What are the constitutional provisions re: environmental laws (volunteer)

ART. I - National Territory - The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands
and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,
consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

ART. II - Principles and State Policies

Sec. 15 – RIGHT TO HEALTH - The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

Sec. 16 - right to healthful ecology- The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Sec. 25 - local autonomy - The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

ART. III - Bill of Rights

Sec. 7 - Right to Information - The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

ART. X - Local Autonomy

Sec. 4 - power of supervision over LGUs - The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of
their prescribed powers and functions.

ART. XII - National Economy and Patrimony

Sec. 1 - exploration of natural resources - The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the
nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged.

Sec. 3 - lands of the public domain Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law
according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines ma15602y lease not more than five
hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements
of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

Sec. 5 - ancestral lands - The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies
and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.
Sec. 10 - Filipino first policy - The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency,
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation
of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.

ART. XIII - Social Justice

Sec. 6 - agrarian reform - The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the
public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

Sec. 7 - rights of fishermen - The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall
provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production,
and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources.
The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

Magallona v. Ermita (volunteer)

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along
coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community
of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within
the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in
lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no
modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III: Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

What are the contentions of Magallona?

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

What is the legal basis used?

UNCLOS- provides for general obligation of States to protect and preserve the marine environment and
recognizes the sovereign right of States to exploit their natural resources consistent with the Constitution
and our national interest. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED.
What is the ruling of the SC?

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas,
as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of
the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones,consistent with the Constitution and our national
interest. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED.

Henares case

FACTS

Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed for a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to
use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners allege that the particulate matters
(PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions
emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition, they allege that with the
continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the
major sources of harmful emissions. They cited studies showing that vehicular emissions in Metro
Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that
pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed
more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are
mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749
otherwise known as the “Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.”

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with
power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness
and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that
these are curbed falls under respondents’ functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and
the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the
function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749
and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does
not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. He recommended that the petition should be addressed to
Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

ISSUES

Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the suggested alternative of requiring
public utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas (cng)
Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to use compressed natural
gas through a writ of mandamus
RULING

Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here,
there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles
to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant
preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs
based on the results of the DOTC surveys.”

In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel
use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon
the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan
and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents
that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The
legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems
bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No. 290, which
implemented a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. The court was assured that the
implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed.

What is the petition about?

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have
caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In
addition, they allege that with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport
sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions. They cited studies showing that
vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary
diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and that the children in
Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners
infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

What did the Sol Gen say

On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and
the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the
function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749
and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does
not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. He recommended that the petition should be addressed to
Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

If you were alive during the time of this case, who would you side with?’

I would say that this is all about business interest, giving the background of the petitioner he is and
economist as well as big business man.

What is the SC ruling?

It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to
the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by
mandamus is taken. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Sec 16. Oposa v. Factoran

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the

legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

What is this case all about?

Right to Healthful Ecology - prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests

Why were the 44 minors allowed to file a petition?

They have locus stadi
Locus Standi refers to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit.
Because of the very broadness of the concept of “class” here involved—membership in this “class”
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future —it appears to me that
everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public
respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi.

What is the legal basis for allowing them?

What is intergenerational responsibility and how does it apply with Sec. 16?

Sec. 22. Carino v. Insular Govt

Facts:

This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the registration of certain land.
The application was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Benguet on behalf of the government of the Philippines, and also on behalf
of the United States, those governments having taken possession of the property for public and military
purposes.

The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the Province of
Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, as far
back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had
lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of
the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated
parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had
been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in
accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and
although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees
then in force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet
could not be conceded until those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated -- a
purpose that has been carried out by the Philippine government and the United States. In 1901, the
plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, an d the lands were registered to
him, that process, however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.

Ruling of the Court of First Instance:

The Court of First Instance found the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds of law

Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Philippines:

This judgment (judgement of the Court of First Instance) was affirmed by the supreme court, 7 Phil. 132,
and the case then was brought here 9 (US Supreme Court) by writ of error.

Who is Mateo Carino?

Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies.

What is this case about?

Application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the registration of certain land.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the plaintiff owns the land?

2. Whether or not the plaintiff wrongfully occupy a royal land?

What is the ruling of the SC?

Ruling of the US Supreme Court:

1. Yes, the plaintiff owns the land.

The US Court held that every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have
been public land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, the Court
ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether justice to the natives and the import of
the organic act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even
beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide.

In this case, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. They all had been recognized as
owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with
Igorot custom.

2. No, the plaintiff did not wrongfully occupy royal land.

The US Court held and cited the laws of Spain that for private ownership, there must have been a grant
by competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects, those who
have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years,
uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. Also, in Article 6, it is provided that "interested
parties not included within the two preceding articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty
and thirty years] may legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands,
by means of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner..."

In this case, when this decree went into effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the very
terms of the decree. The object of this law was to require the adjustment or registration proceedings
that it described, and in that way to require everyone to get a document of title or lose his land. That
purpose may have been entertained, but it does not appear clearly to have been applicable to all. The
regulations purport to have been made "for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by
private individuals." It does not appear that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied.
Note: read on the Separate Opinion of Justice Puno on Cruz v. Secretary