Transglobal Maritime Agency, Inc. vs. Vicente D. Chua, Jr.

G.R. No. 222430, August 30, 2017

Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA, which set
aside the decision of the NLRC and LA, finding the petitioner Transglobal Maritime Agency
(Transglobal) liable for illegal dismissal of respondent Vicente Chua (Chua).
Transglobal hired respondent Chua as a seaman for a nine (9)-month duty on board a
vessel. While at a port in Taiwan, Chua and his four (4) companions left the vessel. Upon their
return, their captain was infuriated in view of their tardiness. The latter served them with a
reprimand letter for misbehaving and arguing with a chief officer in the captain’s presence. They
refused to sign the letter since it allegedly contained false statements. They were dismissed as a
result thereof. Hence, Chua filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Transglobal alleges that Chua’s unwarranted refusal to sign the reprimand letter in violation
of his captain’s order constitute insubordination which is a ground for dismissal. Chua alleges that
his refusal to sign the same was justified due to the false statements contained therein.
ISSUE:
Is the refusal to sign a written reprimand by a seaman sufficient to justify dismissal by
insubordination?
RULING:
No. Refusal to sign a written reprimand by a seaman is not sufficient to justify dismissal.
According to the case of Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Avestruz, Insubordination or
willful disobedience, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the
concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful,
that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have
been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he
had been engaged to discharge.
Chua is bound to obey lawful commands of the captain of the ship, but only as long as
these pertain to his duties. There is no relevance to the order to sign the documents in Chua’s
performance of his duty as a seaman. The pieces of evidence presented are insufficient to
establish that Chua's refusal was characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude
rendering his act inconsistent with proper subordination. Chua had explained that he refused to
sign the written reprimand for he maintained that the same contained falsehoods. Dismissal is too
harsh a penalty to be imposed due to Chua's supposed disobedience.
Therefore, a seaman is bound to obey lawful commands of the captain of the ship but only
as long as these pertains to his duties; signing a written reprimand is not one of these duties.
76 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
MISCONDUCT IMPLIES WRONGFUL INTENT AND NOT MERE ERROR IN
JUDGMENT
Fabricator Philippines, Inc. vs. Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas
G.R. No. 224308-09; September 27, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on Certiorari are the decision and resolution of the CA
which affirmed the rulings of the NLRC and LA that petitioner Fabricator Philippines, Inc.
(petitioner) illegally dismissed respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas. Petitioner Fabricator
Philippines Inc. (FPI), domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of motorcycle
parts, hired Estolas as a welder.
While waiting for a replacement part during work, Estolas took a seat and rested. A co
employee, Rosario Banayad, saw her and reported the matter. Thereafter, verbal confrontations
ensued between Estolas and Banayad in front of a superior, Warlito Abaya. As a result of the
incident, FPI President Victor Lim talked to Estolas and suspended her for three days. A few
months later, Lim told Estolas to resign and instructed her not to report for work. Since Estolas
refused, she was served a notice of termination finding her guilty of serious misconduct.
In her complaint, Estolas claimed that she was illegally dismissed. For their part, petitioner
and Lim maintained that respondent was validly dismissed for gross misconduct, as she was
caught sitting down during office hours and she insulted and uttered offensive language towards
her superior, Banayad.
ISSUE:
Was the misconduct serious and willful to warrant the dismissal from work?
RULING:
No. The misconduct was not serious nor willful and intentional in character.
Article 297 of the Labor Code, as amended, lists serious misconduct as one of the just
causes for an employee's dismissal from work. Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong
conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.
To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning of the foregoing provision,
the following elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee's duties, showing that the employee has become unfit to continue
working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.
In this case, while respondent indeed committed some sort of misconduct when she
engaged in a verbal tussle with Banayad during work hours and in front of their superior, Abaya,
the same was not serious enough to warrant respondent's dismissal. Neither was it shown that
respondent performed such act of misconduct with wrongful intent nor did the same render her
unfit to continue working for petitioner. Respondent could not have been validly terminated from
work.
Thus, Estolas was illegally dismissed.
| 77COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
THE EMPLOYER’S SUBSEQUENT ACT OF HIRING ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE TERMINATION ON THE GROUND OF REDUNDANCY
FOR
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE FOURTH REQUIREMENT IMPOSED BY LAW
San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 200499, October 4, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank and File Union (SACORU) filed a petition for
review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA).
The CA affirmed the dismissal of SACORU's complaint against respondent Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) for unfair labor practice and declared the dismissal of 27
members of SACORU for redundancy as valid. Twenty-seven rank and file workers of Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (CCBPI) were issued with a notice of termination on the ground of
redundancy due to the ceding out of two selling and distribution systems. The affected employees
were members of the San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-file Union (SACORU). The employees
were no longer required to report for work even before the effectivity of the termination. SACORU
filed a Notice of Strike due to the diminution of the union membership amounting to union busting
and to a violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) provision as a result of the selling
and distribution systems. On their part, CCBPI alleged that the new scheme adopted is an exercise
of management prerogative. The strikes and any concerted actions were enjoined by the Secretary
of Labor who issued a return to work order.
The NLRC dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice and declared as valid the
dismissal of the employees due to redundancy. This decision was adopted by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is there a valid implementation of the redundancy program?
RULING:
Yes. There is a valid implementation of the redundancy program.
According to the case of Asian Alcohol Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, for
there to be a valid implementation of a redundancy program, the following should be present: (1)
written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at
least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) payment of separation pay
equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria
in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.
The termination was due to the scheme adopted and implemented by respondent company
in distributing and selling its products, to reach consumers at greater length with greater profits,
through MEPs or dealership system. The adoption of the scheme is basically a management
prerogative and even if it caused the termination of twenty-seven regular employees, it was not in
violation of their right to self-organization nor in violation of their right to security of tenure because
the essential freedom to manage the business remains with management.
78 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
REQUISITES FOR A VALID IMPLEMENTATION OF A REDUNDANCY PROGRAM
MUST
BE COMPLIED WITH
Abbott Laboratories (Philippines), Inc vs. Manuel F. Torralba
G.R. No. 229746; October 11, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari to reverse the rulings which held that petitioner’s
redundancy program was invalid, and that respondents were illegally dismissed from employment.
Respondents Roselle P. Almazar, Redel Ulysses M. Navarro and Manuel F. Torralba were
employed by Abbott in the PediaSure Division. However, the positions of the respondents were
declared redundant when the PediaSure Division and its Medical Nutrition Division were merged
into one. This resulted in the termination of the respondents who were subsequently offered
another position. The offer was denied by the respondents. Respondents signed a Quitclaim after
receiving the amounts offered by Abbott.
A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by respondents arguing that no fair criteria was
utilized in determining who among the employees are redundant. Abbott argued that respondents
were terminated for an authorized cause.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) held that respondents were illegally dismissed due to Abbott’s
failure to overcome the burden of proving the validity of redundancy. The NLRC agreed with the
LA’s decision but ruled that the quitclaim precluded respondents from claiming that there was
illegal dismissal. On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the NLRC ruling that as the ground
for termination of employment was illegal, the deeds signed by respondents could not also be valid.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is there a valid implementation of the redundancy program?
RULING:
No. There was no valid implementation of the redundancy program.
As stated in General Milling Corporation v. Viajar, the burden of proving that the dismissal
of the employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer. Failure to discharge
this duty would mean that the dismissal is illegal. Redundancy exists where the services of an
employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirement of the
enterprise. For there to be a valid implementation of a redundancy program, the following should
be present: (1) written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) payment of
separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair and
reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly
abolished.
Petitioner failed to establish compliance with the fourth requirement since Abbott did not
gauge the redundant employees against the preference criteria of status, efficiency, and
proficiency. Furthermore, the offer for job openings for the position of district sales manager puts
a cloud on the wisdom and validity of the redundancy program as the essence of redundancy is
that the existing manpower exceeds more than what is necessary in their operation. It is
questionable why they opened new jobs for sales manager.
Thus, as the ground for termination of employment was illegal, the quitclaims are deemed
illegal as the employees’ consent had been vitiated by mistake or fraud.
| 79COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE ENJOYS LIMITED SECURITY OF TENURE AND
CANNOT
BE TERMINATED EXCEPT FOR JUST AND AUTHORIZED CAUSES
De La Salle Araneta University, Inc. vs. Dr. Eloisa G. Magdurulang
G.R. No.224319; November 20, 2017
Perlas–Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari which seeks to reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which modified the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
that ordered Petitioner De La Salle Araneta University (De La Salle) to pay respondent Dr. Eloisa
Magdurulang (Dr. Eloisa) backwages and pro-rated 13th month pay.
It was alleged that De la Salle hired her as part time faculty member for the 2nd semester
of 2008 and summer semester of the same year. She was then appointed as a full-time faculty
member for year 2008–2009. During the pendency of her contract for 2009 to 2010, the University’s
acting Dean recommended to the University President that Dr. Eloisa be given a permanent status.
The University President, instead of extending the same, issued a re-appointment to Dr. Eloisa as
full-time faculty member with a reclassified ranking of Asst. Professor 4 and on a contractual basis
for the reason that Dr. Eloisa cannot be extended a permanent appointment as she has yet to
finish the probationary period of six months as required under the university’s personnel handbook.
Dr. Eloisa then filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and claims that despite her
reappointment, she was not given any academic load and her academic administrative position
was also discontinued. She also insisted that since she had already been teaching for three (3)
years, she already attained the status of a regular employee. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint ruling that since Dr. Eloisa has not held a full-time academic teaching position for a
period of six (6) consecutive semesters or nine (9) straight trimesters, she is not eligible for such
appointment. NLRC reversed the decision and declared that Dr. Eloisa have been constructively
dismissed and ordered her reinstatement and payment of full back wages. CA ruled that Dr. Eloisa
is not eligible for permanent appointment. It also modified the NLRC ruling deleting the
reinstatement and ordered the payment of backwages for three semesters.
ISSUE:
Is the respondent eligible for permanent appointment even though she has yet to finish the
probationary period?
RULING:
No. She is not eligible for permanent appointment.
Art. 296 of the Labor Code sets a maximum allowable period of not more than 6 months
within which the employee may be subjected to a probationary period. However, the probationary
period of employment for academic personnel shall be governed by the standards established by
the DEPED and CHED, as the case may be.
As stated under 2010 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools in Basic Education, for
an academic personnel to acquire permanent employment status, it is required that an employee
must be full time, completed the probationary period and his service must be satisfactory.
Respondent failed to comply with the 2nd requisite. However, as a probationary employee,
respondent still enjoys limited security of tenure and cannot be dismissed except for just and
authorized causes.
Hence, De la Salle’s act of depriving her of teaching loads and academic administrative
functions constitute constructive dismissal.
80 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS; PREREQUISITE TO
LAWFUL
DISMISSAL
Marie Vilma G. Doctor and Jaime Lao, Jr. vs. NII Enterprises and/or Mrs. Nilda C. Ignacio
G.R. No. 194001; November 22, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the CA, petitioners Maria Vilma
G. Doctor (Doctor) and Jaime Lao, Jr. (Lao) assailed the decision of the CA, which reversed the
decision of the NLRC and LA, dismissing petitioners’ complaint for illegal dismissal against
respondent NII Enterprises.
NII Enterprises is a sole proprietorship owned by Nilda Ignacio (Ignacio), engaged in the
business of providing car air-conditioning (aircon) services. It hired Doctor as a clerk and Lao as
an aircon technician. Respondent Ignacio and Doctor had a serious argument. This prompted
Doctor, accompanied by Lao who was then engaged to be married to her, to file a complaint for
slander and threat against Ignacio at Makati City. Since efforts to amicably resolve the dispute
failed, the barangay issued a Certification to File Action and petitioners filed a case for illegal
dismissal before the NLRC.
Doctor and Lao alleged that they were illegally dismissed as they were barred from
reporting to their former positions or employment without any valid reason. Respondents countered
that after the heated altercation, Doctor no longer reported for work and Lao similarly absented
himself from work without prior leave.
ISSUE:
Does absence without prior leave constitute abandonment of work?
RULING:
No. Petitioners cannot be deemed to have abandoned their work simply because they had
been absent the days following the heated altercation.
As stated in Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries Inc., mere absence or failure to report for work
is not tantamount to abandonment of work. Before the employer must bear the burden of proving
that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of
his dismissal from service. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality
or illegality thereof.
Respondents failed to present any proof of petitioners’ overt acts which manifest the latter’s
clear intention to terminate their employment. In addition, petitioners’ filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, for employees who take steps to protest
their dismissal cannot, by logic, be said to have abandoned their work. Since the fact of dismissal
had not been satisfactorily established by petitioners, then the burden of proving that the dismissal
was legal, i.e., that it was for just and authorized cause/s and in accordance with due process, did
not shift to the respondents. Also, petitioners could not be deemed to have abandoned their work
by merely being absent and without clear intention of severing the employer-employee
relationship.
Thus, there being no dismissal and no abandonment, the appropriate course of action is
to reinstate the employee/s.
| 81COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
TOTALITY OF INFRACTIONS IS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINATION OF
SANCTIONS AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE
Ricardo G. Sy and Henry B. Alix vs. Neat, Inc., Banana Peel and Paul Vincent Ng
G.R. No. 213748; November 27, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the CA, petitioners Ricardo Sy
(Sy) and Henry Alix (Alix) assail the decision of the CA finding Sy and Alix terminated from
employment for just causes.
Neat, Inc. is a corporation and the owner/distributor of rubber slippers known as “Banana
Peel,” while Paul Vincent Ng is its President and Chief Executive Officer. Sy was hired as a
company driver and Alix was hired as a delivery helper/utility. In order to avoid confrontation with
a fellow employee, Sy assigned to himself a new delivery utility. On the other hand, Alix was tasked
to assist a newly-hired clerk. After doing so, he sat down for a while which Respondent Ng saw
and thought Alix was doing nothing during working hours. Both were informed that they would be
suspended for three (3) days and were thereafter dismissed. Petitioners Sy and Alix then filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims.
Both Sy and Alix alleged that they were illegally dismissed. Respondents countered that
during the period that petitioners were employed, they were both problem employees.
Respondents contended that because of petitioners’ continued and repeated commission of
various offenses and violations of company rules and regulations, they were terminated for a just
cause. Sy was the recipient of numerous disciplinary actions including three (3) counts of wearing
of improper uniform, one count of insubordination and another of poor performance evaluation.
Alix was similarly disciplined for two (2) offenses of poor performance evaluation, two of wasting
time, improper uniform, frequent tardiness, and negligence in work.
ISSUE:
Is the dismissal based on totality of infractions a just cause for dismissal?
RULING:
Yes. Dismissal based on totality of infractions is a just cause for dismissal.
In determining the sanction imposable on an employee, the employer may consider the
former’s past misconduct and previous infractions. As stated in Merin v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., the totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the
period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring
employee.
Habitual tardiness alone, is a just cause for termination of Alix’s employment. Having in
mind the work productivity-related infractions he incurred in a span of five (5) months consisting of
habitual tardiness, two (2) warnings for wasting time during working hours and two (2) more
warnings for poor performance evaluation, the respondents have a just cause to terminate Alix’s
employment. However, the entirety of the violations imputed against Sy shows that respondents
failed to prove with substantial evidence that the totality of infractions committed by him constitutes
as a just cause for his dismissal under the Labor Code. Sy’s insubordination of changing his
delivery utility without permission from the operations manager is no doubt a misconduct, but not
a serious and willful one as to cost him his livelihood.
Therefore, Alix was validly dismissed but Sy was dismissed without just cause and due
process.
82 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
BONA FIDE CESSATION OF BUSINESS OR OPERATIONS AN AUTHORIZED
CAUSE FOR
DISMISSAL
Veterans Federation of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Montenejo, et al.
G.R. No. 184819; November 29, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the CA, petitioner Veteran’s
Federation of the Philippines (VFP) assails the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the
NLRC, which reversed and set aside the decision of LA, finding respondents Eduardo Montenejo,
Mylene M. Bonifacio, Evangeline E. Valverde, and Deana N. Pagal (Montenejo, et al.) illegally
dismissed.
Pursuant to a management agreement entered by the VFP and VFP Management and
Development Corporation (VMDC), respondents Montenejo et al. were hired by VMDC as its own
personnel. The term of the management agreement between VPF and VMDC was extended to
two years. It was again extended albeit only on a month-to-month basis. VFP board passed a
resolution terminating the management agreement. The President of VMDC issued a
memorandum informing the company’s employees of the termination of their services. VMDC
dismissed all its employees and paid each his or her separation pay.
Montenejo, et al. alleged that their dismissals had been effected without cause and
observance of due process. VMDC countered that the dismissals were valid as they were due to
an authorized cause, the cessation or closure of its business.
ISSUE:
Is cessation of business or operations an authorized cause for dismissal?
RULING:
Yes. Cessation of business or operations is an authorized cause for dismissal.
One of the authorized causes for dismissal recognized under the Labor Code is the bona
fide cessation of business or operations by the employer. Article 298 of the Labor Code explicitly
sanctions terminations due to the employer’s cessation of business or operations as long as the
cessation is bona fide or is not made for the purpose of circumventing the employee’s right to
security of tenure.
Montenejo, et. al were dismissed as a result of the closure of VMDC. VMDC’s closure,
qualifies as a bona fide cessation of operations or business as contemplated under Article 298 of
the Labor Code. The acts of VMDC in relinquishing all properties required for its operations and in
dismissing its entire workforce would have indubitably compromised its ability to continue on with
its operations and are, thus, the practical equivalents of a business closure.
Hence, the closure of VMDC had been established and the validity of the closure of VMDC
necessarily validates the dismissals of Montenejo, et al. that resulted therefrom.
| 83COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
MISCONDUCT IS SUFFICIENT FOR DISMISSAL OF A CASHIER ON THE GROUND
OF
LOSS OF CONFIDENCE
Grace R. Aluag vs. BIR Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Norma L. Lipana and Estelita V. Datu
G.R. No. 228449; December 06, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the CA, petitioner Grace Aluag
(Aluag) assails the decision of the CA, reversing the decision of the NLRC and reinstating the
Labor Arbiter’s decision, finding respondent BIR Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BIRMPC) not liable
for illegal dismissal.
BIRMPC employed Aluag as cashier. Initially, she was tasked to give only verbal weekly
reports on BIRMPC’S funds until she was required to put them into writing. BIRMPC’s loan
processors started accepting post-dated checks with the prior approval of the general manger,
who then was Gerardo Flores. She submitted a report of bounced checks and deposited the
remaining checks in her possession. BIRMPC’s Board of Directors sent a letter to Aluag ten (10)
days before she gave birth, temporarily relieving her from her position pending an investigation
against her and two (2) loan processors involving suspicious loans. She then went on a maternity
leave and during which period, she received another letter from BIRMPC preventively suspending
her. Aluag filed a complaint for illegal suspension before the NRLC. She then received another
letter terminating her employment. BIRMPC terminated Aluag's employment for the following
infractions: (a) acceptance of accommodation checks; (b) failure to deposit checks on due dates,
pursuant to a member/debtor's request; (c) not reporting to the manager those checks with no
sufficient funds or which accounts had already closed; and (d) failure to act upon returned checks.
Thus, Aluag amended her complaint from illegal suspension to illegal dismissal.
Aluag claims that she was illegally dismissed. BIRMPC countered that Aluag was legally
dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence as they found her infractions substantially
contributed damages to BIRMPC’s financial position.
ISSUE:
Are the perceived infractions sufficient to warrant dismissal on the ground of loss of trust
and confidence?
RULING:
Yes, the perceived infractions are sufficient to warrant dismissal on the ground of loss of
trust and confidence.
As stated in Cañeda v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., in dismissing a cashier on the ground of
loss of confidence, it is sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has a
reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct, thus making
her unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in her. If there is sufficient evidence showing that
the employer has ample reason to dismiss her, labor tribunals should not deny the employer the
authority to dismiss her from employment.
Being a cashier charged with the collection of remittances and payments, Aluag
undoubtedly occupied a position of trust and confidence. Notably, in holding a position requiring
full trust and confidence, Aluag gave up some of the rigid guarantees available to ordinary
employees. Her failure to deposit the checks on their due dates means that she failed to deliver
on her task to safeguard BIRMPC’s finances.
Thus, BIRMPC had just cause for Aluag’s dismissal.
84 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
STRAINED RELATIONSHIP MAY BE INVOKED ONLY AGAINST EMPLOYEES
WHOSE
POSITIONS DEMAND TRUST AND CONFIDENCE, OR WHOSE DIFFERENCES
WITH
THEIR EMPLOYER ARE OF SUCH NATURE OR DEGREE AS TO PRECLUDE
REINSTATEMENT
Advan Motor, Inc. vs. Victoriano G. Veneracion
G.R. No. 190944; December 13, 2017
Leonardo- De Castro, J.
FACTS:
In a petition under Rule 45, petitioner Advan Motor, Inc. challenges the decision of the CA,
which affirmed and modified the NLRC and LA’s finding of illegal dismissal. Respondent filed an
amended complaint for actual illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries/wages with damages,
attorney's fees, and a prayer for reinstatement and payment of full backwages.
Respondent Victor G. Veneracion works for petitioner’s business of selling and repairing
cars as Sales Consultant. In a letter dated May 21, 2001, he was informed of the termination of his
services "effective May 2, 2001 for the reason of repeated AWOL violations for more than six
consecutive days and management's loss of trust and confidence in you for your repeated
abandonment of your office duties and responsibilities." Aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal.
In his defense, petitioner contended that respondent was oftentimes absent or tardy and
failed to meet his sales quota of three (3) cars a month; that he went on an unannounced leave
and, later, by just handing to the security guard his request for vacation leave; that he informed the
Personnel Officer that he would no longer report for work, prompting management to issue a notice
of termination on May 21, 2001. Petitioner argues that the order of reinstatement is not proper
when the position occupied is one vested with trust and confidence. Petitioner alleges that it placed
a high level of trust and confidence to the respondent as a Sales Consultant.
ISSUE:
Is respondent’s reinstatement not proper as his position is vested with complete trust and
confidence, applying the doctrine of strained relationship
RULING:
No. Respondent’s reinstatement is proper as his position is not vested with complete trust
and confidence.
The Court found that the CA correctly ruled in favor of reinstatement and agreed with the
reasoning that respondent is a mere car sales agent/sales consultant whose function is precisely
to sell cars for the company. Said position is clearly not vested with complete trust and confidence
from the employer as compared to, for example, a managerial employee. In Dimabayao v. National
Labor Relations Commission, the Court had occasion to state that strained relationship may be
invoked only against employees whose positions demand trust and confidence, or whose
differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement.
The CA pointed as significant that "strained relationship" is a question of fact. Petitioner
did not allege in its position paper that it could no longer employ respondent because of "strained
relationship. The doctrine of strained relations should not be used recklessly or applied loosely nor
be based on impression alone" so as to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his means of
livelihood and deny him reinstatement. Reinstatement is proper in this case under Article 294 of
the Labor Code (Security of Tenure).
Thus, respondent was unjustly dismissed from work and is entitled to an award of
backwages and to reinstatement.
| 85COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
THE WILLFULL BREACH BY THE EMPLOYEE OF THE TRUST REPOSED IN HIM
BY HIS
EMPLOYER OR THE LATTER’S AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE IS A JUST
CAUSE
FOR DISMISSAL
Digitel Telecommunications Phils., Inc./ John Gokongwei, Jr. vs. Neilson M. Ayapana
G.R. No. 195614; January 10, 2018
Martires, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on Certiorari, petitioner Digitel Telecommunications, Phil., Inc.
(Digitel) assails the decision of the CA affirming the NLRC’s ruling, which reversed and set aside
that of the LA, finding that respondent Neilson M. Ayapana to have been illegally dismissed.
Petitioner hired respondent as Key Accounts Manager in the areas of Quezon,
Marinduque, and Laguna provinces. Respondent was tasked to offer and sell Digitel's foreign
exchange (FEX) line. Respondent successfully offered two FEX lines to Estela Lim (Lim).
Respondent received P7,000 but did not remit the amount to petitioner. Upon verification by
petitioner’s customer representative, it was found out that there was no existing application for two
(2) FEX lines for Lim. Respondent was ordered to refund the said amount to the client.
Petitioner issued a Notice to Explain to respondent, asking him: why he offered an
inexistent FEX line; why he did not immediately remit the proceeds of the transaction; and why he
retained the subject amount. Respondent submitted a written response where he explained that
he was not aware of the unavailability of the Atimonan line at the time he offered it to Lim; that he
retrieved the official receipts to avoid explaining the late remittance to the treasury department
because, at the time, Lim was still undecided whether to take up respondent's alternative offer of
subscribing to a FEX line in Lucena until such time that an Atimonan line could become available;
and that he made several attempts to return the amount but to no avail.
After the administrative hearing, petitioner issued a Notice of Dismissal finding respondent
guilty of "breach by the employee of the trust and confidence reposed in him under petitioner's
disciplinary rules, which merited dismissal for the first offense. Aggrieved, respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE:
Was respondent validly dismissed for his alleged breach of the trust and confidence?
RULING:
Yes. Respondent was validly dismissed for his alleged breach of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by management or by a company representative.
A perusal of the notice of dismissal shows that the ground relied upon was the breach of
the trust and confidence reposed in respondent by the company. As provided in Martinez v. Central
Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc., the willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or the latter's duly authorized representative is a just cause for dismissal.
However, the validity of a dismissal based on this ground is premised upon the concurrence of
these conditions: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence;
and (2) there must be a willful act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.
The first requisite is certainly present. It is not disputed that respondent was tasked to
solicit subscribers for petitioner's FEX line and, in the course thereof, collect money for
subscriptions and issue official receipts therefor. Being involved in the handling of the company's
funds, respondent undeniably occupies a position of trust and confidence. The records likewise
reveal that the second requisite is present. It is uncontroverted that respondent took part in a series
of irregularities relative to his transaction with Lim.
Hence, respondent was validly dismissed for breach of trust and confidence.
86 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
AN EMPLOYEE’S DISGRACEFUL AND IMMORAL CONDUCT WARRANTS
DISMISSAL
FROM SERVICE
Jovita B. Lamsis vs. Jude F. Sales
A.M No. P-17-3772; January 10, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
For resolution is a complaint filed by Jovita B. Lamsis (Jovita) against respondent Jude F.
Sales, Sr. (Jude), process server of Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC)
for Sexual Harassment under R.A. 7877, which was forwarded to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by Executive Judge Danilo P. Camacho (Judge Camacho).
Jovita works as a janitress in the Hall of Justice in Benguet. During her Saturday duty and
while she was at the 2nd floor of the Hall of Justice, Jude walked towards her while holding his
private organ and showed it to her. She then filed a complaint for sexual harassment under R.A.
7877 and prayed for the preventive suspension of Jude pending the investigation. Jude on the
other hand denied such allegations and he asserted that Jovita only filed the complaint after he
filed a complaint against her for several offenses.
The OCA dismissed the complaint and referred it to the Committee on Decorum and
Investigation (CODI). CODI dismissed the complaint for sexual harassment without prejudice to
him being charged of disgraceful and immoral conduct noting that Jude had also been convicted
of Unjust Vexation for the same act. It ruled that Jude cannot be held liable for sexual harassment
since he does not have moral ascendency over Jovita which is a critical element of the crime. OCA
affirmed the CODI’s decision and ordered that Jude be dismissed from the service.
ISSUE:
Is respondent’s act of holding his private parts and showing it to Jovita a disgraceful and
immoral conduct as to warrant his dismissal from service where this is his second offense for such
conduct?
RULING:
Yes, Jude is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct. The court agrees with the findings
of the OCA and CODI and considering that this is his second infraction of the same nature, he
should be dismissed from the service.
Immoral conduct has been defined as a conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless,
showing moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community
and includes conduct consistent with rectitude or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and
dissoluteness. Section 1 of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No 15, Series of
2010 defines disgraceful and immoral conduct as a willful act that violates the basic norm of
decency, morality and decorum abhorred and condemned by society.
In this case, the court agrees with OCA’s findings that respondent deliberately exposed his
private organ to Jovita and exhibited gross sexual innuendo which are well supported by records.
What made matters worse for respondent is the fact that this is his second offense of the same
nature.
Therefore, Jude is dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits,
except accrued leave benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of the
government.
| 87COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
REDUNDANCY EXISTS WHEN SERVICE CAPABILITY WORK FORCE IS IN
EXCESS OF
WHAT IS REASONABLY NEEDED TO MEET DEMANDS OF ENTERPRISE
American Power Conversion Corporation, et al. vs. Jayson Yu Lim
G.R. No. 214291; January 11, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the CA which set
aside the decision and resolution of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the LA which ruled
that the termination of the respondent was unlawful.
Respondent Jason Lim (Lim) was the Regional Manager of petitioner American Power
Conversion Corporation (APCC). He was terminated by petitioner when he refused to resign. The
letter of termination did not specify any reason why he was being fired from work. Thereafter, he
was informed by General Manager Kong of the supposed company restructuring which rendered
his position as regional manager redundant.
Lim filed a case for illegal dismissal against the petitioners. He claimed that he was illegally
dismissed by petitioners using a fabricated and contrived restructuring/reorganization/redundancy
program, and that in effecting the redundancy program, petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements laid down by the Labor Code. On the other hand, petitioners claimed that there was
a need to abolish the position of respondent and that in effecting the redundancy program, they
complied with the requirement of law.
ISSUE:
Was respondent Lim validly dismissed on the ground of redundancy?
RULING:
No. Lim was invalidly dismissed as the ground of redundancy was not proven.
As provided by Article 283 of the Labor Code, redundancy exists when the service
capability of the work force is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the
enterprise. A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors, such as
over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product line
previously manufactured by the company, or phasing out of a service activity previously
undertaken by the business. Redundancy may be proven by a new staffing pattern, feasibility
studies/proposal on the viability of newly created positions, job description and approval by the
management of the restructuring.
The SC affirmed the ruling of the LA. It was found by the LA that the petitioner did not
present any of the foregoing evidence to establish the supposed restructuring and/or redundancy.
There was also no evidence showing the approval of the said restructuring and/or redundancy by
the directors and officers of petitioner. In the absence of a clear showing of redundancy, the
assertion that petitioner thru the initiative of Kong was motivated to dismiss Lim from the company
because of Kong’s report on the former's violations of the APCC's Code of Ethics was given
credence by the SC. Evidently, the termination of complainant was not due to redundancy but a
retaliatory action in the guise of redundancy for purposes of dismissing the complainant from the
service. It may be true that the investigation was conducted on the reported breach of Code of
Ethics, the lack of transparency on the results thereof prevented the SC from giving credence to
said assertion. The said action is clearly an exercise of management prerogative in bad faith.
Hence, petitioner’s dismissal was invalid.
88 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
SALE OF THE VESSEL IS NOT A VALID CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL
Wilfredo Asayas vs. Sea Power Shipping Enterprises Inc., and/or Avin International S.A.,
and/or Antoniette Guerrero
G.R. No. 201792; January 24, 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The present case seeks the reversal of the decision of CA which nullified and set aside the
decision of the NLRC affirming the decision of the LA finding that herein petitioner Wilfredo Asayas
was illegally dismissed from employment.
Petitioner was employed by respondent Sea Power Shipping Enterprise as Third Officer
on board the M/T Samaria, owned by Avin International SA. Prior to the expiration of petitioner’s
contact, the vessel was sold to the Swiss Singapore Overseas Enterprise, Pte. Ltd. As a result,
respondent assigned him to another vessel, M/T Platinum, to which he was not ultimately deployed
but was engaged to work as a Second Mate on board the M/T Kriti Akti. However, the same was
also sold and he was no longer deployed to any other vessel.
Petitioner complained with the POEA demanding the full payment of his employment
contract. His claim was settled through a compromise agreement with quitclaim, pursuant to which
he received separation pay after deducting his cash advances. Two months later, petitioner filed
a complaint with the LA against the respondents for alleged illegal dismissal. Respondents contend
that petitioner was not illegally dismissed considering that the POEA Standard Contract permitted
the termination of his employment on account of the sale of the vessel.
ISSUE:
Was the sale of the vessel a valid cause for dismissal?
RULING:
No, the sale of the vessel is not a valid cause for dismissal.
The LA and the NLRC both declared that the termination of the petitioner's employment is
illegal and violated Section 23 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment
of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels which states: Where the vessel is sold, laid
up, or the voyage is discontinued necessitating the termination of employment before the date
indicated in the Contract, the seafarer shall be entitled to earned wages, repatriation at employer's
cost and one (1) month basic wage as termination pay, unless arrangements have been made for
the seafarer to join another vessel belonging to the same principal to complete his contract which
case the seafarer shall be entitled to basic wages until the date of joining the other vessel.
Hence, employment of petitioner was illegally terminated and petitioner is entitled to the
payment of salaries for the remaining unexpired portion of his employment contract.
| 89COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE MUST BE BASED ON WILLFUL BREACH
Lourdes School Quezon City, Inc. vs. Luz V. Garcia
G.R. No. 213128; February 7, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to set aside the
decision of CA which reversed the NLRC and LA decision and declared the dismissal of
respondent Luz Garcia (Garcia) as illegal, and consequently, ordering petitioner Lourdes School
Quezon City (LSQC) to pay Garcia separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
Garcia was the Chief Accountant and Head of the Accounting Office of LSQC. In
September 2010, a Memorandum was issued by Fr. Cesar Acuin (Fr. Acuin), Rector of LSQC,
creating two committees to investigate possible irregularities in the purchase of notebook and sale
of textbooks. Thereafter, Fr. Antonio Ala (Fr. Ala), Treasurer of LSQC, instructed Garcia to turn
over all the money and other financial resources of the school to which Garcia immediately
complied with. Both committees then recommended the termination of employment of Garcia on
the ground of breach of trust and confidence through gross and habitual neglect of duty. After the
hearing held by another fact-finding committee, it found that Garcia knowingly misled the School
Treasurer and allowed the massive theft in the sale of textbooks and recommended her dismissal.
Fr. Acuin agreed and in his letter dated April 14, 2011, Garcia was terminated from employment.
Thereafter, Garcia filed a case for illegal dismissal and damages against LSQC, Fr. Acuin, Fr. Ala,
and the committee.
Petitioner contends that Garcia knew exactly how much the inventory of notebooks at any
given time and yet they repeatedly gave false information to Fr. Ala in order to manipulate its
purchase in favor of a supplier. Garcia countered that she discovered the excessive supply of
notebooks and had its delivery stopped and it was Fr. Ala and Angelito Salas who were responsible
for the purchase of said notebooks.
ISSUE:
Was respondent’s negligence a valid cause for dismissal based on loss of trust and
confidence?
RULING:
No. The respondent’s negligence is not a valid cause for dismissal based on loss of trust
and confidence.
The loss of trust and confidence must be based not on ordinary breach but, in the language
of Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, on willful breach. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse. In termination cases, the burden of proving
that the dismissal of the employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer.
In this case, the evidence submitted failed to establish that Garcia had malice aforethought
at the time the alleged oversupply of notebooks and theft in the textbook sale were being
committed. Although the Court agrees with petitioner that Garcia was somehow remiss in her
duties as Chief Accountant of LSQC, nevertheless, for lack of malicious intent or fraud, her
negligence or carelessness is not a justifiable ground to impose the ultimate penalty of dismissal
from employment.
Hence, the dismissal of Garcia is not valid.
90 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
NEGLECT OF DUTY MUST BE GROSS AND HABITUAL
Josephine A. Casco vs. National Labor Relations Commission and/or Thelma N. Clemente
G.R. No. 200571; February 19, 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal that seeks to set aside the decision of the CA which affirmed the NLRC
decision in reversing the Labor Arbiter’s ruling, and which declared petitioner Josephine Casco’s
dismissal to be valid.
Private respondent Capitol Medical Center (Capitol) is a private hospital where petitioner
is the Nurse Supervisor in its Operating Room. In 2008, a representative of Abbot Laboratories
conducted a calibration of the Operating Room's vaporizers and found that several hospital
equipment were missing. A complaint for gross negligence in connection with the loss of hospital
equipment has been filed against the petitioner. Thereafter, Capitol issued a letter of termination.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against respondents.
Petitioner contends that care and custody of equipment were tasked upon the Head Nurse
and that loss of trust and confidence required willfulness on her part but the same was lacking thus
she could only be guilty of simple negligence and such offense was not punishable with dismissal.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that petitioner did not institute control measures to secure
the equipment under her custody and her acts warranting her dismissal were voluntary, willful and
blameworthy for having resulted in financial loss to the employer.
ISSUE:
Was petitioner’s alleged neglect of duty gross and habitual, as to warrant a valid dismissal?
RULING:
No, petitioner's alleged neglect of duty was not gross and habitual, thereby the dismissal
on such ground was not valid.
As stated in School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City v. Taguiam, neglect of duty, as a
ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence implies a want or absence
of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect
implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances. In termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employees
was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer, who must show by substantial
evidence that the termination of the employment of the employee was validly made; the failure to
discharge this duty will mean that the dismissal was not justified and was, therefore, illegal.
In this case, respondent was not able to discharge the burden. Before the petitioner could
be held liable for gross and habitual negligence of duty, respondents must clearly show that part
of her duty as a Nurse Supervisor was to be the custodian of hospital equipment and machineries
within her area of responsibility. Yet, there was no evidence submitted that substantially proved
that the respondents had entrusted to her the custody of such property. Moreover, respondents
failed to establish that the petitioner had willfully and deliberately intended to be mindless of her
responsibilities, or that she had been reckless as to be blameworthy for her acts or omissions.
Therefore, petitioner was illegally dismissed from her employment.
| 91COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
RETRENCHMENT MAY ONLY BE EXERCISED IN COMPLIANCE WITH
SUBSTANTIVE
AND PROCEDURAL REQUISITES
La Consolacion College of Manila, et al vs. Virginia Pascua
G.R. No. 214744; March 14, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to set aside the
decision of CA which reversed the NLRC decision and reinstating the LA decision, and declared
that respondent Virginia Pascua (Pascua) ‘s employment was illegally terminated.
Pascua's services as school physician were engaged by petitioner La Consolacion College
of Manila (La Consolacion). On September 29, 2011, Pascua was invited by Albert Manalili, La
Consolacion's Human Resources Division Director, to a meeting wherein she was handed her
termination of employment letter. The reason for her dismissal was said to be the current financial
situation of La Consolacion caused by the decrease in enrollment. After her exit clearance, Pascua
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against La Consolacion, Sr. Mora, Manalili, and Manabat.
Pascua pointed out that the part-time school physician, Dr. Venus Dimagmaliw should
have been considered for dismissal first or La Consolacion could have asked her to revert to part
time status instead. Sr. Mora explained that Pascua in particular was retrenched because her
position, the highest paid in the health services division, was dispensable.
ISSUE:
Was Pascua’s retrenchment justified by the reason that she had highest rate of pay?
RULING:
No, Pascua’s retrenchment was invalid.
The Labor Code recognizes retrenchment as an authorized cause for terminating
employment. However, it may only be exercised in compliance with substantive and procedural
requisites. As to the substantive requisites, an employer must first show that the retrenchment is
reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses. Second, an employer must also show
that it exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith and not to defeat or circumvent
the employees' right to security of tenure. Third, an employer must demonstrate that it used fair
and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among
the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship
for certain workers. Procedurally, employers must serve a written notice both to the employees
and to the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment and they must pay
the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least 1/2 month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher.
In this case, La Consolacion's failure was non-compliance with the third substantive
requisite of using fair and reasonable criteria that considered the status and seniority of the
retrenched employee. La Consolacion's disregard of respondent's undisputed seniority and
preferred status relative to a part-time employee indicates its resort to an unfair and unreasonable
criterion for retrenchment. Its flawed standard for retrenchment constrains the Court to maintain
that respondent was illegally dismissed.
Hence, respondent, deemed to be employed on a part-time basis from the effective date
of her wrongful termination, is entitled to backwages corresponding to such status and period.
92 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IS ANY MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY
(VERBAL
OR WRITTEN) GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE TO ANSWER THE CHARGES AGAINST
HIM
Central Azucarera De Bais and Antonio Steven Chan vs. Heirs of Zuelo Apostol
G.R. No. 215314; March 14, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to set aside the
decision of the CA which affirmed the NLRC decision reversing the LA ruling and which found
respondent Zuelo Apostol to have been illegally dismissed.
Respondent, now deceased and represented by his heirs, commenced his 20 years of
employment with petitioner Central Azucarera de Bais (CAB) when he was hired as the latter's
Motor Pool Over-All Repairs Supervisor. During the inspection of Tomasito A. Rosel, one of CAB's
security guards, it was discovered that respondent was using his company house, as well as other
company equipment to repair privately owned vehicles. CAB management then through its
resident manager, Roberty Y. Dela Rosa, issued a memorandum addressed to respondent for
violating Rule 9 of CAB's Rules of Discipline. Respondent submitted a handwritten explanation.
Thereafter, respondent received a copy of the termination letter. Respondent filed a Complaint
against the petitioners for constructive dismissal, among others.
The LA dismissed the complaint after finding that CAB complied with the twin requirements
of notice in relation to the dismissal of the respondent. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA’s
decision and ruled that the respondent should be given the opportunity to be heard through a
hearing. The CA, in turn, affirmed the NLRC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Is termination without a formal hearing illegal for being a violation of due process?
RULING:
No. Termination without formal hearing is not illegal for being a violation of due process.
As provided in the case of Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, “ample
opportunity to be heard" means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the
employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense,
whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
In the present case, the petitioners furnished the respondent with two (2) notices: one, the
memorandum issued by CAB's resident manager which sought the respondent's explanation on
the incident and informed the respondent of the charges against him; and two, the letter of
termination which, this time, notified the respondent of CAB's decision to dismiss him. The Court
ruled that rights of the respondent to procedural due process was observed by CAB as documents
clearly show that CAB complied with the twin requirements of due process. Furthermore, it was
previously held that employer has a distinct prerogative to dismiss an employee if the former has
ample reason to distrust the latter or if there is sufficient evidence to show that the employee has
been guilty of breach of trust. In the case at bar, a perusal of the entirety of the records would
reveal that all the requirements for the valid dismissal of the respondent exist. It is not disputed
that respondent is in a position of trust and confidence and that he did violate the company rules.
Hence, respondent was validly dismissed.
| 93COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
CONTRACT IS DEEMED EXTENDED DESPITE ABSENCE OF EXTENSION
AGREEMENT
IF THE EMPLOYER IS AWARE THAT THE EMPLOYEE CONTINUED WORKING
Princess Talent Center Production, Inc. vs. Desiree T. Masagca
G.R. No. 191310; April 11, 2018
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioners assail the CA’s
decision which annulled the NLRC’s decision and ordered them to pay respondent her one-year
unpaid salaries jointly and severally with Saem Entertainment Company, Ltd. (SAENCO).
Respondent Desiree Masagca auditioned for a singing contest at ABC Channel 5 when a
talent manager approached her to discuss her showbusiness potential. Enticed by thoughts of a
future in the entertainment industry, respondent went to the office of petitioner Princess Talent
Center Production, Inc. (PTCPI). A Model Employment Contract for Filipino Overseas Perf.orming
Artists (OPAS) to Korea was executed with PTCPI as the Philippine agent of SAENCO, the Korean
principal/promoter. The contract has a duration of six (6) months extendible for another six months
by mutual agreement of the parties. Respondent left for South Korea and worked there as a singer
for nine (9) months, until her repatriation to the Philippines sometime in June 2004. Believing that
the termination of her contract was unlawful and premature, respondent filed a complaint against
PTCPI and SAENCO with the NLRC.
Respondent alleged that she did not receive any salary and subsisted only on the 20%
commission that she received. PTCPI alleged that respondent was repatriated to the Philippines
on account of her illegal or immoral activities which violated the club policies of SAENCO. Her
salaries were also paid in full as evidenced by the nine cash vouchers. PTCPI alleged that
respondent on her own extended her Employment Contract with SAENCO and so its liability should
not extend beyond the original six-month term of the Employment Contract because the extension
was made without their participation or consent.
ISSUE:
Is the contract of employment deemed extended even without any extension agreement
where the employer is aware of the employee’s continued work?
RULING:
Yes, the contract of employment is deemed extended without any extension agreement.
Ideally, the extension of an employment contract should also be reduced into writing and
submitted/reported to the appropriate Philippine labor authorities. Nonetheless, even in the
absence of a written contract evidencing an extension of employment, the same is practically
admitted by petitioners, subject only to the defense that there is no proof of their knowledge of or
participation in said extension and so they cannot be held liable for the events that transpired
between respondent and SAENCO during the extension period. Petitioners presented nine
vouchers to prove that respondent received her salaries from SAENCO for nine months.
Petitioners also did not deny that petitioner Moldes, President of petitioner PTCPI, went to confront
respondent about the latter's outstanding loan at the Seaman's Seven Club in Ulsan, South Korea
in June 2004, thus, revealing that petitioners were aware that respondent was still working for
SAENCO up to that time.
Therefore, petitioners should pay Masagca because the contract of employment is deemed
extended.
94 | COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
THERE IS NO ILLEGAL TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT WHEN THERE WAS
NO
TERMINATION BY THE EMPLOYER
Renante B. Remoticado vs. Typical Construction Trading Corp. and Rommel M. Alignay
G.R. No. 206529; April 23, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the CA decision which affirmed the LA’s
dismissal of Renante Remoticado (Remoticado)’s complaint for illegal dismissal after finding that
he voluntarily resigned.
Remoticado’s services were engaged by respondent Typical Construction Trading
Corporation (Typical Construction) as a helper in its construction projects. As evidenced by sworn
statements, the field human resources officer Nieto and Remoticado’s co-workers recalled that on
December 6, 2010, Remoticado was absent without official leave. He remained absent until
December 20, 2010 when he informed Nieto that he was resigning. He was advised to return the
next day as his final pay had yet to be computed. The next day, he tried claiming his separation
pay but the same was refuted by Nieto explaining that Remoticado is not entitled thereto because
he voluntarily resigned. He proceeded to sign the “Kasulatan ng Pagbawi ng Karapatan at Kawalan
ng Paghahabol”, a waiver and quitclaim. Subsequently, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against respondent.
In his complaint, Remoticado claimed that he was told to stop reporting to work due to a
“debt at the canteen” and thereafter was prevented from entering the respondent’s premises. On
the contrary, respondent presented the waiver and quitclaim to cast doubt on the veracity of the
petitioner’s recollection of events. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit based on the
finding that Remoticado voluntarily resigned. On appeal, NLRC denied the same. The CA, in turn,
affirmed the decision of the LA.
ISSUE:
Was Remoticada illegally dismissed by the respondent despite his acquiescence on the
waiver and quitclaim?
RULING:
No, Remoticada was not illegally dismissed in view of the waiver and quitclaim that he
executed.
In illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to prove that termination of
employment was for a just cause. However, as provided in Doctor v. NII Enterprises, the
complaining employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of termination by the
employer. If there is no proof of termination by the employer, there is no point in even considering
the cause for it. There can be no illegal termination when there was no termination.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to present convincing evidence as to his version of
events on his alleged illegal dismissal. His basic narrative is bereft of supporting details that could
be taken as badges of veracity. In addition, despite the waiver and quitclaim being antedated,
petitioner never disavowed the same. Generally, jurisprudence frowns upon waivers and
quitclaims forced upon employees. However, these are not invalid when shown to be freely
executed.
Hence, Remoticada was not illegally dismissed by the respondent.
| 95COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION
WAIVERS AND QUITCLAIMS VOLUNTARILY ENTERED INTO AND
REPRESENTING A
REASONABLE SETTLEMENT ARE VALID
University of the East vs. Masangkay
G.R. No. 226727; April 25, 2018
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA).
Respondents Masangkay and Regondola were regular faculty members, Associate
Professors, and Associate Deans of petitioner University of the East (UE)-Caloocan Campus.
Respondents submitted manuals, representing themselves under oath as the authors thereof,
together with their co-author, a certain Rocamora. When UE received complaints via email from
the real authors that the manuals were plagiarized, it investigated the matter. Respondents actively
participated in the investigation. Eventually, UE’s Board of Trustees dismissed respondents.
Rocamora (the co-author) sought reconsideration of the decision to the Board of Trustees.
Respondents, however, did not appeal the decision dismissing them and instead opted to claim
the benefits due them. These were duly acted upon by UE. For the amounts that they received,
they signed vouchers and pay slips.
Rocamora’s case reached the SC and the court ruled that Rocamora was illegally
dismissed. Meanwhile, almost three years after having been dismissed from service and after
collecting their accrued benefits, respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC, claiming that they were also illegally dismissed applying the doctrine of stare decisis of
Rocamora’s case, who was a co-author.
ISSUE:
Does stare decisis apply to respondents who did not appeal their dismissal and instead
opted to receive their benefits where their co-author, who appealed, was held in another case to
have been illegally dismissed?
RULING:
No. Stare decisis is not applicable because unlike Rocamora, respondents acquiesced to
UE's decision to terminate their services and even requested the release of and thereafter claimed
the benefits due them.
As provided in Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission, not all waivers and
quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned
simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the terms of settlement
are unconscionable that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.
Rocamora’s case is not on all fours with the present case. First, herein respondents
categorically represented to UE under oath that the Manuals were free from plagiarism — an act
in which their co-author Rocamora did not participate. Second, respondents benefited financially
from the sale of the Manuals while Rocamora did not. Third, respondents acquiesced to UE's
decision to terminate their services. Thus, there was no reason to rule that respondents did not
waive their right to contest UE's decision. Based on their actuations subsequent to their
termination, it is clear that they were amenable to UE's decision of terminating their services on
the ground of academic dishonesty.
Hence, the Rocamora case cannot be used as a precedent to the case at bar. In view of
the substantial evidence presented by petitioner UE that respondents committed plagiarism, then
the complaint for illegal dismissal must be dismissed for utter lack of basis.
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