l

t
THE MEANING OF EX NIHILO IN THE
CHURCH FATHERS, ARABIC AND HEBREW
PHILOSOPHY, AND ST. THOMAS

W HATEVER the author of the Second

Book of Maccabees (7:28) may have
meant by the term "not existent" in his
statement that God made the heaven and the earth
"from things not existent (!~ ov< oVTwv)," it is clear
that the Church Fathers understood it to mean not
only a denial of Aristotle's theory of the eternity of
the world but also a denial of Plato's theory of the
creation of the world from a preexistent eternal
matter. The "not existent" from which the world
was made is always explained by them to mean
"nothing" and not "matter," and, if the world is
made from matter, then matter itself is explained as
having been created from "nothing."
With Plotinus, however, a new theory of the origin
of the world appeared by the side of the older theories
of Plato and Aristotle. The world was no longer con-
ceived, with Plato, as being created from a preexistent
matter which was itself coeternal with God; nor was
it conceived, with Aristotle, as being in its complete-
ness coeternal with God; it was now conceived as
being eternally generated or emanated from the es-
355
 H. A. WOLFSON THE MEANING OF EX NIHILO
sence of God. With the appearance of this new con- world which is "from the not existent (« roO
ception of the origin of the world the question was µ~ livro,). ".• This ~istinction is given expression to by
raised whether, with the elimination of the element St. Augustme, evidently also with reference to both
of eternity from the Plotinian theory, the traditional Arius and Plotinus, in the following statements:
belief in creation ex nihilo could not be interpreted to "Ther. were made from nothir.g by Thee, not of
mean the temporal generation of the world from the Thee, ' for, if they were made from Thyself, "then
essence of God. they would be equal to Thine Only-begotten, and
To the Church Fathers, however, this conception thereby even to Thee."'
of ex nihilo was unacceptable, for to them, quite inde- Still, in Christianity among those who came under
pendently of the view of Plotinus, a distinction was ~he influence of Pl?tinus there appeared an attempt to
to be made between creation ex nihilo and generation ~nterpre~ the creat10n of the world ex nihilo as meaning
from the essence of God, the former to be used with Its creat10n fro~ the essence of God. An inkling of
reference to the world and the latter with reference that transformat10n of ex nihilo into ex essentia Dei is
to the Word. Thus Hippolytus, evidently in opposi- to be found in Dionysius the Areopagite. He thus
tion to the Basilidian Gnostics, distinguishes be- speak~ of God as one who ''produces substances by an
tween the creation of the world from nothing (,!; outgomg from essence," 7 of "the birth of all things
o/Jlievb,) and the generation of the Word from the from God,"• and of all things as having gone forth
Father.• Thus also Alexander of Alexandria, arguing !rom God.' The language is quite explicit. The world
against Arius' doctrine of the creation of the Word 1s created from the essence of God. But whether this
ex nihilo, distinguishes between the world created by view was presented by him as a new interpretation of
God "from things not existent(!!; ov< linwv)" and the the generally accepted theory of ex nihilo or whether
Word generated "from the true Father himself. " 2 it "."a~ presented by him as a new view in opposition
Similarly Athanasius, again arguing against Arius to 1t 1s not clear.
and distinguishing between the world and the Word, The vagueness with which Dionysius has left us on
says of the former that it was created "from things this ques~ion is cleared up by his follower John
not existent (!!; ov< linwv)", whereas the latter is of Scotus Engena. He makes it definitely clear that he
"the essence of the Father."• So also John Damascene, takes the expression ex nihilo to mean from the essence
evidently with reference to both Arius and Plotinus, of God. His reasoning on this subject falls into four
distinguishes between the generation of the Word stages. First, he tries to show that nihil in the tradi-
which is from "God's nature" and the creation of the tional expression creation ex nihilo means "the priva-
356 357

'

I
 H. A. WOLFSON THE MEANING OF EX NIHILO

tion of the total essence." 10 Second, he explains that was created ex nihilo undoubtedly means that in his
by the phrase "the privation of the total essence" he opinion creation ex nihilo meant the same as creation
means the "universal negation of all habitude, essence from the essence of God.
or substance, and accident, and, in general, the nega- Another type of identification of the formula of
tion of all that can be spoken of or thought of." 11 creation from nothing with Plotinus' doctrine of
Third , he maintains that such a ··universal negation"'
.
emanation from the essence of God is to be found,
applies only to God, inasmuch as only God 1s He who even before Alfarabi, in the Kalam. In the Kalam, we
··cannot be spoken of or thought of.'_' 12 Fourth, fr?m are told by various doxographies, there was a con-
all these premises he concludes that the express10n troversy concerning the meaning of the term "not
"the world was created from nothing" means that existent (al-ma'dum)." 1 • According to one group in
the world was created from God :13 the nothing from the Kalam, the "not existent" is "nothing." Accord-
which the world was created means God to whom ing to another group, the "not existent" is "some-
alone may be applied the negation of all that can be thing," and that "something" is variously described
spoken of or thought of. . . . as an "object of knowledge" or an "object of mem-
The identification of the rel1g10us doctrrne of the ory'" or an "object of discourse" or a "substance." 17
creation of the world from nothing and Plotinus' The origin and nature of this controversy have been
doctrine of the emanation of the world from the es- variously explained by students of Arabic philosophy,
sence of God is also to be found in Alfarabi. Plotinus' and there are at least five explanations; but the present
doctrine was known to Alfarabi through the Arabic writer in a paper published not long ago 18 has tried
epitome of the Enneads, which appeared. under the to show that the controversy had its origin in two
title of The Theology of Aristotle. 14 Referrrng to the different interpretations of the traditional formula
theory of emanation of that work, he says that "in for the origin of the world.
that work it is made clear that God, be He exalted, This traditional formula must have come to the
has created matter from nothing." 15 Now nowhere in Arabs from the Greek Church Fathers, among whom
the Theology of Aristotle, at least in the part of it that the phrase known to us through the Latin as ex
has been published, is there any explicit statement nihilo was expressed by !K rou µ~ oPros, which literally
that matter was created from nothing. The world, means "from the not existent." Now the Greek
including its matter, is presented in that work as ,1, µ~ oP, as well as its Arabic equivalent al-ma'dum, as

emanating from the essence of God. The fact that Arabic philosophers of that time could have known
Alfarabi ascribes to that work the view that matter from Aristotle, has two meanings. On the one hand,
358 359
 H. A. WOLFSON THE MEANING OF EX NIHILO

it means "nothing," for, as says Aristotle, "the not thought ( To vo,,v), inasmuch as "there will be forms
existent (To µ~ ov) is nothing (µ.~li!v)" and not a of perishable things, for we can have an image of
"something ( n)." 19 But, on the other hand, it means these,'' 25 and as enabling us also to carry on a discus-
"matter," for, again, as says Aristotle, the Platonists sion (1haXh,cr8m) 26 . From all this we may infer that
who refer to matter as "the great and small" identify under the influence of Plotinus this group of the
it with the not existent( Toµ~ ov)." Consequently, when Kalam have taken the preexistent matter from which
the philosophers of the Kalam learned of the formula the world was created to be intelligible matter or the
that the world was created from the not existent ·idea of matter. The formula creation ex nihilo is thus
some of them took it in the sense of·· nothing,'' while taken by this group of the Kalam to mean creation
others took it in the sense of "matter" and therefore from an ideal matter, which ideal matter, we may add
interpreted creation ex nihilo as meaning the Platonic here, was further conceived by them to be the totality
theory of creation from a preexistent matter. of ideal atoms." Thus, according to this theory, the
But this latter group, while following Plato in their creation of the world "from the not existent" means
belief of the creation of the world from a preexistent its creation from the ideal matter; but, inasmuch as
matter, describe that preexistent matter as "some- the ideal matter, under this theory, is an emanation
thing." Now the term "something" is not used by from the essence of God, the creation of the world
Plato as a description of matter. In Plotinus, however, "from the n~t existent" means its emanation from
matter ( ilX~) or the not existent ( To µ~ ov) is said to be the essence of God.
"something" (n). 21 We may therefore see here the This difference of opinion among the two groups of
influence of Plotinus. Moreover, this group of the the Kalam as to the meaning of the formula creation
Kalam describe that preexistent matter also as "sub- "from the not existent," whether it means from
stance," as an "object of knowledge," as an "object "nothing·· or from "something," has created the
of memory," and as an "object of discourse." Now, need among those who believed that creation was
again, none of these terms is used by Plato as a de- from "nothing" to formulate their belief in such a
scription of his preexistent matter. In Plotinus, how- way as to leave no doubt as to its meaning. Saadia,
ever, the term "substance (o!urla)" is used as a descrip- who deals with this problem, suggests that the proper
tion of his intelligible matter (ilX~ vo~d), 22 that is to formula is la min shai, literally, "not from thing"
say, the idea of matter, and in Plato the ideas are and not min la shai, literally, "from not thing.""
described as being the object of knowledge (-yvwcr"," What Saadia means by this puzzling statement is this:
!.-,crT4µ~)" and the object of memory or rather of In Arabic there are no inseparable negation prefixes.
360 361
 H. A. WOLFSON THE MEANING OF EX NIHILO

Consequently, when we have the negative particle la, Another expression used by Maimonides for ex
"not," in juxtaposition to the noun shai, "thing," nihilo is "after privation" or "after non-existence"
the two words may be translated either by "nothing" (Arabic: ba'd 'adam; Hebrew: aqar ha-he'eder)." The
or by "no-thing." Now, logically, according to significance of the use of this expression as a substitute
Aristotle, the term "no-thing" is an indefinite or or explanation of the expression ex nihilo may be
infinite term ( ovoµa a.6pHrrov) and, according to his gathered from Aristotle's discussion of the expression
conception of indefinite or infinite propositions, the "to come from something." This expression, accord-
proposition "A is no-thing" does not mean that "A" ing to Aristotle, may mean either "to come from
by its very nature could not be any thing but "noth- something(,~ oi!) as from matter"" or "to come after
ing." It only means that "A" which could be "so1:°e- a thing (µ,0' o) in time. " 34 With this Aristotelian
thing" happens to be "nothing."" Now a th:ng distinction in .the use of the preposition "from" in
which could be something and happens to be nothmg mind, Maimonides seems to argue that the use of the
is not absolute nothing but only relative nothing, and preposition "from" in any formulation of the princi-
such relative nothing is matter. By the same token, ple of creation ex nihilo, unless it be the formula ''not
the ptoposition that "the world was created from from a thing" or unless the preposition "from" be
no-thing" would mean that it was created from taken in.the sense of "after," would be inappropriate,
matter. In order, therefore, to avoid any misunder- inasmuch as "from" usually implies the coming of
standing, says Saadia, the formula should not be some thing from something as from matter. He therefore
min la shai, which might be taken to mean "from suggests that the formula for ex nihilo, however
no-thing," but it should be la min shai, which, ~ean- phrased, is to be understood to mean "after privation"
ing literally "not from thing," could not be misun- or "after non-existence." The term "after" would of
derstood to mean "from no-thing." course have to be purged of any implication of tim~,
Saadia' s statement that the formula "not from a inasmuch as time came into existence only with the
thing" is preferable to the formula •:from not _a creation of time."
thing," will explain why both Alfarabi 30 and Mai- In the light of all this we may understand the full
monides," in restating the principle of creat10_n ex significance of St. Thomas· discussion of the expression
nihilo, use the expression "not from a thing." Neither ex nihilo used in the creation of the world. To begin
of them state the reason for their choice of that par- with, he differentiates between the generation of the
ticular phrasing. Their reason undoubtedly was that \ Son from the "substance of the Father"" or "from
given by Saadia. I the essence of the Father,'· 37 and the creation of the
362 !I 363

I
I
 )
H. A. WOLFSON
1 THE MEANING OF EX NIHILO
I
world "from nothing. " 38 This is not only a repercus-
sion of the patristic arguments against Arius but _it is esse and privatio in these two statements mean the
also meant to be in opposition to Erigena, whose view, same thing and, in fact, the underlying Arabic term
as we have seen, is also the view of Alfarabi. But then ma'dum in Maimonides' statement means both "pri-
he raises the question "whether to create is to ma~e vation" and "nonexistence.''
something from nothing." 39 What he means by this But then St. Thomas proceeds to give another ex-
question is to point out that th~ f~rm~la "creation planation of ex nihilo. The proposition "it is made
from nothing'' involves a contradiction m terms. The from nothing. (fit ex nihilo)," he says, may be also
preposition "from" (ex), he says, wit~ evident _r~fer- taken to mean "it is not made from anything (non fit
ence to Aristotle's discussion of this preposition, ex aliquo)." 43 This quite evidently corresponds to the
I
quoted above, "imports relation of some cause, espe- I
other of Maimonides' two formulations of ex nihilo
cially of the material cause, as when we say that a
'1' quoted·above, that which in the Latin translation of
statue is made from bronze, whereas nothing cannot his work reads non est de aliquo." And this Maimonid-
be the matter of being."" In justification, therefore, i ean formulation of the belief in creation ex nihilo
follows, as we have seen, the formulation openly
of the use of the expression ex nihilo, he resorts to the
other use of the preposition "from" (ex) suggested maintained by Saadia and tacitly used also by Alfa-
rabi.
by Aristotle, namely, that of "after" (post?. !he
expression "created from nothing," he say~, signifies About a century after St. Thomas, the identification
"only order, as when we say, from morning comes t of the expression ex nihilo with the expression de
essentia Dei was suggested by Hasdai Crescas. The
midday, in other words, after morning is midday.'' 41
Accordingly, the expression "from nothing" _means l occa~ion which had given rise to this identification
"after nonexistence (post non esse)." Here, again, the by Crescas was his attempt to refute Gersonicles'
term "after" is to be understood to have no implica- arguments against creation ex nihilo. In this attempt
tion of priority of time, for time was created with the he starts with an analysis of the Plotinian theory of
creation of the world. This explanation of St. Thomas' emanation. This theory, he argues, means that God,
I
corresponds, as may be seen, to one of Maimonides' ./l who is pure form, causes to come into existence some-
two formulations of the principle of ex nihilo quoted thing that is material and absolutely unlike the pure
above that which in the Latin translation of his form from which it is supposed to be emanated. This,
, ' he further argues, means nothing but that the world
work is rendered by post privationem. 42 St. Thomas
post non esse is Maimonides' post privationem, for non came into existence "after pri=tion," or rather "after
nonexistence," without any preexistent matter as its
364
365
 l

H. A. WOLFSON l THE MEANING OF EX NIHILO

subject. Then he tries to show that the traditional tion is that emanation from the essence of God 1s
belief in creation ex nihilo means nothing but that. taken by him to mean the same as creation from
In his attempt to establish this last point, he proceeds nothing.
along the lines of Maimonides and St. Thomas, bring-
ing into play the distinction made by Aristotle be-
tween the two meanings of the preposition ex,
though, again, like Maimonides and St. Thomas, he
makes no reference to Aristotle. The expression ex
nihilo, he says, does not mean that the nihil is a sub-
ject from which the world came into existence in the
same manner as the statue is said to come into exis-
tence from the bronze as its subject or its matter. The
expression ex nihilo rather means that the world came
into existence "after privation," or rather "after
nonexistence,'' without any preexistent matter as its
subject. But this, concludes Crescas, is exactly what
he has shown to be the meaning of emanation. 45 It I
must be remarked, however, that the object of Cres- c\l
cas' argument is not to reinstate in religious good
standing the doctrine of emanation but rather to show
that creation ex nihilo is not less rational a belief than
the philosophic doctrine of emanation.
In conclusion, attention may be called to the use
made by Spinoza of Crescas' identification of emana-
tion from the essence of God with creation from
nothing. Dealing with what may be identified as the
theory of emanation, Spinoza argues to the effect that
the emanation of a material substance from an im-
material substance is impossible on the ground that
something cannot come from nothing." The implica-
366 367
 ,l
NOTES
21. Enmttds ii, 4, 16.

22. Ibid., ii, 4, 5,

23. C,RJ:,lu, 440 B.
24. M,taph. i, 9, 990b, 11-12.
NOTES
25, Ibid., 14-15 .
1. R,futllfio Omnium Haere.rium x, 33, p. 290, II. 7-8 (ed. P. Wendland). Cf. vii, 21ff'.
.I
26. Parmenides 135 C.
2. Bpi.rt. i, 11 (Migne PG, 18, 564 C).
27. a. above n. 18; and "Atomism in Saadia," ]. Q. R., n. s., XXXVII (1946),
3. O,at. i, 29 (PG, 26, 72 C). 107-124.
4. D, FM, 0,-th. i, 8 (PG, 94, 812 Bf.) 28. Cf. Commmtaire sur I, Slf,r Yesira park Gaon Sam/ya dt Fayyoum, par M. Lambert
(1891). Arabic, p. 84, IL 3-6; French, p. 106, and "The Kalam Problem,••
5. Con/. xiii, 33, 48.
pp. 387!.
6. lhid., xii, 7, 7.
29, D, lnterpr., c. 12, 16a, 32. Cf. my paper "Infinite and Privative Judgments in
7. D, Divini.r Nominihus v, 8 (PG, 3, 824 C). Aristotle, Averroes, and Kant,'' Philosophy and Phenommokgil:t1/ Rmarch,

8. Ibid., ix, 9 (916 C-D).

9. Wd. (916 D).

t•" VIII (1947), 173-186.
30. Alfarabi, Joe. cit.

31. Maimonides, M.oreh N,bulum ii, 13, Second Theory.

10. D, Divis. Nat. iii, 5 (Migne PL, 122, 634 C-D). • 11
11. Ibid., iii, 22 (686 C).
I•. 32. Ibid.
ft 33, ~tt1ph. v, 24, 1023a, 26.
12. Ibid. i, 15 ( 463 B).

13. lhid., iii, 22 (686 A-688 A). Cf. H. Bett, ]ohann,s Scotru Brig,na (1925), pp. 34. Ibid., 1023b, 6.
34-36.
35, a. Maimonides, Mor,h N1b11kim ii, 30.
14. Fr. Dieterici, Di, sogmtmnte Theologi, des Aristot/1.r, Arabic, 1882; German, 1883. ::i
36. Sum. Theo/. i, 41, Jc.
15, Kitiih al-Jam', ed. F. Dieterici in Alfiiriihi's philo1ophisch, Ahhandlung,n, 1890,
p, 23, 11. 15-16; German translation, p. 37, 11. 27-29.
II 37. Ibid., ad 2.

16. The Arabic term 'adam, which literally means privation (t7'1°Ep71ut-.r), is also 38, Ibid., c.
used technically in the sense of nonexistence (µ'17 011).
39. Ibid., i, 45, I.
17, Baghdadi, Cairo, 1910, p. 163, I. 17-p, 164, I. 14.
40. Ibid., ad 3, The illustration of a statue and bronze occurs in Aristotle(1023a,29).
18. "The Kalam Problem of Non-existence and Saadia's Second Theory of Crea- f,
tion," ]twi.rh Quarterly R.evi,w, n. s., XXXVI (1946), 371-391. 41. Ibid., The illustration used by Aristotle is "night comes from day" (1023b, 6).
19. D, Gm. ,t Corr. i, 3, 318a, 15.
20. Phy.1., i, 9, 192a, 6-7.
;! 42. Rabi Mo,r,i kgyptij Dux sw Director dubit1Jtttium aut perpl,xorum (Paris, 1520),
Iib. ii, cap. xiv, fol. 47a, 1. 18.

368 369
!
 H. A. WOLFSON
43. Sum. Thlol. i, 45, 1, ad. 3.

44. L«. ril.

45. Or Adtmai iii, i, 5, p. 69a, 11. 4-18 (ed. Vienna, 1859).
46. a. my discussion in Th, Philosophy of Spinota (1934), I, 95, 107, in connection
with quotations from Ethics i. prop. 6, Short T,-,atis, i. 21 and Bpi.rtoUI iv.

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EDITED BY URBAN T. HOLMES, JR,

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