KOMITE NASIONAL KESELAMATAN TRANSPORTASI

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

1st INTERIM STATEMENT

KNKT.21.03.03.04
Aircraft Serious Incident Investigation Report

PT Batik Air
Airbus A320; PK-LUT
Sultan Thaha Airport, Jambi
Republic of Indonesia
6 March 2021

2022
This Interim Statement was published by the Komite Nasional Keselamatan
Transportasi (KNKT), Transportation Building, 3rd Floor, Jalan Medan
Merdeka Timur No. 5 Jakarta 10110, Indonesia.
The report is based upon the investigation carried out by the KNKT in
accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation
Organization, the Indonesian Aviation Act (UU No. 1/2009) and
Government Regulation (PP No. 62/2013).
Readers are advised that the KNKT investigates for the sole purpose of
enhancing aviation safety. Consequently, the KNKT reports are confined to
matters of safety significance and may be misleading if used for any other
purpose.
As the KNKT believes that safety information is of greatest value if it is
passed on for the use of others, readers are encouraged to copy or reprint for
further distribution, acknowledging the KNKT as the source.

When the KNKT makes recommendations as a result of its

investigations or research, safety is its primary consideration.
However, the KNKT fully recognizes that the implementation of
recommendations arising from its investigations will in some cases
incur a cost to the industry.
Readers should note that the information in KNKT reports and
recommendations is provided to promote aviation safety. In no case is
it intended to imply blame or liability.

Jakarta, 28 March 2022

KOMITE NASIONAL
KESELAMATAN TRANSPORTASI
CHAIRMAN

SOERJANTO TJAHJONO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................i
TABLE OF FIGURES ...........................................................................................................ii
ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS ......................................................................... iii
SYNOPSIS ..............................................................................................................................iv
1 FACTUAL INFORMATION ......................................................................................... 1
1.1 History of the Flight............................................................................................... 1
1.2 Injuries to Persons.................................................................................................. 2
1.3 Damage to Aircraft ................................................................................................ 2
1.4 Other Damage ........................................................................................................ 3
1.5 Personnel Information ........................................................................................... 3
1.5.1 Pilot in Command..................................................................................... 3
1.5.2 Second in Command ................................................................................ 4
1.6 Aircraft Information............................................................................................... 5
1.7 Meteorological Information ................................................................................... 6
1.8 Aids to Navigation ................................................................................................. 6
1.9 Communications .................................................................................................... 7
1.10 Aerodrome Information ......................................................................................... 7
1.11 Flight Recorders..................................................................................................... 8
1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information ........................................................................ 8
1.13 Medical and Pathological Information .................................................................. 9
1.14 Fire ......................................................................................................................... 9
1.15 Survival Aspects .................................................................................................... 9
1.16 Tests and Research ................................................................................................ 9
1.17 Organizational and Management Information ..................................................... 10
1.17.1 Aircraft Operator .................................................................................... 10
1.17.2 Civil Aviation Authority in Indonesia .................................................... 17
1.18 Additional Information ........................................................................................ 18
1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques ..................................................... 18
2 FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................... 19
3 SAFETY ACTION ........................................................................................................ 21

i
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Nose landing gear damage ........................................................................................... 3
Figure 2: VOR Approach chart runway 31 ................................................................................. 7
Figure 3: Jambi Airport layout .................................................................................................... 8
Figure 4. MEL Entries related to nose wheel steering fault ...................................................... 11
Figure 5. MEL Items related to the Nose Wheel Steering Fault ............................................... 13
Figure 6. MEL Operational Procedure related to the Nose Wheel Steering Fault.................... 15
Figure 7. QRH page system reset table on Nose Wheel Steering Fault .................................... 16

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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
AFML : Aircraft Flight and Maintenance Log
ARFF : Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting
ATC : Air Traffic Control
ATPL : Airline Transport Pilot Licence
ATS : Air Traffic Services
AOC : Aircraft Operator Certificate
BMKG : Badan Meterologi, Klimatologi, dan Geofisika – The Agency of
Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics
BSCU : Brake and Steering Computer Unit
CB : Cumulonimbus Cloud
CCTV : Close Circuit Television
CPL : Commercial Pilot Licence
CVR : Cockpit Voice Recorder
ECAM : Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor
FCTM : Flight Crew Training Manual
FDR : Flight Data Recorder
FEW/SCT/BKN : Amount of cloud are assesses based on the part of the sky that are
covers by the cloud. FEW is when the 1/8 up to 2/8 of sky area covers
by clouds, SCT (scattered) is when the 3/8 to 4/8 of sky area covers
by clouds, BKN (broken) is when the 5/8 up to 7/8 sky area covers by
clouds
hPa : Hectopascal
Kg : Kilogram
Km : Kilometer
KNKT : Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi
LT : Local Time
MEL/CDL : Minimum Equipment List/Configuration Deviation List
OEB : Operations Engineering Bulletin
OM-A : Operation Manual Part A
PIC : Pilot in Command
QRH : Quick Reference Handbook
SIC : Second in Command
TSM : Trouble Shooting Manual
UTC : Universal Time Coordinated
VOR : Very High Frequency Omni-Range

iii
SYNOPSIS

On 6 March 2021, an Airbus 320 aircraft, registration PK-LUT, was being operated by PT.
Batik Air on a scheduled passenger flight from Sultan Thaha Airport (WIJJ), Jambi with
intended destination of Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta.
At 1302 LT in daylight conditions, the aircraft initiating the pushback with intention to heading
south east to take off from runway 31. During starting the right engine, the WHEEL N/W STRG
FAULT (wheel nose steering fault) alert appeared on the Electronic Centralized Aircraft
Monitor (ECAM). After pushback completed and the parking brake had set, the left engine was
started and the alert of WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT reappeared.
After the engine starting process completed, the pilots review MEL related to Nose Wheel
Steering then the PIC decided to continue the flight. During initial taxi, the PIC realized that
the nose wheel steering failed to turn the nose wheel for taxi. The taxi was stopped and the PIC
discussed the aircraft problem with an engineer. The engineer suggested to the PIC to reset the
anti-skid and nose wheel steering selector and the PIC stated that reset is not allowed based on
the MEL Operational Procedure. The PIC then decided to resume the taxi.
The pilot applied differential braking and asymmetric engines thrust while taxiing and turn,
including the 180° turn for line up on the beginning runway.
At 1328 LT, the aircraft departed. The CCTV recorded that during the initial takeoff, the nose
wheel was tilted. Rubber mark found on the runway from 26 meters after the threshold marks
until about 800 meters. After takeoff the landing gears could not be retracted.
The flight returned and the aircraft touched down at 1351 LT. Shortly after the aircraft
touchdown, the Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) personnel heard the sound like a tire
burst. The tower controller saw sparks appeared on the nose landing gear, during the landing
roll. Having seen this condition, the controller informed to the pilot and pushed the crash bell.
The ARFF deployed to the last aircraft position and found no sign of fire. The passengers and
the crews were disembarked on the runway using passenger boarding stairs and transported to
the airport terminal by bus. No one injured as result of this occurrence.
The investigation is ongoing and Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi (KNKT)
acknowledged the safety actions taken by PT Batik Air and considered that the safety actions were
relevant to improve safety, therefore KNKT did not issue safety recommendation.

iv
1 FACTUAL INFORMATION
1.1 History of the Flight
On 6 March 2021, an Airbus 320 aircraft, registration PK-LUT, was being operated
by PT. Batik Air on a scheduled passenger flight from Sultan Thaha Airport (WIJJ),
Jambi 1 with intended destination of Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII),
Jakarta2.
At 0602 UTC (1302 LT3) in daylight conditions, the aircraft initiating the pushback
with intention to heading south east to take off from runway 31. The engines start
conducted while pushback. During starting the right engine, the pilot noticed that
WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT (wheel nose steering fault) alert appeared on the
Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM), indicated the failure of nose wheel
steering system. There was no ECAM action to be performed.
After pushback completed and the parking brake had set, the left engine was started
and the alert of WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT reappeared. The Pilot in Command (PIC)
asked to the ground engineer who was assisting the pushback and engine starting
(engineer 1) to ascertain that the bypass pin was in the correct position. The engineer
1 reassured the bypass pin position by removed the nose wheel steering disconnect pin
and reinserted it.
After the engine starting process completed, the pilots checked the Minimum
Equipment List (MEL) and found that the problem was under MEL category A4 then
check MEL Operational Procedure which described the Nose Wheel Steering Control
System operation and limitation. Referring to this MEL description the PIC decided to
continue the flight. During initial taxi, the PIC realized that the nose wheel steering
failed to turn the nose wheel for taxi. The Second in Command (SIC) then requested
to Sultan Thaha Tower controller (the controller) to stop the taxi at current position.
The PIC invited the engineer to reconnect the head set. The engineer invited another
engineer who rated for the aircraft type (engineer 2) and discussed the aircraft problem.
The engineer 2 suggested to the PIC to reset the anti-skid and nose wheel steering
selector. The PIC reviewed the MEL Operational Procedure and informed to the
engineer that reset is not allowed. The PIC then decided to resume the taxi.
The PIC applied differential braking and asymmetric engines thrust while taxiing and
turn, including the 180° turn for line up on the beginning runway.

1 Sultan Thaha Airport (WIJJ), Jambi will be named as Jambi for the purpose of this report.
2 Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta will be named as Jakarta for the purpose of this report.
3 The 24-hours clock in Local Time (LT) is used in this report to describe the local time as specific events occurred. Local
time is Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) +7 hours.
4 MEL Category A items must be repaired within the time interval specified in the remarks column of the operator
approved MEL. The remark for the this failure in the Batik MEL was allowed to be inoperative for three flights with
several limitations (see figure 5 on chapter 1.17.1).

1
 At 1328 LT, the aircraft departed. After takeoff the landing gears could not be retracted
and the ECAM alert “L/G ABSORBER FAULT” appeared. The autopilot and the auto
thrust could not be activated. The SIC informed to the controller that they experienced
technical problem and requested to return. The controller confirmed whether the pilot
would make right turn, then the SIC requested via point OLVOD and acknowledged
by the controller.
At 1345 LT, the SIC reported to the controller that they were leaving point OLVOD.
Thereafter, the SIC reported that the runway was in sight and the controller issued
landing clearance with additional information of the wind was 330° with velocity of 6
knots.
At 1351 LT, the aircraft touched down. Shortly after the aircraft touchdown, the
Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) personnel heard the sound like a tire burst.
During landing roll, the tower controller saw sparks appeared on the nose landing gear.
Having seen this condition, the controller informed to the pilot and pushed the crash
bell. The ARFF deployed to the last aircraft position and found no sign of fire.
The passengers and the crews were disembarked on the runway using passenger
boarding stairs and transported to the airport terminal by bus.

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Total in
Injuries Flight crew Passengers Others
Aircraft
Fatal - - - -
Serious - - - -
Minor - - - -
None 6 117 123 -
TOTAL 6 117 123 -
All occupants were Indonesian citizens.

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

The nose wheel and tire were abraded due to contact with the runway and one nose
landing gear tire detached.

2
 Figure 1. Nose landing gear damage
1.4 Other Damage
No other damage to property and/or the environment.
1.5 Personnel Information
1.5.1 Pilot in Command
Gender : Male
Age : 56 years old
Nationality : Indonesian
Date of joining company : 14 August 2014
License : Airline Transport Pilot License (ATPL)
Date of issue : 26 May 1997
Aircraft type rating : Airbus A320
Instrument rating validity : Valid until 30 September 2021
Medical certificate : First class
Last of medical : 1 October 2020
Validity : 1 April 2021
Medical limitation : Holder shall possess glasses that correct
for near vision

3
 Last line check : 15 November 2020
Last proficiency check : 15 September 2020
Flying experience
Total hours : 12,059 hours 22 minutes
Total on type : 4,445 Hours
Last 90 days : 50 hours 16 minutes
Last 30 days : 6 hours 16 minutes
Last 24 hours : 2 Hours 54 Minutes
This flight : 54 Minutes

1.5.2 Second in Command

Gender : Male
Age : 25 years old
Nationality : Indonesian
Date of joining company : 26 May 2020
License : Commercial Pilot License (CPL)
Date of issue : 21 January 2016
Aircraft type rating : Airbus A320
Instrument rating validity : Valid until 31 August 2021
Medical certificate : First class
Last of medical : 1 February 2021
Validity : 5 August 2021
Medical limitation : Holder shall wear corrective lenses
Last line check : 29 October 2020
Last proficiency check : 19 February 2021
Flying experience
Total hours : 1,359 hours
Total on type : 128 hours
Last 90 days : 34 hours 52 minutes
Last 30 days : 25 hours 27 minutes
Last 24 hours : 2 hours 54 minutes
This flight : 54 minutes

4
1.6 Aircraft Information

Registration Mark : PK-LUT

Manufacturer : Airbus
State of Manufacturer : France
Type/Model : A320-200
Serial Number : 7644
Year of Manufacture : May 2017
Certificate of Airworthiness
Issued : 23 May 2020
Validity : 22 May 2021
Category : Transport
Limitations : None
Certificate of Registration
Number : 3945
Issued : 23 May 2020
Validity : 22 May 2023
Time Since New : 9,413 hours
Cycles Since New : 6,111 cycles
Last Major Check : C01 Check on 16 August 2020
Last Minor Check : P10 Check on 16 January 2021
The Aircraft Flight and Maintenance Log (AFML) recorded that on 4 March 2021, the
nose landing gear vibration after lift-off. The maintenance personnel replaced the inner
right main landing gear (position number 3) referred to Trouble Shooting Manual
(TSM) TASK 32-20-00-810-802-A.
On 6 March 2021, the AFML recorded a report of the nose landing gear vibration
occurred during takeoff roll until 1,000 ft. The maintenance personnel replace the left
nose wheel (position number 1).
During takeoff from Jakarta to Jambi, the pilot felt the nose landing gear vibration
occurred until the aircraft altitude approximately 1,800 feet. The pilots did not write
the problems on AFML, instead, the PIC informed the engineer verbally regarding to
the vibration. The engineer advised the PIC to write the problem in the AFML after
landing in Jakarta for the engineer to conduct troubleshoot.

5
1.7 Meteorological Information
Weather report for Jambi, issued on 6 March 2021 were as follows:
Time 1300 LT 1330 LT 1400 LT
Surface Wind 310°/9 Knots 300° / 5 Knots 350° / 7 Knots
Visibility More than 10 km More than 10 km More than 10 km
Weather Nil Nil Nil
Cloud5 FEW014CB FEW014CB FEW014CB
BKN015 BKN015 SCT015
QNH 1010 hPa 1010 hPa 1010 hPa

1.8 Aids to Navigation

The following is the Instrument Approach Chart for Very High Frequency Omni-
Range (VOR) approach runway 31 of Jambi.

5 Amount of cloud are assesses based on the part of the sky that are covers by the cloud. FEW is when the 1/8 up to 2/8 of
sky area covers by clouds, SCT (scattered) is when the 3/8 to 4/8 of sky area covers by clouds and BKN (broken) is when
the 5/8 up to 7/8 sky area covers by clouds.

6
 Figure 2: VOR Approach chart runway 31

1.9 Communications
All communications between Air Traffic Services (ATS) and the crew were recorded
by ground based automatic voice recording equipment for the duration of the flight.
The quality of the aircraft’s recorded transmissions was good.
The excerpt of the communication will be included in the final report.

1.10 Aerodrome Information

Airport Name : Sultan Thaha Airport
Airport Identification : WIJJ/DJB
Airport Operator : PT Angkasa Pura II (Persero)
Airport Certificate : 010/SBU-DBU/XII/2020
Validity : Valid until 7 July 2025
Coordinate : 01° 38’ 08” S; 103° 38’ 35” E

7
 Elevation : 92 feet
Runway Direction : 13 – 31
Runway Length : 2,602 meters
Runway Width : 45
Surface : Asphalt

Figure 3: Jambi Airport layout

1.11 Flight Recorders

The aircraft equipped with Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder
(CVR). After the accident, both recorders were transported to KNKT recorder facility
for data download process.
Both recorders were in good condition and the data were successfully downloaded.
The significant information of the flight recorders will be included in the final report.
1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information
Rubber tire mark from the nose wheel was found about one meter left of runway
centerline, starting from 26 meters from the threshold marking runway 31 and
continued about 800 meters along the runway. The nose wheel mark was the mark
during the takeoff as recorded on the CCTV that the nose wheel was at tilted position
during takeoff.

8
 The first metal scratch mark was found near the runway centerline at about 1,100
meters from threshold runway 31 and the width of the scratch mark increasing until
the aircraft stop position about 1,900 meters from the beginning of runway 31.
One of the nose wheel tire detached from the landing gear and found on the runway at
about 1,300 meters from the beginning of the runway 31.

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

This information is not available at the time of the issuance of this report. In the course
of this investigation, should any medical and/or pathological information be obtained
that is of relevance to this investigation, it will be included in the final report.

1.14 Fire
There was no evidence of in-flight fire. During the landing roll, the controller noticed
spark appeared on the nose wheel which then disappeared after the aircraft stopped.
1.15 Survival Aspects
The Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) personnel monitored the communication
between the pilot and the controller, and aware that an aircraft was experiencing
technical problem and was intending to return. The ARFF team then prepared and
standby on their station. While the aircraft landing, the fire truck driver heard the sound
similar to a tire burst or explosion. The ARFF team deployed to the last aircraft
position and found no sign of fire and stand by near the aircraft.
The pilot requested to the controller to informed the company maintenance personnel
to check the aircraft condition. The maintenance personnel arrived and informed that
the aircraft was unable to taxi due to the nose wheel condition. The pilot requested to
the controller to disembarked passenger on the runway and requested transportation
for the passengers to the airport terminal. The passengers and the crews were
disembarked on the runway using passenger boarding stairs and transported to the
airport terminal by bus.

1.16 Tests and Research

The component Brake and Steering Computer Unit (BSCU) Part number E21327107,
Serial Number 11498 and Electrical Box Part Number D23119751-1, Serial Number
B884 were removed from the aircraft and sent to repair facility. Based on shop finding
(examination) report, the BSCU was found no fault. The functional test to the
Electrical Box was found out of tolerance. The visual inspection found evident of
corrosion, the connector was being replaced.

9
1.17 Organizational and Management Information
1.17.1 Aircraft Operator
AOC Number : 121-050
Aircraft Owner : Celestial Aviation Trading 4 Limited
Address : Aviation House, Shannon, County Clare, Ireland
Aircraft Operator : PT. Batik Air
Address : Lion City Komplek Talaga Bestari Perkantoran Lion Air,
Gedung B 2nd Floor.
Jalan Harmony Blok GK No. 06 Sindang Jaya, Tangerang,
Banten.
The Batik Air Operation Manual Volume A (OM-A) described the general policies,
rules, standards and operational procedures. The OM-A chapter 8.6.9 MEL / CDL
APPLICABILITY stated that:
The provisions of the MEL/CDL are applicable until the aircraft commences the flight
(i.e. when the aircraft begins to move under its own power for the purpose of preparing
for take-off).
Failures occurring between “Off Blocks” and “Brake Release” require
accomplishment of the appropriate abnormal procedure by the crew. Upon completion
of the procedure, once the failure has been clearly identified and confirmed, and prior
to take-off, the MEL/CDL must however be consulted:
• If the item is NO GO or if the MEL/CDL requires the completion of a maintenance
procedure, the PIC must return to the blocks;
• If the item is “GO” or “GO IF” in the MEL/CDL, any decision to continue the
flight must be subject to PIC judgment and good airmanship taking into account
all other relevant factors, performance penalties and operational restrictions
related to the intended flight.
The MEL/CDL may also be consulted in flight to decide on an in-flight turn back
depending on the “GO”/”NO GO” status of the failed function and the possibility to
repair the failure at the destination.
The investigation could not find the policy and procedure in the company manual that
address the pilot action in the case of instrument and equipment failures that occur
after the aircraft leaves the gate or ramp areas until prior to takeoff.
Batik Air issued the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) Airbus A320 which contained
lists of the equipment, components, systems or functions that are safety-related and
that are temporarily permitted to be inoperative at departure. The MEL Entries, MEL
Items and MEL Operational Procedure related to the ECAM Alert Nose wheel steering
Fault were as follows:

10
Figure 4. MEL Entries related to nose wheel steering fault

11
12
Figure 5. MEL Items related to the Nose Wheel Steering Fault

13
14
Figure 6. MEL Operational Procedure related to the Nose Wheel Steering Fault

15
The Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), on the chapter of Abnormal and Emergency
Procedures, system reset table describe the reset procedure when the system malfunction or
ECAM alert WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT as follow:

Figure 7. QRH page system reset table on Nose Wheel Steering Fault
Refer to Flight Crew Techniques Manual (FCTM) – Chapter Airbus Operational
Philosophy on subchapter Management of Abnormal Operations subject Sequence of
Procedure describe that
“In most situations, the following sequence is the basic one that should be applied by
the flight crew. However, this sequence may not cover all operational situations.
Therefore, in all cases, the flight crew should exercise their judgment and adapt the
sequence of actions to the real conditions. In the case of abnormal or emergency
situations, the flight crew should apply the procedures in the following sequence, as
appropriate:

16
 - MEMORY ITEMS or OEB immediate actions,
- OEB,
- ECAM,
- QRH.”

1.17.2 Civil Aviation Authority in Indonesia

The civil aviation in Indonesia is administered by the Directorate General of Civil
Aviation (DGCA) which is part of the Ministry of Transportation. The DGCA has
several directorates including the Directorate of Airworthiness and Aircraft Operations
(DAAO) that responsible in formulating policy and standard including oversight to the
civil aircraft operator, and the Directorate of Air Navigation (DAN) that responsible
in formulating policy and standard including oversight to the ATS provider and
aviation meteorological provider.
The DGCA issued Staff Instruction number 8900 - 4.4 on August 2015 titled Procedure
for The Development Review and Approval of a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and
Configuration Deviation List (CDL). On the chapter 1.10 Take off with inoperable
instruments and equipment subchapter C. Instrument and Equipment Failures that
Occur After an Aircraft Leaves the Gate or Ramp Area (Pushes Back or Taxis) - Part
121 stated that:
Certificate holders conducting part 121 operations must have policies and
procedures that address instrument and equipment failures that occur after the time
an aircraft leaves the gate or ramp area (but prior to takeoff) in their MEL
Management Program. Operation Inspectors must ensure that each certificate
holder's MEL Management Program has procedures for the PIC to communicate with
the dispatch (or operational control for supplemental operations) and maintenance
organizations prior to takeoff to review each situation and determine whether the flight
should:
1. Return for Repairs. If for any reason (e.g., weather, route of flight, aircraft
weight, item not listed in MEL) an inoperative item (instrument or equipment)
would prevent a flight from operating with safety, the aircraft would have to return
to the gate or ramp area for repairs.
2. Return to Accomplish (M) Procedures and (O) Procedures. PICs, dispatchers,
or persons authorized to exercise operational control may determine that an
inoperative item may be deferred and the appropriate (M) and/or (O) procedures
accomplished, in accordance with the certificate holder's approved MEL and
MEL Management Program, or
3. Flight crew Accomplishment of Certain MEL Procedures. Operation Inspectors
may approve procedures that permit flight crew members to accomplish certain
MEL deferrals in coordination with the certificate holder's dispatch and
maintenance organizations without returning to the gate or ramp area. Operation
Inspectors must coordinate with the Maintenance Inspector to approve such
procedures. Operation Inspectors must not approve these types of procedures
unless they contain enough detail to ensure that all of the applicable (M) and/or
(O) procedures are accomplished by qualified persons, and that the certificate

17
 holder has a means to ensure that they satisfy all of the conditions and limitations
associated with each MEL. DGCA's (Operation Inspector, and Maintenance
Inspector) will ensure that certificate holders document these procedures in their
DGCA-approved MEL Management Program.
Coordination between flight-crew members and the maintenance organization
must not involve directed troubleshooting or other forms of system fault diagnosis
beyond what is specifically authorized in the certificate holder's MEL
Management Program procedures. Unless otherwise authorized, troubleshooting
or fault diagnosis necessary to determine suitable MEL relief must be performed
by qualified maintenance personnel.
If the conditions and limitations contained in an MEL affect the aircraft
performance or flight operation (e.g., fuel penalties or restrictions to flight level),
the dispatcher or person authorized to exercise operational control will have to
recalculate (compute) a new flight plan and issue a new or amended dispatch or
flight release.

1.18 Additional Information

This investigation involved the participation of the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses
(BEA) of the France as State of Design and State of Manufacturer and have appointed
the accredited representative to participate in this investigation in accordance with the
provisions in ICAO Annex 13.
Should further safety issues emerge during the course of the investigation, KNKT will
bring the issues to the attention of the relevant parties and issue safety recommendation
as required.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

The investigation was conducted in accordance with the KNKT approved policies and
procedures, and in accordance with the standards and recommended practices of
Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.

18
2 FINDINGS6
Findings are statements of all significant conditions, events or circumstances in the
accident sequence. The findings are significant steps in the accident sequence, but they
are not always causal, or indicate deficiencies. Some findings point out the conditions
that pre-existed the accident sequence, but they are usually essential to the
understanding of the occurrence, usually in chronological order.
According to factual information during the investigation, the KNKT identified initial
findings as follows:
1. The aircraft had valid Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) and Certificate of
Registration (C of R).
2. The pilots and controller the held valid licenses and medical certificates.
3. During starting the right engine, the WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT (wheel nose
steering fault) alert appeared on the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor
(ECAM).
4. After pushback completed and the parking brake had set, the left engine was
started and the alert of WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT reappeared.
5. The Pilot in Command (PIC) asked to the ground engineer who was assisting the
pushback and engine starting to ascertain that the bypass pin was in the correct
position. The engineer 1 removed the nose wheel steering disconnect pin and
reinserted it.
6. After the engine starting process completed, the pilots checked the Minimum
Equipment List (MEL) and referring to this MEL description the PIC decided to
continue the flight.
7. During initial taxi, the PIC realized that the nose wheel steering failed to turn the
nose wheel for taxi. The taxi was stopped and the PIC discussed the aircraft
problem with an engineer. The engineer suggested to the PIC to reset the anti-
skid and nose wheel steering selector and the PIC stated that reset is not allowed
based on the MEL Operational Procedure. The PIC then decided to resume the
taxi.
8. The PIC applied differential braking and asymmetric engines thrust while taxiing
and turn, including the 180° turn for line up on the beginning runway.
9. At 1328 LT, the aircraft departed. The CCTV recorded that during the initial
takeoff, the nose wheel was tilted. Rubber mark found on the runway from 26
meters after the threshold marks until about 800 meters.
10. After takeoff the landing gears could not be retracted and the ECAM alert “L/G
ABSORBER FAULT” appeared. The autopilot and the auto thrust could not be
activated.

6 Findings are statements of all significant conditions, events or circumstances in the accident sequence. The findings are
significant steps in the accident sequence, but they are not always causal, or indicate deficiencies. Some findings point out
the conditions that pre-existed the accident sequence, but they are usually essential to the understanding of the occurrence,
usually in chronological order.

19
11. The flight returned and at 1351 LT, the aircraft touched down. Shortly after the
aircraft touchdown, the Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) personnel heard
the sound like a tire burst. The tower controller saw sparks appeared on the nose
landing gear, during the landing roll. Having seen this condition, the controller
informed to the pilot and pushed the crash bell.
12. The ARFF deployed to the last aircraft position and found no sign of fire.

20
3 SAFETY ACTION
At the time of issuing this report, the Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi
(KNKT) had been informed of safety actions resulting from this occurrence by the
aircraft operator as follow
1. On 9 March 2021, the Operation Directorate published a Notice to Pilot (NTP)
regarding Abnormal Management Procedure to remind the pilot to comply with
the sequence of the abnormal operation management.
2. On 11 March 2021, the Batik Air Safety, Security, and Quality (SSQ) Department
published two Safety Circulars (SC) subjected to:
a. Abnormal Procedures Handling
The Safety Circular was addressed to the Flight Crew to ensure compliance
with handling Abnormal Procedures.
b. Repetitive Defects Management
The Safety Circular provide several safety recommendations for maintenance
and engineering Directorate regarding the management and the anticipation of
repetitive defects.
3. On 24 March 2021, the Operation Directorate published a Notice to Pilot (NTP) to
remind the pilot regarding the management and understanding of MEL and
announce additional policy of MEL applicability.

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