People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) G.R. No.

45685 PETITIONERS: The People of the Philippine Islands The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (Plaintiff & Offended Party CC # 42649) RESPONDENTS Mariano Cu Unjieng (Defendant CC # 42649) th Hon. Jose O. Vera (Judge ad interim of the 7 Branch of the Court of First Instance Manila) FACTS: October 15, 1931 Criminal Case No. 42649 (The People of the Philippine Islands v. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al) was filed with the Court of First Instance Manila with The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening as a private prosecutor. CFIM rendered a judgment of conviction, sentencing Mariano Cu Unjieng to 4 years and 2 months to 8 years in prison, to pay costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party. The court modified the sentence to 5 years and 6 months to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days in prison, to pay costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party. The court denied Mariano Cu Unjieng file for a motion for reconsideration and the 4 successive motions for a new trial. Final judgment was entered but the defendant sought to elevate the case on certiorari to the US Supreme Court. Denied This court denied the defendant petition for leave to file a 2 alternative motion for re3consideration or a new trial and remanded the case to the CFIM for execution of judgment. Mariano Cu Unjieng applied for probation before the trial court, under the provision of Act No. 4221. August 10, 1937
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The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with the questions raised on the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 June 18, 1937* June 28, 1937 IPO denied the application for probation by Mariano Cu Unjieng. Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that the tests have not conclusively established the guilt of the petitioner and that all the facts established are not inconsistent or inconsistent with his innocence and concluded that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent by rational doubt of the crime for which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200 but still denied Mariano Cu Unjiengs petition for probation. Mariano Cu Unjiengs counsel filed an exception to the resolution denying the probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed. Counsel filed an additional motion for reconsideration to supplement the previous motions. Banquet was given by the counsel wherein a motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated. The hearing for the motions but was postponed due to the petition of Mariano Cu Unjiengs counsel because a motion for leave to intervene in the case of amici curiae signed by 33(34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. ** Atty. Eulalio Chaves (courtesy) Fiscal city of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail. The private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae, asking that a date be set for the hearing and that the motion be denied because the signatories were members of the legal staff the counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. FCM moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment to the motion for leave to intervene but Vera postponed upon the objection of Mariano Cu Unjiengs counsel.

July 03, 1937

January 08, 1934

July 13, 1931 July 14, 1937

March 26, 1935

July 30, 1937

December 17, 1935

July 31, 1937

December 18, 1935

November 1936 November 24, 1936

August 06, 1937

August 07, 1937

November 27, 1936

Mariano Co Unjieng: He is innocent, has no criminal record and would observe good conduct. Judge Pedro Tuason (CFIM) referred the application of probation to the Insular Probation Office.

August 14, 1937 Judge Jose O. Vera set the petition for hearing on April 05, 1937. April 02, 1937 The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to granting the probation to Mariano Cu Unjieng. August 19, 1937 April 05, 1937 The private prosecution filed an opposition, alleging that Act No. 4221, if not repealed by section 2 of Art XV, violates section 1, Art III because its applicability is not uniform throughout the islands (Section 11). The private prosecution filed a supplementary opposition elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality of Act No. 4221 as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (Article 6, Sec. 1)

April 19, 1937

Original action instituted for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and of prohibition to the CFIM for (1) the review of the decision in the Criminal Case No. 42649 on the application of Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation under the provisions of Ac No. 4221 and (2) to prohibit CFIM from taking further action concerning the application for probation and have Mariano committed to prison, as convicted by this court in GR. No. 41200. Evidence to the circumstances wherein the motion for leave to intervene was signed and submitted to the court was to be heard.

August 21, 1937

Hearing on the motion of execution - suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by this court.

Section 11 is free from constitutional objects. Private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No.4221 Rationale behind the issuance of extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition: Petitioners allege that Vera acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. 1. Lacks the power to place the respondent under probation. y Sec. 11, Act No. 4221 is applicable only to the provinces of the Philippines. There is no statement of applicability to chartered cities like the City of Manila. y Sec. 37 of the Administrative Code: In the absence of a special provision, the term province may include the City of Manila to give effect to laws of general application but Act No. 4221 is not made for general application, it is applicable only to provinces wherein the provincial board provided for the salary of a probation officer. y Even if the City of Manila is considered a province, it has not provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by Sec. 11, immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Office willing to act for the city of Manila because the Probation Office provided in Sec. 10 is different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided in Sec. 11. 2. Acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and failing to commit the defendant after promulgating his resolution (June 28, 1937) of denying Mariano Cu Unjiengs application for probation. y Limited jurisdiction and power to granting or denying application for probation. y Denial of petition for probation is final and executor. y No right of appeal exists for this cases. y Lacks the power to grant a rehearing or to modify or change said order. 3. Finding of the defendant to be innocent is presumptuous and without foundation, and a violation of the respondents oath of office to serve as an ad interim judge of FI. 4. Violated and continues to violate his duty to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison. Respondents (August 31, 1937) 1. 2. 3. Present petition did not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ of ceteriorari or of prohibition. Petition is premature because the remedy sought is still a pending resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court. Petitioners raised the question to the execution of judgment before the trial court, limiting jurisdiction to the trial court for resolution based on the theory that the resolution is unappealable. This court cannot assume jurisdiction while the CFI has assumed jurisdiction over the same motion with the same petitioners. Elevating the proceedings to this court deprives the trial court of its jurisdiction and impairs its authority and dignity. If this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the resolution of the Trial Court is appealable. The Probation Law did not specify if the denial of probation of the CFI is appealable but the resolution of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court. But the resolution of the Trial Court denying probation has not yet become final and executory due to the respondent filing a motion for reconsideration and a new trial within 15 days and due to the restraining order issued by this court. The Fiscal City of Manila admitted that the resolution of the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said motion. If the TC denying probation is unappealable, the accused can file an action for the writ of certiorari w/ mandamus; but before this writ of certiorari grounded on the irregular exercise of juridiction can lie, the accused must first file for reconsideration specifying the error committed by the TC

Petitioners came to this court to put an end to the allegedly endless proceedings in the CFIM, which fostered the campaign of the defendant to delay the execution of judgment, exposing the courts to criticisms of their inability to effect the final judgment. September 01, 1937 The President recommended to the National Assembly to repeal the Probation Act. *** The petitioner contends that providing for a system of probation is unconstitutional. 1. Confers upon the provincial board the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces. (Violates Sec. 1, Art. of Constitution) 2. Constitutes unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards legislative power (lodged by Sec. 8 of the Jones Law Philippine Legislature and Sec 1, Art. IV of the Constitution National Assembly) 3. Gives the provincial boards the authority to enlarge the powers of the Courts of First Instance without uniformity (contrary to Sec. 2, Art 8 of the Constitution and Sec. 28 of the Jones Law) The President vetoed the bill (2417) repealing the Probation Act. *** The Fiscal of the City of Manila concurs on the issues raised by the other petitioner on the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.

September 09, 1937

September 13, 1937 September 14, 1937

October 06, 1937

FCM elaborated that probation is a form of reprieve and an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieve. City Fiscal filed 2 memorandums contending that Act No. 4221 encroaches on the pardoning power of the executive and constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power and denial of equal protection of the laws. Jointly signed memorandums by the City Fiscal and Solicitor General (People) and the counsel for The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. 1. Sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws. 2. Contending that Act No. 4221 is an unwarranted delegation of legislative power. 3. Alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional and void The Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws. Private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and attack the probation law as unconstitutional. This court may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition proceedings. Counsel for the respondent maintain that (rebutted petitioners): Act No. 4221 is constitutional because it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive.

October 07, 1937

October 09, 1937

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October 23, 1937

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10. Even if the TC resolution is not appealable, it still retains jurisdiction w/in a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance w/ law & justice. This power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercised either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition gin the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration 11. If the resolution of the TC is appealable, it cannot order execution of the judgment while it is on appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation would be closed from the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence Probation implies guilt by final judgment. A probation court hearing a probation case may look into the circumstances, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusions of this court. ISSUES 1. WON the constitutionality of Act. No. 4221 has been properly raised 2. WON Act No. 4221 is not unconstitutional Constitutionality is challenged on 3 grounds: a) Act 4221 encroches upon the pardoning power of the Executive b) It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power c) It denies equal protection of the laws Held: 1) Yes 2) Yes, Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional & void Ratio: SC noted that the TC, in passing on the merits of the application of Mariano & in denying the said application, assumed the task not only of considering the merit of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by the SC. Court said: Probation implies guilt by final judgment, While a probation court hearing a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings & conclusions of the SC, either directly or indirectly. 1) The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised & presented in appropriate cases & is necessary to a determination of the case = the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. Constitutionality of an act may be raised in actions for prohibition & certiorari when the question of constitutionality is necessary to a decision of the case (eg. Yu Cong Eng v Trinidad). Code of Civil Procedure, sec516 The Phil. SC is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition w/ CFI over inferior tribunals or persons, & original jurisdiction over CFI, when such courts are exercising functions w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction. Both the petitioners & respondents are correct that a CFI sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221. Judge Vera passed on the question of constitutionality on the ground that private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise the question. As a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision. In criminal cases, the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings.

And even if H&S Banking Corp is not the proper party to raise it, the People of the Phils. is. The state can challenge the validity of its own laws. Since Mariano has been at large for 4 yrs since his conviction and since many have applied for probation, while some are already on probation, the instant case is of great importance & public policy demand that its constitutionality be now resolved. 2) YES a) Act encroaches on the pardoning power of the President? NO Sec 21, Jones Law vests in the Gov-Gen the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures, w/c is not vested in the President. Framers of the constitution provided that this power can only be exercised after conviction. This grant is exclusive & the legislature cannot exercise this power or delegate it elsewhere. The legislature may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. And courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation. The Probation Act allows the modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment. And the punishment shall not be suffered as long as the conditions of the probation are followed. Thus, it cannot be said that it comes in conflict with the power of the President to grant pardons & reprieves. Probation & pardon are distinct & different. Probation is part of the judicial power wherein the suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction & liability following it & civil disabilities remain & become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon is part of the executive power w/c exempts the person from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. Thus, the application of probation is a purely judicial act & doesnt conflict w/ pardoning power. * it is also diff from reprieve (postpones the execution of the sentence to a certain day) & commutation (changing the punishment assessed to a less punishment) b) Does sec 11 of Act 4221, constitute an undue delegation of legislative power? YES Sec. 11 This act shall apply only in those provinces in w/c the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer. The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power f making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have. Thus, its power cannot be delegated to another body or authority. But there is an exception, the central legislative body is permitted to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. Such legislation is not a transfer of general legislative power but rather a grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations. BUT under the Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed w/ the power to determine when the act should take effect in their provinces. As a rule, an act of legislature is incomplete & invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by w/c the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it and Act 4221 DOES NOT provide any standards or guides. The applicability & application of the act is entirely placed in the hands of the provincial board. The legislature has not made the operation of the Act contingent on specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or nonoperation of the law upon the provincial boards. Though there is a right of local selfgovernment & of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities, matters of general legislation, like that w/c treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified & absolute as provided in Act 4221. (bec each province has the absolute power to determine WON the act should take effect or operate in their provinces w/c is not allowed) c) Does it violate the equal protection of laws? YES

The inequality is said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power (bec the probation act may operate in one province & not in another). Thus, Act 4221 creates a situation in w/c discrimination & equality are permitted. SOsince Act 4221 is unconstitutional & void, SHOULD THE ENTIRE ACT BE AVOIDED? Sec11 of the act, is inseparably linked w/ the other provisions of Act 4221 & its elimination would result in the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people. Respondents argue that even w/o sec11, probation officers may be appointed in provinces under sec 10. But the probation officers & administrative personnel referred to in sec10 (who are to act in the central/probation office) are clearly NOT the probation officers required to be appointed for provinces under sec11. Thus, the entire act was set aside.

Endows the provincial boards with the power to make the effective or otherwise in their respective provinces.

OTHER NOTES: Criminal Case No. 42649 The People of the Philippine Islands v. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al Hon. Jose O. Vera heard the application of the defendant for probation. Estoppel - a rule of evidence whereby a person is barred from denying the truth of a fact that has already been settled Estopped - To impede or prohibit by estoppel. Writ of Prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal fron usurping jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (p.85)

LAWS Article 3, Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Article 6, Section 1: The Legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Article 8, Section 2, Sub-section 1: The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in: All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question.

Article 15, Section 1: The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. Section 11, Act No. 4221 Applicable only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.