NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

SHIMKO, CHAPTER 11, NOTES BY DENIS BAŠIĆ

 THE COLD WAR & NUCLEAR RACE

The USSR joins the U.S. as a nuclear power (1949). Marks the beginning of
the nuclear arms race between US and USSR.

NATO Established (April 4, 1949): The U.S. and its Western European
allies establish NATO, as essentially an anti-Soviet military alliance. Under the
agreement, member European nations allow the U.S. to place missiles and set
up military bases on their soil within striking distance of the USSR.

United Kingdom Becomes Nuclear Power (1952): UK develops its first

nuclear weapon, joining the USSR and the US as nuclear powers.

Warsaw Pact Established by USSR (1955): The USSR establishes its own
military alliance in response to NATO, known as the Warsaw Pact, which
includes Eastern/Central European nations under its influence, such as
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and East Germany.
France Becomes Nuclear Power (1960): France becomes a nuclear power,
bringing the total number of nuclear-capable nations to four.
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962): The USSR begins to build missile bases in
Cuba. The U.S. threatens military action. The USSR backs off with a non-
invasion concession from the U.S., and the agreement that U.S. missiles in
Turkey would be removed.
China becomes a nuclear power (1964).
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968): Nuclear powers agree to begin
the process of destroying stockpiles of nuclear weapons, as part of non-
proliferation agreement. (50 Facts about U.S. Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear
Weapons Today, Ten Facts About Nuclear Weapons)
 THE QUESTION OF IRAN
DETERRENCE & FANATICISM
In the words of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Iran’s leaders
are “a messianic apocalyptic cult” representing the greatest threat to the Jewish
people since Adolph Hitler that cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons.

The fear is that the normal dynamics of nuclear deterrence that have
prevented other nuclear powers from using their weapons might not restrain
the fanatical Iranian regime bent on destroying the Jewish state. Even if Iran did
not attack Israel, a nuclear Iran might embolden the Islamic regime and its
proxies in the region to make life difficult for Israel, forcing its citizens to live
with the permanent threat of annihilation by a regime whose leadership has
expressed a desire to see it wiped it off the face of the map.

For more information, watch this brief documentary by Al Jazeera entitled Iran
and the Bomb.
 NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY
(NPT)
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968 by forty-
eight nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 1968,
the list of signatories of NPT has grown to 189 nations. Israel, India, &
Pakistan never signed the NPT.

The NPT was designed to prevent what many feared most—a world with
dozens of nuclear powers and to preserve the nuclear status quo as it existed
in 1968.

Parties to the treaty agree not to provide technological or material assistance

that would allow other nations to build nuclear weapons.

Nations not already possessing nuclear weapons agree to forgo them in the
future.

Nations possessing nuclear weapons promise to work toward reducing their

levels, with the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons entirely.
 WHICH COUNTRIES OWN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
As of 2008, only eight countries definitely possessed nuclear
weapons: the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China,
Israel, Pakistan, and India.

North Korea claims to have tested a nuclear device in October,

2006, but data regarding the test remain a subject of intense debate
among experts.

South Africa, which had a small nuclear arsenal in the 1980s, is the
only nation to develop nuclear weapons and abandon them later.

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons upon

the Soviet Union’s breakup and later returned the weapons to Russia.
Egypt and Sweden both had active nuclear weapon programs but
terminated them prior to the founding of the NPT.

After 1970, Argentina, Brazil, Libya, Iraq, Romania, South

Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia all had active programs
researching nuclear weapons options.

All of these programs were terminated by the early 1990s, except for
Libya, which was renounced in December 2003.
 NUCLEAR ABSTAINERS &
NUCLEAR UMBRELLA
The list of nuclear abstainers — that is, nations that have the ability to
build nuclear weapons but have chosen not to — is a long one. A 2002
Carnegie Foundation report pointed to forty such abstainers. What
accounts for this restraint?

For many abstainers, such as most Western European nations, as well as

Japan & South Korea, the American nuclear umbrella might provide
an explanation. As allies of the United States, it is understood that any
attack on them would be treated as an attack on the United States,
requiring the appropriate response. Therefore, they have had no reason
to build their own weapons.

But this cannot account for all the abstainers, because others (e.g.,
Sweden and Switzerland) do not enjoy the benefits of U.S. protection.
 THE INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
(IAEA)
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)
The only task of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to monitor
compliance with the NPT.

It was the IAEA that conducted inspections for evidence of an Iraqi nuclear
weapons program during the winter of 2002– 2003 (the inspections for chemical
and biological weapons were carried out by a separate team assembled by the
United Nations). The IAEA has also been active in assessing Iran’s compliance
with the NPT.

The IAEA, however, has no powers to enforce the treaty and must approach the
UN Security Council to impose sanctions for violations.

This difficulty of enforcement is compounded by a provision allowing any

signatory to withdraw from the treaty “if it decides that extraordinary events …
have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”

Who decides what constitutes an extraordinary event or supreme interest? Each

state decides for itself.
 THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA
WITHDRAWAL
In January 2003 North Korea exercised its right to withdraw from the
NPT, citing the previous provision.

Subsequently, in October 2006 North Korea claimed to have tested its

first nuclear weapon. In response, the UN Security Council imposed
sanctions, citing the threat posed to international peace and security.

In 2007, North Korea agreed to suspend its nuclear program in

exchange for financial aid and the removal of sanctions.

In the summer of 2008, North Korea even destroyed one of its nuclear
reactors before a Western audience (video of which can be found on
Youtube), yet suspicions about North Korean intentions linger.
PROLIFERATION OPTIMISTS VS. PESSIMISTS

For proliferation optimists (realists), more nuclear powers may

indeed be good, though there is disagreement about how much
proliferation is desirable.

This perspective contrasts with the more common argument of

proliferation pessimists (liberals) that the consequences of using
nuclear weapons are potentially so disastrous that any proliferation
should be prevented.
 THE CASE FOR
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
 PROLIFERATION AND REALISM

Politics is about the management of conflict, not its elimination.

Realists have generally seen a balance of power between antagonists as

the most stable situation.

States are deterred from going to war because of the fear that they
might lose.

Thus, nuclear weapons deter war in much the same way as the balance
of power.

The basic principles of realism (or any other perspective) provide a

general framework, not a detailed road map, for thinking about
international problems.
WIDESPREAD VS. LIMITED PROLIFERATION

The debate over whether the spread of nuclear weapons contributes

to peace and stability is largely an in-house discussion among
realists.

Kenneth Waltz, who advocates widespread proliferation, and John

Mearsheimer, who favors more limited proliferation, are both self-
described realists. Other realists oppose any further proliferation.

Both Mearsheimer and Waltz agree that nuclear deterrence can be a

powerful force for peace.

They also agree that nuclear deterrence works because it increases

the costs of war, making it less likely that war will be initiated.
 Mearsheimer views nuclear deterrence as a good thing, but he
thinks it is expensive and difficult.

Waltz agrees that nuclear deterrence is a good thing, but thinks it is

relatively cheap and easy.

How come?

The successful deterrence depends on the country’s ability to absorb

an attack by the other side with enough nuclear weapons left over to
inflict unacceptable destruction in retaliation.

For that purpose the country needs to be able to put a lot of nuclear
weapons in places where the other side could not attack them (e.g.,
underground in missile silos and underwater in submarines).
MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD)

mutual assured destruction (MAD) - A strategic reality and

doctrine in which any use of nuclear weapons would inevitably entail
one’s own destruction. Achieved when each party possesses an
invulnerable second-strike (retaliatory) capability.

invulnerable second strike (retaliatory) capability - Nuclear

weapons that cannot be destroyed in a preemptive attack, providing
the ability to respond to any attack with a second (retaliatory) strike.

nuclear triad - consists of weapons based on land, planes, and

submarines.
 SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY

The United States and the Soviet Union accomplished the second
strike capability by putting a lot of nuclear weapons in places where
the other side could not attack them (e.g., underground in missile
silos and underwater in submarines).

Mearsheimer believes that lesser powers may not be able to build and
maintain invulnerable forces. Therefore, he is for limited
proliferation.

Waltz agrees that invulnerable nuclear forces are the key to stable
nuclear deterrence. But he thinks it is relatively easy to build and
maintain an invulnerable second-strike capability. A handful of well-
concealed or mobile missiles would do the trick.
 SO, WHY NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR
IRAN?
Andrew Sullivan expresses the fear in many discussions of
proliferation:
“The problem with deterrence and Iran’s current regime, I think, lies
in its religious orientation…. We are dealing with a religious
movement in which suicide bombing is a virtue. How do we deter
suicide bombers? We cannot.”

This echoes Israeli fears that Iran’s regime is an irrational cult bent on
destroying the Jewish state.

Iran believes that Israel is a state illegally built by the U.N. (U.K. and
U.S.) on the Palestinian land and that Israel keeps on violating human
rights of the local Arab (Muslim and Christian) population.
ROGUE LEADERS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Waltz, sees no reason to assume that today’s so-called “rogue”

leaders will prove less rational than predecessors like Joseph Stalin
or Mao Zedong.

In fact, one of the best things about nuclear deterrence is that it does
not require an incredible level of rationality to understand the harsh
realities.

It is useful to recall the reaction to China going nuclear in 1964. At

the time Mao Zedong was viewed as a rogue leader: bellicose,
unpredictable, brutal, ideological, and fanatical. Certainly this was
not someone to trust with nuclear weapons. There was even
consideration of a preemptive attack on China’s small arsenal.
 THE CASE AGAINST
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
 PROLIFERATION AND LIBERALISM

Liberals generally oppose proliferation in favor of strengthening the NPT

and other international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

Liberal opposition to proliferation derives from a deeper unease with

nuclear deterrence itself.

In liberals’s eyes, nuclear deterrence is an argument for peace based on

fear.

Liberals have always been uncomfortable with the notion that peace is
preserved by making war ever more horrific.

Liberals would rather bring about peace by finding a way to resolve the
issue(s) that create hostility.
 COLD WAR & LONG PEACE

According to historian John Lewis Gaddis, factors that helped the

superpowers avoid war during the Cold War Era are:

the simplicity of bipolarity,

the conservative nature of political leadership in both societies,

the emergence of norms of peaceful competition, and

geographical distance,

but also nuclear weapons.

 COLD WAR & LONG PEACE (2)

For John Mueller, the two world wars were enough to convince U.S.
and Soviet leaders that even a conventional war would have imposed
costs exceeding any potential gains.

Though Malcolmson believes it likely that “the fear of nuclear

catastrophe probably did impose some restraint on the actions of the
superpowers,” he wonders whether “it is possible to establish the
relative importance of this restraining fear.”

Because we cannot provide firm answers to these questions, the

supposedly pacifying impact of nuclear weapons is a rather shaky
basis for increasing the number of nations with their fingers on the
nuclear trigger.
 NUCLEAR APARTHEID

nuclear apartheid — A term used by critics of attempts to create two

classes of nations — those allowed to possess nuclear weapons and
those who cannot be trusted with them. The term apartheid has
unavoidable racial connotations because of its association with the
white supremacist regime that used to exist in South Africa.

As long as nuclear weapons remain in the hands of Northern nations,

there is no problem; it is only when all those different-looking people
in Asia and the Middle East get them that Westerners need to worry.

Ahmed Hashim suggests that such fears are based on “hoary clichés
about the irrationality and callousness of leaders and peoples in the
Middle East.”
 THE BALANCE OF TERROR

If two enemies have thousands of weapons in many different places, as was the
case with the United States and the Soviet Union, such an attack would be
futile. There would be no possibility of eliminating all the other side’s
weapons, and whatever weapons remained would surely be launched in
retaliation. With only a small number of weapons in vulnerable places, a
preemptive attack becomes a feasible, even attractive, option.

One fear is that nations with relatively small nuclear arsenals may be tempted
to launch a preemptive strike crisis—that is, an initial attack to eliminate the
nuclear forces of the other side before it has a chance to use them.

In addition to the possibility that a nuclear war with only a few weapons might
be viewed as winnable, there are serious dilemmas relating to what strategists
call crisis stability, or the likelihood that a crisis will escalate to war.
 LAUNCH ON WARNING

launch on warning - When a nation launches its own nuclear weapons on

indications that it is under attack (as opposed to waiting for the attack to be
completed).

The danger is that if one side waits for an attack to be completed before
responding, they may find themselves with few or no weapons for retaliation.

And because there may be only four or five minutes of warning time for nations
close to each other, time pressures on decision makers will be intense. And
when the warning time is so short that decisions need to be almost
instantaneous, the danger of inadvertent nuclear war increases dramatically.

During the Cold War the superpowers would have had thirty to forty minutes
to determine if an attack was real.
 FINAL THOUGHTS OF THE CRITICS OF
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Critics of nuclear proliferation believe that we cannot extrapolate the U.S.–
Soviet experience into the most likely scenarios for future nuclear
proliferation.

Even if nuclear weapons did produce, or at least contribute to, the

superpower peace, it was only because the United States and the Soviet
Union had the money and technology to build a lot of the right kinds of
weapons.

They also had the technology and time that allowed them to avoid rash,
impulsive decisions that might have led to war by mistake.

It was a balance of terror, to be sure, but it was a stable balance of terror.

Nuclear proliferation will produce more balances of terror in the world, but
these may be delicate, fragile, and unstable.
 TERORRISTS, BLACK MARKETS, &
NUCLEAR HANDOFFS
There is one aspect of nuclear proliferation on which everyone agrees:
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-state actors (a euphemism
for terrorist groups in this context) would be disastrous.

Why do the non-state actors appear so dangerous when it comes to the

ownership of nuclear weapons?

Because “an opponent cannot be deterred by the threat of nuclear

weapons if that opponent has no definable society to threaten.”

These groups would not go to the trouble of getting nuclear weapons

unless they are willing to use them, and because the option of
deterrence would not exist, nothing would prevent them from doing so.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states increases the
likelihood of proliferation to non-state actors. How so?

The problem is not the knowledge of how to build a bomb—a few

hours on the Internet will yield the necessary plans. The big obstacle
is getting one’s hands on the fissile material—that is, the fuel that
feeds the explosion, plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU).

It only stands to reason that more nuclear powers, more nuclear

weapons, and more nuclear fuel in the world will only increase the
chances that weapons will wind up in the wrong hands. And because
the dangers of nuclear weapons in the hands of non-deterrable actors
are so immense, the argument goes, we need to prevent anything that
increases this risk, including proliferation to other states.
OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Concern about nuclear weapons proliferation is often expressed in

the context of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) more generally,
a category that includes chemical and biological weapons as well as
radiological weapons or “dirty bombs.”
Chemical weapons include such things as nerve gas or
other substances that disable or kill people exposed to
them.

Biological weapons involve the release of bacteria or

viruses that cause disease.

Radiological weapons are conventional bombs that would

spread radioactive material.
 THE POOR MAN’S NUKE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Biological weapons are often referred to as the “poor man’s nuke.”

A successful biological attack with a highly infectious and lethal agent

could produce casualties of nuclear proportions.

Once an infectious biological agent is released into the human

population, its eventual course cannot be controlled. It is almost
impossible to know where the agent will travel, whom it will kill, or
how many.

Because biological weapons are so inherently unpredictable, it is

difficult to imagine how they would fit into any rational policy of
deterrence.
 CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Chemical weapons, the easiest to manufacture, were used almost a

century ago when soldiers in World War I confronted a variety of
gasses on the battlefield.

Though certainly frightening, it would be difficult for chemical

weapons to achieve nuclear-like destructiveness.

For this reason, it might be a mistake to classify them as genuine

weapons of mass destruction.