Paul DOBRESCU*

Elena NEGREA-BUSUIOC**
Loredana RADU***

Requiem for European Solidarity.

An Analysis of the European Discourse on the 2014-2020
Multiannual Financial Framework

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze official speeches delivered by three of EU’s high rank officials, namely the
President of the European Commission, the President of the European Parliament and the President of the
European Council, and by the two political leaders of the Union, the French President and the German Chan-
cellor. All the examined speeches focused on the 2014-2020 budget and were delivered before the European
Council held on February 7-8, 2013, excepting Angela Merkel’s speech, which was delivered at the end of
February, in the German Parliament. We used textual analysis to investigate the themes and the meaning cat-
egories that appear in the text and how these themes and categories are discursively constructed in order to
convey a particular view on the budget and on EU’s future prospects as a viable and trustful project. In our
analysis, we started from the premise that there is a gap between discourse and action within the EU, and
that this credibility gap can easily add to the already acknowledged economic, financial and political caus-
es of the EU’s decline. Unfortunately, a credibility gap might produce more damage more rapidly as it usu-
ally generates popular frustration and exhaustion.
Keywords: European solidarity; Euro crisis; multiannual financial framework; EU-related discourse.

1. Introduction

On the 8th of February 2013, the European Council decided upon and validated the Mul-
tiannual Financial Framework (MFF) covering the period between 2014 and 2020. The Coun-
cil’s decision has generated, among net contributors, a general feeling of relief and satisfaction,
whereas all the other states, the so-called “net beneficiaries”, experienced deep disappoint-
ment. The true source of their discontent is given by the fact that, for the first time in histo-
ry, the Union’s budget has decreased as compared to the previous programming period. And
it has decreased when the European Union was in much need of money for its own econom-
ic revival. According to some European officials, this is for the first time when you are go-
ing to witness tensions, if not a true conflict, between the European Council and the European
Parliament.
The leaders of the main parliamentary groups gave a joint statement, arguing that “EU lead-
ers agree to a budget that could lead to a structural deficit. Large gaps between payments and
commitments will only store up trouble for the future and not solve existing problems.”

*, **, *** National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Faculty of Communication
and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected]
76 Revista românã de comunicare ºi relaþii publice

(http://www.eppgroup.eu/) Not surprisingly, on 13th of March, the members of the European

Parliament voted against the MFF in its current version. Also, the Parliament stated that the
MFF should be more flexible and open to revisions. They also insisted on a real system of own
resources for the EU. Martin Schulz, the president of the European Parliament, declared right
after the EP’s voting session ended that “Parliament cannot accept the proposal from the mem-
ber states without the fulfillment of certain essential conditions. There must be maximum over-
all flexibility and an ambitious agreement on own resources.” (http://www.europarl.europa.eu).
The Council’s decision, as well as the Parliament’s vote, exert high pressures on the Eu-
ropean politics and, also, on the European decision-making mechanisms. And these pressures
come in a context that is both uneasy and unsafe for the European project. The negotiations
on the next MFF are emblematic for how this gap is growing deeper and, furthermore, for
how economic interests and negotiation skills seem to eclipse Europe’s social and political
strain. That is why the strategic decisions formulated around the MFF 2014-2020 should be
closely examined and wisely judged, as they impact upon the European project itself. A Eu-
ropean Project that is already very much weakened by the citizens’ eroding trust in the EU
as an entity with a clear role and with a well-defined perspective.
The financial and economic turmoil within the Eurozone has significantly impacted up-
on the way in which the European citizens assess the advantages of EU membership and the
future of the integration process. The results of the spring and autumn waves of the 2010 Eu-
robarometer revealed an inversion of the trust-distrust ratio. In spring 2010, for the first time
in the history of the European public opinion research, the distrust in the EU outweighed trust
(42% of the respondents trusted the EU, whereas 47% said they distrust the Union). Accord-
ing to Eurobarometers between 2008 and 2012, the European citizens acutely perceive the
current crisis as a crisis of the European project. Taking into account the European Parliament’s
recent rejection of the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014-2020 in the version pro-
posed and validated by the European Council, it appears that the year 2013 will further erode
citizens’ confidence in the European Union, in its legitimacy, and in its power to reconcile
the political interests with the economic rationality of the most solid economies. Of course,
this assertion could only be examined based on the results of this Spring Eurobarometer.
However, the evident dichotomy between the interests of the most powerful member-states,
on one hand, and the needs of the least powerful member-states, on the other hand, are noth-
ing but signs of an eroded convergence that is now translating into an eroded strategy for the
next programming period.

2. The European Union and its Multiple Crises

Back in 2008, the first reaction that the EU had in relation to the American crisis was to
simply decouple from the unappealing turmoil. This was hardly possible from several rea-
sons. For example, it is estimated that one fourth of the American “toxic” mortgages went
abroad (Stiglitz, 2010). In this way, the US succeeded in exporting its own crisis to Asia and
mostly to Europe. Furthermore, the institutional contagion transformed many financial organ-
izations in Europe, and made them rely on high debt and leveraging. In addition, the US ex-
ported their deregulatory philosophy and made European institutions believe in the emblematic
“invisible hand” of free markets.
Requiem for European Solidarity. An Analysis of the European Discourse on the 2014-2020 … 77

As soon as the crisis began, Europe has almost hidden behind scenes, whereas the polit-
ical and economic scene has become populated by the leaders of the national institutions, in-
stead of the leaders of the key European institutions. And this is evident if one takes a look
at how media has analyzed the crisis. For example, in a vast quantitative study done in 2011,
the “European leader” emerged as a specific actor in the crisis-related news posted by the
most popular Romanian news portals; however, the “European leaders” were, in fact, the
leaders of the most powerful member-states, such as Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy
(Radu, 2012). George Soros has taken a very firm position in this regard: “The euro crisis has
its origin in German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision, taken in the aftermath of Lehman
Brothers’ default in September 2008 that the guarantee against further defaults should come
not from the European Union, but from each country separately. And it was German procras-
tination that aggravated the Greek crisis and caused the contagion that turned it into an exis-
tential crisis for Europe” (Soros, 2012, p. 118). It is not in our intention to insist on the
plausibility of Soros’s statement. However, we must reveal one basic aspect: the almost four
years between the statement given by the German Chancellor and the centralized actions tak-
en by the European Central Bank in order to manage various issues of the crisis. These 4
years represent a historical detour; it is the long road that has finally led to an important dis-
covery: a Union could only be saved through measures taken at the Union level. Even though
these measures may be proposed at the national level, their implementation should be done
at the central level.
Roger Altman has recently signaled that Europe’s timing for economic reconsolidation is
very different from the American one. Altman uses two key arguments. The peak of the Amer-
ican crisis was in 2008-2009, when several measures to tackle the crisis were implemented
(e.g. bail-out actions, massive restructuring of companies). In Altman’s view, the US is ex-
pected to handle 2 or 3 three more years of harsh efforts and critical decisions, „but after that,
US economic growth should outperform expectations” (Altman, 2013). The peak of the Eu-
ropean crisis was in 2012, „when the sovereign debt and banking crisis hit the continent in
full force, and the Eurozone faced problems comparable to those that had afflicted the US econ-
omy in 2008-9” (Altman, 2013). Thus, we have to deal with two different schedules of the
crisis. EU is facing, concomitantly, two different economic sufferings: the sovereign debts and
the banking crisis. The conjunction of these two issues will affect the timing of the European
recovery. Furthermore, if we take into account Europe’s complexity, the different develop-
ment levels of its countries, the “multi-speed” Europe, and the essential aspect that, in our
view, the European construction has a very uncertain outcome, we will become aware of the
fact that those who wish to truly contribute to identifying a clear resolution for the crisis has
a real difficulty in knowing where to start in this rather complex and incoherent set of issues.
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize laureate for economy, wisely observed that ”recessions can
be seen as the tip of the iceberg; underneath are many ”smaller” market failures, giving rise
in the aggregate of huge inefficiencies.” (Stiglitz, 2009, p. 293). As regards the European cri-
sis, observing the unseen part of the iceberg implies, first of all, a general consent regarding
the typology of the current crisis. Is it a financial crisis? Is it an economic crisis? Is it politi-
cal crisis? If we examine the vast literature produced on the European crisis, we could hard-
ly identify an exact typology of the current crisis. For example, some say that we face a
European sovereign-debt crisis, whereas others state that this is a crisis of the European sin-
gle currency. We have to agree that all these assertions are right, as the European crisis em-
bodies many element of fiscal, economic, and monetary nature. However, the question mark
78 Revista românã de comunicare ºi relaþii publice

stands still. What kind of crisis is Europe facing? Might it be a new type of crisis that is an
aggregated crisis caused by multiple factors, which have complexly combined and which
could potentially change the implicit causality between economics and politics? After all, the
recent developments in the European Union financial policies reveal that economics is poli-
tics and that the structure of a multiannual financial framework is largely shaped by the bar-
gaining power of the most “prominent” member-states.
Just for the sake of a structured and clear analysis, the crisis that the EU is currently fac-
ing should be analyzed under 4 angles at least. The first and the most visible was the finan-
cial turmoil. Here we can include the problems faced by the banking sector, as well as the
national public debts. The second and the most perceptible for most European citizens was
the economic fallout. The most emblematic event here was the crisis of the euro-zone, where-
as the most painful actions revolved around the austerity measures implemented in most mem-
ber-states. The third crisis is the political crisis and, more specifically, the lack of visionary
leadership among European officials. By visionary leadership we mean the ability to seize
and promote the importance of the European project, as well the need for joint concerted ac-
tions aiming at closing the gap between nation states’ interests and EU’ interests. One should
not forget that the very first measures implemented in order to tackle the “American crisis”
were not taken at the EU level, but, rather, at the states level.
Last but not least, we can speak about Europe’s crisis of solidarity that is starting to be-
come even more acute, even more serious than the gravest economic effects of the Econom-
ic crisis. Given the actual context, we could rightfully state that the Europe’s belt-tightening
exercise would easily be eclipsed by the EU’s crisis of solidarity. The current crisis has caught
the European Union in the midst of fundamental reordering, when citizenship and identity were
starting to coagulate. The economic turmoil revealed older tensions and created new ones
among EU’s political actors. But, as Jürgen Habermas explains, the main conflict in Europe
is not necessarily a purely political one, but rather the genuine expression of the gap between
economic rationality and political vision. ”On the threshold between economic and political
unification of Europe, politics seems to hold its breath and to play low profile.” (Habermas,
2012) The “crisis of the European Union” (Habermas, 2011) has emerged as a new angle of
analysis. From this perspective, the current crisis should not be seen solely as a financial and
economic crisis, but rather, as an intrinsically political crisis, generated by the EU’s lack of
solidarity, by the fact that EU could not take concerted decisions in some moments that many
have subsequently deemed as having been critical in the evolution of the crisis. There is gen-
eral consent that the current economic crises, in general, and the euro crisis, in particular,
place the European Union at a crossroads. The problems arising are not only of a practical
(economic and financial) nature, but also highly symbolic. In a statement made by the Coun-
cil for the Future of Europe (Europe is the solution, not the problem, 6th of September 2011)
it is admitted that the vision of Europe that will succeed is that which “inspires the commit-
ment of its citizens whose faith in a European future is shaken”. Some talk about Europe’s
darkest moment: “The crisis in Europe is existential. It is a question of whether the EU sur-
vives as a recognizable entity.” (Giddens, 2012). Even though the outburst of the crisis did
not happen on the European territory, but on the other side of the Atlantic, the effects of what
started in 2007 are most enduring in the EU and one could safely state that most serious im-
pact of the global crisis is on Europe itself: “what started as the subprime crisis in 2007 and
morphed into the Global Credit Crisis in 2008 has become the Euro Crisis in 2009” (Eichen-
green, 2011, p. 1). Now, we are dealing with a never-ending crisis – neither of the common
Requiem for European Solidarity. An Analysis of the European Discourse on the 2014-2020 … 79

currency, nor of the euro zone or of its banking system, but with a never-ending crisis of the
European Union itself (Habermas, 2012). Europe’s crisis of solidarity is now very visible
during the process of deciding on the new Multiannual Financial Framework. The disparity
between nation-oriented interests and Europe-oriented visions is evident and represent the
expression of clearly defined positions in terms of political power.
Under the pressure exerted by both intra-European (i.e. the dilution of convergence, the
polarization of the Member States, the private debt in the new member states) and extra-Eu-
ropean forces (the pressure of globalization, the emergence of China as a genuine global play-
er), Europe is in the midst of a fundamental reordering. This means that we should indeed
deal with those things that we have repeatedly managed to avoid in the past. The “multi-
speed” Europe, which implies a division between the EU-17 (euro zone) and a slower non
euro periphery, has been revealed in several instances during the EU’s crisis. The analysts have
gone even further and discuss about a periphery of the euro zone, consisting in those mem-
ber states that did not achieve considerable economic outputs and recovery. In 2011, Fin-
land’s European Minister, Alexander Stubb, proposed a new “geometry” of the EU, based on
economic ranking. “Within the EU-17 there is a divide between Germany, Austria, Finland,
and the Netherlands, a core Triple-A, net-payers, plus a second tier of Slovenia, Slovakia, and
Estonia, neither Triple-A not net-payer. And, on the other side, we can find Greece, Italy,
Spain, and Portugal that for a variety of reasons have failed to follow the rules. In between
there are euro-area members such as AAA Luxembourg, AA+ France, and AA Belgium, net
payers, whose positions on fiscal disciplines are somewhat more ambiguous.” (Habermas,
2012). Therefore, within the framework of the crisis, the “two-speed” Europe risks to become
a “three-speed Europe”, split among the first tier of countries (Germany, Austria, Finland,
and the Netherlands), the second-tier countries consisting in the new periphery of the euro-
zone, and a third-tier composed of the states outside the monetary union. In the logic of this
new “geometry”, several questions mark regarding the survival of the European Project can
be raised. Will Europe be able to cope with these new divisions? Will we have more Europe
or less Europe after the crisis? Is European solidarity the victim of the current crisis?

3. European Solidarity: Theoretical and Practical Considerations

The questions raised above could only find pertinent answers if we closely analyze the con-
cept of solidarity, including that of financial solidarity. According to the Oxford Dictionary,
by “solidarity” it is meant “unity or agreement of feeling or action, especially among indi-
viduals with a common interest; mutual support within a group”. Thus, the concept of soli-
darity encompasses three interconnected dimensions: the group, the common interest, and
the unity of action.
Very often scholars who try to explain why the needy are supported mention the classic
distinction between “mechanical solidarity”’ and “organic solidarity” put forward by Emile
Durkheim in De la division du travail social in 1893 (Thijssen, 2012, p. 455). In the case of
mechanical solidarity, the emphasis is on the link between likeness and cohesion. As a mem-
ber of a community, one cannot but show solidarity (Durkheim, [1893] 1967, p. 228). If “il-
legitimate” differences become apparent, the members of the community will most probably
feel a moral determination to alleviate them. The engine of mechanical solidarity is the “con-
science collective” that consists of shared values, symbols, and behaviors that take place
80 Revista românã de comunicare ºi relaþii publice

among members that are similar. According to Durkheim, mechanical solidarity is character-
istic for small groups, such as tribes or hordes, where everyone performs more or less the same
task and, thus, where functional differences are rather scarce. The objective similarities be-
tween members of a group conducive to mechanical solidarity will decrease when the group
size increases and the division of labor expands (Thijssen, 2012, p. 457). That is why we need
organic solidarity. In the case of organic solidarity, the emphasis is on the diversity that ex-
ists between various members of the community. These differences are necessary and com-
plementary, as they support the community in accomplishing a large variety of tasks and in
fulfilling many functions. (Thijssen, 2012) This is the so-proclaimed “unity in diversity”,
which promotes, at the same time, group solidarity and group differentiation.
Durkheim subsequently connects his forms of solidarity with successive phases in the his-
tory of civilization. While mechanical solidarity, which stems from compulsion, prevailed
throughout pre-modernity, in modernity, it increasingly had to make way for more individu-
alistic form of solidarity, namely organic solidarity, which is fed by complementary differ-
ences and interdependence (Thijssen, 2012, p. 456). That is to say the organic solidarity was
understood as a superior form of solidarity. However, in his latter works, Durkheim has aban-
doned the distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity for he was not able to demon-
strate that organic solidarity could be superior to the mechanical solidarity.
Coleman (1990) focuses on the instrumental side of solidarity, by emphasizing the prin-
ciple of reciprocity. Trying to explain why rational actors exhibit solidarity, Coleman argues
that solidarity is, in fact, an “investment in the future” (1990, p. 309). By helping someone,
the provider implicitly accumulates credit from the recipient. Thus, differences are very use-
ful; by integrating individuals with different abilities and skills, the group is able to evolve
and to attain more and more complex goals. As Durkheim himself observed (Durkheim, [1893]
1967), the thesis of instrumental solidarity is viable only if the social system that develops
this kind of solidarity is built on ethical principles that is to say if social recognition follows
a set of ethically validated rules. If reciprocal exchange relationships are left unchecked or if
group members perceive these relationships as unfair or unethical, social recognition mech-
anisms will be perverted and some members of the group will end occupying positions that
are not consonant with their own skills and abilities. The outcome of an alleviated solidarity
is the erosion of the group.
Honneth (2007) makes us aware of the fact that instrumental solidarity implies the an-
tithesis of emphatic solidarity that takes into account that individuals are guided by social and
psychological affinities, which could lead to misrecognized differences. “It is only to the de-
gree to which I actively bear responsibility for another person’s ability to develop qualities
that are not my own that our shared goals can be realized.” (Honneth, 2007, p. 261)
Departing from these general theoretical considerations of “solidarity”, we may ask our-
selves what kind of solidarity is the European Union. Is it a mechanical or an organic soli-
darity? Is it an instrumental or an emphatic solidarity? In the Schumann Declaration (1950),
it is stated that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be
built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity” (www.europa.eu).
By conciliating two different states (Germany and France) the EU was founded as an instru-
mental solidarity, meant to prevent the outburst of future violence between the two states:
“The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France
and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (The Schumann
Declaration, 1950). The reciprocal advantage of jointly producing two types of critical raw
Requiem for European Solidarity. An Analysis of the European Discourse on the 2014-2020 … 81

material – coal and steel – was the key argument for setting the foundation of the European
Union. The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, represented a noble and ambitious departure in
European history. Solidarity and predictability in international relations, based on common
institutions and common interests, would ensure Europe’s prosperity and stability much more
effectively than had the traditional balancing act of high-wire diplomacy, whose practition-
ers had too often crashed to the ground (Sutherland, 2012).
After more than 50 years, the motto of an enlarged Union became “United in diversity”,
a motto that is, at least in its formal side, emblematic for the organic solidarity. This motto
was adopted in 2000, following a European contest joined by over 80.000 young Europeans.
In 2004, the motto was written into the failed European Constitution’s Article I-8 about the
EU’s symbols. The Treaty of Lisbon, concluded in 2007, does not contain any article dedi-
cated to symbols of the European Union, including the motto. Despite this, the European Par-
liament took the avant-garde in using the motto on all its official documents. In this context,
European solidarity was a headline.
The “united in solidarity” motto was challenged soon after its intensive broadcasting. The
Dutch and French rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 has since been one of the most
eloquent and most frequently evoked examples of a public refusal of an EU proposal. More
importantly, this rejection might also be taken as a clear indication of the underestimated am-
bivalence of the public opinion towards the political integration process. However, this has
not been a singular event. The shockwave of the powerful “nee” and “no” to the European
Constitution hadn’t been completely dissipated when the level of public support for the EU
was seriously hit again in 2008 by the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by the Irish people.
Eventually, the Lisbon Treaty was ratified by all the Member States and come into force in
December 2009. Such events in which people have been asked for their opinion, and many
others, as well, have short-circuited the EU’s legitimacy to a greater or lesser degree, depend-
ing on the nature and consequences of the issue under public scrutiny at the time.
Widespread opposition to the EU first emerged during the process of ratifying the Maas-
tricht Treaty, in 1992–93, as manifest in referendums held in France, Denmark and Ireland.
This opposition continued in the form of votes for anti-European parties in the 1994 Euro-
pean elections, in the 1994 referendums in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway on EU en-
largement, in the European elections in 1995 and 1996 in Austria, Sweden and Finland, in
opinion polls in the build-up to the launch of European Monetary Union in 1999, and in the
first EP elections in the enlarged EU in 2004 (Hix, 2005, p. 151). According to Simon Hix,
until the 1990s, the citizens of the member-states embraced a so-called permissive consen-
sus, this meaning that they were either neutral or in favor of the decisions taken by their na-
tional governments. “In other words a large majority of the citizens of all member states were
either not interested in European integration, and therefore had no opinion about their gov-
ernments’ actions on the issue, or generally supported their government’s efforts to promote
further integration. There was a favorable prevailing attitude toward the subject, but it was
of low salience as a political issue – leaving national decision-makers free to take steps fa-
vorable to integration if they wished but also leaving them a wide liberty of choice” (Hix, 2005,
p. 152). We may say that the citizens of the members-states grew up in terms of political judg-
ment, with these public rejections as a clear indicator for this evolution. This is the explana-
tion formulated by political scientists.
According to social psychologists, individual feelings of identification are strengthened
by the perception that group membership is valuable and beneficial to the self (Tajfel, 1972).
82 Revista românã de comunicare ºi relaþii publice

For individual actors involved in the exchange of resources, the immediate effect of receiv-
ing benefits through an exchange system is to identify more with the group, to view them-
selves in part as valued group members (Willer, Flynn & Zak, 2012, p. 120). This means that
low benefits would actually translate into a low level of group cohesion, and consequently,
into a lack of solidarity. “Receiving benefits through structures of exchange can compel in-
dividuals to identify as group members, in turn leading those individuals to hold positive per-
ceptions of the group as cohesive and solidary” (Willer, Flynn & Zak, 2012).
The negotiations on EU budget are among the most eloquent exemplifications of how the
perceptions of benefits impact upon the process of negotiation and the allocation of resources.
The issue of equity in allocating EU budget has previously been analyzed by Bowels and
Jones (1992), who use a pooled cross-section time series analysis to conclude that “the EC
Budget is neither neutral nor straightforwardly progressive as far as redistribution is con-
cerned” (1992, p. 101). Many scholars have examined the factors that influence the distribu-
tion of goods that result from political bargaining. For instance, numerous empirical studies
examine how voting power affects the distribution of funds to states in the US (Atlas et al.,
1995; Lee, 2000; Ansolabehere et. al., 2002) or the allocation of funds to member states in
the EU (Baldwin et al., 1997; Kandogan, 2000). Aksoy (2010) argues that the political pow-
er does not totally equate the voting power. What he labels as the “proposal power” plays an
equally important role in shaping critical decisions. In Aksoy’s words, “proposal making pow-
er associated with the EU presidency helps the member states to obtain preferable outcomes
to negotiation.” (2010, p. 172) There are many variables influencing how financial resources
are distributed among a group or a community. Political or voting power is among the most
evident ones. However, in our view, the most important aspect is not necessarily related to
the operational side of resource allocation (how are the resources allocated among the par-
ticipants?), but, rather, it is linked to how the members of the community perceive and assess
the fairness or the equity of this allocation. If members perceive this allocation as being bi-
ased or even illegitimate, the community will most probably fall apart. It will disintegrate, as
Durkheim and many other socio-psychologists have demonstrated. In this context, the MFF
2014-2020 may have a very important stake: the future of the European project.

4. The Discrepancy between Words and Actions. An Analysis of the

European Official Discourse on Financial Solidarity

Built on the compromise of all member states, the “unique success story” of the EU, which
the German Chancellor so proudly acclaimed during her address to the Bundestag at the end
of February 2013, may not be as successful as she and other EU leaders wish it to be. The
European Council has finally agreed to the proposed 2014-2020 multi-annual financial frame-
work, but this consensus should not be seen as a victory of the Union, a fact that has become
evident in the rejection done by the European Parliament. It is at best a consequence of the
negotiation skills of the member states. The question is this: what kind of federation distrib-
utes money based on the negotiation skills of its beneficiaries? We definitely agree that a
strong and effective negotiator may bring in some more money and benefits than a weaker
one. However, budget should be rationally divided among regions and communities based on
a shared financial projection. At this point, what are the EU’s criteria and principles that have
guided the distribution of the 960 billion euros of the next seven-year budget? Put it differ-
Requiem for European Solidarity. An Analysis of the European Discourse on the 2014-2020 … 83

ently, does this budget reflect the largely invoked solidarity between the wealthier and the poor-
er countries in the Union?
In the version validated by the European Council, the Multiannual Financial Framework
2014-2020 limits the expenses of an Union composed of 28 member-states (Croatia includ-
ed) at 959,99 billion Euro in budgetary commitments, which corresponds to a mere value of
1% of EU’s National Gross Product. The initial proposal was around 1078 billion Euro, but
it was not accepted by the leaders of the most powerful economies, such as Germany and
United Kingdom. As compared to the MFF 2007-2013, the budgetary ceiling accepted by the
European Council, was diminished with approx. 3,4% in real terms (959,99 billion euro for
2014-2020 vs. 994,18 billion euro for 2007-2013).
Two important sections of the newly proposed EU Budget have suffered from important
reductions. First, the budget for the economic, social, and territorial cohesion, which is 8,4%
smaller than the previous MFF. Despite this important reduction, Herman Van Rompuy stat-
ed that these funds will be more effectively directed towards the „poorest states”. Second, the
budget for sustainability and natural resources has suffered a major slump – 11% less than
MFF 2007 – 2013. In exchange, the Union’s budgetary resources have been allocated towards
several sectors that net-contributors such as Germany and the Northern states have deemed
as priorities: competitiveness for growth and new jobs, which received 34% more money
than in the MFF 2007-2013, and security and citizenship, where the proponents approved an
increase of over 27% as compared to the previous programming period.
In this section, we analyze official speeches delivered by three of EU’s high rank offi-
cials, namely the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Par-
liament and the President of the European Council, and by the two political leaders of the
Union, the French President and the German Chancellor. All the examined speeches focused
on the 2014-2020 budget and were delivered before the European Council held on February
7-8, 2013, excepting Angela Merkel’s speech, which was delivered at the end of February, in
the German Parliament. We used textual analysis to investigate the themes and the meaning
categories that appear in the text and how these themes and categories are discursively con-
structed in order to convey a particular view on the budget and on EU’s future prospects as
a viable and trustful project. In our analysis, we started from the premise that there is a gap
between discourse and action within the EU, and that this credibility gap can easily add to
the already acknowledged economic, financial and political causes of the EU’s decline. Un-
fortunately, a credibility gap might produce more damage more rapidly as it usually gener-
ates popular frustration and exhaustion. As shown in the literature on EU public support and
EU communication (Valentini, 2008; Koopmans & Statham, 2010; Bârgãoanu & Negrea,
2011; Radu, 2012), the Union has not yet managed to find the adequate measures to ensure
strong public support, especially in troubled times as these when the economic downturn has
had a significant negative impact on the Eurozone.
In their speeches, all five EU leaders have acknowledged the importance of the financial
and social solidarity in achieving consensus over the budget and in consolidating the Euro-
pean integration. European officials and leaders hold slightly different views on solidarity
and on how to foster it in times of crisis. The President of the European Council sees the de-
sirable agreement on the EU budget as an indication of solidarity between EU member states
that goes beyond the utilitarian logic of integration.
84 Revista românã de comunicare ºi relaþii publice

“[…] we are jointly defining European priorities, not just making individual calculations of how to
minimize what each Member State puts in and to maximize what it gets out”. (November 27, 2012)

The cost-benefit ratio of European integration and its impact on the national economies
of the EU countries seem to undermine the solidarity that Europe currently needs. Countries
put first their own economic and social welfare and then they turn to the common European
welfare. This powerful idea is hard to challenge, especially during the crisis when nation-
centered feelings tend to coagulate and consolidate. In trying to show that the proposed budg-
et will contribute to the welfare of all member states, Barroso highlights the fact that the EU
budget actually relieves economic pressure from national budgets, and therefore it is in the
best interest of member states to urgently adopt it.

“In particular at a time when national budgets are under pressure, this framework will not cost tax-
payers any more than at present. […] A Euro spent through the EU budget can usually spare several Euros
for national budgets through synergies and effects of scale. […] we need to put together our resources”.
(March 22, 2012)

This optimistic projection seems to be in conflict with the reality of the budgetary projec-
tion, which, as the President of the European Commission certainly knows it, represents 1%
of GDP. Van Rompuy, too, admits that the proposed financial framework is a “relatively small
budget”. Is the EU budget sufficiently strong to financially support EU’s objectives and to
grant the growth and development that will bring European regions closer in terms of eco-
nomic and social standards? To an apparently rhetoric question we answer by quoting a piece
from The Economist, where reference to other federal budgets is made: “The American fed-
eral budget accounts for some 24% of GDP; the Swiss one is roughly 12%”. The figures
speak for themselves.
The influential utilitarian approach to integration also worries the representative of EU cit-
izens in the European Parliament. In his speech delivered to the European Council, Martin
Schulz, the President of the European Parliament, warns of the deepening of the gap between
richer and poorer states of the Union. This is a strong indicator of the lack of solidarity that
the negotiations over the next EU budget have shown throughout Europe.

“[…] dividing the Member States into net contributors and net recipients no longer makes sense. The
EU budget is not a zero-sum game in which one country wins what another loses”. (November 22, 2012)

Furthermore, the President of the European Parliament suggests that the adoption of the
budget is “part of the solution, not part of the problem”, and that member states should seri-
ously take into consideration the incomparable higher damaging effects that continuous dis-
agreement over this crucial issue may have on the future of Europe. He is aware of the fact
that an effective and unanimously agreed solution to the “divide” between wealthier and poor-
er, responsible and irresponsible, creditor and debtor states is difficult to find, given the in-
crease of nationally-driven views of the EU and future integration process. In fact, he openly
admits that there are two polarized approaches to EU budget and, by extension, to the future
of the European project, which he calls “friends of cohesion” and “friends of better spend-
ing”. These two approaches seem to be irreconcilable and incompatible, and this makes it
very difficult to reach an agreement that goes beyond the narrow interests of countries in the
two groups. Apparently, there is no room for solidarity outside these groups, and the prospects
Requiem for European Solidarity. An Analysis of the European Discourse on the 2014-2020 … 85

for a decision that put Europe first seem rather impossible. This idea is backed up by evidence
from the latest European Council on EU budget: not only did negotiations promote the inter-
ests of member states taken individually, but the “friends of better spending” reported an im-
portant victory, as the final budget included significant cuts, especially from the cohesion
section of the financial framework. It is at least curious that all EU officials admit that the
2014-2020 budget should focus on investments and growth (“the European budget is a budg-
et for investments, […] not a budget for current expenditure” – Barroso; “EU budget is the
most powerful force for growth in Europe” – Schulz; “the MFF (multi-annual financial frame-
work) is essentially an investment budget” – Van Rompuy), while recognizing the need for
“fiscal restraint”, which they consider it more a political pressure than an economic one. Giv-
en this scenario, how can the financial framework for the next seven year significantly add
to Europe’s growth and development if it is based on cuts to essential sections such as cohe-
sion? By trying to reduce development imbalances between European regions, the future
budget will generate others between member states directly affected by a double pressure: a
reduced EU budget and a very limited negotiation power. Will a “moderation budget” (Van
Rompuy) be sufficient to foster economic recovery and growth in a Europe badly hit by the
crisis? The years to come will show it.
As expected, Barroso and Van Rompuy’s speeches are more technical and include many
references to the structure of the multi-annual financial framework (i.e. distribution of mon-
ey into budget chapters, new financial facilities, new programs, etc.). Both ground their ar-
guments in favor of the adoption of the budget proposal on comparisons with the previous
financial framework and highlight the relevance and the appropriateness of the 2014-2020 pro-
posal within the current economic and financial context. They use figures and calculations to
show that there are sufficient “technical” grounds to accept this financial proposal. Building
a EU budget is a complicated and complex process, and no “budgetary aesthetics” (Van
Rompuy) should be expected, especially in these times “when resources are scarce and when
every euro counts” (Barroso). Therefore, member states should understand the constraints of
this financial framework and thus should concentrate on the future impact that its implemen-
tation will have on development and on deepening European integration.
Barroso rarely speaks directly of solidarity between the EU countries, rather he focuses
on the negative impact that a rejection of the post-2013 budget proposal will have on the
credibility of the Union. Credibility of the financial framework and of its management is cru-
cial to all member countries. The European Commission takes the responsibility of ensuring
all countries that the funding is transparent and used for the investments. Barroso warns that
the Commission “will be watching closely and reporting regularly through its scoreboard”.
Unlike the President of the Commission, Van Rompuy openly states that the debated finan-
cial framework is a “synthesis of solidity and solidarity”, although he does not make it clear
in his speech what solidity means and what makes the 2014-2020 budget stronger than the
previous one; in fact, one might think the opposite, namely that the next seven-year budget
is weaker than the 2007-2013 budget, given the fact that we witness an increase of only ap-
prox. 10% in the 2014-2020 budget, from almost 865 to 960 billion euros. As far as solidar-
ity is concerned, the President of the European Council expresses his concerns over the divide
between member states that also worried Martin Schulz. However, in addition to the already
perceived gap between wealthier and poorer member states, Van Rompuy also brings in the
increasingly worrying discrepancy between North and South.
86 Revista românã de comunicare ºi relaþii publice

“We should not characterize this process [the budget] as a fight between rich and poor, between North
and South. […] My proposal can, by the way, count on the support of a large number of countries even if
some Member States are not yet completely satisfied”. (November 27, 2012)

By the time this article was completed, the gap between North and South has deepened
even more once the announcement of the devastating consequences of the crisis in Cyprus has
been made. After intense and contradictory discussions within the EU, a bail-out plan to save
this country from bankruptcy has been approved. Nevertheless, the crisis in Cyprus has re-
vived the popular discontent and mistrust in the EU and the European leaders. The massive
cuts in public spending and the proposal of a tax rise affecting people’s savings from Cypriot
banks have triggered a strong negative public reaction. Cypriots have rejected the measures
imposed by the EU. The crisis in Cyprus has added to the general climate in the Union, which
becomes more and more destabilized by the growing discrepancies between the powerful core
(Germany, UK, the Scandinavian countries) and the weak periphery (Greece, Spain, Portugal
and now Cyprus). This difference is visible not only in terms of economic performance; it has
also been invoked more or less openly by EU leaders and officials in their public speeches, a
practice that we consider to be indicative of the divide between richer and poorer EU coun-
tries, and consequently, between high influential and less influential member states. This di-
vide has contributed to the polarized debate over the post-2013 budget where “austerity-minded
EU governments led by UK and Germany prevailed over freer-spending counterparts to se-
cure the first reduction in the bloc’s long-term budget” (Chaffin & Barker, 2013).
The prospects of a deeper gap between the EU countries worry the leaders of the most in-
fluent member states – France and Germany. In two speeches on the 2014-2020 budget, both
François Hollande and Angela Merkel underscore the importance of the member states’ will-
ingness to compromise over a mutually beneficial solution. However, the French President
seems to have a slightly different view on what compromise consists of than that of the Ger-
man Chancellor. Since France is arguably in an economically privileged position within the
EU, Hollande mainly addresses the need for solidarity, especially financial solidarity, within
the member states. He remarks that

“solidarity isn’t just a matter of transfer between European nations. […] Solidarity also means financial
instruments, through new resources, through the financial transaction tax, through everything that can
enable us to imagine the future together”. (February 5, 2013)

The President acknowledges that the future of the European project depends significant-
ly on the budget and the resources that the EU is able to pull in during these difficult times
for many of the European economies. Nevertheless, he believes that endless debates over the
collection and distribution of money within the EU and continuous negotiations aiming at
satisfying to a greater degree the requests of different EU countries may impact negatively
on the future of Europe.

“Beyond these budget choices isn’t a conception of Europe which is being debated, and I’m going to
tell you mine. Europe can’t make do with being a market, a budget, a currency – invaluable though these
instruments are. Nor can it be just a collection of treaties, a set of rules – necessary – for living together.
Nor can Europe be simply a sum of nations, with each one coming to get from the EU what’s useful for it,
and it alone. Europe – because this is its history, this is its destiny – is above all a political will, in other
words a commitment whereby everyone accepts the balance of rights and obligations, rules are respected
Requiem for European Solidarity. An Analysis of the European Discourse on the 2014-2020 … 87

and confidence creates solidarity – in other words, a project for which we can’t endlessly be discussing
rights we’re entitled to and calling everything into question at every stage”. (February 5, 2013)

Hollande reinforces the idea that Europe should revolve around a political project, and not
simply around an economic and financial one. The current economic downturn has made it
clear that a union such as the EU cannot provide the most appropriate response on time in
the absence of a politically supported decision-making process. Therefore, in addition to com-
plying with the EU rules and obligations, all member states need to show commitment to a
common European “destiny”. Equally important, it is necessary that the EU countries have
confidence in the European integration process and do not (publicly) display such a high de-
gree of suspicion towards one another. While, according to Hollande, “confidence creates
solidarity”, the economic turmoil has substantially eroded the EU solidarity. Basically, the
French President fears that questioning (to much) the EU budget is equivalent to questioning
the European project as such. Judging from the discussions over the financial framework and
their result, one may be inclined to think that Hollande is right.
The view on the post-2013 budget and on Europe’s future for that matter is rather differ-
ent when we turn our attention to the speech delivered by Angela Merkel to the German Par-
liament, at the end of February, after the European Council agreement on the budget. Certainly,
Germany is the largest net contributor to the UE budget and the most fervent supporter of aus-
terity measures to overcome the crisis, therefore, the agreed structure of a reduced budget
seems to quite fit its interests. The Chancellor states that

“we could not have sold this deal, if every European nation is forced to make economies, but not the
European Union itself”. (February 21, 2013)

This is how the Chancellor explains the cuts in EU budget. This may seem justifiable; if
countries are requested to cut spending, so should do Europe. But, if we look deeper into her
words, we might find that they are somehow contradictory to what Barroso and other EU of-
ficials have said: the EU budget is not a budget for covering public expenditures; it is a budg-
et for investments. However, if the budget is reduced, so are the investments, which lead to
a cruel truth: no investment, no growth. Without economic growth the EU is unlikely to safe-
ly weather the crisis, not to mention to emerge stronger. Of course, there are budget chapters
that provide explicitly for development, investments in energy and supporting the countries
in which youth unemployment is higher than 25%. The question is: will these provisions be
sufficient to help the EU get out of the crisis?
The German Chancellor also pleads for “better spending” within the Union. This “better
spending” is required especially form the countries that have been badly hit by the econom-
ic downturn. Merkel believes that once the budget is agreed upon, this “gives all member
states security and allows them to plan”. It is interesting that the Chancellor speaks of secu-
rity rather than solidarity. Although fully aware of Germany’s role as the strongest European
economy, she also admits that it is hard to create and foster solidarity between the “stronger
and the weaker”. To these bleak prospects of European solidarity adds some countries’ dis-
content with Germany’s full endorsement of austerity measures in the member states affect-
ed by the crisis.
In conclusion, it seems that the so-called “austerity-minded EU governments” (Chaffin &
Barker, 2013) have succeeded in better negotiating during the debates over the 2014-2020
budget. Undoubtedly, austerity has been a leitmotif of the reaction of the European politics to
88 Revista românã de comunicare ºi relaþii publice

the crisis. This measure has been almost exhaustedly applied in the Southern member states
in order to fight the serious financial and economic difficulties they were facing. However, al-
though austerity may be efficient in the states with excessive social expenditures, lack of aus-
terity is neither the main, nor the sole cause of the crisis. If profligacy had caused the crisis,
then austerity should have been the efficient solution to overcome it. In reality, this has not been
the case as recent developments in Eurozone countries’ effort to get out of the crisis have
shown. Austerity has not actually guided governments in planning the EU budget; austerity has
been frequently invoked in order to hide the real motivations for cuts in the budget. On the one
hand, a major reason for post-2013 budget reductions has to do with the national dimension
of its planning and implementation. Austerity, on the other hand, has been used to justify the
lack of sufficient efforts for development. Certainly, cutting spending is important, but it can-
not solely provide the way out of the crisis. At the same time, cuts in spending that are too se-
vere, which directly affect consumption, may block and delay economic recovery.

5. Conclusions

An applied analysis would make us discover that the economic stake revolving around the
EU’s budget is relatively low. Technically, this budget only represents 1% of the EU’s Gross
National Income. Thus, should we believe that 1% could revolutionize the European devel-
opment for the 2020 horizon? Of course not! If the negotiations are so inflamed is due to the
fact that Europe – or, at least, a certain part of it – is confronted with poverty. The MFF bil-
lions that may flow into an Eastern European country may literally mean a chance for sur-
vival for it. Just like The Economist put it, even though the economic stake of the EU Budget
is not so important, its symbolic stake is tremendously important. The annual value of the budg-
et is rather small; however, the seven years value is of almost 1 trillion euro. This is a very
significant amount of money.
The current crisis has shown that the only solution for a cohesive Europe is to organize it
according to federal principles. Of course, the federal recipe should be built on an organic sol-
idarity that emphasizes the complementarity and reciprocity among member-states. This sol-
idarity is virtually challenged during the current budgetary negotiations. In our view, the
process of ratifying the MFF 2014-2020 is emblematic for how national interests have pre-
vailed, have become more relevant even than any political or economic rationality. In this way,
the trend of re-nationalization of the political decisions, which has become very obvious dur-
ing the current crisis, has become triumphant. However, according to Calhoun (2007) such a
“shift” is not neutral. “It advantages some and disadvantages others. And that is in fact a cru-
cial reason for the continuing reproduction of nationalism, and a reason why caution is war-
ranted before suggesting that nationalist projects are inherently regressive and cosmopolitan
projects progressive.” (2007, p. 17).
The fact that the federal dimension of the EU has faded away is a clear thing and has been
suggested in at least two circumstances. First, a symbolical gesture: the Council’s final deci-
sion regarding the next MFF was very satisfactory for the United Kingdom, one of the coun-
tries that have repeatedly positioned itself against the federal Europe. Of course, the UK could
not have decided on its own to reduce the EU Budget. Its decision was supported by the “net
contributors”, such as Germany. Could we say that this victory belongs to the “net contribu-
tors”? Undoubtedly, this is a defeat of the federal idea. Also, we could refer to a collateral
Requiem for European Solidarity. An Analysis of the European Discourse on the 2014-2020 … 89

victory, which is the victory of Eurosceptics. The MFF 2014-2020 is a money-related issue,
one may argue. The UK and the Northern states have simply wanted to reduce their contri-
butions. But what is the price for this? Even though a smaller contribution might grant short-
term advantages to contributors, it will certainly bring a big disadvantage for the Union and
its long-term development. The negotiations revolving around the MFF highlighted a criti-
cal aspect, which may impact upon the European project: the explicit desertion of the Euro-
pean solidarity and, at the same time, the tacit abandonment of the federal idea or, at least, a
postponement of its materialization.

Rezumat: In aceastã lucrare, analizãm discursurile oficiale ale Preºedintelui Comisiei Europene, Preºed-
intelui Parlamentului European, Preºedintelui Consuliului European, Preºedintelui Franþei ºi al Cancelaru-
lui Germaniei cu privire la bugetul 2014-2020 al Uniunii Europene. Am folosit analiza textual pentru a
investiga temele ºi categoriile de sens care apar în texte, precum ºi modul în care aceste teme ºi categorii
sunt construite discursive pentru a transmite o anumitã abordare asupra bugetului Uniunii, dar ºi asupra vi-
itorului proiectului European. În demersul nostru, am pornit de la premisa cã existã o prãpastie între discurs
ºi acþiune în Uniunea Europeanã ºi cã aceast clivaj de credibilitate poate amplifica problemele financiare,
economice ºi politice ale Uniunii.
Cuvinte-cheie: solidariate europeanã; criza euro; cadrul financiar multianual; discursul despre UE.

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