceedings. This was overturned in Vivo v. Montesa that
the Court said it is unconstitutional (issuing is for FACTS:
purposes of investigation and before a final order of Petitioners here were convicted of a conspiracy to violate
deportation). the National Prohibition Act through the unlawful
possession, importation and selling of liquor. Petitioner
Olmstead is the leading conspirator and general manager
of the operations. The operation required over 50
Particularity of Description employees, 3 sea vessels, a ranch outside urban Seattle,
-Added consti reqment that the person or thing to be caches in that city, as well as a fully staffed office. Monthly
seized should be described with particularity. sales produced at least $175,000.00. Annual income was
projected to be over $2M.
Remedies against unreasonable search and seizure
The court finally held that evidence obtained through To be able to gather information on the operation, four
warrants illegally issued is inadmissible. The author also federal prohibition officers intercepted messages on the
discusses that in the course of an illegal search a telephones of the conspirators. This gathering of evidence
contraband was found, the limitation recommended is that went on for months, yielding a lot of information. Among
the contraband should not be returned but it would also these were large business transactions, orders and
not be used as evidence. This also applies in illegal search acceptances, as well as difficulties the conspirators
made by private parties, as it does in the Anti-Wire suffered, even dealings with the Seattle police. It is
Tapping Law. important to note that there was no trespass into the
property of any of the defendants as the taps came the
Motorist’s Right streets near the houses.
Since the guarantee protects the person and not places, a
private car is protected from unreasonable searches and ISSUE: Whether wire-tapping amounted to a violation of
seizures. Although there are exceptions, it must almost the 4th amendment.
always have a warrant as said in the Carroll case: “in
cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably HELD: No, wire-tapping does not amount to a violation of
practicable it must be used” the 4th amendment.

Right Against Self-Incrimination RATIO:

The US extended the guarantee against self-incrimination
on the grounds of public policy and humanity. Here, the 4th amendment: The right of the people to be secure in
privilege is only applicable to testimonial or communicative their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
evidence. It is not violated by introducing in evidence the unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
result of an analysis of a substance taken from the body of and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
the defendant, to submit to a pregnancy test or put on a supported by oath or affirmation and particularly
pair of pants to see if it fits. Our SC has held that the right describing the place to be searched and the persons or
against self-incrimination only protects against testimonial things to be seized.
evidence or the performance of acts which not being purely
mechanical, require the application of intelligence and 5th amendment: No person...shall be compelled, in any
attention. However, the conviction of an accused on a criminal case, to be a witness against himself.
voluntary extra-judicial confession in no way violates the
constitutional guarantee where the burden to prove that In deciding this case, the court went through a number of
the confession was improperly obtained rests on the earlier cases discussing the 4 th and 5th amendments. In
defendant. these cases, struck down as unconstitutional were various
acts in the procurement of evidence. Among these were,
unlawful entries, warrantless arrests and seizures, and
requiring the producing of documents that may prove
Conclusion incriminating. These were all acts pertaining to gathering
The right of privacy finds protection not only in various evidence. As they did not comply with the 4 th amendment,
provisions of the constitution but also in special laws. the evidence acquired was deemed inadmissible in court
Author’s recommendations: and had to be returned to the defendants.
1) the constitutional guarantee on the inviolability of
communication and correspondence affords less protection In the present case, the court said that there is no
than originally intended by the convention back in 1934, it compulsion evident, therefore the only issue was with
may well be expanded to include the private persona and regards to the 4th amendment.
his family.
2) because of computerization, there is a need to provide a The court noticed that in all the cases mentioned, they all
regulatory system to protect individual rights pertained to a physical taking, whether of documents,
3) legislation for the protection of the home against evidence, or even of the persons convicted (warrantless
residential picketing arrest). In wire-tapping, however, there is no physical
taking. What was used was the recording of audio and
nothing else. In the court’s eyes, this does not qualify as a Oklahoma courts. Notice and the right to a
taking. Moreover, there was no trespassing involved as the jury trial are provided.
taps were done in the streets and not in the houses of the
conspirators. 1936 Attorney General instituted proceedings
against Skinner. Petitioner challenged the Act
Lastly, the court brought up the common-law rule that as unconstitutional by reason of the 14th
evidence will be appreciated no matter how it was Amendment in the US Consti. After a jury
obtained. “Where there is no violation of a constitutional trial, it was decided that vasectomy be
guarantee, the verity of the above statement is absolute.” performed on Skinner. This decision was
(Professor Greenleaf). This rule is supported by both affirmed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
American and English cases.
ISSUE:
Dissent of J. Holmes: WON the legislation violates the equal protection
In his dissent, J. Holmes, (agreeing with the dissent of J. clause of the 14th Amendment.
Brandeis), says that “the government ought not to use
evidence obtained and obtainable by a criminal act”. What DECISION:
he states is that the courts have 2 options: 1) the courts
use evidence obtained criminally or 2) some criminals Oklahoma Supreme Court decision REVERSED.
should escape in the event that evidence was obtained The Act violates the equal protection clause in the 14th
criminally. To J. Holmes “it is a less evil that some Amendment.
criminals should escape than that the Government should
play an ignoble part”. Lastly, he states “...if we are to  When the law lays an unequal hand on those who
confine ourselves to precedent and logic the reason for have committed intrinsically the same quality of
excluding evidence by violating the Constitution seems to offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has
me logically to lead to excluding evidence obtained by a made as invidious (offensive) discrimination as if it
crime of the officers of the law”. had selected a particular race or nationality for
oppressive treatment.
i. Oklahoma makes no attempt to say that one
who commits larceny by trespass or trick or
SKINNER vs. OKLAHOMA fraud has biologically inheritable traits which
one who commits embezzlement lacks.
ii. Line between larceny by fraud and larceny by
FACTS:
embezzlement is determined “with reference
to the time when fraudulent intent to
1926 Skinner was convicted of stealing chickens
convert the property to the taker’s own use”
and sentenced to the reformatory.
arises.
1. No basis for inferring that the line
1929 He was convicted of the crime of robbery with
has any significance in eugenics, nor
firearm and sentenced again to the
that inheritability of criminal traits
reformatory.
follows the legal distinctions which
the law has marked between these
1934 He was convicted of the rime of robbery with
two offenses.
firearms and sentenced to the penitentiary.

1935 The Oklahoma Habitual Criminal

Example: A clerk who embezzles over $20
Sterilization Act was passed.
from his employer and a stranger who steals
the same amount are both guilty of felonies. If
The Act provides that if someone is found by the court or
the stranger repeats his act and is convicted
jury as a habitual criminal and that he “may be rendered
three times, he may be sterilized. But the clerk
sexually sterile w/o detriment to his/her general health”,
is not subject to the penalties of the Act no
then the court shall order that he/she shall be rendered
matter how large his embezzlements nor how
sexually sterile. Vasectomy in case of male; salpingectomy
frequent his convictions because of the
in case of a female.
exception in section 195 of the Act.

Habitual criminal is defined as

 The Act involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
A person who, having been convicted 2 or more
 Marriage and procreation are fundamental
times for crimes involving moral turpitude, either in
to the very existence and survival of the
Oklahoma court or in a court of any other state, is
race.
thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and
is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an  The power to sterilize may have subtle,
Oklahoma penal institute. However, section 195 of the far-reaching and devastating effects. There
Act states that offenses arising out of the violation is no redemption for the individual whom
of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, the law touches. Any experiment w/c the
embezzlement, or political offenses shall not be state conducts is to the individual’s
considered within the terms of the Act. irreparable injury. He is forever deprived
of a basic liberty.

The Attorney General has to institute a

proceeding against such a person in
Other Criticisms of the Act which the Court mentioned privacy which is within the penumbra of specific
but did not elaborate. guarantees of the Bill of Rights.

1.The Act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the HELD:

police power in view of the state of scientific
authorities respecting inheritability of criminal traits. 1. Appellants have standing to raise the
2.Due process is lacking because the defendant is given constitutional rights of the married people with
no opportunity to be heard on the issue as to whether whom they had a professional relationship.
he is the probable potential parent of socially 2. The Connecticut statute forbidding use of
undesirable offspring. contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy.
3.The Act is penal in character and that the sterilization
provided for is cruel and unusual punishment. RATIO:

The standards of "case or controversy” should be less strict

by reason of the appellants’ criminal conviction for serving
married couples in violation of an aiding-and-abetting
statute. Certainly the accessory should have standing to
assert that the offense which he is charged with assisting
GRISWOLD vs. CONNECTICUT is not, or cannot constitutionally be, a crime.

Justice Douglas The primary issue in this case concerns a relationship

lying within the zone of privacy created by several
FACTS: fundamental constitutional guarantees. These
constitutional guarantees include: Freedom of Speech and
 Appellants are the Executive Director of the Planned Press including the right to distribute, receive, read and
Parenthood League of Connecticut (Griswold), and its teach, and freedom of inquiry and thought; the First
medical director, a licensed physician (Buxton), They Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected
gave information, instruction, and medical advice to from government intrusion; the concept of liberty
married persons as to the means of preventing embraces the right of marital privacy though that right is
conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution; the Due
best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees Process Clause protects those liberties that are “so rooted
were usually charged, although some couples were in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
serviced free. ranked so fundamental.”

 Both were convicted as accessories for giving married This law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives
persons information and medical advice on how to rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to
prevent conception and, following examination, achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive
prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand in
wife's use. A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this
any person to use any drug or article to prevent Court, that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent
conception. Appellants claimed that the accessory activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may
statute as applied violated the Fourteenth Amendment. not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
An intermediate appellate court and the State's highest broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
court affirmed the judgment. The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.
The statutes whose constitutionality is involved in this
appeal are 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of
Connecticut (1958 rev.). The former provides:
EISENSTADT vs. BAIRD
"Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall
be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less
than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined (March 22, 1972)
and imprisoned." Ponente: J. Brennan

Section 54-196 provides: FACTS:

 After delivering a lecture on overpopulation and
"Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or contraception, the appellee invited members of the
commands another to commit any offense may be audience to come and help themselves to contraceptive
prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal articles. He personally handed a package of Emko
offender." vaginal foam to a young, unmarried woman. As a result,
BAM! he was convicted in a Massachusetts state court
ISSUES: for violating Massachusetts General Laws Ann. Secs
21 and 21(a), which made it a crime to sell, lend, or
1. Whether or not Appellants have standing to assert give away any contraceptive device to unmarried
the constitutional rights of the married people. persons. The statute provides a maximum 5-year term
2. Whether or not the Connecticut statute forbidding of imprisonment for such violation.
 The statutory scheme distinguishes among 3 distinct
use of contraceptives violates the right of marital
classes of distributes:
 1. married persons may obtain contraceptives to reasonably be taken as the purpose of the ban on
prevent pregnancy, but only from doctors or distribution of contraceptives.
pharmacists on prescription If health was the rationale of Sec 21(a), the statute
2. single persons may NOT obtain contraceptives would be both discriminatory and overbroad for being
from anyone to prevent pregnancy “illogical to the point of irrationality.” For one thing,
3. married or single persons may obtain not all contraceptives are potentially dangerous. If the
contraceptives from anyone to prevent, not Mass statute were a health measure, it would not only
pregnancy, but the spread of disease invidiously discriminate against the unmarried, but
 State’s goal: preventing the distribution of articles also be overbroad with respect to the married. As a
designed to prevent conception which may have prohibition to conception, the statute conflicts with
undesirable, if not dangerous, physical consequences; a “fundamental human rights” under Griswold v
2nd, more compelling reason = to protect morals through Connecticut.
regulating the private sexual lives of single persons 3. Equal Protection Clause: denies to States the power
 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed to legislate that different treatment be accorded to
conviction persons placed by a statute into different classes on
 US District Court (Mass) dismissed appellee’s petition the basis criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of
for writ of habeas corpus the statute. A classification must be reasonable, not
 US CA reversed US DC’s decision and remanded the arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
case with instructions to grant the writ difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
ISSUES: circumstanced shall be treated alike.
1. WON appellee has standing to assert the rights of  Whatever the rights of the individual to access to
unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives  contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same
YES for the unmarried and the married alike.
2. WON the Mass statute could be upheld as a deterrent  Griswold case  Right of privacy: If the right of
to fornication, as a health measure, or simply as a privacy means anything, it is the right of the
prohibition to contraception  NO individual, married or single, to be free from
3. WON there is some ground of difference that rationally unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
explains the different treatment accorded married and so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
unmarried persons under the assailed statute  no whether to bear or beget a child.
such ground exists, hence, IT VIOLATES THE EQUAL There is no more effective practical guaranty against
PROTECTION CLAUSE of the 14th Amendment arbitrary and unreasonable gov’t intrusion that to require
that the principles of law, which officials would impose
RATIO: upon a minority must be imposed generally. Courts can
1. Baird has sufficient interest in challenging the take no better measure to assure that laws will be just
statute’s validity to satisfy the “case and controversy” than to require that laws be equal in operation.
requirement of Art III of the Consti  it has been held
that the Mass statute is NOT a health measure; hence,
Baird cannot be prevented to assail its validity bec he
is neither a doctor nor a druggist. In this case, the
POE vs. ULLMAN
relationship bet Baird and those whose rights he seeks
to assert is not simply that bet a distributor and
potential distributees, but that bet an advocate of the
rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and This case deals with the statute as in Griswold vs.
those desirous of doing so. Enforcement of the Mass Connecticut where, in this case, two couples and their
statute will materially impair the ability of single physician sued the State and its Attorney-General,
persons to obtain contraceptives. Unmarried persons Ullman, asking the Court to declare the Connecticut
denied access to contraceptives are themselves the statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives
subject of prosecution and, to that extent, are denied a unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment..
forum in which to assert their own rights.
2. Effect of the ban on distribution of contraceptives to FACTS:
unmarried persons has at best a marginal relation to Paul and Pauline Poe had three consecutive pregnancies
the proffered objective. As ruled in Griswold v terminating in infants with multiple congenital
Connecticut, the rationale is dubious considering the abnormalities resulting in their death shortly after birth.
widespread availability to ALL PERSONS in the State, Because of the great emotional and psychological stress
unmarried and married, of birth-control devices for the resulting from these deaths, it is Dr. Buxton’s opinion that
prevention of disease, as distinguished from the the best and safest medical treatment is to prescribe
prevention of conception. The Mass statute is also contraceptives in order to preserve the health of petitioner.
riddled with exceptions that deterrence of premarital On the other hand, Mrs. Doe recently underwent a
sex cannot reasonably be regarded as its aim. pregnancy which caused her critical physical illness such
Moreover, Secs 21 and 21(a) of the Mass statute that another pregnancy would be exceedingly perilous to
have a dubious relation to the State’s criminal her life. Also, their doctor, Dr. Buxton, also joined them in
prohibition on fornication, which entails a $30 fine saying that the statute deprived them of liberty and
and 3-month imprisonment. Violation of the present property without due process.
statute is a felony, punishable by 5 years in prison.
The Court cannot believe that Mass has chosen to ISSUE:
expose the aider and abetter who simply gives away a W/N the allegations raised by petitioners regarding the
contraceptive to 20 times the 90-day sentence of the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute raise a
offender himself. Hence, such deterrence cannot justiciable question before the Court.
HELD: judge district court. This court found that Roe & Hallford
No. Petitioners do not allege that appellee, Ullman had standing, but the Does did not for failing to allege
threatens to prosecute them for their use of or for giving facts sufficient to present a controversy. The District Court
advice regarding contraceptives. The allegations merely held that the fundamental right of single women and
state that in the course of his public duty he intends to married persons to choose whether to have children is
prosecute any violation of Connecticut law. There is thus protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the
no imminent or impending threat of arrest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Texas criminal
petitioners. The Court goes on to say that in the over 75 abortion statutes were void on their face because they
years of its existence, prosecutions for violation of the were both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an
statute seems never to have been initiated according to overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment
counsel nor the researchers of the Court. Judicial notice rights. The court then held that abstention was warranted
was also taken of the fact that contraceptives are readily with respect to the requests for an injunction. It therefore
available in drug stores which invite more the attention of dismissed the Does' complaint, declared the abortion
enforcement officials. Given the fact that federal judicial statutes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive
power is to be exercised to strike down legislation, whether relief. Roe, Doe & intervenor Hallford appealed to SC
state or federal, only at the instance of one who is himself regarding denial of injunction, while defendant DA cross-
immediately harmed or immediately threatened with harm, appealed regarding grant of declaratory relief.
by the challenged action, the circumstances of the case do
not justify the exercise of judicial power as it lacks the Petitioners:
requisites for “case” and “controversy”. 1. Jane Roe-unmarried & pregnant; wishes to terminate
her pregnancy but is prevented by Texas' laws; unable to
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. transfer to another jurisdiction to secure abortion;
contends that the statues invade upon the right of a
Public clinics dispensing birth-control information has pregnant woman to chose to terminate her pregnancy,
been closed down by the State as well as others following grounded in the concept of personal "liberty" embodied in
the Nelson case which the ponente cited as the test case the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal,
for the statute. The Court failed to take notice of the fact marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected
that several prosecutions for violations of this statute had by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras (Griswold, Eisenstat)
been initiated in the minor courts. In failing to answer the or among those rights reseved to the people by the 9th
question of the constitutionality of the statute, in effect the Amendment.
court is asking the people to violate the law and hope that 2. Hallford-had twice been arrested in Texas for violation of
it is not enforced, that they don’t get caught which is not a abortion statutes; because of the uncertainty of the law it
proper choice under the present constitutional system. He was difficult to tell whether his patient's particular
then goes on to repeat the arguments in Griswold situation fell within or outside the exception recognized by
regarding the application of the statute reaching into the A1196; as a consequence, the statutes were vague and
intimacies of the marriage relationship forcing search uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, &
warrants for private bedrooms for its enforcement since that they violated his own and his patients' rights to
what it prohibits is not the sale or manufacture but the privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own
use of contraceptives. right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were
guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments
3. Does-childless couple; Mrs Doe had a "neuro-chemical
ROE vs. WADE disorder" & was advised to avoid pregnancy; discontinued
use of birth control pills; that if ever she became pregnant,
she wishes to have alegal abortion under safe, clinical
(01/22/1973) conditions.
Blackmun, J.
ISSUES:
NATURE: Appeal from the US DC of the Northern District 1. whether or not petitioners have standing to bring suit
of Texas 2. whether or not Texas laws regarding abortions are
unconstitutional for invading a constitutionally protected
FACTS: right
Texas State Penal Code Arts 1191-1194 & 1196 make it a
crime to procure an abortion, as therein defined, or to HELD:
attempt one, except procured or attempted by medical 1. Roe-At the trial court stage, it was undisputed that she
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." had standing; logical nexus test in Flast met as her status
Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of the as a pregnant women was logically connected to the claim
States. Jane Roe,a single woman who was residing in that she sought, that is, that the law be struck down as
Dallas County, Texas, instituted federal action in Mar unconsitutional for her to have an abortion. However,
1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She appellee notes that the records to not disclose whether she
sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal was pregnant at the time of the hearing of the case or
abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and when the TC decision was handed down, which is
an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the important since usual rule in federal cases is that an
statutes. Hallford, a licensed physician, sought & was actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or
granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. John & Mary certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is
Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that initiated (US v Musingwear). The delivery of the baby would
of Roe, also naming the District Attorney as defendant. have rendered the case moot. But the SC relaxed this rule,
claiming like constitutional deprivations, & seeking reasoning that pregnancy provides for classic conclusion of
declaratory & injunctive relief. The two actions were nonmootness, "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-
Hallford-has two pending cases with the State court, which right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision,
is significant because "absent harassment and bad faith, a but that this right is not unqualified, and must be
defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot considered against important state interests in regulation.
affirmatively challenge in federal court the statutes under Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court
which the State is prosecuting him". He tries to distinguish has held that regulation limiting these rights may be
his status as present state defendant from his status as justified only by a "compelling state interest. While there is
"potential future defendant", but the SC sees no a contention that the protection of prenatal life is a
distinction & applies the rule to him, reversing the finding "compelling state interest" that warranted the abortion
of the trial court on the doctor's standing. laws, and that the unborn is a "person" under the 14th
Does-has asserted as their only immediate & present Amend, the Court held that the use of the word is such
injury an alleged "detrimental effect on their marital that it has application only post-natally. None indicates,
happiness"Their claim is that, sometime in the future, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal
Mrs. Doe might become pregnant because of possible application. The unborn have never been recognized in the
failure of contraceptive measures, and, at that time in the law as persons in the whole sense. Measured against these
future, she might want an abortion that might then be standards, "Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in
illegal under the Texas statutes, which the SC finds as restricting legal abortions to those "procured or attempted
very speculative. The bare allegation of so indirect an by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the
injury is insufficient to present an actual case or mother," sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no
controversy (Younger v Harris). Does are therefore not distinction between abortions performed early in
appropriate plaintiffs. pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a
2. The SC took a look first at the historical perspective on single reason, "saving" the mother's life, the legal
abortion, reasoning that most of the laws criminalizing justification for the procedure. The statute, therefore,
abortion are of "relatively recent vintage". Even the cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it
Hippocratic Oath, which said that a doctor should not here."
provide drugs to induce an abortion, was found by the
court to be at the beginning acceptable to only a small District Court decision affirmed.
number of people; abortion was for the most part accepted
ot tolerated. Common law provided that an abortion before
"quickening"(the 1st recognizable movement of the fetus in BOWERS vs. HARDWICK
utero) was not an indictable offense. Whether abortion of a
quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser White, J. +4 concurring, 4 dissenting
crime, is still disputed. In English statutory law, England's
first criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, FACTS:
came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, § 1, a
capital crime, but, in § 2, it provided lesser penalties for In August 1982, respondent Hardwick was charged with
the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by
preserved the "quickening" distinction. The case of Rex v. committing that act with another adult male in the
Bourne, apparently answered in the affirmative the bedroom of his home. Hardwick brought suit in Federal
question whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the
of the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. He
penalties of the 1861 Act. This trend in thinking was asserted that he was a practicing homosexual, that the
carried over to the US to the extent that only as recently as Georgia sodomy statute placed him in imminent danger of
the end of the 1950's, a large majority of the jurisdictions arrest, and that the statute for several reasons violates the
banned abortion, however and whenever performed, Federal Constitution.
unless done to save or preserve the life of the mother.It is
thus apparent that, at common law, at the time of the The court granted Bower’s motion to dismiss for failure to
adoption of the US Constitution, and throughout the major state a claim.
portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less
disfavor than under most American statutes currently in The CA reversed and remanded, holding that the Georgia
effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a statute violated respondent's fundamental rights. It held
substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than that the Georgia statute violated respondent's fundamental
she does in most States today. At least with respect to the rights because his homosexual activity is a private and
early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a intimate association that is beyond the reach of state
limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was present regulation by reason of the 9th Amendment and the Due
in this country well into the 19th century. The SC Process Clause of the 14th Amendment
recognizes that the debate now is between the State's right
(some say duty) to protect prenatal life versus the Attorney General petitions for certiorari questioning the
contention that the laws were passed to protect the woman holding that the sodomy statute violates the fundamental
from placing herself in a potentially life threathening rights of homosexuals.
situation (as abortion techniques were initially unrefined &
presented a threat to the woman's health.) ISSUE: WON the Federal Constitution confers a
The ponencia moves to a discussion on the right to fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy
privacy, conceeding that this is not explicitly found in any and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still
part of the Consti. But this right of privacy, whether it be make such conduct illegal.
founded in the 14th Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action, or in the 9th HELD: No.
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad Precedent Cases:
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not  It is evident that none of the rights announced in
to terminate her pregnancy.The Court concludes that the those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in
 acts of sodomy. No connection between family, presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.
homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated, either by the Court of Appeals or by Court Answers: The law is constantly based on notions of
respondent. morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral
 Moreover, any claim that these cases nevertheless choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process
stand for the proposition that any kind of private Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.
sexual conduct between consenting adults is
constitutionally insulated from state proscription
is unsupportable.
 Despite the language of the Due Process Clauses LAWRENCE vs. TEXAS
of the 5th and 14th Amendments, there are a
multitude of cases in which those Clauses have
been interpreted to have substantive content, FACTS:
subsuming rights that to a great extent are
immune from federal or state regulation or Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private
proscription. residence, Houston police entered petitioner Lawrence’s
apartment and saw him and another adult man, petitioner
Nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act.
protection:
Palko v. Connecticut, , 326 (1937)
The complaints described their crime as “deviate sexual
 those fundamental liberties that are
intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that
sex (man).” App. to Pet. for Cert. 127a, 139a. The
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
applicable state law is Tex. Penal Code Ann. §21.06(a)
sacrificed."
(2003). It provides: “A person commits an offense if he
Moore v. East Cleveland, (1977)
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
 those liberties that are "deeply rooted in individual of the same sex.” The statute defines “[d]eviate
this Nation's history and tradition." sexual intercourse” as follows: (A) any contact between any
part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus
It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would of another person; or “(B) the penetration of the genitals or
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in the anus of another person with an object.” §21.01(1).
acts of consensual sodomy.

Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was The petitioners challenged the statute as a violation of the
forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Tex.
Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Const., Art. 1, §3a. Those contentions were rejected. The
Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were
States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25.
District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties
for sodomy performed in private and between consenting The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District
adults. Against this background, to claim that a right to considered the petitioners’ federal constitutional
engage in such conduct is "deeply rooted in this Nation's arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due
history and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After
liberty" is, at best, facetious. hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion,
rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the
Respondent Argues: The result should be different where convictions. The majority opinion indicates that the Court
the homosexual conduct occurs in the privacy of the of Appeals considered our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
home. Relies on Stanley v. Georgia, (1969), where the 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to be controlling on the federal due
Court held that the 1st Amendment prevents conviction for process aspect of the case. Bowers then being
possessing and reading obscene material in the privacy of authoritative, this was proper.
one's home.
The petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged
Court Answers: Illegal conduct is not always immunized offense. Their conduct was in private and consensual.
whenever it occurs in the home. Victimless crimes, such
as the possession and use of illegal drugs, do not escape
the law where they are committed at home. Stanley itself ISSUE
recognized that its holding offered no protection for the
possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods. WON the bowers case should be a controlling precedent for
And if respondent's submission is limited to the voluntary this case.
sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be
difficult to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct HOLDING
while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and
other sexual crimes even though they are committed in the
home. No, case reversed and remanded (I’m not sure but as an
effect of this ruling, All sodomy laws in the US are now
Respondent Asserts: There must be a rational basis for the unconstitutional and unenforceable when applied to non-
law and that there is none in this case other than the commercial consenting adults in private)
Ratio roots,” ibid., American laws targeting same-sex couples did
not develop until the last third of the 20th century. Even
Equality of treatment and the due process right to now, only nine States have singled out same-sex relations
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive for criminal prosecution. Thus, the historical grounds
guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority
and a decision on the latter point advances both opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice
interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the Burger there indicated. They are not without doubt and, at
law which does so remains unexamined for its the very least, are overstated. The Bowers Court was, of
substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it course, making the broader point that for centuries there
were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual
reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by conduct as immoral, but this Court’s obligation is to define
the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an the liberty of all, not to mandate its own moral code,
invitation to subject homosexual persons to Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
discrimination both in the public and in the private 833, 850. The Nation’s laws and traditions in the past half
spheres. The central holding of Bowers has been century are most relevant here. They show an emerging
brought in question by this case, and it should be awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
lives of homosexual persons. matters pertaining to sex. See County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857.
(a) Resolution of this case depends on whether petitioners
were free as adults to engage in private conduct in the (c) Bowers’ deficiencies became even more apparent in the
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. For years following its announcement. The 25 States with laws
this inquiry the Court deems it necessary to reconsider its prohibiting the conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced
Bowers holding. The Bowers Court’s initial substantive now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against
statement–“The issue presented is whether the Federal homosexual conduct. In those States, including Texas,
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon that still proscribe sodomy (whether for same-sex or
homosexuals to engage in sodomy … ,” 478 U.S., at 190– heterosexual conduct), there is a pattern of
discloses the Court’s failure to appreciate the extent of the nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting
liberty at stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was in private. Casey, supra, at 851–which confirmed that the
simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct Due Process Clause protects personal decisions relating to
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
would demean a married couple were it said that marriage child rearing, and education–and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
is just about the right to have sexual intercourse. 620, 624–which struck down class-based legislation
Although the laws involved in Bowers and here purport to directed at homosexuals–cast Bowers’ holding into even
do not more than prohibit a particular sexual act, their more doubt. The stigma the Texas criminal statute
penalties and purposes have more far-reaching imposes, moreover, is not trivial. Although the offense is
consequences, touching upon the most private human but a minor misdemeanor, it remains a criminal offense
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged,
places, the home. They seek to control a personal including notation of convictions on their records and on
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal job application forms, and registration as sex offenders
recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to under state law. Where a case’s foundations have
choose without being punished as criminals. The liberty sustained serious erosion, criticism from other sources is
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons of greater significance. In the United States, criticism of
the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the Bowers has been substantial and continuing, disapproving
confines of their homes and their own private lives and of its reasoning in all respects, not just as to its historical
still retain their dignity as free persons. assumptions. And, to the extent Bowers relied on values
shared with a wider civilization, the case’s reasoning and
holding have been rejected by the European Court of
 (b) Having misapprehended the liberty claim presented to Human Rights, and that other nations have taken action
it, the Bowers Court stated that proscriptions against consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of
sodomy have ancient roots. 478 U.S., at 192. It should be homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
noted, however, that there is no longstanding history in conduct. There has been no showing that in this country
this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a the governmental interest in circumscribing personal
distinct matter. Early American sodomy laws were not choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent. Stare decisis
directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to is not an inexorable command. Payne v. Tennessee, 501
prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally, U.S. 808, 828. Bowers’ holding has not induced
whether between men and women or men and men. detrimental reliance of the sort that could counsel against
Moreover, early sodomy laws seem not to have been overturning it once there are compelling reasons to do so.
enforced against consenting adults acting in private. Casey, supra, at 855—856. Bowers causes uncertainty, for
Instead, sodomy prosecutions often involved predatory the precedents before and after it contradict its central
acts against those who could not or did not consent: holding.
relations between men and minor girls or boys, between
adults involving force, between adults implicating disparity
in status, or between men and animals. The longstanding  (d) Bowers’ rationale does not withstand careful analysis.
criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon which In his dissenting opinion in Bowers Justice Stevens
Bowers placed such reliance is as consistent with a concluded that (1) the fact a State’s governing majority has
general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not
an established tradition of prosecuting acts because of a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
their homosexual character. Far from possessing “ancient practice, and (2) individual decisions concerning the
intimacies of physical relationships, even when not
intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” students participating in competitive extracurricular
protected by due process. That analysis should have activities.
controlled Bowers, and it controls here. Bowers was not
correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is HELD:
hereby overruled. This case does not involve minors,
persons who might be injured or coerced, those who might
not easily refuse consent, or public conduct or Tecumseh’s Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the
prostitution. It does involve two adults who, with full and School District’s important interest in preventing and
mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a deterring drug use among its schoolchildren and does not
homosexual lifestyle. Petitioners’ right to liberty under the violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 4—14.
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in
private conduct without government intervention. Casey, (a) Because searches by public school officials implicate
supra, at 847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate Fourth Amendment interests, see e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S.,
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the at 652, the Court must review the Policy for
individual’s personal and private life. “reasonableness,” the touchstone of constitutionality. In
contrast to the criminal context, a probable cause finding
The present case does not involve minors. It does not is unnecessary in the public school context because it
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who would unduly interfere with maintenance of the swift and
are situated in relationships where consent might not informal disciplinary procedures that are needed. In the
easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or public school context, a search may be reasonable when
prostitution. It does not involve whether the government supported by “special needs” beyond the normal need for
must give formal recognition to any relationship that law enforcement. Because the “reasonableness” inquiry
homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary
two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each responsibility for children, id., at 656, a finding of
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a individualized suspicion may not be necessary. In
homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to upholding the suspicionless drug testing of athletes, the
respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean Vernonia Court conducted a fact-specific balancing of the
their existence or control their destiny by making their intrusion on the children’s Fourth Amendment rights
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right Applying Vernonia’s principles to the somewhat different
to engage in their conduct without intervention of the facts of this case demonstrates that Tecumseh’s Policy is
government. “It is a promise of the Constitution that also constitutional. Pp. 4—6.
there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter.” Casey, supra, at 847. The (b) Considering first the nature of the privacy interest
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which allegedly compromised by the drug testing, see Vernonia ,
can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life 515 U.S., at 654, the Court concludes that the students
of the individual. affected by this Policy have a limited expectation of
privacy. Respondents argue that because children
participating in nonathletic extracurricular activities are
not subject to regular physicals and communal undress
they have a stronger expectation of privacy than the
BOARD of EDUCATION vs. EARLS Vernonia athletes. This distinction, however, was not
essential in Vernonia, which depended primarily upon the
school’s custodial responsibility and authority. See, e.g.,
id., at 665. In any event, students who participate in
FACTS: competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily subject
themselves to many of the same intrusions on their
The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy (Policy) adopted privacy as do athletes. Some of these clubs and activities
by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma, School District (School require occasional off-campus travel and communal
District) requires all middle and high school students to undress, and all of them have their own rules and
consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to requirements that do not apply to the student body as a
participate in any extracurricular activity. In practice, the whole. Each of them must abide by OSSAA rules, and a
Policy has been applied only to competitive extracurricular faculty sponsor monitors students for compliance with the
activities sanctioned by the Oklahoma Secondary Schools various rules dictated by the clubs and activities. Such
Activities Association (OSSAA). Respondent high school regulation further diminishes the schoolchildren’s
students and their parents brought this 42 U.S. C. §1983 expectation of privacy. Pp. 6—8.
action for equitable relief, alleging that the Policy violates
the Fourth Amendment. Applying Vernonia School Dist. (c) Considering next the character of the intrusion imposed
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 , in which this Court upheld by the Policy, see Vernonia , 515 U.S., at 658, the Court
the suspicionless drug testing of school athletes, the concludes that the invasion of students’ privacy is not
District Court granted the School District summary significant, given the minimally intrusive nature of the
judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the sample collection and the limited uses to which the test
Policy violated the Fourth Amendment . It concluded that results are put. The degree of intrusion caused by
before imposing a suspicionless drug testing program a collecting a urine sample depends upon the manner in
school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse which production of the sample is monitored. Under the
problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such Policy, a faculty monitor waits outside the closed restroom
that testing that group will actually redress its drug stall for the student to produce a sample and must listen
problem. The court then held that the School District had for the normal sounds of urination to guard against
failed to demonstrate such a problem among Tecumseh tampered specimens and ensure an accurate chain of
 custody. This procedure is virtually identical to the
“negligible” intrusion approved in Vernonia, ibid. The ISSUES:
Policy clearly requires that test results be kept in
confidential files separate from a student’s other records 1.  WON AO 308 is a law and not a mere administrative
and released to school personnel only on a “need to know” order, the enactment of the former being beyond the
basis. Moreover, the test results are not turned over to any President’s power à YES
law enforcement authority. Nor do the test results lead to 2.  WON AO 308 violates the right to privacy à YES
the imposition of discipline or have any academic
consequences. Rather, the only consequence of a failed RATIO:
drug test is to limit the student’s privilege of participating 1.      AO 308 establishes a system of identification that is
in extracurricular activities. Pp. 8—10. all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
(d) Finally, considering the nature and immediacy of the particularly, violates the right to privacy. It involves a
government’s concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
meeting them, see Vernonia , 515 U.S., at 660, the Court administrative order.
concludes that the Policy effectively serves the School The blurring of the demarcation line between the
District’s interest in protecting its students’ safety and power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the
health. Preventing drug use by schoolchildren is an Executive to administer and enforce them will disturb the
important governmental concern. See id., at 661—662. delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence,
The health and safety risks identified in Vernonia apply the Court will give stricter scrutiny to the breach of exercise
with equal force to Tecumseh’s children. The School of power belonging to another by one branch of
District has also presented specific evidence of drug use at government.
Tecumseh schools. Teachers testified that they saw ·         Legislative power: the authority, under the
students who appeared to be under the influence of drugs Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.
and heard students speaking openly about using drugs. A The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general
drug dog found marijuana near the school parking lot. and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary
Police found drugs or drug paraphernalia in a car driven power for all purposes of civil gov’t.
by an extracurricular club member. And the school board ·         Executive power: vested in the President; the power to
president reported that people in the community were enforce and administer laws; the power of carrying laws
calling the board to discuss the “drug situation.” into practical operation and enforcing their due
Respondents consider the proffered evidence insufficient observance.
and argue that there is no real and immediate interest to ·         The President, as Chief Executive, represents the
justify a policy of drug testing nonathletes. But a gov’t as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
demonstrated drug abuse problem is not always necessary enforced by the officials and employees of his
to the validity of a testing regime, even though some department. Thus, he is given ADMINISTRATIVE POWER,
showing of a problem does shore up an assertion of a which is concerned with the work of applying policies and
special need for a suspicionless general search program. enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 , 319. The School District organs.
has provided sufficient evidence to shore up its program. ·         Administrative order: an ordinance issued by the
Furthermore, this Court has not required a particularized President which relates to specific aspects in the
or pervasive drug problem before allowing the government administrative operation of gov’t. It must be in harmony
to conduct suspicionless drug testing. See, e.g., Treasury with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 , 673—674. The implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of policy (Sec 3, Ch 2, Title I, Book III, Administrative Code of
childhood drug use provides the necessary immediacy for 1987).
a school testing policy. Given the nationwide epidemic of AO 308 does not merely implement the Administrative
drug use, and the evidence of increased drug use in Code of 1987; it establishes for the first time a NCIRS,
Tecumseh schools, it was entirely reasonable for the which requires an overhaul of various contending state
School District to enact this particular drug testing policy. policies. Also, under AO 308, a citizen cannot transact
Pp. 10—14. business with gov’t agencies without the contemplated ID
242 F.3d 1264, reversed. card; without such, s/he will have a difficulty exercising
his rights and enjoying his privileges. Hence, AO 308
clearly deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
OPLE vs. TORRES 2.      The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed
by the Constitution; hence, it is a burden of gov’t to show
that AO 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
(July 23, 1998) and that it is narrowly drawn.
Ponente: J. Puno (IDOL!) In the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, the ruling in Griswold v.
Connecticut that there is a constitutional right to
FACTS: privacy was adopted. “The right to privacy is accorded
·         Petition for the declaration of unconstitutionality of recognition independently of its identification with
Administrative Order(AO) No. 308, entitled “Adoption of liberty… The concept of limited gov’t has always included
a National Computerized Identification Reference that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions
System (NCIRS)” on 2 grounds: into the personal life of the citizen… A system of limited
1. It is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to
2. It impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
‘zone of privacy’ sector, which the State can control.”
·         AO 308 issued by FVR on December 12, 1996 (see The right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
p. 144-146 for the complete citation of AO 308) provisions of the Constitution, namely: Sections 1, 2, 3(1),
 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights. The zones of privacy are consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees
also recognized and protected in several statutes, namely: of competing drug companies. If management perceives a
Articles 26, 32 and 723 of the Civil Code, Articles 229, conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such
290-292 and 280 of the Revised Penal Code, The Anti-Wire relationship and the employee’s employment with the
Tapping Act, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the company, the management and the employee will
Intellectual Property Code. explore the possibility of a transfer to another department
The ponencia proceeds to discuss the dangers to the in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for
people’s right to privacy: employment outside the company after six months.
1.      Section 4 of AO 308: provides for a Population Reference  Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s
Number (PRN) as a “common reference number to products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
establish a linkage among concerned agencies” through area.
the use of “Biometrics technology” and “computer  Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy,
application designs” a supervisor of Astra (competitor) in Albay
·         AO 308 does not state what specific biological  Tecson received several reminders from his District
characteristics and what particular biometrics technology Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his
shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. relationship with Betsy, still, they got married.
It does not state whether encoding of data is limited to   January 1999- Tecson’s superiors informed him that
biological information alone for identification purposes. his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest.
The indefiniteness of AO 308 can give the gov’t the roving They advised him that he and Bettsy should decide
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose which one of them would resign from their jobs,
other than the identification of the individual through his although they told him that they wanted to retain him as
PRN. much as possible because he was performing his job
·         AO 308 does not tell us how the information gathered well.  
shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and  Tecson asked for more time because Astra was merging
access the data, under what circumstances and for what with another pharmaceutical company and Betsy
purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the wanted to avail of the redundancy package.
privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.  November 1999- Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan
2.      The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur (where his family was
comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual located) sales area. He asked for a reconsideration but
and transmit it over a national network is one of the most his petition was denied. 
graphic threats of the computer revolution. The Court  Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his
ruled that an individual has no reasonable expectation of transfer and brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance
privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of Committee. But it remained firm in its decision and gave
biometrics technology. AO 308 is so widely drawn that a Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the
minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and
regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its continued acting as medical representative in the
provisions. Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
3.      The need to clarify the penal aspect of AO 308 is another  Tecson was not issued samples of products which were
reason why its enactment should be given to Congress. competing with similar products manufactured by Astra.
He was also not included in product conferences
DISCLAIMER: the Court, per se, is not against the use of regarding such products.
computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and
 Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the
transmit data to improve the bureaucracy. Also, the right
grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for
to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual
voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation
privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
pay of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer.
technological advancements that enhance public service
 Tecson brought the case to the National Conciliation &
and the common good. It merely requires that the law be
Mediation Board & the Court of Appeals which upheld
narrowly focused and a compelling interest to justify
the validity of Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees
such intrusions.
from having personal relationships with employees of
competitor companies as a valid exercise of its
management prerogatives.
DUNCAN ASSOC vs. GLAXO WELCOME ISSUE:

FACTS: 1. WON Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying

 Oct 24, 1995 – petitioner Pedro A Tecson was hired by from competitor companies is valid?
Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical 2. WON said policy violates the equal protection
representative clause?
 Tecson signed a contract of employment with the 3. WON tecson was constructively dismissed?
company that states that he agrees to study and abide 
by existing company rules; to disclose to management HELD & RATIO:
any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees or employees of competing 1. Yes. Glaxo’s policy is a valid exercise of
drug companies and should management find that such management prerogative.
relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign
from the company.  Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
 The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
provides that an employee is expected to inform confidential programs and information from competitors,
management of any existing or future relationship by
 especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the
highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. 3. No. Petitioner was not constructively dismissed
 It is reasonable under the circumstances when he was re-assigned to Butuan.
because relationships of that nature might compromise  
the interests of the company. In laying down the  Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an
assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
interests against the possibility that a competitor employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or
 Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,
interests cannot be denied. No less than the insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to unbearable to the employee.
adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right  None of these conditions are present in the instant
to reasonable returns on investments and to case. The record does not show that Tescon was
expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of
to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice such transfer.
and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every  Petitioner’s transfer to another place of assignment
labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The was merely in keeping with the policy of the company
law also recognizes that management has rights which in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus valid.
are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the Tecson’s wife holds a sensitive supervisory position as
interest of fair play. Branch Coordinator in her employer-company which
 Upon signing the contract with Glaxo, Tecson is clearly requires her to work in close coordination with District
aware of Glaxo’s policy in prohibiting relationships with Managers and Medical Representatives. The proximity
employees of the competitor and he is well aware of the of their areas of responsibility, all in the same Bicol
effects and consequences of such transgression. Region, renders the conflict of interest not only
possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the
2. No. The challenged policy does not violate the other’s market strategies in the region would be
equal protection clause of the constitution. inevitable. Management’s appreciation of a conflict of
interest is founded on factual basis.
 The commands of the equal protection clause are  
addressed only to the state or those acting under color of The challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo
its authority. Equal protection clause erects no shield impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time.
against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory There was ample notice given to Tecson by Glaxo, the
or wrongful. contract, employee handbook, fair warnings from the
 The only exception occurs when the state in any of its managers. He was even given time to resolve the conflict
manifestations or actions has been found to have by either resigning from the company or asking his wife to
become entwined or involved in the wrongful private resign from Astra. Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain
conduct. The exception is not present in this case. The Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory
company actually enforced the policy after repeated performance and suggested that he ask Betsy to resign
requests to the employee to comply with the policy. from her company instead. When the problem could not be
Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was
impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different
the lot of the employee.   from that handled by his wife for Astra. The Court did not
 From the wordings of the contractual provision and the terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned
policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo him to another area where his home province is.
does not impose an absolute prohibition against
relationships between its employees and those of BUT BEWARE! D2 NAG-COMMENT C DEAN !!!
competitor companies. Its employees are free to
cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their Excerpts:
own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid
is a conflict of interest between the employee and The aim of the law in this context is to insulate family
the company that may arise out of such values from the menace of the market. Sure, let the
relationships.  market reign over all things commercial. All that the law
The policy being questioned is not a policy against says is that there are certain things that are placed
marriage. An employee of the company remains free to beyond the reach of the market, that are "inalienable"
marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not -- cannot be bartered away -- like, in Pedro's case,
aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs choosing a wife. To force him to choose between his job
only to the individual. However, an employee’s personal and Betsy is callous, the Constitution says. There is a long
decision does not detract the employer from exercising noble history in law where courts refuse to lend their
management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and honor to contracts that dishonor constitutionally
business success. guaranteed claims.
  
 Tecson was aware of that restriction when he signed his
The Court invokes the "state action" requirement that says
employment contract and when he entered into a
the equal protection clause is "addressed only to the state
relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and
or those acting under color of its authority" and "erects no
voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with
shield against merely private conduct, however
Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law
discriminatory or wrongful." Our Charter makes no such
between them and thus, should be complied with in
distinction: it says plainly "nor shall any person be denied
good faith. He is therefore estopped from questioning
the equal protection of the laws." That language protects
said policy.
the "person," the victim, whoever violates his equality
rights, whether the violator is the state or a private person. underwent sex change before she married Mr
For instance, can a taxicab reject pregnant women or Bellinger.
grandparents because they can't board the cab fast  In the present case, Mrs Bellinger seeks a
enough? Can McDonald's or Jollibee exclude street declaration that the marriage was valid at its
children because they are not good for its image? inception and is subsisting. As an alternative
claim, she seeks a declaration that Sec 11(c) of the
There are many ways to satisfy state action. It would have Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 is incompatible w/
been easier here because the Constitution requires the Articles 8 & 12 of the European Convention on
state to respect the "sanctity of family life" as the Human Rights.
"foundation of the nation," etc. In light of this affirmative
command, the Court's inaction is the state action. By *Transsexual: born w/ the anatomy of a person of one sex
tolerating intolerance, the Court becomes a willing but w/ an unshakeable belief or feeling that they are
accomplice. It has blessed the sin with its imprimatur, and persons of the opposite sex. (Mrs. Bellinger is transsexual)
owned up to the wrong it should have chastised. *Note: the aim of gender reassignment surgery is to make
somebody feel more comfortable w/ his/her body, ‘not to
turn them into a woman.’
In the end, this should not be seen as a case of love versus
profit. Rather it is, in its most technical legal sense, a ISSUES
question of the "level of scrutiny," of the standard of 1. WON petitioner, Mrs Bellinger is validly married to
judicial review to be applied by the Court. If all that the Mr Bellinger (that is, WON at the time of the
employer imposes are ordinary job requirements, like marriage, Mrs Bellinger was ‘female’ within the
wearing a uniform, observing official hours, etc., it would meaning of that expression in the statute) [NO]
be enough to say that the management prerogative "to 2. WON Sec 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act
protect a competitive position" is reasonable (or, in legal 1973 is incompatible w/ articles 8 & 12 of the
jargon, it meets the "minimum test of rationality"). But if European Convention on Human Rights [YES]
the employer burdens a constitutionally protected claim
like the right to marry, and treats an employee differently RATIO:
because of his choice of a life partner, then the employer
must discharge a higher burden. He will be judged by 1. NO
heightened standards because he impinges upon rights
 W/ the gender reassignment surgery, Mrs
which enjoy a higher level of protection. That standard is
Bellinger’s testes & penis was removed, and an
called "strict scrutiny," which requires that the regulation
orifice was created; but she was still without
be supported by compelling interests and that it be
uterus or ovaries or any other biological
narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose. Regrettably, the
characteristics of a woman.
Court, by not applying strict scrutiny, has relieved Glaxo
 The present state of English law regarding the sex
of its duty to craft those "narrowly tailored" measures that
of transsexual people is represented by the case of
equal protection entails.
Corbett v Corbett.
 Corbett v Corbett: (concerns the gender of a male to
In case you have any lingering doubts, listen to the Court female transsexual in the context of the validity of
praise Glaxo for its benign but feudal concern for Pedro: a marriage.) Held: The law should adopt the
"When their relationship was still in its initial stage, chromosomal, gonadal & genital test. If all 3
Tecson's supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded him are congruent, that should determine a
about its effects on his employment..." In other words, person’s sex for the purpose of marriage. The
when Pedro and Betsy were just falling in love, the biological sexual constitution of an individual
company did its best to smother that love. To think that is fixed at birth, at the latest, & can’t be
falling in love is one of life's sweetest joys, and here comes changed either by the natural dev’t of organs of
your boss reminding you of "its effects on [your] the opposite sex or by medical or surgical
employment." means.
 Criticism on Corbett: It is too reductionistic to
have regard only to the 3 Corbett factors. This
approach ignores the compelling significance of
the psychological status of the person as a man or
BELLINGER vs. BELLINGER a woman.
FACTS:  The trial judge and the CA, though recognizing the
 On May 2, 1981, Mr. & Mrs. Bellinger went marked change in social attitudes to problems
through a ceremony of marriage under Marriage such as those of Mrs Bellinger since Corbett,
Act 1949. Mrs. Bellinger, formerly Elizabeth Ann adhered to the Corbett approach and held that the
Wilkinson, was a male who underwent gender 3 criteria relied upon therein remain the only basis
reassignment surgery. upon which to decide upon the gender of a child at
 Sec. 1(c) of the Nullity of Marriage Act of 1971, re- birth.
enacted in Sec. 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes
Act 1973 provides that a marriage is void unless
the parties are ‘respectively male and female.’
 Background: Mrs. Bellinger, born in 1946, was The contrary view
classified & registered as male. However, she felt  The European Court of Human Rights said that an
more inclined to be female. Despite this, she increased social acceptance of transsexualism &
married a woman when she was 21, but they an increased recognition of the problems w/c post-
separated and eventually divorced in 1975. Since operative transsexual people encounter. This court
then, she has dressed & lived as a woman and decided the Goodwin v UK case.
 Goodwin v UK: Christine Goodwin was a post- problem w/c should be considered as a whole &
operative male to female transsexual. Court held not dealt with in a piecemeal fashion. The decision
that the UK was in breach of Art. 8 (right to regarding recognition of gender reassignment for
respect for private life) & Art 12 (right to marry) of the purpose of marriage cannot sensibly be made
the Convention. in isolation from a decision on the like problem in
 Goodwin: A test of congruent biological factors can other areas where a distinction is drawn bet’n
no longer be decisive in denying legal people on the basis of gender (i.e areas such as
rec69ognition to the change o gender of a post- educ, child care, birth certificates, etc)
operative transsexual. Court recognized that it is  THIRD, even in the context of marriage, the
for a contracting state to determine the conditions present question raises wider issues. Marriage is
under w/c a person claiming legal recognition as a an institution, or relationship deeply embedded in
transsexual establishes that gender re-assignment the religious & social culture of this country. It’s
has been properly effected. But it found no deeply embedded as a relationship bet’n 2 persons
justification for barring the transsexual from of the opposite sex…There are those who urge that
enjoying the right to marry under any the special relationship of marriage should not
circumstances. [The Goodwin decision is now be confined to persons of the opposite sex
prospective in character]  FOR THESE REASONS I WOULD NOT MAKE A
Developments since the Goodwin decision DECLARATION THAT THE MARRIAGE BET’N MR
 1) The terms of reference of the interdepartmental & MRS BELLINGER WAS VALID. A CHANGE IN
working grp on transsexual people include re- THE LAW AS SOUGHT BY MRS BELLINGER
examining the implications of granting full legal MUST BE A MATTER OF DELIBERATION &
status to transsexual people in their acquired DECISION BY PARLIAMENT.
gender; 2) govt announced intention to bring
forward primary legislation w/c will allow 2. YES
transsexual people who can demonstrate they have  Sec 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973,
taken decisive steps towards living fully & insofar as it makes no provision for the recognition
permanently in the acquired gender to marry in of gender reassignment is incompatible w/ Sec 8 &
that gender; 3) from the Goodwin decision, those 12 of the Convention.
parts of English law w/c fail to give legal  Sec 8: right to respect for private life; Sec 12: right
recognition to the acquired gender of transsexual to marry (Case did not say anything else on the
persons are in principle incompatible w/ Arts 8 & provision)
12 of the Convention. Domestic law, including Sec  Mrs Bellinger claims that although she & Mr
11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act will have to Bellinger celebrated their marriage long before the
change. Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, &
although the Goodwin decision dealt w/ the
Conclusion on first issue: human rights position as at the date of the
 Despite humanitarian considerations & the judgment (Jul 2002), the non-recognition of their
international trend towards recognizing gender ability to marry (by virtue of Sec 11c) continues to
reassignment, the Lordships’ House, sitting in its prevent them marrying each other.
judicial capacity ought not to accede to the  That non-recognition of gender reassignment for
submissions made on behalf of Mrs Bellinger. the purposes of marriage is incompatible w/ Secs
Recognition of Mrs Bellinger as female for the 8 & 12 is found by the European Court of Human
purposes of Sec 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Rights in its Goodwin decision, and the
Act 1973 would necessitate giving the expressions government accepted such position. However, the
‘male’ & ‘female’ in that Act a novel, extended govt’s announcement of forthcoming legislation on
meaning: that a person may be born w/ one sex the matter has not had the effect of curing the
but later become, or become regarded as, a person incompatibility.
of the opposite sex. Questions of social policy &
administrative feasibility arise at several points.
The issues are altogether ill-suited for
determination by courts and court procedures. D. Protected Interests in Property
They are pre-eminently a matter for
Parliament. Mere “Regulation” under the Due Process Clause
 Intervention by the courts would be peculiarly VERSUS “Taking” of Property via the Power of
inappropriate when the change being sought in Eminent Domain
the law raises issues such as the ff:
 FIRST, much uncertainty surrounds the
circumstances in w/c gender reassignment should CHURCHILL VS. RAFFERTY
be recognized for the purposes of marriage. There
seems to be no ‘standard’ operation or recognized
definition of the outcome of completed surgery. It (1915)
is questionable whether the successful completion Trent J
of some sort of surgical intervention should be an  
essential prerequisite to the recognition of gender FACTS:
assignment. There must be some objective,  
publicly available criteria by w/c gender Plaintiffs put up a billboard on private land in Rizal
reassignment is to be assessed. Province "quite a distance from the road and strongly
 SECOND, the recognition of gender reassignment built". Some residents (German and British Consuls) find
for the purposes of marriage is part of a wider it offensive. Act # 2339 allows the defendent, the Collector
of Internal Revenue, to collect taxes from such property is gov't should interfere with individual effort only to the
and to remove it when it is offensive to sight. Court of first extent necessary to preserve a healthy social and economic
Instance prohibited the defendant to collect or remove the condition of society. State interferes with private property
billboard. through, taxation, eminent domain and police power. Only
  under the last are the benefits derived from the
ISSUE: maintenance of a healthy economic standard of society
  and aka damnum absque injuria. Once police power was
1.May the courts restrain by injunction the collection of reserved for common nuisances.  Now industry is
taxes? organized along lines which make it possible for large
  combinations of capital to profit at the expense of socio-
2.Is Act # 2339 unconstitutional because it deprives economic progress of the nation by controlling prices and
property without due process of law in allowing CIR to dictating to industrial workers wages and conditions of
remove it if it is offensive? labor. It has increased the toll on life and affects public
  health, safety and morals, also general social and
RULE: economic life of the nation, as such state must necessarily
  regulate industries. Various industries have regulated and
1.an injunction is an extraordinary remedy and not to be even offensive noises and smells coming from those
used if there is an adequate remedy provided by law; here industries. Those noises and smells though ostensibly
there is an adequate remedy, therefore court may not do regulated for health reason are actually regulated for more
so. aesthetic reasons. What is more aesthetic than sight which
  the ad industry is wooing us with. Ads cover landscapes
2.unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight etc. The success of billboards lie not upon the use of
are not dissociated from the general welfare of the public, private property but on channels of travel used by the
therefore can be regulated by police power, and act is general public. Billboard that cannot be seen by people are
constitutional. useless. Billboards are legitimate, they are not garbage but
  can be offensive in certain circumstances. Other courts in
RATIONALE: US hold the view that police power cannot interfere with
  private property rights for purely aesthetic purposes. But
1.Writ of injunction by the courts is an extraordinary this court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements
preventive remedy. Ordinary (adequate) remedies are in which are offensive to the sight are not dissociated from
the law itself. Sections 139 and 140 of the Act forbids the the general welfare of the public.
use of injunction and provides a remedy for any wrong.  
_Plaintiffs say that those sections are unconstitutional disposition: 
because by depriving taxpayers remedy, it also deprives judgment reversed
them of property without due process of law and it  
diminishes the power of the courts_. Taxes, whether legal _motion for a rehearing_
or illegal, cannot be restrained by the courts by injunction.  
There must be a further showing that there are special trent j:  
circumstances such as irreparable injury, multiplicity of we were right the first time
suits or a cloud upon title to real estate will result.
Practically, if the courts can do so then there will be an U.S. vs. TORIBIO
insane number of suits enjoining the collection of taxes by
tax avoiders. The state will not function since taxes are not
paid (and judges will become unpaid!). There is, of course, FACTS:
no law nor jurisprudence that says it is not allowed to sue  Luis Toribio slaughtered for human consumption
after having paid the tax, and such is the usual course in a Carabao without a permit from the municipal
bringing suits against illegal(?) taxes. Pay it under protest. treasurer violating Act 1147
As to the diminishment of power of the courts, the o Act 1147, Sec. 30. “No large cattle shall be
Philippine courts never had the power to restrain the slaughtered or killed for food at the
collection of taxes by injunction. It is said par 2 sec 56 Act municipal slaughterhouse except upon
136 confers original jurisdiction upon CFI to hear and permit secured from the municipal
determine all civil actions but civil actions at that time had treasurer…”
a well-defined meaning. The legislature had already o Act 1147, Sec. 31. “No permit to slaughter
defined the only action previously and that is the payment carabaos shall be granted by the
of the tax under protest then suit. Civil actions like municipal treasurer unless such animals
injunction suits are of a special extraordinary character. are unfit for agricultural work or for
Section 139 also does not diminish power of the courts draft purposes…”
because the power is still there if there is no adequate  Application of Toribio for a permit
remedy available but sec 140 gives an adequate remedy. was denied since animal was not
  found to be unfit for agricultural
2.sec 100 of act 2339 gives power to the CIR to remove work or draft purposes.
offensive billboards, signs, signboards after due  It is contended by Toribio that statute is applicable
invstigation. The question becomes is that a reasonable only to slaughter done in a municipal
exercise of police power affecting the advertising industry? slaughterhouse and that the statute is
Police power is reasonable insofar as it properly considers unconstitutional sine it penalizes the slaughter of
public health, safety, comfort, etc. If nothing can justify a carabaos without a permit amounting to a taking
statute, it's void. State may interfere in public interest but by the government of the right of the person over
not final. Court is final. Police power has been expanding. his property amounting to an exercise of eminent
blahblahblah (consti1). The basic idea of civil polity in US domain without just compensation or an undue
exercise of police power by the State.
 Private property shall not be taken for public use without
ISSUE: just compensation.

1. W/N the statute is applicable only to slaughter done in

a municipal slaughterhouse

 The statute seeks to protect the large cattle of

the Philippines from theft and to make easy PEOPLE vs. FAJARDO
their recovery by providing an elaborate and
compulsory system of branding and Appeal from the decision of the CFI convicting Juan F.
registration Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance
 By limiting the application of the statue to No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao
those done only in the municipal Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit
slaughterhouse, the purpose of the article is from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the
greatly impaired if not totally destroyed since view of the public plaza.
these animals could now be slaughtered for
human consumption without need of showing FACTS
proof of ownership. During the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F.
 Statute should be construed so as to give Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines
effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in
and promote the object for which the statue question providing as follows:
was enacted.
 Statute therefore prohibits and penalizes "SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or
the slaughter of large cattle for human repair a building should, before constructing or repairing,
consumption anywhere without the permit obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.
provided for in the Act. SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for
each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit
2. W/N the statute is unconstitutional issued.
 Because of the statue the use and enjoyment
of the owners over their cattle are in a way After the term of Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his
impaired… therefore it is not a taking but a son-in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request
just restraint of injurious private use of with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
property  police power of the State. construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a
 “Rights of property, like all other social and parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along
conventional rights, are subject to such the national highway and separated from the public plaza
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among
shall prevent them from being injurious (to the others that the proposed building would destroy the view
equal enjoyment of others having an equal or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their
right to the enjoyment of their property or to request for a building permit, but again the request was
the rights of the community), and to such turned down by the mayor.
reasonable restraints and regulations
established by law, as the legislature, under Appellants proceeded with the construction of the building
the governing and controlling power vested in without a permit, because they needed a place of residence
them by the constitution, may thing necessary very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a
and expedient.” typhoon and they had been living on leased property.
 Disease threatened the total extinction of
carabaos in the Philippines resulting in famine On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and
from the insufficiency of work animals to convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao,
cultivate the fields. Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question.
o Given these circumstances and Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which
conditions, the general welfare affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a
necessitated the enactment of the fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the
statute building in question. From this decision, the accused
 To justify the exercise of appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded
police power of the state: first, the records to us because the appeal attacks the
that the interests of those of a constitutionality of the ordinance in question.
particular class require such
interference; and second, that ISSUE
the means are reasonably WON the assailed municipal ordinance was valid.
necessary for the WON the conviction was valid.
accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly HOLDING
oppressive upon individuals. No, the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7,
Series of 1950 was beyond the authority of said
municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void.
No, The appealed conviction can not stand. The conviction
is reversed, and said accused are acquitted. (as a
Consti. Art. III, sec 9 consequence of the first issue)

RATIO
1. A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity
question is that under it the mayor has absolute discretion to be heard.
to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any
policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the 2. The validity of the ordinance in question was justified
mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the by the court below under section 2243, par. (c), of the
permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal Revised Administrative Code, as amended. This section
are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient provides:
standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance
thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary
power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, character.-The municipal council shall have authority to
and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and exercise the following, discretionary powers:
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an * * *
activity, per se lawful, is invalid (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the
kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired
The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the within them, and issue permits for till creation or repair
discretion vested thereby in the respondents. It prescribes thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the
no uniform rule upon which the special permission of the municipal council and which shall not be less than two
city is to be granted. Thus the city is clothed with the pesos for each building permit and one peso for each
uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to repair permit issued. The fees collected under the
some and deny it to others; to refuse the application of one provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal
landowner or lessee and to grant that of another, when for school fund."
all material purposes, the two are applying for precisely
the same privileges under the same circumstances. The Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however,
danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible the power of the municipal council to require the issuance of
arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution, building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatever, populous parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of
other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them.
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be As there is absolutely no showing in this case that the
tested. Fundamental rights under our government do not municipal council had either established fire limits within
depend for their existence upon such a slender and the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of
uncertain thread. Ordinances which thus invest a city buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it
council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said
which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the
unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have express authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could
be secured.

It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can YNOT vs. CA
refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed building
"destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any FACTS:
public property"; and in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of  Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of EO
Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was NO. 626-A which provides:
predicated on the ground that the proposed building would o The Pres has given orders prohibiting the
"destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its interprovincial movement of carabaos and
being seen from the public highway. Even thus the slaughtering of carabaos of a certain
interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, age. Despite such orders, violators still
in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the manage to circumvent the prohibition.
right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the Therefore, I, Marcos, promulgate the ff
bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of amendment: no carabao, regardless of
appellants property without just compensation. We do not age, sex, physical condition or purpose
overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the and no carabeef shall be transported from
beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the one province to another.
comfort and happiness of residents. But while property
 Petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump
may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and
boat from masbate to Iloilo on Jan 13, 1984 which
in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive
were cxonfiscated
to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580),
 The RTC sustained the confiscation
the State may not, under the guise of police power,
 So did the appellate court
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve  Petitioner’s claim is that the penalty is invalid
or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As because it is imposed without according the owner
the case now stands, every structure that may be erected a right to be heard before a competent and
on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands impartial court as guaranteed by due process
condemned under the ordinance in question, because it  This court has declared that while lower courts
would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the should observe a becoming modesty in examining
highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not
let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious prevented from resolving the same whenever
purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in warranted, subject only to review by the highest
character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
constitution to “review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm in certiorari, as the law or rules of court
 may provide” final judgments and orders of lower invasion or taking of property, the Court ruled
courts in, among others, all cases involving the that rendering lands unusable for purposes of a
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply chicken farm entitles petitioners to compensation
means that the resolution of such cases may be under the Fifth Amendment, despite the Court’s
made in the 1st instance by these lower courts unfavorable view of the application of the common
 Courts should not follow the path of least law doctrine. The measure of value is not the
resistance by simply presuming the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The path of glide
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned as defined by the appellant is not within the
 The challenged measure is denominated as an meaning of minimum safe altitude of flight in the
executive order but it is really a pres decree, statute. Land owners are entitled to at least as
promulgating anew rule instead of merely much space above ground as he can occupy in
implementing an existing law. Issued not for connection with his use of the land. The damages
taking care that the laws are faithfully executed sustained were a product of a direct invasion of
but in the exercise of legislative authority respondent’s domain. It is the character of
 Due process clause- intentionally vague; meant to invasion, and not the amount of damage resulting,
adapt easily to every situation. that determines WON property was taken.
 It may not be dispensed with except in the interest Furthermore, the definition of “property” under the
of public health and public morals Fifth Amendment contains a meaning supplied by
 Police power was invoked by the govt to justify EO local law – as in the case of North Carolina Law.
626-A 2. No, the value of the land was not completely
 Court held that as to the 1 st EO, it was ok destroyed; it can still be used for other purposes.
(reasonably necessary) but not so with the EO Thus, appellees are only entitled to a lower value
626-A bec it imposes an absolute ban not on the given the limited utility of the land. However, there
slaughter of carabao but on their movement is no precise description of the nature of the
 Unlike in the toribio case, here there is no trial easement taken, whether temporary or permanent.
 The EO defined the prohibition, convicted the These deficiencies in evidentiary findings are not
petitioner, and immediately imposed punishment, rectified by a statement of opinion. The finding of
which was carried out forthright. Also, as it also facts on every material matter is a statutory
provides that confiscated carabaos shall be requirement. The Court of Claims’ finding of
donated to charitable institutions as the chairman permanence is more conjectural than factual;
of natl meat inspection may see fit, it’s an invalid more is needed to determine US liability. Thus, the
delegation of powers amount stated as damages is not proper.
3. Yes, the Court of Claims has clear jurisdiction over
 Invalid exercise of police power. Due process is
the matter. The question of WON there has been a
violated. And an invalid delegation of powers
taking property is a claim within the
 EO 626-A=unconstitutional
constitutionally-granted jurisdiction of the Court
 of Claims.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is reversed. Case remanded

U.S. vs. CAUSBY to the Court of Claims for evidentiary hearing.

FACTS: Justice Black, dissenting:

Respondents are owners of 2.8-acre farm outside The Court’s opinion seems to be that it is the noise
of Greensboro, North Carolina. Said property was close to and glare of planes, rather than the flying of the planes
the municipal airport leased by the government. The Civil themselves, which constitutes taking. The appellee’s
Aeronautics Authority (CAA) designated the safe path to claims are at best an action in tort (nuisance, statute
glide to one of the airport runways over the property of violation, negligence). The Government cannot be sued in
appellees. They contend that the noise and glare from the Court of Claims unless over matters of implied or
airplaines landing and taking off constituted a taking of express contracts. There is no contract involved in the case
property under the FIFTH AMENDMENT. The Court of at bar.
Claims found the facts of the case to constitute a taking of The concept of “taking” has been given a sweeping
property and rewarded appellees with $2,000 as value of meaning. The old concept of land ownership must be made
the easement. compatible with the new field of air regulation. The
damages should not be elevated to the level of the
ISSUES: Constitution, as it would be an obstacle to a better-
1. WON appellee’s property was taken as provided for adapted, vital system of national progress.
the Fifth Amendment
2. WON awarding of damages is reasonable
3. WON Court of Claims is with jurisdiction
REPUBLIC vs. PLDT
HELD, RATIO:
1. Yes, US Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act of
1926 (as amended by Civil Aeronautics Act of
1930), which outlines that the US had complete FACTS:
and exclusive national sovereignty in air space. Sometime in 1933, respondent PLDT contracted
The Act deemed navigable air space as that above an agreement with the American company, RCA
the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed by Communications Inc., connecting calls coming and going
the CAA. While appellant contend that the flight is from RCA to the Philippines and vice versa. Later, this
well within the minimum safe altitude (take-off agreement extended to radio and telephone messages to
and landing), and that there was no physical and from European and Asiatic countries. In 1956, PLDT,
complying with their 24-month notice agreement, made HELD:
known its termination of the agreement, which came to 1) No the trial court may not.
pass in 1958. 2) Yes, the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
3) Yes, the Bureau is empowered to engage in
Created in 1947, the Bureau of commercial telephone business.
Telecommunications set up a Government telephone 4) No, these services did not create any unfair
System by renting trunk lines from PLDT. In doing so, the competition.
Bureau has agreed to abide by the rules and regulations of 5) No, PLDT has no right to compensation.
PLDT, which includes the prohibition for public use that
which was furnished for private use. In 1948, the Bureau RATIO:
extended service to the general public.
1) The court here stated that contracts and
In 1958, the Bureau entered into an agreement agreements must be made freely and not tainted
with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service. PLDT then by violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
complained that the Bureau was violating their agreement However, while the RP may not compel an
as the latter was using PLDT’s trunk lines for public use agreement, it may require PLDT to permit
and not just private. PLDT then gave notice that if these interconnection between it and the government, as
activities continued, they would disconnect service. When an exercise of eminent domain. While said power
no reply was received, OLDT pulled the plug on the usually pertains to title, the court here said that
Bureau, causing an isolation of the RP from the rest of the the power may be used to impose a burden on the
world, except the US. owner, without having to relinquish the ownership
and title. Also, the State should be able to require
The Bureau proposed an interconnecting a public utility to render services in the general
agreement, but as negotiations wore on, neither party interest. In this case, the general public would be
could come to a compromise. the ones who will profit from an interconnection.
2) PLDT contends that the court had no jurisdiction,
Petitioner Bureau of Telecommunications is and the proper body is the Public Service
prayed for a judgment commanding PLDT to execute an Commission. The court here stated, however, that
agreement, allowing the Bureau to use PLDT’s facilities, as the latter has no jurisdiction over the taking of
well as a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain property under the power of eminent domain.
respondent from severing existing connections as well as Also, while PLDT is a public utility, and its
restoring those already severed. franchise and properties are under the jurisdiction
of the Public Service Commission, the Bureau’s
While the lower court directed respondent to telecommunications network is a public service
reconnect the severed lines and refrain from disconnecting owned by the RP and is therefore exempt from
more, as well as to accept incoming international calls, such jurisdiction (sec. 14 Public Service Act).
PLDT filed its answer denying any obligation it has to the 3) EO 94 sec. 79 empowers the Bureau to b)
Bureau, as well as assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of negotiate for, operate and maintain wire telephone
First Instance. PLDT also claimed that the Bureau was or radio telephone communication service
engaging in commercial telephone operations, which was throughout the Philippines c) to prescribe, subject
in excess of its authority. to approval by the Department Head, equitable
rates of charges for messages handled by the
The court then said that it could not compel the system and/or for time calls and other services
parties to enter into agreement, that under EO 94, that may be rendered by the system.
establishing the Bureau, said Bureau is not limited to
government services, nor was it guilty of fraud, abuse, or Nothing precludes the Bureau from engaging in
misuse of PLDT’s poles, as well as declared the injunction commercial activities or prevents it from serving
permanent. The complaint and counterclaims, however, the general public. While in the agreement, the
were dismissed. Hence this appeal. Bureau limited itself to government services, the
court said that this does not bar it from future
ISSUES: expansion into commercial services, as this is
allowed by law.
1) Whether or not the trial court can coerce the
parties to enter into agreement. 4) The competition assailed here is merely
2) Whether the court of first instance had hypothetical. This is shown by the figures. At the
jurisdiction. time of filing the proceedings, PLDT still had
20,000 applications pending, and the Bureau had
3) Whether the Bureau of Telecommunications is 5,000. There can be no competition when PLDT
empowered to engage in commercial telephone cannot even handle the demands of the public.
business. Also, the charter of PLDT provides that its rights
are not exclusive. Lastly, the court said that the
acceptance of PLDT of payments for rentals
4) Whether these commercial services created unfair implies knowledge of the Bureau’s intentions to
competition, and the Bureau is subsequently enter into commercial services. As the relationship
guilty of fraud and abuse. has been around for awhile and the public has
utilized both services, it is too late for PLDT to
5) Whether PLDT has a right to compensation for the claim misuse of its facilities.
use of the Bureau of PLDT’s poles. 5) PLDT claims that the use of the poles are free only
for telegraphic services, as the telephone services
 did not exist yet at the time of the franchise. Also price that should be paid was P10/sq.m. The trial
alleged is that the Bureau must pay for the use of court accepted the recommendation.
the poles, as well as if the latter attaches more 10. 1961 – Republic filed a motion for a new trial upon
than one ten-pin crossarm for telegraphic the grounds of newly-discovered evidence but was
purposes. However, the court said that there is no denied by the court. A series of appeals and
proof of any strain caused by the telephone wires, counter appeals followed.
nor of any damage caused, nor that the RP has 11. Republic elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
attached more than one ten-pin crossarm. They
reasoned that so long as there is no additional
burden, the reservation in favor of the telegraphic Important Issues:
wires should extend to the telephone wires.
1. WON the lower court erred holding that the taking
of the properties commenced with the filling of the
action.
2. WON the lower court erred in finding the price of
REPUBLIC vs. CASTELVI
P10/sq.m. of the lands.

FACTS:
DECISION:
1. Republic (Philippine Air Force) occupied Castellvi’s
land on July 1, 1947, by virtue of a contract of Issue #1.
lease, on a year to year basis..
2. Before the expiration of the contract of lease in The trial court is correct in ruling that the “taking”
1956, the Republic sought to renew the contract of the land started only with the filing of the complaint for
but Castellvi refused. eminent domain in 1959 and not in 1947 (start of the
3. The AFP refused to vacate the land. Castellvi wrote contract of lease).
to the AFP Chief of Staff informing him that the
heirs of the property had decided to subdivide the 1. Two essential elements in the “taking’ of the
land for sale to the general public. property were not present when the Republic
4. The Chief of Staff answered that it was difficult for entered and occupied the property in 1947.
the AFP to vacate in view of the permanent a) that the entrance and occupation must be
installations erected and that the acquisition of the for a permanent, or indefinite period
property by expropriation proceedings would be the b) that in devoting the property to public use
only option. the owner was ousted from the property
5. Castellvi brought a suit to eject the Phil. Air Force and deprived of its financial use.
from the land. While the suit was pending, the 2. The right of eminent domain may not be
Republic of the Phil. filed a complaint for eminent exercised by simply leasing the premises to be
domain against Vda. De Castellvi and Toledo- expropriated. Nor can it be accepted that the
Gozun over parcels of land owned by the two. Republic would enter into a contract of lease
6. Trial Court issued an order fixing the provisional where its real intention was to buy.
value of lands at P259, 669 3. To sustain the contention of the Republic
7. Castellvi filed a Motion to Dismiss for the following would result in a practice wherein the
reasons: Republic would just lease the land for many
years then expropriate the land when the lease
a) the total value of the parcels land should is about to terminate, then claim that the
have been valued at P15/sq.m. because “taking” of the property be considered as of the
these are residential lands. date when the Gov’t started to occupy the
b) the Republic (through the Philippine Air land, in spite of the fact that the value of the
Force), despite repeated demands had property had increased during the period of
been illegally occupying the property since the lease. This would be sanctioning what
July 1, 1956. obviously is a defective scheme, which
would have the effect of depriving the
The defendants prayed that the complaint be owner of the property of its true and fair
dismissed OR that the Republic be ordered to pay value at the time when the expropriation
P15/ sq. m. plus interest at 6% per annum from proceedings were actually instituted in
July 1, 1956 AND the Republic be ordered to pay 5 court.
million as unrealized profits.
Issue # 2
Gozun (co-defendant and owner of another parcel
of land) also filed a Motion to Dismiss because her The price of P10/sq.m. is quite high. The Supreme
lands should have been valued at P15/sq.m. as Court fixed it at P5/sq.m.
these were residential and a portion had already
been subdivided into diff. Lots for sale to the 1. There is evidence that the lands in question
general public. had ceased to be devoted to the production of
agricultural crops, that they had become
8. After the Republic had deposited the provisional adaptable for residential purposes, and that
value of the land, it was actually placed in the the defendants had actually taken steps to
actual possessions of the lands. (1959) convert their lands into residential
9. The Commissioners appointed to determine the
value of the land recommended that the lowest
 subdivisions even before the Republic filed the 1. Insofar as these petitions are concerned, the court
complaint for eminent domain. exculpated the private respondents, not only because of
2. In expropriation proceedings, the owner of the the fact that Jupiter Street is not covered by the restrictive
land has the right to its value for the use for easements based on the "deed restrictions" but chiefly
which it would bring the most in the market. because the National Government itself, through the Metro
3. The Court has weighed all the circumstances Manila Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street
(such as the prevailing price of the land in into a "high density commercial (C-3) zone," pursuant to
Pampanga in 1959) and in fixing the price of its Ordinance No. 81-01. Hence, the petitioners have no
the lands the Court arrived at a happy cause of action on the strength alone of the said "deed
medium between the price as recommended restrictions."
by the commissioners and approved by the
lower court (P10) and the price advocated by Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village
the Republic (20 centavos /sq.m.) and Ayala Corporation's commercial section. And since
1957, it had been considered as a boundary — not as a
part of either the residential or commercial zones of Ayala
Corporation's real estate development projects. Hence, it
cannot be said to have been "for the exclusive benefit" of
BEL-AIR ASSOCIATION vs. IAC Bel-Air Village residents.

Ponente: J. Sarmiento As a consequence, Jupiter Street was intended for the use
by both the commercial and residential blocks. It was not
FACTS: originally constructed, therefore, for the exclusive use of
Before the Court are five consolidated petitions, docketed either block, least of all the residents of Bel-Air Village,
as G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 in but, we repeat, in favor of both, as distinguished from the
the nature of appeals from five decisions of the Court of general public.
Appeals, denying specific performance and damages. This
case stems from a provision regarding restrictions found in 2. When the wall was erected in 1966 and rebuilt twice, in
the deed of sale granted to Bel-Air homeowners. Included 1970 and 1972, it was not for the purpose of physically
in the said deed was a restriction (sec II, b) which limited separating the two blocks. According to Ayala Corporation,
use of lots for residential purposes only. In the 1960’s it was put up to enable the Bel-Air Village Association
Ayala Corp. began developing the area bordering Bel-Air "better control of the security in the area" and as the
along Buendia Ave and Jupiter St. With the opening of the Ayala Corporation's "show of goodwill,"
entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic in the In fine, we cannot hold the Ayala Corporation liable for
1970’s, the different residential lots located in the northern damages for a commitment it did not make, much less for
side of Jupiter Street the ceased to be used for purely alleged resort to machinations in evading it. The records,
residential purposes. The municipal government of Makati on the contrary, will show that the Bel-Air Village
and Ministry of Human Settlements declared that the said Association had been informed, at the very outset, about
areas, for all purposes, had become commercial in the impending use of Jupiter Street by commercial lot
character. buyers.

Subsequently, on October 29, 1979, the plaintiffs- It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements,
appellees Jose D. Sangalang and Lutgarda D. Sangalang especially the easements herein in question, are invalid or
brought the present action for damages against the ineffective. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the
defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater
breach of contract and on tort or quasi-delict. They were number as the State may determine in the legitimate
joined in separate suits by other homeowners and the Bel- exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees
Air Village Association (BAVA) against other commercial sanctity of contract and is said to be the "law between the
establishments set up in the vicinity of the village. After contracting parties," but while it is so, it cannot
trial on the merits, the then Court of First Instance of contravene "law, morals, good customs, public order, or
Rizal, Pasig, Metro Manila, rendered a decision in favor of public policy." Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent
the appellees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered to police power, designed precisely to promote health,
a reversal safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the
expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary.
ISSUES:
Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate
1. Did the Bel-Air residents who converted their residences exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown
into commercial establishments violate the restrictions why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed
found the deed of sale? NO "non-impairment" guaranty of the Constitution, which, as
we have declared, is secondary to the more compelling
2. Is Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been
Corporation), liable for tearing down the perimeter wall shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to
along Jupiter Street that had separated its commercial warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.
section from the residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering
in, as a consequence, the full "commercialization" of
Jupiter St, in violation of the very restrictions it had EPZA vs. DULAY
authored?NO
(April 29, 1987)
RATIO: Ponente: J. Gutierrez, Jr.
FACTS:  The method of ascertaining just compensation under
 Jan 15, 1979: Pres Marcos issued PD 1811, reserving the decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment
a certain parcel of land in Mactan, Cebu for the on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court
establishment of an export processing zone by inutile in a matter which, under the Consti, is reserved
petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority. However, to it for final determination. Following the decrees, its
not all reserved areas were public lands. So petitioner task would be relegated to simply stating the lower
offered to purchase the parcels of land in accordance value of the property as declared either by the owner
with the valuation set forth in Sec 92 of PD 464. or the assessor. Hence, it would be useless for the
Despite this, the parties failed to reach an agreement court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the
regarding the sale of the properties. Rules of Court. The strict application of the decrees
 Petitioner filed with the CFI of Cebu a complaint for would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade
expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ as the court has only to choose between the 2
of possession, pursuant to PD 66, which empowers the valuations; it cannot exercise its discretion or
petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any independence in determining what is just or fair.
property for the establishment of export processing  The ruling is that, the owner of property expropriated
zones. is entitled to recover from expropriating authority the
 Feb 17, 1981: respondent judge issued the order of fair and full value of the lot, as of the time when
condemnation declaring petitioner as having the lawful possession thereof was actually taken, plus
right to take the properties sought to be condemned. A consequential damages. If the Court’s authority to
second order was issued, appointing certain persons determine just compensation is limited, it may
as commissioners to ascertain and report the just result in the deprivation of the landowner’s right
compensation for the properties sought to be of due process to enable it to prove its claim to
expropriated. just compensation, as mandated by the Consti. The
 June 19: the 3 appointed commissioners valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding
recommended that P15/sq.m. was the fair and principle or one of the factors in determining just
reasonable value of just compensation for the compensation but it may not substitute the court’s
properties own judgment as to what amount should be awarded
 July 29: petitioner filed Motion for Recon on the and how to arrive at such amount.
ground that PD 1533 has superseded Secs. 5-8 of  In the case, the tax declarations presented by the
Rule 67 or the Rules of Court on the ascertainment petitioner as basis for just compensation was made
of just compensation through commissioners. MFR long before martial law, when land was not only much
was denied by the trial court. cheaper, but when assessed values of properties were
stated in figures that were only a fraction of their true
ISSUE/HELD: market value. To peg the value of the lots on the basis
WON PD’s 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and of outdated documents and at prices below the
superseded Sec 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary
of Court, such that in determining the just compensation and confiscatory.
of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should Guidelines in determining just compensation
be its market value as declared by the owner or as  Determination of “just compensation” in eminent
determined by its assessor, whichever is lower  NO domain cases is a judicial function.
 The exec or leg depts. may make the initial
determinations; but when a party claims a violation of
RATIO: the guarantee in the Bill of Rights, no statute, decree,
Just compensation or EO can mandate that its own determination shall
 The equivalent for the value of the property at the prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the
time of its taking. courts be precluded from looking into the “just-ness”
 A fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, of the decreed compensation.
which is the measure of the indemnity, not
whatever gains would accrue to the expropriating Held: PD 1533 (and the other PDs which it amended) is
entity. unconstitutional and void.
 In estimating the market value, all the capabilities
of the property and all the uses to which it may be
applied or for which it is adapted are to be
considered and not merely the condition it is in at NPC vs. CA
the time nor the use to which it is them applied by
the owner. Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the
 This court may substitute its own estimate of the Court of Appeals, entitled National Power Corporation,
value as gathered from the record. Plaintiff-Appellant,v B.E. San Diego, Inc.
 All the facts as to the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its improvements and FACTS:
capabilities, should be considered. National Power Corporation (NPC, for short), commenced
 In this case, the decrees categorically and peremptorily negotiations with spouses Esteban Sadang and Maria
limit the definition of just compensation. Lachica, for the purchase of a portion of 8,746 sq. ms. of
 Recurrent phrase in the assailed PD’s: the latter's parcel of land of 62,285 sq. ms., situated in
“…the basis (for just compensation) shall be the Barrio San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, for the purpose of
current and fair market value declared by the owner or constructing an access road to its Angat River
anyone having legal interest in the property or Hydroelectric Project. Although the negotiations were not
administrator, or such market value as determined by yet concluded, NPC nevertheless obtained permission from
the assessor, whichever is lower.”
said spouses to begin construction of the access road, Yes. Petitioner is directed to pay interest at six per cent
which it did in November 1961. (6%) per annum on the amount adjudged from December
7, 1962, until fully paid.
However, on December 7, 1962, B.E. San Diego, Inc. a
realty firm and private respondent herein (SAN DIEGO, for Ratio
short), acquired the parcel of land at a public auction sale FIRST ISSUE
and was issued a title.
All considered, P3.75 a square meter is and represents
CFI Decision the fair market value

On February 14, 1963, NPC instituted proceedings for On the other hand, respondent CFI reasoned thus:
eminent domain against the spouses Sadang in the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, later amended on June 20, "It has been amply shown that the defendant
1963, with leave of Court, to implead SAN DIEGO. On purchased the land for the purpose of converting
March 19, 1969, the Trial Court appointed two the same into a first class residential subdivision.
Commissioners, one for each of the parties and another for Evidence has also been adduced to show that, as
the Court, to receive the evidence and determine the just appraised by C.M. Montano Realty, the prevailing
compensation to be paid for the property sought. The Trial market price of residential lots in the vicinity of
Court then rendered a Decision: defendant's land was P20.00 per square meter

a) Declaring to plaintiff the full and legal right to acquire "Defendant further maintains that because the
by eminent domain the absolute ownership over the access road was not constructed in a straight line,
portion of the land referred to in Paragraphs 4 and 9 of the the property was unnecessarily divided into three
Amended Complaint, consisting of 8,746 square meters, separate and irregular segments. This rendered
access road of the plaintiff to its Angat River Hydroelectric the owner's plan of converting the land into a
Project; subdivision 'futile.'
b) Authorizing the payment by plaintiff to defendant of the
amount of P31,922.00 as full indemnity for the property at "Needless to state, plaintiff should have given heed
the rate of P3.75 per square meter, with interest at 12% to the above legal prescription (Art. 650, Civil
per annum from March 11, 1963 until fully paid; Code) by having constructed the road in a straight
c) A final Order of Condemnation over the property and fine in order to cover the shortest distance, and
improvements therein is entered, for the purpose set forth, thus cause the least prejudice to the defendant.
free from all liens and encumbrances; Plaintiff failed to observe this rule, and no
d) Ordering the registration of this Act of Expropriation, at explanation has been offered for such neglect.”
plaintiff's expense, with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
at the back of defendant's title to the whole property. "It is noted that the only basis of the court a quo
in assessing the just compensation of the property
CA Decision at the price of P3.75 per square meter is that at
the time of actual occupancy by the plaintiff, 'the
Both parties appealed to the then Court of Appeals, which property was agricultural in use as well as for
rendered a Decision on December 24, 1980, decreeing: taxation purposes. But such posture is hardly in
"Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances accord with the settled rule that in determining
obtaining in the present case, it is our considered view the value of the land appropriated for public
that the just and reasonable compensation for the purposes. The inquiry, in such cases, must always
property in question is P7.00 per square meter.” be not what the property is worth in the market,
viewed not merely as to the uses to which it is at
Reconsideration having been denied, NPC availed of the the time applied, but with reference to the uses to
present recourse, to which due course was given. SAN which it is plainly adopted; that is to say, what is
DIEGO did not appeal from the Appellate Court judgment its worth from its availability for valuable uses?'
although it filed a Brief. (City of Manila vs, Corrales, 32 Phil. 85, 98). It has
also been held 'that the owner has a right to its
ISSUE: value for the use for which it would bring the most
WON respondent Court of Appeals erred in the market' (City of Manila vs. Corrales, supra;
(1) in fixing the amount of P7.00 per square meter as just Republic vs, Venturanza, et al. 17 SCRA 322,
compensation for the portion of land sought to be 327).
expropriated based on its planned convertibility into a
residential subdivision; and After a review of the records, we are of the considered
(2) in not reducing the rate of interest payable by NPC from opinion that the findings of the Trial Court merit our
twelve (12%) per cent to six (6%) per cent per annum. approval for several reasons:

HOLDING: (1) Both documentary and oral evidence indicate that the
Yes. The judgment of respondent Appellate Court is set land in question, at the time of taking by NPC in 1961,
aside, and the Decision of the then Court of First Instance was agricultural in use as well as for taxation purposes. In
of Bulacan authorizing payment of P31,922.00 as full fact, it was described as "cogonales."
indemnity for the property at the rate of P3.75 per square
meter is reinstated. (2) SAN DIEGO’s contention that the location and
direction of the access road is burdensome is not borne
out by the evidence. The Report of the Commissioner of the
Court revealed that NPC merely improved a pre-existing
mining road on the premises, which was only accessible by " AS regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is
carabao-drawn sledge during the rainy season. entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the
price of the land from the time it was taken up to
(3) The finding of the Trial Court that "there is the time that payment is made by the government.
negligible, if any, consequential damage to speak of' In addition, the government should pay for
thus becomes readily tenable. SAN DIEGO was not, as attorneys fees, the amount of which should be
was the belief of respondent Court of Appeals, fixed by the trial court after hearing."
"prevented from carrying out the plan of converting
the property into a housing subdivision." On the In the case at bar, legal interest should accrue from
contrary, the Trial Court observed that "the December 7, 1962, the time of taking as far as SAN
thoroughfare should provide a marked improvement to DIEGO is concerned, at six per cent (6%) per annum,
the flourishing housing subdivision managed by up to the time that payment is made by NPC
defendant (private respondent)."

(4) The appraisal by a realty firm of P20.00 per square

meter, the price that SAN DIEGO stresses the property “Takings” under Eminent Domain VERSUS “Takings”
should command, is not, to our minds, a fair market under the Social Justice Clause
value. The former owners, the Sadang spouses, offered
to part with the property at P4.00 per sq. meter, SAN
DIEGO had purchased the entire property of 62,285 DE KNECHT vs. BAUTISTA
square meters at public auction for P10,000,00, or at (10/30/1980)
P0.16 per square meter. Previous to that, or in 1957, Fernandez, J.
the property was mortgaged to the Development Bank
of the Philippines for P20,000.00 and subsequently in NATURE: For Certiorari & Prohibition on the Order of the
1958 to SAN DIEGO, by way of second mortgage, for CFI, Pasay
P30,000,00.
FACTS:
The price of P12.00 to P15.00, which respondent Court There was a plan extending EDSA to Roxas Blvd that
observed as the just compensation awarded in two civil would pass thru Cuneta Ave. However, the plan was
suits for lands condemned in the immediate vicinity, changed from that proposed route to Fernando Rein & Del
cannot be a fair gauge since said Court neither adopted Pan Sts, which are lined with old houses, petitioner's
the same, and specially considering that the property property being amongst those that will be affected by the
was "cogonal" at the time NPC constructed its access change in the plan. The owners of the properties along
road in 1961. Moreover, NPC also presented contrary Fernando-Del Pan filed on April 1977 a formal petition
evidence indicating prices of P.05 and P.06 per square with Pres. Marcos asking him to order the Ministry of
meter at around the time it had entered the property. Public Works to proceed with the original plan. Marcos
then ordered the head of the MPH Baltazar Aquino to
SECOND ISSUE explain, & tasked the Human Settlements Commission to
investigate the matter. After formal hearings the HSC
(5) And most importantly, on the issue of just recommended that the planned extension be reverted to its
compensation, it is now settled doctrine, following the original route. Despite this the MPH insisted on
leading case of Alfonso vs. Pasay,2 that to determine implementing the route which passed through Fernando
due compensation for lands appropriated by the Rein & Del Pan Sts. In Feb 1979, gov't filed expropriation
Government, the basis should be the price or value at proceedings in the CFI, Branch 3 of Pasay City. Petitioner
the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated filed motion to dismiss. In June 1979 the Republic filed a
by the Government. motion for the issuance of a writ of possesion, on the
ground that the payment for the expropriated properties
In the case at bar, the taking by NPC occurred in had already been made with the PNB. Respondent Judge
November 1961, when it constructed the access road on Bautista granted writ. It is this that is being assailed in the
the expropriated property at time when it was still present petition.
"cogonal" and owned by the spouses Sadang. The
Complaint was filed only in 1963. Petitioner:
1. respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction in
The convertibility of the property into a subdivision, the issuing the writ of possesion because petitioner raised a
criterion relied upon by respondent Court, is not constitutional question that the court must first resolve
controlling. The case of Manila Electric Co. vs. Tuason, 60 before it can issue an order to take possesion
Phil, 663, 668, cited in Municipal Govt. of Sagay vs. 2. the choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan Sts arbitrary and
Jison,4 has categorically ruled that it is the time of capricious for :
taking and not as "potential building" site that is the a. the original consideration for the extension is
determining factor, that it would travel in a straight line, but the new route
detours to the north first before heading south.
Since SAN DIEGO bought the land in question in the b. equal protection of the law was not accorded to
interim and was issued a title only on December 7, 1962, the petitioner who is one of the "owners of solid &
the "taking" as to it should commence only from said date. substantial homes & quality residential lands
occupied for generations" and not only to the motel
On the issue of legal interest in expropriation proceedings, owners of Cuneta Ave.
we held in Amigable vs. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360 (1972),
that: Respondents:
1. court did not exceed jurisdiction since the Republic
complied with all the statutory requirements for it to have
immediate possesion of the property. o Lower court issued a writ of possession
2. the change from the original plan of Cuneta Ave to the authorizing the Republic to enter into and take
Del Pan route was not sudden or capricious. Those who possession of the properties sought to be
would be adversely affected by the change were notified. condemned, and created a Committee of 3 to
Gov't in changing the proposed route did not intend to do determine the just compensation.
so for the protection of the motels but to minimize the o De Knecht filed with this Court a
social impact factor as more people would be affected if the
original plan had pushed thru as opposed to a smaller
petition for certiorari and prohibition
number of homeowners in the second route directed against the order of the lower.
SC granted the petition. (De Knecht vs.
ISSUE: Baustista)
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of o defendants-Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de
discretion in issuing the writ of possesion Elizalde, Francisco Elizalde and Antonio Roxas
moved to dismiss the expropriation action in
Held: YES compliance with the dispositive portion of the
The power of emminent domain is unesquestioned as it is previous decision of the SC. The Republic filed a
constitutionally granted. (S2, A4, 1973 Consti; S9 A3 manifestation stating that it had no objection to
1987 Consti). But there are exacting standards that need the motion to dismiss.
to be met. Govt may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose  After a few years, the Republic filed a motion to
what private land to be taken. The Court held in JM dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas
Tuason v LTA that "a landowner is covered by the mantle Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating the same properties
of protection that due process affords...it frowns on and for the same purpose. The lower court granted
arbitrariness, is the antithesis of any govermental act that dismissal by reason of the enactment of the law.
smacks of whim & caprice...negates state power to act in  De Knecht appealed to the CA. CA granted appeal on
an oppresive manner" and that it is the courts that can the ground that the choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan
determine whether or not property owners have indeed Streets as the line through which EDSA should be
been the "victims" of partiality & prejudice in the extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial
expropriation proccedings & thus nullify the act. In the approval.
instant case, the Court reasoned that taking all the
factors: 1)that is seemed odd why there was a sudden
change in plan where the route went north rather than ISSUE:
south; 2)that is is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA
along Cuneta Ave can be objected to on the ground of WON an expropriation proceeding that was determined by
social impact as those to be affected are mostly motels as a final judgment of the SC may be the subject of a
opposed to residential areas; 3) that the HSC report has subsequent legislation for expropriation.
recommended the original route; the choice of Fernando
Rein-Del Pan was arbitrary and hence should not recieve RATIO:
judicial approval.

Petition granted.  As early as 1977 the gov’t, through the DPWH began
work on the westward extension of EDSA out fall of
the Manila and suburbs flood control and drainage
project and the Estero Tripa de Gallina.
Republic cs. De Knecht  These projects were aimed at:
o easing traffic congestion in the Baclaran and
GANCAYCO, J.: outlying areas;
FACTS: o controlling flood by the construction of the
outlet for the Estero Tripa de Gallina; and
o completing the Manila Flood and Control and
 Philippines filed in the CFI an expropriation Drainage Project.
proceeding against the owners (Cristina De Knecht w/
 Republic acquired about 80 to 85 percent of the the
15 others) of the houses standing along Fernando
needed properties involved in the project through
Rein-Del Pan streets.
negotiated purchase. The owners did not raise any
 Some motions which led to the victory of De Knecht objection as to arbitrariness on the choice of the
and other land owners in saving their property from project and of the route.
expropriation. (De Knecht v. Baustista) Just to
 It is only with the remaining 10 to 15 percent that the
elaborate, here is what happened:
petitioner cannot negotiate. Thus, Republic filed the
o De Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging
expropriation proceedings in the CFI.
lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the
 The decision in De Knecht vs. Bautista, SC held that
President of the Philippines, prematureness of
the "choice of the Fernando Rain-Del Pan streets as the
complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation
line through which the EDSA should be extended to
of the properties.
Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive
o De Knecht filed for the issuance of a
judicial approval." It is based on the recommendation
restraining order. of the Human Settlements Commission that the choice
o Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a of Cuneta street as the line of the extension will
writ of possession of the property to be minimize the social impact factor as the buildings and
expropriated on the ground that it had made the improvement therein are mostly motels. In view of the
required deposit with the PNB of 10% of the said finding, SC set aside the order of the trial court.
amount of compensation.
 Subsequently B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted. CA held included the properties known as the Tambunting Estate
that the decision of the Supreme Court having become and the Sunog-Apog area in its priority list for a zonal
final, Republic’s right as determined therein should no improvement program (ZIP) because the findings of the
longer be disturbed and that the same has become the representative of the City of Manila and the National
law of the case between the parties involved. Housing Authority (NHA) described these as blighted
 The right of the Republic to take private properties for communities.
public use upon the payment of the just compensation  March 18, 1978 - a fire razed almost the entire
is so provided in the Constitution. Such Tambunting Estate, after which the President made a
expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the public announcement that the national government
petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the would acquire the property for the fire victim
land owners but also by taking appropriate court  December 22, 1978 - President issued Proclamation No.
action or by legislations. When the Batasang 1810 declaring all sites Identified by the Metro Manila
Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340, it appears that it was local governments and approved by the Ministry of
based on supervening events that occurred after the Human Settlements to be included in the ZIP upon
decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in proclamation of the President. The Tambunting Estate
1980 justifying the expropriation. and the Sunog-Apog area were among the sites included.
 The social impact factor which persuaded the Court  January 28, 1980 - President issued PD Nos. 1669 and
to consider this extension to be arbitrary had 1670 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate
disappeared. All residents in the area have been and the Sunog-Apog area expropriated.
relocated and duly compensated. Eighty percent of the
EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had
been completed. Only private respondent remains as Presidential Decree No. 1669, provides, among others:
the solitary obstacle to this project.  Expropriation of the "Tambunting Estate".
 NHAA- is designated administrator of the National
 The single piece of property 'occupied' by De Knecht is
Government with authority to immediately take possession,
the only parcel of land where Government engineers control, disposition, with the power of demolition of the
could not enter due to the 'armed' resistance offered by expropriated properties and their improvements and shall
De Knecht. evolve and implement a comprehensive development plan
 B.P. Blg. 340 effectively superseded the final and for the condemned properties.
executory decision of the SC, and the trial court  City Assessor shall determine the market value. In
committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing assessing the market value, he should consider existing
the case pending before it on the ground of the conditions in the area notably, that no improvement has
enactment of B.P. Blg. 340. been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted
upon by resident families which should considerably
 The decision is no obstacle to the depress the expropriation cost.
legislative arm of the Gov’t in making its  Just compensation @ Pl7,000,000.00 which shall be
own assessment of the circumstances payable to the owners within a period of five (5) years in
five (5) equal installments.
then prevailing as to the propriety of the
expropriation and thereafter by enacting Presidential Decree No. 1670, contains the same provisions for the
Sunog-Apog property valued @ P8,000,000
the corresponding legislation.
 April 4, 1980- NHA wrote to the Register of Deeds of
CRUZ, J., concurring: Manila, furnishing it with a certified copy of P.D. Nos.
B.P. Blg. 340 is not a legislative reversal of the finding in 1669 and 1670 for registration, with the request that the
De Knecht v. Bautista, that the expropriation of the certificates of title covering the properties in question be
petitioner's property was arbitrary. As Justice Gancayco cancelled and new certificates of title be issued in the
clearly points out, supervening events have changed the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
factual basis of that decision to justify the subsequent  However, the Register of Deeds requested the
enactment of the statute. The SC is sustaining the submission of the owner's copy of the certificates of title
legislation, not because it concedes that the lawmakers of the properties in question to enable her to implement
can nullify the findings of the Court in the exercise of its the aforementioned decrees.
discretion. It is simply because the Court has found that  Subsequently, petitioner Elisa R. Manotok, one of the
under the changed situation, the present expropriation is owners of the properties to be expropriated, received a
no longer arbitrary. letter informing her of the deposits made with regard to
the first installment of her property.
 August 19, 1980- petitioner Elisa R. Manotok wrote a
letter to the NHA alleging,that the amounts of
compensation for the expropriation of the properties do
MANOTOK vs. NHA not constitute the "just compensation" & expressed
veritable doubts about the constitutionality of the said
 In the meantime, some officials of the NHA circulated
JUSTICE GUTIERREZ JR.
instructions to the tenants-occupants of the properties
in dispute not to pay their rentals to the petitioners for
FACTS:
their lease-occupancy of the properties in view of the
passage of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670. Hence, the owners
 June 11, 1977 – Pres. issued LOI No. 555 instituting a of the Tambunting Estate filed a petition to declare P.D.
nationwide slum improvement & resettlement program & No. 1669 unconstitutional. The owners of the Sunog-
LOI No. 558 adopting slim improvement as a national Apog area also filed a similar petition attacking the
housing policy constitutionality of P.D. No. 1670.
 July 21, 1977 - issuance of EO No.6-77 adopting the
Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program which
ISSUES: In the instant petitions, there is no showing whatsoever
1. WON PD 1669 & PD 1670 expropriating the as to why the properties involved were singled out for
Tambunting & SUnog-Apog estates are expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled
unconstitutional? the particular choices or selections.
2.WON the petitioners have been deprived of due process
3.WON the taking is for public use The Tambunting estate or at least the western half of the
4.WON there was just compensation subdivision fronting Rizal Avenue Extension is valuable
commercial property. If the said property are given to the
HELD: squatters, they either lease out or sell their lots to wealthy
merchants even as they seek other places where they can
The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state set up new squatter colonies. The public use and social
and the provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such justice ends stated in the whereas clauses of P.D. 1669
power only serve to limit its exercise in order to protect the and P.D. 1670 would not be served thereby.
individual against whose property the power is sought to
be enforced. The Government still has to prove that expropriation of
Limitations: commercial properties in order to lease them out also for
1. taking must be for a public use commercial purposes would be "public use" under the
2. payment of just compensation Constitution.
3. due process must be observed in the taking...
In the challenged PDs, there is no showing how the
1.Yes. The challenged decrees unconstitutional coz they President arrived at the conclusion that the Sunog-Apog
are uniquely unfair in the procedures adopted and the area is a blighted community. Petitioners were able to
powers given to the respondent NHA. The 2 PD’s exceed show however that the Sunog-Apog area is a residential
the limitations in the exercise of the eminent domain. It palce where middle to upper class families reside. The area
deprived the petitioners due process in the taking, it was is well-developed with roads, drainage and sewer facilities,
not public in character & there was no just water connection to the Metropolitan Waterworks and
compensation. Sewerage System electric connections to Manila Electric
Company, and telephone connections to the Philippine
2. Yes. The petitioners were deprived of due process. The Long Distance Telephone Company. There are many
properties in question were summarily proclaimed a squatter colonies in Metro Manila in need of upgrading.
blighted area & directly expropriated without the The Government should have attended to them first. There
slightest semblance or any proceeding. The expropriation is no showing for a need to demolish the existing valuable
is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon improvements in order to upgrade Sunog-Apog.
the signing of the decree. Not only are the owners given
absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, 3. No. There has been no just compensation. The fixing of
plead their side, or question the amount of payments the maximum amounts of compensation and the bases
fixed by decree, but the decisions, rulings, orders, or thereof which are the assessed values of the properties in
resolutions of the NHA are expressly declared as beyond 1978 deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to prove a
the reach of judicial review. An appeal may be made to higher value because, the actual or symbolic taking of
the Office of the President but the courts are completely such properties occurred only in 1980 when the
enjoined from any inquiry or participation whatsoever in questioned decrees were promulgated.
the expropriation of the subdivision or its incidents.
Municipality of Daet vs. CA:
Constitutionally suspect methods or authoritarian just compensation means the equivalent for the value
procedures cannot, be the basis for social justice. A of the property at the time of its taking. Anything
program to alleviate problems of the urban poor which is beyond that is more and anything short of that is less,
well studied, adequately funded, genuinely sincere, and than just compensation. It means a fair and full
more solidly grounded on basic rights and democratic equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the
procedures is needed. measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would
accrue to the expropriating entity.
NPC v. CA:
It mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice the basis should be the price or value at the time it
and reasonable opportunity to be heard are given to was taken from the owner and appropriated by the
the owner to protect his property rights. Government. The owner of property expropriated by
the State is entitled to how much it was worth at the
Where it is alleged that in the taking of a person's time of the taking.
property, his right to due process of law has been violated,
the courts will have to step in and probe into such an
alleged violation. In P.D.s 1669 and 1670, there is no mention of any market
value declared by the owner. Sections 6 of the two decrees
The government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose peg just compensation at the market value determined by
what private property should be taken. The land-owner is the City Assessor. The City Assessor is warned by the
covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It decrees to "consider existing conditions in the area
is a mandate of reason. notably, that no improvement has been undertaken on the
land and that the land is squatted upon by resident
3. No. It was not proven that the taking was for public use. families which should considerably depress the
The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain expropriation costs."
is necessity that is public in character.
The market value stated by the city assessor alone cannot court could complain of the alleged
substitute for the court's judgment in expropriation invasion of the right to privacy and the
proceedings. It is violative of the due process and the guaranty against self-incrimination
eminent domain provisions of the Constitution to deny to a  Lower court decision: The challenged ordinance
property owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation no 4760 of the city of manila would be
made by a local assessor is wrong or prejudiced. unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

National Housing Authority v. Reyes

basis for just compensation shall be the market ISSUE:
value declared by the owner for tax purposes or WON Ordinance No. 4760 is violative of the due process
such market value as determined by the clause- No
government assessor, whichever is lower.
HELD/RATIO:
The maximum amounts, therefore, which were provided  There are standards of constitutional adjudication
for in the questioned decrees cannot adequately reflect the in both procedural and substantive aspects. There
value of the property and, in any case, should not be must be evidence to offset the presumption of
binding on the property owners for, as stated in the above validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
cases, there are other factors to be taken into ordinance
consideration.  Evidence to rebut is unavoidable unless the
ordinance is void on its face
 Precedent US case (O’Gorman &Young v Hartford
Fire Insurance Co): presumption of
ERMITA MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS vs. constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
CITY OF MANILA some factual foundation of record for overthrowing
the statute
 No such factual foundation being laid in the
FACTS: present case. Presumption must prevail.
 June 13, 1963, the municipal board of the city of  The mantle of protection associated with the due
manila enacted ordinance no. 4760. approved on process associated with the due process guaranty
june 14 by vice mayor astorga then the acting city does not cover petitioners ( I think what this
mayor means is that the individual customers should be
 Petitioners: Ermita-Manila Hotel and Motel the ones to invoke the right to privacy thing)
Operator Assoc, Hotel del Mar (a member) and Go  Safeguard to public moral is immune from such
Chiu (president and gen manager of Hotel del imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture
Mar) and unsupported by anything of substance
 Defendant: Mayor of Manila (astorga)  Purpose of the state (the purpose of police power):
 Petitioners contend that the ordinance is promote public health, public morals, public
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable safety, and the general welfare
and violative of due process because it  Purpose specifically in this case is to minimize
1. imposes a 150-200% increase in the license practices hurtful to public morals
fee  Astorga annexed a stipulation of facts that there is
2. requires owner, manager, keeper of a hotel or an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
motel to ask guests to fill up a prescribed form adultery, and fornication in Manila traceable in
that will be open to public at all times (whole great part to the existence of motels which provide
name, birthday, address, occupation, a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
nationality, sex length of stay, number of presence and exit and thus become the ideal
companions with name, age, sex, relationship) heaven for prostitutes and thrill seekers
3. facilities of such hotels will be open for  Means: ordinance check the clandestine
inspection by the mayor, chief of police or any harboring of transients and guests to fill up a
authorized representatives (invasion of the registration form, prepared for the purpose, in
right to privacy and the guaranty against self a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
incrimination) introducing several amendatory provisions
4. classifies motels into two classes and requiring calculated to shatter the privacy that
maintenance of certain minimum facilities characterizes the registration of transients and
5. prohibits admission of persons below 18 guests.
unless accompanied by parents or lawful  Another Means: increase in license fees to
guardian and prohibits establishments from discourage illegal establishments
leasing a room (or part of it) twice every 24  This court has invariably stamped with the seal of
hours approval ordinances intended to protect public
6. provides a penalty which is the cancellation of morals
license causing the destruction of the  In view of the requirements of due process, equal
business protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties, the exercise of police power insofar as
 Respondent says: it may affect the life, liberty, property of any
1. the challenged ordinance bears a person is subject to judicial inquiry
reasonable relation to a proper purpose  When exercise of police power may be considered
which is to curb morality as wither capricious, whimsical, unjust or
2. it is a valid exercise of police power that unreasonable, a denial of due process, or a
only guests or customers not before the
 violation of any other applicable constitutional people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
guaranty may call for correction by the courts for redress of grievances.
 There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. It merely requires that any “taking”
should be valid.

 What then is the procedural or substantive

requisite? ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. SEC. OF
1. responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, AGRARIAN REFORM
obedience to the dictates of justice
2. arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
(1989)
avoided
3. must not outrun the bounds of reason and
 The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution had
result in sheer oppression
already recognized equitable redistribution of private
4. should be reflective of democratic traditions of
property, finally mandating an agrarian reform program
legal and political thought
in the 1987 Constitution. Even before the 1973
5. not unrelated to time, place, and
Constitution, R.A. No. 3844—the Agricultural Land
circumstances
Reform Code—had already been enacted.
6. due process cannot be a slave to form or
 This was superseded by Pres. Marcos’s P.D.
phrases
No. 72 to provide for compulsory acquisition of private
 The increase in license fees is incidental to the
lands for distribution among tenant-farmers & to
police power (power to regulate)
specify maximum retention limits for landowners
 There is municipal discretion which the courts  Pres. Aquino, while exercising legislative
decline to interfere with powers before Congress had convened, had also issued
 Cities and municipalities have plenary power to E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
tax (1) for public purpose, (2)just, (3) uniform the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
 The mere fact that some individuals in the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree
community may be deprived of their present as well as the manner of their payment.
business or a particular mode of earning cannot  This was followed by Pres. Proc. No. 131,
prevent the exercise of police power--- neither is instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
the restriction on freedom (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for
 Purpose was not unreasonable in this case its implementation.
 There is a correspondence between the undeniable  When Congress did convene, it enacted R.A.
existence of an undesirable situation and the No. 6657—the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
legislative attempt at correction 1988, which although considerably changing the
 Liberty is not absolute. Liberty is regulated for the previous enactments, nevertheless gives them
greater good. It is subject to reasonable restraint suppletory effect.
by general law for the common good  4 cases were consolidated and resolved.
 Fundamental aim of the state (to which individual Petitioners in the 4 cases include landowners whose
rights are SUBORDINATED): to secure the general lands are given to the tenants tilling the lands, sugar
comfort, health and prosperity of the state planters, landowners associations etc. who essentially
 There is a required balance bet authority and assail the constitutionality of the different measures to
liberty to ensure peace, order, and happiness for implement the Constitutional mandates regarding
all. agrarian reform.
 People vs Pomar (maternity leave held not a proper  Note: Issues shall be the allegations and
exercise of police p) is no longer a living principle contentions of the petitioners and respondents
 Government has the right to intervene even in
contractual relations affected with public interest ISSUES:
 Ordinance also not vague (common sense can 1. WON petitioners and intervenors are proper
understand it) parties
 YES. Each of them has sustained or is in
Judgment reversed danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result
of the acts or measures complained of. Besides, the
transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if the Court must,
technicalities of procedures.

2. WON enactment of P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131

and E.O. Nos 228 and 229 are constitutional
Consti. Art. III, sec. 1 and 4  YES. Promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by Pres.
Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or laws has already been sustained in Gonzales v.
property without due process of law, nor shall any person Estrella
be denied the equal protection of the laws.  Power of Pres. Aquino to promulgate Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. Nos 228 and 229 is authorized
Sec 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the 1987 Constitution.
  They are not midnight enactments as they  NO. The Constitution calls for “the just
were enacted in July 17 (E.O. 228) and July 22, distribution of all agricultural lands.” In any event,
1987 (Proc. 131 and E.O. 229) while Congress the decision to redistribute private agricultural
convened in July 27. lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was
 These measures did not cease to be valid made by the legislative and executive departments
when she lost her legislative power, they continue to in the exercise of their discretion. The Court is not
be in force unless modified or repealed by justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence
subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. of a clear showing that it has been abused.
 The Congress she allegedly undercut has
not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the 9. WON expropriation as contemplated by the
measures and even provided that they be suppletory agrarian reform program matches the requirements
to R.A. 6657 for a proper exercise of the power of eminent
domain
3. WON P50 billion fund created in Sec. 2 Proc.  YES. The requirements for proper exercise
No. 131 and Secs. 20 and 21 of E.O. 229 is invalid of the power are
for not originating in the House of Reps (Sec. 24, o Public use.
Art. VI) and not being certified by the National o Just compensation
Treasurer as actually available (Sec. 25(4), Art. VI).  Public use. The purposes specified in PD
 NO, as it is not an appropriation measure No. 27, Proc. 131 and RA 6657 is in fact, an
even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the
for that is not its principal purpose. The creation of State adopt the necessary measures “to encourage
the fund is only incidental to the main objective of and undertake the just distribution of all
the proclamation, which is agrarian reform. agricultural lands to enable farmers who are
 It should follow that the specific landless to own directly or collectively the lands they
constitutional provisions do not apply. till.” That public use, as pronounced by the
Constitution, must be binding on the court.
4. WON Proc 131 and EO 229 should be  Just compensation. Petitioners argue that
invalidated for not providing for retention limits as the manner of fixing the just compensation is
required by Sec. 4, Art. XIII, Consti. entrusted to the administrative authorities in
 MOOT as R.A. No. 6657 now does provide violation of judicial prerogatives. To be sure, the
for such limits in Sec. 6 of said law determination of just compensation is a function
addressed to the courts of justice and may not be
5. WON EO 229 violates constitutional usurped by any other branch or official of the
requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, government. But a reading of the assailed provision
to be expressed in its title of R.A. 6657 (Sec. 16(d)) will show that although the
 NO. The title of the bill does not have to be proceedings are described as summary, the
a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the landowner and other interested parties are
matters embodied in the text are relevant to each nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit
other and may be inferred from the title. evidence on the real value of the property. But more
importantly, the determination of the just
6. WON writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel compensation by the DAR is not by any means final
the performance of a discretionary act especially by and conclusive upon the landowner or any other
a specific department of the government (as interested party, for Sec. 16(f) provides: “Any party
contended by a private respondent) who disagrees with the decision may bring the
 NO. mandamus can lie to compel the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to determination of just compensation.” Thus, the
control the discretion to be exercised. In other determination made by the DAR is only preliminary
words, mandamus can issue to require action only unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise,
but not to specific action the courts of justice will still have the right to review
with finality the said determination in the exercise
7. WON sugar planters should not be made to of what is admittedly a judicial function
share the burden of agrarian reform as they belong  The petitioners also argue that Sec. 18 of
to a particular class with particular interests of RA 6657 is unconstitutional insofar as it requires
their own the owners of the expropriated properties to accept
 NO. No evidence has been submitted to just compensation in less than money, which is the
the Court that the requisites of a valid classification only medium of payment allowed. True enough
have been violated, namely jurisprudence has shown that the traditional
o It must be based on substantial distinctions; medium for payment of just compensation is money
o It must be germane to the purposes of the law; and no other (Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, J.M.
o It must not be limited to existing conditions only; Tuazon v. LTA, Mandl v. City of Pheonix, etc.). But
and this is not traditional or ordinary expropriation
o It must apply equally to all the members of the where only a specific and limited area is sought to
class be taken by the State for a local purpose. This is a
revolutionary kind of expropriation which affects all
8. WON the State should first distribute public private agricultural land as long as they are in
agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform excess of the maximum retention limits allowed
instead of immediately disturbing property rights their owners. It benefits the entire Filipino nation,
by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands from all levels of society. Its purpose furthermore,
goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future.
 The cost will be tremendous which is not fully 1. Is socialized housing for public use even though it is not
available at this time. It is assumed that the framers used by public itself?
foresaw this and thus it is assumed that their
intention was to allow such manner of payment as 2. Is there just compensation when value arbitrarily fixed
is now provided for by the CARP law. The Court did by govt?
not find in the records of the Con-Com, categorical
agreement among the members regarding the 3. Is there due process when it allows taking immediate
meaning of just compensation as applied in the possession of property?
CARP. But then, there is nothing in the records
either that militates against the assumption that RULES:
Con-Com had intended to allow such mode of
payment. 1.The expanded concept of public use together with Consti
 With these assumptions, the Court held provisions makes socialized housing for public use
that the content and manner of compensation in
Sec. 18 is not violative. It is further held that the 2. Just compensation is for fair and full value of the loss
proportion of cash payment to the other things of sustained, not provincial assessors say-so.
value constituting the total payment, as determined
on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated,
3.Due process must give opportunity for owner to prove
is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner.
valuation wrong.
10. WON RA 6657 is unconstitutional for divesting
RATIONALE:
the landowner of his property even before actual
payment to him in full of just compensation, in
contravention of a well-accepted principle of 1. The public use requirement for eminent domain is
eminent domain. flexible and evolving. This jurisdictions trend is that
 NO. The rule is that title to the property expropriated
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only welfare of the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
upon full payment of the just compensation. And it public use(Heirs of Juancho Ardona v Reyes). Consti has
is true that P.D. no. 27 expressly ordered the many provisions concerning socialized housing as
emancipation of tenant-farmer as of Oct. 21, propmotion of general welfare. (Art2 sec7:
1972and declared that he shall “be deemed the establish social services including housing; Art2 sec9:
owner” of a portion of land consisting of a family- promote just social order w/ social services; Art13 sec9:
sized farm except that “no title to the land owned by urban land reform). Housing is a basic human need and
him was to be actually issued to him unless and becomes a matter of state concern since it affects general
until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly welfare.
recognized farmer’s cooperative.” It was understood
however, that full payment of the just compensation It has a public character and is recognized as such with
also had to be made first, conformably to the UN calling 1987 International Year of Shelter for the
constitutional requirement. Homeless. The expropriated land would be used for
Bagong
Nayon Project which provides low-cost housing for govt
employees. There is a shortage in housing in NCR with
50% of urban families unable to afford adequate shelter
SUMULONG vs. GUERRERO (NEDA). Petioners also contended that size does not matter
with PD and "any private land" can be expropriated
(concerns with CARP/CARL).
1987
Court says any land can be under eminent domain not
ponente: Cortes J just landed estates.. NHA has broad discretion and absent
fraud, NHA may choose any land without interference from
Facts: court. NHA's powers stem from Consti (art2 sec10: social
justice; art13 sec1: regulate property to diffuse wealth).
Respondent National Housing Authority filed a complaint
for expropriation of 25 hectares of land which includes the 2. Court quotes Export Processing Authority v Dulay. Just
lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes compensation means the value of the property at the time
Balaoing, together with a motion for immediate possession of the taking; fair and full equivalent value for loss
of the properties. The land was valued by provinvial sustained; all facts to the condition of property should be
assessors at P1 / sq meter through PD's. NHA deposited considered. Various factors come into play that provincial
P158,980 with PNB. All these are pursuant to PD 1224 assessors do not take into account like individual
which defines "the policy on expropriation of private differences because they only account for generalities.
property for socialized housing upon payment of just Owners are not estopped from questioning the valuations
compensation". of their property.

Respondent judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued the writ 3. Court quote Export PZA supra: violative of due process
of possession. Petitioners filed for reconsideration. to deny owners of opportunity to prove valuations wrong.
Repulsive to justice to allow a minor bureaucrat's work to
ISSUES: prevail over court. Courts have evidence and
arguments to reach a just determination.
Court quotes Ignacio v Guerrero: Requirements for a writ Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
of possession to be issued: Administrative Code.
1)Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance, The respondent court rendered the decision declaring
2) provisional determination of just compensation by trial Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
court on the
basis of judicial discretion, The City Government and City Council filed the instant
3)deposit requirement petition. Petitioners argue that the taking of the
respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
Disposition: police power and that the land is taken for a public use as
it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They
writ of possession annulled for excess of jurisdiction. further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized
remanded for further proceedings to determine under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, "to
compensation make such further ordinances and resolutions not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act
and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide
for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
CITY GOVERNEMENT vs. JUDGE ERICTA of property therein. "

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.

This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the contends that the taking or confiscation of property is
decision of the CFI of Rizal declaring Section 9 of obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
and void. used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of
all beneficial use of his property. The respondent also
FACTS stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 61 18, S-64, entitled a source of power for the taking of the property in this case
"ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, because it refers to "the power of promoting the public
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND property."
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" ISSUE
provides: WON Section 9 of Ordinance No. 61 18, S-64 is
unconstitutional
"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for HOLDING
charity burial of deceased persons who are Yes, it is unconstitutional. The petition for review is hereby
paupers and have been residents of Quezon City dismissed. The decision of' the respondent court is
for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be affirmed.
determined by competent City Authorities. …”
RATIO
For years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the
not enforced but seven years after the enactment of the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We
ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following cite, with approval the decision of the respondent court:
resolution:
"An examination of the Charter of Quezon City
"RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, (Rep. Act. No. 537), does not reveal any
to request, as it does hereby request the City provision that would justify the ordinance in
Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling question except the provision granting police
and/or transaction of memorial park lots in power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified
Quezon City where the owners thereof have tailed under the power granted to Quezon City to tax,
to donate the required 6% space intended for fix the license fee, and regulate such other
paupers burial. business, trades, and occupation as may be
established or practiced in the City”
Pursuant to this resolution, the Quezon City Engineer
notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that "The power to regulate does not include the
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 Phil.
33 Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765,
CFI Ruling May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A
fortiori, the power to regulate does not include
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the the power to confiscate. The ordinance in
CFI of Rizal, Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for question not only confiscates but also prohibits
declaratory relief', prohibition and mandamus with the operation of a memorial park cemetery,
preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the because under Section 13 of said ordinance,
Ordinance in question. The respondent alleged that the The confiscatory clause and the penal
same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City provision in effect deter one from operating a
 memorial park cemetery. Neither can the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
ordinance in question be justified under sub- cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
section ‘t,' Section 12 of Republic Act 537 Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177(q) that a
which authorizes the City Council to "'prohibit sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of
the burial of the dead within the center of the dead in such place and in such manner as
population of the city and provide for their prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes
burial in such proper place and in such manner the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
as the council may determine, subject to the expropriate private properties to construct public
provisions of the general law regulating burial cemeteries. This has been the law, and practice in the
grounds and cemeteries and governing funerals past. It continues to the present. Expropriation,
and disposal of the dead. however, requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and
"Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside
promoting the public welfare by restraining and certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
in Political Law by Tañada and Carreon V-II, p. subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health,
50). It is usually exerted in order to merely and convenience are very clear from said requirements
regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the which are intended to insure the development of
owner. It' he is deprived of his property outright, it communities with salubrious and wholesome
is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn,
order to promote the general welfare. In police are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
power, the owner does not recover from the individual lots are sold to homeowners.
government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof. It has been said that police power is the As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the
most essential of' government powers, at times the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the
most insistent, and always one of the least municipal corporation, not on any express provision of
limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The
Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660; Ichong vs. clause has always received broad and liberal
Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957). The Supreme interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this
Court has said that police power is so far-reaching particular taking.
in scope that it has almost become impossible to
limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after
very existence of the state itself, it does not need to Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated, received
be expressed or defined in its scope.” necessary licenses and permits, and commenced
operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery
"It seems to the court that Section 9 of cannot even be considered as having been impliedly
Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted
City is not a mere police regulation but an the permits to commence operations.
outright confiscation. It deprives a person of
his private property without due process of
law, nay, even without compensation."

We are mindful of the heavy burden shouldered by LUZ FARMS vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
whoever challenges the validity of duly enacted legislation,
whether national or local. As early as 1913, this Court
ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 Phil. 250) that the
courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity and, FACTS:
more so, where the municipal corporation asserts that the  R.A No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and Law of 1988) was approved on June 10, 1988.
general welfare. o The CARL included the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its
However, there is no reasonable relation between the coverage.
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area  On January 2 and 9, the Secretary of Agrarian
of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of Reform promulgated the guidelines and
deceased paupers and the promotion of' health, Implementing Production and Profit Sharing and
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without No. 6657 respectively.
compensation of a certain area from a private o Sec. 3(b) includes the “raising of livestock
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the (and poultry) in the definition of
municipal corporation. Instead of' building or Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise and
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the Agricultural Activity”
city passes the burden to private cemeteries. o Sec. 11 defines the “commercial farms” as
“private agricultural lands devoted to
'The expropriation without compensation of a portion of commercial, livestock, poultry and swine
private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of raising…”
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City o Sec. 16 (d) and 17 vests on the DAR, the
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of authority to summarily determine the just
the dead within the center of population of the city and to compensation to be paid for lands covered
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the by the CARL.
 o Sec 13 and 32 calls upon petitioner to of net profits to workers) is unreasonable for
execute a production-sharing plan and being confiscatory and therefore violative of
spells out that same plan mentioned in the due process clause.”
Sec. 13
 The petitioner, Luz Farms, is a corporation
engaged in the livestock and poultry business and
along with others similarly situated prays that the
abovementioned laws, guidelines and rules be
declared unconstitutional and a writ of CARIDAY vs. CA
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the
enforcement of the same.
This case is about the proper interpretation of a provision
in the Deed of Restriction on the title of a lot in the Forbes
ISSUE:
Park Subdivision.
W/N Secs. 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of RA 6657 insofar as it
Parties involved:
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in it
Forbes Park Association (FPA)- non-profit, non-stock
coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
corporation organized for the purpose of promoting and
Regulations promulgated in accordance therewith is
safeguarding the interests of the residents
unconstitutional.
Cariday Investment Corporation (CARIDAY)- owner of a
residential building in the Forbes Park Subdivision, hence
a member of the FPA
HELD:
Pertinent restrictions in the “Deed of Restrictions”:
“Lots may be used for residential purposes and not mote
 In constitutional construction, the primary task is
than one single family residential building will be
to give an ascertain and to assure the realization
constructed thereon except that separate servant’s
of the purpose of the framers. Therefore, in
quarters may be built”.
determining the meaning of the language used,
words are to be given their ordinary meaning
Pertinent restrictions in the Building Rules and
except where technical terms are employed in
Regulations:
which case the significance attached to them
”One residential building per lot. It may be used only for
prevails.
residential purposes and not more than one single-family
 While it is true that the intent of the framers is not
residential building will be constructed on one lot except
controlling, looking into the deliberations which
for separate garage and servants’ quarters and bathhouses
led to the adoption of that particular provision
for swimming pools…”
goes a long way in explaining the understanding of
the people when they ratified it.
“…it shall be exclusively for residence only of the owners
o Transcripts of the deliberations shows
and bona fide residents and their families, house guests,
that it was never the intent of the farmers
staff and domestics…in case of violation, Board of
to include livestock and poultry-raising in
Governors shall after at least 10 days previous notice in
the coverage of the constitutionally-
writing, order the disconnection of the water service
mandated agrarian reform program of the
supplied through deep well pumps…”
Gov’t.
o In the words of Commissioner Tadeo: “…
FACTS:
hindi naming inilagay ang agricultural
In June 1986, Cariday with notice to the FPA, “repaired”
worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito its building. After inspection by FPA’s engineer it was
and piggery, poultry at livestock
found out that additions or deletions were made. Upon
workers. Ang inilagay naming ditto ay 2nd inspection, it disclosed more violations where it can be
farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang
used by more than one family. Cariday admitted that it
piggery, poultry at livestock workers.” has the exterior appearance of a single family residence
 Argument of petitioner that land
but it is designed inside to allow occupancy by 2 families.
is not the primary resource in FPA demanded it conform to the restrictions. Cariday still
livestock and poultry and
leased on portion of the house to an Englishman (James
represents no more than 5% of Duvivier), he also leased the other half of the building to
the total investment of commercial
Procter and Gamble foe the use of one of its American
livestock and poultry raisers. executives (Robert Haden).
 Excluding backyard raisers, about
80% of those in commercial A letter by Cariday sent to the FPA requesting a clearance
livestock and poultry production
so that Hayden may move in together with his belongings
occupy 5 hectares or less. The was denied. The security guards did not allow Hayden to
remaining 20% are mostly
enter and Cariday was also threatened that the water
corporate farms. supply be disconnected by the FPA because of his alleged
 It is therefore evident that Section II of RA 6657
violations.
which includes “private agricultural lands devoted
to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising”
Cariday filed in the RTC a complaint for injunction and
in the definition of “commercial farms” is invalid. damages alleging that its tenants’ health may be
And that the Secs. 13 and 32 of RA 6657 in
endangered and their contracts rescinded. RTC granted
directing corporate farms including livestock and upon Cariday’s filing of a P50,000 bond. FPA motion for
poultry to execute and implement “profit-sharing
reconsideration denied. CA reversed and annulled the writ
plans” (distribution of 3% of gross sales and 10% of injunction saying that the FPA had the right to prohibit
entry of tenants and disconnect the water supply accrdg to
its rules and regulations.

ISSUE: WON the FPA’s rules and regulations regarding the III. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
prohibitions are valid and binding
Consti. Art. III, sec. 1
HELD: yes
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
RATIO: In the petition for review of the CA, Cariday was property without due process of law, nor shall any person
asserting that although there is a restriction regards the be denied the equal protection of the laws.
“one residential building” per lot, nowhere in the rules and
regulations a categorical prohibition to prevent him from Consti. Art. II, sec. 14 and 22
leasing it to 2 or more tenants.
The Court said the Cariday’s interpretation unacceptable Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
since the restriction not only clearly defines the type and nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
number of structures but also the number of families that equality before the law of women and men.
may use it as residence. The prohibition’s purpose is to
avoid overcrowding which would create problems in sanity
and security for the subdivision. It cannot be allowed that Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights
it be circumvented by building a house with the external of indigenous cultural communities within the framework
appearance of a single family dwelling but the interior is of national unity and development.
designed for multiple occupancy.
However, recognizing Filipino custom and the cohesive Consti. Art. IV
nature of family ties, the concept of a single-family
dwelling may embrace the extended family which includes ARTICLE IV – CITIZENSHIP
married children who continue to be sheltered until they Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
are financially independent.
(petition denied) [1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
Gutierrez, Jr. Dissenting: [2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
There is absolutely no showing that 2 families living in one [3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
big residence in Forbes Park would lead to any of the mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
unpleasant consequences such as overcrowding, the age of majority; and
deterioration of roads, unsanitary conditions, ugly [4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
surroundings and lawless behavior. The family restriction
is intended to insure Forbes Park real estate value remains Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
high where the Court is not protecting against unpleasant of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
consequences but the inflated land values and an elitist act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those
lifestyle. Under the rules, one family could hire a battalion who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
of servants, drivers, yayas, gardeners and other without paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
violating the single family rule where it is STILL not born citizens.
considered overcrowding.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired
Metro Manila has run out of available residential land as in the manner provided by law.
compared to the exploding population. I consider it a waste
of scarce resources if property worth millions is limited to Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens
the use of one solitary family where it could comfortably shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or
house 2 or more families in the kind of comfort and luxury omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have
which is undreamed of even to upper middle income renounced it.
people.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
Provision in the Const. on Social Justice and Human national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Rights emphasize the social function of land. Congress
must give the highest priority to measures which enhance
the right of all people to human dignity and reduce social, Consti. Art. XII, sec. 2 and sec. 14.2
economic, and political inequalities through the equitable
diffusion of wealth and political power (Sec. 1). The State is Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,
mandated to undertake, together with the private sector, a minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
continuing housing program and an urban land reform of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
program which seek to make available at affordable cost flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
homeless citizens. other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural
There is the difficulty in pinpointing the line where resources shall be under the full control and supervision
restrictions of property ownership go beyond the of the State. The State may directly undertake such
constitutional bounds of reasonableness. Each case must activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture,
be resolved on its particular merits. Insofar as this petition or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
is concerned, I concur with the dissenting minority. corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and
may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, export of sugar.
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under  CFI upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In and declared the taxing power of defendant
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy
or industrial uses other than the development of water Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the fees not excluded in its charter. Thus, this appeal.
grant.
ISSUES:
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic 1. WON defendant Municipal Board has authority to
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to levy such an export tax
Filipino citizens. 2. WON constitutional limits on the power of
taxation, specifically the equal protection clause
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of and rule of uniformity of taxation were infringed
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence RATIO:

fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and 1. YES

lagoons.  OSCI questions the authority of the Mun. Board to
levy such an export tax in view of Sec 2887 of the
The President may enter into agreements with foreign- RAC which states: “It shall not be in the power of
owned corporations involving either technical or financial the municipal council to impose a tax in any form
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and whatever, upon goods & merchandise carried into
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils the municipality, or out of the same, and any
according to the general terms and conditions provided by attempt to impose an import/export tax upon
law, based on real contributions to the economic growth such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be
the State shall promote the development and use of local void.”
scientific and technical resources.  Subsequently however, Sec 2 of RA 2264 gave
chartered cities, municipalities & municipal
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract districts authority to levy for public purposes just
entered into in accordance with this provision, within & uniform taxes, licenses or fees.
thirty days from its execution.  On the inconsistency between the two provisions,
the Court held in Nin Bay Mining Co v Municipality
Section 14. paragraph 2. of Roxas that Sec 2887 of RAC has been
repealed by Sec 2 of RA 2264
The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be  Court therein expressed awareness of the
limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law. transcendental effects that municipal
export/import taxes or licenses will have on the
national economy and stated that there was no
other alternative ‘til Congress acts to provide
ORMOC SUGAR CO., INC. vs. TREASURER of ORMOC
remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable
results.
FACTS: 2. YES
 Felwa v Salas: The equal protection clause applies
 The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed only to persons or things identically situated and
Ordinance No. 4 imposing “on any and all does not bar a reasonable classification of the
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the subject of legislation.
Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal  A classification is reasonable where (1) it is based
tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to USA and on substantial distinctions which make real
other foreign countries.” (Section 1) differences (2) it is germane to the purpose of the
 Payments for said tax were made, under protest, law (3) it applies not only to present conditions but
by Ormoc Sugar Co, Inc (OSCI) totaling also to future conditions which are substantially
P12,087.50. identical to those of the present (4) it applies only
 OSCI filed a complaint in the CFI of Leyte alleging: to those who belong to the same class
1. the ordinance is unconstitutional for being  The questioned ordinance does not meet them, for
violative of the equal protection clause and the it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and
rule of uniformity of taxation exported by the OSCI and none other.
2. it is an export tax forbidden under Sec. 2887  While it its true that at the time of the ordinance’s
of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) enactment the OSCI was the only sugar central in
3. the tax is neither a production nor a license Ormoc City, still, the classification, to be
tax which Ormoc City is authorized to impose reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
under Sec. 15-kk of its charter and under Sec future conditions as well.
2 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
 The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
4. the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
charge in violation of par. 1 of Sec 2 of RA
established sugar central, of the same class as
plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now,
 even if later a similar company is set up, it can’t interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
be subject to the tax because the ordinance will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
expressly points only to OSCI as the entity to be enforcement. Neither Igot nor Salapantan has
levied upon. been alleged to have been adversely affected by the
 OSCI, however, is not entitled to interest on the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as
refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily unconstitutional. Theirs is a general grievance.
collected. At the time of collection, the ordinance There is no personal or substantial interest.
provided a sufficient basis to preclude Provisions can’t be assailed by taxpayers bec they
arbitrariness, the same being then presumed do not involve expenditure of public moneys.
constitutional until declared otherwise. Petitioners do not seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds. Court has discretion as to
HELD: WON a taxpayer’s suit should be entertained
3. Unavoidability of constitutional questions- the
CFI decision REVERSED. Ordinance declared issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Defendants ordered to refund the presented. Petitioners are actually without cause
P12,087.50 paid. of action.
 In the case of a 65-year old elective local official,
who has retired from a provincial, city, or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC from running for the same office from which he
had retired. He ha already declared himself tired
FACTS: and unavailable for the same govt work. Equal
 Petitioners are Dumalao (as a candidate), Igot and protection clause does not forbid all legal
Salapantan (as taxpayers) classification. What is proscribed is a classification
 Dumlao questions constitutionality of BP blg 52 which is arbitrary and unreasonable.
alleging it is discriminatory and contrary to equal  Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of
protection and due process insofar as Sec 4 the questioned provision. There must be a clear
provides for a special disqualification (“any retired unequivocal breach of the constitution. Unless the
elective provincial, city, or municipal official who conflict with the constitution is clear beyond
has received payment of retirement benefits to reasonable doubt, it is within the competence of
which he is entitled under the law and who shall he legislature to prescribe qualifications
have been 65 years of age at the commencement of  HOWEVER!!! Accdg to Igot and Salapantan,
the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, second par of sec 4 “a judgment of conviction for
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
local office from which he has retired”) conclusive evidence of such fact” contravenes the
 Igot and Salapantan on the other hand assail the constitutional presumption of innocence. The
validity of second paragraph of sec 4 providing for court agrees with them.
disqualifications of certain candidates who have  WHEREFORE, 1st par of sec 4 BP blg52= valid, the
cases against them which are filed but have not portion of the 2nd par of sec 4 providing that “the
yet been decided (“a judgment of conviction for any filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive before a civil court or military tribunal after
evidence of such fact”) preliminary investigation shall be prima facie
evidence of such fact”=null and void
Held: (yup, held agad. Walang issues!!! Kidding! Non
justiciable kasi siya in a way except sa isa… yun huli)
 This case is unacceptable for judicial resolution
 For one, there is a misjoinder of parties (dumlao PEOPLE vs. CAYAT
not related to the latter 2)
 Next, there standards to be followed in the FACTS:
exercise of function:
o Existence of appropriate case Being a member of a non-Christian tribe, the accused,
o Personal and substantial interest in Cayat, acquired and had under his possession a bottle of
raising the constitutional question A-1-1 gin, a liquor other than the native wines of his tribe.
o Plea that the function be exercised at the This was in violation of Act. No. 1639 (sec 2 and 3). While
earliest opportunity (this has been met by he admitted to the facts, the pleaded not guilty. He was
petitioners) found guilty and fined to Php50.
o Necessity that the constitutional question
be passed upon to decide the case Sec. 2 makes it unlawful for any Philippine non-Christian
 Explained further… native to buy or possess any alcoholic beverage or liquor
1. Actual Case and Controversy- judicial review is other than the “so-called” native wines and liquors that
limited to the determination of actual cases and they have been made accustomed to. It is then the duty of
controversies. Dumlao has not been adversely the police or any authorized agent to seize and destroy the
affected by the application of the assailed liquor.
provisions. There is no petition seeking for his
disqualification (so WTF is his problem?). He’s Sec. 3 fines a violator of not more than Php200 or
raising a hypothetical issue and his case is within imprisoning them of as term not exceeding 6 months.
the jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC.
2. Proper Party- person who impugns the validity of a Cayat now challenges the constitutionality of the Act for
statute must have a personal and substantial being:
 In this case, the third circumstance is present.
1) discriminatory and denies equal protection of the
laws 4) In discussing police power, the court states
2) violative of due process that the Act serves a purpose, that of peace
3) an improper exercise of police power and order. In discussing whether the means
are reasonable, the courts merely stated that
ISSUE this is in the realm of the legislative.

1) Whether or not Act. No. 1639 satisfies the

requirements of proper classification ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
2) Whether or not Act. No. 1639 is violative of the
due process clause
3) Whether or not it is an improper exercise of police FACTS:
power
1. The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to
HELD prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil.
from having a stranglehold upon the people’s
1) Yes it does. economic life.
2) No it is not.
3) No it is not.  a prohibition against aliens and against
associations, partnerships, or
RATIO corporations the capital of which are not
wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging
1) So as to qualify under the equal protection of laws, the directly or indirectly in the retail trade
law in question must satisfy the requirements of proper
classification. These are:  aliens actually engaged in the retail
business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to
1) must rest on substantial distinctions continue their business, unless their
2) must be germane to the purposes of the law licenses are forfeited in accordance with
3) must not be limited to existing conditions only law, until their death or voluntary
4) must apply equally to all members of the same retirement. In case of juridical persons,
class ten years after the approval of the Act or
According to the court, the classification is real and until the expiration of term.
substantial, as the term “non-Christian tribes” refers, not
to religious belief, but to geography and to the level of  Citizens and juridical entities of the
civilization (remember Rubi v. Provincial Board of United States were exempted form this
Mindoro). Act.

Secondly, it has a clear purpose. The prohibition of  provision for the forfeiture of licenses to
possessing alcoholic beverages other than local wines is engage in the retail business for violation
designed to insure peace and order in the tribes, as free of the laws on nationalization, economic
use of those prohibited beverages often led to lawlessness control weights and measures and labor
and crimes. and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry.
Thirdly, it is not limited as it is intended to apply for all
times as long as those conditions exist. This is due to the  provision against the establishment or
fact that the process of civilization is a slow process. opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or
Lastly, it applies equally to all members of the class. branches of retail business

2) Due process means:

2. Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other
1) there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with alien residents, corporations and partnerships
the general powers of the legislative department affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it
2) it shall be reasonable in its operation unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
3) it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure  it denies to alien residents the equal
4) it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the protection of the laws and deprives
state or a class them of their liberty and property
without due process
Also noted by the court is that due process does not  the subject of the Act is not expressed in
always accord notice and hearing. Property may be seized the title
by the government in 3 circumstances:  the Act violates international and treaty
obligations
1) in payment of taxes  the provisions of the Act against the
2) when used in violation of law transmission by aliens of their retail
3) when property causes a corpus delicti business thru hereditary succession
IMPT. ISSUE: MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of theCourt.

WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal FACTS

protection of the laws.
The petitioner, an American citizen of Japanese descent,
HELD: was convicted in a federal district court for remaining in
San Leandro, California, a "Military Area," contrary to
The law is a valid exercise of police power Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding
and it does not deny the aliens the equal General of the Western Command, U.S. Army, which
protection of the laws. There are real and actual, directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese
positive and fundamental differences between an ancestry should be excluded from that area. No question
alien and a citizen, which fully justify the was raised as to petitioner's loyalty to the United States.
legislative classification adopted. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the importance
of the constitutional question involved caused the court to
grant certiorari.

RATIO: Prosecution of the petitioner begun by information

charging violation of an Act of Congress, of March 21,
1. The equal protection clause does not demand 1942, , which provides that
absolute equality among residents. It merely ". . . whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under
under like circumstances and conditions both the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the
as to privileges conferred and liabilities Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated
enforced. by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions
applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order
2. The classification is actual, real and of the Secretary of War or any such military commander,
reasonable, and all persons of one class are shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of
treated alike. the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that
his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor
3. The difference in status between citizens and and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed
aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable $ 5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or
classification in the exercise of police power. both, for each offense."

4. Official statistics point out to the ever- Exclusion Order No. 34, which the petitioner violated,
increasing dominance and control by alien of was one of a number of military orders and proclamations,
the retail trade. It is this domination and all of which were substantially based upon Executive
control that is the legislature’s target in the Order No. 9066. That order, issued after we were at war
enactment of the Act. with Japan, declared that "the successful prosecution of the
war requires every possible protection against espionage
5. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of and against sabotage to national-defense material,
the distinction between the alien and the national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities. . .
national as a trader. The alien is naturally ."
lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily ISSUE
stays and makes his living. The alien owes no
allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State WON the President and Congress went beyond their war
cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the
emergency. rights of Americans of Japanese descent

6. While the citizen holds his life, his person and HOLDING
his property subject to the needs of the
country, the alien may become the potential No, ruling affirmed. The Court sided with the government
enemy of the State. and held that the need to protect against espionage
outweighed Korematsu's rights. Compulsory exclusion,
7. The alien retailer has shown such utter though constitutionally suspect, is justified in
disregard for his customers and the people on circumstances of "emergency and peril."
whom he makes his profit. Through the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and RATIO
practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic
control on the nation’s economy endangering Validity of Law
the national security in times of crisis and
emergency. In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, we sustained
a conviction obtained for violation of the curfew order. The
Hirabayashi conviction and this one thus rest on the same
1942 Congressional Act and the same basic executive and
military orders, all of which orders were aimed at the twin
KOREMATSU vs. U.S. dangers of espionage and sabotage.

December 18, 1944

The 1942 Act was attacked in the Hirabayashi case as an to the Japanese Emperor, and several thousand evacuees
unconstitutional delegation of power; it was contended requested repatriation to Japan.
that the curfew order and other orders on which it rested
were beyond the war powers of the Congress, the military “Conflict of Order” contention
authorities and of the President, as Commander in Chief of
the Army; and finally that to apply the curfew order It is argued that on May 30, 1942, the date the petitioner
against none but citizens of Japanese ancestry amounted was charged with remaining in the prohibited area, there
to a constitutionally prohibited discrimination solely on were conflicting orders outstanding, forbidding him both to
account of race. To these questions, we gave the serious leave the area and to remain there.
consideration which their importance justified. We
upheld the curfew order as an exercise of the power of The only order in effect touching the petitioner's being in
the government to take steps necessary to prevent the area on May 30, 1942, the date specified in the
espionage and sabotage in an area threatened by information against him, was the May 3 order which
Japanese attack. prohibited his remaining there, and it was that same
order, which he stipulated in his trial that he had violated,
In the light of the principles we announced in the knowing of its existence. There is therefore no basis for the
Hirabayashi case, we are unable to conclude that it was argument that on May 30, 1942, he was subject to
beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive punishment, under the March 27 and May 3 orders,
to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West whether he remained in or left the area.
Coast war area at the time they did. True, exclusion
from the area in which one's home is located is a far “Inseparability of orders” contention
greater deprivation than constant confinement to the home
from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. Nothing short of apprehension by It is argued that the validity of the exclusion order cannot
the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent be considered apart from the orders requiring him, to
danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify report and to remain in an assembly or relocation center.
either. But exclusion from a threatened area, no less The contention is that we must treat these separate orders
than curfew, has a definite and close relationship to as one and inseparable; if detention in the assembly or
the prevention of espionage and sabotage. The military relocation center would have illegally deprived the
authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of petitioner of his liberty, the exclusion order and his
defending our shores, concluded that curfew provided conviction under it cannot stand.
inadequate protection and ordered exclusion.
Had petitioner here left the prohibited area and gone to an
Petitioner urges that when Order No. 34 was promulgated, assembly center the court cannot say either as a matter of
all danger of Japanese invasion of the West Coast had fact or law that his presence in that center would have
disappeared. The court rejects the argument. resulted in his detention in a relocation center. This is
made clear when we analyze the requirements of the
Here, as in the Hirabayashi case, the court cannot reject separate provisions of the separate orders. These separate
as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities requirements were that those of Japanese ancestry (1)
and of Congress that there were disloyal members of depart from the area; (2) report to and temporarily remain
that population, whose number and strength could not in an assembly center; (3) go under military control to a
be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say relocation center there to remain for an indeterminate
that the war-making branches of the Government did period until released conditionally or unconditionally by
not have ground for believing that in a critical hour the military authorities. Each of these requirements, it will
such persons could not readily be isolated and be noted, imposed distinct duties in connection with the
separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the separate steps in a complete evacuation program.
national defense and safety, which demanded that
prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard Since the petitioner has not been convicted of failing
against it." to report or to remain in an assembly or relocation
center, we cannot in this case determine the validity
Like curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin was of those separate provisions of the order. It is
deemed necessary because of the presence of an sufficient here for us to pass upon the order which
unascertained number of disloyal members of the petitioner violated.
group, most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to
this country. It was because we could not reject the The power to exclude includes the power to do it by
finding of the military authorities that it was impossible to force if necessary. And any forcible measure must
bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from necessarily entail some degree of detention or
the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order restraint whatever method of removal is selected. But
as applying to the whole group. In the instant case, whichever view is taken, it results in holding that the
temporary exclusion of the entire group was rested by order under which petitioner was convicted was valid.
the military on the same ground. The judgment that
exclusion of the whole group was for the same reason a Conclusion
military imperative answers the contention that the
exclusion was in the nature of group punishment based It is said that we are dealing here with the case of
on antagonism to those of Japanese origin. That there imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp
were members of the group who retained loyalties to Japan solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or
has been confirmed by investigations made subsequent to inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition
the exclusion. Approximately five thousand American towards the United States. Regardless of the true
citizens of Japanese ancestry refused to swear unqualified nature of the assembly and relocation centers , we are
allegiance to the United States and to renounce allegiance dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion
order. To cast this case into outlines of racial commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory
prejudice, without reference to the real military to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring their
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the separation in places where they are liable to be brought
issue. into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
either race to the other, and have been generally, if not
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area universally, recognized as within the competency of the
because of hostility to him or his race. He was state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. It
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in any mixed
Empire, because the properly constituted military community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant
authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and race, in this instance the white race is property, in the
felt constrained to take proper security measures, same sense that a right of action, or of inheritance, is
because they decided that the military urgency of the property. Conceding this to be so for the purposes of this
situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese case, we are unable to see how this statute deprives him
ancestry be segregated from the West Coast of, or in any way affects his right to, such property. If he
temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its be a white man and assigned to a colored coach, he may
confidence in this time of war in our military leaders have his action for damages against the company for
determined that they should have the power to do just being deprived of his so-called property. Upon the other
this. We cannot -- by availing ourselves of the calm hand, if he be a colored man and be, so assigned, he has
perspective of hindsight -- now say that at that time been deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully
these actions were unjustified. entitled to the reputation of being a white man..

2. So far, then. as a conflict with the 14 th

Amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to
PLESSY vs. FERGUSON the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a
reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there
BROWN, J. must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of
the legislature. In determining the question of
FACTS: reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to
the established usages, customs, and traditions of the
This case centers on the constitutionality of an act of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their
general assembly of the state of Louisiana, passed in 1890, comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and
providing for separate railway carriages for the white and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say
colored races. The petitioner was a citizen of the United that a law which authorizes or even requires the
States and a resident of the State of Louisiana, of mixed separation of the two races in public conveyances is
descent (7/8 Caucasian, 1/8 African). On June 7, 1892 he unreasonable or more obnoxious to the 14th
paid for a first class ticket on the East Louisiana Railway Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring
from New Orleans to Covington. Upon entering the separate schools for colored children in the District of
passenger train he sat in a vacant seat reserved for white Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem
passengers. Despite this, the petitioner was required by to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of
the conductor to transfer to the seats assigned to colored state legislatures.
passengers. When the petitioner refused he was forcibly If the two races are to meet on terms of social equality
ejected from the said coach and was charged with violating wit must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual
the assailed Louisiana statute. appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary
The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the consent of individuals. Legislation is powerless to
ground that it conflicts both with the 13th Amendment of eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions
the Constitution, abolishing slavery, and the 14th based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do
Amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of
on the part of the states. the present situation. If one race be inferior to the
other socially, the Constitution of the United States
ISSUES/HELD: cannot put them upon the same plane.

1. W/O Not the statute is unconstitutional for being in DISSENT:

conflict with the 13th Amendment, abolishing slavery? NO
Justice HARLAN
2. W/O Not the statute is unconstitutional for being in
conflict with the 14th Amendment, which prohibits certain I am of opinion that the statute of Louisiana is
restrictive legislation in part of the States? NO inconsistent with the personal liberty of citizens, white and
black, in that state, and hostile to both the spirit and letter
RATIO: of the Constitution of the United States. If laws of like
character should be enacted in the several states of the
1.A statute which implies merely a legal distinction Union, the effect would be in the highest degree
between the white and colored races, has no tendency to mischievous. Slavery as an institution tolerated by law
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish would, it is true, have disappeared from our country, but
a state of involuntary servitude. The object of the there would remain a power in the states, by sinister
amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of the
equality of the two races before the law, but in the blessings of freedom; to regulate civil rights, common to all
nature of things it could not have been intended to citizens, upon the basis of race; and to place in a condition
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens, now
social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a
constituting a part of the political community, called the The trial court found that the special program operated as
people of the United States, for whom and by whom, a racial quota because minority applicants in that
through representatives, our government is administered. program were rated only against one another, and 16
Such a system is inconsistent with the guarantee given by places out 100 were reserved for them. Declaring that
the Constitution of each state of a republican form of petitioner could not take race into account in making
government, and may be stricken down by Congressional admissions decisions, the program was held to violate the
action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn Federal and State Constis and Title VI. Respondent’s
duty to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in admission was not ordered, however, for lack of proof that
the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary he would have been admitted but for the special program.
notwithstanding.
The California SC, applying a strict-scrutiny standard,
concluded that the special admission program was not the
least intrusive means of achieving the goals of the
admittedly compelling interests of integrating the medical
profession and increasing the number of doctors willing to
serve minority patients. Petitioner’s special admissions
UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA vs. BAKKE program was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Since petitioner could not satisfy its burden of
demonstrating that respondent, absent the special
(June 28, 1978) program, would not have been admitted, the court ordered
Ponente: J. Powell respondent’s admission.

FACTS: ISSUES  HELD:

The Medical School of the Univ of California had 2 1. WON a right of action for private parties exists under
admissions programs for an entering class of 100 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964  YES
students. Under the regular admissions program, 2. WON the special admissions program is necessary and
candidates who had an undergrad GPA below 2.5 (on a appropriate in realizing petitioner’s goal of diversifying
scale of 4.0) were summarily rejected. Applicants who pass its student body  NO
this requirement undergo an interview (rated on a scale of 3. WON petitioner could satisfy its burden of proving that
1 to 100 per interviewer), which composed their respective respondent would not have been admitted even if there
“benchmark scores” based on the interviewers’ summaries, had been no special admissions program  NO
overall GPA, science courses GPA, Medical College
Admission Test (MCAT), letters of recommendation, RATIO:
extracurricular activities and other biographical data.
1. 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: “No
A separate committee, a majority of whom were members person in the US shall, on the ground of race, color, or
of minority groups, composed the special admissions national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
program. Under it, applicants were asked to indicate in denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
their application forms if they wished to be considered as discrimination under any program or activity receiving
“economically and/or educationally disadvantaged” Federal financial assistance.”
applicants/members of a minority group (blacks,
Chicanos, Asians, American Indians). If an applicant was The problem confronting Congress was discrimination
found to be “disadvantaged,” he would be rated in the against Negro citizens at the hands of recipients of federal
same manner as the one employed by the general moneys. Proponents of the bill detailed the plight of
admissions committee. However, they did not have to meet Negroes seeking equal treatment in federally funded
the 2.5 grade point cutoff and were not ranked against programs. The purpose of Title VI was “to insure that
candidates in the general admissions process. No Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Consti and
disadvantaged whites were admitted under the special the moral sense of the Nation” and “to give fellow citizens –
program, though many applied. Negroes – the same rights and opportunities that white
people take for granted.” In view of the clear legislative
Respondent, a white male, applied in 1973 and 1974, in intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial
both years being considered only under the general classifications that would violate the Equal Protection
admissions program. Though he had a 468 out of 500 Clause or the 5th Amendment.
score in 1973, he was rejected since no late general
applicants with scores less than 470 were being accepted. 2.
At the time, 4 special admission slots were still unfilled. In Application of Judicial Scrutiny
1974 respondent applied early, and though he had a score Parties disagree as to the level of judicial scrutiny to be
of 549 out of 600, he was again rejected. In both years, applied to the special admissions program; but it is
special applicants were admitted with significantly lower undisputed that it makes a classification based on race
scores than respondent’s. and ethnic background. Nevertheless, petitioner argues
After his 2nd rejection, respondent filed this action for that the court below erred in applying strict scrutiny to the
mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief to compel his program bec white males, such as respondent, are not a
admission, alleging that the special admissions program “discrete and insular minority” requiring extraordinary
operated to exclude him on the basis of his race in protection from the majoritarian political process. This
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14 th rationale, however, has not been invoked in decisions as a
Amendment, a provision of the California Consti, and prerequisite to subjecting racial distinctions to strict
601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. scrutiny. Nor has this Court held that discreteness and
insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding
that a particular classification is invidious. They are “The law school, the proving ground for legal
subject to stringent examination regardless of these learning and practice, cannot be effective in
characteristics. isolation from the individuals and institutions with
which the law interacts. Few students and no one
14th Amendment: Equal Protection Clause who has practiced law would choose to study in an
 Yick Wo v Hopkins: “The guarantees of equal academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of
protection are universal in their application to all ideas and the exchange of views with which the
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without law is concerned.”
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of HOWEVER, ethnic diversity is only one element in
nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a a range of factors a university properly may
pledge of the protection of equal laws.” consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous
 Although the framers conceived of its primary function student body. Although a university must have
as bridging the vast distance bet members of the Negro wide discretion in making the sensitive judgments
race and the white “majority,” the Amendment itself as to who should be admitted, constitutional
was framed in universal terms, without reference to limitations protecting individuals may not be
color, ethnic origin, or condition prior to servitude. disregarded.
There is no principled basis for deciding which groups
would merit “heightened judicial solicitude” and which Racial classification = Diversity?
would not. Nothing in the Consti supports the notion It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a
that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise specified percentage of the student body is in effect
impermissible burdens in order to enhance the guaranteed to be members of selected groups, with the
societal standing of their ethnic groups. remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of
students. The diversity that furthers a compelling state
Purposes and Means interest encompasses a far broader array of
PURPOSE: qualifications and characteristics of which racial or
1. Reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored ethnic origin is but a single though important element.
minorities in medical schools and in the profession Petitioner’s special program, focused solely on ethnic
2. Countering the effects of societal discrimination diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of
3. Increasing the number of physicians who will practice genuine diversity. The assignment of a fixed number of
in communities currently underserved places to a minority group is not a necessary means
4. Obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an towards that end. Race or ethnic background may be
ethnically diverse student body deemed a “plus” in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does
MEANS: special admissions program not insulate the individual from comparison with all the
other candidates for the available seats. An admissions
Court, holding that the means is not essential in realizing program should operate in such a way that would be
the purposes: flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of
1. Preferring members of any one group for no reason diversity (i.e. exceptional personal talents, unique work or
other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for service experience, leadership potential, maturity,
its own sake. demonstrated compassion, ability to communicate with
2. The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial the poor, etc) in light of the particular qualifications of
interest in ameliorating or eliminating where feasible, each applicant, and place them in the same footing for
the disabling effects of identified discrimination. consideration, although not necessarily according them
However, the Court has never approved a classification the same weight. This kind of program treats each
that aids persons perceived as members of relatively applicant as an individual in the admissions process.
victimized groups at the expense of other innocent
individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or In sum, the petitioner’s special admissions program
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory involves the use of an explicit racial classification never
violations. Without such findings, it cannot be said before countenanced by this Court. The fatal flaw in
that the gov’t has any greater interest in helping 1 petitioner’s preferential program is its disregard of
individual than in refraining from harming another. individual rights as guaranteed by the 14 th Amendment.
3. There is no evidence on record indicating that Such rights are not absolute; but when a State’s
petitioner’s special admissions program is either distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges on
needed or geared to promote such goal. There are more ancestry or the color of one’s skin, that individual is
precise and reliable ways to identify applicants who entitled to a demonstration that the challenged
are genuinely interested in the medical problems of classification is necessary to promote a substantial state
minorities than by race. There is no empirical data to interest. Petitioner has failed to carry this burden; hence,
demonstrate that any one race is more selflessly its special admissions program is constitutionally deemed
socially oriented or by contrast that another is more invalid. However, the State has a substantial interest that
selfishly acquisitive. legitimately may be served by a properly devised
4. Academic freedom has long been viewed as a special admissions program involving the consideration of race
concern of the 1st Amendment. The freedom of a and ethnic origin. Thus, California SC’s judgment
university to make its own judgments as to education enjoining petitioner from taking race into account is
includes the selection of its student body. Four reversed.
essential freedoms: (1) who may teach, (2) what may
be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may 3. Petitioner has conceded that it could not carry its
be admitted. It is true that the contribution of diversity burden of proving that, but for the existence of its
is substantial, with the Court making a specific unlawful special admissions program, respondent still
reference to legal education: would not have been admitted. Hence, he is entitled to
injunction and should be admitted there.
 that the Law School's use of race was narrowly tailored
JJ. Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun; because race was merely a "potential 'plus' factor" and
concurring and dissenting. because the Law School's program was virtually identical
Gov’t may take race into account when it acts not to to the Harvard admissions program described approvingly
demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy by Justice Powell and appended to his Bakke opinion.
disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice,
at least when appropriate findings have been made by Pettioner (Barbara Grutter) :
judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with - respondents discriminated against her on the basis of
competence to act in this area. race in violation of the 14th Amendment; Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d; and
Rev. Stat. §1977, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1981
- her application was rejected because the Law School
uses race as a "predominant" factor, giving applicants who
belong to certain minority groups "a significantly greater
chance of admission than students with similar
credentials from disfavored racial groups."
- respondents "had no compelling interest to justify their
GRATZ vs. BOLLINGER/ GRUTTER vs. BOLLINGER use of race in the admissions process"
Respondents (Lee Bollinger, former Law School dean,
present UMich pres; jeffrey Lehman, Law School dean;
Grutter v Bollinger, 02-241 (June 2003)
Denis Shield, Admissions Director):
-there was no directive to admit a fixed/particular
O'Connor, J.
percentage or number of minority students, but rather to
NATURE: certiorari to the US CA
consider an applicant's race along with all other factors
- 'critical mass' " means " 'meaningful numbers' " or "
FACTS: The University of Michigan Law School (Law
'meaningful representation,'; there is no number,
School), one of the Nation's top law schools, follows an
percentage, or range of numbers or percentages that
official admissions policy that seeks to achieve student
constitute critical mass.
body diversity through compliance with Regents of Univ. of
- the policy did not purport to remedy past discrimination,
Cal. v. Bakke. Focusing on students' academic ability
but rather to include students who may bring to the Law
coupled with a flexible assessment of their talents,
School a perspective different from that of members of
experiences, and potential, the policy requires admissions
groups which have not been the victims of such
officials to evaluate each applicant based on all the
discrimination
information available in the file, including a personal
- the Law School actually gives substantial weight to
statement, letters of recommendation, an essay describing
diversity factors besides race
how the applicant will contribute to Law School life and
- the university policy of promoting diversity constitutes a
diversity, and the applicant's undergraduate grade point
"compelling interest"
average (GPA) and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT)
score. Additionally, officials must look beyond grades and
ISSUES:
scores to so-called "soft variables," such as recommenders'
enthusiasm, the quality of the undergraduate institution
1. Whether or not diversity is a compelling interest that
and the applicant's essay, and the areas and difficulty of
can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting
undergraduate course selection. The policy does not define
applicants for admission to public universities
diversity solely in terms of racial and ethnic status and
does not restrict the types of diversity contributions
2. Whether or not the narrowly-tailored use of race in
eligible for "substantial weight," but it does reaffirm the
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in
Law School's commitment to diversity with special
obtaining the educational benefits of a diverse student
reference to the inclusion of African-American, Hispanic,
body is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause (14th
and Native-American students, who otherwise might not
Amend)
be represented in the student body in meaningful
numbers. By enrolling a "critical mass" of
HELD:
underrepresented minority students, the policy seeks to
ensure their ability to contribute to the Law School's
1. YES. In the landmark Bakke case, this Court reviewed a
character and to the legal profession.
medical school's racial set-aside program that reserved 16
When the Law School denied admission to petitioner
out of 100 seats for members of certain minority groups.
Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and 161
The decision produced six separate opinions, none of
LSAT score, she filed this suit, alleging that respondents
which commanded a majority. Four Justices would have
had discriminated against her on the basis of race in
upheld the program on the ground that the government
violation of the 14th Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights
can use race to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities
Act of 1964, and 42 U. S. C. §1981; that she was rejected
by past racial prejudice. Four other Justices would have
because the Law School uses race as a "predominant"
struck the program down on statutory grounds. Justice
factor, giving applicants belonging to certain minority
Powell, announcing the Court's judgment, provided a fifth
groups a significantly greater chance of admission than
vote not only for invalidating the program, but also for
students with similar credentials from disfavored racial
reversing the state court's injunction against any use of
groups; and that respondents had no compelling interest
race whatsoever. In a part of his opinion that was joined
to justify that use of race. The District Court found the
by no other Justice, Justice Powell expressed his view that
Law School's use of race as an admissions factor unlawful.
attaining a diverse student body was the only interest
The Sixth Circuit of the CA reversed, holding that Justice
asserted by the university that survived scrutiny.
Powell's opinion in Bakke was binding precedent
Grounding his analysis in the academic freedom that "long
establishing diversity as a compelling state interest, and
has been viewed as a special concern of the First military leaders assert that a highly qualified, racially
Amendment, Justice Powell emphasized that the " 'nation's diverse officer corps is essential to national security.
future depends upon leaders trained through wide Moreover, because universities, and in particular, law
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as schools, represent the training ground for a large number
this Nation." However, he also emphasized that "it is not of the Nation's leaders, Sweatt v. Painter, the path to
an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified leadership must be visibly open to talented and qualified
percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to individuals of every race and ethnicity. Thus, the Law
be members of selected ethnic groups," that can justify School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse
using race.Rather, "the diversity that furthers a compelling student body.
state interest encompasses a far broader array of (d) The Law School's admissions program bears the
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. To be narrowly
origin is but a single though important element." Since tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot
Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion has been the touchstone "insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired
for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions qualifications from competition with all other applicants."
policies. Public and private universities across the Nation Bakke. Instead, it may consider race or ethnicity only as a
have modeled their own admissions programs on Justice " 'plus' in a particular applicant's file"; i.e., it must be
Powell's views. Courts, however, have struggled to discern "flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of
whether Justice Powell's diversity rationale is binding diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
precedent. The Court finds it unnecessary to decide this applicant, and to place them on the same footing for
issue because the Court endorses Justice Powell's view consideration, although not necessarily according them
that student body diversity is a compelling state interest in the same weight." It follows that universities cannot
the context of university admissions. establish quotas for members of certain racial or ethnic
groups or put them on separate admissions tracks. The
2. NO. The Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in Law School's admissions program, like the Harvard plan
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in approved by Justice Powell, satisfies these requirements.
obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse Moreover, the program is flexible enough to ensure that
student body is not prohibited by the Equal Protection each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a
Clause, Title VI, or §1981 way that makes race or ethnicity the defining feature of the
a. All government racial classifications must be application. The Law School engages in a highly
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña. But not all such uses giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant
are invalidated by strict scrutiny. Race-based action might contribute to a diverse educational environment.
necessary to further a compelling governmental interest There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of automatic
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause so long as it is acceptance or rejection based on any single "soft" variable.
narrowly tailored to further that interest. Shaw v. Hunt. Gratz v. Bollinger. Also, the program adequately ensures
Context matters when reviewing such action. Gomillion v. that all factors that may contribute to diversity are
Lightfoot. Not every decision influenced by race is equally meaningfully considered alongside race. Moreover, the Law
objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with
framework for carefully examining the importance and the grades and test scores lower than underrepresented
sincerity of the government's reasons for using race in a minority applicants (and other nonminority applicants)
particular context. who are rejected. The Court rejects the argument that the
b. The Court endorses Justice Powell's view that Law School should have used other race-neutral means to
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that obtain the educational benefits of student body diversity,
can justify using race in university admissions. The Court e.g., a lottery system or decreasing the emphasis on GPA
defers to the Law School's educational judgment that and LSAT scores. Narrow tailoring does not require
diversity is essential to its educational mission. The exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative or
Court's scrutiny of that interest is no less strict for taking mandate that a university choose between maintaining a
into account complex educational judgments in an area reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to
that lies primarily within the university's expertise. provide educational opportunities to members of all racial
Attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law groups. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed. The Court is satisfied
School's proper institutional mission, and its "good faith" that the Law School adequately considered the available
is "presumed" absent "a showing to the contrary." alternatives. The Court is also satisfied that, in the context
Enrolling a "critical mass" of minority students simply to of individualized consideration of the possible diversity
assure some specified percentage of a particular group contributions of each applicant, the Law School's race-
merely because of its race or ethnic origin would be conscious admissions program does not unduly harm
patently unconstitutional. But the Law School defines its nonminority applicants. Finally, race-conscious
critical mass concept by reference to the substantial, admissions policies must be limited in time. The Court
important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity takes the Law School at its word that it would like nothing
is designed to produce, including cross-racial better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula and
understanding and the breaking down of racial will terminate its use of racial preferences as soon as
stereotypes. The Law School's claim is further bolstered by practicable. The Court expects that 25 years from now, the
numerous expert studies and reports showing that such use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
diversity promotes learning outcomes and better prepares further the interest approved today.
students for an increasingly diverse workforce, for society, c. Because the Law School's use of race in admissions
and for the legal profession. Major American businesses decisions is not prohibited by Equal Protection Clause,
have made clear that the skills needed in today's petitioner's statutory claims based on Title VI and §1981
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed also fail.
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas,
and viewpoints. High-ranking retired officers and civilian US CA decision affirmed.
 enjoyed in his native state, but was entitles, in the
state of his adoption, to such privileges and
immunities as were enjoyed by the class of citizens to
BRADWELL vs. ILLINOIS
which he belonged by the laws of such adopted state.

14th Amendment: It executes itself in every state of the

FACTS: union. It contains a class of privileges that a state may
not abridge.
Mrs. Myra Bradwell, after obtaining the requisite
qualifications, applied the the judges of the Supreme Court Question: Does admission to the bar belong to that
of Illinois for a license to practice law. class of privileges which a state may not abridge, or
that class of political rights as to which a state may
This was accompanied by an affidavit claiming that she discriminate between its citizens?
was born in Vermont and was formerly a citizen of that
state. However, she is now both a citizen of the United - Court believes that the practice of law is a privilege
States and the state of Illinois after residing in Chicago for which belong to a citizen of the United States.
many years. According to the Chicago statute, no
individual is allowed to practice law without obtaining a Cases:
license from two justices of the state supreme court. Cummings vs. Missouri: all men have certain inalienable
rights. In the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all
The Supreme Court refused to issue Bradwell a license for honors, all positions, are alike open to every one, and that
the reason that her marital status would prevent her from in the protection of these rights all are equal before the law
being bound by her express or implied contracts which the
law upholds between attorney and client. Ex Parte Garland: Attorneys and counselors are officers of
the court and not of the United states. They are not
In providing its decision, the State Supreme Court relied appointed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.
on an existing state statute prohibiting persons from Therefore, they must be admitted as such by its order,
practicing law without a license obtained from two upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning
Supreme Court justices. Furthermore, the issuance of a and fair private character.
license requires a certificate of good moral character
provided by any county court. Other rules of admission are Conclusion: The profession of the law, like the clerical
left to the discretion of the members of the Supreme Court. profession and that of medicine, is an advocation open to
every citizen of the United States. The legislature may
This discretion is subject to two limitations: prescribe qualifications but may not discriminate a class of
1) The terms of admission must promote the proper citizens from admission to the bar.
administration of justice
2) The court should not admit any persons or class of II. Difficulty of clients in enforcing the contracts
persons who are not intended by the legislature to they might make with her because of her
be admitted, even though their exclusion is not being a married woman and on the ground of
expressly required by the statute. her sex.

The court concentrated on the second limitation, - This kind of malpractice may be punishable by
contemplating that admitting women to engage in the fine, imprisonment, or expulsion from the bar. Her
practice of law would be exercising authority conferred to clients would not be compelled to resort to actions
them in a manner different from what the legislature at law against her.
intended. It argued that at the time of the establishment of
this statute, the U.S. had adopted the Common Law JUSTICE MILLER, DISSENTING:
system of England in which female attorneys were
unknown. God designed the sexes to occupy different In regard to that amendment counsel for plaintiff claims
spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, contains privileges and immunities which belong to a
apply, and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost citizen of the U.S., the practice of law has never depended
axiomatic truth. on the concept of citizenship. The right to control and
regulate the granting of license to practice law in the
Mrs. Bradwell, brought this case to the Federal Supreme courts of a state is one of those powers which are not
Court. transferred for its protection to the Federal government.

ISSUE: Judgement affirmed.

WON a female, duly qualified in respect of age, character,
and learning, claim, under the fourteenth amendment, the JUSTICE BRADLEY, DISSENTING:
privilege of earning a livelihood by practicing at the bar of
a judicial court. The claim that under the 14th amendment of the
constitution, which declares that no state shall make or
DECISION: enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
Yes, judgement reversed immunities of citizens of the U.S. assumes that the
practice of law is one of the privileges and immunities of
RATIO: women as citizens to engage in any and every profession.
I. Constitutional amendment:
Civil law has recognized wide differences in the spheres
Original: A citizen emigrating from one state to another and destinies of man and woman. Man is woman’s
carried with him, not the privileges and immunities he
protector and defender. Timidity and delicacy belong to the barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may
female. The founders of the common law believed that a confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight. This
woman had no legal existence apart from her husband. Court is certainly not in a position to gainsay such belief
Their destiny is to become wives and mothers. by the Michigan legislature. If it is entertainable, as we
think it is, Michigan has not violated its duty to afford
Judgement affirmed equal protection of its laws. We cannot cross-examine
either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan
legislators nor question their motives.

Nor is it unconstitutional for Michigan to withdraw from

women the occupation of bartending because it allows
women to serve as waitresses where liquor is dispensed.
The District Court has sufficiently indicated the reasons
that may have influenced the legislature in allowing
women to be waitresses in a liquor establishment over
which a man's ownership provides control. Nothing need
GOESART vs. CLEARY
be added to what was said below as to the other grounds
on which the Michigan law was assailed.
FACTS:
**What if it’s a female owner? Gender classification. What
As part of the Michigan system for controlling the sale of is the basis of distinction?
liquor, bartenders are required to be licensed in all cities,
but no female may be so licensed unless she be “the wife Heigthened
or daughter of the male owner” of a licensed liquor Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, with whom Mr. Justice
establishment. DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MURPHY join, dissenting.

The case is here on direct appeal from an order of the The statute arbitrarily discriminates between male and
District Court, denying an injunction to restrain the female owners of liquor establishments. A male owner,
enforcement of the Michigan law. The claim is that although he himself is always absent from his bar, may
Michigan cannot forbid females generally from being employ his wife and daughter as barmaids. A female owner
barmaids and at the same time make an exception in favor may neither work as a barmaid hereself nor employ her
of the wives and daughters of the owners of liquor daughter in that position, even if a man is always present
establishments. in the establishment to keep order. This inevitable result of
the classification belies the assumption that the statute
ISSUE: was motivated by a legislative solicitude for the moral and
physicial well-being of women who, but for the law, would
WON the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause of the be employed as barmaids. Since there could be no other
Fourteenth Amendment barred Michigan from making the conceivable justification for such discrimination against
classification the State has made between wives and women owners of liquor establishments, the statute
daughters of owners of liquor places and wives and should be held invalid as a denial of equal protection.
daughters of non-owners.

HELD: No.
GEDULDIG vs. AIELLO
RATIO:
Gudeldig, etc. v Aiello et al. 1974
(The Fourteenth Amendment did not tear history up by the
roots, and the regulation of the liquor traffic is one of the California has administered a disability insurance system
oldest and most untrammeled of legislative powers. that pays benefits to persons in private employment who
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from are temporarily unable to work because of disability not
working behind a bar. This is so despite the vast changes covered by workmen’s compensation for almost 30 years.
in the social and legal position of women. The fact that This is funded from contributions deducted from the
women may now have achieved the virtues that men have wages of participating employees. Such participation,
long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices which requires an employee to contribute one percent of
that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States his salary ($85 max. annually), is mandatory unless the
from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly, in employees are protected by voluntary private medical
such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic.) plans approved by the State. These contributions are
placed in the Unemployment Compensation Disability
The Constitution does not require situations 'which are Fund.
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though
they were the same.' Since bartending by women may, in In the event a participant employee suffers a compensable
the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and disability, he can receive a “weekly benefit amount” to be
social problems against which it may devise preventive paid on the eighth day of disability. If he is hospitalized,
measures, the legislature need not go to the full length of the payment would be on the 1 st day of hospitalization and
prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of he can also get additional benefits of $12 per day). Weekly
females other factors are operating which either eliminate benefit amounts for one disability are payable for 26weeks
or reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling so long as the total amt paid doesn’t exceed one-half of the
for prohibition. Michigan evidently believes that the wages received during the base period while additional
oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a benefits are for a max of 20days.
 challenged in this case relates to the asserted
The individual employee is insured against the risk of “underinclusiveness” of the set of risks that the State has
disability from a no. of mental or physical illness(es) and selected to insure. The State has not chosen to insure all
mental or physical injuries. It is not every disabling risks of employment disability and this decision is reflected
condition that triggers the obligation to pay benefits in the level of annual contributions exacted from
though. No benefits are paid for a single disability beyond participating employees. Plus, there is no evidence that
26 weeks or for a disability resulting from individual’s the selection of risks insured worked to discriminate
court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict or sexual against any definable group or class from the program.
psychopath. 2626 of Unemployment Insurance Code
also excludes disabilities resulting from pregnancy. The Court has held previously that, consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause, “a State may take one step at a
Gudelgig, the Director of the California Dept of Human time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem
Resources is responsible for the administration of this which seems acute to the legislative mind…The
program. Aiello et al. became pregnant and suffered legislature may select one phase of field and apply a
employment disability as a result of their pregnancies. remedy there, neglecting others.” Particularly with
Three of the appellees’ disabilities are attributable to respect to social welfare programs, so long as the line
abnormal complications encountered during their drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the Courts
pregnancies while Jaramillo experienced a normal will not interpose their judgement as to the appropriate
pregnancy, which is the sole cause fo her disability. 8 stopping point.
Gudelgig applied 2626 of UIC to preclude the payment of
benefits to appellees. Thus, the appellees were ruled With respect to how a change of the variables would result
ineligible for disability benefits and are now suing to enjoin in a more comprehensive program, the Court expressed
its enforcement and are challenging the constitutionality of that such would inevitably require state subsidy or some
such provision. other measure. The Court held that the State has a
legitimate interest in maintaining the self-supporting
Because of the Rentzer v Calif Unemployment nature of its insurance program and in distributing the
Insurance Appeals Board and the revised administrative available resources in such a way to keep benefit
guidelines that resulted from it, three of the appellees payments at an adequate level for disabilities covered. Also
whose disabilities were attributable to causes other than it has legitimate concern in maintaining the contribution
normal pregnancy and delivery, became entitled to benefits rate at a level that won’t unduly burden participating
under the program and their claims have since then been employees. Moreover, it said that here is nothing in the
paid. Consti that requires the State to subordinate or
compromise its legitimate interests solely to create a more
Issue : WON the California disability insurance program comprehensive social insurance program that it already
invidiously discriminates against Jaramillo and others has.
similarly situated by not paying insurance benefits for
disability that accompanies normal pregnancy and Brennan’s dissent:
childbirth. Despite the Code’s broad goals and scope of coverage,
\Underlying Issue: WON the Equal Protection Clause compensation is denied for disabilities suffered in
requires such policies to be sacrificed in order to finance connection with a “normal pregnancy” – disabilities
the payment of benefits to those whose disability is suffered only by women. By singling out for less favorable
attributable to normal pregnancies. treatment a gender-linked disability peculiar to women,
the State has created a double standard for disability
No. compensation. One set of rules is applied to females while
California intended to establish this benefit system as an another to males. This is sex discrimination. Where the
insurance program to function in accordance with State employs legislative classifications with reference to
insurance concepts. It never drew on general state gender-linked disability risks, “the Court is not free to
revenues to finance disability or hospital benefits. The one- sustain the statute on ground that iot rationally promotes
percent contribution bears a close and substantial legitimate govtl interests; rather such classifications can
relationship to the level of benefits payable and to the be sustained only when the State bears the burden of
disability risks insured under the program. Over the years, demonstrating that the challenged legislation serves
California has been committed to not increasing the overriding or compelling interests that cannot be achieved
contribution rate above the one-percent level. It has by more carefully tailored legislative classification or by the
sought to provide the broadest possible disability use of feasible, less drastic means.”
protection that would be affordable by even those with low-
incomes.

To order the State to pay benefits for disability

accompanying normal pregnancy and delivery is to order MISSISSIPPI UNIV. SCHOOL for WOMEN vs. HOGAN
them to make reasonable changes in the contribution rate,
the max benefits allowable and other variables affecting July 1, 1982
the solvency of the program. These variables represent a JUSTICE O'CONNOR
policy determination by the State.
FACTS:
California doesn’t discriminate with respect to persons or
groups which are eligible for disability insurance In 1884, the Mississippi Legislature created the
protection under the program. The classification Mississippi Industrial Institute and College for the
Education of White Girls of the State of Mississippi, now
8
See meaning of disability as defined in 2626 of Unemployment the oldest state-supported all-female college in the United
Insurance Code, page 2488 of case. States. The school, known today as Mississippi University
for Women (MUW), has from its inception limited its that the validity of a classification is determined through
enrollment to women. reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical
application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions
In 1971, MUW established a School of Nursing, initially about the proper roles of men and women.
offering a 2-year associate degree. Three years later, the
school instituted a 4-year baccalaureate program in The State's primary justification for maintaining the
nursing and today also offers a graduate program. The single-sex admissions policy of MUW's School of
School of Nursing has its own faculty and administrative Nursing is that it compensates for discrimination
officers and establishes its own criteria for admission. against women and, therefore, constitutes educational
affirmative action. As applied to the School of Nursing,
Respondent, Joe Hogan, is a registered nurse but does not we find the State's argument unpersuasive.
hold a baccalaureate degree in nursing. Since 1974, he  
has worked as a nursing supervisor in a medical center in In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification
Columbus, the city in which MUW is located. In 1979, favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and
Hogan applied for admission to the MUW School of directly assists members of the sex that is
Nursing's baccalaureate program.  Although he was disproportionately burdened.  However, we consistently
otherwise qualified, he was denied admission to the School have emphasized that "the mere recitation of a benign,
of Nursing solely because of his sex. compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
which protects against any inquiry into the actual
Hogan filed an action in the United States District Court purposes underlying a statutory scheme."
for the Northern District of Mississippi, claiming the
single-sex admissions policy of MUW's School of Nursing It is readily apparent that a State can evoke a
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth compensatory purpose to justify an otherwise
Amendment. Hogan sought injunctive and declaratory discriminatory classification only if members of the gender
relief, as well as compensatory damages. benefited by the classification actually suffer a
disadvantage related to the classification. Mississippi has
Issue made no showing that women lacked opportunities to
WON the state statute which prevented men from enrolling obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain
in MUW violate the Equal Protection Clause of the positions of leadership in that field when the MUW
Fourteenth Amendment School of Nursing opened its door or that women
currently are deprived of such opportunities. In fact, in
Holding 1970, the year before the School of Nursing's first class
Yes The Court held that the state did not provide an enrolled, women earned 94 percent of the nursing
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based baccalaureate degrees conferred in Mississippi and 98.6
distinction. The state's argument, that the policy percent of the degrees earned nationwide.  As one would
constituted educational affirmative action for women, was expect, the labor force reflects the same predominance of
"unpersuasive" since women traditionally have not lacked women in nursing.
opportunities to enter nursing.
Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced
Ratio by women, MUW's policy of excluding males from
admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate
We begin our analysis aided by several firmly established the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively
principles. Because the challenged policy expressly woman's job. By assuring that Mississippi allots more
discriminates among applicants on the basis of gender, it openings in its state-supported nursing schools to women
is subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of than it does to men, MUW's admissions policy lends
the Fourteenth Amendment. That this statutory policy credibility to the old view that women, not men, should
discriminates against males rather than against become nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is
females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Thus, we
standard of review.  Our decisions also establish that conclude that, although the State recited a "benign,
the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies compensatory purpose," it failed to establish that the
individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the alleged objective is the actual purpose underlying the
burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive discriminatory classification.
justification" for the classification.  The burden is met
only by showing at least that the classification serves Thus, considering both the asserted interest and the
"important governmental objectives and that the relationship between the interest and the methods
discriminatory means employed" are "substantially related used by the State, we conclude that the State has
to the achievement of those objectives." fallen far short of establishing the "exceedingly
  persuasive justification" needed to sustain the gender-
Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory based classification. Accordingly, we hold that MUW's
objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. policy of denying males the right to enroll for credit in
Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "protect" its School of Nursing violates the Equal Protection
members of one gender because they are presumed to Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior,
the objective itself is illegitimate. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST
joins, dissenting.
If the State's objective is legitimate and important, we next .
determine whether the requisite direct, substantial Of the State's 8 universities and 16 junior colleges, all
relationship between objective and means is present. The except MUW are coeducational. At least two other
purpose of requiring that close relationship is to assure Mississippi universities would have provided respondent
with the nursing curriculum that he wishes to pursue.  No associated with teenage pregnancies, & the social
other male has joined in his complaint. consequences of teenage child-bearing, court
concluded that the State has a compelling interest
Nor is respondent significantly disadvantaged by MUW's in preventing such pregnancies.
all-female tradition. His constitutional complaint is based
upon a single asserted harm: that he must travel to attend ISSUE:
the state-supported nursing schools that concededly are WON California’s statutory rape law violates the Equal
available to him. The Court characterizes this injury as Protection Clause. NO
one of "inconvenience."
RATIO:
The arguable but recognized benefits of single-sex colleges On the proper test
must also be considered. They provide an element of  Gender-based classifications are not “inherently
diversity, and [an environment in which women] generally, suspect so as to be subject to the “strict scrutiny”
speak up more in their classes, hold more positions of but will be upheld if they bear a “fair and
leadership on campus, and have more role models and substantial relationship” to legitimate state ends.
mentors among women teachers and administrators."  The traditional minimum rationality test applies.
 Because the Equal Protection Clause does not
The issue in this case is whether a State transgresses the demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to
Constitution when it seeks to accommodate the legitimate all persons or require things which are different in
personal preferences of those desiring the advantages of an fact to be treated in law as though they were the
all-women's college. In my view, the Court errs seriously same, a statute will be upheld where the gender
by assuming that the equal protection standard classification is not invidious, but rather
generally applicable to sex discrimination is realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not
appropriate here. That standard was designed to free similarly situated in certain circumstances.
women from "archaic and overbroad On the legitimate state interest
generalizations . . . ." In no previous case have we  One of the purposes of the California state statute
applied it to invalidate state efforts to expand in which the State has a strong interest is the
women's choices. Nor are there prior sex prevention of illegitimate teenage pregnancies.
discrimination decisions by this Court in which a male Teenage pregnancies, which have increased
plaintiff, as in this case, had the choice of an equal dramatically over the last 2 decades, have
benefit. significant social, medical, and economic
consequences for both the mother and her child,
By applying heightened equal protection analysis to this and the State.
case, the Court frustrates the liberating spirit of the Equal  The statute protects women from sexual
Protection Clause. It prohibits the States from providing intercourse and pregnancy at an age when the
women with an opportunity to choose the type of physical, emotional, and psychological
university they prefer. consequences are particularly severe. Because
virtually all of the significant harmful &
identifiable consequ3ences of teenage pregnancy
fall on the female, a legislature acts well within its
MICHAEL M. vs. SUPERIOR COURT
authority when it elects to punish only the
participant who, by nature, suffers few of the
FACTS: consequences of his conduct.
 Petitioner, then a 17 ½ yr old male, was charged  Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a
with violation of California’s statutory rape law, substantial deterrence to young females. No
which defines unlawful sexual intercourse as “an similar sanctions deter males. A criminal sanction
act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly
female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the “equalize” the deterrents on the sexes.
female is under 18” On underinclusivity/overbroadness
 Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the  There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that
information on both state and federal the statute is impermissibly underinclusive and
constitutional grounds asserting that the statute must, in order to pass judicial scrutiny, be
unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender broadened so as to hold the female as criminally
since men alone can be held criminally liable liable as the male. The relevant inquiry is not
thereunder. The trial court and CA denied whether the statute is drawn as precisely as it
petitioner’s request for relief and petitioner sought might have been, but whether the line chosen by
review in the SC of California. the California Legislature is w/n constitutional
 California SC upheld the statute. It justified the limitations. In any event, a gender-neutral statute
gender classification because only females may be would frustrate the State’s interest in effective
victims and only males may violate the section. It enforcement since a female would be less likely to
subjected the statute to strict scrutiny stating that report violations of the statute if she herself would
it must be justified by compelling state interest. It be subject to prosecution.
found that the classification was “supported not  Nor is the statute impermissibly overbroad
by mere social convention but by the immutable because it makes unlawful sexual intercourse with
fact that it is the female exclusively who can prepubescent females, incapable of becoming
become pregnant” pregnant. Aside from the fact that the statute
 Canvassing the tragic costs of illegitimate teenage could be justified on the grounds that very young
pregnancies, including the large number of females are particularly susceptible to physical
teenage abortions, increased medical risk injury from sexual intercourse, the Constitution
 does not require the California Legislature to limit
the scope of the statute to older teenagers and When a distinction drawn by a statute is not a pretext for
exclude young girls. gender discrimination and the law does not reflect a
On age consideration purpose to discriminate then it is constitutional
 And the statute is not unconstitutional as applied RATIONALE:
to petitioner, who, like the girl involved, was under
18 at the time of the sexual intercourse, on the The Mass Veterans Preference statute was a measure
asserted ground that the statute presumes in such designed to ease the transition from military to civil life by
circumstances that the male is the culpable veterans and to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to
aggressor. The statute does not rest on such an civil service. It is written in gender neutral language (the
assumption, but is an attempt to prevent use of person, male or female), though in 1884, when the
illegitimate teenage pregnancy by providing an 1st such statute was promulgated, no women were in the
additional deterrent for men. The age of the man is armed forces. It has been conceded by the appellants that
irrelevant since the young men are as capable as the civil positions open for competition resulted in a
older men of inflicting the harm sought to be disproportionate amount of males being preferred because
prevented. over 98% of the veterans at that time consisted of men.

HELD: US SC affirmed California SC. Statute does not Equal protection does not take away the ability of the state
violate the Equal Protection Clause. to classify as long as it is rationally based though the
effects may be uneven. However, certain classifications
are, like race, presumptively invalid and can only be
upheld upon extraordinary justification, even if that
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR vs. FEENEY classification is supposedly neutral. If a neutral law has a
disproportionate effect on a minority then it
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v Feeney (1979) unconstitional only if there can be traced a discriminatory
purpose.
ponente: Stewart J
Neutrals laws that have a disparate affect on minorities
Facts: traditionally victims of discrimination may have an
unconstitutional purpose. But equal protection means
Helen Feeney is a nonveteran. She alleges that the equal laws, not equal results. So long as there is no
Massachusetts Veterans Preference Statute is discrimination in the formulation of a law, it is still
unconstitional. The statute grants an absolute lifetime constitutional.
preference to veterans by requiring that "any person male
or female, including a nurse," qualifying for a civil service When a gender neutral statute is challenged, there must
position, who was honorably discharged from the US be a two-fold inquiry:
Armed Forces after at least 90 days of active service, at 1) Whether or not the statutory classification is indeed
least one day in wartime, must be considered for neutral; notgender-based,
appointment to a civil service position ahead of any 2) Whether or not the adverse effects reflects
qualified nonveterans. This formula excludes women from invidious gender-based discrimination. In 2 impact is a
consideration for the best Mass civil service jobs thus starting point but it is purposeful discrimination that
denying women the equal protection of laws. offends consti.

She passed her first civil service exam for the position of The appellee acknowledged and the district court found
Senior Clerk stenographer and was promoted. She that the distinction between veterans and non-veterans is
competed in other civil service exams during her 12 year not a pre-text for gender discrimination.
career to avail herself of a better job and promotion. She
consistently passed and was ranked quite high in some Veteran is a gender-neutral word. The distinction between
but she was always passed over by lower ranked veterans. vetern and non-veteran is not gender based. Men and
She lost her job when it was abolished and concluded that women can be veterans.
further competing in civil sercice exams is useless
because the veterans would always get ahead of her. The appellee and district court contends that
1) there is gender bias because it pefers a status generally
The district Court agreed with her saying that it had a reserved for men,
severe exclutionary impact on women hiring. In the 1st 2) the impact of absolute lifetime employment is too
appeal to the US Supreme Court, the case was remanded inevitable to be unintended.
so that the district court can consider it in light of the
Washington V Davis ruling that states a neutral law does The 1st contention presumes that the state incorporates a
not violate equal protection solely because it results in a panoply of sex-based laws to favor the employment of men
racially disproportionate impact; it must be traced to a in armed forces to become veterans. But veteran
purpose to discriminate on race. The district court preference is not discriminatory to women and the appellee
reaffirmed their judgment. and district court contradicts itself that a limited hiring
preference for veterans could be sustained. Just because
ISSUE: few women become veterans does not mean that the
veteran preference statute was intended by the state to
Does the Veterans Preference Statute violate equal discriminate against women. There must be discriminatory
protection by discriminating against women? intent but the state is simply
Preferring veterans not men. The legislative classification
RULE: between vets and non-vets has
not been disputed to be illegitimate. The Enlistment subject to discrimination. The legislation cant be sustained
policies of the US armed forces may be gender biased but unless carefully tuned to alternatives. Here there are less
that is not the issue here. discriminatory means available to effect the Compensatory
purpose.
The appellee presumes that a person intends the natural
and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions.
The Veteran preference would necessarily place more men
on civil service positions than women and the legislature is YICK WO vs. HOPKINS
aware of this. However, "discriminatory purpose" implies
that the legislature selected a particular course "because ** no digest for this case so I copied the digest from another
of", not "in spite of", adverse reviewer.
Effects on an identifiable group. The veteran preference
was not shown to be enacted because of gender Petitioners are Chinese businessmen engaged in the
discrimantion against women. laundry business who question the statute prohibiting the
operation and maintenance of fire-operated laundry
DISPOSITION: machines. The reson of the State was to prevent another
great fire. SC struck down the statute because it violated
judgment reversed the equal protection clause on 2 grounds:
1. it discriminated against those who used
CONCURRING: Stevens w/ White fire-operated laundry machines for
business (mostly Chinese) and those who
Disadvantaged males are almost as large as disadvantaged used them at home;
females. 2. some people (Caucasians) were still
allowed to operate their business provided
DISSENT: Marshall w/ Brennan that they secure a permit which was given
by the police officer at his discretion.
There is discriminatory intent because the statutory
scheme bears no substantial relationship to a legitimate FRAGRANTE vs. CITY & COUNTY of HONOLULU
government objective. Just because the objective of a
statute is to prefer one group does not always mean that it
does not have another purpose to disadvantage another. FACTS:
 At the age of 60, Fragrante immigrated to Hawaii.
Nobody can ever know what the legislature is thinking at a  He applied for an entry level job as a Civil Service
given time, therefore, critical constitutional inquiry is not Clerk at the City’s Division of Motor Vehicles and
whether an illicit consideration was the primary cause but Licensing.
rather whether it had an appreciable role in shaping a  Fragrante scored the highest among 721 test
given legislative enactment. takers in the written examination and was rank
first on a list of eligibles for two clerk positions.
There is no reliable evidence for subjective intentions so to  Following the interview, it was noted by the two
discern the purpose of a facially neutral policy, the court interviewers that he had a very pronounced accent
must consider the degree, inevitability and foreseeability of and was difficult to understand and therefore, as a
any disproportionate impact as well as the alternatives result of this, he was not chosen for the job and he
reasonably available. Here, the impact on women is was so notified by mail.
undisputed. The burden of proof should be on the state to
prove that sex-based considerations played no part. ISSUE: W/N unlawful discrimination on the basis of
national origin was the reason for denying employment to
To survive a challenge under equal protection clause, Fragrante.
statutes must be substantially related to the achievement
of important govt objectives. HELD: No evidence of unlawful discrimination was found
but it is Fragrante’s lack of the occupational requirement
The appellants contend that the statute: of being able to communicate effectively with the public
1) assists veterans in their readjustment that was the reason for his being denied the job.
to civilian life
2) encourage military reenlistment RATIO:
3) reward those who have served their country.  In disparate treatment cases, under which theory
this case was brought under, the employer is
To 1st objective, the statute is overinclusive because of it's normally alleged to have “treated a person less
permanent preference. The majority of those who currently favorable than others because of the person’s race,
enjoy the system have long been discharged and have no color, religion, sex or national origin.”
need for readjustment. o Plaintiff has the initial burden of proving
by preponderance of evidence a prima
To 2nd objective, it does not actually induce reenlistment facie case of discrimination.
and there is no proof to be found that the statute
influenced reenlistment. Also it bestows benefits equally  4 factors in McDonnell Douglas test:
on those who volunteered and those who were drafted. 1. that he has an identifiable national origin;
2. that he applied and was qualified for a job which
To 3rd objective, rewarding veterans does not adequately the employer was seeking applicants;
justify visiting substantial hardships on another class long 3. that he was rejected despite his qualifications;
 4. that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO ARTICLE (The “New” Equal
applicants from persons of complainant's Protection)
qualifications.

o Employer then has burden of “articulating The Phil. Consti. Provides “nor shall any person be denied
some legitimate, non-discriminatory the equal protection of the laws” which it got from the
reason” for the adverse action.  employer American Const. Amendment “no state shall… deny to any
still has degree of freedom of choice given person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
to him laws”. EP is generally based on moral equality- “although
o To succeed in carrying the ultimate not every person is the moral equal others, there are some
burden of proving intentional traits and factors, of which race is a paradigmatic
discrimination, a plaintiff may establish example, by virtue of which no person ought to be deemed
a pretext either directly, by showing morally inferior to any other person” where race-dependent
that the employer was more likely , gender-dependent and illegitimacy-dependent
motivated by a discriminatory reason, classifications are now generally disfavored. Therefore the
or indirectly, by showing the threshold question is whether similarly situated
employer's proffered reason is individuals are being treated differently.
unworthy of credence.
In the US, it was substantive due process instead of EP
 While Fragrante was able to establish a prima which was used to justify court intervention with state
facie case since jurisprudence and the guidelines economic legislation but in the 1960s the Warren Court
of the Equal Employment Oppurtunity went further where it used EP as a far-reaching umbrella
Commission has defined discrimination to include for judicial protection of fundamental rights not specified
denial of equal employment opportunity on the in the Const. One difference is that if the governmental act
basis that a person has the linguistic classifies persons, it will be subjected to EP analysis;
characteristics of a national origin group… an otherwise, it would be subjected to due process analysis.
adverse employment decision may be EP tests whether the classification is properly drawn, while
predicated upon an individuals accent when it procedural due process tests the process to find out
interferes materially with job performance. whether an individual falls within or without a specific
o The oral ability to communicate effectively classification.
in English is reasonable related to the
normal operations of the clerk’s office who Standards of Judicial Review
must often be able to respond to the There must be a sufficient degree of relationship between
public’s questions in a manner in which the perceived purpose of the law and the classification
they can understand. which the law makes. The choice of a standard of review
 In sum, the record conclusively shows that reflects whether the Court will assume the power to
Fragante was passed over because of the override democratic political process, or whether it will
deleterious effect of his Filipino accent on his limit the concept of a unique judicial function.
ability to communicate orally, not merely because The old EP doctrine applies the rational relationship test-
he had such an accent. it will be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to an end
of government which is not prohibited by the Const.
The new EP doctrine applies the strict scrutiny test. It will
Supreme Court of the United States not accept every permissible governmental purpose as to
support a classification; it will require that it is pursuing a
Manuel T. FRAGANTE, petitioner, compelling end.
v. The newer EP doctrine of the past 10 years has gone
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, et al beyond the two-tiered level of review, and applies the
intensified means test. According to Prof. Gunther of
No. 89-1350 Stanford, the Court should accept the articulated purpose
of the legislation, but it should closely scrutinize the
relationship between the classification and purpose.
April 16, 1990
Two-tiered standard of review
Under this, the first tier consists of the rational
Case below, 699 F.Supp. 1429; 888 F.2d 591. relationship test and the second tier the strict scrutiny
test. Strict judicial scrutiny is applied when legislation
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of impinges on fundamental tights, or implicates suspect
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. classes (classification based on race or ethnicity).
According to American cases, fundamental rights are:
Denied. a. marriage and procreation- “fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race
494 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1811, 108 L.Ed.2d 942, 52 Fair b. voting- “preservative of other basic civil and
Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) political rights”
848, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,796 c. fair administration of justice- fundamental as
established in Griffin v. Illinois
END OF DOCUMENT d. interstate travel- started with the landmark
decision in Shapiro v. Thompson
 e. other constitutional rights- fundamental rights necessary to extend the two-tiered standard of judicial
protected by the first 8 amendments review to cases involving social discrimination.

Suspect classes include: Models for an open-ended standard

a. race or national origin- in the case of Korematsu v. Under the traditional approach, the ideal limit of
US “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil reasonableness is reached when the public mischief
rights of a single racial groups are immediately sought to be eliminated is interchangeable with the trait,
suspect. That is not to say that all such as the defining characteristics of the legislative
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that classification. Problems only arise when it is under-
courts must subject them to the most rigid inclusive or over-inclusive.
scrutiny” There are 3 models drawn by Prof. Nowak of the Univ. of
b. alienage- established in the case of In re Griffiths Illinois for determining the approach that the Court should
take:
Benign classifications and affirmative action a. suspect-prohibited classification- whenever a
The US SC has held that racial classifications which classification burdens persons on the basis of
discriminate against minorities are inherently “suspect” their race, the court would invalidate the law
and will be subject to strict scrutiny and upheld only if unless the legislature can prove that the
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Thee classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
question of benign classification is will the same standard state interest. This standard will be almost
of review apply to government action which discriminates impossible to meet.
in favor of racial or ethnic minorities? It was addressed in b. Neutral classifications- neutral whenever it treats
the case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke persons in a dissimilar manner on the basis of
where they held it is not prohibited if discrimination some inherent human characteristic or status
remedies disadvantages of members of a group resulting (other than racial heritage) or limit the exercise of
from past unlawful discrimination but is still open to a fundamental right by a class of persons. The
questions (intermediate or strictest standard) as to what court should validate a statute only if the means
level of standard to applied. In the Phil. Benign used bear a factually demonstrable relationship to
classification and affirmative action does not necessarily a state interest capable of withstanding analysis.
fall under EP. It is specified in the Const. Art. XV, Sec. 11 c. Permissive classification- whenever legislation
“the state shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, treats classes in a dissimilar manner but does not
and interests of national cultural minorities in the employ a prohibited or neutral classification as the
formulation and implementation of state policies”. (it has basis of dissimilar treatment, it will be upheld as
only to show rational relationship in order to survive long as there is any conceivable basis upon which
judicial challenge) the classification could bear a rational relationship
to the state end.
Appraisal of the Two-tiered standard
Criticized by Justice Harlan, he was saying “classifications Another model drawn by Prof. Gary Simson of Univ. of
which are either based upon certain “suspect” criteria or Texas (discriminatory effect test)
affect “fundamental rights” will be held to deny EP unless His model is based upon the prescribed balance between
justified by a compelling governmental interest (calling it discriminatory effect and governmental justification:
the compelling interest doctrine). He was saying that if 1) courts should first decide whether the individual
classification is based upon the exercise of rights interest affected by the classification before them
guaranteed against state infringement by the Federal is fundamental, significant, or insignificant.
Const., then there is no need for any resort to the EP 2) Whether the disadvantage to the affected interest
clause. He was also saying that the fundamental right is is total, significant, or insignificant.
unfortunate and unnecessary since it creates an exception 3) Next is ascertaining whether the interest informing
which threatens to swallow the standard equal protection the classification is compelling, significant,
rule. In extending the compelling interest rule to all such insignificant, or unlawful
cases would go far toward making the Court a super- 4) Courts should also determine the necessary,
legislature. significant, insignificant, or non-existent character
of the relationship between means and ends.
Notwithstanding such criticisms, the Warren Court gave After all the factors, they should compute:
crucial support saying that since total equality is Nature of the affected interest x magnitude of disadvantage
impossible and undesirable, the judiciary in the name of Nature of the state’s interest x relationship between means
the constitution must select the areas in which quality is and end
to be imposed.
The Philippine Experience
With the advent of the new legal equality, the US has The Phil. SC continues to apply the permissive criteria of
declared it the duty of government to take positive action the traditional EP. The Phil. Court while ostensibly
to reduce social discrimination. In the Phil. It is not applying the rational relationship test, was implicity
necessary since the Const. makes the positive commands: applying the strict scrutiny test in People v. Vera where it
“the state shall promote social justice to ensure dignity, held that the Phil. Probation Act was unconstitutional
welfare and security”, “shall maintain and ensure because application of the statute depended upon salary
adequate social services in the field of education, health, appropriations for probation officers by the provincial
housing, employment, welfare and social security…” , “it boards (since residents of a province could be denied of the
shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, benefits of probation if the provincial board failed to
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or appropriate the necessary amount).
creed”. Therefore in the Phil. it will not always be
In an unfortunate development, the court upheld the Act favor of the school, and DOLE secretary Quisumbing
which made it unlawful for any native of the Phil. who was denied the motion for reconsideration.
a member of non-Christian tribe to possess or drink
intoxicating liquors other than native liquors. It was held Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification is
to be reasonable because it was designed to insure peace discriminatory to Filipinos. Respondents claim, however,
and order among non-Christian tribes but the rational that this is not so as a number of their foreign educators
relationship test would consider this distasteful. are in fact local-hires.
There are still other cases such as the Laurel v. Misa
where the court failed to use the strict scrutiny test and ISSUE:
was considered unworthy of emulation.
The lengthy search in Phil. jurisprudence can be Whether or not the 25% difference in salary is
abbreviated by adopting the category which the American discriminatory.
Court labeled under the two-tiered standard of judicial
review, as the category of cases calling for strict judicial HELD:
scrutiny.
Yes it is.
Scenario for the “new” equal protection
RATIO:
The tired slogan of Filipino politicians “those who have less
in life should have more in law” should be taken on a In deciding the case, the court points first to the 1987
serious level as an affirmative action on the part of the Constitution, particularly the Article on Social Justice and
government, and perhaps the formulation of “benign” Human Rights, which the court says this discrimination is
classifications. Contemporary developments argue for against.
expanding the contours of constitutional equality, by
adopting strict judicial scrutiny in cases where the laws They also point to international law, which likewise looks
seek to restrict fundamental rights or to classify on the down on discrimination. It then goes further to say that
basis of suspect criteria. this is even worse when the discrimination is done in the
workplace. Pointing again to the Constitution, they assert
In the Phil. the equal protection clause, phrased as it is that it promotes “equality of employment opportunities to
after the American model, may pose problems of legislative all”, as well as the Labor Code, which ensure equal
and administrative classifications, of linkages between opportunity for all.
legal and socio-economic opportunity, of equal rewards,
and most fundamentally of the extent of compatibility of Article 135 of the Labor Code looks down on
political liberty and economic equality. In the resolution of discrimination in terms of wages. Article 248 declares such
these problems, the “new” equal protection could prove to a practice unfair.
be a useful and equitable technique of judicial analysis, in
the hands of a SC sentient to the continuing need to Also cited is the International Covenant on Economic,
prevent invidious discrimination against disadvantaged Social and Cultural Rights. Article 7 talks about the
victims of legislative classification or in the exercise of ensuring of remuneration, as well as fair and equal wages
certain fundamental rights by the Filipino people, as a and remuneration.
justice constituency.
In this case, there is no evidence in a difference of
workload nor of performance, so the presumption is that
all the employees are performing at equal levels. There is
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE vs. no evidence of the foreign hires being 25% more efficient.
QUISIMBING The school’s claimed need to entice these foreign hires is
not a good defense, either. As for compensation, the other
FACTS forms of compensation are enough.
Before ending, the court says, however, that the foreign
International School Inc., pursuant to PD 732, is an and local hires are not part of the same bargaining unit,
educational institution targeted towards dependents of nor is there any showing of an attempt to consolidate the
foreign diplomats and other temporary residents. As such, two.
they hire their teachers both from the Philippines and from
abroad.

To indicate whether they are foreign hires or local hires,

they take into consideration 1) domicile 2) home economy BOARD of DIRECTORS vs. ROTARY CLUB
3) economic allegiance 4) was the school responsible for
bringing the individual to the Philippines. May 4, 1987
JUSTICE POWELL
The problem lies in the salary of the teachers. As foreign
hires, they are accorded benefits that local hires do not FACTS:
have. These include, housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Their When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International
salaries are also higher by 25%. The school gives 2 violated club policy by admitting three women into its
reasons: 1) dislocation factor and 2) limited tenure. active membership its charter was revoked and it was
expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in
In a new collective bargaining agreement, ISA educators reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary
contested this difference in salary. Filing a strike, DOLE International's action violated a California civil rights
assumed jurisdiction. Acting secretary Trajano decided in act prohibiting sexual discrimination.
 place more or less outside public view." The court further
Rotary International, "an organization of business and concluded that admitting women to the Duarte Club would
professional men united worldwide who provide not seriously interfere with the objectives of Rotary
humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards in International. Finally, the court rejected appellants'
all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the argument that their policy of excluding women is protected
world." Individual members belong to a local Rotary Club by the First Amendment principles set out in Roberts v.
rather than to International. In turn, each local Rotary United States Jaycees. The court ordered appellants to
Club is a member of International. Individuals are reinstate the Duarte Club as a member, and permanently
admitted to membership in a Rotary Club according to a enjoined them from enforcing or attempting to enforce the
"classification system" The general rule is that "one active gender requirement against the Duarte Club.
member is admitted for each classification, but he, in turn,
may propose an additional active member, who must be in ISSUE:
the same business or professional classification." WON a California statute (Unruh Act) that requires
California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates
Subject to these requirements, each local Rotary Club is the First Amendment.
free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting
new members. Rotary International has promulgated HOLDING:
Recommended Club By-laws providing that candidates for
membership will be considered by both a "classifications No. The Court found that the relationship among the
committee" and a "membership committee." club's members was not of the intimate or private variety
which warrants First Amendment protection. Because
Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. It was many of Rotary's activities are conducted in the presence
testified that the exclusion of women results in an "aspect of strangers, and because women members would not
of fellowship, that is enjoyed by the present male prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there was
membership," and also allows Rotary to operate effectively no violation of associational rights. Even if there were a
in foreign countries with varied cultures and social mores. slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to
Women are however, permitted to attend meetings, give associate, that minimal infringement would be justified
speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Rotary since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in ending
members may form their own associations, and are sexual discrimination.
authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women
between 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or RATIO
Rotaract, organizations sponsored by Rotary International.
Application of the Act to local Rotary Clubs does not
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California, admitted interfere unduly with club members' freedom of
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to private association
active membership. Rotary International notified the
Duarte Club that admitting women members is contrary to In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the court upheld
the Rotary constitution. After an internal hearing, Rotary against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute
International's board of directors revoked the charter of that required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting
the Duarte Club and terminated its membership. The members. Roberts provides the framework for analyzing
Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention was appellants' constitutional claims. As observed in Roberts,
unsuccessful. our cases have afforded constitutional protection to
freedom of association in two distinct senses. First,
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a the Court has held that the Constitution protects
complaint in the California Superior Court. The complaint against unjustified government interference with an
alleged that appellants' actions violated the Unruh Civil individual's choice to enter into and maintain certain
Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code The court ruled in favor of intimate or private relationships. Second, the Court
Rotary International citing that neither Rotary has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for
International nor the Duarte Club is a "business the purpose of engaging in protected speech or
establishment" within the meaning of the Unruh Act. religious activities.

The California Court of Appeal reversed. It held that both The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into
Rotary International and the Duarte Rotary Club are and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a
business establishments subject to the provisions of the fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of
Unruh Act. The Court of Appeal identified several Rights. Such relationships may take various forms. In
"businesslike attributes" of Rotary International, including determining whether a particular association is sufficiently
its complex structure, large staff and budget, and personal or private to warrant constitutional protection, we
extensive publishing activities. The court held that the trial consider factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and
court had erred in finding that the business advantages whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the
afforded by membership in a local Rotary Club are merely relationship
incidental. In particular, the court noted that members
receive copies of the Rotary magazine and numerous other The evidence in this case indicates that the
Rotary publications, are entitled to wear and display the relationship among Rotary Club members is not the
Rotary emblem, and may attend conferences that teach kind of intimate or private relation that warrants
managerial and professional techniques. constitutional protection. The size of local Rotary
Clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to more than 900.
The court also held that membership in Rotary There is no upper limit on the membership of any local
International or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a Rotary Club. About 10 percent of the membership of a
"continuous, personal, and social" relationship that "takes typical club moves away or drops out during a typical
year. The clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow violate the right of expressive association afforded by
of prospects coming" to make up for the attrition and the First Amendment. 
gradually to enlarge the membership. The purpose of
Rotary "is to produce an inclusive, not exclusive, Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is
membership, making possible the recognition of all useful unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude
local occupations, and enabling the club to be a true cross that these contentions were not properly presented to
section of the business and professional life of the the state courts. It is well settled that this Court will not
community." However beneficial this is to the members review a final judgment of a state court unless "the record
and to those they serve, it does not suggest the kind of as a whole shows either expressly or by clear implication
private or personal relationship to which we have accorded that the federal claim was adequately presented in the
protection under the First Amendment. state system." Appellants did not present the issues
squarely to the state courts until they filed their petition
Application of the Act to California Rotary Clubs does for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The court denied
not violate the First Amendment right of expressive the petition without opinion.
association.

Many of the Rotary Clubs' central activities are carried

on in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are BOY SCOUTS of AMERICA vs. DALE
required to admit any member of any other Rotary
Club to their meetings. Members are encouraged to BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE (2000)
invite business associates and competitors to
meetings. In sum, Rotary Clubs, rather than carrying (ponente: Chief Justice Rehnquist)
on their activities in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to
keep their "windows and doors open to the whole
world," We therefore conclude that application of the FACTS:
Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interfere
unduly with the members' freedom of private 1. James Dale was a former Eagle Scout who also
association. became an assistant scoutmaster. While in college,
he was very active in gay and lesbian issues. He
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in even became the copresident of his university’s
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a Gay/Lesbian Alliance.
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a
wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, 2. When the Boy Scouts of America learned that he is
religious, and cultural ends." In this case, however, the an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist, it
evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to revoked his adult membership in the Boy Scouts
Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the of America (BSA) because the organization forbids
existing members' ability to carry out their various membership to homosexuals.
purposes.
3.     Dale filed a complaint against the BSA in the
As a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions New Jersey Superior Court alleging that the BSA
on "public questions," including political or international had violated New Jersey’s public accommodations
issues. To be sure, Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of statute by revoking his membership based solely
commendable service activities that are protected by the on his sexual orientation. The NJ Superior Court
First Amendment. But the Unruh Act does not require the granted judgment in favor of Dale. The decision
clubs to abandon or alter any of these activities. Nor does was affirmed by the NJ Appellate Division.
it require them to abandon their classification system or
admit members who do not reflect a cross section of the 4. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the
community. Indeed, by opening membership to leading judgment of the Appellate Division. It held that the
business and professional women in the community, Boy Scouts was a place of public accommodation
Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a more representative subject to the public accommodations law; that
cross section of community leaders with a broadened the organization was not exempt from the law
capacity for service. under any of its express exceptions; and that the
Boy Scouts violated the law by revoking Dale’s
Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight membership based on his avowed homosexuality.
infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive
association, that infringement is justified because it 5. BSA raised the issue in the US Supreme Court.
serves the State's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women.. On its face the Unruh ISSUES:
Act, like the Minnesota public accommodations law we 1. WON Boy Scouts is an expressive
considered in Roberts, makes no distinctions on the basis association and that the forced
of the organization's viewpoint. Moreover, public inclusion of Dale would significantly
accommodations laws "plainly serve compelling state affect its expression. - YES
interests of the highest order." In Roberts we recognized
that the State's compelling interest in assuring equal 2. WON applying New Jersey’s public
access to women extends to the acquisition of accommodations law in the way applied
leadership skills and business contacts as well as by the NJ Supreme Court violates the
tangible goods and services. The Unruh Act plainly Boy Scouts’ right of expressive
serves this interest. We therefore hold that application association. - YES
of the Unruh Act to California Rotary Clubs does not
 expressive activity that could be impaired in order to
RATIO: be entitled to protection.

1. Forcing a group to accept certain members may 9. State public accommodations laws were originally
impair the ability of the group to express those enacted to prevent discrimination in traditional
views, and only those views, that it intends to places of public accommodation–like inns and
express. “Freedom of association … plainly trains. New Jersey’s statutory definition of “ ‘[a]
presupposes a freedom not to associate.” place of public accommodation’ ” is extremely broad.
The term is said to “include, but not be limited to,” a
2. The constitution’s protection of expressive list of over 50 types of places. . Many on the list are
association is not reserved for advocacy groups. But what one would expect to be places where the public
to come within its ambit, a group must engage in is invited. For example, the statute includes as
some form of expression, whether it be public or places of public accommodation taverns,
private. restaurants, retail shops, and public libraries. But
the statute also includes places that often may not
3. The Boy Scouts seeks to instill values in young carry with them open invitations to the public, like
people by having its adult leaders spend time with summer camps and roof gardens. In this case, the
the youth members, instructing and engaging them New Jersey Supreme Court went a step further and
in activities like camping, archery, and fishing. applied its public accommodations law to a private
During the time spent with the youth members, the entity without even attempting to tie the term “place”
scoutmasters inculcate them with the Boy Scouts’ to a physical location. As the definition of “public
values–both expressly and by example. It seems accommodation” has expanded from clearly
indisputable that an association that seeks to commercial entities, such as restaurants, bars, and
transmit such a system of values engages in hotels, to membership organizations such as the Boy
expressive activity. Scouts, the potential for conflict between state
public accommodations laws and the constitutional
4. The values the Boy Scouts seeks to instill are “based rights of organizations has increased.
on” those listed in the Scout Oath and Law. The Boy
Scouts explains that the Scout Oath and Law 10.  In the Hurley case, we said that public
provide “a positive moral code for living; they are a accommodations laws “are well within the State’s
list of ‘do’s’ rather than ‘don’ts.’ ” The Boy Scouts usual power to enact when a legislature has reason
asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent to believe that a given group is the target of
with the values embodied in the Scout Oath and discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter,
Law, particularly with the values represented by the violate the First Amendment. But we went on to note
terms “morally straight” and “clean.” that in that case “the Massachusetts [public
accommodations] law has been applied in a peculiar
5. The terms “morally straight” and “clean” are by no way” because “any contingent of protected
means self-defining. Different people would attribute individuals with a message would have the right to
to those terms very different meanings. The BSA, participate in petitioners’ speech, so that the
through its official written statements, believes that communication produced by the private organizers
engaging in homosexual conduct is contrary to being would be shaped by all those protected by the law
“morally straight” and “clean.” who wish to join in with some expressive
demonstration of their own.”
6. It is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s
expressed values because they disagree with those 11.  A state requirement that the Boy Scouts retain Dale
values or find them internally inconsistent. As is as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly
true of all expressions of constitutional freedoms, burden the organization’s right to oppose or disfavor
the courts may not interfere on the ground that they homosexual conduct. The state interests embodied
view a particular expression as unwise or irrational. in New Jersey’s public accommodations law do not
As we give deference to an association’s assertions justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’
regarding the nature of its expression, we must also rights to freedom of expressive association. That
give deference to an association’s view of what would being the case, we hold that the constitution
impair its expression. prohibits the State from imposing such a
requirement through the application of its public
7. Dale, by his own admission, is one of a group of gay accommodations law.
Scouts who have “become leaders in their
community and are open and honest about their 12. Justice Stevens’ dissent makes much of its
sexual orientation. . Dale’s presence in the Boy observation that the public perception of
Scouts would, at the very least, force the homosexuality in this country has changed. Indeed,
organization to send a message, both to the youth it appears that homosexuality has gained greater
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts societal acceptance. But this is scarcely an
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of argument for denying protection to those who
behavior. refuse to accept these views. The constitution
protects expression, be it of the popular variety or
8. Associations do not have to associate for the not. And the fact that an idea may be embraced and
“purpose” of disseminating a certain message in advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the
order to be entitled to the protections of the more reason to protect the rights of those who wish
constitution. An association must merely engage in to voice a different view.
 13. We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views a person of the same sex." After the complaint was
of whether the Boy Scouts’ teachings with respect to dismissed and summary judgment entered for the
homosexual conduct are right or wrong; public or defendants, the plaintiffs appealed.
judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s
expression does not justify the State’s effort to ISSUE:
compel the organization to accept members where WON the Massachusetts Statute may deny the protections,
such acceptance would derogate from the benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two
organization’s expressive message. “While the law is individuals of the same sex who wish to marry.
free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of
harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an HELD:
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, The Court concluded that it may not. The Massachusetts
however enlightened either purpose may strike the Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all
government.” individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens.
The defendants have failed to identify any constitutionally
adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex
couples.

RATIO:
GOODRIDGE vs. DEPT. of PUBLIC HEALTH
Civil marriage is created and regulated through exercise of
Ponente: CJ Marshall the police power. Marriage also bestows enormous private
and social advantages on those who choose to marry. The
benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are
FACTS: enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death.
It is undoubtedly for these concrete reasons, as well as for
The plaintiffs are fourteen individuals from five its intimately personal significance, that civil marriage has
Massachusetts counties. Among them are Hillary long been termed a "civil right."
Goodridge, forty-four years old, and Julie Goodridge, forty-
three years old, who had been in a committed relationship The Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of
for thirteen years and lived with their five year old personal liberty against government incursion as
daughter. zealously, and often more so, than does the Federal
Constitution, even where both Constitutions employ
In March and April, 2001, each of the plaintiff couples essentially the same language. The individual liberty and
attempted to obtain a marriage license from a city or town equality safeguards of the Massachusetts Constitution
clerk's office. As required under Genral Laws c.7, they protect both "freedom from" unwarranted government
completed notices of intention to marry on forms provided intrusion into protected spheres of life and "freedom to"
by the registry, see G.L. c. 207, § 20, and presented these partake in benefits created by the State for the common
forms to a Massachusetts town or city clerk, together with good. It also requires, at a minimum, that the exercise of
the required health forms and marriage license fees. In the State's regulatory authority not be "arbitrary or
each case, the clerk either refused to accept the notice of capricious."
intention to marry or denied a marriage license to the
couple on the ground that Massachusetts does not The plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to undermine
recognize same- sex marriage. Because obtaining a the institution of civil marriage. They do not want marriage
marriage license is a necessary prerequisite to civil abolished. They do not attack the binary nature of
marriage in Massachusetts, denying marriage licenses to marriage, the consanguinity provisions, or any of the other
the plaintiffs was tantamount to denying them access to gate-keeping provisions of the marriage licensing law.
civil marriage itself, along with its social and legal Recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of
protections, benefits, and obligations. the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of
opposite-sex marriage, any more than recognizing the right
On April 11, 2001, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior of an individual to marry a person of a different race
Court against the Department of Public Health and the devalues the marriage of a person who marries someone of
commissioner seeking a judgment that "the exclusion of her own race.
the plaintiff couples and other qualified same-sex couples
from access to marriage licenses, and the legal and social Civil marriage is now construed to mean the voluntary
status of civil marriage, as well as the protections, benefits union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all
and obligations of marriage, violates Massachusetts law." others. This reformulation redresses the plaintiffs'
constitutional injury and furthers the aim of marriage to
The Superior Court judge ruled for the department. In a promote stable, exclusive relationships. It advances the
memorandum of decision and order dated May 7, 2002, he two legitimate State interests the department has
dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the marriage statutes identified: providing a stable setting for child rearing and
should be construed to permit marriage between persons conserving State resources. It leaves intact the
of the same sex, holding that the plain wording of G.L. c. Legislature's broad discretion to regulate marriage.
207, as well as the wording of other marriage statutes,
precluded that interpretation. He also held that the
marriage exclusion does not offend the liberty, freedom,
equality, or due process provisions of the Massachusetts
TECSON vs. COMELEC
Constitution, and that the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights does not guarantee "the fundamental right to marry
 (March 3, 2004) categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens.
Ponente: J. Vitug Upon ratification of the Treaty of Paris and pending
legislation by the US Congress, the native inhabitants of
FACTS: the Phils ceased to be Spanish subjects. The term “citizens
of the Philippines” first appeared in the Phil Bill of 1902,
 Dec 31, 2003: respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ) the 1st comprehensive legislation of the US Congress on
filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position the Phils. Under this organic act, a “citizen of the
of President of the Republic of the Philippines under Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the Phils,
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino. In his COC, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The
FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born
the Phils with his date of birth to be Aug 20, 1939 and inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
his place of birth in Manila. Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
 Jan 9, 2004: petitioner Victorino Fornier filed with the Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. While there
Comelec a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due were divergent views on WON jus soli was a mode of
course or to cancel his COC upon the claim that FPJ acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Consti brought an end to
made a material misrepresentation in his COC by any such link with common law by adopting jus sanguinis
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino when in truth: or blood relationship as the basis of Filipino citizenship:
1. his parents were foreigners – his mother, Bessie “Sec 1, Art III: The following are citizens of the Phils:
Kelley Poe, was an American and his father, Allan 1. Those who are citizens of the Phil Islands at the time
F. Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of of the adoption of this Consti
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject 2. Those born in the Phils of foreign parents who,
2. granting that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he before the adoption of this Consti, had been elected
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to public office in the Phil Islands
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an 3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Phils
alien mother (Allan F. Poe contracted a prior 4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Phils and
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his upon reaching the age of majority, elect Phil
marriage to Bessie Kelley. Even if no such prior citizenship
marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessie Kelly 5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law”
only a year after the birth of respondent.) Subsection 4 of the above provision resulted in
 Jan 23: Comelec dismissed the petition for lack of discriminatory situations that incapacitated women from
merit; subsequent MFR was denied transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate
 Petitioner Fornier invokes § 78 of the Omnibus children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
Election Code: mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship. The 1973 Consti
Ҥ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a corrected this by adding the provision:
COC. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course “2. Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of
or to cancel a COC may be filed by any person the Phils
exclusively on the ground that any material 3. Those who elect Phil citizenship pursuant to the
misrepresentation contained therein as required provisions of the 1935 Consti”
under § 74 hereof is false.” The 1987 Consti generally adopted the provision of the
 Petitioners Tecson, et al. and Velez invoke Article VII, § 1973 Consti, except for subsection 3:
4, par. 7 of the Consti in assailing the jurisdiction of “3. Those born before Jan 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
the Comelec. who elect Phil citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority”
ISSUES  HELD:
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the petitions  The Case of FPJ
YES, but only with regard to Fornier’s petition Sec 2, Art VII of the 1987 Consti states that “No person
2. WON FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
COC  NO, hence, he is indeed a natural-born citizen of the Phils,” among other qualifications. The term
Filipino citizen “natural-born citizens” is defined to include “those who are
citizens of the Phils from birth without having to perform
RATIO: any act to acquire or perfect their Phil citizenship.”
1. With regard to petitioner Fornier’s petition, the Court Considering the reservations made by the parties on the
recognizes its own jurisdiction under § 78 of the veracity of the evidence, the only conclusions that could be
Omnibus Election Code in consonance with the drawn with some degree of certainty are that:
general powers of the Comelec. Their decisions on 1. the parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
disqualification cases may be reviewed by the SC per Kelley
Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as well 2. FPJ was born to them on 20 Aug 1939
as § 7, Art IX of the Consti. The petition was aptly 3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
elevated to and could well be taken cognizance by the other on 16 Sept 1940
CS, as opposed to that of petitioner Tecson’s, which 4. the father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou
refers to a contest in a post-election scenario, and 5. at the time of his death on 11 Sept 1954, Lorenzo
hence, not applicable in this case. Pou was 84 years old
2.
Citizenship: Brief Historical Background The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he
During the Spanish regime, there was no such term as died in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed
“Philippine citizens” but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish that he was born sometime in 1870 when the Phils was
subjects.” The natives, as we know, were called “indios,” still a colony of Spain. Petitioner argues that Lorenzo Pou
denoting a lower regard for the inhabitants of the was not in the Phils during the crucial period of 1898 to
archipelago. The Civil Code of Spain came out with the 1st 1902, considering there was no existing record about such
fact. However, he failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at The distinction between legitimate children and
any other place during the same period. In the absence of illegitimate children rests on real differences. But
any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to real differences alone do not justify invidious
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of distinction. Real differences may justify distinction
residence of a person at the time of his death was also for 1 purpose but not for another purpose.
his residence before death.
What possible state interest can there be for
Proof of Paternity and Filiation disqualifying an illegitimate child from being a public
Under the Civil Code of Spain until the effectivity of the officer? It was not the child’s fault that his parents
1950 Civil Code, acknowledgement (judicial/compulsory or had illicit liaison. Why deprive him of the fullness of
voluntary) was required to establish filiation or paternity. political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify
In FPJ’s birth certificate, nowhere in the document was the an illegitimate child from holding an important
signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of
apparently executed by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be “some in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality
other public document.” The 1950 Civil Code, on the other in the distinction, then it transgresses the equal
hand, categorized recognition of illegitimate children into protection clause and must be reprobated.”
voluntary, legal, or compulsory. Unlike an action to claim
legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the WOOHOO! Nai-imagine ko si Father Bernas…
child, an action to claim acknowledgement could only be
brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent. The Hence, where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child
Family Code, however, liberalized the rules, as found in as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for
Articles 172, 173 and 175 re: filiation. the benefit of the child. It was to ensure a Filipino
nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in
Civil law provisions point out to an obvious bias against line with the assumption that the mother, who had
illegitimacy. Such discrimination may be traced to the custody, would exercise parental authority and had the
Spanish family and property laws that sought to distribute duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the
inheritance of titles and wealth strictly according to child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him. In fact,
bloodlines. These distinctions between legitimacy and the 1935 Consti can never be more explicit than it is.
illegitimacy were thus codified in the Spanish Civil Code Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, it states that
and later survived in our Civil Code. Such distinction, among the citizens of the Phils are “those whose
however, remains and should remain only in the fathers are citizens of the Phils” regardless of whether
sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge such children are legitimate or not.
on the domain of political law. The proof of filiation or
paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship
status should thus be deemed independent from and
not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code
provisions of proof of filiation or paternity, although
good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters Consti. Art. III, sec. 4
alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary
rules on evidence could well and should govern. Thus, the Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelly Mangahas, speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
sister of Bessie Kelley Poe, might be accepted to prove the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
acts of Allan F. Poe recognizing his own paternal for redress of grievances.
relationship with FPJ (i.e. living together with Bessie Kelley
and their children in 1 house and as 1 family).

FPJ’s citizenship A. Protected Speech

Petitioner argues that, since FPJ was an illegitimate child,
he followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an PRIOR RESTRAINT
American citizen. Amicus curiae Joaquin Bernas, SJ
states: NEAR vs. MINESOTA
“If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was
on the lis mota, it would be a decision constituting
doctrine under stare decisis; but if it was irrelevant to Near v Minnesota (06/01/31)
the lis mota, it would not be a decision but a mere obiter Hughes, C.J.
dictum, which did not establish doctrine. (He then Facts: A Minnesota statute (Chap285, Session Laws 1925)
proceeds to discredit all the cases cited by petitioner, as provides for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a
being obiter dicta). Aside from the fact that such a "malicious, scandalous & defamatory newspaper, [702]
pronouncement would have no textual basis in the magazine or other periodical. Participation in such
Consti, it would also violate the Equal Protection business shall constitute a commission of such nuisance
Clause TWICE. First, it would make an illegitimate and render the participant liable & subject to the
distinction between a legitimate and illegitimate proceedings, orders & judgments provided for in the Act.
child, and second, it would make an illegitimate Ownership, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, of
distinction between the illegitimate child of a any such periodical, or of any stock or interest in any
Filipino father and the illegitimate children of a corporation or organization which owns the same in whole
Filipina mother. or in part, or which publishes the same, shall constitute
such participation. In actions brought under above, there
shall be available the defense that the truth was published 1. w/n the statute is unconstitutional for being violative of
with good motives & for justifiable ends & in such actions the due process clause
the plaintiff shall not have the right to report to issues or
Held: YES
editions of periodicals taking place more than three
months before the commencement of the action. The To start, the SC notes that the liberty of the press is under
statute also provides that the County Atty, or any citizen of the ambit of "liberty" which is guaranteed by the 14th
the county, may maintain an action in the district court of Amendment. Gitlaw v NY, Whitney v California. In
the county in the name of the State to enjoin perpetually maintaining this guarantee, the State has the power to
the persons committing or maintaining any such nuisance enact laws to promote the safety, health,morals & general
from further committing or maintaining it. It was under welfare of the people, but this power is to be determined
this statue that the County Atty filed an action against with appropriate regard to the particular subject of its
Near (herein petitioner) for allegedly publishing & exercise. Liberty of speech, & of the press, is also not an
circulating a periodical that charged public & law absolute right, & the State may punish its abuse. Whitney
enforcement officials, including the Mayor of Minneapolis, v. California. In the present instance, the inquiry is as to
of inefficiency, gross neglect of duty & graft for failing to the historic conception of the liberty of the press &
quell the city''s gangster problem. The articles made whether the statute under review violates the essential
serious accusations against the public officers named & attributes of that liberty.
others in connection with the prevalence of crimes & the In passing upon constitutional questions, the court has
failure to expose & punish them. The District Court made regard to substance, & not to mere matters of form, &
findings of fact which followed the allegations of the that, in accordance with familiar principles, the statute
complaint & found that the editions in question were must be tested by its operation & effect. Henderson v.
"chiefly devoted to malicious, scandalous & defamatory Mayor. 1st The statute is not aimed at the redress of
articles" concerning the individuals named. The court individual or private wrongs. Remedies for libel remain
further found that the defendants, through these available & unaffected. The statute, said the state court,
publications, "did engage in the business of regularly & "is not directed at threatened libel, but at an existing
customarily producing, publishing & circulating a business which, generally speaking, involves more than
malicious, scandalous & defamatory newspaper," & that libel." It is alleged, & the statute requires the allegation,
"the said publication" "under said name of The Saturday that the publication was "malicious." But, as in
Press, or any other name, constitutes a public nuisance prosecutions for libel, there is no requirement of proof by
under the laws of the State." Judgment was thereupon the State of malice in fact, as distinguished from malice
entered adjudging that "the newspaper, magazine & inferred from the mere publication of the defamatory
periodical known as The Saturday Press," as a public matter. The judgment in this case proceeded upon the
nuisance, "is hereby abated. Near appealed to State mere proof of publication. It is apparent that under the
supreme court, which upheld the decision. Near now statute the publication is to be regarded as defamatory if it
appeals to the US SC. injures reputation, & scandalous if it circulates charges of
Petitioner (Near): reprehensible conduct, whether criminal or otherwise, &
the publication is thus deemed to invite public reprobation
- statute violates the due process clause of the 14th
& to constitute a public scandal. 2nd The statute is
Amendment as it deprives him of liberty (his right to free
directed not simply at the circulation of scandalous &
speech & liberty of the press) & property (his publication)
defamatory statements with regard to private citizens, but
- District Court decision violates the due process clause of at the continued publication by newspapers & periodicals
the 14th Amendment as it deprives him of any future of charges against public officers of corruption,
livelihood (appellant sees the decision as a bar against his malfeasance in office, or serious neglect of duty. 3rd The
establishing any further business involving publication) object of the statute is not punishment but suppression of
the offending newspaper or periodical. The reason for the
Defendants:
enactment is that prosecutions to enforce penal statutes
-insists that the questions of the application of the statute for libel do not result in "efficient repression or
to appellant's periodical, & of the construction of the suppression of the evils of scandal." Under this statute, a
judgment of the trial court, are not presented for review; publisher of a newspaper or periodical, undertaking to
that appellant's sole attack was upon the constitutionality conduct a campaign to expose & to censure official
of the statute, however it might be applied derelictions, & devoting his publication principally to that
purpose, must face not simply the possibility of a verdict
- that no question either of motive in the publication, or
whether the decree goes beyond the direction of the against him in a suit or prosecution for libel, but a
determination that his newspaper or periodical is a public
statute, is before the court
nuisance to be abated, & that this abatement &
-the statute deals not with publication per se, but with the suppression will follow unless he is prepared with legal
"business" of publishing defamation. evidence to prove the truth of the charges & also to satisfy
-the constitutional freedom from previous restraint is lost the court that, in addition to being true, the matter was
because charges are made of derelictions which constitute published with good motives & for justifiable ends. 4th.
crimes. The statute not only operates to suppress the offending
newspaper or periodical, but to put the publisher under an
- the publisher is is permitted to show, before injunction effective censorship. Cutting through mere details of
issues, that the matter published is true & is published procedure, the operation & effect of the statute is that
with good motives & for justifiable ends public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of a
-the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of newspaper or periodical before a judge upon a charge of
scandal which tends to disturb the public peace & to conducting a business of publishing scandalous &
provoke assaults & the commission of crime defamatory matter -- in particular, that the matter
consists of charges against public officers of official
Issues: dereliction -- &, unless the owner or publisher is able &
disposed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge suppression & injunction on such a basis, is
that the charges are true & are published with good constitutionally valid, it would be equally permissible for
motives & for justifiable ends, his newspaper or periodical the legislature to provide that at any time the publisher of
is suppressed & further publication is made punishable as any newspaper could be brought before a court & required
a contempt. This is of the essence of censorship. to produce proof of the truth of his publication, or of what
he intended to publish, & of his motives, or stand
The question is whether a statute authorizing such
enjoined. If this can be done, the legislature may provide
proceedings in restraint of publication is consistent with
machinery for determining in the complete exercise of its
the conception of the liberty of the press as historically
discretion what are justifiable ends, & restrain publication
conceived & guaranteed. In determining the extent of the
accordingly. It would be but a step to a complete system of
constitutional protection, it has been generally if not
censorship.
universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the
guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication. re:the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of
This Court said, in Patterson v. Colorado, "the main scandal which tends to disturb the public peace & to
purpose of such constitutional provisions is "to prevent all provoke assaults & the commission of crime: Charges of
such previous restraints "upon publications as had been reprehensible conduct, & in particular of official
practiced by other governments," & they do not prevent the malfeasance, unquestionably create a public scandal, but
subsequent "punishment of such as may be deemed the theory of the constitutional guaranty is that even a
contrary to the public welfare.For whatever wrong the more serious public evil would be caused by authority to
appellant has committed or may commit by his prevent publication. As was said in New Yorker Staats-
publications the State "appropriately affords both public & Zeitung v. Nolan,"If the township may prevent the
private redress by its libel laws. As has been noted, the circulation of a newspaper for no reason other than that
statute in question "does not deal with punishments; it some of its inhabitants may violently disagree with it, &
provides for no punishment, except in case of contempt for resent its circulation by resorting to physical violence,
violation of the "court's order, but for suppression & there is no limit to what may be prohibited." The danger of
injunction, that is, for restraint upon publication. violent reactions becomes greater with effective
organization of defiant groups resenting exposure, & if this
The protection even as to "previous restraint is not
consideration warranted legislative interference with the
absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been
initial freedom of publication, the constitutional protection
recognized only in exceptional cases: "When a nation is at
would be reduced to a mere form of words.
war, many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their "utterance will not Judgment reversed. Statute declared unconstitutional
be endured so long as men fight, & that no Court could
regard them as protected by any "constitutional right."
Schenck v. United States These limitations are not
applicable here. Nor are we now concerned with "questions
as to the extent of authority to prevent publications in NEW YORK TIMES vs. US
order to protect private rights according to the "principles
governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
equity. The fact that, for approximately one hundred &
fifty years, there has been almost an entire absence of
attempts to impose previous restraints upon publications Voting: 5-4
relating to the malfeasance of public officers is significant
of the deep-seated conviction that such restraints would FACTS:
violate constitutional right. Public officers, whose
character & conduct remain open to debate & free
discussion in the press, find their remedies for false In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the
accusations in actions under libel laws providing for Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York
redress & punishment, & not in proceedings to restrain Times and Washington Post from publishing materials
the publication of newspapers & periodicals. belonging to a classified Defense Department study
regarding the history of United States activities in
re: defendant's contention that the statute deals not with Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was
publication per se, but with the "business" of publishing necessary to protect national security. This case was
defamation: If the publisher has a constitutional right to decided together with United States v. Washington Post
publish, without previous restraint, an edition of his Co.
newspaper charging official derelictions, it cannot be
denied that he may publish subsequent editions for the ISSUE:
same purpose. Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the
re: the constitutional freedom from previous restraint is publication of what it termed "classified information"
lost because charges are made of derelictions which violate the First Amendment?  YES
constitute crimes: The freedom of the press from previous
restraint has never been regarded as limited to such RATIO:
animadversions as lay outside the range of penal In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the
enactments. It is inconsistent with the reason which government did not overcome the "heavy presumption
underlies the privilege, as the privilege so limited would be against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices
of slight value for the purposes for which it came to be Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security"
established should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law
re:is permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan
matter published is true & is published with good motives reasoned that since publication would not cause an
& for justifiable ends: If such a statute, authorizing
inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the There is no statute barring the publication by the press of
safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified. the material which the Times and the Post seek to use.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS joins, concurring. Title 18 U.S.C. 793 (e) provides that "[w]hoever having
unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any
Madison proposed the First Amendment in three parts, document, writing . . . or information relating to the
one of which proclaimed: "The people shall not be deprived national defense which information the possessor has
or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United
their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable." The communicates . . . the same to any person not entitled to
amendments were offered to curtail and restrict the receive it . . . [s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or
general powers granted to the branches of gov’t. The Bill of imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
Rights changed the original Constitution into a new
charter under which no branch of government could The Government suggests that the word "communicates" is
abridge the people's freedoms of press, speech, religion, broad enough to encompass publication. There are eight
and assembly. sections in the chapter on espionage and censorship, 792-
799. In three of those eight "publish" is specifically
Solicitor General argues that the general powers of the mentioned:
Gov’t adopted in the original Constitution should be
interpreted to limit and restrict the guarantees of the Bill 794 (b) applies to "Whoever, in time of war, with intent
of Rights. Both the history and language of the First that the same shall be communicated to the enemy,
Amendment support the view that the press must be left collects, records, publishes, or communicates . . . [the
free to publish news, whatever the source, without disposition of armed forces]."
censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.
Section 797 applies to whoever "reproduces, publishes,
First Amendment gave the free press the protection it must sells, or gives away" photographs of defense installations.
have to fulfill its role in our democracy. The press was to
serve the governed, not the governors. Only a free and Section 798 relating to cryptography applies to whoever:
unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in "communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes
govt. In revealing the workings of government that led to available . . . or publishes" the described material. 2
the Vietnam War, the newspapers nobly did precisely that (Emphasis added.)
which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do.
Thus it is apparent that Congress was capable of and did
The Solicitor General stated: distinguish between publishing and communication in the
various sections of the Espionage Act.
"… `no law' does not mean `no law', and I would seek to
persuade the Court that is true. . . . [T]here are other parts The other evidence that 793 does not apply to the press is
of the Constitution that grant powers and responsibilities a rejected version of 793 which read: "During any national
to the Executive, and . . . the First Amendment was not emergency resulting from a war to which the United States
intended to make it impossible for the Executive to is a party, or from threat of such a war, the President may,
function or to protect the security of the United States."   by proclamation, declare the existence of such emergency
and, by proclamation, prohibit the publishing or
And the Government argues that in spite of the First communicating of, or the attempting to publish or
Amendment, "[t]he authority of the Exec Dept to protect communicate any information relating to the national
the nation against publication of information whose defense which, in his judgment, is of such character that it
disclosure would endanger the national security stems is or might be useful to the enemy.". During the debates in
from two interrelated sources: the constitutional power of the Senate the First Amendment was specifically cited and
the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his that provision was defeated.
authority as Commander-in-Chief." The Act of September 23, 1950, in amending 18 U.S.C.
793 states in 1 (b) that: "Nothing in this Act shall be
To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the construed to authorize, require, or establish military or
publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out civilian censorship or in any way to limit or infringe upon
the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty freedom of the press or of speech as guaranteed by the
and security of the very people the Govt hopes to make Constitution of the United States and no regulation shall
"secure." be promulgated hereunder having that effect."

The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the So any power that the Government possesses must come
expense of informed representative government provides from its "inherent power."
no real security for our Republic. The Framers of the First
Amendment, fully aware of both the need to defend a new The power to wage war stems from a declaration of war.
nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial The Constitution gives Congress power to declare War.
governments, sought to give this new society strength and Nowhere are presidential wars authorized.
security by providing that freedom of speech, press,
religion, and assembly should not be abridged. These disclosures 3 may have a serious impact. But that is
no basis for sanctioning a previous restraint on the press.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE As stated by Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota:
BLACK joins, concurring. "The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by
miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the less
necessary the immunity of the press from previous I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely
restraint in dealing with official misconduct." result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our
Nation or its people. That being so, there can be but one
Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, judicial resolution of the issues before us.
perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and
discussion of public issues are vital to our national health.
On public questions there should be "uninhibited, robust, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE
and wide-open" debate. STEWART joins, concurring.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring. United States has not satisfied the very heavy burden that
The First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial it must meet to warrant an injunction against publication
restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or in these cases, at least in the absence of express and
conjecture that untoward consequences may result. appropriately limited congressional authorization for prior
restraints in circumstances such as these.]  
There is a single, extremely narrow class of cases in which
the First Amendment's ban on prior judicial restraint may In the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own
be overridden. Such cases may arise only when the Nation investigations and findings, I am quite unable to agree that
is at war, during which times no one would question but the inherent powers of the Executive and the courts reach
that a govt might prevent actual obstruction to its so far as to inhibit publications by the press. Much of the
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of difficulty inheres in the "grave and irreparable danger"
transports or the number and location of troops. In standard suggested by the US.
neither of these actions has the Govt presented or even
alleged that publication of items based upon the material In Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941), the
at issue would cause the happening of an event of that words "national defense" as used in a predecessor of 793
nature. Only gov’tal allegation and proof that publication were held by a unanimous Court to have "a well
must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the understood connotation" - a "generic concept of broad
occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a connotations, referring to the military and naval
transport already at sea can support even the issuance of establishments and the related activities of national
an interim restraining order. preparedness" - and to be "sufficiently definite to apprise
the public of prohibited activities" and to be consonant
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE with due process. Also, as construed by the Court in
WHITE joins, concurring. Gorin, information "connected with the national defense" is
obviously not limited to that threatening "grave and
The Executive is endowed with power in the two related irreparable" injury to the United States.  
areas of nat’l defense and int’l relations.
It has apparently been satisfied to rely on criminal
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances sanctions and their deterrent effect on the responsible as
present in other areas of our national life, the only effective well as the irresponsible press. I am not, of course, saying
restraint upon executive policy and power may lie in an that either of these newspapers has yet committed a crime
informed and critical public opinion which alone can here or that either would commit a crime if it published all the
protect the values of democratic government. material now in its possession. That matter must await
resolution in the context of a criminal proceeding if one is
The successful conduct of intl diplomacy and the instituted by the United States. In that event, the issue of
maintenance of an effective natl defense requires both guilt or innocence would be determined by procedures and
confidentiality. standards quite different from those that have purported
to govern these injunctive proceedings.
The responsibility must be where the power is. If the
Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.
unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs and the
maintenance of our national defense, then under the It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept
Constitution the Executive must have the largely unshared of separation of powers for this Court to use its power of
duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal contempt to prevent behavior that Congress has
security necessary to exercise that power successfully. specifically declined to prohibit. There would be a similar
Moral, political, and practical considerations would dictate damage to the basic concept of these co-equal branches of
that a very first principle would be an insistence upon Government if when the Executive Branch has adequate
avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is authority granted by Congress to protect "national
classified, then nothing is classified, and the system security" it can choose instead to invoke the contempt
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the power of a court to enjoin the threatened conduct. The
careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self- Constitution provides that Congress shall make laws, the
protection or self-promotion. A truly effective internal President execute laws, and courts interpret laws. It did
security system would be the maximum possible not provide for government by injunction in which the
disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved courts and the Executive Branch can "make law" without
only when credibility is truly maintained. But be that as it regard to the action of Congress.
may, it is clear to me that it is the constitutional duty of
the Executive is to protect the confidentiality necessary to Congress has on several occasions given extensive
carry out its responsibilities in the fields of intl relations consideration to the problem of protecting the military and
and natl defense. strategic secrets of the United States. This consideration
has resulted in the enactment of statutes making it a
crime to receive, disclose, communicate, withhold, and
publish certain documents, photographs, instruments, spans a period ending in 1968. It is hardly believable that
appliances, and information. The bulk of these statutes is a newspaper would fail to perform one of the basic and
found in chapter 37 of U.S.C., Title 18, entitled Espionage simple duties of every citizen with respect to the discovery
and Censorship. or possession of stolen property or secret government
documents. That duty, was to report forthwith, to
There has been no attempt to make such a showing. The responsible public officers.
Solicitor General does not even mention in his brief
whether the Government considers that there is probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed or whether MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE
there is a conspiracy to commit future crimes. and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

If the Government had attempted to show that there was

In order to decide the merits of these cases properly, some
no effective remedy under traditional criminal law, it would
or all of the following questions should have been faced:
have had to show that there is no arguably applicable
statute.
1. WON the Atty Gen is authorized to bring these
suits in the name of the US.
Even if it is determined that the Government could not in
2. WON the First Amendment permits the federal
good faith bring criminal prosecutions against the New
courts to enjoin publication of stories which would
York Times and the Washington Post, it is clear that
present a serious threat to national security.
Congress has specifically rejected passing legislation that
3. WON the threat to publish highly secret
would have clearly given the President the power he seeks
documents is of itself a sufficient implication of natl
here and made the current activity of the newspapers
security to justify an injunction regardless of the
unlawful.
contents of the documents.
4. WON the unauthorized disclosure of any of these
On at least two occasions Congress has refused to enact
particular documents would seriously impair the natl
legislation that would have made the conduct engaged in
security.
here unlawful and given the President the power that he
5. WON weight should be given to the opinion of high
seeks in this case. In 1917 during the debate over the
officers in the Exec Branch of the Govt with respect to
original Espionage Act, still the basic provisions of 793,
questions 3 and 4.
Congress rejected a proposal to give the President in time
6. WON the newspapers are entitled to retain and
of war or threat of war authority to directly prohibit by
use the documents notwithstanding the uncontested
proclamation the publication of information relating to
facts that the documents were stolen from the Govt's
national defense that might be useful to the enemy.
possession and that the newspapers received them
with knowledge that they had been feloniously
acquired.
7. WON the threatened harm to the natl security or
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
the Govt's possessory interest in the documents
justifies the issuance of an injunction against
These cases are not simple for another and more
publication in light of –
immediate reason. We do not know the facts of the cases.
a. The strong First Amendment policy
No District Judge knew all the facts. No Court of Appeals
against prior restraints on publication;
judge knew all the facts. No member of this Court knows
b. The doctrine against enjoining conduct in
all the facts.
violation of criminal statutes; and
c. The extent to which the materials at issue
The haste is due in large part to the manner in which the
have apparently already been otherwise
Times proceeded from the date it obtained the documents.
disseminated.
It seems reasonably clear now that the haste precluded
reasonable and deliberate judicial treatment of these cases
It is plain to me that the scope of the judicial function in
and was not warranted. The precipitate action of this
passing upon the activities of the Exec Branch in the field
Court aborting trials not yet completed is not the kind of
of foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted.
judicial conduct that ought to attend the disposition of a
great issue.
The power to evaluate the "pernicious influence" of
premature disclosure is not lodged in the Exec alone. The
It is not disputed that the Times has had unauthorized
judiciary must review the initial Exec determination to the
possession of the documents for three to four months,
point of satisfying itself that the subject matter of the
during which it has had its expert analysts studying them,
dispute does lie within the President's foreign relations
presumably digesting them and preparing the material for
power. Constitutional considerations forbid a complete
publication. During all of this time, the Times, presumably
abandonment of judicial control. Moreover, the judiciary
in its capacity as trustee of the public's "right to know,"
may properly insist that the determination that disclosure
has held up publication for purposes it considered proper
of the subject matter would irreparably impair the natl
and thus public knowledge was delayed.
security be made by the head of the Exec Dept.
Would it have been unreasonable, since the newspaper
But in my judgment the judiciary may not properly go
could anticipate the Government's objections to release of
beyond these two inquiries and redetermine for itself the
secret material, to give the Government an opportunity to
probable impact of disclosure on the national security.
review the entire collection and determine whether
agreement could be reached on publication? Stolen or not,
I can see no indication in the opinions of either the DC or
if security was not in fact jeopardized, much of the
the CA in the Post litigation that the conclusions of the
material could no doubt have been declassified, since it
Exec were given even the deference owing to an
administrative agency, much less that owing to a co-equal Baltimore City. There shall be a further right of appeal
branch of the Govt. from the decision of the Baltimore City Court to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, subject generally to the
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. time and manner provided for taking appeal to the Court
of Appeals."
Holmes observation certainly has pertinent application:
“The NY Times secretly devoted a period of 3 months to  State concedes that the picture does not violate the
examine the 47 volumes. Once it had begun publication, statutory standards &  would have received a license if
the NY case now before us emerged. It immediately properly submitted, but the appellant was still convicted
assumed hectic pace and character. Once publication of a violation of the statute
started, the material could not be made public fast  Appellant’s contention: statute in its entirety
enough. From then on, every delay was abhorrent and was unconstitutionally impaired freedom of expression.
to be deemed violative of the First Amendment and of the
public's "right immediately to know."
ISSUE:
The District of Columbia case is much the same. 1.WON the CA was correct in using the doctrine in Times
Film Corp. vs. Chicago as precedence in this case.
There has been much writing about the law and little 2.WON the Maryland statute presents a danger of unduly
knowledge and less digestion of the facts. The most recent suppressing protected expression.
of the material, it is said, dates no later than 1968, already 3.WON the statute lacks sufficient safeguards thus
about 3 years ago, and the Times itself took 3 months to resulting to a delegation of excessive admin discretion
formulate its plan of procedure and, thus, deprived its on the part of the Board of censors.
public for that period.
HELD & RATIO:
The First Amendment is only one part of an entire 1. No. The CA was misplaced in relying on the Times Film.
Constitution. Art II of the great document vests in the Exec In that case, the court upheld a requirement of submission
Branch power over the conduct of foreign affairs and the of motion pictures in advance of exhibition. But the
responsibility for the Nation's safety. Even the newspapers question tendered for decision was "whether a prior
concede that there are situations where restraint is restraint was necessarily unconstitutional under all
constitutional. circumstances." The Court quoted the statement from Near
v. Minnesota that "the protection even as to previous
therefore would remand these cases to be developed restraint is not absolutely unlimited." Appellant presents a
expeditiously, of course, but on a schedule permitting the question quite distinct from that passed on in Times Film.
orderly presentation of evidence from both sides, with the He argues that it constitutes an invalid prior restraint
use of discovery as authorized by the rules, and with the because, in the context of the remainder of the statute, it
preparation of briefs, oral argument, and court opinions of presents a danger of unduly suppressing protected
a quality better than has been seen to this point. expression.

2. Yes. Under the 14th Amendment, a State is not free to

adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with
FREEDMAN vs. MARYLAND
obscenity… without regard to the possible consequences
for constitutionally protected speech." The administration
of a censorship system for motion pictures presents
J. Brennan peculiar dangers to constitutionally protected speech.
Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a censorship
FACTS: proceeding puts the initial burden on the exhibitor or
distributor. Because the censor's business is to censor,
 Appellant exhibited the film "Revenge at Daybreak" at there inheres the danger that he may well be less
his Baltimore theatre without first submitting the responsive than a court to the constitutionally protected
picture to the State Board of Censors as required by interests in free expression. And if it is made unduly
onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, to seek judicial
Md. Ann. Code, 1957, Art. 66A, 2: "It shall be unlawful review, the censor's determination may in practice be final.
to sell, lease, lend, exhibit or use any motion picture
film or view in the State of Maryland unless the said film Only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding
or view has been submitted by the exchange, owner or ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression,
lessee of the film or view and duly approved and only a procedure requiring a judicial determination
licensed by the Maryland State Board of Censors, suffices to impose a valid final restraint.
hereinafter in this article called the Board."

Sec 19 : (if the film is disapproved/ eliminations

ordered) 3. YES. Maryland’s scheme fails to provide adequate
"the person submitting such film or view for examination safeguards against undue inhibition of protected
will receive immediate notice of such elimination or expression, thus rendering the requirement of prior
disapproval, and if appealed from, such film or view will submission of films to the Board an invalid previous
be promptly re-examined, in the presence of such restraint.
person, by two or more members of the Board, and the
same finally approved or disapproved promptly after How can prior submission of films avoid infirmity?
such re-examination, with the right of appeal from the 1. The burden of proving that the film is unprotected
decision of the Board to the Baltimore City Court of expression must rest on the censor. Due process
 requires that the State bear the burden of persuasion to
show that the appellants engaged in criminal speech."
2. While the State may require advance submission of all MALCOLM, J
films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings
of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be FACTS:
administered in a manner which would lend an effect of Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon,
finality to the censor's determination whether a film and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality,
constitutes protected expression. meet on the morning of April 1, 1922, in the presidencia of
Pilar, and became engaged in a discussion regarding the
The Maryland procedural scheme does not satisfy these administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted
criteria. in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like
First, once the censor disapproves the film, the exhibitor myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of
must assume  the burden of instituting judicial Governor-General Wood, because he has recommended
proceedings and of persuading the courts that the film is a bad administration in these Islands and has not
protected expression. made a good recommendation; on the contrary, he has
Second, once the Board has acted against a film, asassinated the independence of the Philippines and
exhibition is prohibited pending judicial review, however for this reason, we have not obtained independence
protracted. Under the statute, appellant could have been and the head of that Governor-General must be cut
convicted if he had shown the film after unsuccessfully off." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon
seeking a license, even though no court had ever ruled on with a violation of article 256. of the Penal Code having to
the obscenity of the film. do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other
Third, it is Maryland statute provides no assurance of persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has
prompt judicial determination. There is no time limit that appealed the case to this court.
is imposed for completion of Board action. There is no
statutory provision for judicial participation in the ISSUE:
procedure which bars a film, nor even assurance of 1. WON article 256 of the Penal Code, the provision
prompt judicial review. Risk of delay is built into the allegedly violated, is still enforceable
Maryland procedure, as is borne out by experience; in the 2. WON the appellant committed libel
only reported case indicating the length of time required to
complete an appeal, the initial judicial determination has HOLDING:
taken four months and final vindication of the film on 1. Yes
appellate review, six months. 2. No, however, he was guilty of a portion of treason and
sedition. Trial court decision affirmed with modification
Without these safeguards, it may prove too burdensome to
seek review of the censor's determination. Particularly in RATIO:
the case of motion pictures, it may take very little to deter Enforceability of Art. 256
exhibition in a given locality. The exhibitor's stake in any
one picture may be insufficient to warrant a protracted The first error assigned by counsel for the appellant is to
and onerous course of litigation. The distributor, on the the effect that article 256 of the Penal Code is no longer in
other hand, may be equally unwilling to accept the force.
burdens and delays of litigation in a particular area when,
without such difficulties, he can freely exhibit his film in In the case of United States vs. Helbig, Mr. Helbig was
most of the rest of the country; for we are told that only prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was
four States and a handful of municipalities have active eventually sent back to the court of origin for a new trial,
censorship laws. the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of
law that article 256 is still in force.
What they can do:
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, that until
otherwise decided by higher authority, so much of article
In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown , the court upheld a New 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate to ministers
York injunctive procedure designed to prevent the sale of of the Crown or to writings coming under the Libel
obscene books. That procedure postpones any restraint Law, exists and must be enforced.
against sale until a judicial determination of obscenity
following notice and an adversary hearing. The statute The Crime Committed
provides for a hearing one day after joinder of issue; the
judge must hand down his decision within two days after Accepting the above statements relative to the
termination of the hearing. continuance and status of article 256 of the Penal
Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in this
In the film industry: allow the exhibitor or distributor to instance is not this article but rather a portion of the
submit his film early enough to ensure an orderly final Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will later
disposition of the case before the scheduled exhibition date appear, we think that the words of the accused did not
- far enough in advance so that the exhibitor could safely so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in
advertise the opening on a normal basis. Failing such a authority, as they did to raise a disturbance in the
scheme or sufficiently early submission under such a community.
scheme, the statute would have to require adjudication
considerably more prompt than has been the case under In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are
the Maryland statute. not directed primarily against individuals, but rather
against the existence of the State, the authority of the
Government, or the general public peace. The offenses
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMNENT

PEOPLE vs. PEREZ

created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this has made a statement and done an act which tended to
character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has
commotions or disturbances 'in the State. Though the made a statement and done an act which tended to
ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order
or at least such a course of measures as evidently of the Government.
engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open
violence against the laws, or the subversion of the While our own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we
Constitution. nevertheless entertain the conviction that the courts
should be the first to stamp out the embers of
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of insurrection. The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an
Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the irresponsible individual, must be dealt with firmly before it
freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to endangers the general public peace.
assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetriate even to VILLAMOR, J., with whom concurs AVANCEÑA, J.,
the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter concurring and dissenting:
how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the I agree in that the accused should be sentenced to suffer
Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, two months and one day of arresto mayor with costs, as
unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when imposed by the court a quo, under the provisions of article
the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the 256 of the Penal Code, but not under section 8 of Act No.
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and 292. The accused should not be convicted of the crime of
press and of assembly and petition must yield to sedition because there is no allegation in the complaint
punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of nor proof in the record, showing that when the accused
constituted authority, the supremacy of the uttered the words that gave rise to these proceedings, he
constitution and the laws, and the existence of the had the intention of inciting others to gather for an illicit
State. purpose, or to incite any conspiracy or rebellion, or to
disturb the peace of the community or the safety and order
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief of the Government
Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position
seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this
instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the
furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More DENNIS vs. US
than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious
tendency in the words used, which could easily produce (1951)
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the FACTS:
Government and obedient to the laws. The Governor- Eugene Dennis and others were convicted of conspiring to
General is the representative of executive civil authority in organize the Communist Party of the United States as a
the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious group to teach and advocate the overthrow of the
attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights Government of the United States by force and violence in
of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. violation of the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act--
sec 2 and 3 of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.A.
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission,
as amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have been In this certiorari they assail the constitutionality of this
placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a said act alleging that it violates their freedom of speech
situation. This section reads as follows: and that it is void for indefiniteness/vagueness.
ISSUES:
"Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches,
or who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels 1. WON sec 2 or 3 of the Smith Act inherently or as
against the Government of the United States or against the construed and applied in the instant case, violates
Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, the First Amendment and other provisions of the
write, publish, utter or make any statement, or speech, or Bill of Rights no.
do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or 2. WON either s 2 or s 3 of the Act, inherently or as
which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together construed and applied in the instant case, violates
for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites the First and Fifth Amendments because of
rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people indefiniteness.  no
against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb HELD:
the peace of the community or the safety or order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil Sections 2 and 3 of the Smith Act do not violate the 1 st
practices from the constituted authorities, shall be amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights, or
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars the 1st and 4th amendments for indefiniteness. Petitioners
United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding intended to overthrow the Government of the US as
two years, or. both, in the discretion of the court." speedily as the circumstances would permit. Conspiracy to
organize the Communist Party and tot each and advocate
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. the overthrow of the government of the US by force and
He has made a statement and done an act which tended to violence created a clear and present danger. Convictions
instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful affirmed.
purposes. He has made a statement and done an act
which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He
RATIO: ideas will result in the wisest governmental
policies. Court have recognized that this is not an
1. Sections 2 and 3 of the Smith Act provide as follows: unlimited, unqualified right, but that the societal
‘Sec. 2. value of speech must, on occasion, be
subordinated to other values and considerations.
‘(a) It shall be unlawful for any person--
 Justice Holmes stated that the ‘question in every
‘(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or case is whether the words used are used in
teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of such circumstances and are of such a nature as
overthrowing or destroying any government in the to create a clear and present danger that they
United States by force or violence, or by the will bring about the substantive evils that
assassination of any officer of any such government; Congress has a right to prevent.’
‘(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of  The constitutionality of the statute is adjudged y
any government in the United States, to print, publish, whether or not it is reasonable. Since it was
edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly entirely reasonable for a state to attempt to protect
display any written or printed matter advocating, itself from violent overthrow the statute was
advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, perforce reasonable.
or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any
government in the United States by force or violence;  wherever speech was the evidence of the violation,
it was necessary to show that the speech created
‘(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or
the ‘clear and present danger’ of the substantive
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or
evil which the legislature had the right to prevent.
encourage the overthrow or destruction of any
government in the United States by force or violence;  Court’s interpretation of the 1 st amendment: ‘(The
or to be or become a member of, or affiliate **861 First) Amendment requires that one be permitted
with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, to believe what he will. It requires that one be
knowing the purposes thereof. permitted to advocate what he will unless there is
a clear and present danger that a substantial
‘(b) For the purposes of this section, the term
public evil will result therefrom.’ However, speech
‘government in the United States’ means the
is not an absolute, above and beyond control by
Government of the United States, the government of
the legislature when its judgment, subject to
any State, Territory, or possession of the United
review here, is that certain kinds of speech are so
States, the government of the District of Columbia, or
undesirable as to warrant criminal sanction.
the *497 government of any political subdivision of
any of them.  This case warrants a restriction of speech because
overthrow of the Government by force and violence
‘Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to
is certainly a substantial enough interest for the
commit, or to conspire to commit, any of the acts
Government to limit speech. Indeed, this is the
prohibited by the provisions of * * * this title.’
ultimate value of any society, for if a society
cannot protect its very structure from armed
internal attack, it must follow that no subordinate
 The general goal of the communist party is to value can be protected.
achieve a successful overthrow of the existing
order by force and violence  As to the meaning of clear and present danger,
court adopts the rule by Chief Justice Hand. Chief
 Purpose of the statute: to protect the existing Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority
government not from change by peaceable, lawful below, interpreted the phrase as follows: ‘In each
and constitutional means, but from change by case (courts) must ask whether the gravity of the
violence, revolution and terrorism. ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies
 argument that there is a ‘right’ to rebellion against such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
dictatorial governments is without force where the avoid the danger.’
existing structure of the government provides for  In this case, the requisite danger existed the
peaceful and orderly change. petitioner’s activities were from 1945-48
 Petitioners contend that the Act prohibits (formation of a highly organized conspiracy) when
academic discussion of the merits of Marxism- there was inflammable nature of world conditions,
Leninism, that it stifles ideas and is contrary to all touch-and-go relationship of the US with other
concepts of a free speech and a free press. The countries. Court is convinced that these satisfy
court held that the language of the Smith Act is convictions. It is the existence of the conspiracy
directed at advocacy not discussion. which creates the danger; we cannot bind the
Government to wait until the catalyst is added.
 Congress did not intend to eradicate the free
discussion of political theories, to destroy the 2.
traditional rights of Americans to discuss and  Re vagueness: arguments by petitioners are
evaluate ideas without fear of governmental nonpersuasive
sanction. Rather Congress was concerned with the
very kind of activity in which the evidence showed  We agree that the standard as defined is not a
these petitioners engaged. neat, mathematical formulary. Like all
verbalizations it is subject to criticism on the score
 Re free speech: basis of the First Amendment is of indefiniteness. But petitioners themselves
the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech, contend that the verbalization, ‘clear and present
propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of
 danger’ is the proper standard. Relations (hearing, substantial evidence, etc). Although
there is no precise and controlling definition of due
 Court has attempted to sum up the factors that process, it does furnish an unavoidable standard to which
are included within its scope gov’t action must conform before depriving a persons
rights. All forms of media are entitled to freedom of speech
as long as they pass the clear and present danger rule. If
they say words that are used in such circumstances and
are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger
ABRAMS vs. US
that they will bring about the substantive evils that a
lawmaker has a right to prevent, screw them.
** no digest for this case so I copied the digest from another
reviewer.
The rule does not have an all-embracing character for all
utterances in every form, however. Broadcast media is
Five plaintiffs were charged and convicted of conspiring to necessarily under stricter supervision than written media.
violate the provisions of the Espionage Act. They wrote, Radio and TV are easily accessible in the country and
printed, and distributed pamphlets in NY, which criticized confront people in public and private, unlike written media
the US War Program in Russia. They claim that it’s their that some people can’t afford nor read. The clear and
intention to prevent injury to the Russian cause; their present danger rule must take this into account. The gov’t
immediate reason was resentment caused by the US gov’t has a right to protect itself against broadcasts which incite
sending troops into Russia as a strategic operation against sedition. But the people have the right to be informed too
the Germans on the eastern battle front. The SC held that and obsequious programming will not serve. The freedom
there was a violation of the Espionage Act. Men must be to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
held to have intended, and to be accountable for, the representative democracy. Broadcast media as the most
effects which their acts were likely to have produces. The popular and convenient info disseminators around deserve
possible effect of their acts was the defeat of the US war special protection by the due process and freedom of
program. Further, the plain purpose of their propaganda speech clauses.
was to excite dissatisfaction, sedition, riots, and revolution
in the US, to defeat US military plans in Europe. Note the
Holmes dissent, which discussed the thory that the DISPOSITION:
constitution is a mer experiment; we should not seek too
much certainty from rules. He further said that intent Moot and academic. But the petitioners would have won.
must be clearly shown, and used in a strict and accurate
sense, since it was not shown that petitioners did, in fact, OTHERS:
attack the government.
Fernando CJ, concurs:
EASTERN BROADCASTING vs. DANS
Oooh, guidelines are good, even if the case is moot and
academic.
(1985) [2nd last Marcos year]
Teehankee J, concurs:
Gutierrez Jr J
Because cut and paste did not actually exist in 1985, I am
FACTS:
still going to submit my concurring opinion for Gutierrez’
ponencia but with an added prefatory statement.
Radio Station DYRE was summarily closed on grounds of
nat'l security. It was alleged that DYRE was used to incite
Good job, ponente, for pulling off the clear and present
people to sedition which arose because they were shifting
danger rule as the standard for limiting “preferred” rights
to coverage of public events and airing programs geared
[freedom of expression, etc]. Good job too in Salonga vs
towards public affairs. Petitioner raises freedom of speech.
Paño[!] which went back to fundamentals and states:
Before court could promulgate it's decision, the petitioner
citizen’s right to be free from arbitrary arrest, punishment
suddenly withdrew its petition because DYRE was bought
and unwarranted prosecution is more impt than crimproc;
by another company and it had no more interest in the
freedom of expression is a preferred right and therefore
case, nor does the buying company have an interest. Moot
stands on a higher level than substantive economic or
and academic.
other liberties because it is the indispensable condition of
nearly every other form of freedom. Debate on public
ISSUES:
issues should be wide open, maybe even nasty, as long as
the debate or the words do not lead to the violent
WON my beautifully written ponencia will go to waste?
overthrow of gov’t.
HELD:
In this case the ponente restates basic and established
constitutional principles. Public officials do not possess
No dammit! I'll use cut and paste to make a guideline for
absolute power to summarily close down a station or
inferior courts thus my glorious role in protecting freedom
deprive it’s license. Broadcast media deserve the preferred
of speech will be enshrined in SCRA forever!
right of free press and speech. It is in the interest of
BWAHAHAHA!
society to have a full discussion of public affairs. Free
speech is a safety valve that allows parties to vent their
RATIO:
views even if contrary to popular opinion. Through free
expression, assembly and petition, citizens can participate
The cardinal requirements for an administrative
not only during elections but in every facet of gov’t. People
proceeding was already laid down in Ang Tibay v Industrial
v Rubio: commendable zeal if allowed to override number, and within 5 days he is issued a registration
constitutional limitations would become obnoxious to certificate He is also assigned a classification denoting his
fundamental principles of liberty. Primicias v Fugoso: eligibility for induction, and is issued a Notice of
disorderly conduct by individual members is not an excuse Classification.
to characterize the assembly as seditious. If that is so then
the right to assembly becomes a delusion. German v Under 12 (b) (3) of the 1948 Act, it was unlawful to forge,
Barangan, my dissent: to require a citizen to assert his alter, "or in any manner" change a certificate. In addition,
rights and to go to court is to render illusory his rights. regulations of the SSS required registrants to keep both
After five years of closure, reopen. their registration and classification certificates in their
personal possession at all times. (nonpossession)
Abad Santos J:
By the 1965 Amendment, Congress added to 1948 Act the
Everybody should read the ponencia, Teehankee and Ang provision punishing also one who "knowingly destroys, or
Tibay. knowingly mutilates" a certificate. The 1965 Amendment
does not abridge free speech on its face, it deals with
conduct having no connection with speech. It prohibits the
knowing destruction of certificates issued by the SSS, and
there is nothing necessarily expressive about such
conduct. The Amendment does not distinguish between
public and private destruction, and it does not punish only
destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views.

II. WON the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as

applied to him.  NO

“SPEECH PLUS”: SYMBOLIC SPEECH O'Brien argues that his act of burning his registration
U.S. vs. O’BRIEN certificate was protected "symbolic speech" within the
First Amendment. Freedom of expression which the First
Amendment guarantees includes all modes of
"communication of ideas by conduct," and that his
1968)
conduct is within this definition because he did it in
demonstration against the war and against the draft.
WARREN, CJ
Even on the assumption that the communicative element
FACTS:
in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the
David Paul O'Brien and 3 companions burned their
First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that
Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of
the destruction of a registration certificate is
the South Boston Courthouse. A crowd, including several
constitutionally protected activity. When "speech" and
agents of the FBI, witnessed the event. After the burning,
"nonspeech" elements are combined, a sufficiently
members of the crowd began attacking O'Brien and his
important governmental interest in regulating the
companions. An FBI agent ushered O'Brien to safety inside
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
the courthouse. O'Brien stated to FBI agents that he had
First Amendment freedoms.
burned his registration certificate because of his beliefs,
Govt regulation is sufficiently justified if:
knowing that he was violating federal law.
1. it is within the const’l power of the Govt
2. it furthers an important or substantial gov’tal
For this act, O'Brien was indicted, tried, convicted, and
interest;
sentenced in the US DC for the District of Mass. He stated
3. the gov’tal interest is unrelated to the suppression
in argument to the jury that he burned the certificate
of free expression; and
publicly to influence others to adopt his antiwar beliefs,
4. the incidental restriction on alleged First
"so that other people would reevaluate their positions with
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
Selective Service, with the armed forces, and reevaluate
the furtherance of that interest.
their place in the culture of today, to hopefully consider
my position."
All requirements met therefore O'Brien can be
The DC rejected O'Brien's arguments. CA held the 1965
constitutionally convicted for violating it.
Amendment unconstitutional under the First Amendment
as singling out for special treatment persons engaged in
O'Brien's argues that once the registrant has received
protests, on the ground that conduct under the 1965
notification there is no reason for him to retain the
Amendment was already punishable since a Selective
certificates. O'Brien notes that most of the information on
Service System regulation required registrants to keep
a registration certificate serves no notification purpose at
their registration certificates in their personal possession
all; the registrant hardly needs to be told his address and
at all times.
physical characteristics.
ISSUE:
The registration certificate serves purposes in addition to
initial notification:
I. WON the 1965 Amendment to 462 (b) (3) abridges
1. as proof that the individual described thereon has
freedom of speech.  NO
registered for the draft.
2. facilitates communication between registrants and
When a male reaches 18, he is required by the Universal
local boards.
Military Training and Service Act of 1948 to register with a
local draft board. He is assigned a Selective Service
3. reminders that the registrant must notify his local destruction of so-called "draft cards" and with "open"
board of any change of address, and other specified encouragement to others to destroy their cards, both
changes in his status. reports also indicate that this concern stemmed from an
apprehension that unrestrained destruction of cards
The many functions performed by SS certificates establish would disrupt the smooth functioning of the Selective
beyond doubt that Congress has a legitimate and Service System
substantial interest in preventing their unrestrained
destruction. The nonpossession regulations does negates
this interest.
TINKER vs. DES MOINES SCHOOL DISTRICT
multiple punishment?
it is not improper for Congress' to provide alternative
statutory avenues of prosecution to assure the effective FACTS:
protection of one and the same interest. Here, the pre- 1. John Tinker (15), Mary Beth Tinker (John’s 13 yr
existing avenue of prosecution(nonpossession) was not old sis) and Christopher Eckhardt (16), were all
even statutory. Congress may change or supplement a attending high schools in Des Moines, Iowa,
regulation. (see difference between pre-existing and new) decided to join a meeting at the Eckhardt
residence. There they decided to publicize their
objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their
Nonpossession vs. Destruction(new) support for a truce by wearing black armbands
during the holiday season and by fasting on
 They protect overlapping but not identical
December 16 and New Years Eve.
governmental interests.
2. The principals of the Des Moines schools became
 They reach different classes of wrongdoers.
aware of their plan to were armbands and adopted
 Whether registrants keep their certificates in their a policy that any student wearing an armband to
personal possession at all times, is of no particular school would be asked to remove it and if he
concern under the 1965 Amendment, as long as they refused he would be suspended until he returned
do not mutilate or destroy the certificates. without the armband.
 The Amendment is concerned with abuses 3. The petitioners still wore black armbands to their
involving any issued SS certificates, not only with the schools. They were sent home and suspended
registrant's own certificates. The knowing destruction until they came back without the armbands. They
or mutilation of someone else's certificates would did not return until the planned period for wearing
therefore violate the statute but not the nonpossession the armbands expired-on New Year’s Day.
regulations. 4. They filed complaints through their fathers and
prayed for injunctions restraining the school
Both the gov’tal interest and the operation of the 1965 officials plus nominal damages. District Court
Amendment are limited to the noncommunicative aspect of rendered in favor of the school officials saying that
O'Brien's conduct. The gov’tal interest and the scope of the it was reasonable in order to prevent disturbance
1965 Amendment are limited to preventing harm to the of school discipline. Court of Appeals affirmed.
smooth and efficient functioning of the SSS. The case at
bar is therefore unlike one where the alleged gov’tal ISSUE:
interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure WON the wearing of black armbands is an expression of
because the communication allegedly integral to the speech and protected by the Constitution?
conduct is itself thought to be harmful.
HELD: YEAH
Because of the Govt's substantial interest in assuring the
continuing availability of issued SS certificates, and RATIO:
because amended 462 (b) is a narrow means of protecting - it can hardly be argued that either the students or
this interest and condemns only the noncommunicative teachers shed their constitutional rights to
impact of conduct within its reach, and because the freedom of speech or expression at the
noncommunicative impact of O'Brien's act of burning his schoolhouse gate
registration certificate frustrated the Govt's interest, a - in West Virginia v Barnette, it was held that a
sufficient governmental interest has been shown to justify student may not be compelled to salute the flag
O'Brien's conviction. - the school officials sought to punish the
III. WON the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as petitioners for a silent, passive expression of
enacted because the alleged purpose of Congress was "to opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or
suppress freedom of speech."  NO disturbance on the part of petitioners. Only a few
of the 18,000 students wore the armbands
The purpose of Congress is not a basis for declaring this wherein only 5 were suspended. There is no
legislation unconstitutional. The Court will not strike indication that the work of the schools or any
down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of class was disrupted. Outside the classrooms, a few
an alleged illicit legislative motive. students made hostile remarks to the children
wearing armbands, but there were no threats or
The statute attacked in this case has no “inevitable acts of violence on school premises.
unconstitutional effect”, since the destruction of SS - In our system, undifferentiated fear or
certificates is in no respect inevitably or necessarily apprehension is not enough to overcome the right
expressive. Accordingly, the statute itself is constitutional. to freedom of expression.
There was little floor debate on this legislation in either - There is no finding and showing that engaging in
House. Reports of the Senate and House Armed Services of the forbidden conduct would materially and
Committees make clear a concern with the "defiant"
 substantially interfere with the requirements of these cases struck down ordinances and laws requiring
appropriate discipline in the operation of the citizens to obtain permits for public meetings, events,
school. parades, processions, and the like.
- School officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students. They are possessed of Lastly, the court states that there is no reasonable reason
fundamental rights which the State must respect to deny this public meeting. As such, the mandamus is
just as they themselves must respect their granted.
obligations to the State. They may not be confined
to the expression of those sentiments that are Note: SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and
officially approved. In the absence of a specific public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the
showing of constitutionally valid reasons to use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
regulate their speech, students are entitled to pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied
freedom of expression of their views. for other purposes as provided by ordinance or regulation:
(reversed and remanded) Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or
exercise during the celebration of national holidays in any
streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint
day of any district in question, may be permitted by means
Assembly & Petition of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the
PRIMCIAS vs. FUGOSO streets or public places or portions thereof, where such
athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And
provided, further, That the holding of any parade or
procession in any streets or public places is prohibited
FACTS: unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor
who shall, on every such ocassion, determine or specify
Petitioner Cipriano Primicias is the campaign manager of the streets or public places for the formation, route, and
the Coalesced Minority Parties. Respondent Valeraino dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided,
Fugoso is the Mayor of Manila. Primicias would like to finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession
compel Fugoso, by means of a mandamus, to issue a shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four
permit for the holding of a public meeting in Plaza hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession.
Miranda, as respondent Fugoso has denied the request.
HILADO DISSENT:
ISSUE: WON the denial of the permit for holding a public
meeting is proper. The dissent of J. Hilado is divided into 4 parts: a, b, c and
d.
HELD: No it is not.
a) Right not absolute but subject to regulation.
RATIO: Mainly says that the right to freedom of speech
and assembly are not absolute rights. After citing
The court first states the importance of the right of U.S. cases, J. Hilado moves to the case at bar and
freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, stating, points out that the Mayor of Manila had the “duty
however, that these rights have their limits in that they and power” to grant or deny permits. Moreover, he
should not be injurious to the rights of the community or says that the government has the right to regulate
society. the use of public places. Pointing to the case at
bar, Plaza Miranda is a public place in that it is a
Then they discuss the other side, the right to regulate high traffic area, whether for vehicles or
these rights. This brings a discussion of police power, pedestrians. As such, holding the meeting there
saying that the legislature delegated police power to the would have caused an “inconvenience and
Municipal Board of the City of Manila, giving it regulatory interfere with the right of the people in general”.
powers regarding the use of public places. These powers, He again states that the right is not absolute, but
however, according to the court, are not absolute. If these “subject to regulation as regards the time, place
powers were absolute, then the Municipal or City and manner of its exercise”.
government would have sole and complete discretion as to b) No constitutional right to use public places under
what to allow and what not to allow. This would be wrong government control, for the right of assembly and
as it would leave decisions open to the whims of those in petition, etc. Here, J. Hilado explains that the
power. While these rights should be regulated, they should action that the Mayor of Manila took was not one
be regulated in a reasonable manner, and giving unbridled of denying the public meeting and regulating the
deciding power to the government is not reasonable. right to speech and assembly, but was merely one
of denying the use of a public place in the
Also, looking at the ordinance Sec. 1119, the courts said conducting of the meeting. In this interpretation,
there there were 2 ways to interpret such an ordinance: there was no constitutional right infringed.
c) Here J. Hilado goes through his own list of U.S.
1) The mayor has unregulated discretion cases to cite as authority. I don’t think dean will
2) Applications are subject to reasonable discretion make us enumerate them. Anyways the
to determine which areas to use to avoid confusion summaries in the case are short.
and minimize disorder d) Mandamus unavailable. Here, J. Hilado cites
nd
section 2728 of Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., a
The court took the 2 interpretation. source of American municipal rules. In this rule, it
is stated that in the issuance of permits, if the
To justify their stand, the court went through a series of power is discretionary, it cannot ordinarily be
U.S. cases that handled similar circumstances. Many of
 compelled by mandamus. The refusal must be and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an
arbitrary or capricious so as to warrant alternative.) The court believes in the Mayor’s appraisal
mandamus. He then points to certain allegations that a public rally at the Plaza Miranda, as compared to
of the Mayor of Manila pointing to the high the Sunken Gardens, poses a clearer and more imminent
possibility of trouble that would result from the danger of public disorders, breaches of peace, and criminal
meeting taking place. His reason in denying the acts. Noting that every time such assemblies are
permit is that of peace and order. As such, the announced, the community is placed in such a state of
refusal was not capricious or arbitrary and does fear and tension that offices are closed early and
not warrant a mandamus. employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes
suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general
detriment of the public.

Villamor, concurring:
NAVARRO vs. VILLEGAS The right to freedom of assembly is not denied, but this
right is neither unlimited nor absolute. The Mayor did not
FACTS: refuse to grant the permit, he offered an alternative which
Jan 26, 1970, Congress opened. Student demonstration is not unreasonable. There being no arbitrary refusal,
in front of the Congress, followed by a series of petitioner is not entitled to the writ.
demonstrations, rallies, marches and pickets, many of
which ended in the destruction of public and private
property, loss of a few lives, and injuries to a score of other
persons. Schools, offices and many stores were forced to Castro and Fernando, dissenting:
close. The right to freedom of assembly, while not unlimited is
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect.
Feb 24 1970, Petitioner, Nelson Navarro, acting in behalf The effect of the Mayor’s ground for refusal amounts to
of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines, an one of prior restraint of a constitutional right, which is not
association of students, workers and peasants wrote a allowable. Laws subjecting freedoms to the prior restraint
letter to respondent, Mayor of Manila Antonio Villegas, of a license, without narrow, objective and definite
applying for a permit to hold a rally (at the Plaza Miranda standards to guide the licensing authority, is
on Feb 26 [Tuesday], from 4:00-11:00pm). unconstitutional.

On the same day, respondent denied his request saying NOTES:

that “In the greater interest of the community, this office, Right of Assembly – a right on the part of citizens to meet
guide by a lesson gained from the events of the past few peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.
weeks, has temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing Right to Petition – any person or group of persons can
any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or
demonstration during weekdays.” He suggested that they office of the government for redress of grievances.
use the Sunken Gardens and to hold the rally earlier Guide to interpretation – The spirit of our free institutions
during the day in order that it may end before dark. allows the broadest scope and widest latitude in public
parades and demonstrations, whether religious or political.
Petitioner filed a suit contesting the Mayor’s action on the The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of
ground that it is violative of the petitioner’s right, among expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring
others, to peaceably assemble and to petition. In reply to individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of
the contention of the responded that the permit to hold a securing participation by the people in social including
rally was not being denied and in fact the Sunken Gardens political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance
was offered as a place of said rally, the petitioner argued between stability and change.
that for obvious reasons the right to peaceful assembly Limitations – any citizen may criticize his government and
cannot be fully enjoyed without the corresponding right to government officials. However, such criticism should be
use public places for the purpose and that therefore, a specific and therefore constructive, specifying particular
denial of the use of public place amounts to the violation objectionable actuations of the government; it being
of the freedom of assembly. For the complete enjoyment of reasoned or tempered, and not of contemptuous
the right, it may be necessary that a particular public condemnation of the entire government set-up. Criticism
place be used for purposes of greater publicity and is within the range of liberty of speech unless the intention
effectiveness. and effect be seditious. When the intention and effect is
seditious, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a denial of the right to speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield
freedom of Assembly. NO. to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the Constitution
RATIO: and the laws and the existence of the State. These rights
Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine the are subject to regulation, termed the sovereign “police
streets or public places to be used in order to secure power.”
convenient use thereof and provide adequate and proper Criterion for permissible restriction – The “Dangerous
policing to minimize the risk of disorder and maintain Tendency” rule is explained as “if the words uttered create
public safety and order. a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not
(Note that the Mayor expressed his willingness to grant necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
permits for assemblies at Plaza Miranda during weekends violence or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that
and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
great disruption of the normal activities of the community necessary that the language used be reasonable calculated
to incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. absence approved by the Company, the officers
It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil who shall fail to report for work the following morning
which the legislative body seeks to prevent.” shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation
This doctrine was later superseded by the “Clear and of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
Present Danger” rule which lays down the test: “whether amounting to an illegal strike.
the words are used in such circumstances and are of a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they 4. At about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a was convoked by the Company wherein it reiterated
right to prevent.” It means that the evil consequence of and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while
the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and all workers may join the Malacañang demonstration,
the degree of imminence extremely high before the the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4,
utterance can be punished. Clear: a causal connection 1969 should be excused from joining the
with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the demonstration and should report for work; and thus
utterance questioned. Present: imminent, urgent and utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order
impending. Danger: requires an unusual quantum of not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly
proof. Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those
who will not follow this warning of the Company shall
be dismissed; the Company reiterated its warning that
the officers shall be primarily liable being the
organizers of the mass demonstration. The union
panel countered that it was rather too late to change
their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang
demonstration will be held the following morning.

5. Because the petitioners and their members numbering

about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite
PBM EMPLOYEES vs. PBM the pleas of the Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the
1973 demonstration and that the workers in the second and
Makasiar, J. third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, a charge
FACTS: against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift was filed in the Court of
1. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization Industrial Relations (CIR), charging them with a
(PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13
employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No.
Co., Inc. The leaders of the union that on March 1, 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Lockout.'
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in 6. In their answer, petitioners claim that they did not
by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) violate the existing CBA because they gave the
as well as those in the regular second and third shifts Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
(from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was
respectively); and that they informed the Company of a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of
their proposed demonstration. speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not
2. On March 2, 1969 the company learned of the a declaration of strike because it was not directed
projected mass demonstration at Malacañang. A against the respondent firm.
meeting between the members of the union and the
Company was called by the Company the next day. 7. The CIR found the PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad
The Company asked the union panel to confirm or faith and the leaders of the union as directly
deny said projected mass demonstration at responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor
Malacañang on March 4. PBMEO confirmed the practice and were, as a consequence, considered to
planned demonstration and stated that the have lost their status as employees of the respondent
demonstration cannot be cancelled because it has Company.
already been agreed upon in the meeting. PBMEO
explained further that the demonstration has nothing 8. Petitioners filed with the CIR a petition for relief from
to do with the Company because the union has no the CIR dismissal order, on the ground that their
quarrel or dispute with Management. failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time
was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake
3. The Management informed PBMEO that the committed by the president of the Union and of the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union office clerk of their counsel. Without waiting for any
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, resolution on their petition for relief, petitioners filed a
however, that any demonstration for that matter notice of appeal with the SC.
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of
the Company. The Company warned the PBMEO ISSUE:
representatives that workers who belong to the first
and regular shifts, who without previous leave of
 WON the CIR was correct in dismissing the officers not even offer to intercede for its employees with
of the union for unfair labor practice for organizing the local police.
and pushing through with the rally at Malacañang
despite the pleas of the company for workers who 5. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of
belong to the 1st shift to report to work. expression well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local
DECISION: officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein
private respondent firm were fighting for their very
1. The order of the CIR was declared null and void. survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them
2. The SC ordered the reinstatement of eight (8) by the Constitution — the untrammelled
union leaders who were dismissed, with full back enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pay from the date of their separation from the pretension of their employer that it would suffer
service until re instated, minus one day's pay and loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
whatever earnings they might have realized from employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
other sources during their separation from the o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
service. preservation merely of their property rights. Such
apprehended loss or damage would not spell the
RATIO: difference between the life and death of the firm or
its owners or its management. The employees'
1. The demonstration held by petitioners before pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused,
Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some harassment and persecuted as they believed they
Pasig policemen, not against their employer. were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
The demonstration was purely and completely above intimated, the condition in which the
an exercise of their freedom of expression in employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local
general and of their right of assembly and police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected
petition for redress of grievances in particular their right to individual existence as well as that of
before appropriate governmental agency, the their families.
Chief Executive, against the police officers of
the municipality of Pasig. 6. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of
2. The freedoms of expression and of assembly as bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
well as the right to petition are included among violation of the collective bargaining agreement
the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly
protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the compass of the collective bargaining
the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
not only to protect the minority who want to talk, speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
but also to benefit the majority who refuse to mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of
listen. free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition.
3. The rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political 7. The mass demonstration staged by the employees
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
his happiness and to his full and complete enjoined by any court, such an injunction would
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens be trenching upon the freedom expression of the
can participate not merely in the periodic workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal
establishment of the government through their picketing or strike. The respondent Court of
suffrage but also in the administration of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes
public affairs as well as in the discipline of that the mass demonstration was not a
abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in
these rights so that he can appeal to the any industrial dispute although there is concerted
appropriate governmental officers or agencies act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage
for redress and protection as well as for the work."
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring
public officers and employees. 8. The respondent company is the one guilty of
unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the
4. The petitioners exercised their civil and political part of the respondent firm to permit all its
rights for their mutual aid protection from what employees and workers to join the mass
they believe were police excesses. As matter of demonstration against alleged police abuses and
fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its petitioners from the service constituted an
members fro the harassment of local police unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
officers. It was to the interest herein private expression, freedom of assembly and freedom
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take petition for redress of grievances.
up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can
report to work free from harassment, vexation or
peril and as consequence perform more efficiently
their respective tasks enhance its productivity as JBL REYES vs. BAGATSING
well as profits. Herein respondent employer did
November 9, 1983 reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent
CJ Fernando and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must
be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether
FACTS: favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march recourse to the proper judicial authority.
and rally on October 26, 1983 from Luneta to the US
Embassy. Once there, the rallyists would deliver a petition Justice Makasiar (Concurring): With the qualification
to the US Ambassador based on the resolution adopted on that, in case of conflict, the Philippine Constitution -
the last day by the International Conference for General particularly the Bill of Fights should prevail over the
Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Vienna Convention.
Military Bases held in Manila. On October 19, such permit
was denied. However, petitioner was unaware of such a Justice Aquino (Dissenting): Voted to dismiss the
fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason petition on the ground that the holding of the rally in front
for refusing a permit was due to a)"police intelligence of the US Embassy violates Ordinance No. 7295 of the City
reports which strongly militate against the advisability of of Manila.
issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied
for" b) Ordinance 7295, in accordance with the Vienna
MALABANAN vs. RAMENTO
Convention, prohibits rallies or demonstrations within a
radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery. (05/21/84)
On October 20, the petitioner filed this suit for mandamus Fernando, C.J.
with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. On October 25, 1983 a minute resolution was FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the G. Araneta
issued by the Court granting the mandatory injunction University Supreme Student Council who were granted a
prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of the permit to hold a meeting from 8am-12nn on Aug 27, '82.
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive Along with other students they held a general assembly at
evil that could justify the denial of a permit. the Vet Med & Animal Sci basketball court, not in the 2nd
flr lobby where the perit stated. In such gathering they
ISSUE/HELD: manifested in vehement & vigorous languange their
Should permit be granted by the City of Manila? YES opposition to the proposed merger of the Institutes of
Animal Science & Agriculture. By 10:30 they marched to
RATIO: the Life Science bldg (outside of he area of the permit) &
To justify limitations on freedom of assembly there must continued their rally, disrupting classes that were being
be proof of sufficient weight to satisfy the Clear and held. The student were notified via a memo on Sept 9 that
Present Danger Test. The general rule is that a permit they were under preventive suspension. Respondent
should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their Ramento as NCR Director of the Ministry of Education
assembly at a public place of their choice. However, found the petitioners guilty of violating par.146(c) of the
another place may be designated by the licensing authority Manual for Private Schools & suspended them for 1 yr. On
if it be shown that there is a clear and present danger. The Nov 16, SC issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from
mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of enforcing the order, thus allowing the students to enroll.
the demonstrators does not suffice. Furthermore, there
was assurance that the police force is in a position to cope Petitioners: (Malabanan, Jalos, Lucas, Leonero, Lee-
with such emergency should it arise. In this case, there is students)
no showing that the circumstances would satisfy such a - invoke their right ot peaceably assemble & freedom of
test. speech
Respondents: (Ramento-NCR Dir; G.Araneta University
Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the Foundation; Mijares-President GAUF;etc)
holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a - maintain that there was no grave abuse of discretion in
radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission affirming the decision of the Universirty finding the
or chancery finds support in Article 22 of the Vienna students guilty
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. - the motion is moot & academic in light of the TRO which
However, there is no showing that that the distance allowed the students to enroll & for Malabanan, Lucas &
between the chancery and the gate is less than 500 feet. Leonero to finish their schooling
Even if it were, the ordinance would not be conclusive - object to the tenor of the speeches of the students
because it still must be measured against the requirement - petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies
of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Rules on Assembly and Petition: 1. w/n the petition is moot & academic
The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should 2. w/n on the facts of the case there was an infringement
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place of the right to peaceably assemble & free speech
where and the time when it will take place. If it were a
private place, only the consent of the owner or the one HELD:
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such 1. YES, if viewed solely from the fact of the TRO allowing
application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the the peititioners to enroll the ensuing semester, with 3 of
public official concerned to appraise whether there may be them doing so & the two equally entitiled to do so, plus the
valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant fact that more than 1 yr has elasped from the issuance of
but at another public place. It is an indispensable the Ramento's decision. But the Court decides to tackle
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and the questions on view of the constitutional nature of the
present danger test be the standard for the decision right to free speech & peaceable assembly
2. YES. According to Reyes v Bagatsing the right to has been nominated by any political party. Election
peaceably assemble & free speech are "both embraced in campaign…refers to acts design to have a candidate
the concept of freedom of expression, w/c is identified w/ elected ot not or promote the candidacy of a person or
the liberty to discuss publicly & truthfully any matter of persons to public office.”
public interest w/o censorship or punishment except on a
showing...of a clear & present danger of a substantive evil o It is claimed by the petitioners (Cabigao was at the time
w/c the state has the right to prevent." Also, "the of filing of petition an incumbent councilor in the 4 th
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform District of Manila and the Nationalista Party official
the licensing authority of the date, the public place where candidate for Vice-Mayor to which he was subsequently
& the time when the it will take place. If it were a public elected; Gonzales is a private individual and a registered
place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to voter) that the enactment of RA 4880 under the guise
legal possesion is required." Such a permit was sought by of regulation is but a clear and simple abridgment of
petitioner-students & was granted. The Court also held, the constitutional rights of freedom of speech,
consistent w/ Tinker v Des Moines, that the students were assembly and the right to form associations for
covered by the constitutional right to free speech & purposes not contrary to law.
expression, "but conduct by the student...that materially
disrupts classwork or involves the substantial disorder or  For the Legislature, the R.A. No. 4880 was passed to
invasion of the rights of others is...not immunized by the insure a free, orderly and honest election by regulating
consitutional guarantee of the freedom of speech." using conduct determined by Congress to be harmful because
this standard, the SC held that the rights to free if unrestrained and carried for a long period before
expression of the petitioners where violated. elections it necessarily entails huge expenditures,
re: respondents objecting to the tenor of the speeches of precipitates violence and even death… resulting in the
the students: "That there would be a vigorous presentation corruption of the electorate and inflicts dire
of views opposed to the merger..was to be expected". The consequences upon public interests.
student leaders, being goaded on by an enthusiastic
crowd, uttering extremely critical statements was ISSUE: WON the enforcement of RA No. 4880 would
"understandable" prejudice their basic rights such as their freedom of
BUT: it does not follow that the students would be totally speech, their freedom of assembly and their right to form
absolved of the events, since they did transgress the limits associations… for purposes not contrary to law,
of their permit. Private respondents were within their guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution.
rights in imposing diciplinary actions. But the punishment
should be proportionate to the transgression. While the HELD: Yes, but there is a lack of the necessary vote to
discretion of the respondents is recognized, the rule of declare it unconstitutional
reason dictates a lesser penalty.
DISCUSSION OF THE BASIC RIGHTS INVOLVED…
Petition granted. Decision nullified & set aside.
 Freedom of expression is not absolute… There are
other societal values that press for recognition. How is
Free Speech & Suffrage it to be limited then?

1. Clear and Present Danger Rule

GONZALEZ vs. COMELEC  Evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be “extremely serious and the degree of
(April 18, 1969) imminence extremely high” before it can be
Ponente: Fernando, J. punished
 Brandeis: Evil apprehended is so imminent that
FACTS: it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion
 Petitioners challenge the validity of two sections now  Holmes: It is a question of proximity and degree
included in the Revised Election Code under Republic
Act No. 4880 which was approved and took effect on 2.
Dangerous Tendency Rule
June 17, 1967  If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent,
The Act: then such words are punishable.
1) Prohibits the too early nomination of candidates  Freedom of assembly… the very idea of a gov’t,
“It shall be unlawful for any political party, political republican in form, implies a right on the part of
committee or political group to nominate candidates for its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
any elective public office voted for at large earlier than respect to public affairs and to petition for redress
150 days immediately preceding an election, and for of grievances… complements the right of free
any other elective public office earlier than 90 days…” speech.
2) Limits the period of election campaign or partisan o Limited when their purpose is contrary to law
political activity DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED…
“It shall be unlawful for any person… or any group… to
engage in an election campaign or partisan political  It cannot be denied that the limitations imposed by the
activity except during the period 120 days immediately statute on the rights of free speech, press and
preceding an election (national) and 90 (local)…” assembly and association cut deeply into their surface
“Candidate refers to any person aspiring for or but it also cannot be denied that evils substantial in
seeking an elective public office, regardless of whether character taint the purity of the electoral process
or not said person has already filed his certificate or
 o But even with such evils present the clear that the City of Baguio and the provinces consisting of
and present danger doctrine rightly viewed the Cordilleras shall take part in a plebiscite for the
requires not only should there be an occasion ratification of said Organic Act on Dec 27, 1989. The
for the imposition of such restriction but also assailed Resolution was promulgated to govern the
that they be limited in scope. conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for
 In striving to remove vagueness the statute listed the CAR.
down the acts included in the terms “election  Sec 19 of Comelec Resolution #2167 states:
campaign” and “partisan political activity”… “Sec 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
o No unconstitutional infringement exists announcers. – During the plebiscite campaign period,
insofar as the formation of organizations, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass
associations, etc. for the purpose of soliciting media columnist, commentator, announcer or
votes or undertaking any campaign and/or personality shall use his column or radio or television
propaganda for or against a candidate or party… time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.”
prohibition against giving, soliciting, receiving  Petitioner, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of
contribution for election purposes is free from Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier, maintains
constitutional infirmity… holding political that as a columnist, his column obviously and
conventions, rallies, etc. for the purpose of necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views
soliciting votes or for campaign or propaganda and beliefs. Said Comelec Resolution 2167 constitutes
also should not be annulled. a prior restraint on his constitutionally guaranteed
o The majority of the Court is thus of the belief freedom of the press and further imposes subsequent
that the solicitation or undertaking of any punishment for those who may violate it because it
campaign or propaganda… by an individual, the contains a penal provision. He believes that if media
making of speeches, commentaries, holding practitioners were allowed to express their views on
interviews for or against election of any party or the issue, it would in fact help in the gov’t drive and
candidate, publication or distribution of desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as
campaign materials suffer from the corrosion ventilate, all sides of the issue.
of invalidity. It lacks however one more  Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned
affirmative vote to call for a declaration of provision is a valid implementation of its power to
unconstitutionality. supervise and regulate media during election or
 It is the opinion of the majority, though lacking the plebiscite periods as enunciated in Sec 4, Art IX of
necessary vote for an adjudication of invalidity, that the Consti. They state further that the Resolution
the challenged statute could have been more does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his
narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited views. He may still express his views or campaign for
more precisely delineated to satisfy the or against the act through the Comelec space and
constitutional requirements as to a valid airtime, which is provided in Sec 90 & 92 of BP 881.
limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine. ISSUE  HELD: WON Sec 19 of Comelec Resolution
 For the minority the provisos of the statute saying, #2167 is unconstitutional  YES
“That simple expressions or opnions and thoughts
concerning the election shall not be considered as RATIO:
part of an election campaign and that nothing in the  Respondent Comelec relies much on Art IX of the
Act shall be understood to prevent any person from Consti & Sec 11 of RA 6646 (Electoral Reform Law) as
expressing his views on current political problems or the basis for the promulgation of the questioned
issues or from mentioning the names of the Resolution. However, what was granted to the Comelec
candidates… whom he supports” if properly by Art IX of the Consti was the power to supervise and
implemented, the barrier to free expression becomes regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits
minimal and far from unwarranted. or other grants issued for the operation and
 They are also of the opinion that the need for transportation of other public utilities, media or
adjudication arises only if in the implementation of communication to the end that equal opportunity,
the Act, there is in fact an unconstitutional time and space, and the right to reply for public
application of its provisions... the present action for information campaigns and forums among candidates
them then is immature. are ensured. The evil sought to be avoided is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give
any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of
advertising space or radio or television time. This is
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC the reason why a columnist, commentator, announcer
or personality, who is also a candidate for any elective
office is required to take a leave of absence from his
work during the campaign period.
(January 29, 1990)  Neither Art IX of the Consti nor Sec 11 of RA 6646 can
J. Medialdea be construed to mean that the Comelec has been
granted the right to supervise and regulate the
FACTS: exercise by media practitioners themselves of their
 Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec 19 of right to expression during plebiscite periods. In fact,
Comelec Resolution #2167 on the ground that it there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite.
violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of Therefore, Sec 19 of Comelec Resolution #2167 has no
expression and of the press. statutory basis.
 RA 6766 or “An Act Providing for an Organic Act  Respondent’s argument with regard to Sec 90 & 92 of
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region” mandated BP 881 is not meritorious. While the limitation does
 not absolutely bar petitioner’s freedom of expression, it quantity or volume of information concerning
is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he candidates and issues in the election thereby
may express his view. curtailing and limiting the right of voters to
 Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and information and opinion.
importance. The people’s right to be informed and to
be able to freely and intelligently make a decision Sec 11(b) RA 6646 Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
would be better served by access to an unabridged Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda
discussion of issues, including the forum. The people
affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should
not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television
where the right to expression may be exercised. station, other mass media, or any person making use of the
mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or
Petition granted; Sec 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 is air time for campaign or other political purposes except to
declared null and void and unconstitutional. the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

taken together with Sections 90 and 92 of B.P. Blg. 881,

Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines:

Sec. 90. COMELEC space. — The Commission shall

procure space in at least one newspaper of general
circulation wherein candidates can announce their
candidacy. Such space shall be allocated, free of
charge, equally and impartially by the Commission
among all candidates

Sec. 92. COMELEC time. — The Commission shall

procure radio and television time which shall be
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates
within the area of coverage of all radio and television
stations.

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMELEC

ISSUES:
March 1992
J. Feliciano 1. WON sec 11(b) of RA 6646 is unconstitutional.
2. WON the provisions constitute a permissible
FACTS: exercise of the power of supervision or regulation
of the operations of communication and
Petitioners are: information enterprises during an election period
1. representatives of the mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and time HELD & RATIO:
for political advertisements;
2. two (2) individuals who are candidates for office in 1. No. sec 11(b) is not unconstitutional. There exists a
the coming May 1992 elections; reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned
3. taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to objective.
be informed of election issues and of credentials of
the candidates is being curtailed.
Purpose: equalizing the situations of rich and poor
candidates by preventing the rich from enjoying the undue
Petitioners argue that : Sec 11 (b) of Republic Act No. advantage offered by political advertisements
6646 invades and violates the constitutional
guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Means: prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air
time "for campaign or other political purposes" except to
They maintain that: the prohibition: the COMELEC (COMELEC time & space)
1. amounts to censorship coz it selects and singles
out for suppression and repression with criminal
sanctions, only publications of a particular  Purpose is not only a legitimate one but it also has
content, namely, media-based election or political a constitutional basis: of the 1987 Constitution
propaganda during the election period of 1992.
2. is a derogation of media's role, function and duty Art IX C sec 4. The Commission [on Elections] may,
to provide adequate channels of public information during the election period, supervise or regulate the
and public opinion relevant to election issues enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits ...
3. abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure
that the suppression of media-based campaign or equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
political propaganda except those appearing in the reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
COMELEC space of the newspapers and on public information campaigns and forums among
COMELEC time of radio and television broadcasts, candidates in connection with the objective of holding
would bring about a substantial reduction in the free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
ART II, sec 26: the egalitarian demand that "the State situations of the candidates in order to promote equal
shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public opportunity, and equal time and space, for political
service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves.
by law."
 The nature and characteristics of modern mass media,
2. Yes. Sec 11(b) is still within the permissible bounds especially electronic media, cannot be totally
of supervision –regulation of media operations during disregarded. Repetitive political commercials when fed
the election period. into the electronic media themselves constitute
 the rights of free speech and free press are not invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. The
unlimited rights for they are not the only important right of the general listening and viewing public to be
and relevant values even in the most democratic of free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects is
polities, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for at least as important as the right of candidates to
public office, without regard to the level of financial advertise themselves through modern electronic media
resources that one may have at one's disposal is also and the right of media enterprises to maximize their
an important value revenues from the marketing of "packaged" candidates.

 such restrictive impact upon freedom of speech &

freedom of the press is circumscribed by certain
limitations:
ADIONG vs. COMELEC
1. limited in the duration of its applicability &
enforceability – limited only during the election GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
period from Jan 12- June 10, 1992)
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated
2. limited in its scope of application – it only covers
Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the
political ads of particular candidates & does not
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts
extend to reporting of news or commentaries or
Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
other expressions of belief
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
3. limitation exempts from its prohibition the "SEC. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. -The following are
purchase by or donation to the COMELEC of print lawful election propaganda:
space or air time, which space and time (a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten
COMELEC is then affirmatively required to or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not
allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and
among the individual candidates for elective public fourteen (14) inches in length: Provided, That decals and
offices in the province or city served by the stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized
newspaper or radio or television station.— posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21
candidates are still given equal media exposure in hereof."
the COMELEC time & space that shall give equal
opportunities to all the candidates irregardless of Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
their financial status "SEC. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda It is
unlawful:
 Sec 11b does not cut off the flow of media reporting, (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit
opinion or commentary about candidates, their any election propaganda in anyplace, whether public or
qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper, private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC
radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign
free to carry out their regular and normal information headquarters of the candidate or political party,
and communication operations. organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own
residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has
more than one: Provided, that such posters or election
 Sec 11b does not authorize any intervention and much
propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in
less control on the part of COMELEC in respect of the
size."
content of the normal operations of media, nor in respect
of the content of political advertisements which the
The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by
individual candidates are quite free to present within
COMELEC are Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code
their respective allocated COMELEC time and COMELEC
on lawful election propaganda.
space.
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the
 There is here no censorship, whether disguised or May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution
otherwise. What Section 11 (b), viewed in context, in fact as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in 'mobile"
does is to limit paid partisan political advertisements to places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to
fora other than modern mass media, and to "COMELEC him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the
time" and "COMELEC space" in such mass media. Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act
No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the
 The freedom of speech & access to media, not being ban on radio, television and print political advertisements,
absolute, its limitation bears a clear and reasonable he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer
connection with the constitutional objective in equalizing grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The
posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving restrictive regulation or ruling, time being of the essence to
vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate a candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable
that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 opportunities may have been lost. When faced with
elections, Finally, the petitioner states that as of February border line situations where freedom to speak by a
22, 1992 he has not received any notice from any of the candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of
Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location the electorate are invoked against actions intended for
of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas." maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local
officials and COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom.
ISSUE:
WON the Commission on Elections may prohibit the We examine the limits of regulation and not the limits
posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or of free speech. The carefully worded opinion of the
private, and limit their location or publication to the Court, through Mr. Justice Feliciano, shows that
authorized posting areas that it fixes. regulation of election campaign activity may not pass
the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or
HOLDING: not limited in time and scope in its application, if it
The petition is impressed with merit and is granted. The restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or
COMELEC's probibition on posting of decals and stickers one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off
on "mobile' places whether public or private except in the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory
designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the
null and void on constitutional grounds. constitutionally sanctioned objective.

RATIO: The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like

1. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the substantial government interest. There is no clear
Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III) public interest threatened by such activity so as to
justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right
There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant of free speech and expression. Under the clear and
the kind of restriction involved in this case.There are present danger rule not only must the danger be
various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech patently clear and pressingly present but the evil
clause which we have adopted as part and parcel of our sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to
own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.All of the justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing
protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important instrument to be stilled:
but we have accorded to free speech the status of a
preferred freedom. “priority (for freedom of speech) gives these liberties a
sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious
This qualitative significance of freedom of expression intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of
arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the the limitation, which determines what standard
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. governs the choice.” The rational connection between
It is difficult to imagine bow the other provisions of the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which
the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be in other context might support legislation against
guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or attack on due process grounds, will not suffice.
persuade is denied and taken away.
The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. Too many convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be
restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to
and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression
if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest. becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and
not of anybody else.
The determination of the limits of the Government's power
to regulate the exercise by a citizen of his basic freedoms 2. The questioned prohibition premised on the statute
in order to promote fundamental public interests or policy and as couched in the resolution is void for
objectives is always a difficult and delicate task. We overbreadth.
recognize the fact that under the Constitution, the
COMELEC during the election period is granted regulatory A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it
powers. The variety of opinions expressed by the members offends the constitutional principle that a governmental
of this Court in the recent case of National Press Club v. purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
Commission on Elections and its companion cases subject, to state regulations may not be achieved by means
underscores this difficulty. However, in the National which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
Press Club case, the Court had occasion to reiterate the area of protected freedoms."
the preferred status of freedom of expression even as it
validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through "In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even
political advertisements. though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
Another problem is the fairly limited period for that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
campaigning. For persons who have to resort to judicial end can be more narrowly achieved.
action to strike down requirements which they deem
inequitable or oppressive, a court case may prove to be a The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and
hollow remedy. By the time we revoke an unallowably stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2)
inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in students who sought to solicit support for their opposition
any place, including mobile places whether public or to a UN resolution against Zionism. One Sat, they set up a
private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. table in a corner of PruneYard’s central courtyard. They
Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and distributed pamphlets, asked passersby to sign petitions
stickers should be posted is so broad that it (were sent to Pres and Congressmen). They were peaceful
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which and orderly. None of PruneYard’s patrons objected.
in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In Pursuant to PruneYard’s policy “not to permit any visitor
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule or tenant to engage in any publicly expressive activity
prescribed by the Constitution would be violated, including the circulation of petitions, that’s not directly
Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that related to its commercial purposes”, the security guard
no person shall be deprived of his property without asked them to leave because they were violating PruneYard
due process of law. regulations. Guard suggested they may transfer to the
public sidewalk at the PruneYard’s perimeter. They left
"Property is more than the mere thing which a person and filed this lawsuit seeking to enjoin PY from denying
owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of them access to it for such purpose.
it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects ISSUE:
these essential attributes. WON Do state constitutional provisions, construed to
permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition
The prohibition would not only deprive the owner who rights on the property of a privately owned center to which
consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the the public is invited, violate the center’s property rights
use of his property but more important, in the process, and his free speech rights?
it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech HELD:
and information. NO.

The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of RATIO:

regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" - The State, in the exercise of police power and its
interest, the burden of justification on the part of the sovereign right to adopt Constitutional individual
Government must be exceptionally convincing and liberties, may adopt restrictions on private property so
irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case. long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking
without just compensation or contravene any law.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and Appellants were not denied their property without due
invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of process of law. They failed to show that due process
election propaganda in any place, whether public or test whereby the challenged law must not be
private, except in the common poster areas sanctioned reasonable, arbitrary or capricious and the means
by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot selected must have a real and substantial relation to
post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his the obj obtained, is not satisfied by the State’s
own front door or on a post in his yard. asserted interest in promoting more expansive rights
of free speech.
3. Tthe constitutional objective to give a rich - While it is true that the 5th A guarantee against the
candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to taking of property without just compensation includes
inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, the “right to exclude others,” nothing suggests that
mandated by Art 11, Sec 26 and Art XIII, Sec I in preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of
relation to Art IX (c) Sec 4 of the Constitution, is not activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of
impaired by posting decals and stickers on private their property as a shopping center. Appellees were
vehicles. orderly and PruneYard could have restricted
expressive activity by adopting time, place and manner
Compared to the paramount interest of the State in regulations that would minimize interference with its
guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial commercial functions.
considerations behind the regulation are of marginal - As to a private owner’s right not to be forced by the
significance. State to use his property as a forum for the speech of
others, the shopping center by choice of its owner is
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers not limited to the personal use of appellants or the
on 'mobile" places whether public or private except in the owners themselves. It is a business establishment
authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes that’s open to the public. The views expressed by
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution: those who come and go will not be identified with
those of the owner. Plus, the owners may disavow any
connection with the message by simply posting signs.
Second, no specific message is dictated by the State to
Use of Private Property as a forum for other’s speech be displayed. There’s no danger of governmental
discrimination for or against a certain message.

1980
PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER vs. ROBINS
B. Unprotected Speech

FACTS: Defamatory Speech

POLICARPIO vs. MANILA TIMES
PruneYard is a privately-owned shopping center open to
public for purpose of encouraging the patronizing of its
commercial establishments. Appellees are hschool FACTS:
 said investigation by Col. Alba had shown that
 Plaintiff Policarpio seeks to recover damages plaintiff was guilty and that, as a consequence,
against the Manila Times Publishing Co. by reason PCAC had filed the corresponding complaints w/
of the publication in the Saturday Mirror of Aug the fiscal’s office. She also said that the article did
11, 1956, and in the Daily Mirror of Aug 13, 1956 not mention that fact that the number of stencils
of 2 articles or news items which are claimed to be involved in the charge was only 18 or 20; that the
per se defamatory, libelous and false. sum allegedly misappropriated by her was only
 CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that P54, and that the falsification imputed to her was
the plaintiff had not proven that defendants had said to have been committed by claiming that
acted maliciously in publishing the articles, certain expenses for which she had sought
although portions thereof were inaccurate or false. reimbursement were incurred in trips during the
 Background: Policarpio was executive secretary of period from July 1 – Sept 30 1955, although the
UNESCO Nat’l Commission. As such, she had filed trips actually were made from Jul 8-Aug 31, 1955.
charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her By omitting these details, plaintiff avers that the
subordinates in the Commission, & caused the Aug 11 article had the effect of conveying the idea
latter to be separated from the service. Reyes, in that the offenses imputed to her were more serious
turn, filed counter-charges which were referred for than they really were.
investigation. Pending completion, Reyes filed a  DEFENDANTS contend that though the
complaint against Policarpio for alleged complaints were filed, not by the PCAC but by
malversation of public funds & another complaint Reyes, this inaccuracy is insignificant &
for estafa thru falsification of public documents. immaterial to the case for the fact is that said
Meanwhile the following articles were published: complaints were filed. As regards the number of
sheets & the nature of the falsification charged,
Saturday Mirror (Aug 11, 1956): they argue that these “details” do not affect the
“WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED truthfulness of the article as a whole. Besides,
PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDS defendants had no means of knowing such
Unesco Official Head Accused on Supplies, Funds “details.”
Use by Colleague”  SC: Prior to Aug 11, Col. Alba had already taken
the testimony of witnesses, hence, defendants
Daily Mirror (Aug 13, 1956): could have ascertained the “details” had they
“PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS wanted to. The number of stencil sheets used was
AGAINST POLICARPIO actually mentioned in the Aug 13 article.
Alba Probes Administrative Phase of Fraud  Moreover, the penalty for estafa/embezzlement
Charges Against Unesco Woman Official; Fiscal depends partly upon the amount of the damage
Sets Prelim Quiz of Criminal Suit on Aug 22” caused to the offended party. Hence, the amount
or value of the property embezzled is material to
 The articles contain news on Reyes’ charges said offense.
against Policarpio for having malversed public  It is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints
property and of having fraudulently sought by another agency of the Govt, like the PCAC,
reimbursement of supposed official expenses. It particularly after an investigation conducted by
was said that Policarpio used several sheets of the same, imparts the ideal that the probability of
govt stencils for her private and personal use. The guilt is greater than when the complaints are filed
other charge refers to the supposed by a private individual, specially when the latter is
reimbursements she had made for a trip to a former subordinate of the alleged offender, who
Quezon and Pangasinan. Reyes’ complaint alleged was responsible for the dismissal of the
that Policarpio had asked for refund of expenses complainant from her employment.
for use of her car when she had actually made the  Newspapers must enjoy a certain degrees of
trip aboard an army plane. Policarpio was said to discretion in determining the manner in which a
be absent from the Bayambang conference for given event should be presented to the public, and
which she also sought a refund of expenses. the importance to be attached thereto, as a news
item, and that its presentation in a sensational
ISSUE: WON defendant is guilty of having published manner is not per se illegal. Newspapers may
libelous/defamatory articles. YES publish news items relative to judicial, legislative
or other official proceedings, which are not of
RATIO: confidential nature, because the public is entitled
 The title of the Aug 11 article was given to know the truth with respect to such
prominence w/ a 6-column (about 11 inches) proceedings. But, to enjoy immunity, a
banner headline of 1-inch types. Its sub-title – publication containing derogatory information
‘PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud” – printed in bold 1 must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it
cm type is not true. Also, the statement in the 1st must be made in good faith and without any
paragraph of the article, to the effect that plaintiff comments or remarks.
“was charged w/ malversation & estafa by the  Art. 354, RPC provides:
Pres’l Complaint & Action Commission” (PCAC) is “Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
not true, the complaints for said offenses having malicious even if it be true, if no good intention &
been filed by Reyes. Neither is it true that said justifiable motive for making it is shown, except:
“criminal action was initiated as a result of current 1. xxx
administrative investigation.” 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, w/o
 PLAINTIFF maintains that the effect of these false any comments or remarks….”
statements was to give the general impression that
  In the case at bar, aside from containing
information derogatory to the plaintiff, the Aug 11 Fidel G. Cruz sued and the trial court awarded him
article presented her in a worse predicament than damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
that in which she, in fact was. Said article was not
a fair and true report of the proceedings therein ISSUE:
alluded to. What is more, its sub-title “PCAC raps
Policarpio on fraud” is a comment or remark, WON the Publishers were guilty of libel?
besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory
imputations contained in said article are HELD:
“presumed to be malicious”
 In falsely stating that the complaints were filed by Yes, though the standard is “actual malice”, in weekly
PCAC, either defendants knew the truth or they magazines there is little excuse for errors in data.
did not. If they did, then the publication would
actually be malicious. I f they did not, or if they RATIONALE:
acted under a misapprehension of the facts, they
were guilty of negligence in making said No liability would be incurred if the petitioners could prove
statement. that their actions are embraced by press freedom. Included
 We note that the Aug 13 article rectified a major therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what items
inaccuracy in the 1st article, by stating that neither should see the light of day as long as they are relevant to a
Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed the complaints. It matter of public interest, the insistence on the
likewise indicated the number of stencil sheets requirement as to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable
involved. But, this rectification or clarification inaccuracies attendant on newspapers and other
does not wipe out the responsibility arising from publications being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If
the publication of the Aug 11 article, although it there is no such showing, there is a quasi-delict. Libel has
should mitigate it. both a criminal and civil aspect because it induces breach
of the peace by the defamed person and it deprives him of
HELD: Decision reversed. Defendants ordered to pay his good reputation.
plaintiff moral damages, atty’s fees plus cost.
Libel was defined in the old libel law as “a malicious
defamation expressed either in writing, printing or by signs
or pictures or like… exposing [someone, dead or alive] to
public hatred, contempt or ridicule”. Newell (Slander and
Libel) states that libel is incurred when the wrong person’s
photograph was published with a libelous article. Holmes
points out that publishing a portrait by mistake was no
excuse. The publisher took the risk in publishing a
libelous article and he publishes at his peril. Learned
Hand states that when a photo exposes a person to
ridicule it is libelous. Cardozo states that though words
dissolve, writings persevere and writings include any
symbol as long as it is intelligible.
LOPEZ vs. CA
Criticism, however, is justified in the interest of society
and the maintenance of good gov’t. Liberty to comment on
(1970) public affairs creates a full discussion and public officers
should not be too thin skinned that they can’t take it.
Ponente: Fernando J Newspapers have the legal right to have and express
opinions on legal questions. Debate on public issues
FACTS: should be uninhibited, robust, wide-open, even allowing
vehement, caustic and sharp attacks. Criticism turns to
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle published a libel when “actual malice” is used – when a statement was
series of articles in January, 1956 about the Hoax of the made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
Year. It also erupted in the earlier part of that month. The disregard that it was false or not (US SC, NY Times vs
story goes that Fidel Cruz was a sanitary inspector in the Sullivan).
Babuyan Islands. He sent out a distress signal to a US air
force plane who relayed it to Manila. Another US plane Paras as ponente in Quisumbing vs Lopez states that
dropped emergency supplies together with a two-way newspapers should not be held to account for honest
radio. Cruz told of killings committed since Christmas, mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. However
1955 which terrorized the populace. The Philippine army this is not the case here. A weekly magazine is not
was sent out only to find Cruz who only wanted oppressed by the tyranny of deadlines as much as dailies.
transportation home to Manila. The army branded it as a There is no need to act in haste.
hoax.
Retractions do not absolve one from pecuniary liability.
The series of articles published the photo of Fidel Cruz. There is still responsibility arising from the publication of
However, it was not the sanitary inspectors photo that was the first article
published but that of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor. As soon as DISPOSITION:
the error was noticed, a correction was immediately
published. Libelous. Affirmed with lower costs because of retraction
 concerning” respondent.  trial judge found for
OTHER OPINIONS: Sullivan, sustained by the Alabama SC
 A publication is “libelous per se” if the words tend
Dizon J, dissent:
to injure a person in his reputation or to “bring
him in public contempt”  this standard is met if
The facts do not bear out the conclusion that actual malice
the words are such as to “injure him in his public
was involved. Damages on the basis of tort are untenable
office, impute misconduct to him in his office, or
because the articles do not involve moral turpitude.
want of official integrity.
Whatever negligence there is in the case should be
considered as excusable. o Once libel per se has been established the
defendant has no defense as to stated
facts unless he can persuade the jury that
they were true in their particulars. Unless
NEW YORK TIMES vs. SULLIVAN he can discharge the burden of proving
truth, general damages are presumed and
(1964) may be awarded w/o proof of pecuniary
injury.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
 A full-page advertisement came out in the New
1. W/N the rule of liability (regarding libel per se)
York Times on March 29, 1960 which talked about
regarding an action brought by a public official
the non-violent demonstrations being staged by
against critics of his official conduct abridges the
Southern Negro students in positive affirmation of
freedom of speech and of the press that is
the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed in
guaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendments. YES
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights signed at
the bottom by the “Committee to Defend Martin a. W/N the advertisement forfeits the
Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the protection guaranteed to free speech and
South” the press by the falsity of some of its
factual statements and by its alleged
 L.B. Sullivan, the Commissioner of Public Affairs
defamation of respondent. NO
of Montgomery, Alabama, whose duties include
supervision of the Police and Fire Department,  “The maintenance of the opportunity for free
brought a civil libel suit against those those who political discussion to the end that gov’t may
came out with the ad (4 Negro clergymen) and the be responsive to the will of the people and that
NY Times Company. changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the
o Basis of the suit was statements in the
Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
text of the ad saying in the 3 rd par. that constitutional system.”
after students sang “My Country, ‘Tis of
Thee” on the State Capitol steps their Factual error of statement:
leaders were expelled from school,
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment
policemen armed with shotguns and tear
guarantees have refused to recognize an exception for any
gas ringed the State College Campus, their
test of truth especially one that puts the burden of proving
dining hall was padlocked to starve them
truth on the speaker.
when the student body protested… and in
the 6th par. that again and again the  Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports
Southern violators have answered Dr. of the political conduct of officials reflect the
Kings peaceful protest with violence and obsolete doctrine that the governed must not
intimidation going on to cite instances in criticize their governors. The interest of the public
which They have done this (e.g. They have outweighs the interest of any other individual. The
assaulted his person). protection of the public requires not merely
discussion, but information. Errors of fact… are
o Neither of these statements mentions the
inevitable. Whatever is added to the field of libel is
respondent by name but he argues that
taken from the field of free debate.
the word “police” in the 3rd par referred to
him as Commissioner who supervised the  A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to
Police Department and that the word guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions--
“They” used in the 6th par would be and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually
equated with the ones did the other unlimited in amount--leads to a comparable 'self-
described acts and hence be read as censorship.' Allowance of the defense of truth,
accusing the Montgomery police and with the burden of proving it on the defendant,
therefore him, of answering Dr. Kings does not mean that only false speech will be
protests with violence and intimidation. deterred.
o Under such a rule, would-be critics of
 Trial judge submitted the case to the jury under
official conduct may be deterred from
instructions that the statements made were
voicing their criticism, even though it is
“libelous per se”, which implies legal injury from
believed to be true and even though it is in
the bare fact of publication itself, and were not
fact true, because of doubt whether it can
privileged therefore the only things left to be
be proved in court or fear of the expense of
proven are whether petitioners published the ad
having to do so. They tend to make only
and whether the statements were made “of and
statements which 'steer far wider of the
 unlawful zone. The rule thus dampens the uncertainty in addition to the those discussed above, the
vigor and limits the variety of public judgment must be reversed and remanded.
debate. It is inconsistent with the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.
ROSENBLOOM vs. METROMEDIA
Defamatory character:
Criticism of their official conduct does not lose its (Brennan)
constitutional protection merely because it is effective
criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations. FACTS
 If neither factual error nor defamatory content 1. 1n 1963, Rosenbloom was a distributor of nudist
suffices to remove the constitutional shield magazines. The Special Investigations Squad of
from criticism of official conduct, the the Philadelphia Police Department, headed by
combination of the two elements is no less Cpt. Ferguson, purchased magazines from more
inadequate. than 20 newsstands. Based on the Captain’s own
determination that the magazines were obscene,
When an article is considered privileged: they arrested most of the newsstand operators.
2. Rosenbloom was about to deliver his magazines
“Where an article is published and circulated among while the arrests were taking place. As a result, he
voters for the sole purpose of giving what the defendant was also arrested.
believes to be truthful information concerning a candidate 3. 3 days later police obtained a warrant to search
for public office and for the purpose of enabling such his home and his rented barn which was used as a
voters to cast their ballot more intelligently, and the whole warehouse where further seizures took place. He
thing is done in good faith and without malice, the article paid bail for the 1st arrest but was again detained.
is privileged, although the principal matters contained in 4. Cpt. Ferguson telephoned the respondent’s radio
the article may be untrue in fact and derogatory to the station WIP, a local radio station, a wire service
character of the plaintiff; and in such a case the burden is and a local newspaper to inform them of the raid
on the plaintiff to show actual malice in the publication of and his arrest. In WIP’s broadcast they used the
the article.” words “allegedly” and “reportedly” obscene more
 Privilege for criticism of public official is than five times.
appropriately analogues to the protection accorded 5. Rosenbloom brought action in the Federal District
a public official when he is sued for libel by a Court for an injunctive relief to prohibit the police
private citizen. Actual malice must be proved. and further publicity in interfering with his
business.
o Proof of actual malice should be presented 6. There was a second broadcast which did not
mention the petitioner’s name about the case
In cases where that line must be drawn, the rule is
described as: as action by “smut distributors” or
that we examine for ourselves the statements in issue and
“girlie book peddlers” seeking the defendants to
the circumstances under which they were made to see
“lay off the smut literature racket”.
whether they are of a character which the principles of the
7. Rosenbloom went personally to the radio station
First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause
(through a lobby telephone talk with a part-time
of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect. We must make an
newscaster) and said that his magazines were
independent examination of the whole record, so as to
found to be completely legal and legit by the US
assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a
SC. The newscaster said it was the district
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.
attorney who said it was obscene, Rosenbloom
 Proof showing actual malice not sufficiently shown
countered saying that he had a public statement
to support judgment. On the part of the NY Times,
of the district attorney declaring the magazines
statement does not indicate malice at the time of
legal and alleged that at that moment, the
publication and even if the ad was not
telephone conversation was terminated.
substantially correct the opinion presented therein
8. In 1964, he was acquitted by a jury saying that
was a reasonable one and there is no evidence to
the magazines were not obscene as a matter of
impeach the good faith of the Times in publishing
law. Following the acquittal, he filed for damages
it.
under Pennsylvania’s libel laws saying that the
characterization of the books seized as obscene
Reference to respondent in the ads:
was proved false by the acquittal. WIP’s defenses
were truth (since Penn. Law recognizes truth as a
Evidence is incapable of supporting conclusion that
complete defense) where their source was Cpt.
statements were made “of and concerning” respondent. No
Ferguson, and privilege (where a conditional
reference to respondent was made either by name or
privilege is recognized for news media to report
official position. None of the statements made suggested
judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings
any basis for the belief that respondent was himself
if the account is fair and accurate and not
attached beyond the bare fact that he was in overall
published solely for the purpose of causing harm
charge of the Police Department.
<but this may be defeated by showing want of
reasonable care and diligence to ascertain the
With regard to damages:
truth, where burden of proof is upon defendant>)
General and punitive damages must be differentiated 9. Court said that 4 findings were necessary to
and since the judge did not instruct the jury to return a verdict for pet. 1) that one or more of the
differentiate it would then be impossible to know which broadcasts were defamatory 2) a reasonable
one they awarded and if adequate proof was presented listener would conclude that the defamatory
warranting such an award of damages. Because of this statements referred to pet 3) WIP either intended
 to injure the plaintiff personally or there is counter criticism may be true for some very prominent
unreasonable care 4) the reporting was false. people, even then it is the rare case where the denial
Judgment awarded him with $25,000 in general overtakes the original charge. Denials, retractions, and
damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. corrections are not "hot" news, and rarely receive the
10. CA reversed saying that the broadcasts concerned prominence of the original story. When the public official
matters of public interest and they involved “hot or public figure is a minor functionary, or has left the
news” published under pressure. Even though he position that put him in the public eye, the argument loses
is not a public figure, the standards should still be all of its force. In the vast majority of libels involving public
applied to implement the First Amendment. officials or public figures, the ability to respond through
the media will depend on the same complex factor on
ISSUE: which the ability of a private individual depends: the
Whether because he is not a “public official” or a “public unpredictable event of the media's continuing interest in
figure” but a private individual that he still needs to prove the story.
the falsehoods resulting from a failure to exercise
reasonable care, or that it was broadcast with knowledge R 2nd argument:
of its falsity, or with reckless disregard if whether they Second, petitioner focuses on the important values served
were false or not (ang gulo no? hehe) by the law of defamation in preventing and redressing
attacks upon reputation.
HELD: Yeah. CA affirmed. Evidence was insufficient to
support a verdict. COURT ELUCIDATING (naks):
General references to the values protected by the law of
RATIO: libel conceal important distinctions. Traditional arguments
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it suggest that libel law protects two separate interests of the
cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual: first, his desire to preserve a certain privacy
individual is involved, or because in some sense the around his personality from unwarranted intrusion, and,
individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. second, a desire to preserve his public good name and
The public's primary interest is in the event; the public reputation. The individual's interest in privacy--in
focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, preventing unwarranted intrusion upon the private
effect, and significance of the conduct, not the aspects of his life--is not involved in this case , the idea
participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. The present that certain "public" figures have voluntarily exposed their
case illustrates the point. The community has a vital entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals
interest in the proper enforcement of its criminal laws, have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at
particularly in an area such as obscenity where a number best, a legal fiction.. In the present case, however,
of highly important values are potentially in conflict: the petitioner's business reputation is involved, and thus the
public has an interest both in seeing that the criminal law relevant interests protected by state libel law are
is adequately enforced and in assuring that the law is not petitioner's public reputation and good name.
used unconstitutionally to suppress free expression.
Whether the person involved is a famous large-scale These are important interests. Consonant with the libel
magazine distributor or a "private" businessman running a laws of most of the States, however, Pennsylvania's libel
corner newsstand has no relevance in ascertaining law subordinates these interests of the individual in a
whether the public has an interest in the issue. We honor number of circumstances. Thus, high government officials
the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which are immune from liability--absolutely privileged--even if
is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending they publish defamatory material from an improper
constitutional protection to all discussion and motive, with actual malice, and with knowledge of its
communication involving matters of public or general falsity. This absolute privilege attaches to judges,
concern, without regard to whether the persons involved attorneys at law in connection with a judicial proceeding,
are famous or anonymous. parties and witnesses to judicial proceedings,
Congressmen and state legislators, and high national and
Rosenbloom’s arguments. state executive officials. Moreover, a conditional privilege
First, he argues that the private individual, unlike the allows newspapers to report the false defamatory material
public figure, does not have access to the media to counter originally published under the absolute privileges listed
the defamatory material and that the private individual, above, if done accurately.
unlike the public figure, has not assumed the risk of
defamation by thrusting himself into the public arena. Even without the presence of a specific constitutional
command, therefore, Pennsylvania libel law recognizes that
COURT SAID: society's interest in protecting individual reputation often
Analysis of the particular factors involved, however, yields to other important social goals. In this case, the vital
convinces us that petitioner's arguments cannot be needs of freedom of the press and freedom of speech
reconciled with the purposes of the First Amendment, with persuade us that allowing private citizens to obtain
our cases, and with the traditional doctrines of libel law damage judgments on the basis of a jury determination
itself. Drawing a distinction between "public" and "private" that a publisher probably failed to use reasonable care
figures makes no sense in terms of the First Amendment would not provide adequate "breathing space" for these
guarantees.The New York Times standard was applied to great freedoms. Fear of guessing wrong must inevitably
libel of a public official or public figure to give effect to the cause self-censorship and thus create the danger that the
Amendment's function to encourage ventilation of public legitimate utterance will be deterred.
issues, not because the public official has any less interest
in protecting his reputation than an individual in private This Court has recognized this imperative: "To insure the
life. While the argument that public figures need less ascertainment and publication of the truth about public
protection because they can command media attention to affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect
some erroneous publications as well as true ones." We Filipinos at EDSA”, in a film. The motion picture is entitled
thus hold that a libel action, as here, by a private “The Four Day Revolution”. This would be done through
individual against a licensed radio station for a defamatory the eyes of 4 fictional characters situated in the
falsehood in a newscast relating to his involvement in an Philippines during the days surrounding the revolution.
event of public or general concern may be sustained only The project was also to be done with the help of Australian
upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory playwright David Williamson and American historian Al
falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false McCoy.
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Calculated falsehood, of course, falls outside "the fruitful When discussed with local movie producer, lope V. Juban,
exercise of the right of free speech. Ayer Productions was told to get the consent of certain
government agencies, as well as that of Gen. Ramos and
Finding of SC regarding the “alleged” and “reportedly” Sen. Enrile. All the proper consent was given, except by
issue: Enrile who did not want his name, or that of his family, to
Our independent analysis of the record leads us to agree be used in the film. Ayer Productions decided to go on with
with the Court of Appeals that none of the proofs, the film, but delete the name of Sen. Enrile.
considered either singly or cumulatively, satisfies the
constitutional standard with the convincing clarity During the filming, Sen. Enrile filed a complaint in Court
necessary to raise a jury question whether the defamatory for a TRO to enjoin petitioner Ayer from filming, saying
falsehoods were broadcast with knowledge that they were that the making of the movie without respondent’s consent
false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false as a violation of his right to privacy. A writ of
or not. That portion of petitioner's case was based upon preliminary injunction was issued upon Ayer as a result.
the omission from the first two broadcasts at 6 and 6:30 p.
m. on October 4 of the word "alleged" preceding a Ayer then filed with the SC through a petition of certiorari.
characterization of the magazines distributed by petitioner. The court granted a TRO on the injunction, allowing Ayer
But that omission was corrected with the 8 p. m. to film those parts of the movie not related to Sen. Enrile.
broadcast and was not repeated in the five broadcasts that
followed. Respondent invokes the right to privacy. Petitioner invokes
freedom of expression.
Regarding the “smut literature” and “girlie book
peddler” ISSUE:
The transcript of the testimony shows that plaintiff's own WON the media’s freedom of expression may encroach on
attorney, when questioning defendant's representative the right to privacy of a public figure.
concerning the allegedly defamatory portion of the last
broadcast, said that he was not questioning its 'accuracy'. HELD: Yes it may
Furthermore, his examination of the same witness brought
out that defendant's representative confirmed the story RATIO:
with the judge involved before the broadcast was made. We The case is basically one of superiority of rights; the
think that the episode described failed to provide evidence filmmaker’s freedom of expression vs. Enrile’s right to
of actual malice with the requisite convincing clarity to privacy. In the case at bar, the Court decided that freedom
create a jury issue under federal standards of expression must prevail.

Petitioner argues finally that WIP's failure to communicate (Some important things to note are that freedom of
with him to learn his side of the case and to obtain a copy expression extends to local and foreign filmmakers in the
of the magazine for examination, sufficed to support a country. It also extends to public and private film
verdict under the New York Times standard. But our companies.)
"cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, Now the court says that the right to privacy is not
or would have investigated before publishing. There must absolute. Allowable is a limited intrusion where the person
be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the is a public figure and the information is of public interest.
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the In this case, the subject matter is of public interest as it
truth of his publication." Respondent here relied on was a historical event, and Sen. Enrile played a big part in
information supplied by police officials. Following this event, thus making his character a public figure.
petitioner's complaint about the accuracy of the Therefore, a limited intrusion is allowable. Furthermore,
broadcasts, WIP checked its last report with the judge who the portrayal of Sen. Enrile is not the main focus of the
presided in the case. While we may assume that the film, but is necessary, again, due to the large part he
District Court correctly held to be defamatory respondent's played in it. “Private respondent is a “public figure”
characterizations of petitioner's business as "the smut precisely because, inter alia, of his participation as a
literature racket," and of those engaged in it as "girlie-book principal actor in the culminating events of the change of
peddlers," there is no evidence in the record to support a government in February 1986”.
conclusion that respondent "in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth" of its reports. (This was contrasted to an earlier ruling regarding the life
of Moises Padilla. But in that case, Moises Padilla was the
main focus of the film. Enrile is not so in this one.)
AYER PRODUCTION vs. JUDGE CAPULONG The Court also talks about the “privilege of enlightening
the public”, which is the privilege of the press. The Court
FACTS: said that this privilege is also extended to film.
Petitioner Hal McElroy is an Australian filmmaker
planning to reenact the “historic peaceful struggle of the
Brought up were 2 doctrines. The “clear and present There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
danger” doctrine and the “balancing of interest” doctrine. President from waiving the privilege.
These are seen as limitations upon the freedom of The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
expression. However, use of either would not matter as the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only
result would be the same. by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President’s behalf. An accused in a criminal case in which
On the “balancing of interest” rule: The principle requires a the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type against such accused.
of situation.
What is the rationale for the privilege of immunity from suit?
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege
of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
BELTRAN vs. MAKASIAR of the Government is a job that demands undivided
attention.
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to review the decision
of the RTC (November 14, 1988)
Per Curiam
FACTS:
Then President of the Philippines (Aquino) filed FACTS:
Informations for libel against the petitioners. Manila RTC Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to review the decision
(Makasiar, J) issued a warrant of arrest for petitioners. of the RTC
Then President of the Philippines (Aquino) filed
ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC erred in issuing the Informations for libel against the petitioners. Manila RTC
warrants of arrest. (Makasiar, J) issued a warrant of arrest for petitioners.

RATIO-HELD: DISMISSED. ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in issuing the warrants of
arrest  NO
Ground 1: Petitioners were denied due process when the
informations for libel were filed against them although the RATIO:
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still Ground 1: Petitioners were denied due process when the
under review by the Secretary of Justice and by the Informations for libel were filed against them although the
President. finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still
Court: Moot and Academic. On March 30, 1988, the under review by the Secretary of Justice and by the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners’ motion for President.
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the USec of Court: Moot and Academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Justice sustaining the City Fiscal’s finding of a prima facie Secretary of Justice denied petitioners’ motion for
case against petitioners. reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the USec of
Justice sustaining the City Fiscal’s finding of a prima facie
Ground 2: Beltran’s constitutional rights were violated case against petitioners.
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the complainant and Ground 2: Beltran’s constitutional rights were violated
the witnesses to determine probable cause. when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
Court: (Please see Art 3, sec 2 of the Consti) In satisfying arrest without personally examining the complainant and
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance the witnesses to determine probable cause.
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to Court: (Please see Art 3, sec 2 of the Consti) In satisfying
personally examine the complainant and his witness. himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally evaluate the report and the supporting personally examine the complainant and his witness.
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
of probable cause and then issue a warrant of arrest, or (2) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
if he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
report and require the submission of supporting affidavit of probable cause and then issue a warrant of arrest, or (2)
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the if he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s
existence of probable cause. report and require the submission of supporting affidavit
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
Ground 3: The President’s immunity from suits imposes a existence of probable cause.
correlative disability to file a suit. If criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of her complaint- Ground 3: The President’s immunity from suits imposes a
affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for correlative disability to file a suit. If criminal proceedings
the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court’s ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of her complaint-
jurisdiction. This would be in an indirect way defeat her affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court’s
witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible jurisdiction. This would be in an indirect way defeat her
contempt of court or perjury. (Beltran) privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the
witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
May the privilege of immunity be waived? contempt of court or perjury. (Beltran)
 under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be
May the privilege of immunity be waived? assuaged with the balm of clear conscience.  While
There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the defamation is not authorized, criticism is to be expected
President from waiving the privilege. and should be borne for the common good.
The privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only
by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the High official position, instead of affording immunity from
President’s behalf. An accused in a criminal case in which slanderous and libelous charges, would actually invite
the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential attacks by those who desire to create sensation. What
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person
against such accused. should be examined from various perspectives if directed
at a high gov’t official. The SC should draw this fine line
What is the rationale for the privilege of immunity from suit? instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege
of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Elizalde v Gutierrez: A prosecution for libel lacks
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance justification if the offending words find sanctuary within
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive the shelter of free press guaranty. It should not be allowed
of the Government is a job that demands undivided to continue where, after discounting the possibility that
attention. the words may not be really that libelous, there is likely to
be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the
Ground 4: Petitioner contends that he could not be held willingness of newspapermen, especially editors and
liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publishers to courageously perform their critical role in
publication. society.
Court: The Court is not a trier of facts. Such a defense is
best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the Ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech clause
evidence of the parties. but we have to understand that some provocative words,
which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage
a public figure, may really be intended to provoke debate
Ground 5: Petitioner claims that to allow a libel case to on public issues when uttered or written by a media
prosper would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom. personality. Will not a criminal prosecution in the type of
Court: There is no basis at this stage to rule on the point. case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the variety
of public debate?
Gutierrez, concurring:
J. Gutierrez concurs with the majority as regards the first
3 issues but reserves his vote with regard to the “chilling
effect” of the prosecution of the libel case on press
freedom.

Salonga v Cruz Paño: the Court should not hesitate to

quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more
enlightened and substantial justice where it is not only the
criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel
case which is involved but broader considerations of MVRS vs. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL
governmental power versus a preferred freedom.
(January 2003, Bellosillo)
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect
FACTS:
will be limited to punishing a newspaperman who, instead
of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in
1. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE
unwarranted personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of
PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than
facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend to
seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and
cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of complainant.
some individual Muslims field in the RTC of
However, this case is not a simple prosecution for
Manila a complaint for damages in their own
libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular
behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim
President who heads the investigation an prosecution
members nationwide against MVRS
service and appoints members of appellate courts but
PUBLICATIONS, INC and some its staff arising
who feels so terribly maligned that she has taken the
from an article published in the 1 August 1992
unorthodox step of going to court in spite of the
issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.
invocations of freedom of press which would inevitably
follow. I believe the Court should have acted on this issue
2. The article reads:
now instead of leaving the matter to fiscals and defense
lawyers to argue before a trial judge. "ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng
US v Bustos (to be discussed in Crim2): Complete liberty to hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the Muslim?
case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves
the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang
 sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang reinstated.
kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan
ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila RATIO:
itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing 1. There was no fairly identifiable person who
araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article.
araw na tinatawag nilang ‘Ramadan’." An individual Muslim has a reputation that
3. The complaint: is personal, separate and distinct in the
community. Each has a varying interest
a) The statement was insulting and and a divergent political and religious view.
damaging to the Muslims; There is no injury to the reputation of the
individual Muslims who constitute this
b) that these words alluding to the pig as community that can give rise to an action
the God of the Muslims was not only for group libel. Each reputation is personal
published out of sheer ignorance but with in character to every person. Together, the
intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and Muslims do not have a single common
disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a reputation that will give them a common or
religion in this country, in violation of general interest in the subject matter of the
law, public policy, good morals and controversy.
human relations;
2. Defamation, which includes libel (in
c) that on account of these libelous words general, written) and slander (in general,
Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in oral), means the offense of injuring a
the Philippines but the entire Muslim person's character, fame or reputation
world, especially every Muslim individual through false and malicious statements. It
in non-Muslim countries. is that which tends to injure reputation or
4. MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. and BINEGAS, JR., in to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or
their defense, contended that the article did not confidence in the plaintiff or to excite
mention respondents as the object of the article derogatory feelings or opinions about the
and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, plaintiff.
that the article was merely an expression of belief 3. Defamation is an invasion of a relational
or opinion and was published without malice nor interest since it involves the opinion which
intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to others in the community may have, or tend
Muslims. to have, of the plaintiff. Words which are
5. The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that merely insulting are not actionable as libel
Islamic Da’wah et al. failed to establish their cause or slander per se, and mere words of
of action since the persons allegedly defamed by general abuse however opprobrious, ill-
the article were not specifically identified. The natured, or vexatious, whether written or
alleged libelous article refers to the larger spoken, do not constitute a basis for an
collectivity of Muslims for which the readers of the action for defamation in the absence of an
libel could not readily identify the personalities of allegation for special damages.
the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an 4. Declarations made about a large class of
individual Muslim member to prove that the people cannot be interpreted to advert to an
defamatory remarks apply to him. identified or identifiable individual. Absent
6. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circumstances specifically pointing or
RTC. It opined that it was "clear from the alluding to a particular member of a class,
disputed article that the defamation was directed no member of such class has a right of
to all adherents of the Islamic faith. This libelous action without at all impairing the equally
imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff- demanding right of free speech and
appellants who are Muslims sharing the same expression, as well as of the press, under
religious beliefs." It added that the suit for the Bill of Rights.
damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC 5. The SC used the reasoning in Newsweek v
DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s IAC: where the defamation is alleged to
religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization have been directed at a group or class, it is
gave it the requisite personality to sue and protect essential that the statement must be so
the interests of all Muslims. sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
7. MVRS brought the issue to the SC. every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual
in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to
IMPT.ISSUE: him, so that he can bring the action
WON there was an existence of the elements of libel in separately.
the Bulgar article. 6. The SC cited some US cases wherein the
DECISION: rule on libel has been restrictive. It was
held that there could be no libel against an
The article was not libelous. Petition GRANTED. The extensive community in common law. With
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals was REVERSED regard to the largest sectors in society,
and SET ASIDE and the decision of the RTC was including religious groups, it may be
 generally concluded that no criminal action 11. American courts no longer accept the
at the behest of the state, or civil action on view that speech may be proscribed
behalf of the individual, will lie. merely because it is "lewd," "profane,"
"insulting" or otherwise vulgar or
7. "Emotional distress" tort action has no offensive.(Cohen v California) Similarly,
application in this case because no libelous speech is no longer outside the
particular individual was identified in the First Amendment protection. Only one
Bulgar article. "Emotional distress" means small piece of the Two-Class Theory in
any highly unpleasant mental reaction Chaplinsky survives - U.S. courts
such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, continue to treat "obscene" speech as
embarrassment, anger, disappointment, not within the protection of the First
worry, nausea, mental suffering and Amendment at all. With respect to the
anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. "fighting words" doctrine, while it
This kind of tort action is personal in remains alive it was modified by the
nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an current rigorous clear and present
individual to assuage the injuries to his danger test.
emotional tranquility due to personal
attacks on his character. Under the Second 12. Respondents' lack of cause of action cannot
Restatement of the Law, to recover for the be cured by the filing of a class suit. An
intentional infliction of emotional distress element of a class suit is the adequacy of
the plaintiff must show that: representation. In determining the
question of fair and adequate
(a) The conduct of the defendant representation of members of a class, the
was intentional or in reckless court must consider:
disregard of the plaintiff;
(a) whether the interest of the
(b) The conduct was extreme and named party is coextensive with
outrageous; the interest of the other
(c) There was a causal connection members of the class;
between the defendant's (b) the proportion of those made
conduct and the plaintiff's parties as it so bears to the
mental distress; total membership of the class;
(d) The plaintiff's mental distress and,
was extreme and severe. (c) any other factor bearing on the
8. "Extreme and outrageous conduct" means ability of the named party to
conduct that is so outrageous in character, speak for the rest of the class.
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc.,
all possible bounds of decency. The actions seeks in effect to assert the interests not only of
must have been so terrifying as naturally to the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole
humiliate, embarrass or frighten the Muslim world as well. Private respondents
plaintiff. obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to
9. Any party seeking recovery for mental represent such a global group; neither have they
anguish must prove more than mere worry, been able to demonstrate the identity of their
anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or interests with those they seek to represent.
anger. Liability does not arise from mere
insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty expressions, or other trivialities. “Fighting words”, Offensive Words
Intentional tort causing emotional distress
must necessarily give way to the CHAPLINSKY vs. NEW HAMPSHIRE
fundamental right to free speech.
(1942)
10. The doctrines in Chaplinsky and Ponente: J. Murphy
Beauharnais had largely been superseded
by subsequent First Amendment doctrines. FACTS:
Back in simpler times in the history of free In 1940 Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was
expression the Supreme Court appeared to distributing literature on the streets of Rochester, New
espouse a theory, known as the Two-Class Hampshire, when he created quite a stir by loudly
Theory, that treated certain types of telling everyone he encountered that organized
expression as taboo forms of speech, religions are “a racket” and by specifically condemning
beneath the dignity of the First Amendment several major ones by name in great detail. Members
such as lewd and obscene, the profane, the of the local citizenry complained to the City Marshal,
libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” Bowering, that Chaplinsky was denouncing all religion
words – those which by their very utterance as a 'racket'. Bowering told them that Chaplinsky was
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate lawfully engaged, and then warned Chaplinsky that
breach of the peace. Today, however, the the crowd was getting restless. Some time later a
theory is no longer viable; modern First disturbance occurred and the traffic officer on duty at
Amendment principles have passed it by. the busy intersection started with Chaplinsky for the
police station, but did not inform him that he was
 under arrest or that he was going to be arrested. On
the way they encountered Marshal Bowering who had
been advised that a riot was under way and was COHEN vs. CALIFORNIA
therefore hurrying to the scene. Bowering repeated his
earlier warning to Chaplinsky who then addressed to (June 17, 1971)
Bowering the words set forth in the complaint. Ponente: J. Harlan

FACTS:
The complaint charged that appellant “with force and
 Appelant Paul Robert Cohen was convicted in the CA
arms, in a certain public place in said city of Rochester, on
of Cal. for violating part of Cal. Penal Code 415,
the public sidewalk on the easterly side of Wakefield
which prohibits “maliciously and willfully disturbing
Street, near unto the entrance of the City Hall, did
the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person… by
unlawfully repeat, the words following, addressed to the
offensive conduct,” for wearing a jacket bearing the
complainant, 'You are a God damned racketeer' and 'a
words “FUCK THE DRAFT” in a corridor of the LA
damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester
Courthouse. The defendant testified that he wore the
are Fascists or agents of Fascists”. He was arrested an
jacket knowing that the words were on the jacket as a
eventually convicted under a state law (Chapter 378,
means of informing the public of the depth of his
Section 2, of the Public Laws of New Hampshire) that made
feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft. He did
it an offense to speak “any offensive, derisive or annoying
not engage in, nor threaten to engage in, nor did
word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or
anyone, as the result of his conduct, in fact commit or
other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive
threaten to commit, any act of violence.
name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence
 In affirming the conviction, the CA held that offensive
and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or
conduct means “behavior which has a tendency to
to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or
provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb
occupation.”
the peace” and that the State has proved this because
“it was certainly reasonably foreseeable that such
Chaplinsky was found guilty by the lower court for
conduct might cause others to rise up to commit a
violating the said statute. Whereupon the appellant raised
violent act against the person of the defendant or
the questions that the statute was invalid under the
attempt to forceably remove his jacket.”
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States in that it placed an unreasonable restraint on
ISSUE  HELD:
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of
1. WON the conviction should be sustained  NO
worship, and because it was vague and indefinite.
2. WON Cal. can excise, as “offensive conduct,” one
particular scurrilous epithet from the public discourse
ISSUE/HELD:
(upon a theory that its use is inherently likely to cause
W/O Not the New Hampshire statute is a violation of the
violent reaction or upon a more general assertion that
freedom of speech? NO
States may properly remove this offensive word from
the public vocabulary)  HELL, NO!!!
RATIO:
RATIO:
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood
1.
that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times
The only “conduct” which the State sought to punish is the
and under all circumstances. There are certain well-
fact of communication. Thus, we deal here with a
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
conviction resting solely upon “speech,” not upon any
prevention and punishment of which has never been
separately identifiable conduct which allegedly was
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
intended by Cohen to be perceived by others as expressive
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
of particular views by which, on its face, does not
insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very
necessarily convey any message and hence arguably could
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
be regulated without effectively repressing Cohen’s ability
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
to express himself. So long as there is no showing of intent
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
to incite disobedience to or disruption of the draft, Cohen
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
could not, consistently with the 1 st and 14th Amendments,
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
be punished for asserting the evident position on the
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
inutility or immorality of the draft his jacket reflected.
The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of what a
This Court has held that States are free to ban the simple
particular addressee thinks. ... The test is what men of
use of so-called fighting words, those personally abusive
common intelligence would understand would be words
epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen,
likely to cause an average addressee to fight. Argument is
are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to
unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations 'damn
provoke violent reaction. While the 4-letter word displayed
racketeer' and 'damn Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke
by Cohen in relation to the draft is not uncommonly
the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a
employed in a personally provocative fashion; in this
breach of the peace. The Court held that the limited scope
instance, it was clearly not “directed to the person of the
of the statute does not contravene the constitutional right
hearer.” No individual actually or likely to be present could
of free expression nor does it contravene the constitutional
reasonably have regarded those words on appellant’s
right of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and
jacket as a direct personal insult. There is no showing that
limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within
anyone who saw Cohen was in fact violently aroused or
the domain of state power.
that appellant intended such result.
Moreover, the mere presumed presence of unwitting (6/24/57)
listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify Brennan, J.
curtailing all speech capable of giving offense. It has been
consistently stressed that “we are often ‘captives’ outside FACTS:
the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable Roth (New York) is in the business of publishing & selling
speech.” The ability of gov’t, consonant with the Consti, to books, photographs & magazines. He used circulars which
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it, he mailed in order to advertise. He was convicted on the
is dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy basis of a federal obscenity statute for mailing obscene
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable circulars & advertisements. Alberts (Los Angeles) operates
manner. a mail-order business. He was charged for violation of a
California Penal Statute, for "lewdly keeping for sale
2. obscene & indecent books".
The rationale of the Cal. court is untenable. At most it
reflects an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of Petitioners: obscenity statutes offend the constitutional
disturbance which is not enough to overcome the right to guaranties because they punish incitation to impure
freedom of expression,” (Tinker v Des Moines). The sexual thoughts, not shown to be related to any overt
constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine antisocial conduct which is or may be incited in the
in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed persons stimulated to such thoughts.
and intended to remove governmental restraints from the 2.the constitutional guaranties are violated because
arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what convictions may be had without proof either that obscene
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, material will perceptibly create a clear and present danger
in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately of antisocial conduct, or will probably induce its recipients
produce amore capable citizenry and more perfect polity to such conduct.
and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon ISSUES:
which our political system rests. 1. In Roth-w/n the federal obscenity statute is in violation
of the 1st Amendment;
The principle contended for by the State seems inherently w/n the power to punish speech and press offensive to
boundless. How is one to distinguish this from any other decency and morality is in the States alone, so that the
offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse federal obscenity statute violates the Ninth and Tenth
public debate to the point where it is grammatically Amendments (raised in Roth
palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet, no readily 2. In Alberts- w/n the obscenity provisions fo the Cal Penal
ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of Code invade freedom of speech & press as they may be
that result if the judgment below was affirmed. For, while incorporated with the liberty protected from state action by
the particular 4-letter word being litigated hers is the 14th Amend;
perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, w/n Congress, by enacting the federal obscenity statute,
it is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is under the power delegated by Art. I, 8, cl. 7, to establish
another’s lyric. post offices and post roads, pre-empted the regulation of
Also, we cannot overlook the fact that much linguistic the subject matter
expression serves a dual communication function: it 3. w/n these statutes violate due process for vagueness
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise,
detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions HELD: Obscenity is not an utterance that is within the
as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their defintion of protected speech & press.
emotive as well as their cognitive force. We cannot
sanction the view that the Consti, while solicitous of the RATIO:
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no Numerous opiniosn of the court have held that obscenity
regard for that emotive function which, practically is not covered by the guarantee on the freedom of speech
speaking, may often be the more important element of the & press. Ex parte Jackson; United States v. Chase; Near v.
overall message sought to be communicated. Minnesota. Though this freedom may be in the
consitution, it is not absolute. As early as 1712,
Lastly, we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one Massachusetts made it criminal to publish "any filthy,
can forbid particular words without also running a obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon"
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. in imitation or mimicking of religious services. Thus,
Indeed, gov’t might soon seize upon the censorship of profanity and obscenity were related offenses. In light of
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing
expression or unpopular views. of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance. This phrasing did not prevent this Court from
In sum, absent a more particularized and compelling concluding that libelous utterances are not within the area
reason for its action, the State may not, consistently of constitutionally protected speech. Beauharnais v. Illinois
with the 1st and 14th Amendments, make the simple All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
public display of this single 4-letter expletive a importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
criminal offense. ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable
because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implicit in the history of the First
Obscenity Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance.
ROTH vs. US re: petitioner's contention on the presence of "clear &
present danger of antisocial conduct"
"Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutional.  YES. Standards of decency
constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either differ. (ex. NY-Mississippi, UP-Miriam)
for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind
the phrase `clear and present danger.' Certainly no one STUFF FROM THE CASE:
would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be
punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Landmark Obscenity Cases:
Libel, as we have seen, is in the same class.
Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic
function in this nation, must embrace all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the Roth vs. US, 1957
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period  obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity protected speech
safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press  presumption that porn is utterly without
for material which does not treat sex in a manner redeeming social value
appealing to prurient interest

Standard:
1.Regina v Hicklin: effect of a single excerpt of the Memoirs vs. Mass, 1966
supposedly "obscene" material upon particularly  Obscenity Test:
susceptibel persons- rejected a) dominant theme appeals to prurient interest
2. whether to the average person, applying contemporary in sex
community standards, the dominant theme of the material b) patently offensive because it affronts
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest- proper contemporary community standards relating
standard. to the description or representation of sexual
re: lack of reasonable ascertainable standards of guilt whic matters
violates due process; words are not sufficiently precise c) utterly without redeeming social value.
because they do not mean the same thing to all people, all  ‘Utterly without redeeming social
the time, everywhere- lack of precision is not itself value’ MUST BE PROVED by prosecution. (almost
offensive to the requirements of due process. the impossible)
Constitution does not require impossible standards; all
that is required is that the language "conveys sufficiently The Present Case:
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices" It is settled that obscene material is not protected by the
United States v. Petrillo 1st Amendment. A work may be subject to state regulation
3. the second issues in both Roth & Alberts fail because of where that work, taken as a whole, falls within the realm
the holding initially stated. of obscenity.
Judgment affirmed.
In lieu of the obscenity test in Memoirs, the Court used a
NEW Obscenity Test:
MILLER vs. CALIFORNIA a) WON ‘the average person applying contemporary
community standards’ would find that the work
appeals to the prurient interest.
Burger, CJ 5-4 vote b) WON the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
FACTS: by the applicable state law
c) WON the work lacks serious literary, artistic,
Miller was convicted of mailing unsolicited sexually explicit political, or scientific value.
material (titles were: “Intercourse”, “Man-Woman”, “Sex
Orgies Illustrated”, “Illustrated History of Pornography”, The test of ‘utterly without redeeming social value’
“Marital Intercourse”) in violation of a California statute articulated in Memoirs is rejected as a constitutional
(punishes distribution of obscene materials, solicited or standard.
not) that approximately used the obscenity test formulated
in Memoirs v. Mass. The trial court instructed the jury to In cases like this one, reliance must be placed in the jury
evaluate the materials by the contemporary community system, accompanied the safeguards that judges, rules of
standard of California. Appellant’s conviction was affirmed evidence, presumption of innocence, etc.. provide. The
on appeal. mere fact that juries may reach different conclusions as to
obscenity of the same material does not mean that
constitutional rights are abridged. The jury may measure
ISSUES/HELD: the essentially factual issues of prurient appeal and patent
offensiveness by the standard that prevails in the
1. WON obscene material is protected by 1st community, and need not employ a national standard.
Amendment.  NO. see Roth vs. Us.
2. WON obscene material can be regulated by the Obscene (as defined by California Penal Code) – to the
States.  YES, subject to safeguards enumerated average person, applying contemporary standards, the
in this case (the New Obscenity Test). predominant appeal of the material, taken as a whole, is to
3. WON the use of contemporary community prurient interest, i.e. a shameful or morbid interest in
standards, instead of a national standard, is nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes beyond the limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters
and is matter which is utterly without redeeming social what involves entertainment. Providing a strict
importance. delineation between the both aspects of motion
pictures would lead to a diminution of the freedom
Prurient (adj.) – characterized by or arousing an interest in of expression. In Reyes v. Bagatsing, press
sexual matters. freedom is the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship. Its limitation comes only upon proof of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent.
GONZALEZ vs. KALAW KATIGBAK
2. The SC affirms the well-settled principle of
freedom of expression established by both U.S. v
Ponente: Chief Justice Fernando Sedano, in the press, and Morfe vs. Mutuc, in
considering the ban on jingles in mobile units for
Petitioner: Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the election purposes as an abridgement of this
Malaya Films freedom, amounting to censorship. At the same
Respondent: Board of Review of Motion Pictures and time, it limits the power of the BRMPT to
Television (BRMPT), with Maria Kalaw Katigbak as classification of films. The court affirms its power
Chairman to determine what constitutes general patronage,
parental guidance or what is “For Adults Only,”
FACTS: following the principle that freedom of expression
is the rule and restrictions the exemption.
October 23, 1984 – Permit to exhibit film “Kapit sa Patalim
under the classification “For Adults Only,” with certain
changes and deletions was granted by the BRMPT. 3. Test of Clear and Present Danger:
October 29, 1984 – the BRMPT, after a motion for
reconsideration from the petitioners, affirmed their original a. There should be no doubt that what is
ruling, directing the Chairman of the Board to withhold feared may be traced to the expression
the permit until the enumerated deficiencies were complained of. The casual connection
removed. must be evident
January 12, 1985 – Court required respondent to answer b. There must be reasonable apprehension
petitioner’s motion. The BRMPT alleges that the petition is about its imminence. There is the
moot since it had already granted the company the permit requirement of its being well-nigh
to exhibit without any deletions or cuts while maintaining inevitable.
the original “For Adults Only” classification. The validity of Postulate: Censorship is only allowable under
such classification was not raised by the petitioners. the clearest proof of a clear and present
January 25, 1985 – Petitioners amended the petition, danger of a substantive evil to public morals,
including in the main objection the legal and factual public health, or any legitimate public
basis of the classification and its impermissible interest.
restraint upon artistic expression.
4. Roth v. U.S.: This case gives a preliminary
-The BRMPT argued that the standard provided by law in definition of obscenity and establishes the courts’
classifying films allows for a “practical and determinative” adverse attitude towards it. According to Brennan:
yardstick for the exercise of judgment and that the “All ideas having the slightest social importance
sufficiency of the standards should be the only question in have the full protection of the guarantees unless it
the case. encroaches upon 1st amendment rights. Obscenity
is thus rejected as utterly without redeeming
- The Supreme Court rejects such limitation of the scope of social importance.
the case, pointing that the justification of the standard to
warrant such a classification is still in question since its 5. Hicklin Test: The early leading standard of
basis, obscenity, is the yardstick used by the courts in obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by
determining the validity of any invasion of the freedom of the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly
artistic and literary expression. susceptible persons. The problem is that such a
standard might involve legitimate material and so
ISSUE: violate the freedom of speech and press.
WON there was a grave abuse of discretion by the Later Tests: This early standard was modified with
respondent Board in violating the right of the petitioners to the standard of whether or not to the average
artistic and literary expression. person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material as
HELD: There exists an abuse of discretion, but inadequate a whole appeals to prurient interest.
votes to qualify it as grave.
6. Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene
RATIO: material is material appealing to prurient interest.
7. Executive Order No. 876: “applying contemporary
1. Motion pictures are important as medium of Filipino values as standard.” Vs. the
communication of Ideas and the expression of the Constitutional mandate of arts and letters being
artistic impulse. This impresses upon motion under the patronage of the state.
pictures as having both informative and - There is no orthodoxy in what
entertainment value. However, there is no clear passes for beauty or reality. It is
dividing line with what involves knowledge and
 for the artist to determine what that the said materials were voluntarilv surrendered by
for him is a true representation. the vendors to the police authorities, and that the said
8. Yu Chon Eng v. Trinidad: It is an elementary, confiscation and seizure was undertaken pursuant to P.D.
fundamental and universal rule of construction No. 960, as amended by P.D. No. 969, which amended
that when law is susceptible of two constructions Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
one of which will maintain and the other destroy
it, the courts will adopt the former. Thus there can On January 5, 1984, plaintiff filed his Memorandum in
be no valid objection to the sufficiency of the support of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
controlling standard and its conformity to what injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the
the constitution ordains. defendants and/or their agents can without a court order
9. There is an abuse of discretion by the board due to confiscate or seize plaintiff's magazine before any judicial
the difficulty an travail undergone by the finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or
petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified not".
for adults only without deletion. Its perception of
obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. The restraining order having lapsed, the plaintiff filed an
However, such abuse cannot be considered grave urgent motion for issuance of another restraining order,
due to lack of votes. The adult classification is which was opposed by defendant on the ground that
simply a stern warning that the material viewed is issuance of a second restraining order would violate the
not fit for the youth since they are both vulnerable Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 11, 1983,
and imitative. Nonetheless, the petitioners were providing for the Interim Rules Relative to the
given an option to be re-classified to For-general- Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which
Patronage with deletions and cuts. The court provides that a temporary restraining order shall be
however stresses that such a liberal view might effective only for twenty days from date of its issuance.
need a more restrictive application when it comes
to televisions. On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the
Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of
merit. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal.
PITA vs. CA
ISSUES
WON.the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision
Sarmiento, j.: of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the police
officers could without any court warrant or order seize and
FACTS confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of
their determination that they are obscene.
On December I and 3,1983, Manila Mayor, Ramon D.
Bagatsing, initiated an Anti-Smut Campaign which seized HOLDING
and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand Yes. Petition granted. CA ruling reversed and set aside
owners and peddlers magazines, publications and other (Note: the dispository portion of this case is quite
reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic complicated due to the concept of seizures and searches.
and indecent. Among the publications seized, and later This is the ruling in terms of whether obscenity is
burned, was "Pinoy 'Playboy" magazines published and protected by the freedom of speech but you may check the
co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. actual case for your own peace of mind)

On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction RATIO

with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary Tests of Obscenity
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, In People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the test, in
as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of determining the existence of obscenity, as follows:
Manila, seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is
defendants and their agents from confiscating to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
plaintiff's magazines or from otherwise preventing the immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or
sale or circulation claiming that the magazine is a other article charged as being obscene may fall." "Another
decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not test," so Kottinger further declares, "is that which shocks
obscene, and that the publication is protected by the the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency."
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of Kottinger hastened to say, however, that "[w]hether a
the press. picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case," and that ultimately, the
On December 12, 1983, plaintiff filed an Urgent Motion for question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate
issuance of a temporary restraining order. against sense of the community reached by it."
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of
plaintiffs "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in
the petition for preliminary injunction in view of Mayor which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided.
Bagatsing's pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut It was People v. Padan y Alova, that introduced to
Campaign. The Court granted the temporary Philippine jurisprudence the "redeeming" element that
restraining order. should accompany the work, to save it from a valid
prosecution. We quote:
In his Answer and Opposition filed on December 27, 1983
defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation We have had occasion to consider offenses like the
and burning of obscence reading materials but claimed exhibition of still or moving pictures of women in the nude,
which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to "There must be objective and convincing, not
morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that there was subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of
involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of the same, such clear and present danger." "It is essential for the
and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the validity of ... previous restraint or censorship that
showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body the ... authority does not rely solely on his own
exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety
vivants. But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded may require." "To justify such a limitation, there must
by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the
it, there is no room for art. clear and present danger test."

Padan y Alova, like Go Pin, however, raised more questions As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case
than answers. For one thing, if the exhibition was attended involving the delivery of a political speech, the
by "artists and persons interested in art and who generally presumption is that the speech may validly be said.
go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve The burden is on the State to demonstrate the
their artistic tastes,"could the same legitimately lay claim existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be:
to "art"? For another, suppose that the exhibition was so (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to
presented that "connoisseurs of [art], and painters and stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must
sculptors might find inspiration," in it, would it cease to be allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it
a case of obscenity? acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a
clear and present danger), it must come to terms with,
In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, the and be held accountable for, due process.
Court, following trends in the United States, adopted the
test: "Whether to the average person, applying The Court is not convinced that the private
contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the respondents have shown the required proof to justify a
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for
Kalaw Katigbak represented a marked departure from which mandatory injunction had been sought below.
Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court
of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than isolated order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography,
passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and
cases are agreed that "contemporary community seizure, by way of a search warrant.
standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene").
The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was
Memoirs v. Massachusettes, a 1966 decision, which sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property
characterized obscenity as one "utterly without any in disregard of due process. Presidential Decrees Nos. 960
redeeming social value,"21 marked yet another and 969 are, police power measures, but they are not, by
development. themselves, authorities for high-handed acts. (The Decrees
provides procedures for implementation)
The latest word, however, is Miller v. California, which
expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established It is basic that searhes and seizures may be done only
"basic guidelines, to wit: "(a) whether 'the average through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become
person, applying contemporary standards' would find unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v.
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient Chief of Staff, AFP,43 We countermanded the orders of
interest ... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, the Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically premises of We Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the Metro Manila dailies, by reason of a defective warrant.
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, We have greater reason here to reprobate the
political, or scientific value." questioned rand, in the complete absence of a warrant,
valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves
DISCUSSION OF THE CASE an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a
political case, because, and as we have indicated,
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of speech is speech, whether political or "obscene"
the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to
suppress smut-provided it is smut. For obvious We reject outright the argument that "[t]here is no
reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists constitutional nor legal provision which would free the
it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes accused of all criminal responsibility because there
develop, adapt to wideranging influences, and keep in step had been no warrant," and that "violation of penal law
with the rapid advance of civilization. [must] be punished." For starters, there is no "accused"
here to speak of, who ought to be "punished". Second,
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly
the ambit of free expression, although not its ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign)
protection. In free expression cases, this Court has without a lawful search warrant because, in his
consistently been on the side of the exercise of the opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed,
right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and
warrant State interference and action. But, so we executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the
asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, "the burden to show very complaint of the petitioner.
the existence of grave and imminent danger that would
justify adverse action. . . lies on the ... authorit[iesl."

DEFAMATION & DISCRIMINATION by: MACKINNON

 Pornography contains ideas like any other social practice.
But the way it works is not as a thought or in the way
Pornography is a constitutionally protected speech. Ours thoughts and ideas are protected as speech. The message
is a society saturated by pornography. 36% of women were is “get her” pointing at all women addressed directly to the
molested as girls, 24% suffers from marital rape, 50% from penis, delivered through an erection, and taken out on
rape or attempted rape, 85% are sexually harassed by women in the real world. What is more protected, his
employers in one way or another. sensation or her life?

A long time before the women’s movement, legal regulation Author’s proposal: law against pornography that defines it
of pornography was framed as a question of the freedom of as graphic sexually explicit materials that subordinate
expression of the pornographers and their consumers— women through pictures or words. This definition includes
government’s interest in censoring expressions of sex vs porn as defamation or hate speech, its role as
the publisher’s right to express them and the consumer’s subordination, as sex discrimination, including what it
right to read and think about them. does through what it says. Such material with activities
like hurting, degrading, violating, and humiliating, that is,
In this new context, protecting pornography means actively subordinating, treating unequally, as less than
protecting sexual abuse as speech and its protection have human, on the basis of sex.
deprived women of speech against sexual abuse.
The idea that pornography conveys: male authority in a
In the US, pornography is protected. Sexual abuse naturalized gender hierarchy, male possession of an
becomes a consumer choice of expressive content, abused objectified other. Porn provides a physical reality i.e.
women become a pornographer’s “thought” or “emotion”. erections and ejaculations. None of this starts or stops as
a thought or feeling. Beyond bringing a message from
Pornography falls into the legal category of “speech” reality, it stands in for reality. What was words and
rendered in terms of “content”, “message”, “emotion”, what pictures becomes, through masturbation, sex itself. In
it “says”, its “viewpoint”, its “ideas” pornography, pictures and words are sex. As sex becomes
speech, speech becomes sex.
Pornography is essentially treated as defamation rather
than as discrimination, conceived in terms of what it says; Denials and justifications include:
a form of communication cannot, as such, do anything 1. porn reflects or depicts subordination that
bad except offend. The trade or the sending and receiving happens elsewhere
is protected by the 1st amendment, the defamatory or 2. porn is a fantasy, unreal, an internal reality
offending element is a cost of freedom. 3. simulated
4. it’s a representation
A theory of protected speech begins here: words express,
hence are presumed “speech” in the protected sense. But In constructing pornography as speech is gaining
social life is full of words that are legally treated as the constitutional protection for doing what pornography does:
acts they constitute without so much as a whimper from subordinating women through sex. Law’s proper concern
the first amendment. For example: saying “kill” to a here is not with what speech says, but what it does.
trained attack dog, saying “ready, aim, fire” to a firing
squad. Words like “not guilty and “I do”. A sign saying The doctrinal distinction between speech and action is on
“white only”. These are considered as “only words”; doing one level obvious, on another level it makes little sense. In
not saying, not legally seen as expressing viewpoint. social inequality, it makes almost none. Discrimination
does not divide into acts on one side and speech on the
In pornography, it is unnecessary to do any of these things other. (speech acts)
to express, as ideas, the ideas pornography expresses. It is
essential to do them to make pornography. Pornography, Words and images are how people are placed in
not its ideas, gives men erections. Erection is neither a hierarchies. Social supremacy is made, inside and between
thought nor a feeling but a behavior. people, through making meanings. .

Speech conveys more than its literal meaning, and its Example of “just words”—expressions that are not
nuances and undertones must be protected but what the regulated:
1st amendment in effect protects is the unconscious mental 1. Ku Klux Klan
intrusion and physical manipulation, even by pictures and 2. segregating transportation bet blacks and whites
words, particularly when the results are further acted out 3. ads for segregated housing
through aggression and other discrimination. Should their racist content protect them as political
speech since they do their harm through conveying a
Porn=sex political ideology?
Sex= not thinking
(from the text: try arguing with an orgasm sometime) Supreme Court referred to porn as “pure speech’ thus
converting real harm to the idea of harm, discrimination
Pornography is protected as a constitutional right. Its into defamation (meaning they contain defamatory ideas,
effects depend upon “mental intermediation”. It is they are protected , even as they discriminate against
protected unless you can show what it and it alone does. women)
Empirically, all pornography is made under conditions of
inequality based on sex, overwhelmingly by poor, 1st amendment protects ideas regardless of the mischief
desperate, homeless, pimped women who were sexually they do in the world. This was construed to apply favorably
abused as children. to communist cases but in effect, it protects pornography.
However there are substantial differences which must be  The CDA differs from the various laws and orders
noted: upheld in those cases in many ways, including
1. pornography has to be done to women to be made, that it does not allow parents to consent to their
no government has to be overthrown to make a children's use of restricted materials; is not limited
communist speech to commercial transactions; fails to provide any
2. pornography is more than mere words, words of definition of "indecent" and omits any requirement
communism are only words that "patently offensive" material lack socially
redeeming value; neither limits its broad
Porn is more comparable to law-- utterance of legal words categorical prohibitions to particular times nor
as tantamount to imposing their reality. Government bases them on an evaluation by an agency familiar
speech backed by power are seen as acts. So is with the medium's unique characteristics; is
pornography: the power of men over women expressed punitive; applies to a medium that, unlike radio,
through unequal sex. It makes no more sense to treat receives full First Amendment protection; and
pornography as mere abstraction and representation than cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time,
it does to treat law as simulation or fantasy. place, and manner regulation because it is a
content-based blanket restriction on speech.
Porn is law for women. It does what it says.  The special factors recognized in some of the
Court's cases as justifying regulation of the
broadcast media—the history of extensive
government regulation of broadcasting, the
scarcity of available frequencies at its inception,
RENO vs. ACLU
and its "invasive" nature,—are not present in
[June 26, 1997] cyberspace.
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.  Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it
violates the Fifth Amendment, the many
FACTS: ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage
Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of render it problematic for First Amendment
1996 (CDA or Act) seek to protect minors from harmful purposes. For instance, its use of the undefined
material on the Internet, an international network of terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" will
interconnected computers that enables millions of people provoke uncertainty among speakers about how
to communicate with one another in "cyberspace" and to the two standards relate to each other and just
access vast amounts of information from around the what they mean.
world. Criminalizes the "knowing" transmission of  The CDA lacks the precision that the First
"obscene or indecent" messages to any recipient under Amendment requires when a statute regulates the
18 years of age. Section 223(d) prohibits the content of speech. Although the Government has
"knowin[g]" sending or displaying to a person under 18 an interest in protecting children from
of any message "that, in context, depicts or describes, potentially harmful materials the CDA pursues
in terms patently offensive as measured by that interest by suppressing a large amount of
contemporary community standards, sexual or speech that adults have a constitutional right
excretory activities or organs." Affirmative defenses are to send and receive. Its breadth is wholly
provided for those who take "good faith, . . . effective . . . unprecedented. The CDA's burden on adult
actions" to restrict access by minors to the prohibited speech is unacceptable if less restrictive
communications, and those who restrict such access by alternatives would be at least as effective in
requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such as a achieving the Act's legitimate purposes.
verified credit card or an adult identification number.  The contention that the Act is constitutional
because it leaves open ample "alternative
The court's judgment enjoins the Government from channels" of communication is unpersuasive
enforcing prohibitions insofar as they relate to "indecent" because the CDA regulates speech on the basis of
communications, but expressly preserves the its content, so that a "time, place, and manner"
Government's right to investigate and prosecute the analysis is inapplicable.
obscenity or child pornography activities prohibited  The assertion that the CDA's "knowledge" and
therein. The injunction against enforcement of CDA is "specific person" requirements significantly restrict
unqualified because that section contains no separate its permissible application to communications to
reference to obscenity or child pornography. The persons the sender knows to be under 18 is
Government appealed to this Court under the Act's special untenable, given that most Internet forums are
review provisions, arguing that the District Court erred in open to all comers and that even the strongest
holding that the CDA violated both the First Amendment reading of the "specific person" requirement would
because it is overbroad and the Fifth Amendment because confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a
it is vague. "heckler's veto," upon any opponent of indecent
speech.
ISSUE:
1. WON CDA is a valid prohibition? Nope… PERSONAL OPINION:
2. WON the CDA act 1996 violates the First and Computer technology evolves over time, every 9
Second amendments by its definition of “obscene” and months if I’m not mistaken, rather than spend money
“patently offensive” prohibitions on internet information. on litigation or a better construction of a Prohibitive
YES…… vague and overbroad. internet law why not spend it on Research and
Development to come up with a screening technology
RATIO: that allows computers to recognize if it is a minor
using the computer and automatically blocks off all
 “offensive” sites? Of course by that time a better (3) The two affirmative defenses offered did not
definition of “obscene” or “patently offensive” should “narrowly tailor” the coverage of the Act. Only the ban
have been constructed? on the “knowing transmission of obscene message
survived because “obscene speech” enjoys no First
Amendment protection.
ASHCROFT vs. ACLU

May 13, 2002 3. Child Online Protection Act. It prohibited any person
from “knowingly and with knowledge of the character of
The case presents the “narrow question” whether the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means
the Child Online Protection Act’s (COPA) use of of the World Wide Web, making any communication for
“community standards” to identify “material that is commercial purposes that is available to any minor and
harmful to minors” violates the First Amendment. We hold that includes any material that is harmful to minors.”
that this aspect of COPA does not render the statute - Congress limited the scope of COPA’s coverage in three
facially unconstitutional. ways:
(1) It applies only to material displayed on the World Wide
BACKGROUND [Please Note]: Web as contrasted to CDA which applied to all
communications over the Internet including e-mail
1. The Internet offers a forum for a true diversity of messages.
political discourse, cultural development and (2) It covers only communications made “for commercial
intellectual activity. By “surfing”, the primary method purposes.”
of remote information retrieval on the internet, (3) COPA restricts only the narrower category of “material
individuals can access various materials in the World that is harmful to minors.”
Wide Web which also contains a wide array of sexually - COPA uses the “three part test for obscenity” set in
explicit material, including hardcore pornography. In Miller v. California to define “material that is harmful to
1998, there were about 28,000 adult sites promoting minors” as “any communication, picture, image, graphic
pornography on the Web. Children discover image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of
pornographic material by deliberate access or by any kind that is obscene or that –
stumbling upon them. (1) the average person, applying contemporary community
2. Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) (As standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and
contrasted to COPA). Congress first attempted to with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
protect children from exposure to pornographic designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
material on the Internet through the CDA. CDA (2) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently
prohibited the knowing transmission over the internet offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated
of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated
under 18 years of age. The prohibition covers “any normal or perverted sexual act, or lewd exhibition of the
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or genitals or post-pubescent female breasts; and
other communication that, in context, depicted or (3) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
described, in terms patently offensive as measured by political, or scientific value for minors.
contemporary community standards, sexual or - COPA also provides “affirmative defenses”: An individual
excretory activities or organs.” may have a defense if he in “good faith, has restricted
- CDA had “two affirmative defenses”: access by minors to material that is harmful to minors –
(1) It protected individuals who took “good faith, (1) By requiring the use of a credit card, debt account,
reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions” to adult access code, or adult personal identification number;
restrict minors from accessing obscene, indecent, and (2) By accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
patently offensive material over the Internet; and (3) By any other reasonable measures that are feasible
(2) Individuals who restricted minors from accessing under available technology.
such material “by requiring a verified credit card, debit - Violators have a civil penalty of up to $50,000 for each
account, adult access code, or adult personal violation or a criminal penalty of up to six month
identification number." imprisonment or a maximum fine of $50,000.
- Court concluded in Reno v. ACLU that the CDA
lacked the precision that the First Amendment FACTS:
requires when a statute regulates the content of One month before the COPA was scheduled to go into
speech because in order to deny minors access to effect, the respondents filled a lawsuit challenging the
potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively constitutionality (“facial challenge”) of the statute in the
suppressed a large amount of speech that adults had United States District Court for the Eastern District of
a constitutional right to receive and to address to one Pennsylvania. Respondents are a diverse group of
another. organizations, most of which maintain their own Web
- Holding CDA unconstitutional was based on “three sites. Respondents all derive income from their sites. All of
crucial considerations”: them either post or have members that post sexually
(1) Existing technology did not include any effective oriented material on the Web. They believe that their
method for a sender to prevent minors from accessing material on their Web sites was valuable for adults but
the communications in the Internet without also they fear that they will be prosecuted under the COPA
denying access to adults. because some of the material could be construed as
(2) Its “open-ended prohibition” embraced commercial “harmful to minors” in some communities. Their “facial
speech and all “nonprofit entities and individuals” challenge” claimed that the COPA violated adults’ rights
posting indecent messages or displaying them on their under the First and Fifth Amendments because COPA:
own computers in the presence of minors. “Indecent” (1) It created an effective ban on the constitutionally
and “patently offensive” were not defined. protected speech by and to adults.
 (2) It was not the least restrictive means of the community most likely to be offended by the
accomplishing any compelling governmental message. COPA applies to significantly less material
purpose. that did the CDA and defines the “harmful-to-minors”
(3) It was substantially overbroad. material restricted by the statue in a manner parallel
The District Court granted respondent’s motion for a to the Miller definition of obscenity.
preliminary injunction barring the Government from - In fact, in Hamling v. United States, which used the
enforcing the Act until the merits of respondent claims “prurient interest” and the “redeeming social value”
could be adjudicated. The District Court reasoned that the requirements, and Sable Communications of Cal.
statute is “presumptively invalid” and “subject to “strict Inc. v. FCC, which used these requirements on the
scrutiny” because COPA constitutes content-based “dial-a-porn” case, the ability to limit the distribution
regulation of sexual expression protected by the First of material into particular geographic areas is not a
Amendment. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit crucial prerequisite. Even if these two cases refer to
affirmed. CA concluded that COPA’s use of “contemporary published books and to telephone calls, we do not
community standards” to identify material that is harmful believe that the Internet’s “unique characteristics”
to minors rendered that statute substantially overbroad. justify adopting a different approach.
CA concluded that COPA would require any material that
might be deemed harmful by the “most puritan of 3. WON the COPA is “unconstitutionally overbroad”
communities” in any state since Web publishers are because it will require Web publishers to “shield”
without any means to limit access to their sites based on some materials behind age verification screens
geographical location of particular Internet users. that could be displayed openly in many
communities. – NO.
Issues: - To prevail in a “facial challenge”, it is not enough for
a plaintiff to show some overbreadth; but rather the
1. WON COPA violates the First Amendment because overbreadth must not only be “real” but “substantial”
it relies on “community standards” to identify as well. Respondents failed to prove it. Congress has
material that is “harmful to minors.” – NO. already narrowed the range of content of COPA.
- The Court upheld the use of “community standards”
in Roth v. United States which was later adopted by HOLDING:
Miller v. California. Miller set the governing “three-part The scope of the decision is “quite limited.” COPA’s
test for obscenity” (discussed earlier) for assessing reliance on community standards to identify “material that
whether material is obscene and thus unprotected by is harmful to minors” does not by itself [I think the Court
the First Amendment. Roth earlier reputed the earlier is saying that it could be unconstitutional “as applied” as
approach of “sensitive person standard” (what is expressed by Justice O’Connor in his concurring opinion]
obscene is dictated by well-known individuals) by render the statute substantially overbroad.
English courts and some American courts in the 19 th - The Court did not decide whether the COPA is
century. In lieu of the “sensitive person standards”, unconstitutionally vague for other purposes or that the Act
which was held to be unconstitutionally restrictive of will not survive if strict scrutiny is applied.
the freedoms of speech and press, the Court approved - Since petitioner did not ask to vacate the preliminary
the “community standard” requiring that material be injunction, the Government remains enjoined from
judged from the perspective of “the average person, enforcing COPA without the further action by the Court of
applying contemporary community standards.” Appeals of the District Court.

2. WON the Court’s prior jurisprudence on Justice O’Connor, concurring in part and concurring in
“community standards” is applicable to the the judgment.
Internet and the Web [considering that Web
publishers right now do not have the ability to I agree that even if obscenity on the Internet is
control the geographic scope of the recipients of defined in terms of local community standards, respondent
their communications]. – YES. have not shown that the COPS is overbroad solely on the
- “Community standards” need not be defined by basis of the variation in the standards of different
reference to a precise geographic area. In Jenkins v. communities. But the respondents’ failure still leaves
Georgia, the Court said that “[a] State may choose to possibility that the Act could be unconstitutional “as
define an obscenity offense in terms of ‘contemporary applied.” To avoid this, a national standard is necessary
community standards’ as defined in Miller without for a reasonable regulation of Internet obscenity. O’Connor
further specification … or it may choose to define the does not share the “skepticism” in Miller in having a
standards in more precise geographic terms…” national standard. He believe that although the Nation is
- Remarkably, the value of a work as judged using diverse, many local communities encompass a similar
community standards does not vary from community diversity.
to community based on the “degree of local
acceptance” it has won. Justice Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in
- When the scope of an obscenity statute’s coverage is the judgment.
sufficiently narrowed by a “serious vale prong” and a
“prurient interest prong” (refer to the Miller three- Breyer thinks that the statutory word
part test for obscenity), we have held that requiring a “community” in the Act refers to the “Nation’s adult
speaker disseminating material to a national audience community taken as a whole, not to geographically
to observe varying community standards does not separate local areas.” The statutory language does not
violate the First Amendment. We noted that the explicitly describe the specific “community” to which it
community standards’ criterion “as applied” to the refers. It only pertains to the “average person, applying
Internet means that any communication available to a contemporary community standards.”
nationwide audience will be judged by the standards of
Justice Kennedy, with who Justice Souter and Justice _________________________________________________________
Ginsburg join, concurring in the judgment. _________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
There is a very real likelihood that the COPA is _________________________________________________________
overbroad and cannot survive a facial challenge because _________________________________________________________
content-based regulation like this one are presumptively _________________________________________________________
invalid abridgements of the freedom of speech. Thus, even _________________________________________________________
if this facial challenge has considerable merit, the _________________________________________________________
Judiciary must proceed with caution and identify _________________________________________________________
overbreadth with care before invalidating the Act. _________________________________________________________
We cannot know whether variation in community _________________________________________________________
standards renders the Act substantially overbroad without _________________________________________________________
first assessing the extent of the speech covered and the _________________________________________________________
variations in community standards with respect to that _________________________________________________________
speech. Two things must be noted in this respect: _________________________________________________________
(1) The breadth of the Act itself will dictate the _________________________________________________________
degree of overbreadth caused by varying _________________________________________________________
community standards. _________________________________________________________
(2) Community standards may have different _________________________________________________________
degrees of variation depending on the question _________________________________________________________
posed to the community. _________________________________________________________
Kennedy then argues that any problem caused by _________________________________________________________
variation in community standards cannot be evaluated in _________________________________________________________
a vacuum. To discern overbreadth, it is necessary to know _________________________________________________________
what speech COPA regulates and what community _________________________________________________________
standards it invokes. He also noted that the decision did _________________________________________________________
not address the issue of “venue” where one surfs the _________________________________________________________
Internet [He does not know the Net that well.] _________________________________________________________
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Justice Stevens, dissenting. _________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
In the context of the Internet, “community _________________________________________________________
standards become a sword rather that a shield.” If a a _________________________________________________________
prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a _________________________________________________________
crime to post it on the Web. Stevens reminded the Court of _________________________________________________________
Justice Frankfurter’s admonition not to “burn the house _________________________________________________________
to roast the pig.” _________________________________________________________
His arguments: _________________________________________________________
(1) The COPA restricts access by adults as well as _________________________________________________________
children to materials that are deemed _________________________________________________________
“harmful to minors” by the relative _________________________________________________________
“community standards’ criterion.” _________________________________________________________
(2) COPA restricts speech that is made available _________________________________________________________
to the general public. COPA covers a “medium” _________________________________________________________
[The World Wide Web] in which speech cannot _________________________________________________________
be segregated to avoid communities where it is _________________________________________________________
likely to be considered harmful to others. _________________________________________________________
(3) COPA’s adoption of the Miller test for _________________________________________________________
obscenity do not cure its overbreadth. _________________________________________________________
Using community standards to differentiate _________________________________________________________
“permissible” and “impermissible” speech could either be a _________________________________________________________
“shield” to protect speakers from the least tolerant _________________________________________________________
members of society. Or it could act as a “sword”, to _________________________________________________________
especially in the context of cyberspace, to remove obscene _________________________________________________________
material from the offended community that defined it as _________________________________________________________
such, and deprive the same material to all else who may _________________________________________________________
think otherwise. _________________________________________________________
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