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Connected Car Assignment - AE ZC443/ AEL ZC443


Ananda Ganapathy. N
2021th55040

V2V - Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication


Definition:
 Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication’s ability to wirelessly exchange
information about the speed and position of surrounding vehicles shows great
promise in helping to avoid crashes, ease traffic congestion, and improve the
environment.
 V2V technologies are C-ITS designed to enable communication between vehicles to
avoid accidents and warn drivers of impending crashes, as well as to enable the
optimization of the overall traffic flow.
 They are being developed with a view to facilitate the implementation of
Autonomous Vehicles in the future.

Benefits:
 V2V technology can also help improve traffic flow management, decrease
congestion, and optimize utilisation of existing infrastructure, thereby minimising
any unnecessary expansion of infrastructure capacity (e.g. more roads and/or
more transit).
 V2V provides data on traffic flows, which is processed and used to share traffic
information on variable message signs and variable speed limit signs, and to enable
vehicle platooning if all vehicles are connected.
 It is also used for route planning.
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VALUE CREATED
Improving efficiency and reducing costs:

 Reduce infrastructure costs and disruption time and costs as vehicle traffic is optimized
with better coordination. Existing infrastructure is fully utilized and less new road
infrastructure expenditure is required.

 Reduce costs associated with road traffic accidents, which will result in reduced
expenditure on medical services, police, infrastructure repair etc.
Enhancing economic, social and environmental value:

 Reduce congestion and improve connectivity between destinations, as traffic flows are
optimized.

 Enable longer-term infrastructure investments through the data collected and the more
efficient demand management removing the need for additional ‘immediate’ capacity
improvement.

 Improve road safety (generating costs savings) and infrastructure management.

 Facilitate the use of private vehicles for new-shared models: the usage and availability
of connected vehicles can be managed in an area, thus it is easier for a private vehicle
owner to integrate their vehicle into a shared transport fleet (such as ride sharing).
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Transmission, collection, storage, and sharing of V2V data

There are two primary categories of V2V system functions - system safety and system
security.

The V2V system’s safety functionality (i.e., the safety applications that produce crash
warnings) requires that V2V devices in motor vehicles send and receive a basic safety
message containing information about vehicle position, heading, speed, and other
information relating to vehicle state and predicted path. The BSM, however, contains no
personally identifying information (PII) and is broadcast in a very limited geographical
range, typically less than 1 km. Nearby motor vehicles will use that information to warn
drivers of crash-imminent situations. Except in the case of malfunction, the system will not
collect and motor vehicles will not store the messages sent or received data sent/received
by V2V devices.

The security needs of the V2V system require the exchange of certificates and other
communications between V2V devices and the entity or entities providing security for the
V2V system (i.e., the Security Certificate Management System). These two-way
communications are encrypted and subject to additional security measures designed to
prevent SCMS insiders and others from unauthorized access to information that might enable
linkage of BSM data or security credentials to specific motor vehicles.
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The safety applications

Crash Type Safety Application


Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
Rear-End
Electronic Emergency Brake Light
Do Not Pass Warning
Opposite direction
Left Turn Assist (LTA)
Junction crossing Intersection Movement Assist (IMA)
Lane change Blind Spot Warning + Lane Change Warning (BSW+LCW)

 FCW: Warns the driver of an impending rear-end collision with another vehicle ahead in
traffic in the same lane and direction of travel.
 EEBL: Warns the driver of another vehicle that is braking hard farther up ahead in the
flow of traffic.
 DNPW: Warns the driver of one vehicle during a passing maneuver attempt when a
slower-moving vehicle, ahead and in the same lane, cannot be safely passed using a
passing zone that is occupied by vehicles in the opposite direction of travel. It also
provide an advisory warning that the passing zone is occupied when a passing maneuver
is not being attempted.
 LTA: Warns the driver of a vehicle, which is beginning to turn left in front of a vehicle
traveling in the opposite direction, that making a left turn, at this time, would result in a
crash.
 IMA: Warns the driver when it is not safe to enter an intersection due to high collision
probability with other vehicles at controlled and uncontrolled intersections.
 BSW + LCW: Warns the driver during a lane change if another vehicle traveling in the
same direction occupies the blind spot zone into which the driver intends to switch. The
application also provides the driver with advisory information that another vehicle in an
adjacent lane is positioned in the original vehicle’s “blind spot” zone when a lane change
is not being attempted
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System Limitations –
V2V safety systems use messages broadcast by vehicles to enable Cooperative crash
warning applications. This section discusses system limitations of V2V safety systems by
comparing their characteristics to those of traditional crash warning systems - use
vehiclebased radar, lidar, mono camera, stereo camera or combinations of these sensors

Comparison to sensor-based system:


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The V2V safety system communications is not impacted by weather (rain, fog, snow, sunlight
or shadows).
Radar and lidar perform reliably under all lighting conditions, while camera systems have some
issues with shadows and lighting transitions, which are typical conditions for tunnels and
under foliage during daylight. Additionally, V2V safety system communications are impaired by
limited sky visibility, as in highly dense urban areas. In contrast, various conventional crash
avoidance sensors perform reliably in urban canyons. In summary, both V2V safety systems
and conventional crash warning systems have system availability limitations.
(1) Other Limitations for Conventional Sensor-based Systems
• Vulnerability to misalignment from impact (lidar and radar)
• Insufficient to react to stopped objects with a single sensor (lidar and radar)
• Limited number of vehicles can be processed (tracked) for threat determination
• Incapable of close range, low speed range-rate estimates (radar, camera)
(2) Other Limitations for V2V Safety Systems
• Requires a significant number of vehicles to be equipped for system effectiveness
• Accuracy is currently only sufficient for collision warning applications.
Additional testing and field experience needed to establish level of trust of V2V messages
sufficient to activate vehicle control applications.

RISKS ANDV2V System


MITIGATIONS Conventional System
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Sino Description Risk Mitigation


To work, effectively V2V requires To mitigate this issue,
widespread communications internationally agreed
networks. In addition, standards for V2V standards should be
the technology’s development and developed with a plan
Implementa uses should be aligned and followed by that ensures the right
1
tion risk all manufacturers. There should also communications
be a thoughtful integration with the networks are in place.
transport network, that enables
seamless and informed data sharing
between transportation services.
Users may be reluctant to accept V2V
2 Social risk technology due to perceived data
privacy issues.
Organizations should
ensure their systems are
Communications network
robust to eliminate the
vulnerabilities are one of the most
risk of a cybersecurity
Safety and important cyber security risks.
breach, and governments
3 (Cyber)secu wireless services can be vulnerable to
should set regulatory
rity risk signal intercept, signal hacking or
frameworks to outline
deterioration and other similar threats
the requirements of
linked to the transmission of data.
these systems to repel
cybersecurity attacks

Public Acceptance
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A. The importance of public acceptance:


Crash avoidance technologies in general and V2V in particular, are new to consumers and can
dramatically change the driving experience always have the potential to raise public
acceptance issues.
1. Potential key aspects of consumer acceptance for V2V communication
A) Enhanced levels of safety
V2V technologies can potentially provide considerable safety benefits, but consumers are
more likely to accept V2V technologies quickly if they understand how vehicles with this
technology can be safer. Crash avoidance technologies play, at first glance, a more abstract
role in keeping consumers safe than crashworthiness features. If a driver avoids a crash, it may
be difficult for the driver to detect whether it was the driver’s own skill or the on-board
technology that actually “saved” them, as compared to a crashworthiness technology like air
bags, which clearly deploy to protect the driver and occupants in a crash. Consumers who
cannot clearly see benefits to V2V technologies could be more tentative in their acceptance of
V2V for longer than they might be with other safety technologies. Performing outreach to
educate consumers on the safety benefits of V2V technologies, as well as on the privacy-
protection methodology built into the V2V communications system, will likely be helpful to
improving consumer acceptance.

Overview - System operation


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In general, two sets of components are needed for V2V communications to operate.

 A device to transmit an accurate and trusted basic safety message and the second are
the components needed for a device to receive and interpret a BSM transmitted from
another entity.

To generate and send a BSM, a device needs to know its own position (such as via a GPS
antenna and receiver). Once its position is known, the device needs a computer processing
unit that can take its location and combine this with other onboard sensors (e.g., speed,
heading, acceleration) to generate the required BSM data string. Once the BSM is generated, a
device is needed to transmit this message wirelessly to another vehicle. As the onboard
processor is generating the BSM, a security module is processing and preparing the security
information and certificates for transmission to provide the receiving vehicle assurance that
the message is valid. This security information needs to be transmitted wirelessly as well. To
receive and interpret a BSM, a device must be capable of receiving the BSM that is transmitted
from a nearby device and it must match the method of BSM transmission (i.e., if the message
is transmitted via DSRC, the receiving device must have a DSRC receiver). It also must have a
computer-processing unit that can decode the BSM properly. A GPS antenna and receiver are
needed to verify the relative distance between the sending device and the receiving device.
Lastly, the device that is receiving the BSM must also have a security module that is capable of
receiving and processing the security credential information as well. Lastly, to operate the
safety applications adequately to warn drivers, a driver-vehicle interface is needed to display
critical advisories and imminent alerts.

Components required for V2V system operation:


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A V2V communication system requires components located in vehicles and along roadways to
enable complete system operation. For a V2V system, this includes both the vehicle based
components and roadside equipment (RSE) units to provide security updates and
communication to the security management system. A V2I system would expand capabilities
by embedding additional RSEs, potentially, in traffic signals, signs, and other infrastructure-
related components. The following sections provide details on vehicle and non-vehicle based
components.

Vehicle-based hardware:

At a minimum, V2V devices would require two DSRC radios and a GPS receiver with a
processor to derive information such as vehicle speed and predicted path from the device’s
GPS data. To improve the quality of the data that vehicle-based components could use to issue
warnings, an inertial measurement unit to detect acceleration forces would be needed. In
addition, a driver-vehicle interface would be essential for issuing warnings to the driver. Such
warnings could be audial or visual or for devices fully integrated into the vehicle at the time of
manufacture, the warnings could potentially be haptic warnings (e.g., tightening of the seat
belt, vibrating the driver’s seat). Figure V-1 illustrates the vehicle-based components needed
for an integrated V2V system that uses integrated vehicle devices.
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Non-vehicle-based hardware

In addition to the vehicle-based V2V components, a V2V system also requires equipment to
be located along roadsides and, if expanded V2I capabilities are sought, to be embedded in
other infrastructure support equipment such as traffic signals or stop signs. Roadside
equipment is the term used to refer to the physical wireless communications infrastructure
that supports communication between the vehicle and the SCMS, and between the vehicle
and V2I applications. There are two types of RSEs with which a vehicle can communicate: RSEs
that serve as a wireless communications link between the vehicle and the SCMS so that the
vehicle can receive new security certificates, report misbehavior, and receive CRL updates, and
RSEs that broadcast messages needed to support V2I applications. The equipment necessary
to support both functions can be located within one RSE device. RSEs could employ DSRC, or
could potentially use some other communications medium such as existing 3G/4G cellular
networks or Wi-Fi.
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Overview of software enabling system operation


V2V communications is based on the wireless exchange of messages between vehicles. The
messages provide information that a device can then use to provide a warning about potential
danger through a safety application. Fundamentally, the basic hardware of a DSRC device is
analogous to a common radio that not only receives information but transmits data as well. As
a result the “core” of a DSRC device will be the software that gives devices the “intelligence”
needed to determine and transmit current vehicle conditions and perform the necessary
evaluations to potentially issue a warning. At the most basic level, a device will require low-
level components to both transmit and receive the basic safety message; a relatively simple
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operating system; connection to a driver-vehicle interface; and algorithms to control the


issuance of warnings (along with continual device diagnosis).
Overall, both vehicle manufacturers and consumer electronic device manufacturers have years
of significant experience developing similar software for the myriad devices and products they
produce. They are skilled at managing suppliers to develop these components or, in some
cases, developing device software in-house as part of their core intellectual property.
V2V devices present a new challenge to the agency regarding software and potential
regulatory action. NHTSA’s FMVSSs are generally performance-based, but the agency has not
yet attempted to regulate software using performance tests, and software is increasingly
pervasive in today’s vehicles. The agency will need to consider carefully how to develop
appropriate tests to regulate the software-based aspects of V2V communications and safety
applications. NHTSA’s research program concerning vehicle automation includes research into
how the agency might regulate safety-critical software.

Interoperability
Interoperability and its importance
In order for the information in a V2V communication to be useful, it must be received timely,
it must be reliable, and it must be transmitted in a standard format. Vehicles participating in
the V2V communications network communicate with other connected vehicles using
standardized DSRC message types broadcast on a standardized network, IEEE 1609.4, over a
standardized wireless layer, IEEE 802.11p.126 DSRC provides local-area, low-latency127
network connectivity, and is generally intended to support broadcast messaging between
vehicles and between vehicles and roadside access points. It is a variant of Wi-Fi that allows
nearly instantaneous network connections, as well as broadcast messaging that requires no
network connection. It uses 75 MHz of spectrum located in the 5.85 to 5.925 GHz frequency
band.128 Vehicles currently use channel 172 to transmit messages that support safety of life
applications. Interoperability, in short, is the ability for different devices using V2V systems
sourced, manufactured, and installed by various OEMs and aftermarket retailers to
communicate with each other in a reliable and timely manner. If devices from different
sources fail to “speak the same language,” then the system as a whole will not be
“interoperable,” and will consequently degrade and break down.
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a) Communication between vehicles


V2V communications consists of two types of messages: safety messages and certificate
exchange messages. The safety messages are used to support the safety applications, and
the certificate exchange messages ensure that the safety message is from a trusted source.
The safety messages are transmitted in a standardized format so that they can be read by
all other vehicles participating in the network. To satisfy this requirement, each DSRC-
equipped vehicle would need to broadcast and receive safety messages in a standardized
format and specified performance level in terms of characteristics like accuracy and
range.129 Additional details on standards related to V2V can be found in Section V.D.1.c).
The safety messages include information about the vehicle’s behavior such as the vehicle’s
GPS position, its predicted path, its lateral and vertical acceleration, and its yaw rate. The
messages are time-stamped so the receiving vehicle knows when the message was sent.
This information can be used by other vehicles for a variety of crash avoidance applications.
NHTSA’s current research is based on the assumption that the V2V system will use a Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) to authenticate messages, so that other vehicles will trust the
m.130 PKI uses certificates to inform a receiving device that the message is from a trusted
source, and it uses cryptography to send encrypted message content. For V2V
communications, BSM messages are trusted but not encrypted, while messages that
contain security information (e.g., certificates) are trusted and the contents encrypted.131
The security system currently being researched for V2V would use a type of cryptography
known as “asymmetric cryptography.”132 In asymmetric cryptography, there are two keys
that are mathematically linked in such a way that what is encrypted with one key can only
be decrypted with the other. Although the keys are mathematically linked, it is extremely
difficult to derive one key based on knowledge of the other. This property allows one key,
the “public key,” to be widely distributed while the other key, the “private key,” is held only
by the owner. Asymmetric cryptography (both encryption and decryption) is
computationally harder than symmetric cryptography and is one of the reasons many
security experts believe asymmetric cryptography to be more secure.133 Many Internet
security protocols use asymmetric cryptography as the basis for their infrastructure. Secure
socket layers/transport layer security (SSL/TLS), 134 the protocol used in most secure
online transactions, uses asymmetric encryption to authenticate the server to the client,
and optionally the client to the server. Asymmetric cryptography is also used to establish a
session key. The session key is used in symmetric algorithms to encrypt the bulk of the
data. This combines the benefit of asymmetric encryption for authentication with the
faster, less processor-intensive symmetric key encryption for the bulk data. 135 The secure
form of Hypertext Transfer Protocol is HTTPS, which operates as a PKI system and uses SSL.
SSL\TLS also operates on its own as a PKI system, independently of HTTPS. For a further
discussion of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, please see Section IX.
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 Vehicle-to-Vehicle Message Sets


For vehicle communication to succeed among OEM-installed in-vehicle devices and
aftermarket devices, communication messages must be standardized so that the devices
speak the same language. SAE J2735 is intended to help address this purpose so that all
V2V safety applications are built around a common framework. SAE J2735 defines the
design specifications for the safety messages, including specifications for the message
sets,136 data frames,137 and data elements.13

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