19900610-1 Ba11 G-BJRT

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 1/92
Air Accidents
Investigation
Branch
T H E DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORT
Report on the accident to

BAC One-Eleven, G-BJRT
over Didcot, Oxfordshire
on 10 June 1990
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 1/92
Air Accidents Investigation Branch
Department of Transport
Report on the accident to

BAC One-Eleven, G-BJRT
over Didcot, Oxfordshire
on 10 June 1990
This investigation was carried out in accordance with
The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents) Regulations 1989

0 Crown copyright 1992
Applications for reproduction should be made to HMSO.
First published 1992.
ISBN 0 11 551099 0
LIST OF RECENT AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORTS ISSUED BY
AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH
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90 nm north-east of Aberdeen
on 10 November 1988
2/90 Boeing 747 N739PA at Lockerbie, September 1990

Dumfriesshire, Scotland
on 21 December 1988
3/90 Sikorsky S-61N G-BEID 29 nm September 1990

north-east of Sumburgh Shetland Isles
on 13 July 1988
4/90 Boeing 737 G-OBME October 1990

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on 8 January 1989
5/90 Bell 206 B Jetranger, G-SHBB February 1991

2 miles east-south-eastof Biggin Hill
Aerodrome, Kent on 18 December 1989
1191 British Aerospace ATP, G-OATP August 1991

at Ronaldsway Airport Isle of Man
on 23 December 1990
219 1 Sikorsky S-61N G-BEWL October 1991

at Brent Spar, East Shetland Basin
on 25 July 1990
319 1 Lockheed LlOll-500, C-GAG1 December 1991

1 nm south-east of Manchester, Cheshire
on 11 December 1990
1/92 BAC One-Eleven, G-BJRT April 1992

over Didcot, Oxfordshire on 10 June 1990
These Reports are available from HMSO Bookshops and Accredited Agents
Royal Aerospace Establishment
Farnborough
Hants GU14 6TD
February 1992
The Right Honourable Malcolm Rifkiind

Secretary of State for Transport
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the report by Mr D F King, an Inspector of Air Accidents, on the
circumstances of the accident to British Airways BAC One-Eleven, G-BJRT, that occurred
over Didcot, Oxfordshire on 10 June 1990.
I have the honour to be

Sir
Your obedient servant
K P R Smart
Chief Inspector of Air Accidents
Contents Page
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . (viii)
SYNOPSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 FACI'UALINFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 History oftheflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1.2 Injuries topersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Damagetoaircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Otherdamage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5 Personnelinformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6 Aircraftinformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.7 Meteorologicalinformation . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.8 Aidstonavigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.9 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.10 Aerodromeinformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.11 Flightrecorders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.12 Wreckage and impact information . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.13 Medical and pathological information . . . . . . . . . 13
1.14 Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.15 Survivalaspects . . a . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.16 Testsandresearch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.17 Additionalinformation . e . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.18 New investigation techniques . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2 ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Engineering Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3 ATC Emergency Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3 CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Causal Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4 SAFETYRECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . 55
Contents (cont.)
5 APPENDICES
Appendix A - ATC Transcript

Appendix B - Layout of Birmingham A q o r t
Appendix C - Shift Patterns
Appendix D - Product Sample Check List
Appendix E - Comparison of bolt heads in countersinks
Appendix F - Report by the Behavoural Psychologist
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
AAIB Air Accidents Investigation Branch

AGS Aircraft General Spares
ASR Air Safety Report
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATSSD Air Traffic Services Standards Department
BAC British Aircraft Corporation
BCAR British Civil Airworthiness Requirements
T Degrees Celsius
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CATC College of Air Traffic Control
csc Chief Sector Controller
CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
DV Direct Vision
FL Flight Level
FOI Flight Operations Inspectorate
HF High Frequency
hrs Hours
IAS Indicated Air Speed
IPC Illustrated Parts Catalogue
kg Kilogram(s)
kt Knot(s)
LATCC London Air Traffic Control Centre
lbf in Pound force inch(es)
LWTR Licence Without Type Rating
"M Degrees Magnetic
MATS Manual of Air Traffic Services
MCP Maintenance Control Programme
MHZ megahertz
NATS National Air Traffic Services
psi pounds per square inch
QMDR Quality Monitoring Deficiency Report
QMP Quality Monitoring Procedures
QNH Corrected Mean Sea Level Pressure
QRH Quick Reference Handbook
RAF Royal Air Force
RAE Royal Aerospace Establishment
TIME Total Inventory Management for Engineers
UFDR Universal Flight Data Recorder
UNC Unified Coarse
UNF Unified Fine
UTC Coordinated Universal Time
VHF Very High Frequency
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range
Aircraft Accident Report No. 1/92
(EW/C 1165)
Registered Owner and Operator: British Airways Plc
Aircraft: Type: BAC One-Eleven
Aircraft Model: Series 528FL
Nationality: British
Registration: G-BJRT
Place of accident: Over Didcot, Oxfordshire
Latitude: 54" 34' North

Longitude: 001" 10' West
Date and Time: 10 June 1990 at 0733 hrs
All times in this report are UTC
Synopsis
The accident was notified by Southampton Airport Air Traffic Control to the Department of
Transport on Sunday 10 June 1990 and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) began
an investigation the same day. The following participated in the investigation:
Mr D F King, Principal Inspector of Air Accidents (Engineering) - Investigator in Charge

Mr R St J Whidborne, Senior Inspector of Air Accidents (Operations) - Operations
Mr S R Culling, Senior Inspector of Air Accidents (Engineering) - Engineering
Mr R J Vance, Senior Inspector of Air Accidents (Engineering) - Flight Recorders
The investigation was assisted by:
Mr I J Weston, Air Traffic Control (ATC) Investigations, - ATC

Safety Regulation Group,
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
Dr A J F MacMillan ) Royal Air Force (RAF) Institute of - Rapid Decompression
Mr R Green ) AviationMedicine - Human Factors
The accident happened when the aircraft was climbing through 17,300 feet on departure from
Birmingham International Airport en route for Malaga, Spain. The left windscreen, which had
been replaced prior to the flight, was blown out under effects of the cabin pressure when it
overcame the retention of the securing bolts, 84 of which, out of a total of 90, were of smaller
than specified diameter. The commander was sucked halfway out of the windscreen aperture
and was restrained by cabin crew whilst the co-pilot flew the aircraft to a safe landing at
Southampton Airport.
The following factors contributed to the loss of the windscreen:-
A safety critical task, not identified as a 'Vital Point', was undertaken by one
individual who also carried total responsibility for the quality achieved and the
installation was not tested until the aircraft was airborne on a passenger carrying
flight.
The Shift Maintenance Manager's potential to achieve quality in the windscreen

fitting process was eroded by his inadequate care, poor trade practices, failure to
adhere to company standards and use of unsuitable equipment, which were
judged symptomatic of a longer term failure by him to observe the promulgated
procedures.
The British Airways local management, Product Samples and Quality Audits had
not detected the existence of inadequate standards employed by the Shift
Maintenance Manager because they did not monitor directly the working practices
of Shift MaintenanceManagers.
Eight Safety Recommendationswere made during the course of the investigation.

1 Factual Information
1.1 History of the flight
The accident occurred during a scheduled flight (BA 5390) from Birmingham to
Malaga, Spain. With 81 passengers, four cabin crew and two flight crew the
aircraft took off from Birmingham International Airport at 0720 hrs and, having
been transferred by ATC to the Daventry and then the Bristol Sector Controller of
London Air Traffic Control Centre (LATCC), was cleared to Flight Level (FL)
140. A number of radar headings were ordered until the flight was instructed to
maintain a radar heading of 195'M and cleared for a further climb to FL 230. The
co-pilot had been the handling pilot during the take-off and, once established in
the climb, the commander was handling the aircraft in accordance with the
operator's normal operating procedures. At this stage both pilots had released
their shoulder harness, using the release bar on the buckle, and the commander
had loosened his lap-strap.
At 0733 hrs as the cabin staff prepared to serve a meal and drinks, and, as the
aircraft was climbing through about 17,300 feet pressure altitude, there was a
loud bang and the fuselage filled with condensation mist. It was at once apparent
to the cabin crew that an explosive decompression had occurred. The commander
had been partially sucked out of his windscreen aperture and the flight deck door
had been blown onto the flight deck where it lay across the radio and navigation
console. The No 3 steward, who had been working on the cabin side of the
door, rushed onto the flight deck and grasped the commander round his waist to
hold onto him. The purser meanwhile removed the debris of the door and stowed
it in the forward toilet. The other two cabin staff instructed the passengers to
fasten their seat belts, reassured them and took up their emergency positions.
The co-pilot immediately attempted to control the aircraft and, once he had
regained control, initiated a rapid descent to FL110. He re-engaged the autopilot
which had become disconnected by displacement of the control column during the
commander's partial egress and made a distress call on the frequency in use but
he was unable to hear its acknowledgment due to the noise of rushing air on the
flight deck. There was some delay in establishing two-way communications and
consequently the Bristol Sector Controller was not immediately aware of the
nature of the emergency. This led indirectly to the LATCC Watch Supervisor not
advising the aircraft operator of the incident, as required by the Manual of Air
Traffic Services (MATS) part 1. Consequently the initiation of the British
Airways Emergency Procedure Information Centre plan was delayed. Meanwhile
the purser re-entered the flight deck and, having hooked his arm through the seat
belts of the fourth crew member jump seat which was located behind the left-hand
pilot's seat, was able to assist the No 3 steward in the restraint of the commander.
The two men tied to pull the commander back within the aircraft and, although
they could see his head and torso through the left Direct Vision @V) window, the
effect of the slipstream frustrated their efforts. The No 2 steward entered the
flight deck and he was able to relieve the No 3 steward whose arms were losing
their strength as they suffered from frostbite and bruising from the windscreen
frame. The No 2 steward grasped the commander's right leg, which was stuck
between the cockpit coaming and the control column whilst his left leg was
wedged against his seat cushion. The steward then strapped himself into the left
jump seat and was able to grasp both of the commander's legs but not before he
had moved a further 6 to 8 inches out of the window frame. He held him by the
ankles until after the aircraft had landed.
Meanwhile, the aircraft had descended to FLlOO and slowed to about 150
knots(kt). The co-pilot had requested radar vectors to the nearest airport and had
been turned towards Southampton Airport and eventually transferred to their
approach frequency. Having verified that there was sufficient runway length
available for a landing, the co-pilot manoeuvred the aircraft onto a visual final
approach to runway 02 and completed a successful landing and stop on the
runway at 0755 hrs. The engines were shut down but the Auxiliary Power Unit,
which the co-pilot had started up during the descent, was left running to provide
electrical power to certain aircraft systems. As soon as the aircraft came to a halt,
passengers were disembarked from the front and rear airstairs while the airport
and local fire services recovered the commander back into the aircraft from his
position half out of the windscreen frame, where he had remained throughout the
descent and landing. He was taken to Southampton General Hospital suffering
from bone fractures in his right arm and wrist, a broken left thumb, bruising,
frostbite and shock. The other crew members and passengers were medically
examined but apart from one steward who had cuts and bruising to his arm there
were no other injuries.
1.2 Injuries to persons
Injuries Crew Passengers Others

Fatal - - -
Serious 1 - -
Minor/none 1 - -
1.3 Damage to aircraft
The pilot's windscreen was missing and one securing bolt was found in the
window frame, this had retained a portion of the rubber seal and a metal bush
from the windscreen. The bolt was not new and its countersunk head had pulled
through the windscreen. The aircraft window frame was checked for distortion
and found to be satisfactory.
Other damage to the aircraft consisted oE-
The High Frequency (HF) aerial, stretching from a forward position on the top of
the fuselage to a fitting close to the tailplane bullet, was missing and the fittings
damaged. There was a dent on the top left side of the fuselage approximately
3 inches long about 3 feet above the overwing emergency exit and a scratch on
the top left side of the fuselage. Minor damage to several items on the flight deck.
1.4 Other damage
There was no other damage.
1.5 Personnel information
I S.1 Commander: Male, aged 42 years

Licence: Airline Transport Pilot's Licence
valid until 13 November 1999
Instrument rating: valid until 16 January 1991
Route check valid until 30 September 1990
Safety procedures: last check 23 October 1989
Medical: last examination 14 March 1990 Class One,
no limitations
Height : 1.67 metres. Weight: 70 kg
Flying experience:
Total: 11,050 hours
ontype: 1,075 hours
Last 28 days: 19 hours
I S.2 Co-pilot: Male, aged 39 years

Licence: Airline Transport Pilot's Licence
valid to 24 June 1991
Instrument rating: valid until 19 November 1990
Route check valid until 8 July 1990
Safety procedures: last check 9 October 1989
Medid last examination 20 December 1989, Class One,
no limitations
Flying experience:
Total: 7,500 hours
on type: 1,100 hours
1S . 3 Cabin crew: Purser: Male, aged 37 years

No 2: Male, aged 29 years
No 3: Male, aged 36 years
No 4: Female, aged 33 years
All Safety and Emergency procedure checks had been completed in the current
year.
1.6 Aircraft information
1.6.1 General information
Manufacturer: British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) Limited

Type: BAC One-Eleven Series 528FL
Registration: G-BJRT
Serial number: BAC 234
Date of manufacture: 1977
Registered owner: British Airways Plc
Total airframe hours: 37,724.07 hours
Certificate of Airworthiness: Transport Category (Passenger) expires
16 March 1992
Hours to next check: 41 hours
I .6.2 AircraJt weight and centre of gravity
Maximum Take-off Weight Authorised: 440oo kg

Dry Operating Weight : 25,818 kg
Zero Fuel Weight: 32,925 kg
Payload: 7,107 kg
Take-off fuel: 9,980 kg
Actual Take-off weight: 42,905 kg
Maximum landing weight: 39,460 kg
Actual landing weight (1): 40,725 kg
Note: 1 Fuel state on landing at Southampton was 7,800 kg, therefore fuel
used during the flight was 2,180 kg.
I .6.3 General description
The BAC One-Eleven 500 series is a twin-engined, passenger aircraft powered by

Rolls Royce Spey turbofans. The fuselage is pressurised and air-conditioned;
8,000 feet conditions being obtainable at 35,000 feet, under which conditions the
pressure differential is 7.5 psi.
The pilots' windscreens are of five-ply glass/polyvinyl-butyl construction, the

innermost (glass) laminate being low-tempered to form a splinter shield in the
event of a bird strike. Windscreen heating is applied, primarily to improve the
impact resistance of the windscreen at low outside air temperatures. The
windscreen is not designed on the 'plug' principal, where cabin pressure
effectively contributes to holding it in place, but is fitted from the outside of the
aircraft and is secured by means of 90 countersunk bolts, also fitted from the
outside. The large number of bolts are required to prevent leakage of pressurised
air through the window seal but the force of internal air pressure could be
satisfactorily resisted by far fewer bolts.
1.7 Meteorological information
I .7.1 Synoptic situation
High pressure existed to the west of Ireland with a light northerly flow over the
Didcot area. There was a possibility of broken Stratus with a base at 600 feet and
scattered Altocumulus with base at 12,000feet and tops at 15,000 feet with a thin
layer of Cirrus above 25,000 feet. Visibility was about 10 kilometres. At 18,OOO
feet the wind was 360' at 17 kt and the air temperature was minus 17 "C. The
freezing level was at 9,OOO feet.
1.7.2 Actual conditions at Southampton
The 0720 hrs observation at Southampton Airport included the following:-

Wind: 350'/12 kt. Visibility:- 8,000 metres in haze. Temperature:- plus 15 "C.
1.8 Aids to navigation
Not relevant.
1.9 Communications
I .9.1 ATC assistance
At the time of the accident the flight was receiving an Air Traffic Area Radar
Control Service from the Bristol sector of LATCC on a frequency of
132.80MHz. The flight came under the control of Southampton Zone on
frequency 131.00 MHz at 0744 hrs. A transcript of ATC recorded transmissions
from the onset of the emergency is reproduced at Appendix A.
The co-pilot made a 'Mayday' call and declared that the aircraft had suffered an
emergency depressurisation and was descending to FLlOO on a heading of
195"M. The controller acknowledged receipt of the 'Mayday' call from BA 5390
but did not attempt to establish if the aircraft could still receive his
communications and, although he alerted his Chief Sector Controller (CSC), took
no further action since he was waiting for further information about the
emergency. He continued to operate the sector as if no emergency existed,
accepting further aircraft onto the frequency with no attempt to off-load traffic or
minimise radiotelephony activity. However, fortunately there was no conflicting
traffic and the CSC had advised the neighbouring sectors of the emergency
descent and told the LATCC watch supervisor and the RAF Distress and
Diversion Cell about the emergency call. Just prior to the handover to
Southampton, BA 5390 was descended to an altitude of 4,000 feet in error rather
than FL40 as had been co-ordinated, despite the Bristol Sector Controller not
being aware of the airfields QNH. This difficulty was resolved when the flight
was transferred to the Southampton Zone Controller who had been alerted to the
possibility of the aircraft landing there and had taken alerting action following a
telephone call from LATCC.
The co-pilot did not select the special purpose Secondary Surveillance Radar
transponder code (7700) to indicate an emergency condition but retained the code
that had been already allocated to the flight. This accorded with the United
Kingdom Aeronautical Information Publication RAC 7-4 which states : '....if the
aircraft is already transmitting a code and receiving an air traffic service that code
will normally be retained.'
1.9.2 ATC handling of emergencies
Guidance to controllers on the handling of emergency traffic is contained in the

MATS Part 1 paragraph 5.1.7 which states:-
'Emergency aircraft - Selection of controlling agency
On receipt of information which indicates that an aircraft is in an

emergency, the controller must decide whether or not to transfer the
aircraft to another agency. The choice of agency will depend upon the
circumstances and no hard and fast rules apply. The following guidance
material will help controllers to d e this decision:
Retaining Control
If the controller can offer immediate assistance the aircraft should

normally be retained on the frequency. If necessary impose a radio
silence on other aircraft or transfer them to another frequency.
Alternatively it may be more expedient to transfer the emergency aircraft to

a discrete frequency, particularly if a radio silence would endanger other
traffic.
The aircraft will have to be retained on the original frequency if it is

unreasonable to ask the pilot, or if he is not prepared, to change
frequency. The controller may be able to relay instructions and
information from other units to the pilot.
Transferring Control
If a controller considers that another unit may be able to give more

assistance than he can himself, and in the circumstances it is reasonable to
ask the pilot to change frequency, he shall either;
(a) Consult the Air Traffic Control Centre Supervisor and transfer
the aircraft according to his instructions, or ,.
(b) Alert the nearest suitable unit and transfer the aircraft to a
common frequency, giving assistance to that unit as required.
Before transferring aircraft, controllers should obtain sufficient

information from the pilot to be convinced that the aircraft will receive
more assistance from another unit. If a change of frequency is desirable
the pilot must be instructed to revert immediately if there is no reply on the
new frequency. Controllers should then listen out on the original
frequency until the aircraft is known to be in two way communication.'
I .9.3 ATC training
An ATC service in the United Kingdom may be provided only by a person who
holds an Air Traffic Controller's licence with the appropriate rating made valid at
the ATC unit at which the service is to be provided. The Air Navigation Order
authorises the grant of licences to persons who demonstrate their knowledge,
experience, competence, skill and physical and mental fitness to the satisfaction of
the CAA. The CAA publication CAP 160 details the evidence which must be
furnished, the examinations which must be passed and other requirements which
must be met before licences, ratings, validations and endorsements are issued.
An applicant for a licence is required to demonstrate his or her knowledge and

skill by passing examinations at two levels:-
a. Rating. The ability to provide a particular type of ATC service

(eg aerodrome control, area control or area radar control).
b. Validity of a Rating. The ability to provide an ATC service at a

particular place. This includes the ability to operate equipment (eg radar)
when it is used to provide the service.
The Bristol Sector Controller had completed an approved course and examination
for the issue of an Area Procedural and Area Radar rating at the National Air
Traffic Services (NATS) College of Air Traffic Control (CATC) in May 1985 and
was then posted to LATCC for validity training. This was successfully
completed and led to the rating being validated on the Bristol Sector position.
Prior to the mid 1980's the Area Radar rating examination had included an
emergency exercise. Both the CATC and the ATC Licencing Branch informally
agreed that the inclusion of an aircraft emergency during the examination placed
undue emphasis on the emergency and worked against assessing the examinee's
ability to handle routine traffic situations. In order to overcome this problem, an
agreement was reached between the College and ATC Licensing Branch that the
emergency would be removed from the examination but that appropriate training
for such events would continue to be given. The Bristol Sector Controller on
duty at the time of the emergency had undertaken his course in 1985 but the
precise content of his course could not be established as the records of courses
conducted at that time were not available.
This situation is believed to have continued until 1988 when the ATC Licensing
Branch was removed from NATS and placed within the CAA Safety Regulation
Group, eventually becoming part of the Air Traffic Services Standards
Department (ATSSD). Due in part to that change, the CATC, which remained
within NATS, was required to submit to annual inspections by the ATSSD so that
approved courses might continue. In contrast to other ATC courses which have a
published syllabus (CAP 390 - ATC Training Manual) no such publication is
made for Area ProceduraVArea Radar Courses. As the CATC was the only
establishment to provide such courses, individual syllabuses were agreed between
ATSSD and the College. No mention of practical emergency training is given in
this syllabus for area radar nor in the course approval which was given after the
ATSSD inspection in 1989. The syllabus did require certain parts of MATS
Part 1 relating to emergency training to be covered, but instructors took a wider
view and also tended to discuss the handling of emergency situations during
theoretical lessons. The instructors, however, found it more difficult to
incorporate emergency situations into routine practical exercises as they found it
was likely to disrupt the learning process. Such training tended to be injected at a
relatively early stage of the course with little opportunity for later consolidation.
Therefore, the course manager was allowed to omit certain emergency situations.
As a consequence, training in practical emergencies could be reduced to such an
extent that it was non-effective. As the syllabus did not require practical
emergency instruction, the CATC management did not inform ATSSD where
such training was not given. ATSSD was not aware that such decisions had been
taken and believed the situation remained as per the agreement following the
removal of emergencies from the examination. Once a student leaves the College
there appears to be no requirement to undergo any emergency training or periodic
appraisal on emergency procedures in order to maintain an Area/Area Radar
validated rating.
1.10 Aerodrome information
The single concrete runway, 02/20, at Southampton Airport is 1,723 metres long.
The landing distance available on runway 02 is 1,650 metres. A VOR/DME
(SAM 113.35 MHz) is located on the airfield which is at an elevation of 44 feet
above mean sea level.
1.11 Flight recorders
1 .I1.I Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
A Fairchild Model A100 four channel CVR was fitted and a satisfactory replay of
the 30 minute audio record was obtained. Channel allocation was :-
Channel 1 Cabin Address

Channel 2 Co-pilot's hot microphone
Channel 3 Pilot's hot microphone
Channel 4 Cockpit area microphone
The rapid decompression caused no discernible change to the signal on the area
microphone channel but it was clearly audible on both crew hot microphone
channels.
1.11.2 Universal Flight Data Recorder (UFDR)
A Sundstrand UFDR was fitted. A satisfactory replay was obtained from the
following recorded parameters:- Indicated Airspeed, Altitude, Heading, Normal
acceleration, Flap position, Pitch attitude, Roll attitude, No 1 engine W ,No 2
engine W, VHF transmit discrete.
Recorded data showed the aircraft climbing at 300 kt Indicated Airspeeed (US)
through 17,300 feet at the time of the loss of the windscreen. As the control
column was pushed forwards, probably due to the movement of the commander
through the windscreen frame, the aircraft pitched 6' nose down and banked 25'
to the right. When the co-pilot took control and closed both throttles, the speed
was allowed to increase to 340 kt as the aircraft descended at 4,600 feet per
minute to FL110. On reaching this level the speed was reduced to 266 kt with a
further decrease to 163 kt as flaps were extended according to the normal
operating schedule and then power was applied to maintain this height and speed.
The time elapsed from the depressurisation to level flight at FLllO was 148
seconds.
1.12 Wreckage and impact information
The aircraft was brought to rest on the runway and electrical power turned off.
The aircraft was towed off the runway and parked.
1.12.1 &minution of the left wi&creen and attaching bolts
The windscreen was found near Cholsey, Oxfordshire, along with the
windscreen outboard corner post fairing strip and some associated bolts.
Of the 90 bolts used to attach the windscreen to the aircraft, 11 had remained in
the windscreen and 18 were found loose nearby; one had remained in the aircraft
window frame.
Twenty-six of the bolts recovered with the windscreen were new bolts identified
against the British Standard as Raving the part number A21 1-8C. The remaining
four bolts recovered were re-used bolts identified as having the part number
A21 1-7D. The Illustrated Parts Catalogue (IPC) specifies that the attaching bolts
should be part number A21 1-8D. The specifications for these bolts are:-
Part No. Shank length (inches) Diameter (inches) Thread Size
A211-8D 0.8 0.1865-0.1895 10 UNF

A211-8C 0.8 0.1605-0.1639 8 UNC
A211-7D 0.7 0.1865-0.1895 10 UNF
UNF = Unified Fine UNC = Unified Coarse
The bolts engage with 10 UNF Kaylock floating anchor nuts mounted on the
inside of the windscreen frame. The replacement windscreen had been installed
with 84 bolts (A211-8C) whose diameters were approximately 0.026 of an inch
below the diameters of the specified bolts but of the same thread pitch, and six
bolts (A211-7D) which were of the correct diameter, but 0.1 of an inch too short.
The left windscreen had been changed during the night shift of the 8/9th June
1990 and the accident flight was the first since that installation. Eighty of the
bolts which had attached the old windscreen were recovered from the work area
during the investigation, and 78 of these were identified as A211-7D, the
remaining two being A21 1-8D. The old windscreen, which had been fitted four
years earlier, before the aircraft had been acquired by British Airways, had
therefore been primarily attached by bolts which were 0.1 of an inch shorter than
those specified.
1.13 Medical and pathological information
Not relevant.
1.14 Fire
There was no fire.
1.15 Survival aspects
Following the loss of the left windscreen and subsequent decompression of the
fuselage, the commander found himself half way out of the aircraft through his
Windscreen aperture. He recalls the impression of lying on his back against the
upper surface of the flight deck exterior and, realising that he was still able to
breathe, he concentrated on this until he assumes he lost consciousness. He
regained consciousness after the aircraft had landed and when he was being
recovered by fire and ambulance staff inside the flight deck prior to be being
placed on a stretcher and taken to hospital.
The co-pilot and the crew members who were holding on to the commander had
individually reached the conclusion that his survival was highly improbable in the
extreme conditions to which he was exposed. They were considerably reassured
when, at a late stage in the descent at about 3,000 feet, the commander started to
kick his legs.
The aircraft was not fitted with an automatic presentation oxygen system in the
cabin and this was not required to be fitted under the original requirements for the
issue of the aircraft's Certificate of Airworthiness. Therapeutic oxygen was
available in the cabin and consisted of 18 sets of facemasks and four portable
oxygen cylinders. The oxygen system supplied gaseous oxygen to the crew and
passengers if decompression occurred and for therapeutic purposes. Oxygen
cylinders were mounted underfloor in the forward fuselage in the electrics bay.
From the cylinders the oxygen was piped through in-line filters to the control
panel in the flight deck right hand console. For therapeutic supply, an outlet from
the double pressure regulator connected to an isolation valve (normally closed)
and thence to a ring main which served twinflow sockets in selected passenger
service panels. With the crew shut off valve and passenger isolation valve open,
oxygen was obtained by connecting a therapeutic mask to an outlet point.
Therapeutic masks were stowed in the aft stowage compartment. Immediately
following the loss of pressurisation, the No 2 steward went and sat in seat 20D
whilst donning the mask of a portable set that was stowed nearby. Oxygen
masks were available to the flight deck crew but the co-pilot elected not to don his
mask since he realised that the aircraft would soon reach FLlOO (see paragraph
1.17.7 below). He also did not want to impede his ability to communicate with
the other crew members who were holding on to the commander.
1.16 Tests and research
I .16.1 Trials of 8 UNC and I O UNF countersunk head bolts with 10 UNF anchor nuts
During the course of the investigation British Airways carried out a simulation of
the window fitting procedure to determine the torque that could be applied to 8
UNC countersunk head bolts fitting into 10 UNF Kaylock type anchor nuts. A
24 anchor nut test piece was used as follows:
To determine the torque at thread slip of twenty 8 UNC bolts in 10 UNF Kaylock
nuts. This was found to be in the range of 1 to 7 lbf in.
To determine the torque required to engage the bolt in the locking mechanism of
the nut, four 10 UNF bolts were fitted in 10 UNF Kaylock nuts. This torque
was found to be in the range of 10 to 11 lbf in.
A further, more representative test was carried out in the presence of AAIB using
a BAC One-Eleven in which 32 bolts (A21 1-8C) were used to fasten a window
and seal in an aircraft. In this test torque figures ranging between 0 and 12 lbf in
were achieved before the threads slipped.
A third test was carried out using some of the anchor nuts removed from G-BJRT
to ensure that no unforeseen effect could have made the G-BJRT window
unrepresentative; ten 8 UNC bolts were fitted and these slipped at torques ranging
from 0 to 6 lbf in.
The combined results using 8 UNC bolts in 10 UNF Kaylock nuts showed a
maximum torque of 12 lbf in and an average of 4.7lbf in at thread slip.
It was noted that the thread range 4 UNC to inch UNF, commonly used on
aircraft bolts, contains three adjacent pairs of sizes with similar thread pitches
which allow the smaller bolt to engage in the larger Kaylock nut.
1 J6.2 Examination of the torque limiting screwdriver used tofit the windscreen
Tests on a similar torque limiting screwdriver to that used to fit the windscreen
showed that at a low setting (5 lbf in) the feel of the screwdriver clutch slipping
was indistinguishable from the feel of an 8 UNC thread slipping in a 10 UNF
anchor nut. At a higher setting (15 lbf in) a more pronounced click was felt as the
screwdriver clutch released.
The actual torque limiting screwdriver used had a high level of residual friction
(typically 7 lbf in at a setting of 20 lbf in) after the set value had been achieved
and was therefore taken to the manufacturer for examination in the presence of
AAIB and British Airways. The torque limiting screwdriver employed a cam
plate with three lobes to retain three ball bearings which were displaced against
the action of a spring to release at the set torque. Once released, the drive shaft
carrying the ball bearings rotated through a third of a revolution until the balls re-
indexed against the cam. Thus, in use, the torque should build up to the set
value, slip and reduce to a residual value whilst the balls move across the constant
radius section of the cam to the next indexing position.
The residual torque was c o n f i i e d as being high at a value of approximately

30 per cent of the torque set, rather than the usual value of between 5 and 10 per
cent. Subsequent discussions with the manufacturer disclosed that the
specification for the grease, used in the assembly of the torque limiting
screwdriver, had been changed approximately five years ago because of problems
of the grease breaking down with age. At this time retrospective action for those
torque drivers already sold was considered impractical because of the large
numbers involved and the lack of information about their location. The
screwdriver under test was at least five years old and strip examination revealed
that the excessive friction was caused by deterioration of the old specification
grease. No significant wear was evident on the cam or the ball bearings, and
when rebuilt with the correct grease the torque limiting screwdriver performed
satisfactorily.
The high residual torque occurred after the set value had been achieved (ie 20 lbf
in) and did not affect the torque at which the screwdriver operated. The residual
torque would not have been felt before the set torque was reached.
I J6.3 Special checks called for on widcreen bolts after the accident
Before the diameter of the replacement bolts had been established British Airways
issued an instruction to be carried out on all its BAC One-Elevens before the next
flight, to remove every fourth bolt from the No 1 left-hand and No 1 right-hand
windscreens to check for correct length.
Throughout the British Airways fleet of BAC One-Elevens two aircraft failed the
check, having a total of 41 short bolts (A211-7Ds).
A similar check was carried out on the four BAC One-Elevens belonging to
another airline and two aircraft failed the check, having a total of 107 short bolts.
When the smaller diameter bolts were identified in the detached window British
Airways called for a 100 per cent visual inspection of bolt head diameter; this
check utilised the fact that the smaller bolt head had 27 per cent less area than the
head of the correct bolt. All the aircraft passed the check.
1.17 Additional information
I.17.I Certijicationof Airworthiness of Aircraft
1.17.1.1 Type Certification of the BAC One-Eleven
The BAC One-Eleven Model 500 was type certificated to British Civil
Airworthiness Requirements (BCAR) Section D in 1970 which calls up duplicate
inspections after certain safety critical maintenance operations. However the
glazing elements of windscreens are not identified as principal structural elements,
nor does the application of this duplicate inspection philosophy attempt to cover
possible safety critical situations caused by servicing errors.
There are no airworthiness requirements for aircraft windows to be fitted from the
inside (plug type).
The BAC One-Eleven windscreen was designed to be secured with countersunk

head bolts to British Standard A211-8D. This British Standard specifies that the
British Standard number and the bolt part number shall not be applied on the
bolts, but shall be clearly marked on the labels of parcels of bolts.
1.17.1.2 Aircraft Maintenance Requirements
a. Duplicate Inspections
BCARs require a duplicate inspection of all control systems in an aircraft to

be made after initial assembly and before the first flight after overhaul,
repair, replacement, modification or adjustment. In September 1985
BCARs introduced a requirement for duplicate inspections of 'Vital Points',
which are defined as any point on an aircraft at which a single mal-assembly
could lead to catastrophe, Le. result in loss of the aircraft and/or fatalities.
The CAA state that the term 'Vital Point' is not intended to refer to multiple
fastened parts of the structure, but only applies to a single point, usually in a
control system.
The regulations contain a waiver making the definition of 'Vital Points' non-
mandatory for aircraft with a Maximum Take-off Weight Authorised of over
5,700 kg which were manufactured in accordance with a Type Certificate
issued prior to 1st January 1986. This waiver includes the BAC One-
Eleven. However, even had it not, British Aerospace would not expect the
pilots' windscreens to appear in a 'Vital Point' analysis of the BAC One-
Eleven.
b. Cabin Pressure Checks
There are no CAA requirements for a cabin pressure check to be called up

after work has been carried out on the pressure hull. There is no specific
company policy on leak checks within British Aerospace. Such checks are
written into the aircraft Maintenance Manual at the discretion of the aircraft
design team, and were not called up on the BAC One-Eleven.
1.17.1.3 Quality Requirements for Airlines
CAA approval of Aeroplane Maintenance Organisations, such as British Airways,

includes a requirement for a company exposition containing details of the systems
and procedures for the control of matters, including Quality Control, directly
affecting continuing airworthiness. The systems established for Quality Control
and Quality Assurance should be such that the prime objective is to maintain a
continuous check on the effectiveness of the maintenance organisation and on the
procedures and systems employed to ensure that all CAA requirements as well as
those of the Organisation itself are met.
When assessing an Organisation for approval the CAA will examine the systems
used to control all maintenance activities, including Quality Control and
Assurance. The certification procedures used by many airlines, including British
Airways, and approved by the CAA, allow a single authorised engineer to
undertake most aircraft work within his trade boundaries, and sign for it, without
supervision or independent checking. The exception to this, on the BAC One -
Eleven, is the requirement for duplicate inspection of control systems.
1.17.1.4 Maintenance Engineer Licencing
Aircraft maintenance licences are issued for a period of two years and renewed for
a maximum period of five years. Licences will normally be renewed on
application provided that, during the 24 months preceding the date of expiry of
the licence, the holder has been engaged for periods totalling at least six months
on appropriate work. No medical standards are specified for issue or renewal,
neither are any examinations associated with the renewal of licences. No periodic
training or tests are required on individual maintenance engineers.
The CAA issue aircraft maintenance engineer's licences in several categories, of

which category ' A applies to aeroplanes. Generally there are two parts to each
category:-
a. Licence Without Type Rating (LWTR)
The LWTR does not in itself confer any certification responsibilities or

privileges but is a prerequisite for the granting of the relevant Type Ratings
which confer the privileges of certification appropriate to that Type Rating.
The LWTR is also a prerequisite for issuing an approved company
authorisation in the appropriate licence category.
b. Type Ratings
Type Ratings confer on the holder of a licence privileges and certification

responsibilities in respect of certain aircraft registered in the United
Kingdom.
1.17.1.5 Company Authorisations
Certain aircraft types may be maintained only by organisations which are

specifically approved by the CAA for that purpose - BCAR chapter A8-13 refers.
Licence Type Ratings are not granted for these types. In accordance with the
procedures associated with this CAA approval the organisation may grant
authorisation to persons to issue Certificates of Release to Service for specific
aircraft types to suitable engineers who hold a LWTR.
The organisation can also issue such authorisations to cover aircraft types for
which a Licence Type Rating is available. British Airways is such an approved
company and the fitting of the windscreen and its certification were in accordance
with these procedures.
The holding of company authorisations allows the engineer to make maintenance

certifications affecting the airworthiness of the aircraft. Therefore, such an
engineer carries some of the responsibility for the day-teday airworthiness of the
aircraft.
1.17.1.6 Maintenance Manuals
The CAA requires the BAC One-Eleven to be serviced in accordance with the
BAC Maintenance Manual, which contains chapters covering each system in the
aircraft, each chapter providing: a detailed description of the system and its
operation, with sufficient detail for diagnostic use by the aircraft maintenance
engineers; specific values to be achieved during servicing, ie torque loadings,
pressures, dimensional checks, timings, etc; procedural information containing
detailed sequences of the steps to be followed during the removal and replacement
of significant items. The Maintenance Manual is complemented by the IPC,
which contains detailed drawings of all parts of the aircraft and identifies the
components used by manufacturers' part numbers.
Although the Maintenance Manual breaks the windscreen removalheplacement

task into a series of individual steps, the British Airways maintenance
documentation at that time treated the task as a single stage operation.
I .I 7.2 British Airways' i$rastructure
Paragraphs 1.17.2.1 to 1.17.2.3 contain extracts from a much longer internal

British Airways document.
1.17.2.1 Quality Monitoring Procedure (QMP) - The System
British Airways policy is that quality cannot be policed into a product. The QMP
system, which was introduced in 1987, was developed actively to pursue a policy
of encouraging staff to 'wear the mantle of Quality Assurance' as they went about
their work tasks. QMP forms the structure on which all of the monitoring activity
is based and has three main components, these are: The Local Exposition;
Continuous Monitoring; and Product Sampling.
a. The Local Exposition
Each Departmental Head is required to raise a Local Exposition which lists

the functions for which he or she is responsible and the geographic
locations where the work is carried out. The functions are allocated to
managers, by name, and the procedures that are used to control tools,
equipment, procedural and documentary amendments, modifications,
special processes, etc. are defined. Each Local Exposition is registered with
the CAA and, in conjunction with other documents, forms the British
Airways' submission for requesting approval for the various engineering
functions that are carried out.
b. Continuous Monitoring
The second requisite is the availability of a reporting system through which

all staff can register deficiencies as they occur (by raising a Quality
Monitoring Deficiency Report (QMDR)), this is a 'closed loop' system
which informs the originator of the action that has been taken to rectify the
problem. This is known as Continuous Monitoring.
The QMP system is confined to airworthiness related items and does not
duplicate other reporting systems. It can, however, report the shortcomings
in other systems where this is appropriate in airworthiness terms.
The role of the individual is crucial to the success of the QMP system. The
QMP system gives each person the responsibility of reporting deficiencies
in the quality of the services and procedures which are provided to them and
on which they depend in order to produce their goods or services at the
proper level of quality. By so doing, they are given a formal device for
influencing their working environment.
c. Product Sampling
In addition to the Continuous Monitoring process there is an imposed

Product Sample that has to be carried out at set periods to satisfy the
requirement of an independent assessment of work. Product Sampling is
seen as a check on the effectiveness of the Continuous Monitoring system
and all sample reports are submitted to the Chief Quality Engineer for
evaluation; some of which are passed on to the CAA in support of their
approval of British Airways' maintenance arrangements.
1.17.2.2 The Management Role in QMP
The Departmental Head is responsible for his organisation's quality performance,

for assessing standards and for maintaining a quality awareness in all his staff.
Through the Local Exposition, the Departmental Head declares the staff, facilities,
equipment and systems for which he is responsible and sets down how Quality
Monitoring is to be implemented throughout his area of responsibility. He holds
regular briefings to ensure that Continuous Monitoring is being correctly applied,
and monthly summary reports of the QMP system are submitted to him by his
staff. From this monthly summary it is possible to deduce the amount of QMP
activity, in terms of numbers of deficiencies raised by Continuous Monitoring and
by Product Sampling.
Every quarter the Departmental Head summarises all of the QMP activity for his
area by completing a Quarterly Report. The Quarterly Report is sent to the British
Airways Audit Unit who compile statistics from the reports and report those
statistics to the Quality Forum. Forum meetings are arranged monthly and are
chaired by the Chief Engineer of Quality and Training Services on behalf of the
Engineering Director. The CAA Surveyors in charge of both the Heathrow and
Gatwick offices participate in these meetings.
The Quality Forum ensures that Departmental Heads are accountable for the QMP
process and provides the opportunity for quality objectives and performance to be
discussed and acted upon.
1.17.2.3 Auditing theProcess
The effectiveness of the QMP is assessed through independent audits which are
conducted by a small group of quality engineers from the Quality Audit Unit, a
paperwork exercise every six months and a visit every two years. In addition
they will act in an advisory capacity on airworthiness matters and on the
management of the QMP system. The independence of the Audit Unit from the
engineering operation has been accepted by the CAA, who check on this aspect
through regular surveys on the Audit Group.
The Audit Unit is also empowered to carry out traditional 'systems audits' if
sufficient grounds exist to suspect that functions or procedures are not properly
controlled. The results of such audits are reported to the appropriate Departmental
Head so that the necessary corrective action can be taken. As a last resort, the
result can also be reported to the Quality Forum, for corrective action to be
allocated.
1.17.2.4 The Maintenance Control Programme (MCP)
British Airways is approved by the CAA as a maintenance organisation; as part of

that approval, the MCP has been developed. This is a closed-loop system which
is continuously reviewed by engineering management to ensure that aircraft
technical performance is satisfactory. As part of the programme, the following
performance parameters are measured and monitored:-
Aircraft technical delays

Aircraft systems performance
Engine in-flight shutdowns
Unscheduled component removals
Repetitive defects
Air/Ground incident reports.
These parameters are analysed, and where appropriate have defined targets or
alert levels. All of these parameters are evaluated and reported on for all fleets
and corrective action taken through a series of structured MCP committees, which
in turn report to an Engineering Control Review Board who meets formally twice
per year to review the effectiveness of the MCP.
1.17.2.5 Ground Occurrence Report Form E 1022
Ground Occurrence Report Form E1022 is used for the notification of defects
found during work on aircraft or aircraft components which are considered
worthy of special attention. The system is also used for the notification of
'Ground Found' Mandatory Occurrence Reports as required by the Air
Navigation Order and Regulations and to highlight any technical or other matter
which, if unreported, could lead to a potential airworthiness hazard.
All British Airways' Engineering staff are required to take E1022 action when
encountering deficiencies of the type listed below, unless the subject of an Air
Safety Report:-
Failure, potential failure or obstruction of any aircraft system
Defects in aircraft structure such as cracks in primary or secondary

structure, structural corrosion or deformation greater than expected
Failures or damage likely to weaken attachments of major structural items

including flying controls, landing gear, power plants, windows, doors,
galleys, seats and heavy items of equipment
When any component part of the aircraft is missing, believed to have

become detached in flight
Overheating of primary or secondary structure
Unreported damage
Defects that cannot be cured by normal replacements or repairs
Incmect assembly
Use of incorrect fuel, oil or other vital fluids
Failure of any emergency equipment that would prevent or seriously

impair its use
Critical failures or malfunction of equipment used to test aircraft systems

or aircraft units
ActuaVpotentialfires
Items rejected ex-stores and low life failures
Lack of clarity or conflict between technical procedures
Spillages in aircraft
Any defects found as a result of a Special Mandatory Inspection or Check
Any other occurrence or defect considered to require such notification.
I .I 7.3 British Airways' Organisation at Birmingham
1.17.3.1 Task
The task includes flight servicing, scheduled maintenance and rectification of the
13 BAC One-Eleven fleet, and flight servicing and rectification for other British
Airways aircraft (HS 748 and ATP) and other contracting airlines. The first batch
of the British Airways One-Eleven fleet depart between 0630 hrs and 0730 hrs
each weekday morning.
For operational reasons most of the maintenance work on the BAC One-Eleven
fleet was carried out at night and consequently the Shift Maintenance Managers on
the night shift usually had more work available to them than they could satisfy.
This required the allocation of task priorities and the night shift manpower was
usually sufficient to complete all the necessary airworthiness engineering tasks
with only minor Acceptable Deferred Defects being left to be dealt with by a
subsequent night shift. Indeed, in order to curb over-enthusiasm engendered by
the pride felt by the shifts in their ability to satisfy the task, the management at
Birmingham repeatedly stressed that night shifts should not attempt to do more
than was prudent.
1.17.3.2 Facilities
At the time of the accident Birmingham Airport was undergoing extensive works
services to increase its capacity. The British Airways engineering facilities
comprised accommodation at two locations:-
a. Under the International Pier
Office accommodation plus an unmanned store with an adjacent small

workshop area which contained a carousel with 408 drawers holding
consumable Aircraft General Spares (AGS).
b. Eastern Apron
A hangar bay large enough to contain a BAC One-Eleven, with a tail dock
containing staging allowing access to the tail. The Eastern Apron used to be
the terminal area and the bay contained accommodation previously used by
the engineering department. This facility housed a manned store and .
engineering accommodation suitable for work in the area.
The geographical location of these areas is shown at Appendix B.
1.17.3.3 Manpower
The engineering establishmentcomprised :-
a. An Area Maintenance Manager with responsibilities for outstations in

MidSouth England; these included Birmingham, Jersey, Southampton,
Cardiff, East Midlands and Bristol Airports. However Southampton,
Cardiff, East Midlands and Bristol were not served by British Airways
scheduled operations, although British Airways charter flights may have
landed there occasionally. British Airways had no engineering staff at these
stations which were served as necessary by agencies, appointed by the Area
Maintenance Manager, or visiting engineers for specific flights. Jersey was
a transit station with, at most, one aircraft stopping overnight. Therefore
more than 80 per cent of the Area Maintenance Manageis time and attention
was devoted to Birmingham. He was specifically responsible for the
control and effectiveness of the Quality Monitoring system in maintaining
the established quality performance targets and was to conduct regular
checks throughout the organisation assigned to him to ensure that quality
performance targets were achieved.
b. A Station Maintenance Manager of foreman grade, who acted as deputy
to the Area Maintenance Manager.
c. Five rotating shifts, comprising a Shift Maintenance Manager of foreman

grade and approximately six engineers and a storekeeper.
d. A permanent night shift of four engineers to supplement the duty night

shift and three double day shifts of three men to augment day work.
These figures are establishments, manning levels on shifts may be depleted by

leave, sickness, etc.
1.17.3.4 Station Organisation
The Station Maintenance Manager and the Shift Maintenance Managers all
reported directly to the Area Maintenance Manager. The only Terms of Reference
that were available for the engineering maintenance personnel employed by
British Airways at Birmingham were those which appeared in their Union
agreement, however their job specifications may have appeared in recruitment
advertisements issued locally.
a. Shifts
The shift pattern worked by the five rotating shifts gave 24 hour cover over
a 35 day cycle. The duty shift was augmented by the various standing
shifts in a system designed to provide optimum cover at the times when it is
needed, primarily for aircraft handling during the day and rectification at
night. Reduced cover was provided over the weekends. A diagrammatic
representation of the shift system is shown at Appendix C.
b. Workload
The workload for all levels of management at Birmingham was high; the
Area Manager did not monitor the day-to-day work practices of his
subordinates, but relied on the trending of parameters such as numbers of
Acceptable Deferred Defects, repeated defects, and failures to meet
schedules as indicators of quality. (The total list of parameters is at
1.17.3.6 b).
Although the Station Maintenance Manager was responsible for the technical
activities on the Unit, he was the same grade as, and received the same pay as, the
Shift Maintenance Managers under him. He worked on aircraft when the need
arose and so was closer to the day-to-day standards used, however the
organisation structure was such that Shift Maintenance Managers often
communicated directly with the Area Maintenance Manager. Because of his day
time duties the Station Maintenance Manager rarely had the opportunity to observe
the workings of shifts at night, especially during the early hours of the morning.
1.17.3.5 Stores procedures
The stores computer based Total Inventory Management for Engineering (TIME)
system employed by British Airways is such that an item whose part number has
been identified can be located down to the drawer containing the stock. All parts
and materials are requested by description and part number as specified in the IPC
which is available at all work stations.
AGS are contained within a dispenser with a stores identification label and issue
may either be over the counter, or self service. This method used to dispense
AGS is common throughout airlines. At Birmingham three carousels were
employed, two in the hangar under the control of a storeman, integrated in the
TIME system, and labelled with drawer location codes, and one, uncontrolled,
under the International Pier with drawers labelled with part numbers.
AGS generally arrived in transparent plastic packs of 100 items, the packs
containing a label or a computer produced description and bar code; the drawers
frequently contained the identifying labels from the packs. There was, however,
no way, other than measurement, of identifying the contents after they had been
removed from the packs.
Minimum stock levels per drawer were usually set at between 50 and 100 items
depending on bulk and usage. The hangar carousels contained drawers with
stock levels well below the resupply level; no instances were found of incorrect
contents in the hangar carousels. The uncontrolled carousel, on the other hand,
had some drawers which were not labelled and some which contained a mixture
of items. The 408 drawers in this carousel were categorised as follows:-
No label, no contents 46
No label, contained stock 25
Labelled, no contents 68
Labelled, contained stock 269
The last category was further broken down showing that:-
In 25 1 drawers the majority of the contents were as the label, (163 drawers
contained solely the contents described on the drawer label).
In 18 drawers the majority of the stock was wrongly labelled, (in 9 drawers
none of the contents were as described on the drawer label).
The uncontrolled nature of this carousel had been recognised by some British
Airways personnel, who had reported the problem informally. There was no
record of this problem in the QMDRs at Birmingham, a system specifically
designed to receive reports of this nature.
1.17.3.6 Quality AssurancePractice
a. Training
The initial training for QMP consisted of 11/2 days of external training for middle
management who provided ad hoc training to foremen and supervisors in the local
area, based on a standard package consisting of a video plus viewfoils. The
foremen in turn were required to train the subordinate grades.
Continuation training in QMP was carried out as and when required. The Audit
Team, through sampling of QMP awareness across the Company in June 1988,
identified a shortfall; the Quality Forum directed each Department to carry out
QMP training, and an illustrated ‘Guide to QMP’ was produced. A further QMP
survey in January 1989 identified that improvements had been achieved but that a
lack of comprehension still existed. At the time of the accident, action to remedy
this was still under discussion.
b. The Birmingham Exposition
Product Samples were required from Birmingham on a monthly basis and prior to
each aircraft Certificate of Airworthiness renewal. They were carried out by the
Station Maintenance Manager and a nominated Shift Maintenance Manager. The
quality monitoring schedule for the Product Sample is at Appendix D.
The completed Product Sample proforma were distributed to the Area

Maintenance Manager, the British Airways Quality Forum and some to the CAA.
A British Airways Engineering Department procedure stated that the Area

Maintenance Managers were responsible for maintaining the established quality
targets with respect to the following:-
Technical Despatch Reliability

Acceptable Deferred Defect levels
Repetitive Defects
Air Safety Reports
Significant Technical Defects sent for investigation (E1022’s)
Product Samples
QMDRs
Quality Audit Reports
Technical Log entries.
c. Continuous Monitoring Reports from Birmingham
British Airways literature circulated amongst engineering staff stressed the need
for an open reporting system using QMDRs. Over a 39 month period, ending in
April 1990,36 QMDRs were raised on local issues at Birmingham. Eleven of
these were as a result of the monthly Product Samples, and the other 25 were
raised by the British Airways employees, of whom approximately a quarter had
been active in the system. The Area Maintenance Manager stated that there was
less of a need to complete QMDRs as some faults could be identified and actioned
immediately as he had control of the Birmingham engineering budget.
d. Product Samples from Birmingham
British Airways produced ten copies of Product Samples carried out at

Birmingham, seven of these related to the period before the accident and were
carried out during work packages involving; Acceptable Deferred Defect
Clearance, Base Checks and Modifications, and Ramp Checks. The seven pre-
accident product samples raised a total of 65 deficiencies which were of a minor
nature.
The CAA produced six copies of Product Samples carried out at Birmingham
before the accident; three of these duplicated copies provided by British Airways,
and the additional three, from early 1989, were similar in content to the others.
e. British Airways Quality Audit at Birmingham
Paperwork audits of the Engineering function at Birmingham to assess the use of

and adherence to monitoring procedures, required under QMP procedures, were
scheduled and performed at six monthly intervals. A physical audit of the
Birmingham station, in the form of a two day visit, was last carried out prior to
the accident by a representative of the British Airways Quality Audit Unit on
15/16 June 1988, when it was reported that the engineering facility was to a high
standard. Seven observations were raised relating to minor, non-aircraft, matters.
f. CAA Supervisory Visit to British Airways Engineering at Birmingham
One of the duties of the CAA's Flight Operations Inspectorate (FOI 7) was (at the
time of the accident) to carry out supervisory visits to survey the engineering
services provided by British Airways at Birmingham in support of their Air
Operator's Certificate. The last FOI 7 visit, an 'Air Operator's Certificate:
Supervision of Operator's Line Maintenance Station', before the accident took
place on 22 June 1989 ,followed a proforma schedule, lasted for approximately
half a day and did not detect any significant engineering problems.
1.17.3.7 Use of E 1022 h e d u r e at Birmingham
Over the same 39 month period in which 36 QMDRs were raised, 365 E1022s
were raised at Birmingham.
1.I 7.4 Fitting the windscreen
1.17.4.1 History of the shift
The Shift Maintenance Manager arrived at work in the offices under the
International Pier 45 minutes earlier than his shift start time in order to allow
himself time to catch up with the paperwork and establish the shift work content;
this included three significant defects, routine items and various minor cabin
defects.
A Supervisory Aircraft Engineer and a further Licenced Aircraft Engineer,

normally part of the shift, were not available that night and, although the work
outstanding remained the same, the Friday night shift was routinely not supported
by the four man night shift supplement because there was reduced scheduled
flying on Saturday and Sunday. The shift consisted of:-
The Shift Maintenance Manager

1 Licenced Aircraft Engineer
1 unlicenced engineer &ame/engines
1 Supervisory Aircraft Engineer (Avionics)
1 Avionics engineer.
The engineers were directed to their tasks whilst the Shift Maintenance Manager
carried on with the administration and the task of entering the contents of the
aircraft technical logs into the computer. At about midnight, the Shift
Maintenance Manager spent some time with the Licenced Aircraft Engineer on a
steering defect and the completion of this coincided with the arrival of a Tunisair
Boeing 737 which the shift had to handle. As none of the engineers had Boeing
737 experience the Shift Maintenance Manager carried out the pre-departure
inspection and the refuelling in conjunction with the Licenced Aircraft Engineer to
give him experience. All this activity took place at various locations around the
airfield and was co-ordinated using radio.
The departure of the Tunisair Boeing 737 at around 0145 hrs coincided with the
meal break, which the Shift Maintenance Manager spent working on
administration whilst he ate his sandwiches. After the break he directed his two
airframe engineers onto a galley water leak on one of the BAC One-Eleven aircraft
which needed rectifying before the aircraft departed the following morning.
Although there was no operational requirement for G-BJRT the next day, the
Shift Maintenance Manager knew that the oncoming morning shift were also
depleted and that an aircraft wash had been booked, using overtime, at 0630 hrs
the following morning. Whilst no external pressure had been put on him, he was
aware that the previous week the wash team had been brought in on a similar
basis and not used. In order to achieve the windscreen change during his shift
and have the aircraft ready for the wash team, he decided to carry out the
windscreen change himself.
The aircraft was located in the No 2 bay, off the Eastern Apron on the other side
of the airfield, and was parked tail into the hangar with the nose by the doors. In
retrospect the Shift Maintenance Manager could not recall exactly what the
weather was, but thought that it was raining; in which case he would have closed
the doors, leaving a few feet between the nose of the aircraft and the doors. The
windscreen change was carried out between approximately 0300 hrs and 0500 hrs
on the Saturday morning.
1.17.4.2 Procedures used
British Airways statistics show that 12 No 1 windscreens, left or right, had been
changed on their BAC One-Eleven aircraft over the last year, and a similar
number the year before. The Shift Maintenance Manager had carried out about
six windscreen changes on BAC One-Eleven aircraft whilst employed by British
Airways.
a. Maintenance Manual
The Shift Maintenance Manager glanced briefly at the Maintenance Manual as he

had not changed a windscreen for about two years and wanted to refresh his
memory. This check confirmed his impression that it was a straightforwardjob
with no apparent difficulties.
b. LPC
The IPC was available on a microfiche reader, but was not used to identify the
part number of the bolts to be replaced, consequently a stock check, using TIME,
to assess the availability and location of replacement bolts was not carried out.
The Shift Maintenance Manager justified this omission by saying that he was
quite satisfied that the bolts that he had removed were the correct bolts, and that it
would take so much time to find the correct numbers in the IPC that he did not
feel justified in using the WJ in the circumstances of the job in question.
The page of the Ipc for the 528 series aircraft shows a sketch of the pilot's No 1
windscreen and the adjacent DV window, but only illustrates one bolt - that in the
DV window, which is an A211-7D. The components for the pilot's No 1
window are listed in the text, along with several alternative modification states,
and its bolts are defined as 'attaching parts' and are identified as A21 1-8Ds. The
IPCfor the 510 series, in contrast, is very clear in identifying the correct bolts.
The bolts actually fitted to the defective windscreen were, in the main, A21 1-7Ds,
the bolts illustrated as applicable to the DV window. That is bolts of the correct
diameter but 0.1 of an inch shorter than those specified.
c. Bolt selection
The Shift Maintenance Manager removed the windscreen with the aid of the
Avionics Supervisor, who also disconnected the electrical connectors of the
screen heaters. The bolts were 'on condition' items, and as some of the paint-
filled bolt heads had been damaged during removal, and others showed signs of
corrosion, the Shift Maintenance Manager decided to replace them and took one
of the bolts to the store to identify it by comparison with those held in the
carousel. The carousels were under the control of a storeman and had drawers
which were clearly labelled with a location code to which engineers were directed,
after entering the part number into the adjacent stores computer terminal.
Because of their small head size the bolts do not carry individual identification,
but the Shift Maintenance Manager accurately matched the removed bolt by going
through several trays, and comparing the removed bolt with the drawer contents.
He then identified the part number of the bolt as A21 1-7D by looking at the stores
issue note in the drawer (the windscreen should have been fitted using A211-
8Ds). The Stores Supervisor, who had been in the job for about 16 years,
informed him that A21 1-8Ds were used to fit that windscreen, but did not press
the point. The Shift Maintenance Manager decided that as A21 1-7D bolts had
come out, he would replace them with bolts of the same size.
The minimum stock level in the carousel for A211-7D bolts was 50, but there
were only four or five bolts in the drawer (when checked by the AAIB the
following Monday it contained four). The Shift Maintenance Manager drove to
the unsupervised carousel underneath the International Pier, taking the removed
bolt with him. The drawers in this carousel were labelled with the part number of
the contents, although the labels were old and faded. The ambient illumination in
this area was poor and the Shift Maintenance Manager had to interpose himself
between the carousel and the light source to gain access to the relevant carousel
drawers. He did not use the drawer labels, even though he now knew the part
number of the removed bolt, but identified what he thought were identical bolts
by placing the bolts together and comparing them. He also picked up six A21 1-
9Ds, thinking that the attachment of the outboard corner post fairing strip would
need longer bolts.
The old seal was found to be serviceable, so the new windscreen, which weighed
60 pounds, was manoeuvred into position and the electrical connections made.
d. Torque loading of the bolts
The aircraft manual calls for a torque of 15 lbf in to be applied to the bolts, which
are then retorqued to 5 lbf in after 100 flying hours. The Shift Maintenance
Manager's experience told him that many of the bolts would be found up to three
turns loose during the retorque procedure, so he decided to increase the initial
torque to 20 lbf in.
The British Airways toolstore at Birmingham held a calibrated dial indicating

torque wrench to cover the range of 5 to 120 lbf in, but the retorque requirement
of 5 lbf in was at the bottom of the range and the dial indicating torque wrench
was not considered suitable for this task. Two calibrated torque checking gauges
were available at Birmingham to allow engineers to c o n f i i the wrench accuracy.
The calibrated dial-indicating torque wrench was not available on the toolboard
that night, but the Stores Supervisor had recently acquired from British Airways
at London, on his own initiative, a torque limiting screwdriver specifically for the
windscreen task, but on receipt it was found to be out of calibration date and it
was therefore not cleared for use. It was not the company policy at Birmingham
to allow the engineers to adjust torque wrenches as and when required, but rather
to have the wrenches adjusted in a standards room and then issued for use at that
specific setting. It was therefore the intention of the Stores Supervisor to have it
set in the London standards room before issue, but, in the absence of any suitable
alternative, the storeman set this screwdriver to the figure of 20 lbf in requested
and gave it to the Shift Maintenance Manager, who checked the setting using both
torque checking gauges.
The Shift Maintenance Manager used a 3/4 inch bi-hexagonal socket to hold the
No 2 Phillips screwdriver bit onto the speedbrace used to run the screws down
into the countersinks. The socket did not have any means, such as a spring clip,
to retain the screwdriver bit, consequently the Shift Maintenance Manager found
that during the two-handed operation of using the speedbrace the bit fell out
several times and he had to descend from the safety raiser (mobile staging) and
retrieve it from the floor. To overcome this problem when using the same '/4 inch
bi-hexagonal socket with the torque limiting screwdriver, he held the screwdriver
in his right hand and used his left hand to hold the bit in the socket. Additionally,
to reach most of the bolts with both hands from the safety raiser, he had to stretch
across the nose of the aircraft, outside the safety rail provided by the safety raiser.
This situation was exacerbated by the fact that the safety raiser was incorrectly
positioned alongside the aircraft. His left hand obscured his view of the bolt
head, and the need to stretch removed the operation from his direct vision.
He fitted the windscreen using 84 of the bolts collected from the International Pier
carousel and obtained a similar feel from the torque limiting screwdriver for each
one; a feel that met his expectations. When he came to the outboard corner post
fairing stip he realised that the A21 1-9D bolts were too long, descended from the
staging and retieved and refitted the six old bolts that he had removed with the
fairing.
The new bolts that he had fitted were in fact A211-8C bolts - one size down in
diameter but with the same thread pitch as those specified and within 0.050 of an
inch in length to the A21 1-7D bolts removed from the window. The bolts engage
in 10 UNF 'Kaylock' floating anchor nuts; the self locking action is the result of
part of the nut being an elliptical shape prior to the insertion of the bolt. Some of
the anchor nuts were attached directly to the inside of the aircraft window frame
and some were carried on strips, themselves attached to the window frame. The
outboard corner post fairing strip interposed an additional thickness and required
A211-8D bolts, and these were specified for the attachment of the whole
windscreen, even though in the majority of locations approximately five threads
would be visible below an anchor nut fastened directly to the frame when used
with an A21 1-8D bolt. The amount of thread in safety would be reduced when
used with the backing strips and the outboard corner post fairing.
e. Missedcues
The safety raiser used by the Shift Maintenance Manager did not give easy access
across to the centreline of the aircraft, and he had to stretch over the aircraft nose
to accomplish the task. Due to the inadequate access to the job and the obscuring
effect of his left hand the Shift Maintenance Manager was not in a position to
observe that the bolt thread was slipping in the anchor nut thread, instead of the
torque limiting screwdriver allowing its shaft to remain stationary while the
handle rotated. However, the bit and socket would have continued to rotate in his
left hand.
The window was finished in primer and had countersunk holes for the bolts; an
A211-8C bolt head sits significantly further below the surface of the window,
down in the countersink, than does an A211-8D bolt head, leaving an annulus of
unfilled countersink which is easily discernable when viewed under good
conditions. This excessive annulus of unfilled countersink was not seen.
When the bolts were being fitted to the windscreen centre column, the bolts from
the right hand window, the heads of which filled the countersinks, were close to
those of the left hand window, and, although painted, the difference is perceptible
under normal circumstances. The Shift Maintenance Manager missed this
difference in depth of the bolt heads in the windscreen centre column. (See
photograph in Appendix E).
When fitting the outside corner post fairing with the six bolts previously removed
from it, the Shift Maintenance Manager failed to notice the difference in torque
achieved or the difference in countersink fit of the bolt heads between the old and
new bolts.
The following night the Shift Maintenance Manager carried out another
windscreen change, this time a right hand one. The job had been set up before he
arrived and he noticed that the bolts were A211-8Ds. He recalled fitting A21 1-7D
bolts the previous night, but he rationalised that the aircraft were old and of
differing modification states and the previous night he had an aircraft modification
standard requiring A211-7D bolts and that night he had an aircraft requiring
A21 1-8D bolts.
f. Documentation
The documentation used to report and clear the defect stated:-
DEFECT SYMPTOM ACTION TAKEN
SYSTEM Port Windscreen
During cruise darkening & bubbling Windscreen replaced.

noted in small area on bottom LH port A.S.R. Actioned.
windscreen. Q.R.H. drill carried out. F/Check satis
SIGNED BY REPORTING CAPTAIN SIGNED BY ENGINEER

(SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING DECLARATION)
THE WORK RECORDED ABOVE HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AIR NAVIGATION ORDER FOR THE TIME BEING IN
FORCE AND IN THAT RESPECT THE AIRCRAFI"/EQUIPMENT IS CONSIDERED FIT
FOR RELEASE TO SERVICE
Note:
Q.R.H Quick Reference Handbook.

A.S.R Air Safety Report, raised by the captain. The Shift Maintenance
Manager's action was to clear the defect.
F/Check Functional check of the windscreen heating system.
1 .I 7.5 Prevalent attituaks
During the course of the investigation a number of visits to the operator's

engineering facility at Birmingham were made, the Shift Maintenance Manager
who changed the windscreen was interviewed and informal interviews conducted
with the other maintenance managers in order to provide a context for the actions
of the engineer who undertook the windscreen replacement task. Subsequently
these managers provided written signed statements, mostly concerned with the
range of issues raised at the interviews.
The overriding impression given by the Maintenance Managers was that morale
was high and that they were proud of their record in meeting the task and of the
way that they went about it.
The Shift Maintenance Managers did not criticise the shift system, however the
potential problems associated with sleep deprivation and circadian effects were
acknowledged and various strategies were cited to cope with the situation.
During the initial part of the investigation the Shift Maintenance Manager who
carried out the windscreen fit did not appear to grasp the lack of care that his
actions implied. He co-operated fully in the investigation and, when shown the
full list of errors and omissions that he had made, offered an explanation for each
individual action.
The Area Manager was aware of the pressures to produce aircraft that the Shift
Maintenance Managers worked under, and continually stressed that there were
other objectives besides maximising the work throughput on the shifts.
Four of the six Maintenance Managers who subsequently gave written statements
raised the issue of the large numbers of E1022 forms originated at Birmingham
and concluded that these indicated their concern for quality and general standards.
One Maintenance Manager stated that he felt that the QMP system was in its
infancy at the time of the accident but that the E1022 process was well known.
He went on to say that the staff at Birmingham felt more comfortable with the
E1022 system because they knew exactly how it worked and they knew that they
would get a response.
Another Maintenance Manager also concluded that when he returned damaged

parts through the E1022 system he had direct contact with the development
engineerr by telephone and his requests were actioned without them being
channelled through a third party. The E1022 system was therefore more
effective, the QMPs took longer to action and were, in his opinion, clearly for
non-urgent quality lapses.
I .I 7.6 Human factors
1.17.6.1 Personal details
The person who fitted the windscreen was a Shift Maintenance Manager holding
authorisations on BAC One-Eleven, Boeing 737, Boeing 757, HS 748 and with
transit authorisations on L-1011 Tristar, Boeing 747 and a CAA licence holder for
airframe and engines on the Viscount. His experience included 10 years in the
RAF, followed by 23 years with British Airways. He appeared to be a mature,
dedicated engineer who was well respected by flightcrew and engineers alike. No
domestic or financial distractions were identified, either by British Airways
management, the Behavoural Psychologist engaged by the AAIB who
interviewed him or the AAIB Inspectors; the Shift Maintenance Manager denied
any such problems.
He had been on leave over the period of the last night shift carried out by his shift
and so the Friday/Saturday night shift during which the windscreen was fitted
was his first night work for approximately five weeks. He had had a normal
nights sleep the previous night and had gone to bed at about 1730 hrs, and had
slept for 11/2 hours, getting up at 2030 hrs. He said that he would have been
happier if he had slept for an hour longer, but wasn't dismayed that he had not.
The last shift worked by the Shift Maintenance Manager was on Tuesday 5 June
from 0630 hrs to 1500 hrs.
The Shift Maintenance Manager made limited use of a fairly weak prescription for
reading glasses, but did not habitually use them at work and was not wearing
them when making the bolt selection.
His record with British Airways has been reported as exemplary and he had
received commendationsduring this period.
1.17.6.2 Behavoural Psychologists's Report
A Behavoural Psychologist interviewed the Shift Maintenance Manager who

carried out the windscreen fitting task and was present during AAIB interviews
with him and informal interviews with the other Maintenance Managers. His
report is included at Appendix F.
1.17.6.3 Opthalmologist's Report
The Shift Maintenance Manager was examined by a consultant in opthalmology

who concluded that his eyes were normal with full central fields and normal
ocular muscle balance. He had full stereoscopic vision and his intra-ocular
pressures were normal. However he was presbyopic and for this he needed
glasses for close work, and his own half-eye reading glasses were perfectly
adequate for his needs.
If he were to read small print or figures without his reading glasses, he would
have difficulty. With his reading glasses and in good lighting, he would have no
problems.
1.17.6.4 Relationship between Serious Accidents and Near Misses
Two analyses of groups of accidents and incidents occurring in industrial

situations have shown that for every serious accident there can be between 4001to
6002 near misses. These figures indicate that, in an industrial context, degraded
standards may exist for some time before a serious accident occurs or the situation
becomes apparent to an independent observer.
The experience of accidents involving aircraft maintenance shows that an accident

usually occurs as a result of a series of errors, and that the probability of the
accident occurring is low compared with the probabilities of the individual failures
in the chain of events leading to it. The incorrect installation of the windscreen
resulted from a sequence of contributory events ( para 1.17.4.2), any one of
which, if identified and eliminated from the chain could have prevented the
windscreen loss.
I .I 7.7 The efsects of rapid decompression
In an attempt to analyse and quantify the dynamic forces and physiological effects
caused by the loss of the windscreen, all the available data was presented to the
Aircrew Systems Division of the RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine, RAE
Farnborough.
The conclusions drawn suggested that the critical factors affecting the
survivability of all the aircraft occupants were the time of decompression and the
final cabin altitude. Those affecting the commander were the time of
Per TyePearson
Per Frank Bird
decompression and the final altitude of exposure, together with the low
temperature and the aerodynamic forces to which he was exposed during the
remainder of the flight.
Calculation provided that the duration of the decompression was likely to have
been in the region of 1.13 to 1.46 seconds, and this was supported by the
duration of the rapid changes of aircraft attitude. The maximum cabin altitude,
achieved during this time period, depended upon the interaction between the ram
effect of the outside airflow and the airflow provided by the internal
pressurisation systems. Analysis suggested that this was unlikely to have been
greater than 13,000 to 13,500 feet which, when followed by the descent profile
flown, would not have promoted sufficient hypoxia to impair either the
passengers or the crew.
The forces acting upon the commander, to project him through the windscreen
aperture, were a function of the differential pressure between the inside and
outside of the cabin and are calculated as having a force of approximately 5,357
pounds (depending upon his exact proximity to the aperture). This would be
quite adequate to drive a person weighing 70 kg from his seat and through the
aperture, whereafter the ram effect of the airstream would pin him to the fuselage
and seriously impair movement.
1.18 New investigation techniques
None.
2 Analysis
2.1 General
The crew were faced with an instantaneous and unforeseen emergency. The
combined actions of the co-pilot and cabin crew successfully averted what could
have been a major catastrophe. The fact that all those on board the aircraft
survived is a tribute to their quick thinking and perseverance in the face of a
shocking experience.
Up to the time of the loss of the windscreen, the flight had proceeded
uneventfully and in accordance with the company's normal procedures. It was
quite in order for the flight crew to release their shoulder harnesses once they
were established in the climb and, for reasons of comfort, the commander
loosened his lap strap as he neared the cruising phase of the two and a half hour
flight to Malaga. Therefore, when the left windscreen was blown out, it was not
surprising that the commander, who was very lightly built, was drawn partially
through the windscreen aperture. It is not certain what prevented his complete
egress from the aircraft but, since the No 2 steward later had to free his legs from
a position between the control column and the flight deck coaming, it is likely that
he had been restrained by his legs during the initial stage of the emergency.
Later, he was restrained simply by the efforts of the No 2 steward who was
holding on to both of his legs.
The co-pilot immediately took control of the aircraft and was able to establish a
rapid descent despite the disorientating effects of the dramatically transformed
cockpit environment coupled with a push over and right roll. It was fortunate that
he was an experienced pilot with more than 1,OOO hours experience of flying the
BAC One-Eleven aircraft. Thus he was able to handle the aircraft on his own and
complete the normal operating procedures from memory without the assistance of
another pilot. He alone was faced with a double emergency, namely rapid
decompression and incapacitation of the handling pilot. He rejected the idea of
donning his oxygen mask in favour of being able to shout instructions to his
cabin crew. In the event, this was probably sensible but if the depressurisation
had occurred at a greater height, say above 20,000 feet, it would have been
imperative for him to don the oxygen mask to avoid incapacitation to the extent
that he could not fly the aircraft.
2.2 Engineering Factors
2.2.1 The selection and use of the wrong bolts
The windscreen was lost because it had been secured by bolts, the vast majority
of which were of an incorrect diameter. The windscreen fitting process was
characterised by a series of poor work practices, poor judgements and perceptual
errors, each one of which eroded the factors of safety built into the method of
operation promulgated by British Airways:-
a. During the fitment of the windscreen to G-BJRT the Shift Maintenance

Manager was confronted with certain situations which made his job more
difficult:-
Incorrect bolts, A21 1-7D had been used in the previous installation
Insufficient stock of A21 1-7D bolts, incorrect but demonstrably adequate,

existed in the carousel in the bay stores at the Eastern Apron.
Nevertheless, problems of this type are not unusual and cannot be used to explain
the subsequent chain of events which led to the loss of the windscreen.
b. A number of procedures were ignored and some poor trade practices

followed:-
The IPC, available to identify the required bolts' part number was not used
The stores TIME system, available to identify the stock level and location of
the required bolts, was not used
Physical matching of old and new bolts by touch and eye was attempted,
leading to a mismatch with bolts from the International pier carousel
Arbitrary choice of A21 1-9Ds to fit through the comer fairing took place
An increase in bolt torque over that stated in the Maintenance Manual was
used.
c. Non conformity with British Airways standards was also demonstrated:-
An uncontrolled torque limiting screwdriver was set up outside the

Calibration Room.
d. Use of unsuitable equipment took place:-
A bi-hexagonal bit holder was used leading to occasional loss of the bit and
covering of the bolt head during the torquing process
A Safety Raiser which provided inadequate access to the job was used.
e. A number of cues were either ignored or missed:-
The warning from the Storekeeper that A2 1 1-8D bolts were required did not
influence the choice of bolts
The amount of unfilled countersink left by the small boltheads was not
recognised as excessive
The increased amount of unfilled countersink with the new bolts, compared
to the flush fitting of adjacent, correctly sized bolt heads in the windscreen
centre column, went unnoticed
The difference in torque and the amount of countersink remaining unfilled

between the new bolts and old bolts used in the corner fairing went
unnoticed
The use of, as he thought, A21 1-7Ds when using A21 1-8Ds the next night
was not questioned
The difference between the bolt thread stripping idthrough the nut and the
torque limiting screwdriver 'breaking' was not recognised even though the
bi-hexagonal socket and screwdriver bit, located by his left hand, were still
rotating. However, the high residual torque of the particular screwdriver
resulted in a less positive 'break' and, although the break torque was never
achieved with the 8 UNC bolts, it was when setting the screwdriver and
when installing the fairing. This screwdriver, on reaching the set torque
may have felt more like the thread stripping than would one with a more
'snappy' break.
2.2.2 The windscreen replacement task
The windscreen is part of the aircraft's pressurised hull and is attached from the
outside by 90 bolts. It may be the only critical item on the aircraft that was
susceptible to failure through the chain of circumstances listed above, in that:-
a. Its replacement required the renewal of the majority of the bolts in the
judgement of the Shift MaintenanceManager.
b. The wrong diameter bolts engaged with the anchor nuts, and had the
same thread pitch.
c. The bolts were not special to type items needing a part number to
identify and obtain replacements, but were general use items, obtainable
from an uncontrolled carousel.
d. The windscreen was not designed on the plug principle such that
internal air pressure would hold it in place, but was fitted from the outside.
e. The windscreen replacement was not designated a 'Vital Point' task,

therefore no duplicate inspection was required.
f. The Shift Maintenance Manager was the only person whose work on the
night shift was not subject to the review of a maintenance manager.
The windscreen may therefore have been unique in that it alone, of all the critical
components, could have accommodated the errors which occurred during its
fitment, to expose them so dramatically the first time that the windscreen was
called upon to resist cabin pressure. Had it been any other item, the selection of
the wrong bolts may have been unmistakably apparent during the fitting process,
or the subsequent failure may not have been so obvious or traumatic.
2.2.3 Relevant British Airways' Procedures
2.2.3.1 AGS dispensing
The use of unsupervised dispensers for aircraft general spares is a recognised and
necessary part of aircraft engineering practice. Small units can rarely afford to
keep a full-time storekeeper to administer a dispenser, or even a store, and good
trade practice has to be relied upon. Before the Shift Maintenance Manager went
to the unmanned carousel he knew the part number of the bolts he was seeking,
and although they were too short, similar bolts had held the old windscreen in
place for four years. Despite the poor segregation, labelling and lighting, the
selection of the wrong bolts cannot be explained by the carousel system.
2.2.3.2 Work by Shift Maintenance Managers
During the course of his duties the Shift Maintenance Manager reviewed the work
of his shift, this review augmented the self certification task required of the
engineers by British Airways' maintenance policy. Once he had decided to cany
out rectification work himself, he withdrew from the active supervision of the rest
of the shift. The task of the windscreen installation was not designated a
'Vital Point' and consequently no duplicate inspection was called for and none
took place, nor was the work of the Shift Maintenance Manager subject to review
by another manager.
Thus the Shift Maintenance Manager had no backstop with any chance of
detecting his errors. Errors that were made more likely by the sleep deprivation
and circadian effects associated with the end of a first night shift.
2.2.4 Quality Assurance
2.2.4.1 Application of Self Certification to Aircraft Engineering
The adoption of self certification systems within manufacturing industry has

typically resulted in savings, mainly arising through reduction in scrap and in the
achievement of higher manufacturing efficiency. Nevertheless, at the end of the
production line the product is normally still tested, before being despatched.
Some aircraft maintenance tasks which may be undertaken using self certification
procedures do not allow for the testing of the end product before it is flown.
It could be argued that the concept of self certification suffers from the drawback
that the expectations of the engineer are such that he is unlikely to detect an error
of his own making; the application of self certification reduces the level of
inspection and supervision.
It is recommended that the applicability of self certification to aircraft engineering

safety critical tasks following which the components or systems are cleared for
service without functional checks, should be reviewed by the CAA. Such a
review should include the interpretation of 'single mal-assembly' within the
context of 'Vital Points' and the requirements which include a waiver making the
definition of 'Vital Points' non-mandatory for aircraft with a Maximum Take-Off
Weight Authorised of over 5,700 kg which were manufactured in accordance
with a Type Certificate issued prior to 1 January 1986.
2.2.4.2 Feedback
A fundamental requirement of any management process is a feedback loop to

detect the success or failure of the system, and two types of feedback are available
- a formal feedback through auditing/monitoring activities and an informal
feedback through free discussion amongst engineers discussing their work
problems in an open forum.
Some feedback was generated by the monitoring of a series of performance

parameters which were airline parameters with quality overtones rather than
parameters capable of giving a comprehensive picture of the engineering quality
built into tasks. The crucial element missing was direct assessment of the
standards used by the Shift Maintenance Managers to perform their tasks.
Whilst literature circulated by British Airways stressed the need for open
reporting through QMDRs, a number of the Maintenance Managers indicated that
they felt more comfortable with the E1022, Ground Occurrence Report Form,
with which they were particularly familiar, finding it a more direct and responsive
reporting system. The findings at Birmingham are consistent with the British
Airways Audit Team sampling of QMP awareness in 1988 and a further QMP
survey in 1989 which identified that a lack of comprehension still existed. At the
time of the accident action to remedy this was still under discussion within British
Airways.
The E1022 system was well established and understood when QMP was
introduced three years before the accident. The statements of the Birmingham
Maintenance Managers indicate that at least some of them still prefer, and may
use, the E1022 system in instances when a QMDR might be more appropriate.
The list of circumstances under which an E1022 is to be used appears to overlap
into procedural areas which might be thought of as the domain of the QMP
system.
Some evidence of a quality problem within the British Airways engineering unit at
Birmingham is provided by the failure of the unit to use the Continuous
Monitoring system to report some of the problems seen during investigation of
the windscreen fitment:-
The poor labelling and segregation of parts in the uncontrolled carousel

under the International Pier
Inadequate access available to certain areas of the aircraft from the work
platform
Inadequate tools to achieve some specific torque loading
Windscreen attachment bolts found loose at the 100 hour re-torque.
It is recommended that British Airways review their Quality Assurance system

and the relative roles of E1022s and QMDRs be clarified and that they continue to
educate and encourage their engineers to provide feedback from the shop floor.
2.2.4.3 Local Management
The Area Maintenance Manager did not directly observe the work methods of the
engineers at Birmingham. His involvement in monitoring consisted of processing
the monthly Product Samples and the QMDRs raised by his staff, along with
monitoring levels and trends of a set of performance parameters on the BAC One-
Eleven fleet. Whilst these parameters may form part of a quality monitoring
system they are inadequate to inform management about the standards used by
individual Shift Maintenance Managers.
The Station Maintenance Manager was directly responsible for the work of the
Shift Maintenance Managers, and he was also responsible for carrying out
Product Samples on his area. Because his job required him to work during the
day he was rarely present during the night shift. No evidence was presented of
any 'in-place' system to monitor the standards used by individual Shift
Maintenance Managers.
The relationship between the Station Maintenance Manager and the Shift
Maintenance Managers was ill-defined, there was no clear delegation of duties,
itemised terms of reference were not available and the duties of the Shift
Maintenance Managers were not documented.
As a result of the lack of specific direction of duties neither the Area Maintenance
Manager nor the Station Maintenance Manager observed the standards employed
by individual Shift Maintenance Managers.
It is recommended that British Airways should review the need to introduce job
descriptions/terms of reference for engineering grades of Shift Maintenance
Manager and above.
2.2.4.4 Product Samples and Quality Audits
The principle that personnel carrying out quality audits should be independent of
the specific activities or areas being monitored is reflected in British Airways'
documentation. The same principle of independence should apply to the Product
Samples, even though they were a check on standards rather than an audit.
However, not only were the Product Samples at Birmingham carried out by the
person who had direct managerial responsibility for the tasks, but the results were
sent to the British Airways Quality Audit Unit for the attention of the CAA. It is
unreasonable to expect that someone who has condoned, or not recognised, the
practice as a manager will report it under the aegis of his quality assurance
responsibilities to such bodies.
At the time of the accident a physical audit of the Birmingham base was about due
according to the QMP schedule. The British Airways Quality Audit Unit had last
visited Birmingham two years before the accident over a two day period and were
satisfied with the engineering standards.
It is recommended that British Airways should review the Product Sample

procedure with a view to achieving an independent assessment of standards and
conduct an in-depth audit into the work practices at Birmingham.
2.2.4.5 CAA SupervisoryVisits
The CAA supervision of the engineering functions of operators, away from their
main bases, is undertaken by FOI 7, and the British Airways engineering facility
at Birmingham was given a half-day visit approximately a year before the
accident. The visit, in view of the time allocated, was necessarily superficial and
only likely to have picked up gross discrepancies.
It is recommended that the CAA should review the purpose and scope of the
FOI 7 Supervisory Visit.
2.2.5 Technicalstandurds
Every engineer was responsible for the quality of his own work under the British
Airways QMP. Quality standards at Birmingham were the responsibility of the
local management; the Area Manager and his deputy, the Station Maintenance
Manager, as part of their routine daily management task. Additionally the
monthly Product Samples looked at methods and standards of work. Further
quality monitoring was conducted during audits by the British Airways Quality
Audit Unit and supervisory visits by the CAA. Thus any explanation of how
inadequate work standards came to be employed on the night in question would
also have to explain how the various quality and management monitors failed to
detect earlier evidence of such inadequate standards. This could have been
because the Shift Maintenance Manager had generally maintained high standards
and his actions on the night were not representative of his normal standards or the
monitoring procedures had failed to detect inadequate standards employed by him
for some time, or some combination of the two. The two extreme explanations
are categorised as follows:-
a. The Random Failure Theory
The lapses on that night were a 'one-off and therefore there had not been
any previous symptoms to alert managemendqualitymonitors.
b. The Systems Failure Theory
The lapses were typical of standards employed by the Shift Maintenance

Manager, which were either known to the managemendquality monitors,
who condoned them, or were not known to them because they had been
unable to monitor the situation satisfactorily.
The track record of the One-Eleven fleet at Birmingham, in terms of the

engineering criteria monitored, indicated that standards were generally good and
the Product Samples and Continuous Monitoring reported only minor
discrepancies. This impression of a satisfactory operation, gained from in-house
sampling at Birmingham, was supported by independent information from the
physical audit carried out by British Airways Quality Audit Unit and the visit by
the CAA. However, such quality lapses as those perpetrated by the Shift
Maintenance Manager would not have been apparent to other than detailed
observation until combined with such a task as the windscreen change. (See
Paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).
Some studies on the effects of human error on industrial safety indicate that the
ratio of near misses to serious accidents could be as high as 600:1, therefore
inadequate standards can be applied over a considerable period of time before
giving rise to a reportable accident or notifiable occurrence. This implies that a
series of degraded procedures could be applied over a period of time without
becoming apparent.
British Airways point to the exemplary record of the Shift Maintenance Manager
throughout his service with them as being proof of the continuing satisfaction of
local management with the Shift Maintenance Manager's standards, and that
record as being incompatible with anything other than an isolated example of
inadequate work standards.
The Behavoural Psychologist described the Shift Maintenance Manager as

conscientious and pragmatic rather than conscientious and meticulous. The
behaviour of a man who, based on experience, changed the mandatory torque
setting for the bolts, visually matched the replacement bolts, and arbitrarily
selected A21 1-9D bolts for the fairing is compatible with that description only if
he believed that these practices were accepted at Birmingham (whether or not they
were in fact accepted).
Many of the actions taken that night by the Shift Maintenance Manager may be
described as evidence of a lack of sufficient care in the execution of his
responsibilities. Such a catalogue of events does not equate to a momentary lapse
in behaviour but is more indicative of the approach of a conscientious and
pragmatic engineer working in an non-procedural manner. Such a description of
the individual is not necessarily inconsistent with his 'exemplary record, because
until matched with a task such as this windscreen change, his approach was
capable of going undetected by anything other than a close observation of his
work practices.
At no time was any evidence presented to indicate that the standards and practices
used on that night were in any way different from those used generally by the
Shift Maintenance Manager. Nor were any external or job-related pressures
identified which may have caused a lack of concentration. Indeed, even when
shown the full list of errors and omissions that he had made, he still offered an
explanation for each individual action.
The number of errors perpetrated on the night of this job came about because
procedures were abused, 'short-cuts' employed and mandatory instructions
ignored. Even when doubt existed about the correct size of bolt to use, the
authoritative documents were not consulted. After the event the Shift
Maintenance Manager concerned demonstrated a lack of appreciation of the
significance of failure to adhere to the specified procedures, good trade practices
and even the requirements of the Maintenance Manual. This makes it most
unlikely, in the view of the AAIB, that the practices which permitted such errors
were 'one-offs' but supports the argument for a longer term failure by the Shift
Maintenance Manager to observe the promulgated procedures.
Such compromised standards on the part of the Shift Maintenance Manager

cannot explain all of the errors which led to the accident, such as his failure to
react to the various cues indicating that something was wrong. However, they
did reduce his potential to achieve quality in the task and provided a context in
which mistakes could go undetected, building into a critical chain.
Thus the explanation of how the catalogue of errors occurred on the night in
question lies somewhere on the continuum between the stated extremes of
Random and System Theories with contributions from each. The system element
being that which accommodated the application of inadequate standards by the
Shift Maintenance Manager for some time and the perceptual errors contributing
the random element.
2.2.6 Engineering Requirements
2.2.6.1 Periodic training and testing
There is clear evidence of a different philosophy applied to pilots, who are

required to undergo regular line and base standardisation checks, and engineers
who are not subjected to any comparable standardisation or refresher checks.
An experienced Licenced Engineer with an exemplemy record demonstrated an
abuse of procedures, employed short cuts, ignored mandatory instructions and
failed to conform with what is generally regarded as 'good trade practice'.
Therefore, it is recommended that the need for periodic training and testing of
maintenance engineers should be reviewed by the CAA.
2.2.6.2 Check lists and technical documentation
The work of flightcrew during routine and emergency operations is highly

formalised, with check lists to be followed at critical stages of the flight. Even
though they may have already performed the operation several times previously
that day, the flightcrew will still follow a check list, item by item, on each
occasion, and in some cases individual responses will be monitored by another
crew member. Whilst the use of the Maintenance Manual is mandatory and some
of the processes detailed in it are complex, apart from work on flying and engine
controls, and 'Vital Points' (if defined) an authorised engineer may work on an
aircraft unsupervised and unchecked.
In spite of the itemised nature of the procedures detailed in the Maintenance

Manual, in some areas on work not involving flying and engine controls,
including the BAC One-Eleven windscreen change, an engineer may clear the
documentation with a one line statement saying in effect, 'Defect cleared', with a
pre-printed Release to Service certificate contained on the form. The use of an
itemised servicing procedure in the form of a document that requires signatures at
each stage is considered to be a valuable aid to ensuring that the correct process
has been acknowledged and signed for.
2.2.6.3 Eyesight standards
The Shift Maintenance Manager required mild corrective lenses to read small print
or figures and he did not use his glasses whilst performing the windscreen
replacement. The lack of corrective glasses cannot account for the majority of the
errors made that night, but may have subconsciously influenced the Shift
Maintenance Manager in short circuiting some of the procedures which rely on
adequate eyesight.
It is recommended that the CAA should recognise the need for the use of
corrective glasses, if prescribed, in association with the undertaking of aircraft
engineering tasks.
2.3 ATC Emergency procedures
In the circumstances it was imperative that the co-pilot was given all the help that
could be made available. In this case the Bristol Sector Controller neither
complied with the co-pilot's specific request for radar navigational assistance, nor
did he advise the flight of its position or give any relevant information regarding
Southampton, such as current weather, runway in use, pressure settings, etc, as
would have been expected
Given that emergencies are rare, it is inadvisable to leave to chance the possibility
of a controller having experience in such a situation. The provision of training in
the handling of emergencies and other infrequent occurrences is therefore
considered to be essential. A persuasive argument in favour of emergency
training is that adequate preparation can lessen the stress which may be induced in
the real situation. While such an argument has a good deal of face validity,
supporting data are not easy to find. Nevertheless, experiencing similar situations
in training and learning to cope, should instil in the individual a degree of
confidence in his ability to handle real events. Emergency evacuation and fire
drills are conducted on this premise.
It is sometimes argued that training for emergencies is not possible because all
emergencies are essentially different from each other, cannot be anticipated and
therefore cannot be programmed into a course of training. The fact that
emergencies will differ in detail or in the precise accumulation of events which
lead to their occurrence, does not, however, negate the value of training. All too
often emergency training focuses on the use of a limited number of problem
situations. These become familiar to trainees and are seldom updated from one
training course to the next. Not only will trainees lack the ability to cope with
other events, but this method encourages a tendency to fit novel situations into
known patterns using strategies which have worked in the past but may not be
applicable to the current problems. During training a variety of scenarios should
be employed to provide both experience in coping with a number of different
situations and the opportunity to build confidence in handling them.
Whilst no two emergencies may be identical, there are a number of basic steps
which have to be taken in dealing with them. In ATC terms this would include
ensuring that there are no other conflicting aircraft, ascertaining the extent of the
problem, informing the appropriate emergency services, etc. If these predictable
elements of emergency handling are well trained and automatic they release 'spare
capacity' which can be devoted to coping with the unanticipated or unique aspects
of each case.
The Bristol Sector Controller quite properly intended to allow his actions to be
guided by the decisions of the co-pilot and the Bristol CSC but he formulated no
specific plan of action to deal with the emergency. No training programme,
however well constructed, can guarantee the trainee's performance during a
genuine emergency. However, more preparation for handling emergencies
during both initial training and as part of a systematic pattern of refresher training
and skill maintenance may help controllers involved in incidents to realise that
such events can happen and would prepare them to accept the reality of the
situation and to cope with it more effectively.
It is recommended that the Authority ensure that prior to the issue of an ATC
rating a candidate shall undergo an approved course which includes training in
both the theoretical and practical handling of emergency situations. This training
should then be enhanced at the validation stage and later by regular continuation
and refresher exercises.
Conclusions
Findings
The crew were properly licenced, medically fit and rested to conduct the
flight.
The take-off and initial climb from Birmingham were uneventful.
Whilst climbing through 17,300 feet pressure altitude and on a heading

of 195'M, the left windscreen was blown out of its frame under the
influence of cabin air pressure.
The commander was sucked partially out of the windscreen aperture and
blown backwards over the flight deck roof. He was restrained from
further egress by the cabin staff who held onto him until after the aircraft
had landed.
The co-pilot suffered a degree of disorientation but he was able to regain

control of the aircraft and start an immediate descent.
The remaining crew and passengers suffered no ill effects from the rapid
decompression and lack of oxygen. It has been calculated that the cabin
altitude was unlikely to have been greater than 13,000 to 13,500 feet,
achieved within two seconds after the loss of cabin pressure.
The left windscreen had been replaced and the task certificated by the
same Shift Maintenance Manager with the appropriate British Airways
authorisation 27 hours before the accident flight and the aircraft had not
flown since its replacement.
The replacement windscreen had been installed with 84 bolts (A211-8C)

whose diameters were approximately 0.026 of an inch below the
diameters of the specified bolts (A211-8D), and 6 bolts (A211-7D)
which were of the correct diameter, but 0.1 of an inch too short.
The windscreen fitting process was characterised by a series of poor

work practices, poor judgements and perceptual errors, each one of
which eroded the factors of safety built into the method of operation
promulgated by British Airways.
A series of cues were available to the Shift Maintenance Manager to
draw attention to the use of incorrect bolts but all went unnoticed or
unheeded.
Although an independent final inspection would have had a high

probability of detecting the error, the task of the windscreen installation
was not designated a 'Vital Point' and consequently no duplicate
inspection was called for and none took place.
(xii) The work of the Shift Maintenance Manager was not subject to review
by another manager and thus the there was no backstop with any chance
of detecting his errors. Errors that were made more likely by the sleep
deprivation and circadian effects associated with the end of a fist night
shift.
(xiii) The practices employed by the Shift Maintenance Manager which

permitted such errors were not considered to be 'one-offs' but were
symptomatic of a longer term failure on his part to observe the
promulgated procedures.
(xiv) The British Airways local management, Product Samples and Quality
Audits had not detected the application of inadequate standards by the
Shift Maintenance Manager, because they did not monitor directly the
working practices of Shift Maintenance Managers.
The windscreen replacement task may have been unique in that it alone
could accommodate the errors associated with its fitment, such that they
were exposed so dramatically the first time that the windscreen was
called upon to resist cabin pressure.
(mi) The CAA supervisory visit was superficial and as such did not monitor
the working practices of Shift Maintenance Managers.
(xvii) The British Airways local Product Samples at Birmingham did not
provide an independent assessment of standards as they were carried out
by the person who had direct managerial responsibility for the tasks.
(xviii) Literature circulated by British Airways stressed the need for open
reporting through QMDRs, however, a number of the Maintenance
Managers indicated that they felt more comfortable with the E1022,
Ground Occurrence Report Form,with which they were particularly
familiar, finding it a more direct and responsive reporting system.
(xix) The Shift Maintenance Manager required mild corrective lenses to read
small print or figures but did not use his glasses whilst performing the
windscreen replacement.
(xx) Following receipt of the co-pilot's distress message, and when two way
communication had been re-established, ATC facilitated diversion of the
flight to Southampton Airport.
(xxi) The nature of the emergency was never fully appreciated by LATCC.
(xxii) The Bristol Sector Controller's training in the handling of emergency

situations was probably inadequate.
(xxiii) The recovery to Southampton was managed effectively by the co-pilot

who was assisted by the Southampton Zone Controller.
Causal factors:-
0) A safety critical task, not identified as a 'Vital Point', was undertaken by

one individual who also carried total responsibility for the quality
achieved and the installation was not tested until the aircraft was
airborne on a passenger carrying flight.
(ii) The Shift Maintenance Manager's potential to achieve quality in the

windscreen fitting process was eroded by his inadequate care, poor
trade practices, failure to adhere to company standards and use of
unsuitable equipment, which were judged symptomatic of a longer term
failure by him to observe the promulgated procedures.
(iii) The British Airways local management, Product Samples and Quality
Audits had not detected the existence of inadequate standards employed
by the Shift Maintenance Manager because they did not monitor directly
the working practices of Shift Maintenance Managers.
4 Safety Recommendations
4.1 The CAA should examine the applicability of self certification to aircraft
engineering safety critical tasks following which the components or systems are
cleared for service without functional checks. Such a review should include the
interpretation of 'single mal-assembly' within the context of 'Vital Points' and the
requirements which include a waiver making the definition of 'Vital Points' non-
mandatory for aircraft with a Maximum Take-Off Weight Authorised of over
5,700 kg which were manufactured in accordance with a Type Certificate issued
prior to 1 January 1986.
4.2 British Airways should review their Quality Assurance system and the relative
roles of E1022s and QMDRs be clarified and they should continue to educate and
encourage their engineers to provide feedback €tom the shop floor.
4.3 British Airways should review the need to introduce job descriptions/terms of
reference for engineering grades including Shift Maintenance Manager and above.
4.4 It is recommended that British Airways should review the Product Sample
procedure with a view to achieving an independent assessment of standards and
conduct an in-depth audit into the work practices at Birmingham.
4.5 The CAA should review the purpose and scope of the FOI 7 SupervisoryVisit.
4.6 The CAA should consider the need for the periodic training and testing of
Engineers.
4.7 The CAA should recognise the need for the use of corrective glasses, if
prescribed, in association with the undertaking of aircraft engineering tasks.
4.8 The CAA should ensure that, prior to the issue of an ATC rating, a candidate shall
undergo an approved course which includes training in both the theoretical and
practical handling of emergency situations. This training should then be enhanced
at the validation stage and later by regular continuation and refresher exercises.
D F KING
Inspector of Air Accidents
January 1992
The Civil Aviation Authority's response to these Safety Recommendations is contained in CAA
Follow-up on Accident Reports (FACTAR)No. 1/92, to be published coincident with this
report.
APPENDIX A
ATC TRANSCRIPT
Doubtful words are indicated by a series of question marks. The time signal is shown in
brackets as it occurs in the sequence. There was a slight difference between the time signals at
LATCC and Southampton (SOTON) but it was of no significance and has not been adjusted.
The co-pilot was unable to hear the transmissions from LATCC during the descent and before
he had slowed the aircraft to 150 kt at FL 110, due to the noisy cockpit environment produced
by airflow noise and the captain flailing on the outside of the aircraft.
To From Recorded Intelligence
LATCC BAW 5390 Mayday mayday - - London this is the speedbird five three
nine zero mayday mayday mayd-
BAW 5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero Roger mayday acknowledged
out
LATCC BAW 5390 - - - - ??? ??? ??? Speedbir- (0733)
BAW 5390 LATCC Er Speedbird five three nine zero er c o n f m acknowledge

mayday
LATCC BAW 5390 Mayday mayday
BAW 5390 LATCC Er Speedbird five three nine zero London Control one three
two d- decimal eight mayday acknowledged
LATCC BAW 5390 Speedbird five ??? ??? zero mayday mayday mayday
emergency depressurisation on a radar heading of one nine
five descending to flight level one hundred
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero mayday acknowledged

understand er descending flight level one zero zero on
heading one nine five degrees
LATCC BAW 5390 (0734)Speedbird five three nine zero is maintaining one one
zero -
BAW 5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero understand maintaining one
one zero
LATCC PAA 34 London from thirty four would you like us to try to relay
thirtytwo eight
PAA 34 LATCC Er it's okay Sir I think he may be receiving
? What's that
PAA 34 LATCC Thirty four er thanks all the same Sir
LATCC PAA 34
BAW5390 LATCC And Speedbird five three nine zero how do you read now Sir
LATCC BAW 218 (0735) Er London Speedbird two one eight good morning er
we're descending to flight level two seven zero
BAW218 LATCC Speedbird two one eight good morning Sir make your
heading now one one five degrees and continue descent
down to flight level one one zero to be level abeam Kenet
LATCC BAW 218 - Speedbird two one eight radar heading one one five
descend flight level one one zero to be level abeam Kenet
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero London Control how do you
read
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero London Control how do you
read (0736)
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero er London Control how do
you read now Sir
LATCC DAN 231 London Dan' two three one good morning flight level two
nine zero direct to Berry Head
DAN231 LATCC Dan' two three one good morning Sir maintain flight level
two nine zero
LATCC DAN 23 1 Maintaining two nine zero two three one

LATCC BAL 224A 'Morning London Britannia two two four alfa at three one
eight climbing three three zero direct Berry Head
BAL224A LATCC Britannia two two four alfa good morning maintain flight
level three three zero on reaching
LATCC BAL 224A S- two two four alfa wilco (0737)
LATCC BAL 224A Britannia two two four alfa's reaching three three zero
BAL224A LATCC Two two four alfa roger
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero London one three two eight
(0738)
BAW5390 LATCC Er sorry station calling try again
LATCC EIN 522 Er London the speedbird five three nine zero's having
problems ??? ???
LATCC BAW 5390 ??? ??? five three nine zero do you read
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero read you strength five Sir go
ahead now
BAW5390 EIN522 Five three nine zero go ahead
BAW5390 EIN522 Five three nine zero go ahead London reading you
LATCC BAW 5390 London this is speedbird five three nine zero this is er
speedbird five three nine zero
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero London Control one three two
decimal eight I hear you strength five Sir go ahead now
LATCC BAW 5390 Roger Sir we have had an emergency depressurisation and er
requesting radar assistance please for the nearest airfield
(0739)
BAW5390 LATCC Er speedbird five three nine zero roger can you accept
landing at Southampton
LATCC BAW 5390 Speedbird er five three nine zero I am familiar with Gatwick
would appreciate Gatwick
BAW5390 LATCC Er speedbird five three nine zero roger if you make a left turn
now Sir direct to Mayfeld
LATCC BAW 5390 - nine zero if you can er direct me into Southampton
affmative
BAW5390 LATCC Okay Sir would you prefer Southampton or Gat- er Gatwick
BAW5390 LATCC Er Speedbird five three nine zero c o n f m you wish to route
now to Southampton
LATCC BAW 5390 Speedbird five three nine zero er we have (fuselage) sorry
(heads down) - speedbird five three nine zero - I am
maintaining one one zero I am at er one fifty knots requesting
radar assistance into Southampton
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero roger er standby Sir (0740)
BAW5390 LATCC And speedbird five three nine zero if you er commence
descent Sir down to flight level seven zero initially
LATCC BAW 5390 Descend seven zero five three nine zero
LATCC RYR 506 London the Ryanair five zero six standing by for descent Sir
RYR506 LATCC Five zero six roger cleared down to flight level one one zero
level er by Kenet
LATCC RYR 506 - leaving two one zero for one one zero to be level by Kenet
five - five zero six
LATCC BAW 5390 C o n f i i height cleared to
BAW5390 LATCC Er speedbird five three nine zero you're now cleared down to
flight level seven zero if you make one left hand orbit in your
present position please Sir be handing you off very shortly
(0741)
LATCC BAW 5390 Cleared to seven zero speedbird five three nine zero
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero continue now with London
Control frequency is one three four decimal four five they
will see you into Southampton
LATCC BAW 5390 - four four five thanks very much
BAW5390 LATCC
BAW218 LATCC Speedbird two one eight report your heading now to London
Control frequency is one three two decimal zero five good
hY
LATCC BAW 218 One three two zero five with heading speedbird two one
eight good day
EIN 602 LATCC Shamrock six zero two contact London Control one three
three decimal four five good day
LATCC EIN 602 - Three four five
EIN 522 LATCC Shamrock five two two contact London one two seven
decimal seven good day
LATCC EIN 522 One two seven seven five two two (0742)
RYR 506 LATCC Ryanair five zero six make your heading now zero nine five
degrees
LATCC BAW 5390 This is ??? ??? ??? nine zero descending out of eight zero for
seven zero - no if you could hold on if you could hold onto
him
BAW5390 LATCC Er speedbird five three nine zero roger remain on this
frequency then Sir and I will give you radar vectors into
Southampton
LATCC RYR 506 - Er London c o n f m radar heading zero nine zero for
Ryanair five zero six
RYR506 LATCC Five zero six make it zero nine five please
LATCC RYR 506 Zero nine five for Ryanair five zero six
LATCC BAW 5390 Descending to seven zero Sir
BAW5390 LATCC Five three nine zero roger c o n f m you wish to remain on
this frequency
BAW5390 LATCC And speedbird five three nine zero continue descent now
down to four thousand feet
LATCC BAW 5390 London it's speedbird five three nine zero
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero how do you read now sir
LATCC BAW 5390 Roger reading you er strength five I'm afraid er we have
some er debris in the flight deck and er could you confim
the frequency you changed me to (0743)
BAW5390 LATCC Okay sir if you remain on this frequency sir and continue
descent down to four thousand feet please
LATCC BAW 5390 Four thousand feet on QFE confirm QNH c o n f m
BAW5390 LATCC Affmative sir
LATCC BAW 5390 What is the QNH five three nine zero
BAW5390 LATCC Standby sir
BAW5390 LATCC And speedbird five three nine zero if you check that now on
er frequency one three one decimal zero Southampton
approach
LATCC BAW 5390 One three one decimal zero bye bye
BAW5390 LATCC
LATCC OORDL London oscar oscar romeo delta lima good morning
OORDL LATCC Oscar oscar romeo delta lima good morning sir maintain
flight level eight zero and you can set course from your
present position -
OORDL LATCC - Direct for the bravo romm india
SOTON BAW 5390 - Five three nine zero do you read
BAW5390 LATCC Five three nine zero read you strength five sir
LATCC OORDL Oscar delta lima maintaining eight zero and proceeding direct
er bravo romeo india
BAW5390 LATCC Er speedbird five three nine zero how do you read now sir
(0744)
SOTON BAW 5390 ------ ton it's speedbird five three nine Z -
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero read you strength five go
ahead with your message
BAW5390 LATCC Speedbird five three nine zero
LATCC BAL 224A Er London it's britannia two two four alfa er speedbird five
three nine zero's now talking to Southampton on er one three
one zero
BAL224A LATCC Two two four alfa roger thanks a lot sir
LATCC BAL 224A Thank you (0745)
SOTON BAW 5390 Southampton this is speedbird five three nine zero do you
read (0744)
BAW5390 SOTON Speedbird five three nine zero good morning identified on
hand over London radar six miles to the west of
Southampton airfield what is your passing level
SOTON BAW 5390 Roger sir presently leaving flight level six four could you
c o n f m er your QNH please
BAW5390 SOTON Roger my QNH one zero one nine millibars the runway in
use is runway zero two the wind is three five zero degrees at
twelve knots
SOTON BAW 5390 Roger sir I am not familiar with er er Southampton I request
you shepherd me on to the runway please (0744:30)
BAW 5390 SOTON Roger that is copied roll out then on to a heading of one eight
zero
SOTON BAW 5390 Radar heading of one eight zero speedbird five three nine
zero
BAW5390 SOTON Five three niner zero what is your passing level
SOTON BAW 5390 Passing level size zero for four zero sir
BAW5390 SOTON Thank you and what is your number of persons on board
SOTON BAW 5390 We have eighty four passengers sir and er I think that will be
all until we're on the ground (0745)
BAW5390 SOTON Roger that's copied
BAW5390 SOTON And we've been advised that it's pressurization failure is that
the only problem
BAW5390 SOTON Speedbird five three nine zero turn left heading one one zero
SOTON BAW 5390 Turning left one one zero speedbird five three nine zero
BAW5390 SOTON Five three nine zero we've been advised it's pressurization
failure is that the only problem
SOTON BAW 5390 Er negative sir the er captain is half sucked out of the
aeroplane I understand I believe he is dead (074530)
BAW5390 SOTON Roger that is copied
SOTON BAW 5390 Er flight attendant's holding on to him but er requesting

emergency facilities for the captain I I I think he's dead
BAW5390 SOTON Roger that is copied continue your descent then at two
thousand feet QNH one zero one niner make it a nice gentle
turn at the moment you're seven miles southwest of the
airfield
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three niner er five three nine zero that's a f f m that's er
ro-radar heading one one zero descending to two thousand
feet
BAW5390 SOTON Affirm what is your passing level (0746)
SOTON BAW 5390 I'm leaving flight er five thousand five hundred feet on ten
nineteen
BAW5390 SOTON Roger that's copied give you a little bit more space then turn
right on to a heading of one eight zero
SOTON BAW 5390 Turning right onto one eight zero speedbird five three nine
zero could you please confirm the er the length of your
runway at Southampton is acceptable for er a One-Eleven
(0746:30)
BAW5390 SOTON Yes it is acceptable for a One-Eleven and rll just give you
the figures very shortly
SOTON BAW 5390 Er as long as we have er at least two and a half thousand
metres I am happy
BAW5390 SOTON Er I', afraid we don't have two and a half thousand metres
neither do Bournemouth we have a maximum of eighteen
hundred metres
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero that is acceptable
SOTON G-BS Bravo sierra sorry to interrupt we're at Hurst Castle (0747)
G-BS SOTOF Thank you bravo sierra contact Bournemouth frequency one
one nine decimal six two
SOTON G-BS One one nine six two thank you
BAW5390 SOTON Speedbird five three niner zero what is your passing level
SOTON BAW 5390 Speedbird five three nine zero passing level er three eight
fifty
BAW5390 SOTON Thankyou very much continue descent altitude one seven
zero zero feet QNH one zero one niner if I turn you in now
you will have fourteen miles is that sufficient
SOTON BAW 5390 Give me twenty miles speedbird five three nine zero descend
to er c o n f i i level clear to (0747:30)
BAW5390 SOTON One seven zero zero feet
SOTON BAW 5390 Cleared to seventeen hundred feet on QFE
BAW5390 SOTON Er QFE one zero one seven now
SOTON BAW 5390 QFE one zero one seven speedbird five three nine zero
BAW5390 SOTON Five three nine zero commence a gentle left turn now then
onto a heading of three six zero I'll give you twenty track
miles to run for touchdown (0748)
SOTON BAW 5390 Roger sir do you have an ILS frequency
BAW5390 SOTON Er negative I have a VOR but it will be radar vectors onto the
visual final
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero thank you very much we are three
greens er and flaps forty five so I'm set up for an approach
but make it please very gentle
BAW5390 SOTON Yes I will do indeed you are number one in traffic
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero thank you
UKA455 SOTON Air Ukay four five five are you with me
SOTON MAQ 422 Southampton er good morning this is Mac Air four two two
er five zero level er holding over hotel romeo november
(0748:30)
UKA 455 SOTON Air Ukay four five five Southampton
SOTON UKA 455 Yeah we're fmally levelling six zero on one two zero
UKA 455 SOTON Thank you very much turn right now own navigation for
ortac
SOTON UKA 455 Ortac ukay four five five request level change one two zero
SOTON MAQ 422 Southampton er good morning rnac air four two two five
thousand and we're er hotel romeo november (0749)
SOTON BAW 5390 Speedbird er five three nine zero heading er turning er left
onto a heading of due north and levelling er eighteen hundred
feet
BAW5390 SOTON Thank you make that one seven zero zero feet on the QFE
one zero er one seven millibars turn right heading zero two
five final approach
SOTON BAW 5390 Descending on to seventeen hundred feet and turning right
onto zero two five er speedbird five three nine zero
(0749:30)
UKA455 SOTON Ukay four four four five five contact London frequency one
three four four five
SOTON UKA 455 One three four four five cheerio
MAQ422 SOTON Mike alfa kilo four four two descend altitude two five zero
zero QNH one zero one niner
SOTON MAQ 422 Leaving zero five zero to twenty five hundred feet one zero
one niner rnac four two two
MAQ422 SOTON Four two two contact Bournemouth frequency one two five
decimal six bye bye
SOTON MAQ 422 Two two now to one two five point six so long
BAW5390 SOTON Speedbird five three nine zero is nine miles from touchdown
you are clear to land the wind indicates zero two zero degrees
one four knots descend to height one five zero zero feet on
the QFE one zero one seven
SOTON BAW 5390 Roger sir descending to fifteen hundred feet talk me me
down all the way I need all the help I can get
SOTON BAW 5390 We're running on a heading of zero two five five five three
nine zero
BAW5390 SOTON Roger and er you will be able to stop on the runway to
evacuate the aircraft on the runway you are number one you
are clear to land (0750:30)
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero thank you very much
BAW5390 SOTON Your range now is seven miles from touchdown you're on
the extended centreline
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero thank you very much guidance all the
way please
BAW5390 SOTON Of course
BAW5390 SOTON Your range now is at six and half miles you are clear to land
you are on the final approach track
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero (0751)
BAW5390 SOTON Five three nine zero turn left five degrees you are five miles
from touchdown continue your descent at the recommended
rate for a three degree glide path (075 1:30)
SOTON BAW 5390 Roger sir if you can er understood

BAW5390 SOTON You need not acknowledge further instructions unless

requested it will be an interrupted talk down but feel free to
interrupt if you need to you are clear to land four and half
miles on the final approach track heading zero two zero
SOTON BAW 5390 Emergency facilities er facilities please er and the ambulance
BAW5390 SOTON Everything is available for you
SOTON BAW 5390 Er five three nine zero thank you
BAW5390 SOTON Your range is four miles your height should be one two five
zero feet and the wind is zero two zero degrees at one zero
knots (0752)
SOTON BAW 5390 Five five five three nine zero thank you
BAW5390 SOTON Three and a half miles from touchdown turn right three
degrees on the final approach track heading is good
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero thank you very much
BAW5390 SOTON You're lined up you are clear to land
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero
BAW5390 SOTON You are three miles from touchdown the height should be
nine five er zero feet on a three degree glide path you are
lined up you are clear to land (0752:30)
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero thank you er I have the runway in sight
BAW5390 SOTON Thank you and you are clear to land do you wish me to
continue with further information
SOTON BAW 5390 Negative
BAW5390 SOTON Roger remain on this frequency
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero

BAW5390 SOTON Speedbird five three nine zero fantastic approach you may
shut down on the runway and leave the frequency
SOTON BAW 5390 Five three nine zero thank you

APPENDIX B
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BIRMINGHAM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT - LAYOUT

APPENDIX C
0000 0600 1200 1800 2400

su 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
I I I I I I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1
Mo
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tu
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I I I I I I I I I I I
Fr 1~~~
I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sa
I
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I
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I
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I
I I I I I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MOL
I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1
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I I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1
We
I I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1
Th
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I I I I I l l , , I I I I I I l l I I
Sa I I
0000 0600 1200 1800 2400
su I 1 1 1 1 I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1
Mo I I I I I
I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1
I I I I 1 1 1 1 1
Tu
We 1 1 1 1 1
Th I I I I I I I I I I
1 1 1 1 1 l l l l l -
Fr
I I I I I I I ,
Mo I I I I I
I
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Tu I I I I I
We I 1 1 1 1 I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 1
Th I I I I I I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fr I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
We I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ~
Th I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 I I -
Fr I I I I I I I I I I -
I I
S a . I I I I I
I I I I I I I
su I I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 I I -
1 1 1 1 1
Mo I I I I I I
Tu. I I I I I
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I I
I I 1 1 1 1 1
We I I I I I
I I 1 1 1 1 1
Th I I I I I
Fr I I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sa I , 1 1 1 , I , , I I I I I I I l l I I
APPENDIX D
QUALITY MONITORING SCHEDULE

PRODUCT SAMPLE
(AIRCRAFT ON-LINE AND MINOR CHECK)
This Form is to be used when applying the Quality Monitor Schedule EDP-MON-01-01
Appendix B item 01.
1 Cleanliness: Check areas and assemblies
2 Condition: check the following for general condition:-
2.1 External airframe and attachments
2.2 Wheel Bays and assemblies
2.3 Service CentresEquipment Bays
2.4 Engines
2.5 Interior Furnishing
2.6 Flight Deck
2.7 Galleys
2.8 Toilets
2.9 Emergency Equipment
2.10 Decaldnotices/documentation
3 Rectification standards monitor: Select 3 defects actioned during this input and
monitor for recurrence and number of further rectifications required to effect a
cure over a minimum of 7 days in service. Record the number of recurrences
for each defect. Reference defects and highlight by Sect/Log/Defect NO. (The
information should be obtained from DISC) and attach to Product Sample.
Functioning: Select specific systems for TestPart Test to be conducted in

accordance with the M.M and in conjunction with Authorised staff.
ATP/Work sheets: Manuals, worksheets and Technical Logs selected for check
on amendment state, condition, location, accuracy, legibility, eligibility.
Work carried forward: Current record of ADD and DDA.

New 8 UNC
Comparison of bolt heads in countersinks

(shown approximately 1.9 life-size)
APPENDIX F
PSYCHOLOGIST'S COMMENTS
The human factors issues raised by the fitting of incorrectly sized bolts to the windscreen of
this aircraft may be roughly categorised into those directly associated with the individual who
carried out the work, and those associated with the system or environment within which he
operated. These factors are considered in turn.
Factors Associated with the Individual
The errors made by the Shift Maintenance Manager in fitting the windscreen may be listed as
follows:
a. He failed to adopt the ideal procedure of identifying the type of bolt required by reference
to the illustrated parts catalogue (IPC), and its location by reference to the stores computer.
Instead he simply made a match that relied on his own perception of identity between a used
bolt removed from the old windscreen and a new one from the parts carousel drawer.
b. He failed to heed the storeman who told him words to the effect "They're 8Ds in that
windscreen", and continued to make a perceptual match.
c. In making the perceptual match, he accepted as identical two bolts that are different.
d. He failed either to notice or to question the significance of the fact that the incorrectly
fitted bolts left an abnormally large amount of countersink showing once they had been fitted.
e. He noticed, when fitting a windscreen the following night that 8D bolts were being used
to fit it, believed himself to have used 7D bolts the previous night, but, even so, failed to
question the acceptability of his previous night's work.
Perceptual Problems
The above factors may be split into those in which he made what could be termed poor
judgements or work practices and those that involve perceptual errors. Item c, the failure to
identify the difference between the used 7D bolt and the new 8C bolt may reasonably be judged
a perceptual error.
The Shift Maintenance Manager claims that he made this perceptual match accurately in the well
lit stores area of the hangar, and noted that the used bolt matched with a new size 7D bolt.
When he came to make the match in the poorly lit stores of the international pier area, however,
he was content that the used bolt matched a new size 8C bolt. He claims that he made the
discriminationin terms of both sight and touch. He held both bolts between the forefinger and
thumb of one hand while rolling them between the forefinger and thumb of the other.
The subjective similarity of these bolts may not be defined without some form of experiment: it
is fair to suggest, however, that they are similar, but not so similar that they cannot be
distinguished with reasonable care. The Shift Maintenance Manager does make limited use of
reading glasses, which appear to be of a fairly weak prescription, but does not habitually use
them at work and was not wearing them on this occasion. Given the poor quality of lighting in
the pier area stores, he cannot be regarded as having been in the best visual environment or
possessing the best visual equipment for making a visual discrimination that required some
degree of acuity.
Item d above may also be regarded as a perceptual error if he failed to perceive that there was
more countersink than normal showing around the heads of the 8C bolts. It is possible,
however, that he did notice this, but made what might be termed a poor judgement in not acting
upon his awareness that the heads looked too far down the countersink. The latter possibility
may be regarded as the more likely since, when one of his colleagues spoke with him after the
accident, he claims that he remembered that the countersinks had appeared too big - ie, he had
noticed extra countersink showing, but interpreted this in terms of an oversize countersink and
not in terms of an undersize bolt.
Although such an interpretation may seemextraordinary, it is well documented that individuals

who generate an internal model of the world with which they are content often require
overwhelming contradictory evidence before they are prepared to reassess their model. This
tendency may well be exacerbated when the mental resources required for such reassessment
are limited by, for example, sleep deprivation or circadian (time of day) effects.
The effects of time of day on many physiological and psychological variables are heavily
researched, the results indicating that the period between 0300 and 0600 is that during which
human performance is at its lowest ebb. It is likely that such time of day effects were important
both in enabling the Shift Maintenance Manager to fail to make accurate perceptual
discriminations, and in terms of enabling him to fail to appreciate the significance of cues with
which he was presented. Direct circadian effects are compounded in this instance with some
sleep deprivation. As is common among those on a first night shift, he had slept normally the
night before his shift, but slept little during the afternoon before going on shift. Thus, at 0300-
0500 he would have had a significant requirement for sleep as well as being at his circadian
low. These factors may reasonably be regarded as combining to exacerbate the effects
described above.
Problems of Judgement and Work Practice
Items a, b, and e above may be regarded as problems of poor judgement or work practice. The
Shift Maintenance Manager's failure to use the IPC and stores computer to their best effect, his
failure to heed the storeman's identification of the bolts, and his failure to take any retrospective
action when he realised the following day that he was using bolts of a different size from those
he had used on the same job the previous day, lead to the conclusion that he was not working
with the degree of care that the job demanded. What is less clear, however, is whether he was
doing the job in a way that he regarded as being of a standard acceptable to the system within
which he was working, or whether he knew that his work practices left a good deal to be
desired, but chose to ignore this knowledge in the interests of expediency.
A clue to the solution may be found in the Shift Maintenance Manager's other behaviour and in
the opinions of his colleagues. A consistent picture emerges from such considerations. He
appears to be regarded as solid and careful by others, and this assessment seems substantiated
by his behaviour on the night in question. Although his shift did not start until 1030, he was at
work 45 minutes early in order to prepare himself and to get the work of his shift organised.
He also continued to work through his meal break. At interview he does not give the
impression of one who would take his responsibilities lightly, or behave in a way that he would
consciously appreciate as derelict. One is left with the impression that the Shift Maintenance
Manager behaved in a way that he felt was appropriate to the circumstances in which he found
himself. Overall, his approach to the job could be summarised as conscientious but pragmatic,
rather than conscientious and meticulous. A good example of this approach concerns his
decision to torque the windscreen bolts to 20 lbf in instead of the specified 15 lbf in. He
plainly did not do this as a matter of expediency, but because he felt that this was a better way
to do the job. What was missing was an appreciation that such individual work practices are
completely out of place in aircraft servicing.
This impression is reinforced by conversation with other shift supervisors. At informal

interview, these individuals gave the general impression of being free to tackle jobs in
idiosyncratic ways, and when informed of the manner in which the Shift Maintenance Manager
behaved on the night in question they did not (except one individual) regard this as
unreasonable or demanding of censure. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the
general climate in the maintenance facility at Birmingham was not one in which the care and
safety awareness exhibited by the staff matched the criticality of the task. The nature of the
maintenance operation at Birmingham and the setting and checking of operational standards is
therefore examined below.
The Operating Environment
Inspection
A procedure included in many industrial operations that have safety implications is that of
independent inspection of work. It is possible that independent inspection would have
prevented this accident since the poor fit of the bolt heads in the countersinks was potentially
observable. There are some more important general points that may be made about the utility of
inspection in safety critical systems:
a. Independent inspection does not have a small effect on the possibility of a maintenance
error,going undetected, but reduces it dramatically. If an individual operator has, say, a .01
chance of not noticing a fault, then the combined probability of two such individuals failing to
notice the fault becomes only .OO01.
b. If an individual has made an error in work that he has carried out, then (because he has
developed a perceptual "set") he is less likely to detect that error than an individual who comes
to the task both afresh and in a "checking" frame of mind.
c. The knowledge that work is to be inspected may change the approach of an operator to
his task. It could be argued that the operator would become less careful if he felt that inspection
would pick up his errors, and would make him feel less trusted and responsible. For
individuals with some pride in their work, however, the knowledge that their work was to be
inspected might well make them more careful since they would not wish to be found to have
made a mistake.
e. Inspection is likely to have a general effect on the individual operator's perception of the
standards and care expected of him by the system. Inspection of work may serve as a regular
reminder to operators that the work they carry out has safety importance, and must be carried
out meticulously. It is likely that an operator will perceive the absence of inspection as an
indication that the managers of the system regard the cost saving involved as more important
than the safety benefit, and this may well influence the Shift Maintenance Manager's general
approach to his task.
It is thus suggested that inspection represents an important addition to the maintenance work
practices evident in this accident, and that it is especially important for work carried out at
night, when errors are more likely to be made, and less likely to be detected by their
perpetrators.
Lastly, it is interesting to note in this context that had this windscreen been changed in the
Royal Air Force, not only would the work have been inspected, but the aircraft would have
been pressure tested on the ground before flight.
Maintenanceof Standards in Working Practices
There appears to be a stark contrast between the procedures adopted to ensure that pilots adhere
to standard operating procedures and to ensure that they are familiar with good working
practice and those adopted for maintenance personnel. Although the maintenance environment
is checked periodically to ensure, for example, the calibration of equipment and currency of
technical information, there does not appear to be any checking of the knowledge of, or
techniques used by, the engineers. In the absence of such checks, and in the apparent absence
of any courses, instruction, or training designed to ensure that aircraft engineers appreciate the
importance of standardised procedures, a meticulous approach to the job, and the consequences
of error, it should not perhaps be regarded as surprising that experience and familiarity tend to
dull the engineer's conscious appreciation of the critical nature of his task.
It seems that the system operated at Birmingham relied entirely on the "professionalism" of
individual shift supervisors to ensure that working practices were appropriate. Whereas it is
entirely right to expect a professional approach from such individuals, the wisdom of leaving
the safety of aircraft entirely to individual judgement without having any systems for
maintaining consistency or for checking that high standards are maintained must be
questionable.
Design Safety
It is obviously highly undesirable that this windscreen assembly should have been designed
such that it could be fitted with bolts that were very similar to the correct ones, that could be
inserted and engage with the anchor nuts, and yet which failed as soon as they were loaded. It
is not asking too much for considerations such as this to be made during design, but the
awareness that this type of problem is best obviated at the design stage was not widespread
when this aircraft was conceived. It could also be argued that this windscreen should have
been designed to be fitted as a plug from the inside of the aircraft - an obviously safe practice in
a pressurised hull.
Poor design is further evidenced by the fact that this aircraft was already fitted with the wrong
bolts (7Ds instead of 8Ds) in the old windscreen. This is probably because the No 1 and No 3
windscreens are fitted with bolts of slightly different lengths, yet only the shorter bolt is
actually illustrated in the IPC. It is difficult to believe that it would not have been easily
possible for these windscreens to have been designed so that they were both fitted with the
same size of bolt.
When a new windscreen is fitted, it is customary for the engineers to fit new bolts only if those
removed were damaged or paint clogged. The relative cost of bolts and windscreen might
suggest, however, that it would not be unreasonable for new bolts to be fitted whenever a
windscreen was changed. If this were so, the windscreen could be supplied as a kit with a set
of correct bolts included.
It may also be observed that, once the type of bolt used on this windscreen is removed from its
packet, it carries no identifier, compelling it to be identified by its physical characteristics. It is
possible that if its head were stamped with such an identifier (eg 8D), then the Shift
Maintenance Manager may have used this instead of relying on a physical comparison.
Printed in the United Kingdom for HMSO

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which the recommendation is concerned. It is for
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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 1/92

Report on the accident to

Air Accidents Investigation Branch

Report on the accident to

This investigation was carried out in accordance with

The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents) Regulations 1989

1/90 Sikorsky S-61N G-BDES in the North Sea, May 1990

2/90 Boeing 747 N739PA at Lockerbie, September 1990

3/90 Sikorsky S-61N G-BEID 29 nm September 1990

4/90 Boeing 737 G-OBME October 1990

5/90 Bell 206 B Jetranger, G-SHBB February 1991

1191 British Aerospace ATP, G-OATP August 1991

219 1 Sikorsky S-61N G-BEWL October 1991

319 1 Lockheed LlOll-500, C-GAG1 December 1991

1/92 BAC One-Eleven, G-BJRT April 1992

The Right Honourable Malcolm Rifkiind

I have the honour to be

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . (viii)

1.1 History oftheflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Appendix A - ATC Transcript

AAIB Air Accidents Investigation Branch

Aircraft Accident Report No. 1/92

Registered Owner and Operator: British Airways Plc

Aircraft: Type: BAC One-Eleven

Aircraft Model: Series 528FL

Place of accident: Over Didcot, Oxfordshire

Latitude: 54" 34' North

Date and Time: 10 June 1990 at 0733 hrs

All times in this report are UTC

Mr D F King, Principal Inspector of Air Accidents (Engineering) - Investigator in Charge

The investigation was assisted by:

Mr I J Weston, Air Traffic Control (ATC) Investigations, - ATC

The following factors contributed to the loss of the windscreen:-

The Shift Maintenance Manager's potential to achieve quality in the windscreen

Eight Safety Recommendationswere made during the course of the investigation.

1.1 History of the flight

1.2 Injuries to persons

Injuries Crew Passengers Others

1.3 Damage to aircraft

Other damage to the aircraft consisted oE-

1.4 Other damage

There was no other damage.

1.5 Personnel information

I S.1 Commander: Male, aged 42 years

I S.2 Co-pilot: Male, aged 39 years

1S . 3 Cabin crew: Purser: Male, aged 37 years

1.6 Aircraft information

1.6.1 General information

Manufacturer: British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) Limited

I .6.2 AircraJt weight and centre of gravity

Maximum Take-off Weight Authorised: 440oo kg

The BAC One-Eleven 500 series is a twin-engined, passenger aircraft powered by

The pilots' windscreens are of five-ply glass/polyvinyl-butyl construction, the

1.7 Meteorological information

I .7.1 Synoptic situation

1.7.2 Actual conditions at Southampton

The 0720 hrs observation at Southampton Airport included the following:-

1.8 Aids to navigation

I .9.1 ATC assistance