C-130 Avionics Modernization Program
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program
htm
Program
System
Requirements
Document
DRAFT
Prepared by
NOTE: This draft, dated 19 29 April 1999, prepared by WR-ALC/LBRE, has not been approved and is subject to
modification.
Foreword
I have made this letter longer than usual because I lacked the time to make it short.
BLAISE PASCAL
(1623 –
1662)
This draft Systems Requirements Document (SRD) translates Warfighter needs from several Operational Requirements
Documents (ORDs) into a single source of performance-based technical requirements for the C-130X Avionics
Modernization Program. The requirements fall into three broad categories:
1. Derived requirements – These are traceable to the ORD, and provide an expanded definition of the ORD
requirements in technical performance terms. The translation from operational to technical requirements
incorporates knowledge of C-130 aircraft systems, lessons learned, and engineering best practices.
2. Requirements directly from the ORD – In some cases, the ORD contains sufficient detail and requires no
further technical embellishment.
3. Existing capability – This is a special category of derived requirements, focusing on the basic ORD directive
to maintain existing C-130 capabilities. In cases where the available technical documentation of existing
subsystems/equipment is poor, the SRD authors compiled data from various sources and assembled
complete, top-level performance descriptions.
In the process of creating the draft SRD, the authors accumulated a large quantity of detailed technical information about
the existing capability of the C-130. The level of detail exceeds what is reasonable for the SRD and was deleted from early
drafts of the document, but is certainly valuable for understanding the baseline C-130. We have no way of knowing whether
this information is available and familiar to the C-130 experts in the contractor community, so we decided to publish it in the
Bidder’s Library as 101 Things Contractors Need to Know about the C-130. This document will be placed in the Bidder’s
Library by mid May 99.
The draft SRD is very much a work in progress. It represents an enormous, dedicated effort by many people to assemble a
large body of knowledge and distill it to essential elements. Our intent is to provide a technical performance baseline that
will allow maximum flexibility for contractors to define innovative solutions to the ORD requirements. In some cases, we
may have inadvertently limited that flexibility in some arbitrary way, and we solicit contractor feedback to help us understand
where that may have happened. We plan to incorporate appropriate feedback from all sources and issue at least one more
draft prior to final RFP release. Please send us your constructive comments and participate in the creation of a clear, fair,
and effective document.
Woody Battle
Ed Kunay
C-130X Program
1. 1.0 SCOPE *
1.1 Identification *
1.1.1 Global Air Traffic Management (GATM)/ Navigation/Safety *
1.1.2 Total Cost of Ownership *
1.1.3 Cockpit Layout *
1.1.4 Reliability, Maintainability and Supportability *
1.1.5 Standardization *
1.1.6 Enhanced Situational Awareness (ESA) (SOF Aircraft) *
1.1.7 Terrain Following / Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) (SOF Aircraft) *
1.1.8 Air Vehicle *
3.9.1.2 Temperature *
3.9.1.3 Altitude *
3.9.1.4 Temperature, Altitude, and Vibration Combination *
3.9.1.5 Vibration *
3.9.1.6 Shock *
3.9.1.7 Humidity *
3.9.1.8 Salt Atmosphere *
3.9.1.9 Sand and Dust *
3.9.1.10 Decompression *
3.9.2 Fluid Resistance *
3.9.3 Air Vehicle Electrical System *
3.9.3.1 External Power *
3.9.3.2 Aircraft Wiring *
3.9.3.3 Aircraft Circuit Breakers *
3.9.4 Environmental Control System *
3.10 Computer Resource Requirements *
3.10.1 Software Requirements *
3.10.1.1 General Software Requirements *
3.10.1.1.1 Software Engineering Process/Guidelines *
3.10.1.1.2 Software Configuration *
3.10.1.1.3 COTS/GOTS *
3.10.1.1.4 Year 2000 Guidance *
3.10.1.1.5 Higher Order Language (HOL) *
3.10.1.1.6 Software Design Requirements *
3.10.1.1.7 Software Reuse *
3.10.1.2 Mission Planning *
3.10.1.3 Operational Flight Software *
3.10.1.3.1 Real-Time Operating System *
3.10.1.3.2 Application Program *
3.10.1.3.3 Application Program Interface (API) *
3.10.1.3.4 Response Time/Data Transfer Rate *
3.10.1.3.5 Fault Tolerance *
3.10.1.3.6 Operational Flight Software/Simulator Software Interface *
3.10.1.3.7 Operational Flight Software Loading and Verification *
3.10.2 Computer Hardware Requirements *
3.10.2.1 General Computer Hardware Requirements *
3.10.2.1.1 Databus Throughput *
3.10.2.1.2 Declassification and Zeroize Capability *
3.10.2.2 Database Requirements *
3.10.2.3 Modified COTS/GOTS and Developmental Hardware *
3.10.3 Support *
SCOPE
1. Identification
This document provides top-level technical performance requirements for the C-130 Avionics Modernization
Program (AMP). Its intent is to provide a framework for more detailed definition of the AMP system, which will be
documented by the AMP contractor in the System Specification. These modification requirements are
constrained due to the operational requirement for no degradation in capability, and other constraints placed on
the program due to the multiple configuration/multiple mission aspect of the C-130 weapon system. This
modification program addresses five major areas: (1) Global Air Traffic Management (GATM), (2)
Navigation/Safety (Nav/Safety), (3) Reduced Manpower Requirements, (4) Reliability and Maintainability, and
(5) Standardization. The C-130 AMP will lower the cost of ownership and increase survivability of the C-130
aircraft, while complying with Air Force Navigation and Safety (Nav/Safety) Master Plan and Global Air Traffic
Management (GATM) requirements. In addition to specifying the AMP requirements, this document also defines
the performance requirements for those C-130 aircraft affected by the Common Avionics Architecture for
Penetration Program (CAAP), namely the Special Operations Forces (SOF) C-130s (AC-130H, AC-130U,
MC-130E, MC-130H, MC-130P, EC-130E).
Functional allocation of requirements may be determined by the contractor and not limited to the functional
layout of this document.
1. The AMP/CAAP Functions and Equipment
The AMP for the C-130 modified aircraft encompasses the functions/equipment specified in Table 1.1.1.
To ensure global airspace access, the C-130 requires extensive upgrades to existing communication,
navigation, and surveillance (CNS) equipment. Cockpits must meet the requirements of the Air Force
cockpit endorsement process outlined in AFI 11-202 Vol. III. GATM equipment, as a minimum, shall meet
(or comply with the intent of) FAA or other appropriate civil technical standards and government licensing
and certification.
Upon completion of AMP modification the aircraft shall be compliant with all GATM as addressed in the
C-130 AMP ORD (operational requirements document) and Air Force Navigation Safety Master Plan
requirements as they apply to worldwide C-130 operations.
The navigation function will meet the Required Navigation Performance-1 (RNP-1). Internal aircraft
systems will provide automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) as well as TCAS (traffic alert and collision
avoidance system). The C-130 AMP equipment will be functionally operational with all ground network and
satellite aeronautical network provider communication requirements. To meet AF/XO Nav/Safety and
European carriage requirements, an Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) is required. Also
required is a Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS), a windshear detection capability and a
Global Positioning System (GPS). In addition, Digital Flight Data Recorders (DFDR) and Cockpit Voice
Recorders (CVR) will be installed into the aircraft.
The GATM architecture will comply with applicable information technology standards contained in the DoD
Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) and JTA-AF architectures to the maximum extent possible without
compromising GATM. Any command and control (C2) applications that operate over the GATM
communication systems will be interoperable with the Defense Information Infrastructure-Common
Operating Environment (DII-COE).
To allow aircraft to operate in the European Air Traffic Service (ATS) route structure, GATM navigation
systems must meet requirements for basic area navigation (BRNAV) as defined in FAA Advisory Circular
AC 90-96. BRNAV requires RNP-5 performance and a limited set of functional capabilities as defined in
the guidance material referenced above. A capability that complies with the RNP MASPS (DO-236) is
needed to meet planned requirements for precision area navigation (PRNAV) operation in European
airspace.
3. Total Cost of Ownership
The C-130 AMP modification will be designed to minimize the total ownership cost (TOC) of the C-130
aircraft. TOC shall be used as a fundamental constraint in all aspects of the design, development,
documentation, and support of the system. The term "Life Cycle Cost (LCC)" shall be used as an
alternative for TOC. When LCC is used in the C-130 AMP documentation, briefings, and discussions, LCC
means TOC.
4. Cockpit Layout
The system will be designed to allow operation of the aircraft by two pilots and a flight engineer for all
combat delivery missions.
5. Reliability, Maintainability and Supportability
The AMP system will be designed to enhance the reliability and maintainability of the overall C-130 aircraft
to perform the assigned mission. System should be maintainable with existing skill mix of personnel,
utilizing existing support equipment to the greatest extent possible.
6. Standardization
The modification will be designed to put all combat delivery aircraft (C-130E, C-130H, C-130H2, C-130H3)
into a single standard avionics hardware and software configuration, regardless of the starting
configuration of the aircraft.
Special mission aircraft, affected by the modification, will be baselined on the combat delivery
configuration. However, special mission aircraft (ACs, ECs, HCs, LCs, and MCs) will have some
configuration differences to account for special mission requirements and equipment. To the maximum
extent possible, AMP equipment installed on special mission aircraft will be the same as on baseline
aircraft. Additional hardware and software required for special mission aircraft will build upon the baseline
aircraft configuration in an open system approach. Life cycle cost analysis (total cost of ownership) will be
a primary factor in determining the commonality of avionics/subsystems selected for combat delivery and
special mission aircraft.
7. Total Cost of Ownership
The total cost of ownership over the life cycle of the fleet will be substantially reduced through judicious
application of open system architecture principles to the integration of the overall avionics system, to the
selection of OTS/NDI subsystems, and to any Developmental items.
8. Enhanced Situational Awareness (ESA) (SOF Aircraft)
The Enhanced Situational Awareness (ESA) system will provide near real time threat information (for
emitting and non-emitting threats) to the aircrews. The ESA system will include correlation and data fusion
of threats reported by off-board and on-board sensors and an integrated digital map display of aircraft
situation. The system will also provide threat avoidance capability in the form of in-flight route replanning
and integrated countermeasures control.
9. Terrain Following / Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) (SOF Aircraft)
Certain versions of the C-130 will receive an improved terrain following/terrain avoidance capability. This
improved capability will use onboard sensors as well as the existing terrain database with new terrain
following and terrain avoidance algorithms to achieve a low probability of interception/low probability of
detection (LPI/LPD) capability.
10. Air Vehicle
Modifications to the C-130 aircraft, for example, modifications to the environmental control system, electrical
system, or aircraft structure, required to meet AMP avionics equipment requirements are part of the AMP
program.
2. Equipment to be Removed
The list presented in Appendix 1 identifies the existing avionics that, as a minimum, will be removed along with
associated wiring, circuit breakers, and mounting hardware. The AMP will not degrade or remove any existing
system capabilities.
3. Use of Off-The-Shelf Equipment
The following priorities will be used for the selection of equipment for the C-130 AMP system unless cost or performance
requirements/analyses indicate otherwise:
1. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
This list is intended to be a reference starting point for contractors.
1. Specifications
2. Standards
3. Technical Orders
AMC ORD 315-92 Airborne Broadcast Intelligence (ABI), AKA, Real Time
Information in the Cockpit (RTIC), (DRAFT)
FAA Notice 8110.64 FAA Interim Guidance, Terrain Avoidance and Warning System
8. Non-Government Documents
ARINC Report 610A Guidance for Use of Avionics Equipment and Software in
Simulators, dated 1 February 1994
IEEE 12207.1
IEEE 12207.2
DO178B
2. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Items in this document that relate to all aircraft affected by the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program are presented
in an Arial font. Sections that contain additional requirements driven by special mission aircraft only are
distinguished by a Times New Roman Bold font. Requirements derived form CAAP (Common Avionics
Architecture for Penetration) ORDs are further designated (CAAP) .
1. System Overview
The avionics system shall provide, as a minimum, precision autonomous navigation and safety including global
air traffic management, effective threat warning and self-defense, communications, reconnaissance and
precision weapon delivery/fire control.
1. General Requirements
Installation of AMP systems shall not cause a reduction in capabilities currently existing on the C-130
aircraft.
1. Total Cost of Ownership
Total ownership costs shall be a fundamental constraint on the engineering design. For commonality
of equipment installed on baseline and special mission aircraft, total life cycle cost (LCC) analysis will
be used to determine the logistics requirements for both baseline and special mission aircraft. Annual
ownership cost of new, replacement subsystems shall be reduced by 6% in relation to systems they
are replacing. An objective is to reduce these annual ownership costs by 25%.
Life cycle cost analysis (total cost of ownership) shall be a primary factor in determining the
commonality of avionics/subsystems selected for combat delivery and special mission aircraft. (e.g.
Special mission avionics requirements shall be integrated into the baseline avionics architecture
when practical and cost effective, provided the baseline requirements are met).
Under no circumstances shall Combat Delivery aircraft be equipped with TF/TA (terrain
following/terrain avoidance) navigation capability or be given the capability to turn off the DFDR
(digital flight data recorder) or CVR (cockpit voice recorder).
2. Standard Avionics Configurations.
Hardware and software components and equipment locations shall be common and interoperable
between all C-130 models. Exceptions to common equipment shall be determined by life cycle cost.
In addition, all components shall comply to the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA).
Each aircraft in an MDS (Mission Design Series) shall have equipment and circuit breakers in the
same general location.
An objective is commonality of GATM equipment across AMC weapon systems to reduce the overall
AMC support structure, particularly for en route locations and forward-deployed units.
1. Special Mission Configuration
Special mission aircraft, affected by the modification, shall be baselined to the Combat Delivery
configuration, to the maximum extent possible. Special mission aircraft (ACs, HCs, MCs, LCs and
ECs) may have configuration differences to account for special mission requirements and equipment.
Kits should be designed for special mission aircraft to use the same hardware and software as the
Combat Delivery aircraft. Additional hardware and software required for special mission aircraft shall
build upon the baseline aircraft configuration in a open systems approach.
3. Cockpit Configuration
Cockpits shall meet the requirements of the Air Force cockpit endorsement process outlined in AFI
11-202.VOL. 3. GATM equipment shall meet (or comply with the intent of) FAA or other appropriate
civil technical standards.
1. Combat Delivery Aircraft Cockpit Layout
The cockpit avionics architecture on all combat delivery aircraft shall be optimized to ensure the
aircraft can effectively execute the combat delivery mission throughout the world with a basic
cockpit crew of no greater than two pilots and one flight engineer from their respective crew
positions. Navigators shall not be required on missions flown by combat delivery aircraft.
It is desirable to remove the flight engineer from all combat delivery C-130 aircraft.
Therefore, the layout of the cockpit avionics architecture should be optimized to ensure
aircrews can effectively execute all missions throughout the world from their respective
crew positions, without a flight engineer. In order to maintain fleet commonality and
reduce overall LCC cost, all C-130s, including Special Mission aircraft should be
modified.
2. ACM Location
The navigator station on existing combat delivery aircraft will be referred to as an auxiliary
crewmember (ACM) station. The ACM station shall be equipped with wiring and (group A)
hardware that will permit optional installation and use of, as a minimum, a multi-function
display, a control display unit, a radar/moving map cursor control, a full size keyboard, and
necessary interfaces to allow an ACM to employ the ACM station if required. Standard crew
station equipment/capability, such as, lighting, oxygen, heating/cooling outlets, interphone,
radio, etc. shall be retained.
2. Special Mission Aircraft Cockpit Layout
A fully functional dual crew position console shall be integrated on the cockpit of all
AC-130H, HC-130N/P, and MC-130E/H/P aircraft. To the maximum extent possible, components
of the second navigator/ACM station will be identical to the baseline ACM station.
This dual console will accommodate one navigator and one fire control officer (AC-130H), one
navigator and one radio operator (HC-130N/P, MC-130P), or one navigator and one electronic
warfare officer (MC-130E/H). The functionality of each current crew position shall be
maintained. It is desired that the cargo compartment crew console be deleted, and the full
cargo compartment capacity restored on MC-130E aircraft, while maintaining the EWO and
radio operator functionality intact.
4. Open Systems Architecture
Contractor(s) shall use an open-system architecture approach as defined by the Open System Joint
Task Force (OSJTF)The design of the AMP avionics suite shall use an open architecture approach,
with all interfaces defined to facilitate future upgrades to the avionics suite. See Section 5.1.1. Term
Definitions for a detailed definition of Open Systems.
The functional and physical interfaces between the air vehicle and avionics subsystem, as well as
the internal interfaces within the avionics subsystem, shall be defined and controlled. All AMP
systems components shall facilitate future upgrades by incremental technology insertion, rather than
by large-scale system redesign to allow for incorporation of additional or higher performance
elements with minimal impact on the existing systems.
These interfaces shall include, but not be limited to mechanical, electrical (power and signal wiring),
software, cockpit controls and displays (including instrument panels and center console), aircraft
sensors/avionics system, engine data signals/avionics system, environmental (including cooling,
vibration, acoustic, shock, EMI/EMC (electromagnetic interference/ electromagnetic compatibility)),
lighting, antenna locations, alignment/boresighting provisions, airframe structure, and critical cable
lengths.
1. Level of Openness
For this program, the level of openness shall be to al least the LRU (line replaceable unit)/LRM
(line replaceable module) level. LCC shall justify any open interfaces defined below this level.
LCC shall be the fundamental constraint in the engineering design process.
2. Avionics Architecture
The system shall provide a single, overall avionics architecture that will support aircrews in the
accomplishment of the diversity of missions across the C-130 fleet. The avionics architecture
shall provide an affordable software/hardware solution that minimizes life cycle cost, provides
To ensure global airspace access, the C-130 requires extensive upgrades to existing
communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) equipment. As a minimum, the GATM
architecture shall meet the following requirements and possess growth capability to meet future
requirements.
3. Interfaces to Retained/Existing Equipment
All system and subsystem avionics components used in this program shall function as part of a
fully integrated core avionics suite using open systems architecture. System integration with
existing equipment not planned for replacement is required.
4. System Growth
The AMP system shall be designed and installed to allow 50% growth to technology and future
operational requirements. The objective is 100% growth potential. Growth shall not be limited to
processor speed and memory, but be expanded to include databus capabilities, additional
processors, and expanded/additional sensors.
5. The design of the AMP avionics suite shall use an open architecture approach, with all interfaces defined to facilitate
future upgrades to the avionics suite.
6. The functional and physical interfaces between the air vehicle and avionics subsystem, as well as the internal
interfaces within the avionics subsystem, shall be defined and controlled.
7. These interfaces shall include, but not be limited to mechanical, electrical (power and signal wiring), cockpit controls
and displays (including instrument panels and center console), aircraft sensors/avionics system, engine data
signals/avionics system, environmental (including cooling, vibration, acoustic, shock, EMI/EMC), lighting, antenna
locations, alignment/boresighting provisions, airframe structure, and critical cable lengths.
To ensure global airspace access, the C-130 requires extensive upgrades to existing communication,
navigation, and surveillance (CNS) equipment. As a minimum, the GATM architecture shall meet the
following requirements and possess growth capability to meet future requirements.
5. Graceful Degradation
Orderly and graceful degradation of mission critical systems shall be provided by means of automatic
regression and operator selection of backup modes. Mission critical systems are defined as those
systems that are essential for operation to ensure mission success. Included within these systems
are all safety of flight systems and subsystems. Mission critical systems shall have sufficient
redundancy to prevent single point failures.
Commonality of GATM equipment across AMC weapon systems is desired to reduce the overall
AMC support structure, particularly for enroute locations and forward-deployed units. GATM interface
with navigation, surveillance, and communication equipment not planned for replacement is
imperative.
6. Provisions to apply power to selected avionics LRUs/systems, which do not have dedicated controls shall be
supplied.Cockpit Configuration
Cockpits shall meet the requirements of the Air Force cockpit endorsement process outlined in AFI
11-202.VOL. 3. GATM equipment shall meet (or comply with the intent of) FAA or other appropriate
civil technical standards.
1. Combat Delivery Aircraft Cockpit Layout
The cockpit avionics architecture on all combat delivery aircraft shall be optimized to ensure the
aircraft can effectively execute the combat delivery mission throughout the world with a basic
cockpit crew of no greater than two pilots and one flight engineer from their respective crew
positions. Navigators shall not be required on missions flown by combat delivery aircraft.
It is desirable to remove the flight engineer from all combat delivery C-130 aircraft.
Therefore, the layout of the cockpit avionics architecture should be optimized to ensure
aircrews can effectively execute all missions throughout the world from their respective
crew positions, without a flight engineer. In order to maintain fleet commonality and
reduce overall LCC cost, all C-130s, including Special Mission aircraft should be
modified.
2. ACM Location
The navigator station on existing combat delivery aircraft will be referred to as an auxiliary
crewmember (ACM) station. The ACM station shall be equipped with wiring and (group A)
hardware that will permit optional installation and use of, as a minimum, a multi-function
display, a control display unit, a radar/moving map cursor control, a full size keyboard, and
necessary interfaces to allow an ACM to employ the ACM station if required. Standard crew
station equipment/capability, such as, lighting, oxygen, heating/cooling outlets, interphone,
radio, etc. shall be retained.
2. Special Mission Aircraft Cockpit Layout
A fully functional dual crew position console shall be integrated on the cockpit of all AC-130H,
HC-130N/P, and MC-130E/H/P aircraft. To the maximum extent possible, components of the second
navigator/ACM station will be identical to the baseline ACM station.
This dual console will accommodate one navigator and one fire control officer (AC-130H), one navigator
and one radio operator (HC-130N/P, MC-130P), or one navigator and one electronic warfare officer
(MC-130E/H). The functionality of each current crew position shall be maintained. It is desired that the
cargo compartment crew console be deleted, and the full cargo compartment capacity restored on
MC-130E aircraft, while maintaining the EWO and radio operator functionality intact.
In order to provide the necessary interfaces for integration with the new integrated FMS needed to meet future
RNP phases of flight performance, accuracy, and operational redundancies, a dual autopilot is required. A dual
autopilot with an integrated flight director, and data bus interface capabilities is required. This autopilot shall
retain maximum commonality with the AN/AYW-1 installed on the C-130 and C-141 aircraft to reduce the overall
logistics supportability requirements. The dual autopilot systemAll Weather Flight Control System (AWFCS)
(autopilot (AP) and flight director (FD)) shall be capable of integrating with the new FMS (flight management
system) and external sensors.
The Autopilot function shall maintain stabilized automatic flight through control of the aircraft roll, pitch, and yaw
axes, with flying qualities consistent with the performance of C-130 aircraft before the AMP modification. The
autopilot shall be fail-operational. The dual autopilot/flight director configuration shall provides dual independent
flight directors so should one FD fail, the other FD is operational.
When engaged, the AWFCSautomatic flight control function shall provide the aAutopilot functions and
parameters defined in Table 3.2. The AWFCS shall be fail-operational.
The Autopilot functions shall maintain aircraft stabilized flight within the normal ranges defined by existing C-130
flight manuals. technical orders (TOs) 1C-130B-1, 1C-130H-1, 1C-130(H)H-1, 1C-130(A)U-1, 1C-130(A)H-1,
1C-130(L)H-1, 1C-130(M)H-1, 1C-130E(II)-1, 1C-130E(H)-1, and 1C-130(M)E-1. There shall be no undesirable
periodic oscillations. All transient engagement oscillations shall be removed. During any of the AWFCSutopilot
modes or submodes of operation, there shall be no hunting (about any axis) that is detectable by the flight crew;
nor shall there be any uncommanded sideslip.
The autopilot shall meet or exceed the performance characteristics of AC 120-29 for Category I approach. CAT
II, AC 120-29, capability with a growth capability to CAT III, AC 120-28C and AC 120-57A, is desired.for Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Category I approaches. The future capability of Category II approaches is desired.
The autopilot shall not be engaged in bank, pitch, or roll angles greater than the limits of the command authority.
The LNAV bank limit shall be ± 32° during Orbital Guidance Modes for the AC-130 aircraft.
Roll ±60°
Yaw ±20°
Heading Hold (HH) Autopilot Control Heading Hold Range Any Heading
Roll Attitude Hold (RH) Autopilot Control Bank Angle Limit ±60°
Heading (HDG) Select Autopilot Control Heading Select Range Any HDG defined by
Heading Set Marker (HSI
marker)
Note 10 and 11
TACAN Intercept Angle ±30°
TACAN ±15°
Heading Error
Overshoots: ±15°
±15 degrees
LOC/BCRS Track:
Up to +/- 45 degrees
Course Maintenance
Crosswind Correction
Lateral Navigation Autopilot Control Bank Angle Limit - 32 deg (Bank Left)
Stabilized on glideslope
before an altitude of 700 feet
above field level is reached.
From an altitude of 700' to
Track: the 200' (CAT I) or the 100'
(CAT II) decision height, the
Aautopilot shall cause the
longitudinal axis of the
25 knots
25 knots
15 knots
Wind limits
Headwind
Crosswind
Tailwind
Windshear
Stabilized on glideslope
before an altitude of 700 feet
above field level is reached.
Track: From an altitude of 700' to
the 200' (CAT I) or the 100'
(CAT II) decision height, the
aAutopilot shall cause the
longitudinal axis of the
aircraft to track the center of
the indicated glideslope to
within TBD degrees+/- 35
microamperes or 10',
whichever is greater, without
sustained oscillations.
25 knots
25 knots
15 knots
Wind limits
Headwind
Crosswind
Tailwind
Windshear
Pitch Sync (PSYNC) Autopilot Basic lateral mode PSYNC active then the pitch
(14) and roll servo clutches shall
disengage for the time the
PSYNC button is depressed.
PSYNC button released
servos shall re-engage at
the present attitude and
heading command.
Control Wheel Steering Autopilot Control Bank Angle Range Pitch and Roll angle
(CWS) Note 13 determined by applied pilot
Pilot and Copilot Pitch Angle Range or copilot control wheel force
Control Wheel in excess of 2.5 lbs. Note 12
1 The Autopilot shall be capable of restoring the aircraft to a command stabilized attitude about all axes within the stated ranges.
2 Following a pitch wheel commanded maneuver and once the pitch wheel is stationary, the pitch attitude represented by the new position of the pitch wheel shall be
maintained to within ±0.5°, within the limit of ±30° of pitch attitude.
3 At a distance no less than 15 miles from the localizer transmitter and within 4 miles of the center of beam.
4 Stabilization shall occur before the outer marker, and once stabilized the performance shall be free from sustained oscillation. Once the aircraft is stabilized on beam center, from the outer marker to an altitude of 300 feet above runway
elevation on the approach path, the aAutopilot shall cause the aircraft to track automatically to within ±35 microamps of the indicated localizer course on the HSI (horizontal situation indicator) or 0.58° from localizer beam center. FAA CAT I
approach requirements of AC 120-29 shall be satisfied. For CAT I The autopilot shall cause the aircraft to track automatically to within ±25 microamps of the indicated localizer course or 0.41° from localizer beam center. While tracking the
localizer beam, roll angles for correcting shall be limited to ±30°. The roll angle limits shall be reduced to ±7.5° within 1 minute after glideslope capture. FAA CAT II capability, AC 120-29 and growth capabilities to CAT III, AC-120-28C and
AC 120-57A, is desirable. The C-130 AMP architecture shall allow the pilot to disengage the autopilot function and complete the landing manually. From an altitude 300 feet above runway elevation on the approach path to the 200-foot (CAT
I) or the 100-foot (CAT II) decision height altitude, the Autopilot shall cause the aircraft to track automatically to within ±25 microamps of the indicated localizer course or 0.41° from localizer beam center. While tracking the localizer beam,
roll angles for correcting shall be limited to ±30°. The roll angle limits shall be reduced to ±7.5° within 1 minute after glideslope capture.
5 During Autopilot commanded turns up to an altitude of 50,000 feet, the reference altitude shall be held within ±50 ft or ±0.3%, whichever is greater, in turns involving up to 30° bank angles; and ±90 feet or ±0.4%, whichever is greater, between 30° to 45° bank angles. Loss of lift
occurring in roll attitudes shall be compensated for by the AWFCS while in ALT HLD mode.
6 Engagement of the altitude hold mode at rates of climb or dive of less than 2,000 feet per minute shall level and return the aircraft to the altitude existing at the time of engagement without exceeding 0.32g incremental normal acceleration.
7 The transient response at engagement shall be controlled to within ±5 KCAS under steady state conditions. For non-steady state conditions, the airspeed should stabilize within one and one-half cycles when the airspeed at the time of engagement is changing less than 2 KCAS per second. For every 1 KCAS per second in excess of 2 KCAS per second, an additional 3 KCAS overshoot shall be allowed. Any
periodic oscillation of velocity within these limits shall have a period of greater than or equal to 20 seconds.
8 Acceleration limits: The miscoordinated sideslip angle shall be not greater that an angle corresponding to 0.05 g lateral accelerations or 2 degrees, whichever is less, while at steady-state bank angles up to 38 degrees. When the aircraft rolls from 38 degrees to one side to 38 degrees to the other at up to 25 degrees per second in essentially level flight, the lateral acceleration shall be maintained within 0.1 g. Lateral acceleration refers to body-axis acceleration at the center of gravity.
9Overstation. The VOR/TACAN mode shall include automatic means for maintaining the aircraft within ± 1 degree of aircraft heading or
ground track existing at the inbound edge of the VOR ZOC. During overflight of the ZOC, adjustment of the present course heading or its
equivalent shall cause the roll AFCS (automatic flight control system) to maneuver the aircraft to capture the appropriate outbound radial
upon existing from the ZOC. The VOR/TACAN capture maneuvering limits may be reinstated during overstation operation in a no-wind
condition.
10VOR Capture and Tracking. Overshoot shall not exceed 5,800 ft (20 microamps) beyond the desired VOR radial beam center in a no-
wind condition for captures 50 nautical miles or more from the station with intercept angles up to 45 degrees. Following capture at 50
nautical miles or more, the aircraft shall remain within a root-mean-square (rms) average of 5,800 feet (20 microamps) from the VOR
radial beam center. Average tracking error shall be measured over a 5-minute period between 50 and 10 nautical miles from the station or
averaged over the nominal aircraft flight time between the same distance limits, whichever time is shorter.
11 TACAN Capture and Tracking. Overshoot shall not exceed 6,300 ft beyond the desired ground track line in a no-wind condition for
capture 120 miles or more from the station with intercept angles up to 30 degrees. The required 0.3-damping ratio shall be exhibited for
continuous tracking between 120 miles and 20 miles from station.
12 CWS shall be armed when CWS mode selected. CWS shall be active when CW forces exceeds 2.5 pounds. Roll axis CW force > 2.5
pounds shall develop proportional aircraft roll rates of 1 degree per second per pound of wheel force. Pitch axis CW forces > 2.5 pounds in
pitch shall develop proportional pitch rates of 0.5 degrees per second.
13 Altitude hold and CWS shall be compatible. Altitude hold shall have priority.
14 Not compatible with ALT HLD, GA, or SOP modes. PSYNC shall revert to basic pitch hold mode if any of these modes are activated.
15The RMS attitude deviation shall not exceed the respective degrees in the respective attitude in Table 3-2 and shall provide at least
Operational State 2 in turbulence at the RMS gust intensities corresponding to 10-2 probability of exceedance, per Table 3-2A.
Table 3-2A. RMS Gust Intensities for Selected Cumulative Exceedance Probabilities (ft/sec TAS)
PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDANCE
The AFWCS flight director function shall be available for use when required system inputs (e.g., heading,
navigation cross track error, VOR bearing) are operational and valid. A flight director function shall be
available to each pilot, independent of the other pilot with and without the autopilot function operating.
The flight director function shall independently provide attitude (pitch and roll axes) command steering and
deviation data to the pilot and copilot primary flight displays. The flight director function shall provide
separate and independent flight direction data in all flight director modes to the pilot and copilot’s displays
and with the AP engaged.
The flight director function shall be driven by navigation sources selected by the pilot and copilot’s controls.
The flight director function shall be operational with and without the Autopilot function operating. The flight
director function shall be fail-passive to each crewmember.
When engaged and flight director modes are selected, the AWFCS automatic flight control function shall
provide the flight director functions defined in Table 3.2.1.
Not to exceed ± 5°
Not to Exceed
-- Cruise 3° /sec2
-- Landing Config
Roll Acceleration
Not to Exceed
Crosswind Correction
Not to Exceed
(tail to nose)
Track: ± 27°
Not to exceed
Residual Oscillations
± 2,000 ft/min
Pitch Sync Flight Director Basic lateral mode PSYNC active shall cause the
pitch FD cue to synchronize to
(PSYNC) 8 zero error. The roll FD bar shall
continue to display lateral
commands. When PSYNC
button released the FD cue
shall operate as detailed
above.
NOTES:
1 The disengaged submode shall be available for use, if it is compatible with the other engaged modes.
3 If approach or lateral navigation modes are selected, capture of radio beam (VOR/ILS/LOC, TACAN, MLS) will cause the flight director function to transition from the pre-capture HSEL mode to the appropriate lateral track
mode.
4 The RMS attitude deviation shall not exceed the respective degrees in the respective attitude in Table 3-2 and shall provide at least Operational State 2 in turbulence at the RMS gust intensities corresponding to 10-2 probability of exceedance, per Table 3-2A.
5 Overshoot shall not exceed 0.5 degrees (37.5 microamps) radial error from localizer beam center for captures with initial intercept angles of 45 degrees at 8 miles from runway threshold and increasing linearly to 60 degrees at 18 miles from runway threshold in a no-wind condition. During localizer capture, the system shall
exhibit a damping ratio of at least 0.1 within the noted capture ranges, including the effects of system nonlinearities. The system shall be considered to be tracking whenever the following conditions are satisfied: localizer beam error is 1 degree (75 microamps) or less, localizer beam rate is 0.025 degrees/second (2 microamps,
1 second) or less, and roll attitude is 5 degrees or less. During beam tracking, the system shall exhibit a damping ratio of 0.2 or greater at a distance of 40,000 feet from the localizer transmitter.
6 The RMS attitude deviation shall not exceed the respective degrees in the respective attitude in Table 3-2 and shall provide at least Operational State 2 in turbulence at the RMS gust intensities corresponding to 10-2 probability of exceedance, per Table 3-2A.
7 Overshoot shall not exceed 0.5 degrees (37.5 microamps) radial error from localizer beam center for captures with initial intercept angles of 45 degrees at 8 miles from runway threshold and increasing linearly to 60 degrees at 18 miles from runway threshold in a no-wind condition. During localizer capture, the system shall exhibit a damping ratio of at least 0.1 within the noted capture ranges, including the effects of system nonlinearities. The system shall be
considered to be tracking whenever the following conditions are satisfied: localizer beam error is 1 degree (75 microamps) or less, localizer beam rate is 0.025 degrees/second (2 microamps, 1 second) or less, and roll attitude is 5 degrees or less. During beam tracking, the system shall exhibit a damping ratio of 0.2 or greater at a distance of 40,000 feet from the localizer transmitter.
68 VOR Capture and Tracking. Overshoot shall not exceed 5,800 ft (20 microamps) beyond the desired VOR radial beam center in a no-wind condition for captures 50 nautical miles or more from the station with intercept angles up to 45 degrees. Following capture at 50 nautical miles or more, the aircraft shall remain within a root-mean-square (rms) average of 5,800 feet (20 microamps) from the VOR radial beam center. Average tracking error shall be measured over a 5-minute period between 50 and 10 nautical miles from the station or averaged over the
nominal aircraft flight time between the same distance limits, whichever time is shorter.
79 TACAN Capture and Tracking. Overshoot shall not exceed 6,300 ft beyond the desired ground track line in a no-wind condition for capture 120 miles or more from the station with intercept angles up to 30 degrees. The required 0.3-damping ratio shall be exhibited for continuous tracking between 120 miles and 20 miles from station.
8 Not compatible with ALT HLD, GA, or SOP. PSYNC shall revert to basic pitch hold mode if any of these modes are activated.
10 Overstation. The VOR/TACAN mode shall include automatic means for maintaining the aircraft within ± 1 degree of aircraft heading or ground track existing at the inbound edge of the VOR ZOC. During overflight of the ZOC, adjustment of the present course heading or its equivalent shall cause the roll AFCS to maneuver the aircraft to capture the appropriate outbound radial upon existing from the ZOC. The VOR/TACAN capture maneuvering limits may be reinstated during overstation operation in a no-wind condition.
11 The Autopilot shall be capable of restoring the aircraft to a command stabilized attitude about all axes within the stated ranges.
12 Following a pitch wheel commanded maneuver and once the pitch wheel is stationary, the pitch attitude represented by the new position of the pitch wheel shall be maintained to within ±0.5°, within the limit of ±30° of pitch attitude.
13 At a distance no less than 15 miles from the localizer transmitter and within 4 miles of the center of beam.
14 Stabilization shall occur before the outer marker, and once stabilized the performance shall be free from sustained oscillation. Once the aircraft is stabilized on beam center, from the outer marker to an altitude of 300 feet above runway elevation on the approach path, the Autopilot shall cause the aircraft to track automatically to within ±35 microamps of the indicated localizer course on the HSI or 0.58° from localizer beam center. From an altitude 300 feet above runway elevation on the approach path to the 200-foot (CAT I) or the 100-foot (CAT II) decision height altitude, the Autopilot shall cause the aircraft to track automatically to within ±25 microamps of the indicated localizer course or 0.41° from localizer beam center. While tracking the localizer beam, roll angles for correcting shall be limited to ±30°. The roll angle limits shall be reduced to ±7.5° within 1 minute after glideslope capture.
15 During Autopilot commanded turns up to an altitude of 50,000 feet, the reference altitude shall be held within ±50 ft or ±0.3%, whichever is greater, in turns involving up to 30° bank angles; and ±90 feet or ±0.4%, whichever is greater, between 30° to 45° bank angles.
2. Autothrottle (Objective)
1. Autothrottle Performance Requirements
The addition of an autothrottle function is desired. TheAWFCS should include an autothrottle capability
that function shall performperforms the following functions: airspeed/a hold, throttle control in all phases of
flight including SKE (station keeping equipment) formation , airdrop operations, approach, during autoland,
and /go-around, and hold of a manually selected airspeed. coupled throttle control. All functions shall be
available in the range of idle to maximum forward thrust. When the aircraft is stabilized in a climb, cruise,
descent, or coordinated turn mode and the throttle is not operating at the minimum or maximum limits, the
autothrottle shall maintain the aircraft speed within ± 5 knots of the engaged airspeed under the following
conditions:
The autothrottle function shall control the throttle movement in response to speed and vertical flight path
commands. There shall be no undesirable periodic oscillations of the throttle commands. There shall be no
transient engagement oscillations. The autothrottle function shall provide fail-passive.
When engaged, the automatic flight control function shall provide the autothrottle functions defined in Table
3.2.2.1TBD.
Autothrottle shall disconnect when any engine exceeds torque and TIT (turbine inlet temperature) limits as
defined in T.O. 1C-130-1. The throttle force (with the autothrottle function not engaged) shall be 6.5
pounds nominal.
The autothrottle function shall be operational during stabilized climb, cruise, descent, and coordinated
turns. All modes shall be available from idle to maximum forward thrust. The AMP architecture shall allow
the pilot to physically overpower the autothrottle function with a nominal force of 16 lbs. per throttle.
Table 3.2.2.1. Autothrottle Function (Engaged) Performance Limits
Residual Oscillations
Take Off /Go Around Autothrottle Control TOGA Command Manual Control
(TOGA)3 Targets
Go Around Button 17 to 106 %, not to exceed
TIT Control Range
875° C TIT (T56-7)
Approach (Autoland)4 Autothrottle Control TIT Control Range 17 to 106 %, not to exceed
NOTES:
1 The disengaged submode shall be available for use, if it is compatible with the other engaged modes.
2 Adjustments allowed up to full authority with airspeed hold command control in increments of ± 1.0 KCAS or ± 0.005 Mach..
3 During go around the autothrottle function shall drive the throttles to the takeoff position within 4 seconds.
4 The autopilot function shall provide the autothrottle function with the command to retard the throttles during the flare maneuver.
6 Engagement of the autothrottle in steady-state conditions when the difference between aircraft speed and selected speed is within 5 knots, shall not cause more than 1.5 degrees of throttle action.
7 The airspeed error shall be held within 2% of clutched-in airspeed in a non-linear wind shear of up to 5 knots per 100 feet with aircraft sink rates up to 1,000 feet per minute.
8 In vertical or longitudinal gusts, the maximum airspeed error shall not exceed 3% of the clutched-in airspeed.
3. Go-Around Function
As a minimum, the go-around function shall perform all the functions in the present GAAS.
The go-around function is activated when commanded by either the pilot or copilot. The go-around function
is disengaged when commanded by either the pilot or copilot. The go-around function shall be fail-passive.
1. Go-Around Function Without Autothrottle
If Autothrottle is not implemented, the Go-Around function shall calculate and display 1.2 Vstall
values to the aircrew.
2. Go-Around Function With Autothrottle
If Autothrottle is implemented, the aircrew shall have the ability to select a fully automated go-around function
3. Cockpit Controls and Displays
This section defines the requirements for control and display functions. The intent of these requirements is to
minimize the workload in critical phases of flight and to provide critical information in a timely and effective
manner and to minimize the workload in critical phases of flight.
Control and presentation functions for normal operation of the communication/radio navigation equipment,
except for the intercom, shall be integrated in the control/display system.
The system shall provide for display information redundancy and graceful degradation in the event of display
failures. Display system information stored in database format shall be configured in a redundant architecture.
Display functions shall be selectively displayed depending on flight situation or display malfunctions. No loss of
any control or display function significant to completion of the mission shall result from any single point failure.
New or modified control and display components shall not interfere with the usage of NVIS (NVIS Type I and
Type II Class B). No loss of any control or display function significant to completion of the mission shall result
from any single point failure.
The display processing architecture shall provide dual redundant processing capability. Display system
information stored in database format shall be configured in a redundant architecture.
The display system shall have an overall availability of 106 hours between occasions where it is not available to
the crew. The probability of the aggregate display system presenting erroneous or out-of-date information shall
be less than 10-6 per flight hour. The probability of presenting any Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI)
shall be less than 10-9 per flight hour. Hazardously Misleading Information is defined as displayed misleading or
false information that leads to hazardous conditions.
New or modified control and display components shall not interfere with the usage of Type I, Class B NVIS
devices as defined in ASC/ENFC 96-01, Lighting, Aircraft, Interior, NVIS Compatible.
Multiple, iIntegrated, digital, color multifunction displays (MFDs) shall be installed on the main instrument
panel. The pilot and copilot shall each have an identical set of displays. Any format for any display shall be
selectable at any time by both the pilot and copilot. The MFDs which shall be capable of presenting
primary flight information, engine and aircraft system parameters, and information from navigation
systems, radar, Intraformation Positioning/Collision Avoidance System (IFPCAS), TCAS, TAWS,
windshear detection, defensive systems, and status reporting systems. The system shall be able to display
IFPCAS, TCAS, TAWS, radar information, and flight plan data from the navigation system FMS
concurrently. All MFDs should be interchangeable for lean logistics and mission flexibility considerations.
Display formats shall be independently selectable on any display. MFDs shall provide for cross-cockpit (or
cross console) viewing.
The display system shall be capable of displaying, at one time, all functional display presentations shown
in Table 3.3.1.
Each display shall be flexible enough to present data necessary to meet all specific C-130 mission
requirements.
The pilots’ radar presentation shall be stabilized relative to aircraft heading unless operating in slave
mode. In slave mode, the stabilization is that selected by the aircrew. The source for stabilizing and
orienting the presentation shall be selectable as Heading Up, Track Up, Drop Zone/Landing Zone Up, or
north up (true, grid, or magnetic according to navigation system mode). The radar presentation shall be in
range and azimuth with ground range in nautical miles (NM) from the nose of the aircraft and azimuth in
degrees relative to the selected stabilization source. The radar presentation shall also provide overlays of
current heading, altitude, compass rose, selected range and range mark separations, mode, system
health, and antenna tilt angle. The radar presentation shall have sufficient range and azimuth marks to
permit estimates of target position within 10 percent of the actual radar range and 5 degrees of the actual
bearing of the target. The refresh rate shall be such that the display(s) do not flicker under any operational
condition.
The MFD shall support the display of full rate, real-time video from multiple sources, including radar, digital
map, and FMS overlays. It is desired that this be accomplished with no loss of current resolution.
The MFDs on all AFSOC aircraft shall also support FLIR (for AFSOC and ACC), IDS (Infrared
Detection System), and TV video and symbology. It is desired that this be accomplished with no
loss of current resolution.
For all AFSOC aircraft, the system shall support the growth for integration and display of LPI
formation rendezvous and station keeping systems such as the Intra-Formation Positioning
System (IFPS). IFPS requirements are described in AFSOC ORD 046-91-IA, Intra-Formation
Positioning System.
The system shall include integration of airdrop solutions for presentation as well as for radar update.
The system shall integrate the head-up display with the MFDs and the FMS. It is desired to have this
capability without a separate dedicated head-up display processor
In addition, compatibility of MFDs with aircrew laser eye protection devices, as outlined in CAF (TAF
505-87)-I-A ORD for Aircrew Laser Eye Protection, should be considered in selection of MFDs.
The capability to direct mission critical information to an alternate display within the pilot’s field-of-view in
case of a display failure shall always be available to the aircrew.
The MFD video system architecture shall ensure that either pilot can view all mission critical information
after any single MFD failure. MFDs shall provide for cross cockpit (or cross console) viewing.
2. Head-Up Displays (HUD)
Two head-up displays (HUDs) shall be installed; one located in front of the pilot and one located in front of
the copilot. The HUD shall be endorseablecertified as a Primary Flight Display and shall allow primary
flight information to be viewed by the pilots in a head-up, eyes-out format. The HUD shall be viewable in
both full sunlight, at night, and when the pilots are flying with NVGs (night vision goggles).
The HUD imagery shall be conformal to the external world world and provide both pilots with all primary
flight information (i.e., heading, airspeed, flight path, vertical velocity, altitude, and attitude) required to
control the aircraft. In order tTo prevent obstruction of data, no information shall be displayed over aircraft
structures such as windshield wipers and windscreen posts.
Both pilots shall have the ability to display additional information on the HUDs, in a pilot-selectable, flight-
mode-specific format, such as formation positioning, aerial delivery information, threat alerts, wind and
drift, TCAS information, and master caution/warning. Final display content, hierarchy, and priorities shall
be determined by a cockpit working group.
The HUDs shall be aligned with the aircraft flight path (aircraft boresight corrected for drift) to optimize the
ability to execute precision landing and airdrop. All approach and navigation aids shall be selectable for
display with the associated course guidance. The HUD shall display primary flight information in all modes.
To reduce clutter, the system shall allow both pilots to deselect all "non-primary flight information" from the
HUD, when desired.
Each HUD subsystem shall be connected to both pilot and copilot displays. Each HUD system shall have
the capability to allow each pilot to view the same display data and configuration as presented to the other
pilot for cross-cockpit awareness. Each HUD shall project infinity-focused images of symbols into the
pilot’s/copilot’s eye box in order to provide primary flight display (PFD) data while the pilot/copilot is looking
outside the aircraft. The eyebox design shall be large enough to allow the largest and smallest pilots to
view all of the HUD symbology. The eyebox design shall also be large enough to allow for normal head
and body movement without degradation of pilot’s ability to view all HUD data without requiring changes to
existing seat and rudder configuration. The HUD shall accommodate the use of night vision goggles, and
be located such that when NVGs are stowed on the helmet there is no occlusion of HUD symbology. , and
shall accommodate the use of night vision goggles. HUD spectral content shall be compliant with NVIS
Type I Class B Leaky Green, as defined in ASC/ENFC-96-01.
HUD symbology shall be standard Air Force symbology derived from MIL-STD-1787.
Side HUD on AC-130H/U aircraft shall be retained and integrated into the overall HUD architecture.
3. Flight Deck
The following paragraphs define the requirements for locating the AMP controls and displays for pilot,
copilot, Auxiliary Crew Member (ACM), Special Mission Crewmember (SMC), and flight engineer. The
AMP cockpit arrangement shall be designed using JSSG-2010 as a guide.
.The installed AMP controls and displays shall be located and sized to be operable by the central 90% of
the aircrew population as described below in Table 3.3.3, Multivariate Pilot Models. All other controls shall
be accessible and operable by the same population with the restraint harness unlocked, but without
adjusting the seat position or loosening the lap belt.
INCHES Short Sitting Short Legs Big All Short Sit / Big Sit /
Height Long legs Short Legs
The cockpit avionics architecture on all combat delivery aircraft shall be optimized to ensure the
aircraft can effectively execute the combat delivery mission throughout the world with a basic cockpit
crew of no greater than two pilots and one flight engineer from their respective crew positions.
Navigators shall not be required on missions flown by combat delivery aircraft.
The cockpit layout shall meet the requirements of the Air Force cockpit endorsement process
outlined in AFI 11-202 Vol. 3.
The arrangement of all elements, including controls and displays, within the cockpit shall
accommodate the pilot population described in Table 3.3.3 for reach and visual access. Primary
flight, navigation, engine, and Cautions, Warnings, and Advisorys data shall be displayed in the
primary field of view, visible from within the design eye box of each pilot location. Frequently used
controls shall be installed on the glare shield, forward on the pedestal or on the side panel. Status or
mode annunciation’s may be outside the primary field of view, but shall be as near as possible to the
primary field of view.
3. ACM Location
The navigator station on existing combat delivery aircraft will be referred to as an auxiliary
crewmember (ACM) station. The ACM station will be unpopulated on combat delivery aircraft. The
ACM station shall be equipped with wiring and (group A) hardware that will permit optional
installation and use of, as a minimum, a multi-function display, a control display unit, a radar/moving
map cursor control, a full size keyboard, and necessary interfaces to allow an ACM to employ the
ACM station if required. Standard crew station equipment/capability, such as, lighting, oxygen,
heating/cooling outlets, interphone, radio, etc. shall be retained.
The station shall have the capability to be repopulated to full comm/nav control capability within eight
hours by O-level personnel. The repopulation process shall provide for a method to incorporate the
additional equipment into the display subsystem functional architecture.
When populated, the controls and displays for communications management and navigation
management at the ACM station shall be in the primary field-of-view of the operator. When
populated, the ACM station shall have sufficient functionality to allow the operator to complete all
normal navigator duties associated with low level and airdrop operations.
1. Special Mission Crewmember Stations
A fully functional dual crew position console shall be integrated on the cockpit of all
AC-130H, HC-130N/P, and MC-130E/H/P aircraft. This position will be referred to as a special
mission crewmember (SMC) station.
To the maximum extent possible, components of the SMC stations will be identical to the
baseline ACM station.
This dual console will accommodate one navigator and one fire control officer (AC-130H), one
navigator and one radio operator (HC-130N/P, MC-130P), or one navigator and one electronic
warfare officer (MC-130E/H). The functionality of each current ACC/AFSOC crew position shall
be maintained. An objective is that the cargo compartment crew console be deleted, and the
full cargo compartment capacity restored on MC-130E aircraft, while maintaining the EWO
(electronic warfare officer) and radio operator functionality intact.
4. Removal of Flight Engineer (Objective)
An objective is to have the capability to perform all flight engineer functions from the pilot and co-pilot
locations, without the need to occupy the flight engineer location. If the flight engineer is removed, the
layout of the cockpit avionics and crew workload shall be optimized to ensure aircrews can effectively
execute all missions throughout the world from their respective crew positions.
When the flight engineer location is occupied, all engine displays shall be in the primary field of view, and
controls within the reach envelope, of the flight engineer.
4. System Lighting
1. NVIS Compatibility
1. General Requirements
Lighting shall be compatible with the use of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). All lighting on the
flight deck and cargo compartment shall be NVIS compatible in accordance with the
requirements specified herein including stated exceptions.
The new lighting shall be equal to or better than the existing lighting systems for daylight and
naked eye night operations. The modification shall permit normal use and readability of all
aircraft controls, instruments and displays during all operating conditions with and without
NVIS.
All new light producing equipment installed by this document and existing equipment which
radiates light shall meet the requirements of ASFC/ENFC 96-01 Type 1 Class B With the
exceptions stated below:
No additional lighting controls shall be used. Existing lighting controls shall be utilized to the
maximum extent possible. The cockpit thunderstorm lights shall not be modified.
All new or existing red warning lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible red in accordance
with the chromaticity and NVIS radiance requirements specified in ASC/ENFC 96-01.
The cargo compartment floodlights may be replaced with NVIS compatible green lights or an
additional system may be added. Cargo compartment floor lighting shall not be modified. The
Cargo compartment shall be equipped with NVIS-compatible red no drop (jump lights). The
jump caution NVIS compatible red light shall have an NVIS radiance of less than 1.4x10-7 at a
luminance of 15.0 foot lamberts (fl).
The modifications shall be designed such that there is minimum impact on aircrew procedures
and training. New or modified lighting, control and display components required for the
integrated avionics display suite shall not cause any interference with the usage of Type I Class
B NVIS devices. New lighting controls required shall not induce delays in cognitive recognition
of aircraft performance or flight instruments or induce crew misorientation and/or disorientation
of aircraft flight attitude or parameters.
2. Specific Requirements
The luminance and contrast of the NVIS compatible lighting shall be sufficient to support crew
operations throughout the flight environment. Existing lighting controls shall remain functional. All
lighting modifications shall be permanently installed (but removable for maintenance) and not
requiring modification by the flight crew to achieve NVIS compatibility. There shall be no degradation
to visual acuity through the aircraft windscreen with the unaided eye or the NVIS due to reflections
on the windscreen from any lighting or lighting reflections emanating from within the cockpit with the
NVIS compatible lighting at normal operational luminance.
All mechanical or structural parts, assemblies, and installations shall be capable of withstanding the
following loads without permanent deformation:
Flood lights and map lights at the ACM’s station shall be equipped with filters which meet the
following specifications:
NVIS friendly position lights shall replace the existing position lights. The NVIS friendly position lights
shall meet FAR 25.1385 through FAR 25.1397 and shall not noticeably degrade the NVIS during
formation flying. Formation flying intervals is 2000 ft. minimum.
2. Cockpit Lighting
All lighting in the cockpit shall be permanently modified to NVIS Class B compatibility with the
exception of ANDVT panel lights, KY-58 panel lights. Modified ANDVT and KY-58 controls will be
GFE and they shall be included in the kit, drawings, and TOs.
Cross-cockpit viewing (pilot to copilot’s and copilot to pilot’s instruments) of primary flight instruments
shall not be degraded. The Pilot’s and Copilot’s Instrument Panels shall be designed for a luminance
uniformity not to exceed 2:1 between instruments.
All edge lit (integrally illuminated) plastic information/control panels MIL-P-7788 Type III which use
the MS 25010 light assemblies shall be replaced with the MIL-P-7788 Type IV or Type V NVIS
compatible panels.
All caution, warning, and advisory lights (including pod status lights) shall be readable in an ambient
light level of 10,000 foot-candles incident on the display from any direction (non-specular).
All existing amber, green and white annunciation lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green B
except as otherwise specified herein. All other lighting (flood lights, instrument lights and edge lit
panel lights etc.) shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green A. All red annunciators, caution,
warning, and advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible red. All amber annunciators,
caution, warning, and advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible yellow B. All green
annunciators, caution, and advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible green B.
3. Cargo Compartment Lighting
All lighting (to include caution, warning, advisory and panel lights) in the cargo compartment shall be
permanently modified to NVIS compatibility with exception of the existing floor floodlights, loading
floodlights and the overhead white floodlights. Cargo NVIS compatible floodlights shall be installed and
they shall provide both bright and dim levels. The existing red flood lights may be modified for NVIS
compatibility or a new NVIS compatible flood light system may be added. The dim level shall be low
enough to provide paratrooper night vision acclimation - 0.1 fl.
The cargo jump lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green B. The cargo jump caution lights shall
be modified to NVIS compatible Red. The jump and jump caution lights shall be readable in an ambient
light level of 10,000 foot-candles (non-specular) incident on the display from all directions when viewed
plus and minus forty five degrees to either side of a line normal with the surface of the display. The jump
caution NVIS Red light shall have an NVIS radiance of less than 1.4x10-7 at a luminance of 15.0-foot
lamberts (fl).
5. Information Presentation
1. Primary Flight FunctionInformation
The Primary Flight Function (PFF), both the HUD and Head down displays shall conform to the
requirements of MIL-STD-1787.
The Flight InformationPFF, one for the pilot and one for the copilot, shall be presented within a
contiguous, single presentation area as the primary means of flight information display. implemented
using a Primary Flight Format (PFF). The PFF shall be presented within a contiguous, single
presentation area as the primary means of flight information display.
The PFF shall provide, as a minimum, a display of an Attitude Director Indicator (ADI), a Horizontal
Situation Indicator (HSI), an Airspeed/Mach Indicator(AMI), an Altitude Indicator(AI), a Vertical
Velocity Indicator(VVI), and an Angle of Attack Indicator. The head down PFF display area shall be
large enough to present simultaneous ADI (Attitude Direction Indicator) and HSI information in a full
(not truncated) format sufficient to ensure ease and accuracy of readability from the normal crew
positions. The capability shall be provided to present an expanded HSI display. As data is updated,
displayed symbols and graphics shall move or scroll smoothly. Each indication shall display the
behavior of the associated control or sensor, using the parameter as the visual presentation of
information, within the stated limits. For example the
Each display page shall be consistent with each other, but the flight crew shall also be able to readily
discriminate between them. The PFF shall include cautions, warnings, and other information that
affects the ability to safely fly the aircraft.
2. Standby Instruments
A standby instrument suite (SIS) or equivalent single instrument, shall be installed on the main
instrument panel in a location that can be easily viewed by either the pilot or co-pilot. The suite shall
be independent of the MFD/HUD display system such that a failure of that system shall not interfere
with the operation of the SIS instruments. The suite shall indicate, at a minimum, barometric altitude,
airspeed, attitude, vertical velocity, and a magnetic compass heading independent of other
navigation sources. All standby instruments which require electrical power shall be powered from the
last fallback electrical source.
3. Navigation Information Function
Navigation information, used as the primary means of navigation and situational awareness, shall be
presented within a contiguous, single display area. Each display of the selected navigation solution in
the cockpit shall unmistakably and conspicuously identify which navigation solution drives the aircraft
flight controls and steers the airplane. Notification shall be provided that both the pilot and co-pilot
are using the same source of information. All the displays shall be synchronized to UTC time. The
navigation information function (one display for the pilot and one for the co-pilot) shall be
implemented using the following formats:
1. Digital Moving Map
A digital moving map system shall be installed to allow both pilots and the ACM, if present, or
the SMC on special mission aircraft, to display digitally-stored map image data in a moving
format on MFDs as selected by the individual crewmember.. The system shall provide smooth,
automatic, real-time updates of map data as the aircraft moves. This map shall present the
aircraft situation relative to flight plan, targets, threats, and other air traffic. Crewmember
selectable overlays of navigation flight plan waypoints and other symbols, such as threat
symbols, own aircraft, etc., shall be integrated with the basic map for composite display. The
system shall also have the capability to display threat rings/range data blended with terrain
elevation data to visually depict threat intervisibility. The system shall have a minimum of two
independent, fully functional video channels to show current location, as well as have a look-
ahead capability. The system shall have the capability to be easily updated with current
"CHUM" data to allow its use as a primary means of navigation. The moving map system shall
display, as a minimum, aeronautical charts to the level of detail found in the following scale
charts: 1:12,500; 1:25,000; 1:62,500; 1:100,000; 1:125,000; 1:250,000; 1:500,000; 1:1,000,000;
and 1:2,000,000.
The moving map shall be capable of changing operating modes (i.e. from one map product or
scale to another) within one second of operator input 90% of the time, threshold, with an
objective of 0.5 seconds. The digital map subsystem shall have memory capacity to store map
data for a geographic area of 1,000,000 square miles using JOG (joint operational graph), TPC
(tactical pilotage chart), ONC (operational navigation chart), and GNC (global navigation chart)
scaled charts without any in-flight loading. Chart coverage of the entire world using TPC, ONC,
JNC (jet navigation chart), and GNC scaled charts without in-flight loading is desired. It is
desirable to have the digital map presentations be similar to the paper form of the map. It is
desired that the AMP moving map system be able to overlay radar data.
All NIMA (National Imagery and Mapping Agency) data required by the system shall be utilized
without prior transformation into system specific formats. As a minimum, the digital map system
shall display all NIMA products, at all available scales, to include Compressed Arc Digitized
Raster Graphics (CADRG), Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED), Controlled Image Base
(CIB), and Vector Graphics, as well as operator-created Data Frame graphics.
1. It is desirable to have the digital map presentations be similar to the paper form of
the map. The digital moving map system shall provide smooth, automatic, real-time
updates of map data as the aircraft moves. The moving map presentation shall be
capable of changing operating modes (i.e. from one map product or scale to
another) within one second of operator input 90% of the time, with an objective of
0.5 seconds. The system shall have the capability to be easily updated with current
"CHUM" data to allow its use as a primary means of navigation. The system should
have a built-in, reprogrammable upgrade capacity to allow for future growth.
2. Moving Map Presentations Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) Mappin
The digital moving map system shall include as a baseline all Combat Delivery map
capabilities. Operating modes shall include aeronautical chart, digital terrain data
and data frame mode. Map orientations shall include heading up, track up and
north up. The area to be displayed in nautical miles shall be equivalent to the map
zoom factors. The system shall display elevation color banding that shall be
dynamic based upon the active mission altitude or the altitude set by the aircrew.
When selected, the system shall present elevation contour lines selectable down to
30 meters. The map presentations shall include pre-mission data loaded from
existing and upgraded mission planning and intelligence systems. The system
shall monitor and present the status of system caution and advisory discretes and
present the status within one second, 99% of the time and within 10 seconds, 100%
of the time whenever there is an out of tolerance condition. A prioritized
hierarcchial system shall be utilized to ensure problems of more immediate
concern shall not be hidden by lesser advisories. The time from system input data
available to display of the data shall not exceed one second, 99% of the time.
1. Map Modes
The aeronautical chart mode shall provide selectable plan and perspective
aeronautical chart views with selectable symbology overlays. The overlays
shall include preplanned EOB (electronic order of battle), pop-up threats,
translucent threat intervisibility, enemy C3 nets, hostile air tracks, elevation
color banding, waypoints, threat area, no-fly zones, flight plan links, targets,
landing/drop zones and aircraft present position. The Digital Terrain Data
mode shall provide a plan view with symbology overlays from the Digital
Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) and Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD) in the
database produced by DMA. The overlays shall include aircraft present
position. The map presentation shall shade the digital terrain data map when
selected. The sun angle shading of the terrain and cultural features shall be
from a fixed sun angle, elevation and azimuth. The map presentation shall be
capable of presenting the aircraft position indicator on the digital terrain data
and aeronautical charts in a centered or decentered mode. The Data Frame
mode shall provide a digitized data frame picture with symbology overlays.
The system shall store up to 10 data frames and 100 pictures. The system
shall provide operator-selectable overlays to include threat intervisibility,
plots of aircraft navigation and mission data., ground/maritime threats, threat
detection/engagement ranges, current ownship threat-detectable emanation
radius, tracks of airborne threats, consolidated EW (electronic warfare)
system status and fault warning, survivor location and targets/objectives
data. Threat and mission overlay information, including aircraft route data,
aircraft position, hostile threat locations and intent, friendly and hostile air
tracks, targets, and friendly ground force/survivor location data shall be
available as operator-selectable, geo-referenced overlays on any of the
presentation backgrounds. Any movement of the aircraft symbol when
changing operating modes shall be imperceptible to the operator.
The system shall calculate threat intervisibility for all or selected EOB and OB
updates when directed. Threat acquisition and detection zones shall be color-
coded based on lethality and ECM effectiveness. Threat systems that cannot be
identified by the sensor package shall be displayed with an unambiguous and
contrasting vignette to the aircrew. The intervisibility calculations shall be
selectable between a dynamic state for the changing altitude of the aircraft or
based on set clearance planes. To avoid a constantly changing display during
dynamic intervisibility calculations, a threshold delta shall be used to
accommodate minor and transient altitude changes. The results of the
intervisibility calculations shall be displayed allowing the crews to read through
the threat plot and see the map data. Threat intervisibility calculations shall be
from individual threat locations, not site-centered locations. Detection ranges and
intervisibility shall be calculated from the threat acquisition/tracking device.
Lethality ranges and intervisibility shall be calculated from the threat weapon
location. The system shall notify the aircrew when a threat has been identified
within 0.5 seconds and present the pop-up threat and intervisibility within 2
seconds, 99% of the time, with a desired goal of 1 second. The system shall be
capable of resolving EOB display information to the individual radar location as
display range is reduced. Individual radars and threats with intervisibility, or only
edges of combined intervisibility, shall be crewmember selectable options at all
ranges in addition to the requirement for display as range is reduced. When 2 or
more overlays or symbols overlap, the system shall present the top priority
overlays or symbol. The priority of the overlay and symbology shall be determined
by the CSWG (crew station working group).
The SMM shall provide a central, non-volatile repository of data for the aircraft systems and sufficient data storage capacity
and access speed (read and write) to fully support all of the functions of the TAWS, FMS, Moving Map and all other
applicable components of the AMP, including the AFSOC EW Bus and ESA systems. The SMM, including data input and
output paths, shall have adequate capacity to ensure overall system performance is maintained and growth provisions are
provided for. The SMM shall provide sufficient redundancy and protection from single point failure to ensure reliable
operation. The system shall provide an efficient, automated means for loading and updating information stored in the SMM.
The SMM shall, as a minimum, include concurrent storage provisions, without in-flight reloading, for:
◦ Worldwide DTED Level 1 data, with a desired objective of worldwide DTED Level 2.
◦ NIMA electronic terrain data for the entire departure and the entire destination continent at a resolution of
1:250,000 (TBR) or better, plus a two hundred square mile area at 1:25,000 with an objective to store all
electronic terrain data in all resolutions available from NIMA at the time of fielding the system
◦ All A/W/E data used by the Planning And Rehearsal System plus a minimum of 100 more TBD aircraft
parameters
◦ A minimum of one hundred (TBR) 24-bit depth color pictures, 1024 by 1024 (TBR) pixels in size with an
The system shall have the capability to interface with the ABI system, per "Draft" AMC ORD
315-92, Airborne Broadcast Intelligence (ABI), AKA, Real Time Information In The Cockpit
(RTIC).
The map system shall present the EOB data and updates as symbols. The EOB and
updates shall be presented at the actual threat latitude/longitude or UTM coordinates.
The EOB symbols shall be common throughout the C-130 fleet. AFSOC AC/MC-130
moving map systems shall be able to overlay radar, infrared, and TV real-time video.
The system shall provide display resolution to the individual radar location as display
range is reduced. The system shall provide a crew selectable option to display
individual radars and threats with intervisibility, or only edges of combined visibility. The
system shall provide color coding of acquisition and threat detection zones based on
lethality and ECM effectiveness, consistent with CWG guidance. The moving map
system shall receive, store, and present pop-up threat data from the various onboard
sensor systems as well as from off-board broadcasts.
Threats detected by the on-board EW sensors and from off-board sources shall be
presented on the MFDs with threat detection and engagement intervisibility as required
by crew position. Detailed threat data shall be made available in a window-type display
by selecting the item or area on the MFD. The system reception time from subsystem
output to display of the data shall not exceed one second 99% of the time.
The map system shall calculate threat intervisibility for all or selected EOB and OB
updates when directed. These calculations shall be based on the individual threat
location (not site-centered data), DTED, threat radius (maximum effective range, radar
range limit, Plan Position Indicator (PPI) limit, etc), and aircraft altitude supplied by the
mission computer. Threat systems which cannot be identified by the aircraft sensor
package shall be displayed with an unambiguous and contrasting vignette to the
aircrew. The intervisibility calculations shall be selectable between either a dynamic
state for the changing altitude of the aircraft, or based on set clearance planes. To avoid
a constantly changing display during dynamic intervisibility calculations, a threshold
delta of 25 feet shall be used to accommodate minor and transient altitude changes. The
results of the intervisibility calculations shall be displayed, allowing the crew to read
through the threat plot and see the map data. Required operator-selectable overlays are
threat intervisibility plots of ground threats, current on-board threat detectable
emanation radius and tracks of airborne threats, and consolidated EW warning.
2. TAWS Imagery
TAWS terrain data imagery shall be displayed per the format of ARINC 708. The terrain shall
be displayed relative to the aircraft and shall provide visual indication of terrain that presents a
threat distinct from terrain that is not a threat. A perspective view of the terrain information shall
be provided.
The display shall also provide positive indication for geographic areas not in the terrain
database (e.g., floor alert). The terrain display shall be available at all times. A means to "pop
up" the terrain display during warning conditions shall be provided. The terrain display shall be
selectable during warning conditions.
3. Radar Imagery
The capability shall be provided to display radar imagery on any MFD(s) as selected by the
individual crewmember. Imagery shall be displayed in color where color significantly enhances
presentation. The system shall be capable of simultaneously displaying two radar modes on
different displays (e.g., ground map and beacon). Radar imagery shall be selectable as an
overlay on the other imagery sources.
The pilots’ radar presentation shall be stabilized relative to aircraft heading unless operating in
slave mode. In slave mode, the stabilization is that selected by the aircrew. The source for
stabilizing and orienting the presentation shall be selectable as Heading Up, Track Up, Drop
Zone/Landing Zone Up, or north up (true, grid, or magnetic according to navigation system
mode). The radar presentation shall be in range and azimuth with ground range in nautical
miles (NM) from the nose of the aircraft and azimuth in degrees relative to the selected
stabilization source. The radar presentation shall also provide overlays of current heading,
altitude, compass rose, selected range and range mark separations, mode, system health, and
antenna tilt angle.
4. Flight Plan Display
The Flight plan display shall be available on all MFDs and shall provide a composite of the existing SOF flight plan
display capabilities for all SOF aircraft.
The engine and aircraft systems information function (EASIF) shall be displayed to the pilot, copilot,
and flight engineer using the MFDs.
The EASIF shall display contain engine performance menus that contain engine RPM, turbine inlet
temperature (TIT), torque, fuel flow rate, Beta lights, oil temperature, oil pressure, oil cooler flap, and
oil quantity. The caution advisory panel shall include, as a minimum, low engine oil and low propeller
oil warnings. Each EASIF shall be displayed within a contiguous, single display area as the primary
means of engine performance monitoring.
A digital fuel quantity indicator, that is at least as reliable as the system currently installed on FY95
and FY96 C-130H3 aircraft, is required on all C-130s.
2. Cautions, Warnings, and Advisory Function
An integrated Cautions, Warnings, and Advisory (CWA) function is required. When two or more
Warning or Advisory situations occur simultaneously (TCAS, TAWS, Engine, etc.), the presentation
of audio warnings and corresponding CWA information displays shall be prioritized such that higher
priority is given to the situation which requires a more immediate response to ensure the safety of the
aircraft. Existing CWAs may remain where they are if they are tied to the Master Caution and
Warning which will call the crew's attention to them. The CWA function shall be presented within a
contiguous, single presentation area, which may be shared with the navigation information function
or the engine information function. Cautions and Warnings shall be annunciated by both a Master
Caution and a Master Warning alert in the primary field of view, distinct aural tones, and an indication
or message. The CWA function shall require redundant operational capability and be fail-operational.
3. . TCAS Presentations
CDTI (Cockpit Display of Traffic Information) shall be provided for presentation on all multi-function displays as selected by
crewmembers occupying those stations. When displayed as an overlay the TCAS information shall be automatically scaled
to the selected range scale.
1. Control and Data Entry
The flight crew shall be provided those controls necessary to perform all mission tasks. Controls shall
include, but not be limited to; flight parameters, display format selection, communication, navigation, radar,
and defensive systems. The control function shall provide redundant operational capability and be fail-
operational.
1. Brightness Control
The brightness control function shall control the edge-lighted panels, the individual display elements,
and the lighting for the pilot and copilot stations, as well as SMC, ACM, and flight engineer stations,
as applicable. The brightness control shall be fail-passive.
The DTD is an electronic vehicle for entry, storage, and download of mission and maintenance data
to/from the host platform. Flight plans, mission parameters’ values, and communication plans, which
are preplanned on the ground prior to a mission, are loaded into the DTD.
The DTD shall be used to transfer stored, primary mission and maintenance data to/from the
platform, and to/from maintenance information systems, mission planning systems and intelligence
systems. The DTD shall be compatible with aircraft A/W/E and current and planned mission and
flight planning stations. The DTD shall receive Electronic Order of Battle (EOB), Communications
Order of Battle (COB) and other OB data and updates. The DTD shall record the OB data and
updates as well as read and upload the intelligence broadcast receiver EOB.
The DTD shall store maintenance data and retrieve and store EOB data for intelligence de-briefings.
The time required to upload or download to the DTD, by MDS, shall not exceed current capability
with an objective to reduce the time required by a factor of 10 (TBR).
The DTD shall be zeroized when the DTD is installed in the platform and a system zeroize action is
performed. The DTD shall also be capable of being zeroized via a single aircrew action when not
installed in the system.
1. DTD Mission Support
Terminal procedures
Airdrop data such as CARP (computed air release point), HARP (high altitude release point)
communication frequencies
All overhead and offset markpoints created in the system shall be stored and subsequently
transferred to the mission DTD for post-mission purposes.
2. DTD Maintenance Support
Each MFD shall be identical in performance capability, and shall be able to display the functions described
in paragraph 3.3.5. Each MFD shall be capable of presenting either monochromatic or 256-color imagery,
at a minimum, with a goal of supporting 24-bit color. The display system shall simultaneously support
monochrome and color display generation. Monochrome imagery shall be displayed as 16 shades of gray,
as a minimum.
Latency of displayed data shall be minimized to the extent that the crew does not perceive a delay
between control inputs and systems response.
New or modified C-130 displays shall meet the performance characteristics of Table 3.3.67.
Parameter Requirement
Data Freeze Display of stale or otherwise erroneous data shall meet the
requirements for prevention of HMI above.
1. Display Legibility
Cockpit displays shall be fully legible in all lighting environments from full sunshine to darkness. The
follow 3 specific situations may be sued to simulate the full range ambient lighting. (1) 8,000 foot-
candles (fc) of sunlight directly incident on the display with 500 fL (foot-lamberts) of luminance
incident at the specular angle, (2) 2,000 fc of illumination incident on the display with 2,000 fL of
luminance incident at the specular angle, (3) darkness, i.e., less than 0.1 fc. The relationship
between these light sources and the display should follow the guidance in MIL-HDBK-87213.
2. Display Unit Viewing Angle
The Display Unit shall be legible (readable) anywhere from within a solid viewing angle bounded by
an ellipse having its major axis oriented horizontally and extended from 60 degrees to the left to 60
degrees to the right of the display central viewing axis and with its minor axis located in a vertical
plane and extending from 20 degrees below to 20 degrees above the central viewing axis. As a
design goal the Display Unit horizontal viewing angle shall be from 65 degrees to the left to 65
degrees to the right of the central view axis. The central viewing axis of the Display Unit is defined as
a line from the center of the display to the design eyepoint for a display installed in the instrument
panel directly in front of the pilot.
The displays shall not exhibit any apparent color shift in imagery or symbology when viewed with the
display unit viewing angle described above. Compliance with this legibility requirement shall be
established by demonstrating compliance with all of the Display Unit contrast, luminance, and color
fidelity requirements of this specification, for both day and night ambient illuminations viewing
conditions.
3. Display Contrast
The Display shall produce a minimum contrast of 4.0 (i.e., a contrast ratio of 5:1) for graphics and
alphanumerics imagery in the specified combined diffuse/specular display environments (see
legibility requirements).)
This contrast shall be met from any angle within a symmetrically centered solid elliptical viewing
angle having major and minor axis which are 75% of those of the overall solid elliptical viewing angle
(i.e., major axis = ± 45 degrees, minor axis =± 15 degrees.) A minimum contrast of 3.0 shall be met
or exceeded in the balance of the overall display viewing area. The Display shall be capable of
producing imagery at a contrast of at least 50 in a dark ambient on the central viewing axis.
4. Display Unit Luminance
The area averaged maximum luminance of the Display Unit shall be capable of being controlled by
the crew so as to produce a minimum difference luminance (see MIL-HDBK-87213) of 160 fL or
greater, irrespective of the ambient illuminance level.
When the area-averaged difference luminance of the Display Unit white and maximum NVIS
radiance color imagery is set to 0.5 fL, the spectral radiance emissions of the displays when
measured in accordance with ASC/ENFC 96-01 shall not exceed the NVIS Radiance permitted for
Type I, Class B multicolor electronic displays. The maximum difference luminance of the red and
blue primary colors shall be sufficient to produce the specific display color palette "white"
chromaticity, at an area-averaged minimum difference luminance of 160 fL or greater, irrespective of
the ambient lighting conditions.
5. Display Unit Luminance Non-uniformity
The luminance of any symbol, segment of a symbol, vector or area, when compared to other
symbols or areas of like kind and chromaticity, shall not vary by more than ± 30% of the average
across the usable area of the display. The luminance of any symbol, segment of a symbol, vector or
area, when compared to other symbols or areas of like kind and chromaticity, shall not vary by more
than ± 10% of the average across any 1 cm diameter area of the display. Background display areas
whether "off" during positive contrast image portrayals or "on" during negative contrast image
portrayals shall appear uniform with no noticeable blotches or mottling.
Luminance uniformity shall be maintained throughout the entire range of luminance control.
Luminance non-uniformity shall be defined as ((maximum or minimum luminance – average
luminance) divided by the average luminance) times 100 to get percent. Average luminance shall be
defined as (maximum luminance +– minimum luminance) divided by 2.
6. Stray Light
Displays shall achieve a Stray Light Luminance Ratio (SLLR) of TBD for white symbols and TBD for black
background areas. SLLR of white is defined as the luminance of a white area measured from the design
eye to the luminance of the same area measured from anywhere outside a xx degree cone about the
central viewing axis. SLLR of black is defined as the luminance of TBD.
3. Video Distribution System (VDS)
The VDS shall route all video signals from any video source to any destination on board the aircraft. The
routing shall be controlled by system software. This routing function shall be non-blocking such that the
routing of a given source to a destination shall not preclude routing that same source to any or all other
destinations. If any such blocking is deemed appropriate, it shall be controlled by system software. The
VDS video signal format shall be in accordance with an open video standard (e.g., EIA or SMPTE). The
selected signal format shall support both color and monochrome images. The VDS shall route color and
monochrome video signals simultaneously.
The VDS shall accommodate legacy video sources and destinations. If required, a format conversion shall
be provided. A given video signal shall be converted no more than once.
The method for routing color video shall not degrade the video image. The selections of the video signal
format shall consider compatibility with commercially available video components. The VDS shall
seamlessly provide monochrome versions of all color display images for use on legacy monochrome
monitors.
The VDS carries critical display information. Therefore, it shall be fault-tolerant. There shall be no single
point failures in the system. The VDS shall provide redundancy to allow the system to perform at full
function with some failed components.
The VDS shall be designed with a growth capability. The VDS shall initially have a 50% spare capacity for
inputs and outputs. Additional video components (e.g. sources, displays) shall be added without affecting
existing components. The VDS shall be extendible if more channels than the 50% reserve are needed.
4. Video Recording System
The VRS shall utilize unmodified readily commercially available recording media. The media shall be accessible during
flight, and shall be removable by the crew. A unit of media (e.g. tape, cartridge) shall have a recording capacity of TBD
hours. The VRS shall record any signal handled by the VDS. The VRS shall accept the VDS video signal format, and shall
convert the VDS signal format to a form recordable on readily available, unmodified, commercially available recording
media.
The VRS shall not degrade the recorded images more than I % (TBR). The VRS shall have the ability to playback recorded
signals during flight. The VRS shall, as a minimum, record TBD# of video channels, simultaneously. The final number shall
be MDS specific. The VRS shall be modularly extendible to provide the requisite number of channels, and to provide for
future growth.
1. System Lighting
1. NVIS Compatibility
1. General Requirements
Lighting shall be compatible with the use of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). All lighting on the flight
deck and cargo compartment shall be NVIS compatible in accordance with the requirements
specified herein including stated exceptions.
The new lighting shall be equal to or better than the existing lighting systems for daylight and naked
eye night operations. The modification shall permit normal use and readability of all aircraft controls,
instruments and displays during all operating conditions with and without NVIS.
All new light producing equipment installed by this document and existing equipment which radiates
light shall meet the requirements of ASFC/ENFC 96-01 Type 1 Class B With the exceptions stated
below:
Existing lighting controls shall be utilized to the maximum extent possible. The cockpit thunderstorm
lights shall not be modified.
All new or existing red warning lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible red in accordance with
the chromaticity and NVIS radiance requirements specified in ASC/ENFC 96-01.
The cargo compartment floodlights may be replaced with NVIS compatible green lights or an
additional system may be added. Cargo compartment floor lighting shall not be modified. The Cargo
compartment shall be equipped with NVIS-compatible red no drop (jump lights).
New or modified lighting, control and display components required for the integrated avionics display
suite shall not cause any interference with the usage of Type I Class B NVIS devices. New lighting
controls required shall not induce delays in cognitive recognition of aircraft performance or flight
instruments or induce crew misorientation and/or disorientation of aircraft flight attitude or
parameters.
2. Specific Requirements
The luminance and contrast of the NVIS compatible lighting shall be sufficient to support crew operations
throughout the flight environment. All lighting modifications shall be permanently installed (but removable
for maintenance) and not requiring modification by the flight crew to achieve NVIS compatibility. There
shall be no degradation to visual acuity through the aircraft windscreen with the unaided eye or the NVIS
due to reflections on the windscreen from any lighting or lighting reflections emanating from within the
cockpit with the NVIS compatible lighting at normal operational luminance.
NVIS compatible flood lights and map lights shall be provided at the ACM and SMC stations.
NVIS compatible White filters may be used for instrument overlay filters
NVIS friendly position lights shall replace the existing position lights. The NVIS friendly position lights shall
meet FAR 25.1385 through FAR 25.1397 and shall not noticeably degrade the NVIS during formation
flying. Formation flying intervals is 2000 ft. minimum.
2. Cockpit Lighting
Cross-cockpit viewing (pilot to copilot’s and copilot to pilot’s instruments) of primary flight instruments shall
not be degraded. The Pilot’s and Copilot’s Instrument Panels shall be designed for a luminance uniformity
not to exceed 2:1 between instruments.
All caution, warning, and advisory lights (including pod status lights) shall be readable in an ambient light
level of 10,000 foot-candles incident on the display from any direction (non-specular).
All existing amber, green and white annunciation lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green B
except as otherwise specified herein. All other lighting (flood lights, instrument lights and edge lit panel
lights etc.) shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green A. All red annunciators, caution, warning, and
advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible red. All amber annunciators, caution, warning, and
advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible yellow B. All green annunciators, caution, and
advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible green B.
3. Cargo Compartment Lighting
All lighting (to include caution, warning, advisory and panel lights) in the cargo compartment shall be
permanently modified to NVIS compatibility with exception of the existing floor floodlights, loading floodlights and
the overhead white floodlights. Cargo NVIS compatible floodlights shall be installed and they shall provide both
bright and dim levels. The existing red flood lights may be modified for NVIS compatibility or a new NVIS
compatible flood light system may be added. The dim level shall be low enough to provide paratrooper night
vision acclimation - 0.1 fL.
The cargo jump lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green B. The cargo jump caution lights shall be
modified to NVIS compatible Red. The jump and jump caution lights shall be readable in an ambient light level of
10,000 foot-candles (non-specular) incident on the display from all directions when viewed plus and minus forty
five degrees to either side of a line normal with the surface of the display. The jump caution NVIS Red light shall
have an NVIS radiance of less than 1.4x10-7 at a luminance of 15.0-foot lamberts (fL).
2. Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance Function
1. Communication
The required radios and equipment shall have the capability of being operated simultaneously without
causing degradation of communications, equipment performance or security.
Voice communication systems (VHF, HF, UHF, and SATCOM, if installed) shall be integrated with the
aircraft ICS (Interphone Communication System), and shall interface with the FMS for mission coordination
purposes to deliver a fully coordinated mission voice-data package. SATCOM, VHF, and HF
communications systems shall provide a data link capability, and shall also provide/maintain VHF, HF, and
SATCOM voice capability. Secure Voice/Data encryption, anti-jam/anti-spoof capabilities shall be provided
for all communications systems.
1. Communication System Components
System components shall include, at a minimum: dual VHF, dual HF, dual UHF, SATCOM, digital
ICS, and secure communication systems. The VHF, SATCOM, and HF systems shall support data
link capabilities; a worldwide data link capability to support air traffic control (ATC) and command and
control (C2) functions, and a communications management function (CMF).
The communication system shall meet the GATM requirements. The system should provide the
cockpit crew with the capability to talk simultaneously on any combination of VHF, UHF, HF, and
SATCOM radios from all cockpit crew position and the ability to transmit and receive on all radios
from any crew position.
The VHF, UHF and SATCOM radios shall be capable of receiving time from the aircraft GPS to
synchronize frequency hopping during anti-jam modes. The communication system control display(s)
shall display the actual frequency selected in all modes.
Existing SATCOM communication capabilities shall be retained and integrated into the overall
system such that aircrew and/or mission crew communications capabilities are not degraded. The
communication system shall also provide for a manual control (Hard Wired) solution that provides
emergency backup VHF/UHF voice capability. These radios shall receive power from the aircraft
battery bus.
1. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Requirement
All proposed radio systems must comply with the JTRS architecture and standards. For any radio
systems other that the Airborne Integrated Terminal (AIT) or the JTRS, a waiver must be obtained
from the JTRS Joint Program Office.
2. Communication Management Function
The Communications Management Function (CMF) shall prevent single point failures. A dual CMU
(Communications Management Unit) or functional equivalent is required to act as a router for the
data link applications and shall be capable of hosting data link applications. The communications
management function shall comply with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC
Characteristic 758. The CMF shall support operation over the existing ATC/airline operational control
(AOC) data link ground infrastructure and provide a clear growth path to support operation over the
planned aeronautical telecommunications network (ATN).
3. UHF
The UHF system shall be capable of worldwide air-to-air and air-to-ground traffic control in the 225 -
400 MHz frequency bands. Existing UHF capability shall be integrated into the CMF function
including control for power up, frequency selection, mode control, volume/squelch control, antenna
selection, and secure/plain selection. The system shall be compatible with, and capable of operating
in UHF voice, DF (direction finder), and anti-jam modes including Have Quick I and II.
4. SATCOM (Military and Commercial)
Existing Military SATCOM capability shall be retained and integrated with the CMF. The military
SATCOM system utilized on these aircraft must maintain the current capabilities including voice
capability. The military SATCOM system shall be compliant with the CJCS DAMA/DASA SATCOM
requirements.
The SATCOM system shall provide both line-of-sight and satellite data communications in the 225 -
400 MHz frequency bands. The system shall be capable of operation in both the 25 kHz and 5 kHz
bandwidths. A SATCOM data link system that is compliant with ICAO SARPs is required to provide a
second, independent, worldwide data link capability to support ATC and C2 functions. The SATCOM
system shall provide priority-preemption schemes to allow it to be shared between ATC and C2
functions.
The SATCOM system shall be compliant with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC
741 (Aviation Satellite Communication System) or ARINC 761 (Second-Generation Aviation Satellite
Communication System.)
It is desired that the SATCOM system provide an ICAO SARPs-compliant voice capability that can
be used for direct pilot-to-controller communication.
5. VHF
The VHF system shall provide dual VHF AM/FM/SINCGARS capable radios with VHF-AM operation
at 25 kHz and 8.33 kHz channel spacing. Dual VHF radios need to be integrated into the CMF
function including control for power up, frequency selection, mode control, volume/squelch control,
antenna selection, and secure/plain selection.
Radios utilized on AFSOC/ACC aircraft must maintain the capability of operating in the FM
high band, Maritime band. (AFSOC, ACC only).
1. 8.33 kHz VHF Channel Spacing
To allow aircraft to operate as general air traffic in European upper airspace, dual radios capable of
VHF-AM analog voice operation at reduced (8.33 kHz) channel spacing in accordance with ICAO
SARPs (Annex 10, Volume III) are required. Existing 25-kHz channel spacing capability shall be
retained (e.g., 125.025 MHz, 125.050 MHz, 125.075 MHz, etc.).
6. VHF Digital Link
VHF aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS) and VHF digital link (VDL)
Mode 2 (aviation VHF packet communication, AVPAC) capabilities are required. It is desired that the
GATM radios have a well-defined upgrade path to meet future requirements for line-of-sight data link
communications: VDL Mode 3, time-division multiple-access (TDMA) digitized voice and data; and
VDL Mode 4, self-organizing TDMA.
7. HF-Automatic Control Processor (ACP)
The HF system shall provide worldwide HF single side band (SSB) and amplitude modulated (AM)
voice and data communication in the 2 - 29.9999 MHz frequency range. The ACP and control is
required for HF frequency hopping. Time of day shall be provided from the GPS system.
Dual HF radios shall be integrated into the CMF function including control for power up, frequency
selection, mode control, volume/squelch control, antenna selection, and secure/plain selection. A
high frequency data link (HFDL) system that is compliant with ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPs) is required to provide a worldwide data link capability to support ATC and C2
functions. The HFDL system shall provide priority-preemption schemes to allow the system to be
shared between ATC and C2 functions. The HFDL system shall be compliant with ARINC 635 (HF
Data Link Protocols) and with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC 753 (HF Data Link
System).
8. Secure Communication / Anti-Jam
Communication encryption (voice and data) shall be provided for all UHF, VHF, HF, and military
SATCOM radios. The use of secure equipment shall be operator selectable. Secure devices should
have a centralized load panel that will enable all cryptographic processors to be loaded from one
central point. The secure devices shall be accessible so that a crewmember can load each unit
individually in the event of centralized loading failure. The secure equipment shall include plain,
cipher, and cipher text only modes of operation. The HF secure equipment shall include Plain and
Cipher Text Only modes of operation.
All communications radios shall be compatible with, and include, a suitable anti-jam mode. All
systems shall be certified to be supportable in the electromagnetic spectrum.
9. Interphone Communication System (ICS)
A highly reliable, digitally controlled central intercommunications system that is compatible with
active noise reduction (ANR) headsets is required. The ICS shall allow monitoring of and
transmission on all radios from all ICS locations as selected by individual crewmembers. The ICS
shall support the capability to talk simultaneously on any combination of VHF, UHF, HF, & SATCOM
radios from all cockpit crew positions. The ICS shall be capable of supporting, as a minimum, the
same number of ICS units as existing combat delivery aircraft with no degradation as more
crewmembers utilize the system. The ICS shall provide audio warnings, EMI shielding, high quality
sound, and EW threat audio. System shall include the ability to address passengers and crew
through a speaker system in the cockpit and cargo compartment. Audio transmissions shall be
intelligible at all operational ambient noise levels. In the event of a main aircraft power failure, the
ICS shall remain operable. The ICS system should have 50 percent reserve capability for audio
inputs (e.g., an additional radio, an additional defensive system tone, etc.). As a minimum, all aircrew
members shall be able to talk with each other and the aircrew shall have an emergency radio
useable at all times.
1. Intercommunications System (AFSOC Only)
For all AFSOC aircraft, compatibility with a wireless intercom system is required
(AC/MC-130). For AFSOC aircraft, the ICS shall be capable of supporting up to 23 units
(AC-130U/H) with no degradation as more crewmembers utilize the system. For all
AFSOC aircraft, the ICS shall have, as a minimum, three private nets with imbedded
isolation nets. The ICS shall provide the capability to talk simultaneously on any
combination of VHF, UHF, HF, & SATCOM radios from all crew positions.
2. Interphone Communications System (ACC Only)
For EC-130 aircraft, the ICS shall be capable of supporting up to 24 units with no degradation
as more crewmembers utilize the system. For HC-130 aircraft the ICS shall be compatible with
a wireless intercom system, must be able to support one additional cockpit unit above the
standard combat delivery requirement, and will not decrease the existing number of ICS units
in the aircraft cargo compartment.
10. Cockpit Printer.
A cockpit printer shall be installed as part of the avionics suite. The printer shall be able to print, as a
minimum, all Air Traffic Control information including flight plans received from off board sources
through the avionics suite. The printer should also be able to print information from the avionics
computers, terminal area products, and have the fidelity to print charts and photos (not photo quality)
for use by the crew.
11. Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR)/Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
A FAA TSO-C-124a compliant solid state digital flight data recorder with at least 25 hours of solid
state memory to record data is required. Data bus monitoring is required to ensure that necessary
parameters are recorded, including those from display and HUD systems that have no analyzable
hardware for accident investigation.
The system shall have the capability to record, as a minimum, all of the 88 parameters identified in
Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121, Appendix M, that are applicable to C-130 aircraft, plus
engine fuel flow, TIT, and all engine/propeller synchrophaser control parameters for each engine. The
system shall also be capable of recording engine parameters a minimum of once per second.
Additionally, the capability for the recorder to record, for aircraft so equipped, the structural life history
data is desired.
A solid state CVR with at least two hours of solid state memory and a minimum of four-channel
capability is required. The CVR shall comply with FAA TSO-C123a.
Dual redundant DFDR and CVR capabilities are an objective. DFDR/CVR annunciation, displays,
and controls shall be readable during the day, or at night, and shall be accessible by at least one
crewmember. Actual annunciator placement shall be determined in the Cockpit Working Group.
1. DFDR/CVR Requirements
1. DFDR/CVR General Requirements
Installation of the DFDR and CVR unit(s) shall be in accordance with Title 14 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 25, to the
maximum extent practical. The contractor shall recommend placement locations for the
DFDR and CVR unit(s), so that the first unit(s) is in compliance with FAR Part 25, and the
second unit(s) is as far from the first unit(s) as practical while still maximizing survivability
and maintenance access.
The DFDR shall comply with FAA TSO-C124a. The CVR shall comply with FAA TSO-
C123a. The DFDR and CVR shall be equipped with a self-powered, underwater acoustic
beacon to assist with location in the event of loss during an overwater flight.
The DFDR/CVR system shall be self monitoring, and shall alert the operator in the event
of failure of critical system components. The DFDR/CVR system shall have provisions for
a back-up power source in the event of loss of all aircraft-generated power. The back-up
power source shall be capable of providing operating power to the DFDR/CVR system for
a minimum of 20 minutes. The DFDR/CVR system shall be capable of recording data bus
information from various aircraft data bus standards as required.
The system shall provide the capability to verify system functionality and performance at
the local unit (O-level maintenance). The ability to verify system functionality shall include
down load and analysis of data as necessary to check the system. The operating unit
should be able to use existing resources for this verification.
Up to two months worth of DFDR data as well as all data currently collected
manually on AFTO form 151A shall be stored on aircraft. The entry of AFTO form
151A shall be automated. This data does not have to be stored in a crashworthy
medium. The system shall be designed to allow periodic downloading of structural
life history data by O-level maintenance personnel.
The CVR shall be capable of recording a minimum of four channels of voice data. However, six
channels are desired. The CVR shall be integrated with the Interphone Communications
System (ICS) and radio circuits, and shall monitor the pilot, the copilot, the flight engineer, and
a wide-area microphone (channels one through four). The remaining two channels, if available,
are undefined, and are to be reserved for future use.
The CVR shall have a minimum capacity to store two hours of recorded voice data on solid-
state media prior to overwriting. The CVR shall record all audio annunciations provided to the
aircrew through the ICS.
2. AFSOC OPSEC Mode
The CVR and DFDR must have the capability to be declassified, turned off, or operated in an OPSEC
mode to preclude recording sensitive mission data in non-volatile memory.
2. Navigation
1. Flight Management System (FMS)
The Flight Management System (FMS) for the C-130 aircraft shall provide automatic performance
optimized, guidance along two-, three-, and four-dimensional paths. Parameters that shall be used
for control are the energy-state of the aircraft, computation of speed, altitude, vertical and lateral
track error, flight path angle, and vertical and lateral track angle. The control commands and
indications, and path guidance/deviation data shall be displayed to the flight crew on the flight
instruments such that a seamless horizontal and vertical path between the start and end of the
planned flight can be achieved. The system shall include numerous functional improvements and
additional functions required, satisfying the future operational mission of the C-130 aircraft fleet. The
following functions shall be included in the FMS:
The C-130 AMP system shall include a dual integrated FMS, dual integrated GPS and dual
integrated INS (inertial navigation system). The C-130 AMP system shall meet all technical and
system performance requirements in RTCA/DO-236 for RNP-1, RTCA DO-229A (Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/Wide Area Augmentation System
Airborne Equipment), and requirements set forth in ARINC Characteristic 702A (Advanced Flight
Management Computer System).
The FMS/GPS shall have a clearly defined upgrade path to Local Area Augmentation System
(LAAS) being currently defined by RTCA.
The FMS shall be four-dimensional. The AMP FMS shall provide the C-130 aircraft with a self-
contained navigation capability. The AMP FMS as well as the AMP system shall be able to perform
all missions at all Lat/Lon points around the globe including the North and South Poles.
The navigation sensors shall be integrated so that the failure of a primary sensor shall cause the
system to automatically revert to alternate navigation sensors and/or subsystems, and notify the
aircrew that a failure has occurred and indicate the new mode of operation. The current radio
navigation aid capabilities shall be retained and integrated into the overall AMP/FMS system or radio
management unit and CMU:
The FMS shall meet or exceed the functional requirements of FAA AC 20-130A for multi-sensor
systems integrating TSO C-129a class A1, B1, or C1 sensors. The current Doppler Velocity Sensor
(DVS) capabilities shall be retained and integrated into the overall AMP/FMS system. INS capability
shall be retained as part of the multi-sensor navigation system. The INS-only capability shall be
retained as a back-up navigation capability in the event of loss or failure of the GPS signal or
receiver, and the GPS-only capability shall be retained as a back-up navigation capability in the
event of loss or failure of the INS.
A capability shall be provided that shall allow the aircrew to select any navigation mode. Means to
check and align the bore-sight of navigation sensor equipment during maintenance actions shall be
provided.
New geospatial information shall be converted to and stored in the World Geodetic System-84
(WGS-84) coordinate system to support navigation and approach operations.
The dual FMS shall provide fully automatic and coupled solution for precision airdrop for both high
and low altitudes and airborne radar approach functions that are included in existing aircraft. The
dual FMS shall provide, at a minimum, the same functionality for munitions delivery as currently
employed on the AC-130H and AC-130U.
The FMS shall comply with TSO-C129, Section (3)(ix)(2) for Waypoint Entry; Section (3)(x)(1) for
Waypoint Storage; and Section (3)(xi)(1) and (2) for Waypoint or Leg Sequencing. The database
shall conform to ARINC Specification 424, Navigation System Database.
1. FMS Functional Description
The FMS shall provide the following functions: navigation, fight planning, lateral and vertical guidance, performance
optimization and prediction, air-ground data link, and pilot interfaces via the MFD and MCDU displays. The following
paragraphs provide a summary description of these characteristics, with references to their functional descriptions as
described in ARINC Characteristic 702A.
Navigation (paragraph 4.3.1) - The navigation function determines the position and velocity of the aircraft, using
input data from all appropriate sources. The outputs include position in terms of altitude, latitude and longitude,
and velocity in terms of ground speed and track angle, wind, true and magnetic headings, drift angle, magnetic
variation, and inertial flight path angle.
◦ Navigation Modes
◦ RNP Based Navigation
Flight Planning (paragraph 4.3.2) - This function provides the sequence of waypoints, airways, flight levels,
departure procedures, and arrival procedures to fly from the origin to the destination, and/or alternates. The
flight plan may be entered manually on the MCDU, or automatically by uplink via the air-ground data link. A
navigation database in the FMS contains the necessary data associated with every flight plan element identifier
for the entire aircraft flight domain.
Lateral and Vertical Navigation (paragraph 4.3.3) -Lateral guidance is computed with respect to great circle
paths defined by the flight plan, and to transitional paths between the great circle paths, or to preset headings or
courses. Vertical guidance is computed with respect to altitudes assigned to waypoints, or to paths defined by
stored or computed profiles. Speed control along the desired path is provided during all phases of flight.
Trajectory Predictions (paragraph 4.3.3.1) - This function predicts distance, time, speed, altitude, and gross
weight at each future waypoint in the flight plan, including computed waypoints such as top-of-climb and top-of-
descent.
Performance Calculations Function (paragraph 4.3.4) - The objective of this function is to optimize the vertical
and speed profiles to minimize the cost of the flight and to provide Take Off and Landing Data (TOLD).
Air-Ground Data Link - Two-way data communication can be provided to the airline operations facility and to
ATS (Air Traffic Service). Tactical Airlift Control Center (TACC) Functions (4.3.6) permits uplinking of data, such
as flight plans, weather data, takeoff speeds, preflight initializations, etc., from the airline operations facility
directly into the FMS, via the ACARS or ATN network.
CNS/ATM (air traffic management) Functions (paragraph 4.3.7) is used to communicate predefined ATS
controller-to-pilot uplink and pilot-to-controller downlink messages via the MCDU.
Pilot Interface via the MCDU (6.0) - The MCDU is the pilot interface to the FMS. It transmits button pushes to the
FMS, and displays data on the MCDU screen in response to transmissions from the FMS. The MCDU may also
provide backup functions should both FMSs fail.
Navigation Display Interface (paragraph 4.3.10 and section 7) - The FMS generates a variety of data for display
on the MFD for display of command and reference data on the Primary Flight Display (PFD), and for graphic
map display of the flight plan on the Navigational Display (ND) as well as display of dynamic data such as
ground speed, wind, etc.
The system should provide for the initialization of various navigation sensors.
2. Functional Description
1. Navigation
1. Multi-Sensor Navigation
2. Navigation Modes
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.1.2 with the addition of the
following:
Navigation Modes - The FMS shall provide the following independent navigation
modes:
Pilot Copilot
Independent Independent
GPS-1 GPS-2
1. Position Updates
The FMS shall provide the following methods of position update according to
the sensor used to establish the position fix: TACAN position update, Distance
Measuring Equipment (DME)/DME position update, VOR/DME position
update, VOR/VOR position, Visual position update, Radar position update,
GPS position update, Infrared position update, Shutdown update, and Altitude
updates.
2. System Altitude
Dual Radar Altimeters shall be integrated into the AMP system and provide ground
clearance information from 0 to 50,000 ft. Dual Radar Altimeters shall provide a
visual and aural low altitude warning indication if the measured altitude drops below
a manually set limit. Their accuracy shall be ( 2% from 0 – 5,000 ft. and ( 1% above
5,000 ft.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.1.6.1 with the addition that all User-
defined NAVAIDs shall be included in the search for the closest NAVAIDS to be
displayed. Thus, the closest NAVAIDS displayed by the FMS shall be a combination of
the closest NAVAIDS and User-defined NAVAIDS.
2. Flight Planning
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.2 with the addition that data can also
be extracted from the navigation database that contains parachute ballistics. Also, the
data shall be transferable via AFMSS (Air Force Mission Support System), if available, or
by other means.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.2.1 except that the MFDs shall
show the modified flight plan together with the unmodified active flight plan, with
unique symbology to differentiate between them. The FMS shall routinely compare
the planned route of flight with TAWS and the digital terrain database to determine if
the planned three-dimensional route of flight conflicts with the terrain database. This
conflict shall be annunciated to the crew. This function shall check all route changes
and proposed route changes made in flight. A conflict will be annunciated to the
crew and the route change shall not be accepted without change made to resolve
the conflict.
The FMS shall also provide near real-time threat avoidance resolution to support
automatic and semi-automatic route replanning to increase probability of mission
success. Threat data shall include pre-mission threat/tactical information, updates to
the pre-mission threat data received in-flight and new information received from
onboard defensive systems and, when installed, the Airborne Broadcast Intelligence
(ABI), AKA, Real Time Information In The Cockpit (RTIC) as discussed in paragraph
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.2.2 and section 9, with the
addition that the system shall be capable of defining a flight path based on Drop
Zone (DZ) data that will calculate and provide guidance to the Computed Air
Release Point (CARP) and High Altitude Release Point (HARP). The system shall
be also capable of defining a flight path for Rendezvous’ (including aerial refueling
rendezvous), Search and Rescue Patterns, and AC-130 Orbits.
In addition to the flight path terminators defined in ARINC 424 and RTCA/DO-236,
the FMS shall provide for Radius-of-turn (ROT) and Curved-path (CP) flyover and
nonflyover transitions.
The FMS shall have the memory capacity of holding portions of the NIMA DAFIF
(Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File) worldwide database, plus additional
civilian GPS approach information or have ready access to this information via a
mass memory storage. As a minimum the database shall contain the worldwide
ICAO waypoint and NAVAID data. This data shall not be lost due to any single point
failure. All non-user-defined information contained in the database shall be
protected from inadvertent corruption by the user. Flight plans, the DAFIF database,
and mission data shall be loaded from the AFMSS portable computer by utilizing the
Air Force developed A/W/E. An objective is for the loaded FMS navigation database
should be adequate for world-wide operations in all phases of flight without having
to load additional data.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.2.3 with the addition that the
supplemental and temporary NDB shall have a minimum of 200/500 points.
The FMS shall provide the capability to load almanac data into the GPS sensor.
Almanac data may be derived from the GPS sensor when the database is not valid.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.2.4.1 with the addition of the
following:
The FMS shall permit the operator to manually load waypoints by entering either the
ICAO identifier or a latitude/longitude coordinate. The FMS shall permit the user to
recall waypoints by ICAO identifier or by user defined identifier.
5. Airdrop
The C-130 AMP system shall be Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System
(AWADS) certified as defined in AFI 55-130.
The FMS shall be able to perform airdrop functions at any point on the globe to
include the North and South Poles.
The FMS shall automate the airdrop procedures outlined in AFI 11-2C-130 Volume
3, Operations, to the maximum extent possible. The operator shall have the ability
to define a minimum of eight (8) Drop Zones in a flight plan. Each of the eight
airdrops shall have an independent set of ballistic parameters for the equipment or
personnel to be dropped.
The flight crew may specify the ballistics for either a low altitude release or a high
altitude release, and the auto-release method of extraction shall be assumed for the
airdrop procedure.
The FMS shall have access to all AFMSS parachute parameters (as defined in AFI
11-231) loaded. Parachute parameters in the database shall be protected from
The operator shall have the ability to manually validate and update the ballistic
values during waypoint definition.
The FMS shall have the capability of performing a rendezvous function. The
rendezvous function shall predict the intercept point with a moving target and
provide guidance to the rendezvous. The time-tagged position and velocity of the
target shall be enterable. The position, velocity, and information provided by TCAS
shall be used to determine the intercept point and course. Guidance and steering
shall be provided to the intercept point.
The user shall be able to construct four different types of Search and Rescue (SAR)
patterns: moving line (creeping line), expanding square, parallel, and sector search.
An automatic infrared sensor scan capability shall be integrated with the SAR
guidance function in order to improve the search efficiency when installed.
8. Orbital Guidance
The orbit guidance function shall provide guidance to fly the aircraft in a specified
orbit about a specified point. This mode shall provide position (CDI and glideslope),
nominal airspeed, and flight director (pitch and bank) cues to the pilot and co-pilot.
These cues shall be available to both pilots’ MFD displays, as well as to both pilots’
HUDS. On the AC-130H/U the cues shall also be available on the side looking
HUD. The system shall have the capability to couple to the autopilot providing
automatic orbit capability.
There shall be provision for up to eight (8) approaches in the flight plan. Each of the
approaches shall have an independent set of parameters that define a three-
dimensional descent path; the format of the source data shall be as specified in
ARINC 424. Provisions shall be made for allowing temporary and permanent
position updates using ownship sensors (e.g. radar, infra-red systems) when
defining the three dimensional approach path.
The FMS shall provide lateral and vertical guidance for the airdrop function
described in section 3.5.2.1.3.2.5 and in the following sections.
Lateral guidance shall be provided to the release point in accordance with the flight
plan.
The FMS shall provide lateral and vertical guidance for the Three-Dimensional
RNAV Approach described in section 3.5.2.1.3.2.9 and in the following sections.
Lateral guidance shall be provided to the touchdown point in accordance with the
flight plan, and vertical guidance shall be provided to either the touchdown point or
the Missed Approach Point (MAP).
The FMS shall provide lateral and vertical guidance for the rendezvous
function.
The FMS shall provide lateral and vertical guidance for the search and rescue
function.
3. Orbital Guidance
The FMS shall provide lateral and vertical guidance for the orbital guidance function.
Flap and deck angle calculations for Container Delivery Systems (CDS) airdrops as described
in AFI 11-2C-130 Vol. 3.
Calculation of optimum slowdown distance to the drop zone (DZ) as described in AFI
11-2C-130 Vol. 3.
Calculation for the IMC (Instrument Meteorological Conditions) descent point as described in
AFI 11-2C-130 Vol. 3.
The C-130 AMP shall meet the Required Navigation Performance-1 (RNP-1). Accuracy
requirements for the lateral navigation function defined in RTCA/DO-236, Minimum Aviation
System Performance Standards (MASPS) for Area Navigation. The system shall meet the
vertical accuracy requirements as defined in RTCA/DO-236. (These requirements are still in
the draft phase and should be approved by the time of the C-130 AMP. If they have not been
approved by contract award, the contractor shall make provisions for upgrading the system to
the vertical requirements.)
1. Degraded Accuracy
During degraded modes of operation (i.e. loss of GPS), the C-130 AMP shall have a maximum
INS/DVS solution CEP (Circular Error Probability) of 0.25NM.
4. Navigation Sensor Interfaces
Each of the following sensor systems and principal system components shall comply with the
applicable characteristics stated in ARINC 702A Section 5. In general, when a dual capability
exists or is specified, the interfaces between each of the dual FMS components and other FMS
components shall allow an automatic or manual selection of which unit of a dual system
component is functional with each FMS. This is required to support redundant and single-point
failure prevention operation of the FMS.
VHF Omni Range System (VOR) and Protected-Instrument Landing System (P-ILS)
Global Positioning System (GPS) and Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS)
The dual Inertial Navigation System (INS) capability shall meet or exceed the
performance requirements in SNU 84-1 and 84-MMSRE-011-INS. Replacement or
modification/upgrade of the existing INS will be considered as a part of an overall AMP
proposed implementation.
The C-130 Tactical Air Navigation System (TACAN), AN/ARN-118 and AN/ARN-139,
capability shall be fully integrated with the AMP.
The existing dual VHF Omni Range System (VOR) & Instrument Landing System (ILS)
shall be modified or replaced to provide a Protected Instrument Landing System (P-ILS).
To prevent operational restrictions, ILS receivers shall meet the immunity to FM broadcast
emission requirements as outlined in ICAO Annex 10.
The required approach capability is CAT I minimums; CAT II capability with a growth
capability to CAT III is desired. A multi-mode receiver that integrates P-ILS, MLS, and
DGPS is desired. The precision approach and landing system solution should be
compatible with the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) solution,
including local area differential GPS (LADGPS), as it applies to C-130 missions.
The Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) system shall meet or exceed the capabilities of the
AN/ARN-149 and be fully integrated into the AMP system.
The existing Doppler Velocity Sensor (DVS) capability shall be retained in the FMS. The
DVS shall interface with the appropriate components of the FMS and the DVS functions
shall be fully integrated the FMS.
The existing Microwave Landing System (MLS) capability shall be retained in the FMS.
The MLS shall interface with the appropriate components of the FMS and the MLS
functions shall be fully integrated the FMS. A multi-mode receiver that integrates P-ILS,
MLS, and DGPS is desired.
As a minimum, the current AN/APN-169C SKE capability shall be retained and integrated.
equipped. The system shall be compatible with current and future ground based zone
marker (ZM) or compatible systems and shall interrogate system within 40 NMs (100 NMs
desired). The system shall provide relative position information on all aircraft in the
formation, or a subset of selected aircraft (i.e., element or serial) to include distance,
bearing, heading, airspeed, and relative altitude. The system shall provide steering
commands to correct and maintain formation position settings. The system shall provide
visual and aural proximity and collision warnings of similarly equipped aircraft and other
aircraft currently IMC formation equipped that infringe on selected range and provide
warnings for loss of signal or system degradation. The system shall be capable of being
coupled to and interfacing with the autopilot during all phases of SKE operation including
airdrop.
The integrated GPS system, provided by the GPS Joint Program Office, shall be precise
positioning service (PPS) equipment which complies, as a minimum with Air Force policy
(26 Mar 97 AF/XO message "Implementation of AF Navigation and Safety Master Plan
and Policy Clarification for GPWS, ADF, and GPS Navigational Systems"). The integrated
GPS shall provide en route, terminal, and non-precision approach operations in
accordance with TSO-C129a, class A1, B1, or C1.
The GPS function shall also comply with or meet the intent of RTCA DO-229A for
interoperability with the wide-area augmentation system (WAAS), to allow GPS-based
navigation through non-precision approach. A CAT II capability using the local-area
augmentation system (LAAS) is desired.
The GPS should also be readily upgradable to incorporate the NAVWAR (navigation
warfare) solution required by FY06, as specified in Draft ORD AFSPC/ACC 003-92-III for
GPS, and should have a growth path for easy upgradability to meet future requirements.
GPS receivers should have maximum capability against jamming.
A growth path for differential GPS (DGPS) precision approach and landing capability is
required: the required approach capability is CAT I minimums; CAT II capability with a
growth capability to CAT III is desired.
The Aerial Delivery System provides for cargo airdrops. Once armed, the flight crew can
initiate the release of the pallet shackles (and chute release) via a switch on the center
pedestal.
The C-130 FMS shall implement an automatic release control. The copilot shall have a
switch that selects the C-130 FMS or manual control of the aerial delivery system.
The Troop Jump System consists of red caution lights and green jump lights that can be
activated by a switch on the copilot's side panel.
The C-130 FMS shall implement automatic jump light control. The copilot shall have a
switch which selects either the C-130 FMS or manual control of the troop jump system
lights. The C-130 FMS shall determine when the lights need to be illuminated and
activate the appropriate output discrete.
The SMMU shall be the repository for several types of information. This information shall
include but shall not be limited to: 1) National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) land
mass data (for example, Digital Terrain Elevation Data [DTED]), 2) Aircraft performance
data (for example vertical "g" capability, gross weight, etc), and 3) Imagery. For purposes
of sizing the SMMU, it shall have adequate capacity to store, as a minimum, all of the
following:
NIMA electronic terrain data for the entire departure and the entire destination continent
at a resolution of 1:250,000 (TBR) or better, plus a two hundred square mile area at
1:25,000 with an objective to store all electronic terrain data in all resolutions available
from NIMA at the time of fielding the system
All A/W/E data used by the Special Operations Forces Planning And Rehearsal
System (SOFPARS) plus a minimum of 100 more TBD aircraft parameters
A minimum of one hundred (TBR) 24-bit depth color pictures, 1024 by 1024 (TBR) pixels
in size with an objective to store one thousand (TBR) pictures of the same size
Operational Navigation Chart (ONC), 150 nautical mile (NM) wide by 3000 NM long
corridor, 25 NM radius in flat or rolling terrain and 50 NM radius in mountainous terrain
around C-130 capable airfields world wide
Tactical Pilotage Chart (TPC) for 50 NM cross track and 3000 NM long track and 25 NM
radius around all C-130 capable airports worldwide
Joint Operational Graph (JOG) for 50 NM cross track and 3000 NM long track
The Multi-purpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU) shall meet or exceed the intent of
ARINC characteristic 739-1, Multi-purpose Control and Display Unit.
The guidelines set forth in the following subparagraphs shall be used to develop the
characteristics of the man/machine interface of the FMS for operations.
All user-specified data for navigation, flight planning, radio control, aircraft
parameters, 3-D RNAV Approach, and airdrop shall be enterable. The user shall be
able to select the Flight Director mode. Situation and command indicators for
navigation, flight planning, radio control, and 3-D RNAV Approach and airdrop
procedures shall be displayed on the MCDUs and MFDs. The user shall have the
means to load mission data manually and automatically. The location of the data
transfer system shall be on the flight deck.
2. Display Outputs
When the pilot or copilot has selected a C-130 FMS steering mode, the lateral deviation bar
sensitivity shall be as shown in Table 3.4.1.1.5.1.2.2
5. Reference Systems
1. Coordinate Systems
The user entry of position shall be either, latitude and longitude, or UTM coordinates. In
response to user UTM inputs, the UTM coordinates shall be converted to the WGS-84
coordinates. The FMS shall also support display and computation of navigation data
using the Military Grid Reference System and Latitude/Longitude coordinate system. The
FMS shall select/display and allow inputs in coordinate systems other than WGS-84, and
convert it to WGS-84 in the background to work with the GPS and other navigation
systems. The ability to upload a minimum of 5 newly defined geodetic datums using
mission planning software and mission data transfer systems is an objective for the
Combat Delivery fleet. The ability to upload a minimum of 5 newly defined geodetic
datums using mission planning software and mission data transfer systems is
required for AFSOC aircraft.
2. Heading Systems
The direction reference in all flight director modes shall be independently user-selectable
for each INU (inertial navigation unit) as true, magnetic, or grid north. This shall also
define the direction reference for the heading indicator on the HSI display.
In all flight director modes, the grid north output of the INU shall be determined within said
INU using inertial-sensed true heading (and position) and a convergence factor supplied
by FMS.
The FMS shall be capable of calculating Magnetic Variation (MV) in all regions of the earth.
In all of the Flight Director modes, magnetic heading shall be determined by the INU using inertial-sensed true heading and
FMS determined magnetic variation using the magnetic variation database specified in ARINC Characteristic 702A,
paragraph 9.5.
1. Air Data System
The basic requirement is to have a dual system consisting of dual fuselage mounted pitot static
systems and dual digital air data computers, each connected to a separate pitot static system. It is
the objective to have a single pitot-static system design and a single Air Data Computer version
utilized across all C-130 mission design series. If this objective can not be met, the preferred system
would minimize the number of air data computer models as opposed to minimizing the number of
pitot-static system designs. It is acceptable to have multiple compensation in the air data computer,
as needed for the aircraft installed.
The Air Data System shall provide correction for pitot and static pressure errors as necessary to
support and meet the C-130 AMP system flight performance, including the 1000 foot vertical
separation requirement of GATM. The Air Data System shall include failure monitoring and an output
to alert the crew of system failure by visual and/or audio means.
Means shall be provided to allow the pilot and co-pilot to select the system for providing inputs for
their display. Means shall also be provided, in the event of failure of a system, to switch critical inputs
for subsystems to the operating system. Automatic switching shall be accomplished as appropriate.
The Air Data System shall support fire control functions for the AC-130U and AC-130H
aircraft.
1. Pitot-Static System
The system shall be designed and installed to be repeatable across all aircraft modified with
the new system installed. The repeatability error shall be considered in the system performance
requirements, including the 1000-foot vertical separation.
The system shall be capable of continuous unaffected operation in an icing atmosphere. If the
sensors are location specific (right, left, upper, or lower) then means shall be provided to
prevent installing them in the wrong position. AC-130H nose and wingtip mounted pitot-
static probes shall be removed, unless fuselage mounted sensors would not meet the
AMP performance requirements specified herein.
2. Digital Air Data Computers (DADC)
Dual Digital Air Data Computers shall be installed, and the design and installation shall provide
the outputs to meet the system and subsystem performance requirements as specified herein.
The DADC 1 and DADC 2 shall operate from static system 1 and 2 respectively and shall
replace those individual air data sensors on existing C-130 aircraft. If multiple static source
error corrections are included in the DADC, a positive means shall be provided to prevent the
wrong correction being applied to aircraft system on which installed.
The system shall provide for Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and growth provisions
for Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) requirements as both are defined in RTCA
DO-229A shall be provided. The outputs shall also be compatible with the displays and the
flight instrument accuracy requirements.
A means shall be provided to allow pilot and/or co-pilot input of local barometric pressure. The
DADC shall provide outputs of barometric corrected and uncorrected pressure altitude as
required. The DADC shall provide outputs, as necessary, for any subsystem requiring at data
parameters.
3. Altitude Reporting
A digital flight altitude signal, compatible with the AIMS IFF Mode C system, shall be provided
for automatic altitude reporting.
4. Altitude Alerting
A means shall be provided to insert and monitor an assigned altitude with and without the autopilot.
The inserted altitude shall also be provided as an output to the TCAS function. A warning signal shall
be provided when the aircraft deviates from the assigned altitude to the extent that vertical
separation becomes at risk or if the air traffic control system would be alerted. The warnings shall be
integrated with the TAWS or TCAS warnings and any flight director command functions generated.
The alerting warnings shall nominally be activated at 100 feet deviations.
2. Radar
The C-130 aircraft requires a radar system to replace the APN-59, APN-122, APQ-170 and APQ-175
radar systems. The radar system shall be used as a primary navigation aid, providing position
updates, ground mapping, and data for overlay with flight plan displays. The system shall also
provide weather avoidance, beacon communication, skin paint, as well as guidance for aerial
rendezvous and supplemental formation station-keeping. The radar system shall meet or exceed the
capabilities and performance of radar systems installed on C-130H3. The C-130 radar shall be
operationally compatible with installed Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) systems and feature Low
Probability of Detection/Interception, defined as follows: A passive detection threat has less than 5%
probability of detecting the aircraft, and less than 5% probability of locating and identifying the
aircraft, if detected, at the longest distance that the aircraft would otherwise be detected. As an
objective, the radar integration and design should consider constraints associated with the CV-22
aircraft. Failures or degradation of radar capability shall cause an indication to be issued.
The radar shall be certified for Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) capability to
provide accurate radar positioning (position update) and guidance to drop zones (hot cursor), landing
zones, and airfields. The radar shall be integrated to all variants of the C-130 aircraft including
Special Mission aircraft, except AC-130U.
The radar shall provide a blanking pulse that is time coincident with the radar pulse. The radar shall
be able to blank, and to be blanked by, host MDS avionics. The blanking signal shall be compatible
with existing blanking signals in the host MDS. Power requirements shall not exceed 2000VA @
115VAC/3f /400Hz and 200W @ 28VDC.
1. Radar Controls and Annunciators.
The controls shall provide for total operation of the radar from any populated crew station.
When a station is in the navigation update mode, any cursor controls located at other stations
shall be operative for non-radar functions only.
Both pilots and the navigator (both navigators for AFSOC) shall be provided the means
to adjust the cursor position on the radar presentation to match the true position of the
target. The IDS cursor control functions shall be operative during radar updating.
The Pilot’s control(s) shall include a slave mode option that shall cause the Pilots’ displays to
show what the ACM is displaying. The controls shall provide for the display of Flight Plan, SKE,
and TCAS during Standby, as stand alone displays during Operate, or as overlays with other
displays and/or radar modes.
The radar shall be capable of interleaving, from one scan to the next, two separate radar
modes. The ACM’s control shall be capable of selecting two radar modes (interleaving) and
overlaying display options to produce multiple integrated displays in accordance with Table
3.4.1.3.2. If the ACM selects two radar modes, the pilots’ displays shall be placed in standby
unless either or both of the ACM selected modes are the same as those selected by the Pilot.
The controls shall be capable of manipulating the radar’s cursor to any point. The radar’s
cursor shall be used for navigation position update, offset or expanded PPI, and range and
bearing measurement.
The radar shall generate and display an orthorectified map of terrain features as depicted by
radar returns. The radar shall display the selected terrain in either a centered, expanded, or
offset Plan Position Indicator (PPI) format. The radar system shall have ground mapping
capabilities that meet or exceed current capabilities and performance of radar systems installed
on C-130H3 models after 1995.
In addition to the modes required for the capabilities stated herein, the radar shall provide
a Freeze Mode.
Freeze The radar shall be able to store a complete radar map and use the information
Display for subsequent navigation and situation awareness. When commanded from
Mode. any station, the radar shall freeze the current map display and indicate via the
display at all stations that the radar is in freeze mode. A symbol shall be
generated, using information from the navigation system, to indicate the
aircraft’s own position on the frozen display. The symbol’s position shall be
continuously updated using information from the navigation system. Cursor
functions (range and bearing, latitude and longitude readouts) shall remain
operational while in the freeze mode. Any interleaved mode and all RF
transmission shall cease when this mode is commanded. The freeze mode
will continue until the operator commands a return to normal operation.
The radar shall provide data to the display system for an accurate representation of the
geographic relationship of terrain features such as mountains, shore lines, islands, rivers,
cities, bridges, and dams at long range, 30-240 nautical miles (NM), and short range, £
30 NM, targets such as road intersections, bridges, dams, towers, trucks, hangars, and
peculiar shoreline contours of lakes. In addition, the radar shall detect runways, small
buildings, bridges, and patrol and larger boats at 30NM. At short range, the radar shall
provide data to the display system in such detail that the operator can successfully
perform radar-assisted landings, low altitude navigation, and precision cargo airdrops.
Long range and short range requirements may be accomplished using separate modes.
Radar accuracy is defined in terms of a circular error probability (CEP) and a bias. CEP is
defined as the radius of a circle that contains 50 percent of the detections from a valid
target. The radar shall provide the range accuracy consisting of a CEP, defined as the
radius of a circle that contains 50 percent of the detections from a valid target, no greater
than shown in Table 3.5.2.3.2.22 with a bias no greater than 10% of the CEP.
50 5,000 390
5-20 1,500 35
At long range, 30-240 nautical miles (NM), the radar shall provide data to the display
system for an accurate representation of the geographic relationship of terrain features
such as mountains, shore lines, islands, rivers, cities, bridges and dams. Detection is
defined in terms of single scan probability of detection (Pd) with a corresponding
probability of false alarm (Pfa). For all detection requirements herein, Pd shall be equal to
or greater than 90 percent with a Pfa of no greater than 1x10-6. The radar shall detect
targets, in terms of radar cross section (RCS), as shown in table 3.5.2.3.2.34, provided
the RCS of a given target exceeds the surrounding terrain by at least 6 dB.
Slant Range from Aircraft Target Radar Cross Sectional Area (m2)
At short range, £ 30 NM, the radar shall provide data to the display system for an accurate
representation of targets such as road intersections, bridges, towers, trucks, hangars, and
peculiar shoreline contours of lakes. When operating at short ranges (550 ft - 30 NM), the radar
shall detect targets, in terms of RCS, as shown in table 3.5.2.3.2.54, provided the RCS of a
given target exceeds the surrounding terrain by at least 6 dB.
Slant Range from Aircraft Target Radar Cross Sectional Area (m2)
5 1,500 50 60
3. Enhanced Resolution Ground Map
The terrain sensing shall provide a resolution sufficient to detect runways, landing zones, small
buildings and bridges at 30NM, with a desired range of 40NM. The system shall also provide
sufficient resolution to detect barrier cables supports and small obstacles (less than 1 m3)) on
unimproved or paved landing zones at a range of 5NM and a desired range of 8NM. The radar
shall provide signals to display the selected terrain in a centered, offset, or expanded plan
position indicator (PPI) format.
4. Very High Resolution Ground Map Mode (CAAP)
The system shall provide sufficient resolution at to detect barrier cables and small
obstacles (less than 1 cubic meter) on unimproved or paved landing zones at a
threshold range of 5NM. The system shall detect small boats and vehicles at a distance
of at least 5NM.
5. Precision Airdrop Capability
The radar shall support precision airdrop operations by providing precise position updates to
the navigation system using a cursor with ground mapping. The radar will normally be operated
in a hot cursor mode during precision airdrops.
6. Navigation Update
The radar shall be capable of providing precision updates to the aircraft’s navigation system.
The radar shall accept navigation system commands and position a visible symbol (cursor)
over a radar target based on navigation system present position, altitude above the target,
heading, and the designated target position. The operator shall be provided the means to
adjust the cursor position on the radar presentation to match the true position of the target.
When the cursor is precisely positioned over the target, the operator shall be able to signal the
radar to compute and send the necessary data over the aircraft databus to the navigation
system to update the accuracy of its position. . The radar shall be capable of positioning the
cursor over a target at a designated set of coordinates provided by the FMS. The radar shall
provide data indicating the ground range, as opposed to slant range of a designated target. The
radar shall also provide data indicating the ground range and bearing of a designated target, as
well as conversions from and in addition convert its azimuth, and range, and elevation to
latitude and longitude.
7. Cursor Functions.
8. Airborne Radar Approach (ARA)
The radar shall be capable of supporting ARAs by providing precise position updates to the
navigation system using a cursor with high-resolution ground mapping. The radar will normally
be operated in hot cursor mode during ARAs. During hot cursor operation, radar target position
information is used by the navigation system to temporarily update the navigation solution and
drive the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) accordingly.
9. Weather
The radar system shall have weather detection capabilities that meet or exceed the capabilities
and performance of radar systems installed on C-130H3 aircraft after 1995. The radar shall
locate and display weather to a range of 240NM with a desired range of 320NM
notwithstanding radar horizon due to altitude, and facilitate the operator in determining rainfall
intensity. The radar shall be capable of detecting, characterizing, and presenting data to the
display system for displaying weather returns as a function of rainfall intensity and range. The
radar shall provide data to the display system for weather returns in either a centered PPI or
offset PPI format.
1. Detection
The radar shall be capable of detecting a weather cell of up to a minimum of 45,000 feet
in height and 3 NM in diameter having a rainfall rate of 25 mm/hr at a range of 150 NM
with a 10 NM, 4 mm/hr intervening band of weather between the aircraft and the weather
cell.
2. Characterization
The radar shall provide data to the display system for weather returns in both color coded and
monochrome formats. The color-coded format shall conform to ARINC 708 type format as
specified in AC-25-11, Transport Category Airplane Electronic Display Systems, 16 Jul 87,
page 11. The color-coding shall be as follows:
The radar shall transpond, as a minimum, SST-181X-E and PPN-19 beacons and present
beacon data for overlay with other terrain sensor modes such as ground map. The radar shall
transpond ground and air beacons up to 20NM with an objective of 40NM.
In addition to SST-181X-E and PPN-19 beacons, the radar on all AFSOC aircraft
shall transpond SMP-1000 beacons.
In addition to the requirements for AMP, the TF/TA system shall provide for LPI/LPD
beacon operation as shown below.
The radar shall be capable of transponding the SST-181, PPN-19, and SMP-1000
beacons. Specific beacon characteristics are given in Table 3.4.1.3.10. The radar shall
also be capable of blocking beacon returns from interrogations by other radars
(defruiting). The data provided by the radar to the display system shall be compatible for
overlay with non-radar display presentations (Flight Plan, SKE, TCAS, etc.).
The radar shall provide data to the display system for returns from ground beacons in a
centered, offset, or expanded ground-stabilized PPI format with or without ground
mapping or weather overlaid. When ground beacon operation is commanded the radar
shall automatically tilt the antenna down to point at the center of the range scale selected
and select a spread beam for better ground coverage. When beacon returns are overlaid,
they shall be displayed in such a way as to ensure they are discernible from other returns.
The radar shall present location and beacon data from ground and air beacons and
overlay beacon returns on other terrain sensor modes (such as ground map). The radar
shall have the capability of successfully transponding ground beacons at a range of 20
NM at an altitude of 1000 feet or less with a Pd of 90 percent and a Pfa of 1x10-5.
Resolution and accuracy requirements in this mode are the same as those for ground
mapping.
The radar shall provide data to the display system for returns from airborne beacons in a body-
stabilized PPI format with or without ground mapping, skin paint, or weather overlaid. When air
beacon is commanded the radar shall automatically adjust the antenna tilt to zero degrees of tilt
and select a pencil beam. When beacon returns are overlaid, they shall be displayed in such a
way as to ensure they are discernible from other returns. The radar shall have the capability of
successfully transponding airborne beacons from 30 NM at an altitude of 1000 feet or more
with a Pd of 90 percent and a Pfa of 1x10-5.
The radar shall detect and present for display returns from C-130 size aircraft within ± 60
degrees of the aircraft heading when the target is above 1000 feet AGL (above ground level)
and in a lookdown scenario without significant degradation by intervening moderate
precipitation. The radar shall be capable of operating in this mode to at least 20 NM, with a
desired range of up to 40NM. The radar shall implement a selectable clutter notch filter to reject
main beam clutter and ground moving targets that it may detect in a lookdown scenario.
Minimum detection probability in this mode shall be 50% with a false alarm probability no
greater than 1 per minute. Targets shall be presented for display in a PPI format with target size
proportional to the target’s radar cross section. For each target , the radar shall cause the
display to present a vector arrow on the target to indicates the target’s relative direction and
motion.
12. Radar Detectability
When not in a transmitting mode, or while transitioning between modes, emissions shall be reduced
to a level that is not detectable by an adversary’s current passive detection system.
3. Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS)
A TAWS, formerly called Ground Collision Avoidance System (GCAS), which utilizes a worldwide
digital terrain database and a terrain display to provide a "look ahead" capability, is required. A
system that complies with, or meets the intent of, FAA Technical Standards Order TSO-C92c and the
FAA interim guidance (FAA Notice 8110.64) is required. Compliance with FAA TSO C-151 and
pending advisory circular (AC) for TAWS is required.
In addition to Nav/Safety requirements, the TAWS system shall utilize digital terrain elevation data
(DTED) level 1 in all flight regimes to include low level operations. An objective is DTED level 2.
TAWS shall have a crew selectable tactical mode with tailored warning parameters to allow the
aircraft to perform low-level missions and assault landings without false TAWS warning indications.
Visual and audible warning annunciations shall be individually inhibitable (AFSOC aircraft
only.)
1. Radar Altimeter
The radar altimeter capability shall be retained and integrated into the AMP system. The presentation
of radar altitudes shall be incorporated on the new electronic displays.
4. Windshear Detection
A predictive windshear detection capability shall be provided. The windshear detection capability
shall detect, and present on the multi-function displays, areas of low-level windshear in sufficient time
for corrective action.
The windshear detection capability shall present on the multi-function displays low altitude horizontal
windshear warnings when a potential hazard (microburst) is present. The required coverage for this
mode is ± 30 degrees in azimuth and 5 NMs in range. The objective detection range is 10 NMs.
In this mode weather reflectivity shall be presented over the required spatial domain using the same
ARINC 708 standard described above. Windshear is defined in terms of an F factor over a distance
where F is defined as:
F = Wx/g – Wh/v
where:
g = gravity
v = airspeed
Advanced warnings shall be presented for F factors greater than or equal to 0.105 averaged over
one kilometer, for the approved weight, altitude, and temperature envelope of the aircraft. The
windshear detection capability shall detect and present advanced windshear warning while the
aircraft is at least 3 NMs from a hazard while operating in dry air with a reflectivity of 5 dBz and
intervening rain up to the reflectivity of 40 dBz.
The WDS shall provide aural warnings to all cockpit crew stations. An objective is windshear
detection capability that also provides various levels of windshear alerts, awareness, possible
corrective action, and immediate corrective action.
1. Turbulence
A further objective is detection of turbulence. The system should measure the spectral width of each
weather return and declare turbulence present whenever the one-sigma value (standard deviation) of
the spectral width is equal to or greater than 5 m/s. The system should provide data to the display
system such that areas of turbulence can be identified using unique colors or techniques to readily
alert the operator. The system should be capable of detecting turbulence to a range of 50 NM.
5. Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance Navigation System (MC-130E/H) (CAAP)
The Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) navigation system defined in this document
shall be Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection. The TF/TA shall provide the
modes and capabilities defined in paragraphs below.
1. TF/TA Life Cycle Cost
TF/TA navigation shall employ systems that minimize Operations and Support (O&S)
costs. For systems that will replace existing systems, there shall be a 50% reduction in
the existing O&S costs, with a desired 75% cost reduction for these systems. In order to
reduce O&S costs, the TF/TA radar shall utilize an existing SOF C-130 radome. The
MC-130H IDS may be relocated to facilitate the use of an existing radome.
2. Functional Characteristics
The TF/TA shall use standard National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) products.
Terrain following guidance shall not cause unsafe operation of the aircraft. The system
shall operate within current aircraft velocity performance envelopes with no
degradation. If the system falls out of tolerance for safe flight, the system shall
annunciate the failure and issue a fly-up command within 0.5 seconds. Terrain following
guidance shall not require climb rates nor climb gradient in excess of current aircraft
capabilities. In so doing, the algorithm shall utilize real-time estimates of aircraft weight
and balance, thrust, lift, drag, trim, g’s onset rate, and available pitch rate. Classified
performance requirements can be found in Appendix 1.
3. Low Probability of Detection (LPD) and Low Probability of Intercept (LPI)
LPI/LPD requirements apply only to blended and passive modes of the system.
The system shall provide the following system states: 1) Active, 2) Passive, and 3)
Blended. The TF/TA System State shall be selectable by the operator(s) with the default
being blended. TF/TA shall provide 20NM of terrain to the aircrew in any TF/TA state. The
TF/TA shall provide a clear and distinct visual identification of present TF/TA System
State. The TF/TA state definitions are below. Three engine TF shall be supported in all
states.
During operation in either passive or blended state, the system shall alert the crew if the
aircraft leaves the area covered by the electronic terrain database, or if the current
aircraft ground track and speed will cause the aircraft to leave the area covered by the
database within 30 seconds All system modes shall be available in all states.
The system shall have a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of 600 hours with a desired
MTBF of 1000 hours in the blended or active states, and a 2000 hour MTBF with a
desired 3500 hour MTBF in the passive state.
1. Active
An onboard active terrain sensor is required. The active sensor shall control
emissions. The C-130 AMP radar shall be considered for use as the active terrain
sensor. TF/TA data and presentations shall be based only the terrain data received
from the terrain sensor. The TF/TA system shall generate a terrain profile.
2. Passive
TF/TA data and presentations shall be provided based only on stored electronic
DTED and the radar altimeter and a proven Terrain Reference Navigation (TRN)
algorithm. This state is intended for visual meteorological conditions (VMC) flight.
The appropriate display presentation(s) shall be generated strictly from these
sources of terrain data. While in this state, the terrain sensor system shall
automatically command the terrain sensor into a Standby condition. Emissions
from the terrain sensor shall be –130dBm or less. The terrain sensor system shall
provide TF and/or TA commands and display presentation(s) inputs in this mode. It
is desired that DTED data be used to determine navigation position.
3. Blended
This state is a combination of active and passive states. TF/TA data and presentations
shall be based on a combination of short-range terrain sensor data and long-range
electronic DTED. The TF/TA shall provide a minimum of 4.0º LIT (Look Into Turn), with a
desired 6.0º LIT. The TF/TA shall blend the short- and long-range data into a continuous
terrain profile with no operator-perceptible anomalies in the Energy/Elevation (E2) or
equivalent TF/TA presentation.
5. Modes
The system shall have TF and TA navigation modes that shall be power managed and
use pulse compression and/or other techniques to minimize the probability of intercept
while providing safe TF/TA navigation steering in stand-alone or blended mode. TF and
TA navigation shall operate either separately or together. The system shall have
concurrent TF/TA navigation and other modes. All functions and modes of the system
shall be available for flight in VMC and IMC conditions. The system shall be optimized to
provide safe flight while at minimum operating altitudes down to 250 feet AGL, and to
minimize the probability of detection and interception by enemy active and passive
threats while in either meteorological condition. Active and blended modes of the
system must allow for weather identification and avoidance plus TF/TA navigation in
visible moisture up to 10-mm /hour. Additionally, the system shall operate in the
presence of man-made obscurants including smoke and bacteriological and chemical
agents.
The TF/TA system shall ensure safe operation over mountainous, rolling, or
smooth terrain, reflective or non-reflective, including water, sand dunes and heavy
snow. The TF corridor shall be pre-planned using the mission or flight planning
system associated with the host MDS. The corridor width shall be based on the
combination of cross-track deviation error, navigation system Circular Error
Probability (CEP), and wingspan. The TF/TA system shall utilize real-time data or
estimates of MDS weight and balance, thrust, lift, drag, available pitch rate and
other current capabilities to calculate vertical commands to the crew.
The TF/TA shall provide the necessary information to accomplish TF over all
types of terrain, including sand, ice and snow covered terrain, and man-made
obstacles. Man-made obstacles shall be detected at a distance to allow
clearance. The false alarm rate shall be less than 1/hour. Single scan
probability of detection shall be 90% or greater. The TF mode shall detect
terrain as specified below from a minimum range of 550 ft to 20 NM.
s0 Range
-40 dBm Up to 1 NM
In all modes, the TF/TA shall provide Line of Sight (LOS) stabilization within
the host MDS altitude limits.
3. Set Clearance.
The TF/TA shall maintain safe and effective manual TF flight guidance at
selectable Set Clearances Planes (SCP) of 100’ to 1000’ AGL.
Off-route shall be defined as the aircraft has left or will leave the preplanned
route or corridor. Off-database shall be defined as the aircraft has left or will
leave the area covered by the stored electronic terrain database. The TF/TA
shall alert the crew within one second of determination of either or both of
these conditions. When the aircraft is off-route, the TF/TA shall provide safe
guidance to return to the pre-planned route. If the aircraft is about to leave the
database, the TF/TA shall provide safe guidance to return to the pre-planned
route.
The TF/TA shall provide an indication(s) to the crew when the aircraft state is
beyond the ability of TF/TA to maintain safe flight or recovery. This indication shall
be clear, distinct and unambiguous. The indication(s) shall be provided within one
second with 0.5 secondsdesired. The system shall TF/TA through steady rain of up
to 10-mm/hour, with a desired capability of 15-mm/hour, and permit safe TF/TA
navigation in areas of moderate rain cells without commanding fly-ups due to
weather.
TF/TA shall provide a terrain avoidance (TA) mode which shall detect at or greater than
current aircraft altitude over the ranges and azimuth specified herein (TBD). The TA
mode shall function in straight and level flight as well as climbing, descending, and
turning flight. The TF/TA shall provide terrain data for terrain avoidance for all specified
aircraft for all mission regimes. The TF/TA shall perform this mode while in Active,
Passive, or Blended State.
6. TF/TA Status
In addition to the requirements for AMP avionics BIT in Section 3.11.1.2.1, upon crew
initiated BIT, the TF/TA system shall then analyze the BIT results, and present the results
to the aircrew in English within 5 seconds of fault detection. When in the TF/TA mode of
operation and an operator has commanded (initiated) BIT, the TF/TA shall display a "fly-
up" command to the crew. The TF/TA shall store the BIT data for ground analysis. In
addition, the TF/TA system shall monitor all system caution and advisory discretes for
presentation to the crew in a prioritized highest-to-least critical order. During continuous
BIT all non-critical out-of-tolerance performance and trends toward out of tolerance
performance shall be reported to the aircrew within 5 seconds of detection, with a
desired goal of reporting within 1 second. Time delays between critical system failures
and reporting to the crew shall be imperceptable.
7. TF/TA Software
In addition to the requirements for AMP software in Section 3.10, all TF/TA software shall be the same across all
SOF MDSs. Upon application of power, the TF/TA shall automatically, without aircrew or ground crew intervention,
determine the MDS in which it is installed.
1. Communication
The AMP radio communication system shall perform the required communication functions and be
compatible with other avionics equipment necessary to the mission, and with the overall aircraft
requirements. Control and presentation functions for normal operation of the communication/radio
navigation equipment, except for the intercom, shall be integrated in the control/display system. The
required radios and equipment shall have the capability of being operated simultaneously without causing
degradation of communications, equipment performance or security. New or modified VHF radios are
required to alleviate frequency congestion in the VHF band.
Voice communication systems (VHF, HF, UHF, and SATCOM) shall be integrated with the aircraft ICS, and
shall interface with the FMS for mission coordination purposes to deliver a fully coordinated mission voice-
data package. SATCOM, VHF, and HF communications systems shall provide a data link capability, and
shall also provide/maintain VHF, HF, and SATCOM voice capability. All installed systems that emit RF
signals outside the aircraft shall be cockpit selectable including the ability to turn it on and off from a
primary crew member position. Secure Voice/Data encryption, anti-jam/anti-spoof capabilities shall be
provided for all communications systems.
1. Communication Management Function
The Communications Management Function (CMF) shall be designed to prevent single point failures.
A dual CMU or functional equivalent is required to act as a router for the data link applications and
shall be capable of hosting data link applications. The communications management function shall
comply with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC Characteristic 758. The CMF shall
support operation over the existing ATC/airline operational control (AOC) data link ground
infrastructure and provide a clear growth path to support operation over the planned aeronautical
telecommunications network (ATN).
2. Communication System Components
System components shall include, at a minimum: dual VHF, dual HF, dual UHF, SATCOM, digital
ICS, and secure communication systems. The VHF, SATCOM, and HF systems shall also be
upgradeable to support data link capabilities; a worldwide data link capability to support air traffic
control (ATC) and command and control (C2) functions, and a communications management function
(CMF).
The communication system shall meet the GATM requirements. The system should provide the
cockpit crew with the capability to talk simultaneously on any combination of VHF, UHF, HF, and
SATCOM radios from all cockpit crew position and the ability to monitor all radios from any crew
position.
The VHF, UHF and SATCOM radios shall be capable of receiving time from the aircraft GPS to
synchronize frequency hopping during anti-jam modes. The communication system control display(s)
shall display the actual frequency selected in all modes.
Existing, SATCOM communication capabilities shall be retained and integrated into the overall
system such that aircrew and/or mission crew communications capabilities are not degraded. The
communication system shall also provide for a manual control (Hard Wired) solution that provides
emergency Backup VHF/UHF voice capability. These radios shall receive power from the aircraft
battery bus. The communication system shall use multifunction wide band antennas and the
associated diplexers/filters required for simultaneous operation of navigation and communication
systems.
The Communications Management Function (CMF) shall be designed to prevent single point failures.
A dual CMU or functional equivalent is required to act as a router for the data link applications and
shall be capable of hosting data link applications. The communications management function shall
comply with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC Characteristic 758. The CMF shall
support operation over the existing ATC/airline operational control (AOC) data link ground
infrastructure and provide a clear growth path to support operation over the planned aeronautical
telecommunications network (ATN).
3. UHF
The UHF system shall be capable of worldwide air-to-air and air-to-ground traffic control in the 225 to
400 MHz frequency bands. Dual UHF systems shall be integrated with the FMS and controlled
through software from the MCDUs to include power up, frequency selection, mode control,
volume/squelch control, antenna selection, and secure/plain selection. There shall be a hard-wired
control panel for emergency control of one UHF system located on the pilots control panel and
powered by the aircraft battery bus. The system shall be compatible with, and capable of operating in
UHF voice, data, DF, encryption, and anti-jam modes including Have Quick I and II. Multi-band
antennae such as UHF/L-band or VHF/UHF antenna shall be used.
4. SATCOM
The SATCOM system shall provide both line-of-sight and satellite voice/data communications in the
225-400 MHz frequency bands. The system shall be capable of operation in both the 25 kHz and 5
kHz bandwidths. A SATCOM data link system that is compliant with ICAO SARPs is required to
provide a second, independent, worldwide data link capability to support ATC and C2 functions. The
SATCOM system shall provide priority-preemption schemes to allow it to be shared between ATC
and C2 functions.
The SATCOM system shall be compliant with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC
741 (Aviation Satellite Communication System) or ARINC 761 (Second-Generation Aviation Satellite
Communication System.) The SATCOM system shall be compliant with CJCS DAMA/DASA
SATCOM requirements. (See ORD para 3.1.2.3).
The SATCOM system shall also provide an ICAO SARPs-compliant voice capability that can be used
for direct pilot-to-controller communication. The SATCOM system shall have a Multi band antenna
capability like a SATCOM/GPS antenna.
5. VHF
The VHF system shall provide dual VHF AM/FM/SINCGARS capable radios with VHF-AM operation
at 25 kHz and 8.33 kHz channel spacing. Dual VHF systems shall be integrated with the FMS and
controlled through software from the MCDUs to include power up, frequency selection, mode control,
volume/squelch control, antenna selection, and secure/plain selection. There shall be a hard-wired
control panel for emergency control of one VHF system located in the Co-pilots control panel and
powered by the aircraft battery bus.
Radios utilized on these aircraft must also be capable of operating in the FM high band,
Maritime band. (AFSOC, ACC only). Encryption capability shall be provided to meet all operating
bands of these radios. The system shall be upgradeable to support data link capability including
worldwide support of Air Traffic Control and C2 functions and a communications management
function.
1. 8.33 kHz VHF Channel Spacing
To allow aircraft to operate as general air traffic in European upper airspace, dual radios capable of
VHF-AM analog voice operation at reduced (8.33 kHz) channel spacing in accordance with ICAO
SARPs (Annex 10, Volume III) are required. Existing 25-kHz channel spacing capability shall be
retained (e.g., 125.025 MHz, 125.050 MHz, 125.075 MHz, etc.).
6. VHF Digital Link
VHF aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS) and VHF digital link (VDL)
Mode 2 (aviation VHF packet communication, AVPAC) capabilities are desired. It is desired that the
GATM radios have a well-defined upgrade path to meet future requirements for line-of-sight data link
communications: VDL Mode 3, time-division multiple-access (TDMA) digitized voice and data; and
VDL Mode 4, self-organizing TDMA. Encryption capabilities are required for all VDL modes of
operation.
7. HF- Automatic Control Processor (ACP)
The HF system shall provide worldwide HF single side band (SSB) and amplitude modulated (AM)
voice and data communication in the 2 - 29.9999 MHz frequency range. The ACP and control is
required to for the HF frequency hopping. Time of day shall be provided from the GPS system.
The HF system shall be integrated with the FMS and controlled through software from the MCDUs to
include power up, frequency selection, mode control, volume/squelch control, and secure/plain
selection. A high frequency data link (HFDL) system that is compliant with ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) is required to provide a worldwide data link capability to support
ATC and C2 functions. The HFDL system shall provide priority-preemption schemes to allow the
system to be shared between ATC and C2 functions. The HFDL system shall be compliant with
ARINC 635 (HF Data Link Protocols) and with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC
753 (HF Data Link System).
8. Secure Communication / Anti-Jam
Communication encryption (voice and data) shall be provided for all UHF, VHF, HF, and SATCOM
radios. The use of secure equipment shall be operator selectable through either the applicable
MCDU or remote secure system terminal. Secure devices should have a centralized load panel that
will enable all cryptographic processors to be loaded from one central point. The secure devices shall
be accessible so that a crewmember can load each unit individually in the event of centralized
loading failure. The secure equipment shall include plain, cipher, and cipher text only modes of
operation. The HF secure equipment shall include Plain and Cipher Text Only modes of operation.
All communications radios shall be compatible with, and include, a suitable anti-jam mode. All
systems shall be certified to be supportable in the electromagnetic spectrum, and host nation
frequency assignment, when required, must be obtained prior to fielding the first aircraft.
9. Interphone Communication Set (ICS)
A highly reliable, digitally controlled central intercommunications system that will maintain the current
number and general location of ICS stations and be compatible with active noise reduction (ANR)
headsets is required. General requirements shall be as follows:
The new ICS shall have growth capability to meet future radio requirements. An ICS shall be
provided to control the selected use of the radio receivers and transmitters, navigation aids, IFF, and
person-to-person communication by crewmembers within the air vehicle, as well as with ground
maintenance personnel. The ICS shall provide for this control and these communications links at all
crew stations.
The ICS stations shall have the necessary controls for selecting equipment for monitoring, adjusting
volume level for the various equipment, hot mike control, selection of interphone channel, and
adjustment of the signal level to the headset or loudspeaker. All interior intercom positions shall have
an emergency override capability.
1.
ICS Capabilities
The ICS system should provide the cockpit crew with the capability to talk simultaneously on
any combination of VHF, UHF, HF, and SATCOM radios from all cockpit crew positions and the
ability to monitor all radios from any crew position. All positions shall have a hot mike capability
independent of the normal interphone channels. As a minimum, all crewmembers shall be able
to communicate with each other and the aircrew shall have an emergency radio useable at all
times. The ICS shall provide an emergency override interphone call function.
The intercommunication system shall operate on internal battery, engine generator(s), external
power, or in combinations thereof. In the event of main aircraft power failure, the ICS shall
remain operable.
All flight deck ICS positions shall interface with navigation aids, IFF, the main interphone and all
private interphone channels. ICS operation shall not be degraded no matter how many stations
are in use at any one time. A non-delayed sidetone shall be provided for all stations. A failed
ICS station shall not degrade the performance of the remaining ICS components and system.
The ICS shall accommodate both secure and clear data and voice. The ICS shall provide
intelligible audio signals, high quality sound, during all phases of the operational mission. The
ICS shall provide private conferencing between two or more stations. The exact number shall
be determined based on mission needs. Total delay due to processing of any type of the audio
signal by the ICS shall not exceed 100 milliseconds.
All ICS controls will include audio on/off switches as well as volume control. The ICS system
shall provide plain/cipher indicators for each crew position that has a transmit capability for a
selected radio subsystem.
When enabled, from any station, this call function shall be applied to all ICS stations in a way
that the call audio is 6 dB above all other audio signals. The ICS shall provide path redundancy
to reduce chances of catastrophic failure, and be EMI shielded.
At least three channels shall be provided (one primary and two private) for two-way crew
communications. Study and analysis of mission requirements shall determine the actual
number of channels. ICS shall provide ability for appropriate personnel to monitor equipment-
warning tones, i.e. EW threat audio. Study and analysis of mission requirements shall
determine identification of appropriate personnel.
The ICS shall have a HOT MIC capability, which allows the operator to transmit over the
interphone without pressing the PTT switch. The ICS automatic gain control (AGC) response
time shall not be noticeable or mission impairing.
The system shall have 50 percent reserve capability for audio inputs (e.g., an additional radio,
an additional defensive tone, etc.). The system must include the ability to address passengers
and crew through a speaker system in the cockpit and cargo compartment.
2. Interphone, ACC and AFSOC Aircraft Only
The ICS should allow for enabling/disabling the transmission function at any ICS station. The
ICS, as a minimum, shall have a Crew Station Control Unit available for each crew member
position, and shall be capable of supporting up to 27 ICS units for ACC and AFSOC with no
degradation as more crewmembers utilize the system. The ICS shall have, as a minimum,
three private nets accessible by all crew positions with imbedded isolation nets. The ICS shall
provide audio warnings, EMI shielding, high quality sound, and EW threat audio. Audio
transmissions must be intelligible at all operational ambient noise levels.
10. Cockpit Printer.
A cockpit printer shall be installed as part of the avionics suite. The printer shall be able to print, as a
minimum, all Air Traffic Control information including flight plans received from off board sources through
the avionics suite. The printer should also be able to print information from the avionics computers,
terminal area products, and have the fidelity to print charts and photos (not photo quality) for use by the
crew.
2. Surveillance
1. Surveillance System Components
An Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) that is interoperable with civil systems and an
Automatic Dependent Surveillance system for automatic position reporting is required to meet
surveillance requirements. The main components shall include, but are not limited to a TCAS
system, Mode S transponder, and displays.
The downlink aircraft parameters (DAP) capability, which allows Mode S transmissions from the
aircraft to carry aircraft state information to the ground Mode S sensor, is desired to meet future
European carriage requirements planned for 2003. The TCAS II system and Mode S transponder
shall provide a growth path to support ADS-B in accordance with RTCA DO-185A and RTCA
DO-181A, respectively, and RTCA DO-242, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards
(MASPS) for ADS-B. Conflict resolutions are coordinated between aircraft via a Mode S transponder.
2. Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
1. Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Overall Capabilities
Fault detection and display, communication protocols, interaction with other transponder-
equipped aircraft and ground agencies shall also meet the requirements of TSO-C119a and
applicable FARs, except as directed by this document.
TCAS II operation requires a Mode S transponder, with level 2 (or higher) functionality. After
modification, the aircraft shall maintain its IFF Mode 4 capability and the capability for
simultaneous operation of IFF and TCAS systems. The TCAS system shall be designed and
installed to allow the aircrew to turn-off the system.
When using Enhanced TCAS, the radar and display systems shall be capable of
communicating, via the aircraft databus, with the Enhanced TCAS processor to effect an
air-to-air rendezvous (ACC and AFSOC Tanker aircraft only).
2. TCAS Controls and Presentations
Situation awareness information shall be provided for presentation on the multi-function display(s) as
selected by each pilot, and on multi-function display(s) located at the ACM station and SMC station
as selected by crewmembers occupying those stations. When displayed as an overlay the TCAS
information shall be automatically scaled to the selected range scale.
3. Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
A TAWS, formerly called Ground Collision Avoidance System (GCAS), which utilizes a worldwide
digital terrain database and a terrain display to provide a "look ahead" capability, is required. A
system that complies with, or meets the intent of, FAA Technical Standards Order (TSO) TSO-C151
and the FAA interim guidance (FAA Notice 8110.64) is required. Compliance with FAA pending
advisory circular (AC) for TAWS is required if the AC is available at contract award.
In addition to Nav/Safety requirements, the TAWS system shall utilize digital terrain elevation data
(DTED) level 1 in all flight regimes to include low level operations (300 feet AGL), with a desired
capability of DTED level 2 in all flight regimes to include low level operations. Visual and audible
warning annunciations shall be individually inhibitable (AFSOC aircraft only.) TAWS shall have
a tactical mode with tailored warning parameters to allow the aircraft to perform low-level missions
and assault landings without false TAWS warning indications.
1. Radar Altimeter
The radar altimeter functions shall be retained and integrated into the AMP system. The presentation
of radar altitudes shall be incorporated on the new electronic displays. There shall be manual and
automatic selection of either Combined Altitude Radar Altimeter (CARA).
2. Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR)/Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
A FAA TSO-C-124a compliant solid state digital flight data recorder with at least 25 hours of solid
state memory to record data is required. Data bus monitoring is required to ensure that parameters
are recorded, including those from display and HUD systems that have no analyzable hardware for
accident investigation.
The system shall have the capability to record, as a minimum, all of the 88 parameters identified in
Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121, Appendix M, that are applicable to C-130 aircraft, plus
engine fuel flow, TIT, and all engine/propeller synchrophaser control parameters for each engine. The
88 FAA parameters are included in Appendix 1. The system shall also be capable of recording
engine parameters a minimum of once per second. Additionally, the capability for the recorder to
record, for aircraft so equipped, the structural life history data is desired.
A solid state CVR with at least two hours of solid state memory and a minimum of four-channel
capability is required. The CVR shall comply with FAA TSO-C123a.
Dual redundant DFDR and CVR capabilities are desired. DFDR/CVR annunciation, displays, and
controls shall be readable during the day, or at night, and shall be accessible by at least one
crewmember. Actual annunciator placement shall be determined in the Cockpit Working Group.
1. DFDR/CVR Requirements
1. DFDR/CVR General Requirements
The contractor should integrate the redundant DFDR and CVR in a dual redundant
manner, so that one DFDR or CVR can accomplish all stated functions in the event of
loss of the other DFDR or CVR. Redundant DFDR/CVR capability is desired. In the
interest of reducing the impact to logistics and maintenance, the use of a Combined Voice
and Flight Data Recorder (CVFDR) unit is preferred.
Installation of the DFDR and CVR unit(s) shall be in accordance with Title 14 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 25, to the
maximum extent practical. The contractor shall recommend placement locations for the
DFDR and CVR unit(s), so that the first unit(s) is in compliance with FAR Part 25, and the
second unit(s) is as far from the first unit(s) as practical while still maximizing survivability
and maintenance access.
The DFDR shall comply with FAA TSO-C124a. The CVR shall comply with FAA TSO-
C123a. The DFDR and CVR shall be equipped with a self-powered, underwater acoustic
beacon to assist with location in the event of loss during an overwater flight.
The DFDR/CVR system shall be self monitoring, and shall alert the operator in the event
of failure of critical system components. The DFDR/CVR system shall have provisions for
a back-up power source in the event of loss of all aircraft-generated power. The back-up
power source shall be capable of providing operating power to the DFDR/CVR system for
a minimum of 20 minutes. The DFDR/CVR system shall be capable of recording data bus
information from various aircraft data bus standards as required.
The contractor shall examine and define the availability of data sources for various
loss of power scenarios. This definition shall include the data sources that will be
lost or degraded for each power loss condition, and shall track the loss or
degradation to a specific loss of power condition.
The contractor shall recommend the parameters that will comprise this minimum
parameter set. The objective is to maximize the acquisition of flight data relevant to
accident investigation. The DFDR/CVR system shall be integrated so that signal
acquisition during degraded modes of operation is automatic, and that the minimum
set of data parameters always shall be acquired for recording under every power
loss scenario without any additional actions taken by crewmembers.
The DFDR/CVR system shall be capable of monitoring all aircraft data buses. The
contractor shall maximize the use of data buses for signal acquisition, and shall
keep the use of DFDR system-unique transducers or similar devices to a minimum.
An objective for the integration is to utilize data bus inputs for at least 90 percent of
signal acquisition. The DFDR shall monitor and record data bus streams from
equipment, such as aircraft displays and other similar equipment for which no post-
crash analyzable hardware exists. It is the intent of this requirement to enable the
investigator to review aircraft data bus traffic as a part of the overall accident
investigation effort.
The DFDR shall have a minimum capacity to store 25 hours of recorded data on
solid-state media. The contractor shall select a DFDR analysis software package
that is capable of being run in a personal computer network environment utilizing a
Windows NT or Windows 95 or later version, operating system.
The contractor shall integrate the DFDR to acquire and record structural life history
data. The data collected shall be stored on digital media. The life history data
memory shall be capable of recording and storing up to a minimum of 12 hours of
information.
The contractor shall recommend the data to record, but, as a minimum, the data
specified in Technical Order (T.O.) 1C-130-101 and collected manually on Air Force
Technical Order (AFTO) Form 151A shall be acquired, recorded, and stored as
structural life history data.
The system shall be capable of transmitting the life history data via an RF data link.
The data format and transmission frequency shall be compatible with GANS/GATM
equipment and requirements. The data burst transmission feature shall have two
modes of operation, manual and automatic. Operation in the manual mode shall be
initiated by the operator. In the automatic mode, the system shall transmit the
required data after having been interrogated by a suitably equipped ground station.
The crew shall have the option of attempting to transmit the data in the manual
mode, or to select a feature that prohibits overwriting the data until the next
scheduled transmission attempt. At the next scheduled attempt (a one-hour interval
from the last scheduled failed attempt), the system shall attempt to establish contact
and transmit all stored data not previously verified as successfully transmitted.
The contractor shall recommend the equipment required for both the aircraft and
ground station to ensure compatibility of the systems. The contractor shall ensure
that the downloaded data is compatible with ground station analysis software." The
contractor shall select a software package that provides a structural life history
analysis module integrated with the DFDR analysis software. The software shall be
capable of being run in a personal computer network environment utilizing a
Windows NT or Windows 95 or later version, operating system.
The CVR shall be capable of recording a minimum of four channels of voice data. However, six
channels are preferred. The CVR shall be integrated with the Intercommunications System
(ICS) and radio circuits, and shall monitor the pilot, the copilot, the flight engineer, and a wide-
area microphone (channels one through four). The remaining two channels, if available, are
undefined, and are to be reserved for future use.
The CVR shall have a minimum capacity to store one hour of recorded voice data on solid-
state media prior to overwriting. The CVR shall record all audio annunciations provided to the
aircrew through the ICS. The contractor shall integrate with the ICS and radio circuits to ensure
that classified transmissions are not recorded.
2. AFSOC OPSEC Mode
The CVR and DFDR must have the capability to be zeroized, turned off, or operated in an
OPSEC mode to preclude recording sensitive mission data in non-volatile memory, or to
prevent inadvertent transmission of life history data.
3. Windshear Detection
A predictive windshear detection capability shall be provided. The windshear detection capability shall detect, and present
on the multi-function displays, areas of low-level windshear in sufficient time for corrective action.
The windshear detection capability shall present on the multi-function displays low altitude horizontal windshear warnings
when a potential hazard (microburst) is present. The required coverage for this mode is ± 30 degrees in azimuth and 5 NMs
in range. The desired detection range is 10 NMs.
In this mode weather reflectivity shall be presented over the required spatial domain using the same ARINC 708 standard
described above. Windshear is defined in terms of an F factor over a distance where F is defined as:
F = Wx/g – Wh/v
where:
g = gravity
v = airspeed
Advanced warnings shall be presented for F factors greater than or equal to 0.105 averaged over one kilometer, for the
approved weight, altitude, and temperature envelope of the aircraft. The windshear detection capability shall detect and
present advanced windshear warning while the aircraft is at least 3 NMs from a hazard while operating in dry air with a
reflectivity of 5 dBz and intervening rain up to the reflectivity of 40 dBz.
The windshear detection capability shall also provide various levels of windshear alerts, awareness, possible corrective
action, and immediate corrective action. Detection of turbulence is also desired.
1. Defensive Systems (DS)
1. Combat Delivery and AC-130H/MC-130E Defensive Systems
The existing C-130 AAR-47 Missile Warning System (MWS), ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing
System (CMDS), and ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) shall be integrated on Combat Delivery
aircraft. The existing ALQ-172 Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) jammer system, ALQ-196 jammer,
ALR-69 RWR, AAR-44 MWS, ALE-47 CMDS, AAQ-24 DIRCM and APR-46 RF receiver subsystems
shall be integrated on AC-130H and MC-130E aircraft.
All stores equipment and stores used in the aircraft’s defensive systems suites shall comply with SEEK
EAGLE requirements if applicable.to provide automated protection against IR and RF threats. The
integrated DS shall optimize countermeasures techniques by correlating threat reports from the MWS and
RWR to provide combined threat reporting to the CMDS. DS integration shall provide fully automatic threat
response capabilities to minimize crew defensive duties during critical phases of flight. Threat and DS
status information shall be integrated into the HUD and MFDs to increase situational awareness, improve
threat response capabilities and decrease aircrew defensive workload.
1. DS Integration
The MWS, CMDS, and RWR shall be interconnected to provide the integrated DS capability for the
aircraft. No hardware or software modifications to the existing DS subsystems shall be required to
implement the DS integration, with the exception of planned or on-going upgrades. The system shall
be fault tolerant to the extent that no subsystem failure shall cause degradation of other DS
subsystem baseline capabilities and data bus failure shall not degrade baseline subsystem
integration or performance. Integration of the items making up the defensive systems may allow
classified data to be transferred electronically between them. This classified data shall be protected.
The DS shall be capable of clearly displaying the classification level of the system to maintenance
and operations personnel. The crew shall have the capability to zeroize classified current mission
data only or zeroize all classified data for the system and subsystems (OFP, threat tables, and
mission data). The integrated DS subsystems shall be provided appropriate power for operation even
during the most critical power conditions.
2. System Performance
The integrated DS shall retain the capabilities of the individual subsystems. The system shall be
capable of capturing, processing and transmitting all data bus messages for all subsystems. The
system shall be capable of receiving and transmitting the required data from/to other aircraft buses to
allow for the required control and display functions. Information from the DS must be displayed to the
crew to allow for rapid situation analysis and appropriate reaction.. The time from threat signal
reception to display shall not exceed baseline subsystem capabilities plus one-half second. The
integrated DS shall utilize FMS data to establish environmental criteria for automated defensive
system operation and to enhance aircrew situational awareness. The system shall be capable of
manual or automatic dispensing of CMDS expendables. Responses shall be based on threat
priorities. In the automatic mode, chaff shall be dispensed in a patterned mode when a properly (no
ambiguity) identified threat has been detected by the RWR. When an ambiguity exists, the system
will dispense a generic chaff program. The system shall not allow dispensing of expendable while the
aircraft is on the ground, however, there shall be a means for maintenance to test chaff/flare
dispensing on the ground to ensure system confidence. The system shall be fault tolerant to the
extent that no subsystem failure shall cause degradation of other DS subsystem baseline capabilities
and data bus failure shall not degrade baseline subsystem integration.
3. Defensive System Software
A means shall be provided for flightline loading of all subsystems data (OFPs, threat tables, and
mission data) from a single point. The DS system shall be programmable using the standard Air
Force reprogramming device. System self-test shall be automatically initiated at power up. All
software load (MDF, MDT and OFP) version information shall be displayed in the cockpit during initial
system startup. The system should perform periodic autonomous self-test without degrading
operation of the DS subsystems. The DS shall comply with AFI 10-703, Electronic Warfare
Integrated Reprogramming (EWIR) requirements for rapid reprogramming of threat parameters and
system software.
4. Data Correlation
The system shall correlate threat reports based on the detected threat ID/emitter parameters using
stored threat ID and correlation databases. Correlated threat reporting shall be provided to the
CMDS for control of expendables dispensing. The system shall provide fused data for selected
output to the aircraft display system including threat environment information, countermeasures
availability/ response status, threat parameters, high priority text messages and caution and advisory
messages.
5. Controls and Displays
All DS controls and displays shall have sufficient redundancy to preclude a single point failure of the
system. Further requirements for DS control and display functions can be found in the classified
annex.
1. Controls
Each of the pilots, ACM and navigator on ACC aircraft, shall be able to control all of the
defensive systems equipment from their normal seated crew positions. Manual backup controls
for the CMDS, RWR and MWS shall be provided. A means shall be provided for the crew to
safe the system such that all DS systems are inhibited from ejecting stores during air refueling
or paratroop drops. The system shall not allow dispensing of expendables while the aircraft is
on the ground, however, there shall be a means for maintenance to test chaff/flare dispensing
on the ground to ensure system confidence. Chaff and flare modes, including manual or
automatic dispensing, shall be controllable by the crew from selected stations throughout the
aircraft. As a minimum, all primary crewmembers shall have both chaff and flare dispensing
controls at their respective crew stations. The aircrew shall be able to override the remote
dispense switches.
2. Displays
Threat and status information from the integrated DS shall be displayed on the HUD and any MFDs.
All data currently displayed on individual subsystem displays shall be displayed on any selected
MFD. Audio alerts shall be provided to the flight crew headsets. An indication shall be provided
giving the number of chaff and flare events remaining given current settings for available chaff and
flare programs. It is desired that stored subsystem data (tables, maintenance data, etc.) be
accessible from the cockpit on MFDs or by using standard maintenance aids/personal computers.
6. Growth
The It is desired that the DS shall have sufficient flexibility and growth potential to be capable of capturing,
processing, and transmitting data bus messages for all planned subsystems, includingfor possible future
additions such as laser warning receivers/jammers, laser dazzle devices, radio frequency and infrared
countermeasure systems, towed decoys and off-board tactical broadcast receivers.
2. AFSOC Defensive Systems (AC-130U and MC-130H)
The AFSOC AC-130U and MC-130H aircraft DS integration shall include as a baseline all Combat
Delivery DS capabilities and requirements. In addition to the Combat Delivery DS capabilities, the
following AFSOC-only capabilities shall be provided. The existing ALQ-172 Electronic
Countermeasures (ECM) jammer system, ALQ-196 jammer, ALR-69 RWR, AAR-44 MWS, ALE-47
CMDS, AAQ-24 DIRCM and APR-46 RF receiver subsystems shall be integrated via an Electronic
Warfare (EW) bus to provide automated protection against IR and RF threats. The integrated EW
Bus shall be integrated with Enhanced Situational Awareness (ESA) capabilities to correlate and
fuse threat reports from the on-board and off-board sensors and provide combined threat reporting
to the CMDS and ECM systems. The integrated EW Bus and ESA systems shall provide the aircrew
with in-flight, near real-time tactical information. The DS systems should have sufficient
redundancy to prevent single point failure of the system.
1. DS Integration
The DS shall be capable of capturing, processing and transmitting all data bus messages for
all subsystems attached to the EW bus, with growth potential for all planned subsystems.
System self-test shall be automatically initiated at power up.
2. DS Integration.
The AFSOC DS integration shall enhance crew situational awareness by providing in-flight,
near real-time tactical information in the cockpit. This threat data shall include pre-mission
threat/tactical information, updates to the pre-mission threat data received in-flight and new
threat information received from intelligence satellite broadcasts and on-board EW sensors.
Pre-mission data (e.g. planned route, threat locations, targets or landing/drop zones, no-fly
areas, etc.) shall be loaded from existing and upgraded mission planning and intelligence
systems. The system shall also allow for manual input of any other tactical data. The system
shall filter broadcast data so that only relevant intelligence updates are received in the
cockpit. The filters shall be set on the ground, selectable in flight and include a moving filter
about the aircraft present position. The system shall also provide threat geolocation with
sufficient accuracy to support automatic and semi-automatic route replanning to increase
probability of mission success. Threat information shall be displayed on any MFD in a digital
moving map format. The system shall have the capability to monitor aircraft caution and
advisory signals and display them to the EWO.
The DS shall allow easy and rapid input, in-flight or as preloaded mission data, of crew-
designated no-fly/avoidance areas for example, weather, hostile ground troops, etc.
The DS shall provide in-flight, NRT (near real time) threat location using pre-mission, on-
board and off-board data for route replanning and threat detection/avoidance. Pre-mission
data shall be loaded from existing and upgraded mission planning systems. The DS shall
filter broadcast data so that only relevant intelligence updates are received in the cockpit. The
filters shall be set on the ground, selectable in flight and include a moving filter about the
aircraft present position. The DS shall also provide threat geolocation to support automatic
and semi-automatic route replanning to avoid detection/engagement. The DS shall provide
cueing to the aircrew for countermeasures and maneuvers to assist in determining threat
response strategies. The DS shall provide control information to the EW systems to provide a
balance between covertness and countermeasures protection. This threshold protection
capability shall be re-configurable in flight to allow maximum mission flexibility. A user-
definable response approach shall be incorporated to contain desired countermeasures
response for each detected threat as well as the desired EW system when there are
overlapping capabilities. This response shall be re-programmable during ground or airborne
operations on the aircraft without removing LRUs.
3. Defensive System Performance
The DS shall receive Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) data through the Multi-mission
Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT) or equivalent, and other existing receivers. The system
shall receive pre-mission EOB from current and planned USSOCOM intelligence systems and
databases including SOCRATES and Combat Intelligence System (CIS). The DS shall utilize
Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) from off-board sources where appropriate. The DS shall
be able to receive, store and present pop-up threat data from the on-board sensors as well as
from off-board broadcasts. Pop-up threats shall be displayed on MFDs and backup displays,
at actual latitude/longitude or UTM coordinates, using RWR-compatible symbology. It is
desired that EOB symbology be common throughout the SOF C-130 fleet.
1. Threat Response
Threats detected by the EW sensors shall be displayed to the crew to allow for rapid
situation analysis and appropriate reaction. The system shall present the pop-up threat
and intervisibility within a two-second threshold 99% of the time. The DS system shall
receive, store, and present pop-up threat data from the various onboard sensor systems
as well as from off-board broadcasts via an intelligence receiver, paragraph 3.5.2.7. Each
threat shall be displayed at its actual location using standard symbology. In the
automatic mode, chaff shall be dispensed in a patterned mode when a properly (no
ambiguity) identified threat has been detected by the RWR or other receiver.
The system shall allow easy and rapid input of crew-designated no-fly/avoidance areas
including weather, hostile ground troops, etc. If detection or engagement cannot be
avoided, the DS system shall provide alternative threat response strategies that are
enabled by crew consent and shall include the host aircraft Electronic Counter
Measures (ECM) capabilities, the hostile threat intentions, terrain, etc. The aircrew shall
have absolute consent over all responses to threats. The system shall provide inputs for
timely manual and semi-automatic aircrew-initiated route re-planning. The following
requirements shall be refined at a crew station working group (CSWG):
The DS shall determine if the planned route of flight will bring the aircraft within
coverage of a threat received from on- or off-board systems. If the planned route is
within threat coverage, the aircrew shall be alerted within 2 seconds. The DS shall
complete an automatic route replan within 3 seconds, with an objective of 1 second,
when a new threat is received that can have LOS visibility to the host aircraft.
The DS shall provide alternative threat response strategies that are enabled by crew
consent and include the host aircraft ECM capabilities, hostile threat intentions, and
terrain. The DS shall plan at least one abort route.
2. Upon notification of a new threat if detection can be avoided:
3. The DS system shall determine if the planned route of flight will bring the aircraft within detection or lethal
range of the threat. Inter-visibility for correlated threat locations shall be calculated using standard NIMA
products and shall be compared to the planned route.
4. If the planned route is within threat coverage, the aircrew shall be alerted within 2 seconds.
5. The DS system shall complete an automatic route replan within a minimum of 3 seconds with an objective of
1 second.
6. If detection cannot be avoided:
7. The system shall control the subsystems to provide a balance between covertness and countermeasures
protection. This threshold capability shall be re-configurable in flight to allow maximum mission flexibility. A
user-definable response approach shall be incorporated to contain desired countermeasures response for
each detected threat as well as the desired ECM/expendable system when there are overlapping capabilities.
This response shall be re-programmable during ground or airborne operations on the aircraft without
removing LRUs. The objective capability shall incorporate (vice flight revise) ECM techniques such as
Advanced Detection And Response system (ADARS) and Enhanced Situational Awareness Insertion (ESAI).
Further requirements on integrated control over chaff and flares can be found in the classified annex.
8. The DS system shall also plan at least 1 abort route option when detection/engagement cannot be avoided.
9. Defensive System Software
10. The DS system shall be programmable using the standard AFSOC reprogramming device. System software
shall be loaded using the standard Air Force loading device.
11. Data Correlation and Fusion
The DS shall provide fused data for selected output to a consolidated EW display, including
threat environment information, countermeasures availability/response status, threat
parameters, high priority text messages, caution and advisory legends and activation of
expendable and RF jamming subsystems. Using all available on-board and off-board data, the
DS shall perform Level IV fusion, including SEI when required emitter data is available. For
airborne threats, data shall be correlated and fused such that hostile air tracks shall be
displayed on the map presentation if they meet crew-selectable timeliness and distance
criteria. Correlation and fusion shall incorporate a reidentification capability for unknown or
misidentified threats. All relevant threat data shall be displayed to the crew within 2 seconds,
with a desired goal of 0.5 seconds. This capability shall be employed to reduce ambiguities
and incorrect identification of threats.
4. Controls and Displays
An MFD shall be provided at the EWO crew station which provides for consolidated control
and monitoring of all EW/ESA subsystems. Further requirements for EW/ESA control and
display functions can be found in the classified annex.
1. Modifications to the existing EWO suite panels should be minimized. Existing EWO Control Display Units
(CDUs) should be maintained as backups as appropriate.
2. Controls
The aircrew shall have absolute consent over all responses to threats. ECM response
should be selectable so as to apply either an automatic or EWO-initiated response for
each subsystem to counter specific threats. In the automatic mode, chaff shall be
dispensed in a patterned mode when a properly (no ambiguity) identified threat has
been detected by the RWR or other receiver. When an ambiguity exists, the system will
dispense a generic chaff program. The DS shall allow for easy and rapid input of crew
designated no-fly/avoidance areas. The DS shall also allow for manual input of other
tactical data, including threat avoidance data, routes and waypoints. There shall be
dedicated buttons or main menu controls for brightness and contrast, which are readily
accessible by each crewmember while seated. Each crewmember shall have selectable
decluttering and precedence of display layers, with declutter or precedence changes in
no more than 1 second, 99% of the time, with a desired goal of declutter or precedence
changes within 0.5 seconds, 99% of the time. There shall be sufficient levels of feature
deselect or declutter to permit a single layer or no layers to remain. Declutter levels shall
be independent between displays. The AFSOC EW/ESA system shall have a declassify
function which destroys sensitive EOB, MATT and mission data and zeroizes COMSEC
data from any crew position in no more than 3 keystrokes, and includes a ‘CONFIRM’
message before data destruction.
A separate MFD or other device shall be provided at the EWO crew station which
provides for control and monitoring of all DS subsystems. CMDS/ECM response shall be
selectable between either an automatic or crew-initiated response for each subsystem
(as it is capable) to counter specific threats. The EWO shall be able to select/deselect
override of all remote dispense switches.
3. Displays
The consolidated EWO MFD shall display all requisite EW/ESA information simultaneously. It
is desired that the common AMP MFD be used. The display shall provide the EWO with
navigation data, off-board data, on-board pre-mission data and correlated and fused sensor
data consolidated into a single user selectable display. The EWO display shall provide at a
minimum; threat azimuth and estimated range, threat modes such as search, acquisition,
track and launch, emitter parametric data and DS subsystems status. The crew shall be able
to select a plain background or two- and three-dimensional map presentations. No more than
30% of the background shall be obscured by all active overlays; no single overlay/layer shall
obscure more than 20% of the background. The DS shall have the capability to display
APR-46 information in a format similar to that in use on SOF aircraft. The DS shall display
emitter parameters for the highest priority threat or a threat selected by the operator. The DS
shall display threats and their parameters on a flight following screen at a computed range
and bearing. The MFD shall provide an indication for those threats that are being jammed by
aircraft ECM systems The DS presentation shall include a PPI-format type display with threat
symbols displayed in their relative position around the aircraft. Threat symbols shall be
similar to those used by current USAF radar warning receivers. Threats which do not have
existing RWR symbols shall be assigned a readily identifiable symbol as determined by a
CSWG. IR missile launch indications shall be distinct from radar threat launches. IR missile
launch indications shall be displayed at the appropriate azimuth with an indication of
elevation (above or below the aircraft). The DS shall display flight path waypoints, basic
navigational data (e.g., groundspeed, altitude, time/distance to waypoint) and location of
threats programmed through the mission planning interface.
The DS should provide the capability to separate collocated threat symbols. Separated threat
symbols should not be moved to an incorrect lethality range. The DS should provide the
capability to designate a symbol as friendly. Provisions should be made for the addition of
symbology, including a laser warning symbol. The DS should display emitter parameters for
the highest priority threat or a threat selected by the operator. The DS should indicate the
source of signal detection.
5. Growth
The EW/ESADS system shall allow for the integration of required aircraft data buses (FMS,
controls and displays) and the seven required EW subsystems, with desired growth capacity
for an additional eight EW subsystems. The AFSOC DS DS shall accommodate future
incorporation of on-board Beyond Line of Sight Threat Detection/ Geo-location (BLOSTD/G)
and a Special Receiver.
6. Intelligence Broadcast Receiver
The system shall receive and filter near-real-time (NRT) electronic order of battle (EOB)
updates and over-the-horizon threat information via National Source Broadcasts. Received
threat updates, including imagery, shall be correlated and displayed on any applicable
display. The system shall interface with the host platform, defensive system, display systems,
display controls, and data transfer device systems to provide intelligence broadcast data to
the receiver. System electrical interfaces, mechanical interfaces, environmental,
electromagnetic, and effectiveness shall be optimized for host platform integration. Message
filter settings shall be selectable in flight. Redefining message filter settings in-flight shall not
significantly increase bus traffic nor impose performance degrading calculation demands on
the AMP FMS. The system shall accommodate a carry-on or permanently mounted
intelligence receiver.
7. Mission Playback.
A mission playback function shall provide a means to record up to four hours, with a desired
goal of eight hours, of flight time information of data crossing the EWDS data bus. Record
start/stop period shall be operator selectable. The function should record threat audio/symbol
indications, aircraft intercom, threat reaction, aircraft position and EW system status and
mode (switch settings). The DSplayback should interface with AFSOC mission planning
systems to provide a graphical depiction of aircraft position for playback.
8. EW Training and Simulation
The system shall provide an on-board, training/simulation mode for aircrews. All capabilities and
performance of the EW systems shall be preserved while in this mode. The DS shall use training or
exercise EOB, including pop-up threats that are hidden from the aircrew until LOS is established. Pop-
up threats shall be entered as part of pre-mission planning or in-flight. The DS shall use this data as
actual threat data. The level of training shall be selectable to provide scenarios from entry level training
to advanced tactical scenarios. The DS shall maintain up to three preplanned missions in aircraft
memory. Pre-loaded training missions shall be modifiable on the aircraft prior to flight. The capability
shall further exist to load an additional new mission. The DS shall upload/download mission data
from/to AFSOC mission planning systems, and shall provide for quick and easy transfer of that data.
The DS shall provide a means to ensure the aircrew that all pertinent mission data has been loaded.
Aircrew shall receive a query if threat parameters, turn points or other mission essential data have not
been input. In the training mode, the DS shall simulate threat inputs and provide all requisite aural and
visual indications. The mission playback function shall record all training inputs as though they were
actual threat engagements. The training mode shall use Air Force approved Jammer, Artillery, Radar,
and Missile Systems (JARMS) symbology to construct training missions. The DS shall load and store
data on aircrew reactions to support de-briefings and training.
2. Security
Only physical security shall be required for these systems. When installed on an aircraft, the normal security
provided for the aircraft should be sufficient. Communications, information, physical, and operational security
requirements shall not exceed those currently on the aircraft. Program protection shall be applied throughout the
system’s lifecycle to maintain technical superiority, system integrity and availability. System security measures
shall be applied to integrate facilities, procedures, and equipment.
Security on board C-130 aircraft shall build upon the capabilities and doctrine presently employed on the
different Mission Design Series (MDSs). The avionics systems may include encryption/decryption devices with
embedded physical and operational security protection, to ensure sensitive classified information and data are
protected both during normal and emergency operations. The system processors and encryption/decryption
devices will include data and code destruction upon loss of system power and/or physical intrusion, either
through attempted unauthorized access or through component destruction through battle damage or aircraft
crash. Therefore, the AMP system and subsystems shall allow for appropriate loading of top secret/sensitive
compartmented information (TS/SCI) level databases.
3. Safety
1. System Safety
To ensure optimum safety, the C-130 AMP design shall be consistent with MIL-STD-882C (Change 1) and
the applicable sections of RTCA DO-160 and MIL-HDBK-454.
1. General Design Requirements
The use of safety devices, warning provisions or special procedures shall be limited to those
applications demonstrated by analysis to provide a significant improvement in system effectiveness,
or as otherwise specified herein. When so selected, safety devices, warning provisions and
procedures shall be developed so failures, malfunctions, and errors do not result in hazards.
2. Safety Design Order of Precedence
Equipment and software design features, which adequately control or eliminate hazards shall be
given precedence over corrective or protective features which increase the equipment complexity.
3. Operational Safety
Both operational and maintenance factors shall be included in the selection of any safety design
features included in the design of the C-130 AMP equipment / System.
4. Safety Design Criteria
The C-130 AMP design shall meet all the requirements in Sections 4 and 5 of MIL-STD-882C (Change 1).
2. Personnel Hazards and Safety
The equipment shall provide personnel hazard protection in accordance with MIL-STD-1472. Appropriate
safeguards shall be provided to prevent operator contact with moving parts, extreme temperatures, high
voltages, sharp edges, or other hazards. Conspicuous placards shall be displayed near equipment that
presents a hazard to personnel. Personnel shall not be exposed to unacceptable concentrations of toxic
substances.
3. Air Vehicle Characteristics
All design changes shall be made in such a way as to minimize degradation of air vehicle performance,
service life, engine and auxiliary power unit capabilities, and crashworthiness from that of the unmodified
C-130 air vehicle. Structural strength margins of modified structures and unmodified structures whose
loads have been increased by the modifications shall show a positive margin of safety of 0.25.
Airworthiness and flying qualities of the aircraft within the operational envelope shall not be degraded. All
AMP systems shall operate within current aircraft performance envelopes with no degradation.
4. Crashworthiness
Installations of the AMP Group A and B equipment shall meet the crashworthiness requirements as shown
Crashworthiness of the unmodified portions of the airframe and subsystem installations shall not be
degraded by AMP modifications.
5. Explosive Atmosphere
The design, construction and installation of all new and/or modified equipment associated with the C-130
AMP program shall not provide an ignition source while exposed to an explosive environment. This
requirement is the same for both normal operating modes and failure modes.
6. Hazardous Materials/ODCs
The C-130 AMP program (design, components, testing, production, installation, maintenance, support and
disposal) shall not introduce any new Ozone Depleting Chemicals (ODCs). The C-130 AMP shall also minimize
the use of other hazardous materials. If hazardous materials are used, adequate procedures and equipment
shall be included to minimize risk to the environment, personnel, and to accomplish disposal. As a design goal,
the production and maintenance procedures for all new items for the aircraft or its support should be free of
hazardous materials. The Air Force will not modify any existing weapon or facility systems scheduled to remain
in the Air Force inventory beyond 1 January 2020 in any manner that adds requirements for either Class I or
Class II ODCs in their operations or maintenance.
4. System Environment
The AMP system and its components shall operate in the C-130 during normal aircraft operation. The system
shall be designed to operate tin the existing environment, or, the aircraft environment shall be modified to
operation of the AMP system. AMP system performance and reliability shall not be degraded due to
environmental issues.
1. Environmental Conditions
The system shall be able to operate without degradation or operational constraints in biological and
chemical environments that permit C-130 operation. The system shall be operable and maintainable by
persons wearing biological or chemical protective ensembles, and/or cold weather gear.
The system shall be capable of self-sustained worldwide operations in the temperature range of -40oF to
+120oF (outside air temperature) and in storage. The environmental conditions will be for the equipment
as installed in the C-130 AMP aircraft. When the avionics equipment is required to operate outside of the
temperature range stated in above, provisions shall be performed to condition the environment to
acceptable levels to allow the equipment to operate within acceptable limits.
1. Fungus
The C-130 AMP system shall withstand, in both operating and non-operating conditions, exposure to
fungus growth experienced by the C-130 aircraft. Fungus inert materials shall be used, and the
system shall not promote the growth of fungus.
2. Temperature
The C-130 AMP system shall operate in ambient temperatures from -40oF to +120oF, without
degradation of system performance and reliability.
3. Altitude
Systems shall operate unpressurized at all altitudes and environments, equal to or greater than, the
current aircraft ceiling of the C-130.
The C-130 AMP system shall operate at all combinations of temperatures, altitudes, and vibration as
encountered during the missions of the C-130 aircraft.
5. Vibration
The C-130 AMP system shall operate and meet all performance requirements when subjected to the
extreme levels of vibration encountered throughout the mission.
6. Shock
The C-130 AMP system shall not incur damage or subsequently fail to operate properly when
subjected to normal levels of shock that may be encountered in operational usage. All newly
developed or modified equipment, and newly installed equipment, shall be designed to withstand
crash shock experienced by the C-130 aircraft.
7. Humidity
The C-130 AMP system shall operate in conditions of up to 100 percent humidity, including
condensation, during operating and non-operating conditions without degraded performance.
8. Salt Atmosphere
The C-130 AMP system shall operate without degraded performance in salt atmosphere.
The C-130 AMP system shall withstand exposure to sand and dust without degrading performance.
10. Decompression
The C-130 AMP system shall withstand pressure changes due to rapid decompression at altitude without
degrading performance.
2. Fluid Resistance
AMP system components shall be designed and installed to withstand exposure to natural and man-made
fluids such as water, urine, de-icing fluid, hydraulic fluid and JP-4/8.
3. Air Vehicle Electrical System
To preclude requiring unwarranted changes to the aircraft electrical system, beyond those required to
upgrade the aircraft’s direct current (DC) power system, the AMP modification should maximize the use of
the Electrical System Upgrade (ESU) Alternating Current (AC) power buses.
If the electrical load analysis determines that insufficient or inadequate power exists to support the aircraft
equipment, either the existing MIL-STD-704 or MIL-E-7894 power shall be upgraded to meet the new
requirement or the AMP equipment shall be made to operate reliably in all phases of operation, using the
existing power.
The DC system shall have capability to provide 30 minutes of emergency back-up power, as a minimum,
to critical avionics, navigation, performance, and communication systems in the event of partial or total
electrical power failure (excluding the battery).
The 28VDC system shall be upgraded to provide "clean, regulated" electrical power as required by
installed AMP equipment.
1. External Power
When powered by an external power source, the aircraft’s electrical system shall monitor the input
power and shall protect all aircraft equipment from damage due to improper input voltage levels or
from excessive input current.
2. Aircraft Wiring
All new aircraft wiring shall conform to MIL-W-5088 and be installed in accordance with TO 1-1A-14.
Modification and repair of existing aircraft wiring shall be in accordance with TO 1-1A-14. All existing
aircraft wiring required to be interfaced (spliced) into by the AMP wiring shall be replaced with new
wiring. The wire identification code scheme shall be in accordance with Appendix "B" of MIL-W-5088.
All wires in the areas of modification shall be inspected for visible damage, such as chafing. If
damaged wires are found during the inspection, the wire shall be replaced. Existing wiring that has
been removed shall not be reused.
Excess wiring shall be completely removed from the aircraft and shall not be capped and stowed.
The aircraft circuit breaker panels shall be standardized for core avionics within each MDS and shall utilize
circuit breaker designs consistent with current industry. Fuses shall be 5/8" versus 1/2".
4. Environmental Control System
The cooling/heating capacity of the installed environmental control system shall be adequate to condition the
basic airframe, retained avionics systems, and the installed AMP avionics systems and NVIS compatible
devices when exposed to the environmental extremes associated with C-130 world-wide operations and the
requirements of paragraph 3.9.1 of this document.
The aircraft environmental system shall ensure that the integrated avionics suite, as installed in the aircraft, is
sufficiently cooled to prevent any degradation in performance or MTBF (mean time between failure) due to
excessive heat buildup inside the aircraft throughout the entire operating spectrum of the aircraft.
Liquid cooling, even closed-cycle within a sub-system, shall not be employed. The modified aircraft shall have
the capability to perform all required avionics and equipment ground checks prior to flight without the use of
environmental ground support equipment (SE). System cooling/heating shall minimize increases in cabin
temperature. The system shall minimize increases in aircraft infrared signature above current C-130H3 aircraft
levels.
5. Computer Resource Requirements
Computer resources shall consist of all computer hardware and software necessary to fulfill mission
requirements. Computer resources include the hardware and software associated with aircraft avionics systems,
mission planning systems, training systems and support equipment. Support equipment shall include, but is not
limited to, Software Development Environment (SDE), Software Integration Laboratories (SILs), Automatic Test
Equipment (ATE), data collection/reduction/analysis equipment, Programmer Loader Verifiers (PLVs), and
ground support equipment.
1. Software Requirements
1. General Software Requirements
All software developed under this program shall meet these requirements.
All newly developed software, including modified COTS and modified GOTS, which is not
aircraft software, shall follow the process described in IEEE/EIA 12207.0.1 and IEEE/EIA
12207.0.2. All newly developed aircraft software, including modified COTS and modified
GOTS, shall follow the process described in DO-178B.
2. Software Configuration
All combat delivery aircraft shall be modified into a single standard avionics software
configuration regardless of starting configuration of aircraft. Additional software required for
special mission aircraft shall build upon baseline aircraft configuration in an open system
approach.
Version information for all operational software (MDF, MDT, and OFP) installed on the aircraft
shall be displayed on a user selectable MFD automatically without aircrew or ground crew
intervention at system start-up and upon operator request.
3. COTS/GOTS
Unmodified OTS (COTS or GOTS) software shall be usedwhere it reduces life-cycle cost,
reduces development cost, is affordable, and meets operational requirements . OTS (COTS or
GOTS), where used, shall be modified as necessary to be compatible with any newly designed
software and existing software, and shall be modified as necessary to operate within the open
system architecture guidelines.
4. Year 2000 Guidance
All computer hardware and software resources shall comply with DoD Year 2000 (Y2K)
guidance.
5. Higher Order Language (HOL)
All new software (OFPs, GMPs, test and support, etc.) shall be written in a higher order
language and shall use ANSI standard instruction set. Modifications of existing code greater
than 30% of the software unit shall be written in a higher order language. Assembly and other
lower programming languages used only with prior written approval.
6. Software Design Requirements
The software shall be designed such that computer program error allocations (e.g., round-off
errors, truncation errors, algorithm errors, cycle time) when combined with the related hardware
error allocation, shall not degrade any software/hardware accuracy.
Software design shall be capable of accepting third party design without redevelopment of
existing software.
7. Software Reuse
All aircraft on-board computer resources shall take advantage of existing, government-owned
software and firmware to avoid duplication of effort and expense.
2. Mission Planning
An Application Program is defined as the system software that provides the operational
functionality. Examples of Application Programs are navigation and fire control. "Core"
application programs that meet the intent of or require FAA and/or ICAO certification and
validation shall be independent from all combat mission (AMC, ACC, AFSOC) application
software to provide for specific security, performance, and other unique special mission
requirements. The combat mission application software shall be functionally partitioned into
and managed as separate Computer Software Configuration Items (CSCIs) to accommodate
incremental and separable requirements verification, validation, certification, and compliance.
3. Application Program Interface (API)
The Application Program Interface is the interface definition that allows an application program module to communicate with
the processing system hardware, software operating system, system utilities and other application program modules . The
processing system shall provide a uniform API for interfacing all application software. The API shall provide application
software independence from hardware including, but not limited to CPU type, bus and network interfaces, registers, and
clocks. The API shall provide independence among the application software to the extent that no application is dependent
on the inner workings of another application. The API shall allow new applications to be added to the system without
affecting the existing applications to the maximum extent possible.
The API shall define and provide the following key features:
The time and overhead involved in switching among software tasks as well as computation
speed and data access of the AMP system shall not degrade the performance of the existing
aircraft system capabilities. The timing and capacity of the AMP system, including the
reintegration of existing capabilities, shall cause no degradation in data transfer rates or latency
of data in the aircraft system.
2. Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance provisions in the design shall allow mission completion with minimal degradation of performance in the
event of subsystem failure. The system shall have enough redundancy to be able to identify and isolate faulty equipment
and then continue to operate with minimal degradation by reconfiguring resources as needed.
The software shall allow for graceful degradation -- a smooth, automated transition with minimal increase in user workload
when:
ARINC Report 610A, dated 1 February 1994, "Guidance for Use of Avionics Equipment and
Software in Simulators," prepared by the Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee shall be
used as a guide for designing the necessary accommodations and provisions to support
training system software into new or modified operational flight software.
2. Operational Flight Software Loading and Verification
For all systems and sub-systems connected to the data bus, the operational flight software shall be loaded using the same
commercially available data transfer medium used by the aircraft Mission Data Loader. Systems and sub-systems shall also
be capable of being loaded (flightline reprogrammable) via an Air Force standard PLV through a single reprogramming
point. The system shall automatically return to normal mode of operation when OFP load is complete and verified.
All AMP operational flight software loading and verification shall be capable of being applied in less than one hour by a
single individual. All AMP operational flight software shall be capable of being loaded/verified in the field by three and five
skill-level technicians without special tools (other than those identified in previous paragraph) and with appropriate
instructions.
1. Computer Hardware Requirements
1. General Computer Hardware Requirements
All system memory, timing, bus loading and input/output shall be adequate to provide spare (reserve)
and growth capability.
At IOC, all computer hardware resources, including interconnecting databus, memory, and processor
utilization rates, shall have a minimum 50% reserve (100% is desired) over that used or experienced
during worst case processing based on each current MDS. The reserve capacity requirement for
computer hardware shall be applied to each component or sub-system and shall not simply be a
system wide average. Both foreground and background tasks shall be included in calculating
reserves.
All computer resources shall provide a spare throughput capacity of 50% of that available while the
software is operating under worst case processing conditions. This spare throughput capacity shall
apply to each processor of a multiprocessor configuration individually. The spare throughput capacity
shall be available at any periodic rate up to and including the most frequent rate used by the
implementing software, and shall be available at any task priority. The spare throughput capacity
shall be available during the worst case processing of the software for each of its various modes of
operation, and is applicable to all periodic time intervals in use by the existing software and all
aperiodic functions.
The contractor shall provide computer systems such that processor and memory modules can be
upgraded with newer technology without requiring software changes or a lengthy re-certification
process.
The system shall incorporate the latest fault tolerant techniques into the computer hardware design
to eliminate any potential single point system failure modes.
All combat delivery aircraft shall be a single standard avionics hardware configuration regardless of
starting configuration of aircraft. Additional hardware required for special mission aircraft (ACC and
AFSOC) shall build upon the baseline AMP C130 aircraft configuration in an open system approach.
1. Databus Throughput
Each Databus must have a 50% reserve capacity in throughput over that used or experienced
during worst case processing based on each current MDS. As an objective, databuses should
have a growth capability in throughput of 100% without requiring future modification.
2. Declassification and Zeroize Capability
For new equipment, in the event of an emergency, the aircrew shall have the ability to declassify all
mission data with a single action and zeroize all COMSEC data with a single action. During routine
operations, operators shall have the capability to selectively declassify electronic combat, digital map
and mission data, and selectively zeroize COMSEC data with power on or off the equipment is
required.
The aircrew shall have the capability to destroy sensitive EOB, MATT, and mission data in a storage
device in no more than 3 keystrokes when directed from multiple crew positions; include a
"CONFIRM" message before data destruction.
Zeroizing data shall be accomplished in accordance with the procedures detailed in Air Force
System Security Instruction 5020, Remanence Security, dated 20 August 1996.
2. Database Requirements
The system shall be designed to allow full or partial updates to the database through machine
interface or manually by the crew. The timing and database content requirements located elsewhere
in this specification shall be used to determine system constraints such as, but not limited to, access
time and storage capacity.
3. Modified COTS/GOTS and Developmental Hardware
Modified or developmental solutions shall be applied where they save life-cycle cost, are affordable, and
meet operational and environmental requirements.
2. Support
1. Software Engineering Environment
The Software Engineering Environment (SEE) for the C130 AMP program shall include a Software Development
Environment (SDE) and a Software Integration Laboratory (SIL) for the C-130 AMP Program which shall be used to
manage, analyze, design, develop, test and maintain the C-130 AMP software. The SEE shall also be capable of
incorporating software enhancements/modifications into parallel, scheduled software releases/updates for each MDS in
accordance with current USAF procedures for identifying, tracking and managing software change requests. The SEE shall
be capable of configuring and distributing these software releases/updates in accordance with TO 00-5-16, ACPINS or
current USAF procedures. The capability for rapid turn around "software releases" shall also be part of the SEE.
Releases/Updates shall be capable of being transmitted electronically to organizational or field maintenance teams for
update.
Capabilities of the SEE shall include tools for the technical aspects as well as the managerial aspects of software
development. Managerial capabilities included in the SEE shall include program management, requirements management,
risk management, configuration management, documentation, and metrics collection. Technical capabilities of the SDE
shall include the ability to analyze, design, develop, integrate and test (unit, component, integration, CSCI and possibly
some CSCI to CSCI integration) C-130 AMP software. Technical capabilities of the SIL shall include the capability to
analyze, integrate, test, verify, and debug software requirements at the system level. The SIL should have a simulation
environment that can adequately test the software to the fidelity necessary to minimize flight testing. The SIL shall, at least,
include simulations and models of the dynamics of the AMP system configuration as well as any other integrated systems
for each MDS affected by the AMP modification, aircraft simulations for each MDS, error modeling, provisions for actual
LRUs, data recording and reduction, and the capability to perform real-time debugging within an LRU.
Integrated Computer Aided Software Engineering (I-CASE) tools [compatible with Integrated Program Support Environment
(IPSE) standards] shall be used to create an I-CASE environment for the Software Engineering Environment (SEE). The
most current industry supported toolsets shall be used. For example, this means that all the software components (whether
new/modified/reused) must be developed using the latest supportable version compiler and toolset available for that
particular language and target processor. No modified COTS or proprietary support tools shall be used.
The SEE should be housed in a laboratory with raised flooring to accommodate an expanse of interconnected computer
equipment and LRUs. The laboratory should provide aircraft power supply to the software support equipment and test
stations.
Maximum use should be made of the following existing government facilities for the C-130 AMP modification to avoid
duplication of effort and expense.
The following existing government facilities (SEEs) shall be modified or replaced to facilitate maintenance of all newly
developed, mission specific software and modified OTS software:
The ability to modify and maintain existing software in these facilities shall be retained.
1. Support Equipment
Support equipment shall be common at all levels where practical. Peculiar non-Air Force equipment shall be kept to a
minimum. Support equipment shall be operable and maintainable under all Air Force environmental conditions (including
biological and chemical).
New Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) shall not be developed when existing GFE capability exists. New ATE developed for
aircraft shall have periodic Built In Test (BIT).
1. System Quality Factors
1. Operation and Organizational Concept
1. Operational Life
The operational life of 25,000 hours shall not be adversely affected by the AMP integration and
installation into the C-130 aircraft.
2. Integrated Diagnostics
The AMP system will incorporate integrated diagnostics to provide system status information and to
detect and isolate all faults that degrade C-130 AMP functions. BIT for any subsystem shall be
initiated from any MFD. BIT capabilities of existing systems shall be integrated into the overall AMP
diagnostic system. A combination of Built-In Test (BIT), external test equipment, and Technical
Orders (TO) manual procedures will detect and unambiguously isolate 100 percent of all faults to the
repairable, adjustable, or replaceable assembly. The system design will minimize external test
equipment on the flight line and facilitate efficient maintenance.
1. Built-In Test (BIT)
Built-in-test (BIT) shall be used for fault detection/isolation. The BIT shall have the capability to
effectively isolate 95 percent of all faults to one LRU and isolate 90 percent of all faults to one LRM,
with an objective of 100 percent isolation to one LRU/LRM. Using a combination of BIT, Technical
Orders (TO) and manual test, technicians shall be able to detect, isolate, and verify 100 percent of all
faults to one LRU/LRM. The system must have a continuous BIT function, initiated at power up, that
must detect 100 percent of all critical faults. Critical faults are defined as degradations or failures,
indicated or actual, that jeopardize the flight worthiness of the aircraft or safety of the crew.
BIT shall provide essential information to both the operators and maintainers. The BIT shall include
power-on, continuous, and initiated BIT, and shall identify any significant change in mission-critical
functions to the systems operator in a clear and timely manner, without degrading system operation.
BIT failure reporting should be in plain English and preclude the use of fault codes or cross-
referencing of multiple codes. The BIT shall store fault and fault-related data in a nonvolatile memory
medium for recall on demand by operator/maintenance personnel. As an objective, fault history data
should include at least the last 100 detected faults and should be manually erasable by maintenance
technicians only. Fault history downloads shall be at least equivalent to that of similar commercial air
transport equipment, and not less than current C-130 avionics equipment that shall be replaced.
Data shall be transferred using PCMCIA and PC-based technology through the aircraft's 1553
databus. If fault isolation codes are necessary, they shall be structured in a numerical sequence and
a table to match the code in specific word profiles shall be built. Development of an information
management system is not required. Bit false alarm rates shall be kept down to a maximum of 2%,
with an objective of 1%, to maintain system confidence.
3. Built-In Test
Built-in-test (BIT) shall be used for fault detection/isolation. The BIT shall have the capability to effectively isolate
95 percent of all faults to one LRU and isolate 90 percent of all faults to one LRM, with a goal of 100 percent
isolation to one LRU/LRM. Using a combination of BIT, Technical Orders and manual test, technicians shall be
able to detect, isolate, and verify 100 percent of all faults to one LRU/LRM. The system must have a continuous
BIT function, initiated at power up, that must detect 100 percent of all critical faults. Critical faults are defined as
degradations or failures, indicated or actual, that jeopardize the flight worthiness of the aircraft or safety of the
crew.
BIT shall provide essential information to both the operators and maintainers. The BIT shall include power-on,
continuous, and initiated BIT, and shall identify any significant change in mission-critical functions to the systems
operator in a clear and timely manner. BIT failure reporting should be in plain English and preclude the use of
fault codes or cross-referencing of multiple codes. The BIT shall store fault and fault-related data in a nonvolatile
memory medium for recall on demand by operator/maintenance personnel. Fault history data should include at
least the last 100 detected faults and should be manually erasable by maintenance technicians only. Fault
history downloads shall be at least equivalent to that of similar commercial air transport equipment, and not less
than current C-130 avionics equipment that shall be replaced. Data shall be transferred using PCMCIA and PC-
based technology through the aircraft's 1553 databus. If fault isolation codes are necessary, they shall be
structured in a numerical sequence and a table to match the code in specific word profiles shall be built.
Development of an information management system is not required. Bit false alarm rates shall be kept down to a
maximum of 2% (a 1% BIT false alarm rate is desired) to maintain system confidence.
2. Design and Construction
1. Physical Characteristics
Controls, displays, markings, coding, labeling, and arrangement schemes for equipment and panel layouts
shall be uniform for common functions of all equipment. Units, which are not panel mounted, shall be
designed for installation in aircraft areas, which do not interfere with mission operation, minimize aircraft
modifications, and remain accessible for maintenance.
1. Payload
Useable payload for modified aircraft shall not be reduced below current levels. Space, Center of
Gravity (CG), and weight shall not be adversely impacted; it is an objective to improve present
payload and CG capabilities where other system attributes are not substantially affected.
2. Mass Properties
Any adverse mass property changes caused by the C-130 AMP equipment/system installation shall
be held to a minimum. All mass property changes to the aircraft as a result of the installation of the
modification shall be recorded and tracked by the contractor.
1. Weight and Balance
Any net weight increase caused by the installation of the C-130 AMP equipment shall be held
to a minimum, with the objective of no net increase. All equipment which is required for C-130
AMP missions shall be included in the basic aircraft operating weight. The weight and balance
of the C-130 aircraft shall be determined by calculation in accordance with Technical Order
1C-130X-5. The weight and balance shall conform to Technical Orders 1-1-40B, 1-1-50.
2. Ballast
The installation of the C-130 AMP equipment/system shall not cause the need for any ballast to
be added to the aircraft.
3. Center of Gravity
The modifications required to transform a C-130 aircraft into a C-130 AMP aircraft shall not
impact the ability of the aircraft to maintain aircraft Center of Gravity (CG) within flight limits
throughout the mission. The CG shall be controlled within limits under all fuel / payload
combinations required to meet the missions.
4. Drag
While designing the changes required to modify a C-130 aircraft into a C-130 AMP aircraft, it is an
objective that the AMP integrated system should not create additional parasitic and induced drag.
3. Access For Maintenance
The equipment shall be easily accessible and removable to allow repair and inspection of the aircraft
structures. The design should include the use of quick fasteners/disconnects to allow for rapid removal,
replacement or inspection. The fasteners for LRUs and all cannon plugs should be self locking (not
requiring safety wire). Common hardware should be captive hardware. To the maximum extent practicable,
equipment location shall preclude the need for ladders, maintenance stands, or high reach support
equipment during inspection or on-equipment maintenance. Equipment location shall require only common
tools for access and repair activities. Equipment shall adhere to a "one-deep" packaging concept in which
access to one LRU does not require removal of another LRU.
2. Materials, Parts and Process
The materials, processes, and part used in the design of the C-130 AMP shall be selected on the basis of
reliability, maintainability, producibility, survivability, safety, logistic considerations, and prior service history.
1. Finish Coatings
Finish coatings shall be applied to C-130 equipment to provide protection from corrosion, fungus
growth, abrasion, and other deleterious action. Lusterless finishes shall be used on all surfaces
visible to operating personnel. Items acquired to commercial specifications need not be refinished to
meet this requirement. Selected finishes shall be compatible with existing finishes and shall meet the
safety requirements of paragraph 3.8. MIL-HDBK 1568 shall be used for guidance in the selection of
finish systems.
2. Production Facilities, Capabilities and Processes
The manufacturing system shall have the facilities, capabilities and process controls to provide products of
consistent quality that meet performance requirements. Key production processes shall have the stability,
capability and process controls to maintain key production characteristics within design tolerances and
allowances.
3. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
The installed performance of the C-130 AMP system shall achieve electromagnetic compatibility in
accordance with MIL-STD-464. Paragraphs 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 5.9 and 5.10 of MIL-STD-464 are
applicable for the AMP program. Air Force Systems Command Design Handbook 1-4 shall be used as a
design guide.
1. Subsystem and Equipment Compatibility
The C-130 AMP system shall be integrated to achieve mutual EMC and a fully compatible aircraft
system, and shall comply with the requirements of MIL-E-6051. The AMP system shall not be
vulnerable to manmade electromagnetic emissions which it can encounter in its operating
environment.
2. Frequency Management
Electronic equipment added to the aircraft shall consider Spectrum Management Guidance. All
equipment shall comply with national and international spectrum standards and guidance on the use
of the electromagnetic spectrum. Furthermore, the equipment shall be certified in accordance with
AFI 33-118 and AFM 33-120 to be supportable in the electromagnetic spectrum prior to fielding the
first aircraft.
3. Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM)
As a minimum the system shall retain the current communications ECCM capability. Proposed
equipment shall include a list of specifications of basic ECCM properties inherent in its design and
operations.
1. AFSOC Only (MC-130E/H) Requirements.
The systems shall maintain full operation of terrain sensing in an ECCM environment. ECCM
techniques shall include, but are not limited to, frequency agility, frequency avoidance,
sidelobe blanking, jamming detection and editing, and spoofing. Detection and warning of
terrain/obstacle sensor jamming shall be displayed to the aircrew within 2 seconds in all
sensing modes.
4. OPSEC/COMSEC
To meet military OPSEC/COMSEC and mission requirements, all installed systems that emit RF
signals outside the aircraft shall be cockpit selectable, including the ability to turn it on and off from a
primary crewmember position. It is desired that radars, communications, and beacons that emit RF
signals outside the aircraft should be capable of operating in a low probability of intercept (LPI)
mode. The LPI mode may be the standard operating mode, or a selectable mode. As a minimum,
LPI mode should be included in all radars, communications, station keeping equipment, and
beacons. All systems should be capable of operating in a non-emitting/receive only mode.
5. Electrical Bonding
All new equipment installed during the C-130 AMP modification shall be identified. Nameplates shall be
used to aid in this identification. The nameplates shall be permanently attached and shall not adversely
affect the equipment appearance or performance. Contractor’s standard practice shall be used to establish
nameplate content and format.
5. Interchangeability
All parts, subassemblies, and assemblies having the same part number shall be mechanically and
electrically interchangeable. When any of the plug-in boards or modules are interchanged, the equipment
shall meet all performance limits without adjustment of any controls or tailoring of any part or subassembly.
6. Survivability/Vulnerability
Existing survivability enhancement and vulnerability reduction features inherent in the C-130 basic design
shall be retained and considered in determining placement/ protection of all systems and subsystems used
in this program. Modifications and equipment installations required for the C-130 AMP shall not degrade
these design features.
7. Interoperability
System shall be interoperable with sister service, allied, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
equipment, procedures, and tactics, to include standard ground handling equipment and ground power units.
DISA’s Joint Interoperability Test Command must certify all C4I systems prior to their production and fielding
unless an official waiver has been granted.
3. Human Factors
Any information required to be in the primary field of view shall be within a 30-degree cone from the design eye
point to the center of the visual sector of greatest concern to the individual aircrew member.
Displays shall be located so they may be read to the degree of accuracy required by personnel in the normal
operating or servicing positions without requiring the operator to assume an uncomfortable, awkward or unsafe
position. Control/display relationships shall be apparent through proximity, similarity of groupings and similar
techniques.
Appropriate safeguards shall be provided to prevent operator contact with moving parts, extreme temperatures,
high voltages, sharp edges, or other hazards
The system shall be maintainable by the 5th percentile female through the 95th percentile male as defined
below, using common hand tools.
New and modified equipment shall not degrade the existing acoustical environment to the point that it will cause
personnel injury, interfere with voice or any other communications or degrade system reliability.
The AMP equipment shall meet the requirements to MIL-STD-1472, 5.9.1.8, regarding error-proof design.
C-130 AMP equipment that weighs more than 37 lbs. shall be prominently labeled with the weight of the object
and lift limitation, e.g., mechanical or two-person lift.
Each LRU shall be equipped with two handles or grasp areas to aid removal and replacement.
4. Personnel And Training
1. Personnel
Operational level technical orders shall be fully proceduralized job performance aid (FPJPA) materials.
FPJPAs shall conform to the aircraft maintenance job guide using digitized technical data format.
Emphasis shall be on cross-utilization among general mechanics and maintenance specialist personnel.
Aircraft systems shall be designed to be supported using FPJPAs.
Training and trainers for new systems not used in the current fleets shall conform to current Air Force
standards. New training for health hazards may be required. Manpower authorizations shall not be
required to increase for the new system. An objective is that the system should allow maintenance
manpower authorizations to decrease by at least 4.4%. Personnel, safety, and training may change for
existing systems. The system shall be designed so as to require minimal workload.
2. Training
{tbd}
3. Simulators
{tbd}
Installation of new systems will increase the overall avionics suite reliability. The AMP system shall not
shorten scheduled interval for depot maintenance intervals of the aircraft. Scheduled maintenance down
time shall be equal to or less than that for current C-130s.
For ease of maintainability, the systems shall be of line replaceable unit/line replaceable module
(LRU/LRM) design. LRU/LRMs are defined as components such as black boxes, circuit boards, etc., which
can be removed, replaced and fully tested in the aircraft.
The avionics system shall support a two-level maintenance concept and high degree of systems
availability and reliability. Mechanical interfaces and packaging will ensure reliable operation across the
diversity of missions, flight conditions, and environments for all C-130 variants.
2. Mean Time Between Maintenance-Corrected
Mean time between maintenance-corrected (MTBM-C) shall be used as a measure of logistics reliability.
MTBM-C shall be at least equivalent to that of similar commercial air transport equipment, and exceed that
of current avionics equipment being replace. MTMB-c shall be no less than TBD hours, with an objective of
TBD hours.
Mean repair time (MRT) shall be used as a measure of system maintainability. MRT is the time required to
complete a corrective maintenance action. Corrective maintenance includes all actions necessary to
correct any inherent, induced, or no-defect malfunction. MRT shall not exceed 120 minutes with a goal of
not exceeding 30 minutes.
4. Agile Combat Support
Minimize the deployment footprint of the system, training (ops and maintenance), and its support. System
shall have a deployment footprint equal or less than the current system. Effort should be made to reduce
the deployment footprint size by 20%.
5. Wartime Combat Support
Support requirements should be developed to, as a minimum, allow AMP modified aircraft the ability to
surge and self-support at a barebase location in or out of theater for 30 days without resupply.
1. Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) Capability
All installed systems shall have the capability to have ABDR performed in the field using currently
accepted temporary fixes to permit minimum operational capabilities as outlined in TO 1-1H-39.
2. Surge Support.
Surge support requirements should be developed to allow C-130X AMP modified aircraft the ability to
satisfy re-supply requirements for the 31st through 60th day following surge initiation.
Bare Base Operation support requirements should be developed to allow C-130X AMP modified aircraft
the ability to self-support at a bare base location in or out of theater for 30 days without re-supply. C-130X
AMP systems shall be capable of being maintained in a bare base environment without special facilities for
maintenance, software loading, special alignment procedures, or specialized equipment beyond hand-held
tools.
6. Maintainability.
1. Maintenance Planning.
New equipment shall conform to the two-level maintenance concept. Maintenance actions shall be
categorized as organizational-level (on-equipment) and depot-level (off-equipment) maintenance.
The logistics infrastructure at the existing C-130 bases shall be considered the baseline of available
support. The system shall be designed to allow maintenance to be accomplished by USAF three-
and five-skill level personnel. The modification shall not impose increased scheduled maintenance
requirements on the C-130.
2. Maintainability.
All like components (same part numbers) shall be directly interchangeable with each other, and from one
C-130 aircraft to another with minimal alignment, adjustment, or special harmonization. The desire is no
additional alignment, adjustment, or special harmonization should be required. The equipment shall be
easily accessible and removable to allow repair and inspection of the aircraft structures. The design should
include the use of quick fasteners/disconnects to allow for rapid removal, replacement or inspection. The
fasteners for LRUs and all cannon plugs should be self locking (not requiring safety wire). Common
hardware should be captive hardware. To the maximum extent practicable, equipment location shall
preclude the need for ladders, maintenance stands, or high reach support equipment during inspection or
on-equipment maintenance. Equipment location shall require only common tools for access and repair
activities. Equipment shall adhere to a "one-deep" packaging concept in which access to one LRU does
not require removal of another LRU. All critical components shall be easy to maintain in an austere
environment with minimum support equipment and manpower required.
7. Support Capability.
O-level maintenance capability is required 30 days prior to first production system delivery. Depot-level
maintenance capability can be either organic or contractor logistic support. However, the source of repair
decision shall be made early enough to minimize interim contractor support, and provide sufficient lead
time for programming appropriate funding. Logistics support information shall be acquired to provide
information for planning and management of long term sustainment of end items and equipment
introduced by this modification.
8. Maintenance Environment.
The maintenance concept shall support worldwide C-130 operations. The current logistics infrastructure at
existing bases is the logistics baseline.
9. Other Logistics Considerations.
1. Technical Manuals (TM)
TMs shall describe system and LRU/LRM theory of operation, interfaces, component removal,
preventive maintenance, repair, and replacement, and shall include necessary fault isolation manuals
and fault reporting manuals. Flight manuals, system wiring diagrams, work unit code manuals, and
an illustrated parts breakdown to facilitate parts ordering shall be supplemented or replaced as
necessary to reflect modifications made to the C-130. TMs shall be validated by the contractor,
verified by appropriate user personnel, and fully incorporated into the baseline technical orders (TO)
as a change or revision. Technical data will be verified and validated, and fully incorporated into the
baseline TOs. Time and cost to fully incorporate tech data will be part of the modification cost and
schedule. Technical data shall be delivered in a digital format in accordance with Air Force standards
—current directives require data to be delivered in indexed portable document file and have internal
linking specified by Technical Order Conversion Requirements established by the MSG/ILMP. Data
delivered digitally will be in a format capable of being stored and managed in Joint Computer Aided
Acquisition and Logistics System, and maintained to meet Air Force technical manual specification
and standards. All personnel should be able to order data in either paper or a digital data format.
2. Supporting Command Requirements.
1. Warranty
Warranties should be pursued within the purview of AFMAN 64-110. Warranties and
guarantees shall cover all spares, SE, and technical data shortfalls.
2. Facilities and Land.
Existing facilities shall be used to the fullest extent possible. Construction of new facilities or
modification to existing facilities, beyond those required to meet new/modified simulator
requirements, shall not be required. Consideration should be given to sharing assets with other types
of aircraft at the same beddown location. Compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, and
standards on air/water pollution, waste/hazardous waste disposal, sewage disposal, radiation, noise,
and reporting shall be complied with.
3. Continuous Acquisition/Life Cycle Support (CALS).
The C-130 AMP design shall ensure line replaceable units (LRUs) and support equipment are
transportable via C-130 or operational support airlift aircraft in support of mobility and operations at austere
locations.
2. Items for Immediate Use
Items for immediate use (i.e., test) shall be packaged to ASTM D3951-95.
Shipment may be by various forms of transportation, such as, but not limited to, truck, rail, or air. Bonded
storage shall be provided for items not immediately delivered.
4. Packaging and Packing
AMP equipment shall be designed for packaging and packing to allow shipment in standard containers.
5. Container Marking
As appropriate, all containers shall be tagged or stamped with all markings necessary for delivery and storage, all markings
required by regulations, statutes, and common carriers, and all markings necessary for safety and safe delivery. Markings
shall be IAW ASTM D3951-95.
1. VERIFICATION
The purpose of verification is to ensure system requirements are understood and correctly implemented. Verification,
when accomplished incrementally, provides insight to the Government as the design matures and the program
progresses to ensure early identification of problems. Verification of COTS/NDI system components may require
presentation of existing qualification and verification data to insure COTS/NDI items are suitable for safe operation in
the C-130 worldwide environment. Developmental components shall require verification throughout the development,
test, and production process.
The C-130 AMP implements incremental verification. Lower level product verifications shall add up to and contribute
to verification for the integrated system from the component and subsystem levels up to the system level. Incremental
verification measures product integrity against established entrance and exit criteria found in management and test
plans and presented at program milestones. Incremental verification uses increasingly more rigorous criteria at
various stages throughout program to provide progressive insight into contractor’s progress. Program milestones and
specific success criteria shall be developed by the contractor showing the use of incremental verification in the design
effort.
The functional performance requirements of Section 3 shall be verified by one or more of the following five methods.
Process The detailed review and analysis of process descriptions and metrics,
Control: and production operations, to ensure a requirement is met by
consistent product compliance with specific standards of quality.
In all cases the method of verification shall successfully verify the requirement has been met; specifically, the C-130
AMP meets all installed system performance requirements of this document
1. Software Verification and Validation
Contractor shall have a disciplined, standardized software verification and validation process. This process
includes technical and documentation reviews, quality and configuration audits, software process/product
measurements, and software certification (testing). Contractor shall develop a Verification and Validation plan
which ensures that the software functionality is correctly implemented and that the customer’s software
requirements have been achieved.
1. Software Testing/Certification
Software testing shall include unit (component) testing, integration testing, validation testing, system testing, and
formal acceptance testing.
Software testing, at least, shall include these types of tests: white-box, black-box, recovery, performance, stress,
and regression. Real-time tests shall, at least, include timing of data and parallelism of the processes that
handle the data, interrupt handling and impacts of hardware faults on software processing. Regression tests
shall be conducted before release of each configured software baseline. System testing shall, at least, include
recovery testing, stress testing, performance testing and regression testing.
The Government desires that the cyclomatic complexity of each software module not exceed ten (10). Modified
COTS or NDI equipment software shall be re-tested and re-qualified (via methodology equivalent to the original
certification) to the level of functional criticality for its usage in the AMP architecture.
The AMP shall use off-the-shelf (OTS) equipment to the maximum extent possible to reduce schedule and
cost impact. OTS is defined as equipment that has been either certified to meet commercial specifications
and standards by an appropriate certification agency (e.g., FAA, CAA), or qualified by a military program
under military specifications and standards for use on aircraft. Certification or qualification documentation
shall be provided to the Government for verification. Commercial OTS (COTS) is the term used in this
document for equipment that has been previously certified under commercial specifications and standards.
In the case of modified COTS or NDI equipment (thus, reclassified as Developmental Items), the affected
components or software shall be re-tested and re-qualified (via methodology equivalent to the original
certification) to the level of functional criticality for its usage in the AMP architecture.
2. Modeling and Simulations
The contractor shall use modeling and simulations to perform early testing of units, subsystems and
systems. The use of modeling and simulations shall be aimed at finding and resolving system design
issues as early as possible in the design and development process.
3. Human Factors Demonstrations
The contractor shall perform a series of Human Factors Demonstrations. These demonstrations shall show
the human-machine system function, and detail expected maintenance concepts.
The contractor must demonstrate to the government that the system design satisfies the human factors
performance requirements. Demonstrate the human interfaces for the combat delivery aircraft and the
differences for each special mission MDS. This demonstration shall include the level of detail required to
show the size, location, appearance, and function of every panel, control, and display on the aircraft.
The human factors demonstrations shall be sufficient to show the impact to crew workload both for
individual crew members and for the aircrew as a whole. Demonstrate the ability to perform all combat
delivery missions with a reduced crew compliment.
The human factors demonstrations shall be sufficient to show the impact of the modification on
maintenance crew workload.
4. Systems Integration Demonstrations
The contractor shall perform a systems integration demonstration for each MDS prior to the input of the trial install
aircraft. The system integration shall use actual EMD hardware and software for all new systems and subsystems
being installed on the aircraft. Existing aircraft equipment can be either simulated or stimulated. Both the hardware
and the software shall be fully functional, but neither has to be flight qualified. All interfaces, internal and external,
shall be implemented and fully functional.
The contractor shall demonstrate that the systems are fully functional and that the aircraft integration is complete and
verified to the extent that they can be in a laboratory environment. The integration demonstration shall be designed to
allow both open loop and closed loop testing. The open loop testing shall use a set of cockpit displays and controls
arranged like they will be in the actual aircraft. The demonstrations shall be sufficient to test throughput, databus
loading and data latency issues.
2. NOTES
1. Definitions
1. Term Definitions
Fail-operational
Fail-passive
Firmware Computer program and computer data at the microprogram level, any
level of executable computer programs and computer data that cannot
be readily modified under program control, i.e., read only; all
information processing implementation technologies, programs, digital
data, and devices not included under the definition of digital
computers and associated computer programs and not included under
hardware. Firmware includes microprocessors, Read Only Memories
(ROMs), Programmable Read Only Memories (PROMs), and any
other programmable logic elements.
Fusion Level I fusion deals with positional, kinematic and attribute fusion. Key
features are 1) data alignment; 2) data/object correlation; 3)object
positional, kinematic and attribute estimation; and 4) object identity
estimation. Level II fusion deals with situation refinement and
develops a description or interpretation of the current relationships
among objects and events in the context of the environment. Level II
develops a threat-oriented perspective of the data to estimate enemy
capabilities, identify threat opportunities, estimate enemy intent and
determine levels of danger. Level IV fusion produces a recommended
course of action to be taken in order to defeat or frustrate enemy
actions and can also reallocate resources based on anticipated needs.
Guide The term "guide" when used in relation to a referenced document (e.g.
MIL-STD-129C) shall be used as a guide) means that the contractor
shall consider the information/data of the document during the design
and development process and shall be prepared to provide, upon
request, justifying rationale for-not complying with the requirements
therein.
Intent The term "intent of," when used in conjunction with military
specification applications, means that the contractor shall comply with
the aim or objective of the military specification but not necessarily the
detailed application. Deviation from the aim or objective of the
specification shall be identified.
Intervisibility
Personnel Personnel shall include all aircrew, ground crew, and support
personnel.
Significantly The term "significantly modified equipment" shall apply when one or
Open system: A system that implements sufficient open specifications for interfaces,
services, and supporting formats to enable properly engineered
components to be utilized across a wide range of systems with minimal
changes, to interoperate with other components on local and remote
systems, and to interact with users in a style that facilitates portability.
An open system is characterized by the following:
Open systems The open systems approach is an integrated business and technical
approach: strategy to (1) choose commercially supported specifications and
standards for selected system interfaces (external, internal, functional,
and physical), products, practices, and tools, and (2) build systems
based on modular hardware and software design. In order to achieve
an integrated technical and business strategy, an integrated product
team (IPT) process is needed that involves all interested parties, e.g.
engineering, logistics, finance, contracting, industry, etc. Selection of
commercial specifications and standards shall be based on:
Open system- Open system-based commercial items are commercial items that use
based open standards as their primary interface standards and are selected
commercial based on performance, cost, industry acceptance, long term availability
items: and supportability, and upgrade potential.
Geoid Mean sea level is the surface of equal gravity that best fits the average
sea surface over the entire earth. This irregular, but smooth surface
shall be called the geoid.
Geoidal Height Geoidal height is the height of a particular point on the geoid above or
below the WGS-84 ellipsoid, measured along a line that passes
through the point on the geoid and is normal to the surface of the
ellipsoid.
Orthometric Orthometric altitude is the height of the airplane above or below the
Altitude geoid, measured along a line that passes through both the airplane
and the point on the geoid and is normal to the surface of the WGS-84
ellipsoid.
Geodetic Geodetic height is the height of a point on the physical surface of the
Height earth above or below the ellipsoid, measured along a line that passed
through the point on the earth and is normal to the surface of the
WGS-84 ellipsoid.
Geodetic Geodetic altitude is the airplane distance above or below the ellipsoid
Altitude as measured along a line that passes through the airplane and is
normal to the surface of the WGS-84 ellipsoid.
Pressure Pressure altitude is the airplane distance above mean sea level (the
Altitude distance above the geoid) on a standard day.
True Altitude True altitude is the actual airplane distance above mean sea level (the
actual distance above the geoid).
System The MCDU indication of the airplane height above the geoid shall be
Altitude called SYSTEM ALTITUDE. SYSTEM ALTITUDE is an approximation
of true altitude.
a. Barometric shall mean the altitude derived from air data (air
data computer).
b. Baro-Inertial shall mean the altitude from the INU. (A
complementary filter in the INU shall operate on barometric
pressure altitude and vertical acceleration to determine an
optimal estimate of altitude.)
c. GPS shall mean the altitude from the GPS receiver.
Height Above The airplane height above ground level (or ground clearance or vertical
Ground Level range) shall be the vertical distance between the airplane and the
ground directly below the airplane. This distance is equal to the
difference between orthometric altitude and orthometric height, and is
also equal to the difference between geodetic altitude and geodetic
height.
Height Above The airplane height above the target (or target clearance or the target
the Target vertical range) shall be the vertical distance between the airplane and
the ground elevation of a target or sensor aiming point.
AC Advisory Circular
AC Alternating Current
AF Air Force
AIMS
AM Amplitude Modulation
CG Center of Gravity
CP Curved Path
DC Direct Current
DF Direction Finding
DS Defensive System
DZ Drop Zone
E2 Energy/Elevation
EW Electronic Warfare
fc Foot-candles
FD Flight Director
fL Foot-lambert
FM Frequency Modulation
GAAS Page 50
HF High Frequency
IP Initial Point
IR Infrared
kHz Kilo-Hertz
LOC Localizer
LZ Landing Zone
MV Magnetic Variation
Nav/Safety Navigation/Safety
ND Navigational Display
NM Nautical Miles
OB Order of Battle
RF Radio Frequency
RNAV Page 72
SE Support Equipment
EISE
TA Terrain Avoidance
TBD To Be Determined
TF Terrain Following
TO Technical Order
VA Volt-Ampere
A/W/E Aircraft/Weapons/Electronics
W Watts
ZM Zone Marker
To Be Determined