The Euro: Europe's Construction or Destruction?

P U BL IS HI N G
M A J O R E U R O P E A N D E B AT E S C O L L E C T I O N
European Training Institute
This is an authorised free electronic edition of the book
THE EURO: EUROPES CONSTRUCTION OR DESTRUCTION?

by Daniel Guguen and JC Gonzalez Alvarez
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ISBN: 2-930409-02-9
The conclusions of the authors are theirs alone
the time-honoured formula expresses it: "The views expressed here by Juan Carlos Gonzalez Alvarez and Daniel Guguen are entirely their own, and do not represent the opinion of Europe Information Service". This is doubly true, because some of the analyses, convictions and views of the authors diverge. But the aim is not to persuade the reader. Rather, it is to provoke reflection and individual analysis - on the future of the Euro, and on the future of the European Union.
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5
Daniel Guguen: Bibliography
EIS Publishing
Comitology and other Committees & Expert Groups with Caroline Rosberg - March 2004
Editions Apoge
Le Guide pratique du labyrinthe communautaire First edition: June 1991 - translated into 18 languages Cls pour le Parlement Europen with Dominique Lund - January 1992 Euro-subventions : mode demploi with Bernard de Galembert - June 1992 Les cus de lEurope with Roxanne Feller and Bernard de Galembert May 1993 Le Parlement europen. Pour une Europe des citoyens January 1994 LEurope contre-sens April 1996
Editions Dervy
Les bijoux Rose-Croix (1760 1890) with Robert Vanloo et Philippe Klein May 2003
Editions de lUniversit de Bruxelles

International lobbying in the EU (in preparation)
French translations and adaptations

Le drame yougoslave, by Mihailo Crnobrnja September 1992 Europe ltrange superpuissance, by David Buchan June 1993
English translation and adaptation:
Peter ODonnell
To contact the authors:
Juan Carlos Gonzalez e-mail : [email protected] www.eis.be Daniel Guguen e-mail : [email protected] www.clan-public-affairs.be
CONTENTS
THE EURO: YESTERDAY UNIMAGINABLE, TODAY INDESTRUCTIBLE? THE LAUNCH CIRCUMSTANCES: 1999: Europe's economies diverge 2004: further and further
17
13
LIBERAL AND FEDERALIST LOGIC

23
UNCHECKED UPSETS: TAX AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS NO EURO LEADERSHIP IS NO GOOD FOR THE EU THE "STUPID" STABILITY PACT
31
43
53
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN MONETARY UNIONS THE EURO TODAY THE EURO IN 2015: FOUR SCENARIOS SEVEN PROPOSALS FOR A SUSTAINABLE EURO
65
71
77
83
11
The Euro: yesterday unimaginable; today, indestructible?
13
he idea of a single European currency provoked incredulity back in 1995 even at the most senior national and European levels. Ministers, Commissioners and senior officials of central banks privately admitted to deep scepticism: for them, at that time, a European currency was just an impossible dream. They pointed to the lack of structural coordination among the EU's economies, the incomplete single market, reticence over federalism. Interview after interview produced the same refrain: "A successful single currency requires three conditions: a single market, a federal state, and European citizenship...." - conditions that just didn't exist in 1995. Now, less than 10 years later, the Euro is in our pockets, and nobody questions its existence, its foundations or its durability. Any suggestion of the dismantling or disappearance of the Euro is viewed as sacrilege. Six years after its launch, the Euro is considered rock-solid, impregnable, indestructible. But in a broader historical perspective, six years might be considered hardly sufficient to validate this thesis, or to justify unquestioning confidence about the sustainability of the Euro. The assumption that a currency cannot disappear is not supported by recent events - notably the 2002 Argentine crisis - the consequence of an untenable fixed parity between the US dollar and the Argentine peso. And just a few years before that, the Yugoslav dinar collapsed under the combined effect of inter-regional economic instabilities and the break-up of the federal Yugoslavian model. These are challenging examples in the light of the current conditions in the Eurozone: The envisaged convergence of the economies of the Euro-zone countries has not happened: instead, they have diverged substantially over the last four years. As a result, competitive capacity varies widely across the member states, the countries with low productivity face increasing deficits and debts, and the maintenance of parity and a single interest rate imposes strains on economies evolving at different rhythms. While the Euro is a valuable economic lever for Euro-zone countries with buoyant economies, it is becoming a ball and chain for others: - they cannot devalue when faced with excessive exchange rates; - they must endure a single interest rate; 14
- their indebtedness is subject to ceilings; - they cannot relaunch economic activity through budgetary expansionism because of the limits on authorised deficits. In short, the greater the difficulties a Euro-zone member encounters, the less it enjoys a margin for manoeuvre and a capacity to react! While a single currency is essentially a federal tool, the European Union is not deepening its political integration; on the contrary, its ever-widening enlargement is reducing it to little more than a free trade area that has deliberately renounced any federal ambitions Meanwhile, however easy the public finds its use, the Euro has contributed nothing to the emergence of a sense of European citizenship. National sentiments in 2004 continue to predominate over Community spirit, and the "Citizen's Europe" simply doesn't exist. And as the EU grows larger, so Euroscepticism is likely to gain ground. Worse still, even if the Euro has become a medium of exchange and a store of value, it is not an economic tool. Its management has been handed over to the European Central Bank, which lacks political power and is disconnected from national economic policies. The management focus is on maintaining price stability rather than on promoting employment and growth. So the Euro is an expression of deep asymmetry between monetary policy and economic policy in total contrast to the US dollar. This asymmetry contains the seeds of social and political conflict.
The true budget deficit figures

With budget deficits running above 3% of GDP year after year (which means public expenditure levels 20-25% above fiscal revenues! see the box alongside) several Euro-zone states are structurally living beyond their means - in particular the two biggest, Germany and France. Spending much more than they are earning, these two countries have increased their debt well above the 60% ceiling required by the Stability Pact. And the longer this
The budget deficit of a member state is calculated with reference to its GDP. When a citizen hears of a budget deficit of 3%, he might imagine that public expenditure is 100 and tax revenues are 97. The reality is entirely different, as the example below shows. France's GDP in 2003 State Budget Tax revenues Budget deficit Budget deficit as a % 1 557,2 billion 272 billion 208,3 billion 63,7 billion 23,4 %
15
goes on, the more they lose competitiveness. Weighed down by structural spending, they no longer have any margin for manoeuvre, while they refuse to put in place the liberal reforms required by the very nature of the single currency; Lacking labour market flexibility, but with a large public sector and high labour costs, these countries suffer persistent unemployment that drags the national accounts even further down: for both France and Germany, the Euro is becoming too expensive, and overvalued; If inflation starts to rise again - not an improbable hypothesis, in the face of higher oil prices and the prospect of increased US interest rates - the vulnerable Euro-zone economies - Germany, Belgium, France, Italy - with their high levels of debt will find themselves incapable of repaying even the interest on their debt... There are currently no answers to these predicaments. That is why the authors conceived this book - to shed light on a subject that is vital to every EU citizen, to give readers the elements to make their own assessment, and to suggest possible solutions that are technically achievable in the short/medium term. Neither of the authors has a cause to defend, and they do not always share the same opinions on each step of the argument. But this diversity may have the merit of stimulating readers to make their own analysis. The authors do however share a sense of unease and urgency about impending monetary disaster... Juan Carlos Gonzalez is more confident in the ability of the authorities to find solutions; Daniel Guguen sees a probable Euro-crisis and a serious threat to the very existence of the European Union in its current configuration. But both authors are, first and foremost, Europeans who believe objective analysis and debate should precede decision, and for whom prevention is better than cure.
16
The launch circumstances:

Convergence criteria 1998 : criteria ignored
1999: Europe's economies diverge 2004 : further and further
17
The launch circumstances
Convergence criteria
Joining the Euro required compliance with convergence criteria, to ensure economic coherence among the Euro-zone countries - an essential condition for creating a single currency. The five criteria are: > 1 : an annual budget deficit below 3% of GDP; > 2 : public debt not exceeding 60% of GDP; > 3 : inflation no higher than 1.5 points above the average of the three best countries; > 4 : long-term interest rates no more than 2 points above the average of the three best countries; > 5 : two years membership of the European Monetary System, with no devaluation. The selection was carried out on the basis of results for 1997:
Criteria (annual average)
Budgetary deficit (as % of GDP) -3 -2.7 -2.5 -2.1 -2.6 -0.9 -3.0 0.9 -2.7 1.7 -1.4 -2.5 0.7 -1.9 -1.9 -4.0 - 3,2
Debt (as % of GDP)
Inflation (%)
LIMITS Germany Austria Belgium Spain Finland France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Denmark United Kingdom Sweden Greece UE 15
60 61.3 66.1 122.2 68.3 55.8 58.0 66.3 121.6 6.7 72.1 62 64.1 53.4 76.6 108.7 63,6
2,7 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 5.2 2,9
12 month Membership long-term of European interest rate (%) Monetary System 7,1 5.6 YES 5.6 YES 5.7 YES 6.3 YES 5.9 YES 5.5 YES 6.2 YES 6.7 YES 5.6 YES 5.5 YES 6.2 YES 6.3 NO 7.1 NO 6.5 NO 9.8 NO 5,5
18
1998: criteria ignored

On 2 May 1998, the heads of state and of government of the EU member states selected the qualifying countries. Of the (then) 15 member states: Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom were not candidates: Greece (which eventually joined the Euro-zone on 1 January 2001) met none of the 5 criteria, The remaining 11 countries (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal) were all selected, but on the basis of an assessment which was more political than technical. None of the qualifying countries (except Luxembourg) met the 5 criteria set as a condition of their participation in the Euro: several (Germany, Belgium, France, Italy) cut their budgetary deficit to 3% not by reducing public expenditure (as the spirit of the criteria required) but by increasing, sometimes massively, their direct or indirect tax take; exceptional revenues were used to artificially reduce the budget deficit for the 1997 reference year (gold sales in Germany and Belgium, and the payment made by France-Tlcom to the French state); in several countries (notably in Germany), the 3% budgetary deficit criterion was met by increasing debt; 8 countries out of the 11 exceeded the debt ceiling, and Belgium and Italy were accepted despite debt levels twice the permitted level... in addition, meeting the budgetary criteria was greatly facilitated by the fortuitous steep fall in inflation and interest rates within the EU; So for this historic step in European Union construction, the selection was subjective, even artificial. And since the criteria were not respected then, sustained convergence of the economies is in no way guaranteed now.
19
1999: Europe's economies diverge

Because selection for the Euro-zone was politically fudged, the members did not meet the convergence requirement that the single currency required. The following table demonstrates how far European economies diverged in 1999: 9
growth rates in 1998 (%)
8 7 6 5 4 6,9 3 2 1 0 1,8
Italy Germany
Source : Eurostat
8,9
3,4 2 2
Belgium France
3,6
4,3
4,3
4,6
Austria Spain
Netherlands Finland Ireland Portugal Luxembourg
As can be seen, the 1998 growth rates for Euro-zone countries varied between +1.8% in Italy and +8.6% in Ireland... The obvious question is how the European Central Bank could manage such a disparate economic situation with a single interest rate.
2004: further and further

The table below reveals a striking contrast: Austria, Spain, Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg reported a sizeable reduction in their deficit and debt levels. But three of the four large Euro-zone members - Germany, France and Italy reported a significant deterioration of deficit and debt levels. 20
This is disturbing, because the Euro had not only failed to bring economies closer together, as had been expected; on the contrary, the Euro had accelerated the divergent trends: It was acting as a lever for virtuous countries; but as an impediment for the countries with high deficit and debt. Convergence criteria 2004 (estimates at 26 October)
Budget deficit (as % of GDP) Germany Austria Belgium Spain Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Euro-zone - 3,9 - 1,3 - 0,1 0,6 2,3 - 3,7 - 5,5 - 0,2 - 3,0 - 0,8 - 2,9 - 2,9 - 2,9 Debt (as % of GDP) Inflation (%) Long-term interest rate (2003) 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,2 4,1 4,2 4,1 4,1 4,2 4,1 Growth rate
65,9 64,0 95,8 48,2 44,8 64,9 112,2 30,7 106,0 4,9 55,7 60,8 71,1
1,7 2,1 2,0 3,1 0,2 2,3 3,0 2,3 2,3 3,0 1,2 2,4 2,1
1,9 1,9 2,5 2,6 3,0 2,4 3,8 5,2 1,3 4,0 1,4 1,3 2,1
Source : European Commission, Eurostat
A word on the non-Euro-zone countries

The three members of the EU15 that did not join the Euro clearly improved their economic and public finance performances between 1999 and 2004.
Budget deficit (as % of GDP) Denmark United Kingdom Sweden UE 15 1,0 - 2,8 0,6 - 2,7
Debt (as % of GDP)
Inflation (%)
Long-term interest rate (2003) 4,3 4,5 4,6 4,2
Growth rate
43,4 40,4 51,6 64,4
1,1 1,4 1,1 2,0
2,3 3,3 2,7 2,3
21
As for most of the ten member states that joined the EU in May 2004, they have massive budgetary deficits, persistent inflation and growing debt. With the exception of Lithuania and Slovenia, they do not meet the five convergence criteria.
Budget deficit (as % of GDP) Cyprus Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Slovenia UE 25 - 5,2 0,5 - 5,5 - 2,0 - 2,6 - 5,1 - 5,6 - 4,8 - 3,9 - 2,3 - 2,8 Debt (as % of GDP) Inflation (%) Long-term interest rate (2003) 5,2 4,6 8,1 5,0 4,7 8,1 6,9 4,7 5,1 5,2 4,6 Growth rate
72,6 4,8 59,7 14,6 21,1 72,4 47,7 37,8 42,4 30,9 63,3
2,4 3,4 6,9 6,8 1,2 3,7 3,5 2,8 7,7 3,9 2,2
3,5 5,9 3,9 7,5 7,1 1,0 5,8 3,8 4,9 4,0 2,5
The conclusions are clear: 1. The five convergence criteria for admission to the Euro-zone have been systematically scorned by the member states. 2. Far from converging, the Euro-zone economies have increasingly diverged: in 2004, eight of the twelve still do not meet the criteria, and six of them (Germany, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) are much further away than they were in 1999! 3. Paradoxically, the three EU15 countries outside the Euro-zone have improved their economic performance and have substantially cut their debt levels - from an average of 64.7% in 1999 to 44.7% in 2004 (a drop of 30%). 4. While the Baltic States and Slovenia might be able to join the Euro in the next five to seven years, for the other new member states the prospects are very distant.
22
Liberal and federalist logic

The Constitutional Treaty deliberately omits the word "federal". The Euro protects the least efficient Euro-zone countries from devaluation, but this is a deceptively precarious shield. Low worker mobility and multiple European languages act as a structural barrier to macroeconomic adjustments between countries. Enlargement is incompatible with the Euro.
23
The Euro commits the EU to a federalist logic

Although nearly every election at national or regional level in an EU member state generates debate about whether the EU is becoming a federal Europe or a free trade area, the reality is that the Euro has already set the EU on a federal course. But the political trend is in precisely the opposite direction. In contrast to the 1980s, when Germany and Belgium were officially calling for European federalism, not one of today's 25 member states is fundamentally federalist. Even in Germany and France, the favoured formula nowadays is the ambiguous dictum of Jaques Delors "the European Union federation of nation-States" - an admirable phrase which even its author admitted has no real meaning. The lack of political enthusiasm for the federal model is clearly demonstrated in the Constitutional Treaty signed in October 2004, where the word "federal" was carefully avoided. During the long discussions that led to the new Treaty, the most that was sought by some member states was a reference to "federal" in the preamble. The Euro may find it impossible to sustain itself in the absence of a European federal state. The most recent experience of a monetary pact between two sovereign states - the USA and Argentina - turned into a famous disaster. And this was only a limited arrangement, a simple fixed-parity agreement with each currency maintaining its own notes and coins. A common currency depends on the existence of a single state because it requires common taxation, common social policies, a common political project. Its chances of success are severely limited if it has to cope with - as the Euro does - diverse conditions in its component states, with: - different rates of growth - variable-geometry budget policies - debts ranging from single to triple - labour markets that are flexible in some countries, rigid in others - labour costs ranging from single to double - taxation regimes that remain 100% national and 100% uncoordinated - political convictions ranging from liberal to social democrat... and from militant Atlanticism to the Franco-German alliance It could be objected that certain countries have - much like the European Union differences in growth rates and taxation between their regions, without jeopardizing their currencies. Such is the case today in the USA, and was the case until recently in the reunified Germany. 24
The observation is valid in respect of the USA, where productivity, growth and taxation may differ from one state to another. But the situation is self-correcting: Americans move from less-productive areas to where economic potential is high - and these population movements are easier because the country has a common language... The German case is different: it was only the transfer of 1,250 billion Euros in the shape of subsidies, favourable loans, and social provision which allowed the Federal State to maintain for over 10 years a single - and completely artificial parity between the old Federal and Democratic Republics of Germany. The existence of a common language might have facilitated population movements between eastern and western Lnder - had mobility been as well accepted in Germany as in the USA. Without any question, the EU is in the worst position possible to affect the economic and political integration within which the Euro could be the cornerstone. Because in addition to its many divergences of productivity and performance, its mosaic of languages precludes any significant regional shift of population in response to decline and boom.
The Euro commits the EU to an ultra-liberal logic

Macro-economic management of a country can be based on: the Keynesian scheme of relaunching the economy through public spending and budgetary deficits the liberal logic of the "virtuous circle"... The Keynesian approach can be defined as economic interventionism by the state. At its simplest, it involves relaunching the economy by public funding, such as after the 1929 crisis in the USA, when the British economist John Maynard Keynes proposed a massive temporary budget deficit, large-scale public works, government support for employment, and the artificial creation of growth so as to increase domestic consumption and business investment. Once economic activity is re-established, business resumes its leading economic role, allowing the state to withdraw. The Keynes approach assumes self-correction: the return to full employment generates tax receipts to fill the budget gaps created by the relaunch. 25
The "virtuous circle" applies to the current era, in which the Keynesian scheme no longer functions: nowadays, major public undertakings create very few jobs - a few thousand even on a project as huge as the Channel Tunnel, in addition, the Stability Pact rules for the Euro effectively preclude any relaunch via budgetary policies - all the more so since countries with weak growth suffer a structural budget deficit that leaves little room for budgetary manoeuvre when circumstances deteriorate, as France experienced in 2003 and 2004. In the liberal logic of the "virtuous circle" approach, the state intervenes little, and instead provides economic players with a macro-economic context geared to a return to growth and to the balancing of the national accounts. Rather than digging a Keynesian budget deficit, the aim is to reduce or even eliminate it by sharp and rapid cuts in public spending, by slashing the civil service or state benefits...
Reduction in public deficits
Cuts in interest rates
Fiscal improvement
Relaunch of investment and employment
Increased consumption
At the same time, legislation promotes labour flexibility, encourages (or obliges) the long-term unemployed to return to work, and extends working time, while stimulating business competitiveness through lower interest rates, brusque monetary readjustment, cuts in corporate tax, investment incentives The return to work, the relaunch of private-sector investments, a business26
friendly legal and taxation environment set the virtuous circle in motion, leading to stable jobs, increased consumption, and a return to balanced public finances. It is a kill-or-cure approach... Some countries have adapted, to varying degrees: the UK, Ireland, Spain, the Scandinavian countries. Others - notably Germany - are not adapting, and others - notably Belgium and France - do not even wish to try. The "virtuous circle" has advantages: it combats budgetary waste it promotes economic efficiency and labour productivity it leads to the reduction of charges on labour But the "virtuous circle" has its own disadvantages: with zero inflation, cuts in interest rates become ineffective the focus on economic improvements tends to neglect social considerations it aggravates inequalities and generates exclusion An ultra-liberal logic also has an impact at the macro-economic level: larger companies that can benefit fully from economies of scale promote mergers and acquisitions the larger market that the Euro creates drags the larger companies into a competitive race the price transparency introduced by the Euro stimulates competition the demands of efficiency impose increasingly heavy social and fiscal consequences - including cuts in work-force, the imposition of wage ceilings, social deregulation, and relocations. The authors defend no specific thesis - still less any personal views - in this explanation of the link between the single currency and liberal economic logic. Their point is merely that the liberal economy - as defined in this chapter - is the inescapable background for modern European economies, and that no other approach offers a solution. 27
The European domestic market becomes the Euro-zone

Before the creation of the Euro-zone, the member state markets were essentially separate, and most of their trade was consequently international. They treated their trade with other member states as imports or exports. As much as 60% of the GDP of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, for instance, was accounted for by imports and exports. The high proportion of international trade made currency exchange rates of major importance, both for imports and exports.
Trade before the creation of the Euro-zone

Imports Exports In % of GDP Imports Exports In % of GDP
20,5 %
21,7 %
18,2 %
20,8 %
FRANCE
GERMANY
Imports
Exports In % of GDP
Imports
Exports In % of GDP
61,6 %
66,3 %
51,5 %
55,9 %
BELGIUM
NETHERLANDS
With the coming of the Euro, the proportion of foreign trade has fallen. IntraCommunity commerce is no longer treated as exports and imports, but as domestic trade. For companies, the domestic market has widened to the dimensions of the Euro-zone. This has a triple result: Since intra-community trade is no longer considered as exports and imports, the exchange rate for the Euro-zone countries has less importance; 28
The Euro-zone countries are thus protected by the "Euro-shield": without it, France, Germany and Italy would each have suffered at least one currency devaluation - and possibly more - between 1999 and 2004. The "Euro-shield" cuts both ways: it protects, but at the same time it masks the competitiveness gap springing up between countries - with the consequences outlined in this study.
Trade after the creation of the Euro-zone

Imports Exports
In % of GDP
15,6 %
16,9 %
EURO ZONE
Imports
Exports
In % of GDP
11,1 %
8,4 %
USA
Imports
Exports
In % of GDP
8,6 %
10,7 %
JAPAN
29
Liberalism and federalism - compatible or contradictory?

The obvious question that arises is whether the federalist logic that underpins the Euro is compatible with the liberal logic that it also depends on. The obvious answer is - in theory - yes. But in practice, it is equally obvious that the answer is no. At least not in today's European Union, where every summit of its leaders demonstrates the cruel reality: the more it becomes liberal, the less it is federalist... or at any rate, the greater the tendency towards liberalism, the weaker the attachment to federalism. As a result, there is a deep inconsistency at the heart of the EU. The political decision to launch the Euro clashes with the majority view among its leaders that the EU is primarily a market, a huge free trade area which should continue to expand so as to widen its frontiers, its market and its economic power. This forced march towards a larger EU would make economic sense if the Euro did not exist. But it makes no sense at all in an EU which has provided itself with a single currency, since it is manifestly impossible simultaneously to broaden the EU (as the liberals want) and to deepen it (as the Euro requires). The further the EU enlarges, the weaker it becomes, and the greater the threat to the Euro.
30
Unchecked upsets: tax and social affairs

Until 2000, neither fiscal pressure nor labour costs were significant influences on business competitiveness. But the Euro is going to change this: the Euro requires fiscal and social harmonisation. With the Euro, the EU economic model embraces both an ultra-liberal vision with a push for social deregulation, and significant structural funding to help develop the regions that lag behind. This is bound to lead to major industrial relocation, principally towards the east. There can be only one remedy for this: the urgent creation of a common fiscal policy and a common employment policy. But at present, the EU lacks the political will for anything more than gestures in this direction: in practice, tax and social regulation remain largely under the control of the member states themselves.
31
Major fiscal distortion

The EU as a whole is heavily taxed compared to its principal world competitors, and within the EU taxation varies widely from state to state. The EU's heavy tax burden The table below confirms the heavy burden of European taxation compared to the USA and Japan. The differences amount to as much as 20% of GDP! It shows, for instance, that the fiscal pressure in Sweden is almost twice that in South Korea... The table also reveals the more balanced nature of the tax structure in the USA and Japan, where light taxation on companies and individuals makes companies more competitive and gives workers more incentives to earn.
Structure of tax receipts in Europe, the USA and Japan as % of GDP in 2002 (2001 for USA andJapan)
60
Others Taxes on goods and services
50
Employers' social security contributions Workers' social security contributions
40
Company taxation Income tax on individuals
30
20
Sources : Eurostat, OECD
10
0
Sweden Denmark EU 25 Spain Ireland United States Japan
32
Divergent taxation across the EU15

This table demonstrates the divergent tax systems across the countries of the EU15: not only does the fiscal pressure vary widely across the member states, from a high of 50.6% of GDP in Sweden to a low of 28.9% of GDP in Ireland, but the structure of the tax take is unique to each country, confirming - as if confirmation were needed - the extreme heterogeneity of European tax regimes.
National structure of tax receipts of the EU15 as % of GDP in 2002

60
Others Taxes on goods and services Employers' social security contributions Workers' social security contributions Company taxation Income tax on individuals
50
40
30
20
10
0
Luxembourg United Kingdom Belgium Austria Denmark Finland Germany Greece France Italy EU 15 Spain Sweden Netherlands Portugal Ireland
Sources : Eurostat
33
The lighter tax systems of the new member states

The ten new member states have lower GDP and more limited social protection, and naturally have a much lower tax take than in the EU15: an average of at least 6 points of GDP. Of particular note is the generally lower level of social security payments and company taxation, which promote inward relocation from countries with more onerous regimes.
Structure of tax revenue of new member states in 2002

Others Taxes on goods and services Employers' social security contributions Workers' social security contributions
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Czech Republic Slovenia Poland Hungary Estonia Slovakia Latvia
Company taxation Income tax on individuals
Malta
Sources : Eurostat
34
Lithuania
EU 25
Fiscal pressure and distortions in context

Heavy taxation does not necessarily preclude company competitiveness: some low-tax countries have high wage costs (USA, Japan) or suffer from fragile financial institutions (Korea) high levels of mandatory wage deductions can go hand-in-hand with high company productivity - such as in Belgium and the Scandinavian countries, some countries mitigate fiscal rigidity by maximizing the financial and social niches that most of them offer (notably France). Nevertheless, these major distortions between member states give cause for concern, for the future even more than for the present. The Euro-zone countries can be split into three categories: The "virtuous countries" (Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg) which combine low taxation with a low deficit, low debt and a liberal economic approach. They are well-equipped to cope with international competition and with general downturns in the economy. The "liberal-social" countries (Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal): these countries may suffer from high taxation or significant budget deficits, but they all have flexible labour markets and adaptable economies. The "rearguard" countries (Germany, Belgium, France) combine all the handicaps: high taxation, elevated levels of debt, budget deficits, generous social provision, inflexible labour markets, a conservative vision of society and the economy, and strong resistance to change. They all lack any margin for manoeuvre. The crucial problem is that these countries, with their markedly different performances and fiscal approaches, are inextricably linked, creating significant tensions. And these tensions are mirrored by a similar degree of discrepancy in terms of social provision.
35
Major social distortion

Labour costs within the European single market diverge widely. Hourly costs per employee vary from 1 to 3,5.
Wage and non-wage costs in European industry (in Euros/hour)

30
25
Salary cost non salary cost
20
15
10
Denmark
Sweden
Germany
United Kingdom
Luxembourg
France
Italy
Austria
Finland
Ireland
Greece
Spain
Netherlands
Source : Eurostat
Alongside these differences, there is frequently a strong correlation between labour costs and labour productivity: the higher the labour cost, the higher the productivity. However, some countries combine high labour costs and relatively low labour productivity. This observation reveals in fact a different reality between countries with inflexible labour markets (Germany) and those with highly flexible labour markets (Sweden, Denmark, United Kingdom). The latter make up for any productivity deficits by increased margins for manoeuvre in the organisation of their labour markets.
36
Portugal
Productivity and labour costs in the European Union in 2002 The index of 100 represents EU 15
160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
Productivity Labour cost
United Kingdom
Finland
Luxembourg
Ireland
Denmark
Germany
Sweden
Austria
Greece
France
EU 15
Spain
Italy
Netherlands
Source : Eurostat
Up to the year 2000 business competitiveness was directly conditioned neither by tax pressure nor by labour costs. But the Euro is going to change that.
The Euro requires fiscal and social harmonisation

By making price comparisons possible between countries, and by giving substance to the single market, the Euro has given a major stimulus to competition. This trend is reinforced by the World Trade Organisation obligation (with the active support of EU member states) to maximize competition and by the ultraliberal approach to economics in most EU member states. The continental-scale domestic market created by the Euro has inevitable industrial consequences - and these will be all the greater since the European market is so diverse in labour costs and productivity. 37
Portugal
According to classical theory, the coexistence of weak and strong economies within the same monetary zone leads to one of two consequences: either wage differentials are maintained in line with productivity differentials, so differences in competitive capacity remain, or wage costs in the weak-economy countries become aligned with those of the strong-economy countries without a corresponding increase in productivity degrading their competitive capacity. But this classic scenario does not apply to the Euro, because the European Union's economic model paradoxically combines an ultra-liberal vision including social deregulation, and significant structural funds for the development of backward regions. This part-liberal, part-interventionist model is likely to generate some unexpected effects on the location of manufacturing industries in Europe. The cumulative effect of an attractive tax system, low wage costs, an active, young and well-educated population and longer annual working hours is to induce companies to relocate their industrial operations - towards the southern European states (Spain, Portugal), and even more towards the new member states in central and eastern Europe that will benefit most from structural funds from 2007. This industrial relocation will primarily affect the countries that are the least competitive in terms of costs and efficiency - the very same countries already facing unemployment, deficits and debt. Any additional unemployment will deepen the deficits in these countries. Any new deficit will create debt. And this spiral will widen still further the gap between the efficient and non-efficient countries, creating month after month increasing economic divergences which will have to be dealt with. Since the traditional adjustment mechanism of devaluation is no longer permitted within the Euro-zone, the only way of avoiding potentially explosive consequences is to create, as a matter of urgency, a common taxation policy and a common employment policy. But a cautionary note is necessary here, too: in the current context, any tax and social security harmonisation will not be a levelling up, but a levelling down - cutting the budgets of the spending countries, and adjusting their social benefits to the level of international competitiveness. 38
Europe backs off tax

An EU taxation system remains a distant prospect. The Commission's desire for greater harmonisation is not matched in the member states, who are determined to retain their sovereignty over taxation - despite the fact that they have abandoned their monetary sovereignty. And in Brussels, the Commission can only propose: it is for the member states to dispose!
The state of play in 2004

The Commission has optimistically opened up several avenues towards consistent tax policy - but with mixed success, and often in the face of member state hostility: savings tax: after many setbacks, agreement was reached on preventing crossborder deposits escaping tax: from 2005, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg will make deductions at source - and Switzerland, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino will do the same. excise duties: notable efforts have been made to harmonise structures and to align rates. administrative cooperation: progress has been made towards mutual assistance among member states to limit fraud, combat tax evasion and improve collection. The results are meagre - shadow-boxing rather than dealing with the real challenges. In recent years, little has been done on the more important issues of VAT, the structure of company taxation, or tax rates, and nothing at all on taxation of earnings, wealth, or e-commerce. The obstacle is that decisions have to be taken unanimously. Progress remains "mission impossible" in the face of the rooted opposition of the UK and other member states to significant harmonisation of tax policy in Europe.
Failure to make institutional changes

Despite all the lengthy discussions on institutional change, the EU's new Constitutional Treaty failed to unblock the unanimity requirement on taxation policy decisions. The Convention that prepared the draft Constitution did propose a minimal 39
compromise to allow qualified majority voting for administrative cooperation and the fight against fraud and tax evasion in indirect taxes. But even that was no more than a pious aspiration. Under the current Treaty, unanimity remains the rule for taxation matters. And even if the Constitutional Treaty is ratified, unanimity will remain the rule.
Enhanced cooperation can't break the deadlock

The current EU Treaty does offer a procedure designed to circumvent the unanimity rule: "enhanced cooperation". This allows eight or more member states to adopt their own measures on a matter of common interest, provided they have obtained agreement in principle from the Council of Ministers by qualified majority. But this procedure is hardly the lever to unblock fiscal Europe. There seem scant possibilities of reinforcing fiscal cooperation among the countries of the Euro-zone: - the legality of applying enhance cooperation to taxation matters remains open to question: it is uncertain whether measures could be directly applicable in the member states concerned or whether they would need approval by the Council of Ministers - and if so, by what majority. - any enhanced cooperation in tax matters would have to be directed towards increasing competitiveness rather than towards erecting protectionist barriers: so member states involved would be harmonising aspects of their tax laws to attract investors. For instance, enhanced cooperation in corporate tax might lower the average rate charged in the countries concerned - but this would require them either to generate other tax revenues (which might be difficult) or to reduce their public expenditure (much more difficult for some of them).
No EU employment policy
Employment policy remains an entirely national matter, just as with taxation, which means any common action is also subject to the unanimity rule. So there is no social Europe, there is no harmonisation of collective agreements, working hours, or social legislation - and there is no European employment policy! 40
The fiscal and social distortions highlighted in the preceding pages are going to persist for a long time. So the Euro, this federal tool par excellence, is based on a disparate body of national legislation, national psychologies and national political interests.... It will be no surprise if the economic and social systems of the Euro-zone not only do not converge, but continue increasingly to diverge.
Building from the top down

The previous chapters have listed some of the long-term handicaps confronting the Euro: the major fiscal and social distortions among the Euro-zone countries the persistent lack of a common fiscal and social policy the emergence of a group of "rearguard countries" incapable of adapting their economies to the liberal logic that the Euro imposes the competitiveness gap between Euro-zone countries - and its tendency to widen. It is an inescapable conclusion that the European Union has skipped some essential steps in creating its single currency.
THE EUROPEAN HOUSE: CLASSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The European House: state of progress in 2004 A common currency without a common political project, and with an incomplete single market. In other words, the chimney has been superimposed on a structure that still lacks form...
Chimney: the Euro Roof: a common political project Walls: fiscal and social harmonisation
Foundations: the single market
41
No Euro leadership is no good for the Euro

The US deploys the dollar as an economic tool to promote growth and employment. By contrast, the Euro's only objective is to ensure price stability. And the Euro suffers from divided management: monetary policy is set by the European Central Bank, while economic, tax and budgetary matters are handled by the member states.
43
Serious imbalances for the Euro: the lack of symmetry between economic, political and monetary matters.
Analysis of the Euro-dollar parity between January 1999 and October 2004 demonstrates that the economic climate is linked closely to exchange rates within the European Union and in the USA. The table below shows how the Euro-dollar exchange rate is used as an economic weapon by the USA: at the beginning of 1999, the US economy was helped along by the low dollar in 2000-2001, the sharp fall in the Euro and parallel gains for the dollar coincide with the first signs of an economic slowdown in the USA 2002: US economic relaunch post 9/11 with tax breaks, budget deficits and a plunge in the dollar...
United States
High conjuncture, Dollar low Low conjuncture, Dollar high High conjuncture, Dollar low
1.3 1.2 1.1 1 0.9 0.8

n1 9 Ap 99 r1 9 Ju 99 l1 9 Oc 99 t1 9 Ja 99 n2 00 Ap 0 r2 0 Ju 00 l2 00 Oc 0 t2 0 Ja 00 n2 0 Ap 01 r2 0 Ju 01 l2 0 Oc 01 t2 0 Ja 01 n2 0 Ap 02 r2 0 Ju 02 l2 0 Oc 02 t2 0 Ja 02 n2 0 Ap 03 r2 0 Ju 03 l2 0 Oc 03 t2 0 Ja 03 n2 00 Ap 4 r2 0 Ju 04 l2 00 4 Ja
Min = 0.8252 (26 Oct 2000) Max = 1.2858 (17 Feb 2004)
Low conjuncture, Euro high
High conjuncture, Euro low
Low conjuncture, Euro high
Euro space
44
The explanation lies in the respective objectives set for the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve. The ECB has just one task: to guarantee price stability. The Federal Reserve, by contrast, has three objectives: promoting full employment ensuring price stability keeping long-term interest rates down. The European Central Bank has only a monetary role, while the US Federal Reserve exercises overall economic responsibility - a fundamental distinction reflected in the overall economic organisation of the USA and the European Union: the US system is coherent: the Federal Government, responsible for overall economic policy, and the Federal Reserve, responsible for monetary policy, work in synergy. The evidence suggests that economic policy in the US - a federal state - involves close coordination of monetary, budgetary and fiscal decision-making. the central bank independence that Duisenberg and Trichet consider axiomatic for the European Central Bank is a mere sideshow in the USA: the Federal Reserve's theoretical independence takes second place to ensuring close political cooperation in defence of US interests and the American economy. in direct contrast, the European approach makes no link between economic and monetary policy. As the diagram on pages 48-49 shows, monetary policy is exclusively the domain of the inflexibly independent ECB, while economic, budgetary and fiscal matters are a member state competence and remain essentially national responsibilities. A system like Europe's simply cannot function
45
GENERAL ECONOMIC POLICY Federal Government Objective: economic relaunch and stability Fiscal policy Budgetary policy
The Fed's objectives cannot be pursued independently of government economic objectives The Fed's independence is limited by political influence and economic coordination
US economic policy results from close coordination of monetary, budget and fiscal instruments.
Formal independence but limited in practice
Objectives: full employment, price stability, long-term interest rates kept down .
The US Federal Reserve MONETARY POLICY

46
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE COMPARED Federal Reserve
Relative independence
Members are nominated for 14 years Independence in the choice of monetary policy instruments Ac ts in co o p era ti o n wi th the American Administration
European Central Bank
Total independence
Members are nominated for 8 years May neither seek nor take instructions Independence in the choice of monetary policy instruments
3 objectives
Full employment Price stability Moderate long-term interest rates
Single objective
Price stability
Responsibility Responsibility
Hearing of the Fed President twice per year before Congress The President of the ECB presents a yearly report to the European Parliament
Policy coordination
Informal consultations between members of government and of the central bank Strict coordination of the economic and monetary policies
Absence of coordination
Centralised common monetary policy National economic and fiscal policies Total absence of coordination
Management of the dollar

The Feds objectives are in line with the general framework of the stability and growth of the economy. The dollar is viewed as a tool for the management of the economy
Management of the Euro

To ensure the objective of price stability and to avert the risk of inflation, the ECB imposes the dogma of the strong euro
GOOD MANAGEMENT OF THE DOLLAR = ECONOMIC GROWTH
GOOD MANAGEMENT OF THE EURO = HIGH EURO

47
The Euro: Major asymmetry between

MONETARY POLICY
European Central Bank System
European Central Bank (ECB)
National Central Banks
Fully independent ECB:

can neither accept nor request instructions from Community institutions or agents, EU member state Governments, or any other organisation is responsible to no democratic body is free to choose its own methods to affect single monetary policy
Objective:
The priority objective of the ECB is price stability
Mechanisms:
Conducts exchange operations, manages Euro-zone countries' exchange reserves and ensures proper functioning of payment systems.
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political, economic and monetary policy

ECONOMIC POLICY
General Economic Policy
Budgetary Policy
Fiscal Policy
European Union
Eurozone
Remains mainly a national competence Decision-making in fiscal matters requires unanimity
ECOFIN
Council of Ministers of Economy and Finance
Eurogroup
BEPG
Broad economic policy guidelines
Encouraging dialogue between Euro-zone members
Checking public deficits of EU Member States
Non restrictive coordination of economic policy
Coordination based on consensus: not obligatory
No sanctions at this stage
Mixed Policy
European orientation National implementation
Mixed Policy
mainly national level
National Policy
49
Management: proactive in the USA, reactive in Europe

Political power and monetary power may be formally independent of each other, but in practice are inextricably linked. The last decade has offered plenty of news images illustrating the total confidence, closeness and even intimacy between successive US Presidents - Clinton I, Clinton II, Bush I - and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan. The Euro-dollar exchange rate cycle is eloquent. Before 9/11, the dollar was at the peak of its upswing: 1 Euro = $US 0.85. The current parity is 1 Euro = $US 1.23 a fall of 45% of the dollar. In response to 9/11 and its seriously depressive effect on the US economy the Bush administration and the Fed decided to apply shock therapy: a sudden cut in the Fed's headline rate, bringing it down from 6.5% in the fourth quarter of 2001 to 1% from the middle of 2003: this abrupt rate-cut provoked a parallel fall in the dollar: returns on dollar deposits fell, but the cheaper credit provided a strong incentive to invest. heavy reliance on budget deficit: in surplus during President Clinton's second term, the Bush Presidency's budget rapidly went into the red - deeply - to reach 5% of GDP by 2004. in addition to financing the war efforts in Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq, the budget deficit was also used to provide massive tax cuts and incentives to consumption, reinforcing the effect of low interest rates. In the face of the 9/11 shock, the USA followed a deliberate policy of unconstrained economic revival, deploying all possible instruments for intervention: economic, monetary, budgetary and fiscal. More than ever, it has become clear in these tragic circumstances that the dollar is a tool in the service of US prosperity.
Reactive management of the Euro

Proactive management is a matter of deliberate action and anticipation. It could not be further removed from the delay and temporization that characterizes reactive management. But delay and temporization is exactly how the Euro's management between 1999 and 2004 can be best described. 50
The management of the Euro was so passive that since its launch at the high rate of $US 1.18 in January 1999, it fell in the space of two years to $US 0.82 - a fall of 40%, without any intervention by the European Central Bank. And the subsequent rebound caught the European Central Bank almost un-awares. Its interventions to hold back the rise of the Euro were timid.
Public deficit (as % of GDP)

2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
United States Euro-zone
2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
Sources : DRI, OECD, Forecast CDC IXIX Sources : Datastream CDC IXIX
Central bank headline rates

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
United States Euro-zone
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Nothing could better demonstrate the aggressive and successful management of interest rates by the Federal Reserve, and the defensive and tardy approach of the ECB. In fact the management of the Euro during its rise over the last eighteen months 51
was so ill-judged that - against all the rules of monetary orthodoxy - some of the ECB's headline rate reductions have led to further appreciations of the Euro against the dollar, instead of reducing its exchange rate. The reason is obvious. By repeatedly intervening too little and too late, the ECB's actions lacked credibility. The unanimous opinion of the financial community was that the deliberate US strategy would prevail over the timid and hesitant reaction of the EU - and the unequal combat created yet further falls in the dollar.
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The "stupid" Stability Pact

The Stability Pact's imposition of limits for budgetary deficits and debt is an essential mechanism for the long-term functioning of the single currency. But the Commission's recommendations for corrective measures when member states breach the rules have been brushed aside by Ecofin, where law is made by outlaws. This could get worse under the new Constitutional Treaty, because the currently weak powers of the European Commission will be further reduced.
53
omano Prodi's repeated accusations that the Stability Pact was "stupid, like all inflexible decisions" shattered the soft consensus on the sanctions mechanisms applicable to countries who consistently fail to meet the Pact's criteria. The pact, invented in the autumn of 1995 by Germany, and imposed on its European partners, is based on supervision of member states' economic policy mechanisms, and sanctions for failure to abide by the rules. Hans Tietmeyer, President of the Bundesbank, also suggested that no member state would qualify for entry into the Euro if it was carrying a budget deficit above the 3% limit even by as little as a tenth of a point. The famous phrase of "Drei Komma Null" ("three point zero "), has a hollow ring today.... So far, the Commission has applied the excessive deficit procedure provided for to five member states: Portugal (2002), Germany (2003), France (2003), the Netherlands (2004) and Greece (2004). When the Euro was launched, none of these countries - except Portugal - was felt to be in any danger of ever breaking the norms of the Stability Pact. The patronising attitude of Germany towards the "Club Med" countries Portugal, Spain, Greece - which it felt to be unworthy of Euro-entry is still remembered in Madrid, with derision, but in Berlin with embarrassment. It is an irony that those countries considered virtuous at the time of the Euro's launch - particularly Germany, France and the Netherlands - today find themselves exposed to European ridicule for their inability to obey the rules that they themselves created.
Prevention and sanctions

The Stability Pact functions through a system of preventive measures and tough controls on public finances, under which penalties can be imposed as soon as the deficit exceeds 3% of GDP (which in effect means a state's public revenues are some 20% below its public expenditure). But the part of the mechanism designed to prevent member states exceeding the 3% GDP limit has not delivered the expected results, since the European Commission is unable to require member states to adopt the measures it recommends. So deficits grow, and persist. A further weakness is the focus on the 3% budget deficit - and the virtual neglect 54
of the 60% debt ceiling, currently breached by half the Euro-zone countries. Since one year's deficit is rolled over as debt in the following year, and member states guilty of excessive deficits have for years been repaying only the interest, these debts become one of the major headings in the state budget. The obvious danger is that any return to inflation - domestic or imported - could throw the most heavily indebted Euro-zone countries into non-payment, or even into bankruptcy.
Prevention
As part of the Pact's prevention policy, Euro-zone countries annually provide the European Commission with stability programmes, describing the budgetary measures taken to attain balanced public expenditure - or even a surplus - over the medium term. They set out: the medium-term objectives and reduction forecasts for deficit and public debt in relation to GDP the principal economic development assumptions, in particular GDP growth, employment and unemployment, and inflation a description of budgetary measures envisaged to achieve the objectives of the programme. Programmes are validated by the ECOFIN Council of Ministers (Ministers of Economy and Finance). Twice a year, the ECOFIN Council is supposed to detect any actual or anticipated divergences from the agreed adjustment path, on the basis of European Commission recommendations. These preventive measures, detailed in regulations on the application of the Pact, allow no room for divergent interpretation. But practice has shown that without political will from the member states, the Pact cannot function, particularly when the major Euro-zone economies are the source of concern. The first warning intended to prevent a breach arose in 2001. In line with its duty, the Commission launched the so-called "early warning" procedure against Portugal, because the deficit of 1.1% of GDP foreseen in its stability programme was looking as though it was going to rise in reality to 2.1%. The early warning, once set in motion, contains recommendations addressed to 55
the defaulting country. But the ECOFIN Council did not follow up the Commission's proposals, judging sufficient instead Portugal's undertaking that it would take measures to re-establish a balanced budget by 2004. When the new Portuguese Government undertook an audit in 2002 of the 2001 accounts, the data were subject to serious modification: the real 2001 deficit was in fact 4.1% of GDP, as against the 2.1% announced by the previous government. Portugal became the first Euro-zone country to break the 3% limit, and there was then no option but to launch the excessive-deficit procedure that same year. The excessive-deficit procedure involves a total of 11 stages: from the budgetary surveillance of member states to the imposing of sanctions. ECOFIN adopts its decisions by a qualified majority of its members, with the country implicated in the procedure unable to vote. Throughout the entire preventive phase, all countries within the Council, including those not members of the Euro-zone, take part in the vote (with the exception of the member state concerned). However, from the moment a member state must submit the control of its public finances (as well as the ensuing stages and until the sanctions) only the Eurozone countries can take part in the vote, again with the exception of the member state concerned.
Dissuasion
Once a country's deficit has exceeded 3% of GDP, the dissuasive part of the Pact comes into play, defining the corrective measures to be taken. Failure to comply risks penalties equivalent to 0.5% of GDP for the offending country - some 8 to 11 billion Euros for a large country. In addition, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece would stand to lose the special structural assistance received from the European budget under the cohesion fund if they did not implement the corrective measures decided by ECOFIN. Against this background, Portugal opted for budgetary measures that enabled it to bring its deficit below the 3% ceiling by 2002, and it also respected the ceiling in 2003. But the treatment imposed on the country by Prime Minister Barroso, the new President of the European Commission, plunged Portugal into a recession. As a consequence, Portugal's growth rate fell from 1.7% in 2001 to 0.4% in 2002, and to minus 1.3% in 2003. 56
Germany was the second country to violate the Stability Pact rules: its stability programme for 2000 forecast a deficit of 1.5 % of GDP for 2001. In the event, this rose to 2.7% of GDP, dangerously close to the ceiling. As with Portugal, the Commission activated the "early warning" procedure. But again, ECOFIN did not feel it appropriate to approve the Commission's recommendations. The result was that in 2002, the deficit in the largest Eurozone economy reached 3.8% of GDP. The excessive deficit procedure was therefore initiated in January 2003. In 2002, France saw its deficit approach the 3% ceiling: official EU estimates put it at 2.7%, against the 1.4% predicted in France's stability programme. In January 2003, the early warning system was activated. But by June, the Council, noting that the 2002 deficit had exceeded 3%, activated the excessive-deficit procedure against France. Paris then had one year to reduce its deficit to beneath the ceiling.
The crisis of autumn 2003

The economic situation in both France and Germany continued to deteriorate through the autumn of 2003. It became clear that they would be unable to bring their deficits below 3% in 2004, a full year after the breach was revealed. At this point, an open confrontation broke out. Germany refused to submit its public finances to the guidance of the Commission's experts, and rejected the recommendation the Commission made under the excessive-deficit procedure. The situation for Germany was grave, as it was in the final stage of the procedure before the launch of the Pact's sanctions.
Fines
The Stability Pact penalties must be paid as an interest-free deposit, which becomes a fine after two years if the offending country has not taken action to reduce its deficit. The deposit is set at a fixed amount equivalent to 0.2% of GDP, with an additional variable element of 0.1% of GDP for each point of the deficit above the 3% limit. For the fine to reach 0.5% of GDP, the deficit would have to be 6% of GDP. For a deficit of 4% of GDP, the fine would be 0.3% of GDP - still close to 7 billion Euros for the large countries. 57
The Commission proposes, ECOFIN disposes

The Commission's Stability Pact proposals or recommendations have to be adopted by a qualified majority of member states. In the battle between Germany and the Commission, ECOFIN closed ranks with the offending member state on 25 November 2003, and totally rejected the Commission's proposals. Germany enjoyed solid support within the Council, particularly from countries themselves in breach, or at risk of it. The Ecofin decision provoked a serious institutional crisis - and at a stroke terminated the legally binding nature of the Stability Pact. And as proof that the system was being deliberately subverted by the member states, France - in the same situation as Germany - also benefited from Council rejection of the proposals the Commission made. France and Germany offered the concession of political commitments to reduce their deficits below 3% of GDP in 2005. But the value of these commitments will become clear only in December 2005! In January 2004, the Commission took the unprecedented step of taking the ECOFIN decision - which had in effect suspended the application of the Stability Pact - to the European Court of Justice. The Court judgement, in July 2004, overruled the conclusions of the 25 November Ecofin - but at the same time the Court confirmed that ministers could reject Commission proposals, consequently merely perpetuating the confrontation. As a result of the Court's rejection of the Commission's recommendations, the only legally binding texts are those adopted by ECOFIN in January 2003 (in the case of Germany) and in June 2003 (for France), requesting these two member states to reduce their deficit below 3% of GDP in 2004, but without setting any penalties.
Proposals to reform the Pact

In the face of the legal uncertainties now hanging over the application of the Pact, the Commission wants to reform it - or at least simplify its implementation. But it is also continuing to apply the Pact in its current form against other Eurozone countries. Thus Greece has been accused of an excessive deficit since July 2004 and the Netherlands since June 2004. 58
ECOFIN also activated the excessive-deficit procedure against six of the member states which joined the EU in May 2004. Since these countries are not members of the Euro-zone, the Council accepted the timetables they put forward for complying with the 3% ceiling: Cyprus in 2005; Malta, 2006; Poland and Slovakia, 2007; and 2008 for the Czech Republic and Hungary. The Commission presented its proposals for amending the Stability Pact in September 2004. The package has four main elements: Reinforced serveillance of debt levels The aim is to specify a rhythm for bringing debt down to a prudent level within a reasonable time. Each member state's rate of economic growth would be taken into account in defining the period. If growth is running below its potential, the pace of reduction would be slower. The opposite would also be true. The underlying Commission objective is a closer link between budget deficits and debt levels. Setting national targets for a return to balanced accounts: The objective of balanced (or surplus) public accounts is linked to the mediumterm, to allow member states sufficient room for manoeuvre while staying under the 3% ceiling in difficult economic circumstances. This discipline would also make it possible to cut debt levels - although the Treaty does not set any timetable for bringing the debt of Euro-zone countries below the threshold of 60%. Setting national targets aims at smoothing out the deficits and surpluses over a period of several years: higher deficits in bad times, but return to surplus in good times. The overall intention is to reach a public finance equilibrium over the average of the period, while taking account of the diversity of national circumstances. This would imply that the deadline for balancing public accounts is tightest for countries with a high level of debt. This may be good in theory, but is unrealistic in the short/medium term: Belgium, Italy or Greece will not be able to bring debt below the 60% threshold in the foreseeable future. Taking account of exceptional circumstances : The Pact currently takes no account of unfavourable circumstances that cause persistently low growth. To remedy this, the Commission is proposing to redefine the exceptional circumstances clause as it currently figures in one of the Stability Pacts application regulations (1467/97): The notion of exceptional 59
circumstances is applied to an unusual event outside the control of the Member States concerned and which has a major impact on The "Stupid" Stability Pact the financial position of the general government, or when resulting from a severe economic downturn (in cases where there is an annual fall of real GDP of at least 2%). The Commissions Communication on the reform of the Stability Pact proposes to render this definition more flexible, without, however, specifying how. In parallel, a timetable would be set for member states in excessive deficit to get back below the 3% limit. This will require a rapid correction once the procedure is activated, with the pace adjusted in line with the economic situation of the country concerned. Currently, corrective measures must commence four months after the launch of the procedure, and the initial sanctions start six months later if the necessary measures are not taken. The Commission proposes to extend these unrealistic allowances. It wants the correction measures to be evaluated along with the convergence and stability programmes, at the beginning of each year. Intensified prevention measures: member states should adopt financial and budgetary policies in line with economic circumstances so as to create margins of manoeuvre adequate to prevent a recession.
Poorly supported reform

The competences of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers were intensively debated during the gestation of the Constitutional Treaty. The Commission won the first round, but lost the second.
The Convention that drafted the Treaty wanted to increase the Commission's powers
Under the present system, during the phases of prevention and dissuasion, the Commission can put forward "recommendations", which ECOFIN can reject with a simple blocking minority. To reinforce this arrangement, the Convention proposed that the Commission 60
should make "proposals" to states with excessive deficits: these "proposals" could be rejected or amended by ECOFIN only by unanimity.
Governments reduced the Commission's powers

The InterGovernmental Conference of EU leaders seriously weakened this bid. Under strong pressure from Germany, Italy, Poland and Greece (four particularly non-virtuous countries as regards their public finances), the Commission's role was finally reduced to the bare minimum. The final text of the Constitutional Treaty stipulates that: If the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it shall address an opinion to the Member State concerned and shall inform the Council accordingly. The Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission, having considered any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make and after an overall assessment, decide whether an excessive deficit exists. In that case it shall adopt, without undue delay, on a recommendation from the Commission, recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period. () Those recommendations shall not be made public. The Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned. A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the other members of the Council, representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of the participating Member States. Where it adopts a European decision establishing that there has been no effective action in response to its recommendations within the period laid down, the Council may make its recommendations public. If a Member State persists in failing to put the Council's recommendations into practice, the Council may adopt a European decision giving notice to the Member State to take, within a specified time-limit, measures for the deficit reduction which the Council judges necessary to remedy the situation. In such a case, the Council may request the Member State concerned to submit reports in accordance with a specific timetable in order to examine the adjustment efforts of that Member State. 61
It would be difficult to give less power to the Commission... It's almost as if the Commission didn't exist!
A Highway Code, but no traffic police!

Although ECOFIN welcomed the Commission's wish to reform the Pact, member states differed over the content and scope of the modifications. The reform is unlikely to be completed until the first semester of 2005, under the Luxembourg Presidency. But the 3% deficit ceiling and the 60% debt limit are confirmed by the Constitutional Treaty, so no change is foreseen there. From 1 January 2005, Luxembourg's Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Jean-Claude Juncker will also take over the Presidency of the Eurogroup for an extended term of two years. Giving Juncker the nickname "Mr Euro" will help visibility, but the extension of the term of office will not widen the Group's powers: it remains a simple forum for informal dialogue amongst the Euro-zone countries. There are some identifiable areas where the Pact has worked - and others where it has not. Its role in promoting convergence of the economies and public finances of the Euro-zone cannot be over-emphasised, and the 3% deficit and 60% debt maxima seem the correct thresholds. It has brought a culture of stability to EU countries, particularly amongst the "Club Med" countries, where past laxity led to regular devaluations. The member states, particularly France and Germany, did not use the exceptional growth of 2001-2002 to put their public finances in order. When the slowdown arrived in 2002, they had no margin of manoeuvre to keep their attempts at revival within the 3% deficit ceiling. The Pact's preventive mechanism therefore hasn't worked. The level of national debt has been virtually ignored in the evaluation of stability programmes - and far from improving, the average level of public debt amongst the Euro-zone countries deteriorated in 1999-2004. The Commission's proposed reforms partially address the identified problems. More flexibility would be valuable, allowing the 3% or 60% thresholds to be broken in exceptional circumstances. It is after all the capacity of the member 62
states to adjust their deficits and debts in a coordinated manner that counts: the problem is not the threshold levels per se. So deficits could be permitted in order to revive the economy, and reduced when growth returns... on condition that all countries work together. The Commission's proposals will do nothing to enhance the credibility of national budget figures, however. The case of Greece, which entered the Euro-zone in 2001, is of concern, since its latest corrected data confirm that since 2000 it has systematically exceeded the 3% of GDP ceiling, and the situation is continuing to deteriorate, with the prospect of a 2004 deficit close to 6% and debt close to 120%. Worse, while the Stability Pact provides the single currency with a sort of Highway Code to prevent bad driving and accidents, a Highway Code is useless in the absence of traffic police. There is real cause for concern about the future because of the absence of Commission power, the conduct of ECOFIN, the readiness of offending member states to support one another in order to avoid sanctions, and the Constitutional Treaty's weakening of the Commission's few remaining powers. To be blunt - it is the height of irresponsibility.
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64
Successes and failures in monetary unions

the German Zollverein (1834-1870) the US dollar the Yugoslavian dinar
the US dollar Argentine peso tandem
65
THE GERMAN ZOLLVEREIN (1834 TO 1870)

Historical context
Weak economic integration Competition from British goods At the beginning of the 19th century, the German states experienced accelerated modernisation and industrialisation. This led to increased interdependence amongst the economic players, who then found their commercial relationships were being held back by a variety of trade tariffs and a multitude of monetary systems. At the same time, German businesses were subject to considerable competition from British goods, particularly textiles. The continuing increase in trade, facilitated by the spread of railways, led to the creation of the Deutscher Zollverein in 1834. This first customs union was designed to break down any obstacles to economic integration and to protect against imports, through dismantling internal trade barriers, and creating common external customs tariffs. The Zollverein lacked centralised institutions, but was dominated by the largest and most powerful state in the region, Prussia, which was seeking to bring about the political unification of Germany. Economic integration became a means towards political integration, and a useful tool for Prussia's political ambitions. Efficient operation Contribution to German integration Management of the Zollverein was a success: the German economy grew and became stronger. Apart from a short revolutionary period in 1848, the smooth running of the Zollverein contributed to a progressive political centralisation and the unification by stages of the German states, brought to fruition by Bismarck in 1871. The tendency towards monetary union following the establishment of a "single market" was limited at first to the setting up of fixed exchange rates, helped by the central role played by the Prussian currency in the German sphere. By contrast, it was not until 1871, several months after the foundation of the Reich, that its currency definitively came into being as the Reichsgoldwhrung. A single market, common external customs tariffs, a fixed-parity monetary system and the Prussian domination of the other entities are the elements that made up the German success story.
Towards customs union Lessons to be drawn

66
Prussian domination
Achievements
Single market leading to the political construction of Germany
THE US DOLLAR
The USA has been a monetary union for more than 200 years.
History
Longstanding monetary union
In 1789, when the American Constitution came into force, the Union consisted of 13 states. Subsequently, more joined so that now 50 states make up the United States. From the very beginning, the Constitution gave Congress the right to manage the monetary affairs of the country. This function has been handed over to the Federal Reserve since its foundation in 1913. In the management of the economy, the US Government essentially has three tools at its disposal: fiscal policy, budgetary policy and monetary policy. From the 1930s onwards, following the Great Depression, the government primarily used fiscal and budgetary policy to promote economic growth and stability. Under the Clinton administration, monetary policy became the leading tool. Since 2001, the Bush administration has used a mixture of the three instruments, fiscal, monetary and budgetary, to revive the US economy. Drawing-up monetary policy is specifically a Federal responsibility. This role is now carried out by the Federal Reserve, an independent agency operating under a fixed legislative mandate. This triple mandate is not prioritised: it is simultaneously to ensure high levels of employment, to maintain price stability, and to keep long-term interest rates down.
Instruments and objectives
Fiscal, budgetary and monetary policies
The Federal Reserve and its triple duty
Achievements and lessons to be drawn
A successful EMU
The success of the US economic and monetary union rests largely on a combination of three elements: - government policies which offer the Federal State wide room for manoeuvre in the management of the economy,
Fiscal policy Flexibility Variable prices and wages
- major market flexibility thanks to a relatively large mobility of jobs and of capital, - adjustable prices and wages. Together these elements allow the economy to adapt and to overcome internal problems of asymmetry as well as negative external problems.
67
THE YUGOSLAVIAN DINAR

Economic Situation 1980-1990
Economic crisis Regional disparities Single market? In the 1980s Yugoslavia fell into a prolonged period of economic crisis marked by high levels of external debt, ever-increasing unemployment and 150% inflation. Inequalities of development and investment amongst the republics of the federal State became more marked. Economic reforms introduced in 1990 by the Markovic government represented the last attempt to create a single-market economy. The federal structure was reflected in a highly decentralised banking and financial system. The decentralised network of national banks corresponded to the substantial autonomy accorded to the regional governments. From the 1970s onwards, the National Bank of Yugoslavia, responsible for deciding and implementing monetary policy, lost all control over the numerous commercial banks, and declared itself incapable of setting a genuinely national monetary policy. Government programmes of redistribution of national wealth to the poorer republics were unable to reverse the tendency towards increasing regional economic disparities. After some violent conflict, Croatia and Slovenia acquired their independence in 1992. This year also saw the start of the war in Bosnia, which was eventually brought to an end by the Dayton agreements in November 1995. Yesterday's Yugoslavia has today been replaced by a federation between Serbia and Montenegro. Yugoslavia's progressive erosion and final fragmentation were the result of economic, political and cultural factors originating in the complex history of the six Republics. The absence at the heart of this multi-ethnic and multinational federal State of a single monetary policy, and the lack of coordination of the republics' economic policies, reinforced the regional disparities, provoking the resurgence of the ethnic and nationalist tensions which had earlier been contained by the communist leadership. The National Bank's lack of authority and power adversely affected the economic and monetary union of the country. Markovic's reforms could do nothing to avert the imminent break-up of the federation.
Financial environment
Achievements
Decentralisation of financial power
Impotence of the National Bank
Economic inequalities The end of Yugoslavia A complex history
Lessons to be drawn
68
Lack of coordination Ethnic and national tensions Disappearance of the single currency and of Yugoslavia
THE US DOLLAR-ARGENTINE PESO TANDEM

The 1980s: "The Lost Decade" Argentina's transition to democracy from 1983 was accompanied by a desperate economic situation: hyperinflation reached 4,900% in 1989 and external debt $65 billion. The 1989 GDP was equivalent to that of 1973. Launch of the third monetary stabilisation programme in the history of Argentina and the setting of a fixed rate parity exchange system with the USA: 1 dollar = 1 peso. April 1991 : 1 peso = 1 dollar The Central Bank was declared independent in 1992. It took on responsibility for control of the financial system (including interest rates) but could not pay interest on bank deposits. Alongside the new monetary system, Argentina adopted a series of growth-stimulating mechanisms: deregulation, liberalisation of financial markets, and a policy of supply-side fiscal support The State lost all control over the money mass. The ultra-liberal policies aimed at stabilising the economy and prices were full of promise: inflation was brought under control, rates of growth and investment increased, and confidence in the financial system appeared to have been restored. A mixed result : It was called the "Argentine miracle". However, the end of the decade revealed the hidden face of the longed-for success: unemployment reached 18% in 1995 and real wages fell by 30%. In 1998, the country was hit by a deep depression. Ever-increasing poverty and uncertainty led directly to almost unsustainable levels of social and political unrest The risks involved in an imperfect monetary union are demonstrated by the Argentine example. In practice, it became apparent that the conditions of growth and competitiveness of the two economies were incompatible. While the US economy gained strength and enjoyed a higher growth rate, the Argentine economy lost competitiveness. The fixed parity with the dollar became progressively untenable for the overvalued peso. In its desperate attempt to maintain the fixed parity, Argentina precipitated the return of inflation, budget deficits, a serious economic crisis, and the end of the monetary union. The monetary union was ended in 2002. The peso was immediately devalued by 40%.
Incompatibility Restricted room for manoeuvre Inflation, deficits and economic crisis
69
A compelling demonstration
These four examples constitute a compelling demonstration of how things can go right - and wrong. First of all, they show that the eventual collapse of a monetary union is by no means fiction. It has not only happened often, but it has happened very recently. It could happen again. To suggest - as many observers do - that "it could never happen to the Euro" doesn't resist a moment's analysis. The four examples confirm that a monetary union cannot hope to sustain itself without: a single market, a federal State, a feeling of national (or according to case, international) affiliation The Zollverein, a model of the architecture necessary for the construction of a single currency, reveals the inadequacies of the EU's architecture (see diagram, page 41) The Zollverein is a perfect example: creation of a single market protected by a common customs tariff ensuring a "community preference" - as at the beginning of the European Economic Community. the existence of a common language and cultural identity, and a leading state, Prussia. a progressive approach: first a simple agreement on the establishment of fixedrate parities between different currencies within the zone, then an interval of several decades (the time necessary to bring together the appropriate conditions) before the Reichsgoldwhrung could be created. The Yugoslav dinar is the perfect demonstration that a single market and a federal State (two of the three required conditions) are insufficient to ensure the long-term existence of a monetary union. The dinar died because of Yugoslavia's inability to iron out the economic distortions between its regions, and because of the nationalism of the federated republics. The same is true for the $US-Argentine peso tandem, which neatly confirms that monetary union is incompatible with economies that evolve at different rates in terms of budgetary deficits, debt, and levels of growth, employment and productivity. 70
The Euro today

Opinion polls show that the public is generally satisfied with the Euro, but they have no emotional link with it, and they resent unjustified price increases. At the business level, the balance is less positive. The major beneficiaries are large companies; smaller firms are facing increasing competition. Views are reserved, even negative, at the level of national economies. The Euro certainly provides a "shield effect" which protects the weak economies from devaluation, but questions remain over for how long.
71
The Euro today
n parallel to the issue of the Euro's sustainability, the users of the Euro also deserve attention: public authorities, companies and consumers. What assessment can be made after three years of daily use? Has the Euro been accepted? Is it well integrated into the way people calculate prices, or is the consumer still thinking in terms of marks, francs, or lira? Have companies become more efficient because they are exposed to greater competition? And while the evidence shows that the Euro-shield is protecting member countries from having to devalue, this may have disadvantages as well as advantages.
The Euro and the Public

Opinion polls may not always be reliable, but they can offer a useful snapshot or an illustration of trends. A European Commission study of nearly 12,000 European citizens in October-November 2003 showed that: In response to the question "Will the Euro remain one of the major events in the history of the European Union?", most replied "yes" in the 12 member countries of the Euro-zone, ranging between a high of 80% in Luxembourg and a low of 53% in Germany. The question "Overall, is the adoption of the Euro favourable or unfavourable for your country?" elicited a more varied response across a median of 50% finding it favourable, and a wider spread ranging from 79% "favourable" in Luxembourg to a smaller 42% in Germany. The public seemed to be wiser than their masters when asked whether the Stability Pact limits on budget deficits are good or bad. The response was overwhelmingly positive, with a high of 85% in Luxembourg and a low of 64% in Italy. A crushing answer was provoked by the question "Do you think that in your country, the conversion to the Euro has been to the advantage or disadvantage of the consumer?". 85% of the survey felt they were victims of unjustified price increases - with a high of 96% in Italy and a low of 55% in Luxembourg. The results were also illuminating to the question "When you buy things, do you reckon in Euros or in your national currency?". They show that consumers are becoming accustomed to thinking in Euros for their small purchases (46% on average), but continue to use their national currency for major purchases (54% on average). 72
The Euro today
European citizens are rapidly becoming used to the Euro: they find using it convenient, particularly when travelling abroad. And they have acquired the reflex of thinking in Euros, at least for small purchases. The downside is the feeling that businesses and shopkeepers have profited from the Euro's introduction to increase prices, sometimes very significantly, as in Italy. The European public seems to have lost its "monetary loyalty": the national attachment to the mark or the franc has gone. All the evidence points to the fact that Euro-cash is seen as just that - carrying no symbolic value nor based on any common cultural heritage, just bits of paper and circular bits of metal which carry purchasing power. But the overall balance for the public is positive.
The Euro and business

Here, the balance is very different. The Euro has certainly made life easier for financial directors of companies trading abroad: lower transaction costs, fewer holdings in foreign currencies, and easier management of company finances. And combined with EU enlargement, the Euro has been helpful for large companies in encouraging economies of scale, increasing market size and boosting competition. But the purely monetary logic of the Euro is negative for companies. While the USA uses the dollar as an economic weapon and as a tool for employment, the Euro is designed only to ensure price stability. Its very reactive management has furthermore done nothing to stimulate investment and growth. The Euro-effect appears much less favourable for smaller companies, particularly those in the "rearguard" countries. While it can be a positive stimulus for multinational companies, the tough competition resulting from the twin development of "Euro-plus-enlargement" puts additional pressure on many potentially fragile companies. More intense competition bears still more heavily on the smaller firms in Eurozone countries with a weak entrepreneurial culture. It is no easy task to be an entrepreneur in countries with a short working week, rigid work practices, heavy social charges and hesitant administrations 73
The Euro today
The Euro and National Economies

The results are at best mixed, and overall probably negative. The myth has survived too long that a high (i.e. expensive) Euro means a strong Euro. The two ideas are completely separate. The US dollar, which is very low at present, remains nevertheless not only a strong currency, but the world's reference currency, a position to which the Euro can only aspire. It is another myth that the high Euro helps the European economy by diminishing the effect of oil price rises. It may have this effect, but the high Euro is also a costly Euro, and it penalises exports, economic growth and employment - even if the reduced exposure of the European market to exports (as explained on page 29) means the impact of the high Euro on the Union's foreign trade is attenuated. A nuance needs to be introduced too into the argument that the Euro creates a "shield effect" which protects the economies of the members of the Eurozone from any devaluation. The "shield effect" is undeniable, saving several European currencies from severe and possibly repeated devaluations since 1999. The protection against devaluation is not, however, an unqualified benefit. Since these countries were prevented from devaluing, their weak economies are now faced with an overvalued Euro and are losing competitiveness. This situation is creating increasing distortions and significant divergences in competitiveness between the virtuous Euro-zone countries and the rest. The Argentine experience suggests that the Euro is in the early stages of a scenario which could become untenable if the essential structural reforms are not rapidly put in place. When the Euro was launched in 1999, it was expected to bring European economies closer together. Today, far from becoming closer and more harmonised, the Euro-zone economies are on a downward spiral of divergence and dispersion. Worse still, while the Euro has been a stimulant for the liberal economies of Ireland or Spain, it has penalised the German and French economies with a loss of competitiveness.
74
The Euro today
This spiral of dispersion is just beginning, and can only get worse. It is difficult to see how a single exchange rate and a single headline interest rate can be compatible for economies which are evolving at very different rates.
75
The Euro in 2015: four scenarios

Scenario 1 : Long-term success - the rose-tinted scenario Scenario 2 :
Exit from the crisis "upwards" Scenario 3 :
Exit from the crisis "downwards" Scenario 4 :
The Doomsday (or Argentine) scenario
77
SCENARIO 1 Long-term success - the rose-tinted scenario

Today, this scenario seems to be the subject of almost general consensus. It meets the aspirations of the political leaders of the Union, corresponds to the Commission's vision, expresses the thinking of opinion leaders, and is in step with public expectations. It's the Authorised Version... Under this scenario, the same political will which brought the Euro into being must of itself also bring in the necessary structural adjustments required by the single currency. Like an elevator used in the construction of the new Europe, the Euro will inexorably deliver the financial, social and political Europe. This rosy scenario has little or no chance of coming about, in view of the laxity of member states, the continuing disregard for the stability pact criteria, and the evident lack of harmonisation of the Euro-zone economies. The economy there is revenging itself on the lack of courage displayed in 1998, when the EU failed to insist on strict respect for the convergence criteria. Euro-zone members are experiencing growth problems, and some of them are presenting significantly worse public finances and worrying losses of competitiveness. This scenario accepts as dogma the invulnerability of a Euro created in line with an eternal and unchangeable logic. It refuses to accept that the Europe of 25 has no political project. And it forgets that the hardest part is yet to come.
0%
Daniel Guguen We can always hope for a miracle, but in my opinion, this is a totally unrealistic scenario...
10 %
Juan Carlos Gonzalez The probability of this scenario is weak, but it is possible to imagine that political leaders will emerge who could restore the balance.
78
SCENARIO 2 Exit from the crisis "upwards"

According to this scenario, the success of the Euro will be achieved, although with difficulty. After years of effort, the Euro will replace national currencies, its existence will be internationally accepted, and its future will be assured. 2005 will be the critical year for this scenario: political leaders and economic decision-makers will at last recognise that the Euro's existence requires advanced economic harmonisation in the member states and major structural adjustments in many of them - such as stabilisation of public finances, and greater worker flexibility. The recognition of the magnitude of the task is accompanied - in practice - by the unanimous will to find solutions. The Commission and the member states will arrive at painful agreement on a common European project, and on a reform of the European institutions that will allow fiscal and social harmonisation by qualified majority voting. The European Central Bank will accept a new balance between economic and monetary policies, to encourage convergence among the Euro-zone economies. And European trade unions and employers' organizations will accept social dialogue and give priority to negotiation rather than confrontation. Labour flexibility, modernization of wage structures, and discussion of social provision will be conducted in a peaceful social climate. Finally, workers and the public will accept these changes without a fight.
20 %
Daniel Guguen Too good to be true! Why should the laxity of previous years suddenly disappear? We've gone too far up the wrong road.
60 %
Juan Carlos Gonzalez This is the most likely scenario. Reinforced cooperation seems to me the right instrument for a solution.
79
SCENARIO 3 Exit from the crisis "downwards"

In contrast to Scenario 2, confrontation replaces dialogue in this scenario. The 2004 Constitutional Treaty will offer no improvement on the current rules for EU decision-making, and social and fiscal matters will continue to be decided by unanimity. The EU will continue to lack a common political project. Flying in the face of reality, and with its institutions insufficiently adapted, the EU will pursue enlargement beyond the accession of the ten central and eastern European states. Generalised free trade and eastward enlargement will turn the EU into little more than a large market - wide open to social dumping, industrial relocation and tax evasion. The "rearguard" countries will suffer a dramatic loss of competitiveness. Higher unemployment and growing inequalities will render social dialogue impossible. Management-union relationships will deteriorate. Labour disputes will become frequent in many member states. In this tense climate, the governments of the Europe of 30 will finally get a grip on the situation, and provide themselves with the means to harmonise their social and fiscal legislation. This harmonisation will translate into a brutal reduction in social security deductions in France, Belgium and Germany. The structural reforms necessitated by this abrupt loss of revenues - including cuts in social benefits, and fewer public service jobs - will be rejected by public opinion. Several years will then be necessary to re-establish an equilibrium in a debilitated EU.
50 %
Daniel Guguen This is the most likely scenario, combining major structural reform for the "rearguard" countries and rejection by society.
30 %
Juan Carlos Gonzalez It is a credible scenario. It is likely that public opinion would react badly to the necessary structural reforms.
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SCENARIO 4 The Doomsday (Argentine) scenario

This scenario is not necessarily unimaginable. There are many defenders of the possibility of an in-flight explosion of the Euro. Liberal economists, in particular several Nobel prize-winners of the Chicago school, including Milton Friedman, believe that the Euro fulfils none of the essential conditions for a single currency. Friedman maintains that rigidity of labour, lack of mobility, divergence among economies and the primacy of nation-states are totally incompatible with a single headline rate, free circulation of capital and the existence of fiscal paradises throughout Europe. And more than 150 German economists launched an appeal at the end of 1997 for a delay in the Euro, arguing that it was irresponsible to set up the single currency in advance of harmonised taxation and employment conditions, and without even having completed the single market. All the major banks have been considering the "impossible" scenario, including central banks of Paris and of the Netherlands, who - according to the Wall Street Journal of 6 January 1999 - conducted a study entitled "The End of the Euro - Thinking the Unthinkable". The trigger to the failure of the Euro will be the accentuation of divergences between the economies of the Euro-zone. The Argentine example is there for all to see.
30 %
Daniel Guguen It would be dramatic, but I fear that the Euro will suffer an Argentine scenario if measures are not taken urgently to remedy the deficiencies.
0%
Juan Carlos Gonzalez Unthinkable. I cannot imagine it for one second, because the explosion of the Euro would mean, quite simply, the explosion of the European Union.
81
Seven proposals for a sustainable Europe
83
he conclusion of this study can be neatly commenced by questioning the title to its introduction: "The Euro: yesterday unimaginable, today, indestructible." This almost unanimous conviction among EU and national officialdom depicts the Euro as a permanent reality, widely accepted by the EU population. No parliamentary question and no pressure from journalists will ever induce JeanClaude Trichet, Jean-Claude Juncker or Joaquin Almunia to admit - even as an academic possibility - that an existentialist crisis could ever hit the Euro. But the authors of this study see things very differently. They are sceptical about a future of rosy continuity for the Euro in a harmoniously developing EU. With some differences of nuance, they concur that this scenario is unlikely, even impossible. For them, the medium- and long-term future of the Euro presents a serious challenge to the EU and its member states. This challenge demands a redefinition of the very purpose of the EU, a reorganisation of responsibilities within it, and a profound revolution in the way some Euro-zone members run their economies.
A national currency - and even more so an international currency - requires three intimately linked conditions to sustain itself, as demonstrated by the examples of monetary unions that have failed (Argentina, Yugoslavia) and those that have succeeded (the dollar, the DM). There must be a single market a federal state a common citizenship. The EU fulfils none of these conditions. The single market of 1993 provides some freedom of movement of people, services, goods and capital, but it is still incomplete. A federal state is so far from the real ambitions of any member state that the very word "federal" was banished from the Treaty. And the absence of anything that could be called a Europe of citizens is shocking and inexcusable, but incontestable.
Furthermore, any assessment of the feasibility of a single currency has to take full account of the enlargement of the EU. The question has to be asked, coldly and clearly: is the integration required by a single currency compatible with rapid enlargement of the EU? 84
For the authors of this study, the answer is a clear no. It is not possible to widen and deepen at the same time. The discussions over the EU's new Constitutional Treaty clearly demonstrated that the further the EU enlarges, the more it is diluted. The Treaty may reasonably be saluted as the best text possible in a Europe of 25 - but it still falls far short of what was needed, because it is based on the lowest common denominator. Nor is it possible to hope for more in the future, even if negotiations are reopened. There is nothing to suggest any route towards a fiscal, social or federal Europe through the current blockage. If the current situation is untenable, and will lead to crisis, what is to be done?
There is no doubt that status quo will lead to crisis, because the shielding effect of the Euro is not unlimited. Member states that continue to accumulate deficits and debts - and particularly those in the rearguard - are going to be faced with: loss of competitiveness, which will result in unemployment and a deterioration of their public finances risks of inflation - domestic or imported (from the US, in particular) grave difficulty even in meeting interest payments on their debt This situation, by 2015, will be quite simply unsustainable. A key element in the predicament is that several Euro-zone members are consistently guilty of serious laxity in economic and monetary policy. The French budget for 2005, for instance, is presented as respectable, although it is based on a 3% budget deficit attained only through a trick - the exceptional payment of 7 billion by Electricit de France. The 3% budget deficit is calculated on the basis of GDP, but French public expenditure will exceed tax revenues by 20%! The implausibility of the status quo is dramatically illustrated by the fact that this has been greeted as "a good budget". Similarly, Greece has camouflaged its national accounts with total impunity for years, and now the 2004 results turn out to be catastrophic: +/- 6% budget deficit and +/-115% public debt - twice the maximum permitted level for each! A subliminal perception of the unacceptability of the status quo is starting to provoke some timid responses from the member states. Some of them are now 85
urging a harmonisation of the corporate tax base or tax rate. And the member states have agreed to appoint Jean-Claude Juncker as Eurogroup president for a 30-month period - a significant extension from the six-month arrangement in force until now. But these responses are utterly inadequate to deal with an underlying problem of such a scale. So what should be done?
Some assistance to successful emergence from the crisis may be found in the following proposals.
Proposal 1: Oblige member states to respect the stability pact

An end must be put to the current irresponsibility that allows eight out of 12 Euro-zone members to ignore the pact's five criteria, and allows seven of them (Germany, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) to seriously and deliberately defy them. Non-respect of the criteria will inevitably lead to wider economic divergences among euro-zone members, with all the evident consequences. So compliance has to be imposed, along with the penalties provided for when member states transgress. This is essential to avoid an irreversible aggravation of the alreadyevident gaps in competitiveness between member states. Feasibility: weak - the current rules provide the Commission with insufficient powers, and the new Constitutional Treaty will weaken them further.
Proposal 2: Rapidly complete the single market

The single market functions imperfectly because it is incomplete - in respect of the Community patent, financial services, accounting standards, the European 86
company statute subjects that remain governed at national level as long as the EU fails to agree on new rules. But it will be necessary to go much further: administrative formalities of all types must be harmonised, educational systems brought closer together, retirement and social systems made compatible, collective labour agreements progressively harmonised... Feasibility: strong - a simple question of political will.
Proposal 3: Make more use of enhanced cooperation

The existing EU Treaty provides for enhanced cooperation between member states who wish to move ahead in areas of common interest, such as approximation of direct taxation harmonisation of educational systems creation of a Europe of culture compatibility of social regimes Feasibility: strong - a simple question of political will.
Proposal 4: Define limits to EU enlargement

The discussion of EU enlargement is - as for many European questions - based on the wrong questions. Just to take the case of Turkey, the problem is neither the size of the population, nor poverty, nor even religion. It is the incoherence between the political integration required for the Euro, and the dilution that enlargement inexorably brings. Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey should all be helped. But they should not be brought into the EU as full members. 87
The help should be substantial, and delivered in areas such as free trade agreements, easier immigration, massive financial aid, technology transfers, and assistance in building stable democracy in these countries. This is as much in the interests of the EU as of these countries. But further enlargement will mean further attenuation of the already very limited common denominator that exists among the 25. Feasibility: zero - the EU summit of July 2004 gave a unanimous and unambiguous green light for further enlargement. Note: the authors diverge in their analysis of enlargement: Juan Carlos Gonzalez Alvarez takes a nuanced view. "Enlargement has gone so far that a few more countries hardly make a significant difference now". Daniel Guguen is more trenchant: he says enlargement has already gone too far, and any further enlargement will limit the EU's capacity to act and react. Juan Carlos Gonzalez Alvarez believes that enhanced cooperation could be an effective remedy - a life-raft - to overcome the dilution of the EU from its successive enlargements. Daniel Guguen disagrees: enhanced cooperation will not be enough to oblige the "rearguard countries" to carry out the necessary reforms. In any case, enhanced cooperation will be no more than a secondary legislative instrument, which will remain subject to agreement by all EU member states.
Proposal 5: Achieve wider acceptance of flexible working

The logic has to be followed of the ultra-liberal approach embraced by the EU in creating the Euro - with its implications for a wider market, price transparency, international free trade, tougher competition So the Euro-zone economy cannot run permanent budget deficits and massive debts, or suffer high wage costs, short working hours, rigidity of labour, intrusive regulation, and official indifference (and even, sometimes, hostility) to entrepreneurialism. 88
Amazingly, however, three countries currently display just these characteristics: Germany, Belgium, and France. And only Germany has made any start on the necessary structural reforms, such as a 40-hour working week, flexible working time, fixed-term contracts, easier redundancies, and making unemployment pay conditional on searching for other work. Even then, resistance and inertia holds back German progress. Feasibility: theoretically strong - but will happen only if member states are obliged to change.
Proposal 6: Promoting the "modest state"

The liberalisation of the workplace envisaged in Proposal 5 does not automatically imply the abandonment of social protection. Denmark, Sweden and - to some extent - Finland all provide examples of "social-liberal" regimes in the EU. Such regimes combine four characteristics: high taxation, linked to high levels of social protection; and a flexible labour market linked to a minimalist civil service In Sweden and Denmark, the number of officials has been halved in recent years, to create a civil service which is low in numbers and cost, but high in efficiency. This trend is precisely the opposite of the German, French or Belgian approach. This administration-elite is an intrinsic part of a "modest state", with highlydeveloped financial transparency, close links between the electorate and their elected representatives, and simplification of all aspects of the functioning of the state. It is a Calvinist approach, diametrically opposed to the atmosphere of the court of Louis XIV, which still flourishes on both banks of the Seine. Feasibility: currently very weak - but there is no alternative.
89
Proposal 7: Building a Europe of citizens

There can be no sustainable single currency without European citizenship - and to build European citizenship requires the construction of a Europe of citizens. To date, the countless debates about a Europe of citizens have had no positive effect whatever. Paradoxically, however, despite 25 years of bureaucracy, complexity, opacity, and remote decision-making, citizens remain fundamentally pro-European. All the evidence is that citizens are in favour of the EU - not necessarily in its current configuration, but certainly in favour of the construction of a European Union. This encouraging phenomenon should be exploited. The stakes are high, but so too are the chances of success: the essential requirements are only transparency, a little education and communication, and closer links between the European citizen and the decision-making process. Feasibility: very strong - doing it requires no more than wanting to do it.
The Euro's situation is disquieting, but not yet disastrous. There are plenty of measures that could be taken to strengthen the single currency and prevent its demise. But the essential component is political will. And if political will cannot be found - as is to be feared - then the solution may have to lie in the axiom that necessity is the mother of invention. Crisis itself may become a resource. But it would be better to act now and avoid that final recourse of the desperate.
90
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The book that reopens the euro debate

No harmonization of tax or social policy. Growing gaps in economic performance by the EU member states. And no common European project. The conditions are just not there for sustainable success of the Euro.
An analysis 4 scenarios 7 proposals

The authors:
: A degree in journalism from the Free University of Brussels, a Masters in journalism from the University of Madrid, then a professional journalist: Brussels correspondent for the newspaper "El Mundo" and specialist in monetary affairs for the Europe Information Service agency (EIS). Juan Carlos Gonzalez Alvarez has followed the single currency throughout all its stages, from the creation of the European Monetary Institute to the launch of the Euro on 1 January 1999 and beyond. He is widely recognised as an authority on the subject.
JC Gonzalez Alvarez
: Entered European affairs in 1975. Successively Head of the European Sugar Federation, and General Secretary of COPACOGECA, the European farmers' union. Currently Chief Executive Officer of CLAN Public Affairs, one of the principal European consultancies, and co-Director of Europe Information Service (EIS). A convinced European and a campaigner for a federal Europe. A prolific writer and speaker. Author of many books on Europe, including the Practical Guide to the EU Labyrinth, translated into 18 languages.
Daniel Guguen
The Euro is still an open question

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The Euro: Europe's Construction or Destruction?

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The Euro: Europe's Construction or Destruction?

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P U BL IS HI N G

European Training Institute

This is an authorised free electronic edition of the book

THE EURO: EUROPES CONSTRUCTION OR DESTRUCTION?

The conclusions of the authors are theirs alone

Eric Damiens Chairman, Europe Information Service

Training in European affairs

Online: eis.net Print edition

Courses open to the public

Daniel Guguen: Bibliography

Editions de lUniversit de Bruxelles

French translations and adaptations

English translation and adaptation:

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LIBERAL AND FEDERALIST LOGIC

The Euro: yesterday unimaginable; today, indestructible?

The Euro: yesterday unimaginable; today, indestructible?

The Euro: yesterday unimaginable; today, indestructible?

The true budget deficit figures

The Euro: yesterday unimaginable; today, indestructible?

The launch circumstances:

1999: Europe's economies diverge 2004 : further and further

The launch circumstances

Criteria (annual average)

Debt (as % of GDP)

The launch circumstances

1998: criteria ignored

The launch circumstances

1999: Europe's economies diverge

Netherlands Finland Ireland Portugal Luxembourg

2004: further and further

The launch circumstances

Source : European Commission, Eurostat

A word on the non-Euro-zone countries

Debt (as % of GDP)

Long-term interest rate (2003) 4,3 4,5 4,6 4,2

43,4 40,4 51,6 64,4

1,1 1,4 1,1 2,0

2,3 3,3 2,7 2,3

The launch circumstances

Liberal and federalist logic

Liberal and federalist logic

The Euro commits the EU to a federalist logic

Liberal and federalist logic

The Euro commits the EU to an ultra-liberal logic

Liberal and federalist logic

Reduction in public deficits

Cuts in interest rates

Relaunch of investment and employment

Liberal and federalist logic

Liberal and federalist logic

The European domestic market becomes the Euro-zone

Trade before the creation of the Euro-zone

Liberal and federalist logic

Trade after the creation of the Euro-zone

Liberal and federalist logic

Liberalism and federalism - compatible or contradictory?

Unchecked upsets: tax and social affairs

Unchecked upsets: tax and social affairs