G.R. No.

198587, January 14, 2015

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J.

BETIA, Petitioners, v. MA. JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO,

MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH A.

CRISTOBAL AND LORAINE S. SCHNEIDER-CRUZ,

Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

All Filipinos are entitled to the protection of the rights guaranteed in

the Constitution.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary

injunction under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying

that judgment be rendered reversing and setting aside the June 16,

2011 Decision1

and September 13, 2011 Resolution2

of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006.

Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation

established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia. It has a Philippine office located at 4/F, Metro House Building,

Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City.3

In its Petition filed with this

court, Saudia identified itself as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and existing

under the Royal Decree No. M/24 of 18.07.1385H (10.02.1962G) in

Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("KSA"). Its Philippine Office is

located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil J. Puyat Avenue,

Makati City (Philippine Office). It may be served with orders of this

Honorable Court through undersigned counsel at 4th and 6th Floors,

Citibank Center Bldg., 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.4

(Emphasis

supplied)

Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited

and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the

accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration.5 After undergoing seminars required by the Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration for deployment overseas, as

well as training modules offered by Saudia (e.g., initial flight

attendant/training course and transition training), and after working as

Temporary Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight

Attendants. They then entered into Cabin Attendant contracts with

Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma. Jopette) on May 16, 1990;6

Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal

(Rouen Ruth) on May 22, 1993;7

and Loraine Schneider-Cruz

(Loraine) on August 27, 1995.8

Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were

separated from service on various dates in 2006.9

Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was

illegal. They alleged that the termination was made solely because they

were pregnant.10

As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their respective

pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to process

their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later

on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required

respondents to file their resignation letters.11

Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would

terminate them all the same. The threat of termination entailed the loss

of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements.12

Specifically, Ma. Jopette received a call on October 16, 2006 from

Saudia's Base Manager, Abdulmalik Saddik (Abdulmalik).13

Montassah was informed personally by Abdulmalik and a certain

Faisal Hussein on October 20, 2006 after being required to report to

the office one (1) month into her maternity leave.14 Rouen Ruth was

also personally informed by Abdulmalik on October 17, 2006 after

being required to report to the office by her Group Supervisor.15

Loraine received a call on October 12, 2006 from her Group

Supervisor, Dakila Salvador.16

Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and

demand for their resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for

Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract).17 Under the Unified

Contract, the employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant

is rendered void. It provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be

physically fit on board to provide various services required in normal

or emergency cases on both domestic/international flights beside her

role in maintaining continuous safety and security of passengers, and

since she will not be able to maintain the required medical fitness

while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if the Air Hostess

becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this

shall render her employment contract as void and she will be

terminated due to lack of medical fitness.

18 (Emphasis supplied)

In their Comment on the present Petition,19 respondents emphasized

that the Unified Contract took effect on September 23, 2006 (the first

day of Ramadan),20 well after they had filed and had their maternity

leaves approved. Ma. Jopette filed her maternity leave application on

September 5, 2006.21 Montassah filed her maternity leave application

on August 29, 2006, and its approval was already indicated in Saudia's

computer system by August 30, 2006.22 Rouen Ruth filed her

maternity leave application on September 13, 2006,23 and Loraine filed

her maternity leave application on August 22, 2006.24

Rather than comply and tender resignation letters, respondents filed

separate appeal letters that were all rejected.25

Despite these initial rejections, respondents each received calls on the

morning of November 6, 2006 from Saudia's office secretary

informing them that their maternity leaves had been approved. Saudia,

however, was quick to renege on its approval. On the evening of

November 6, 2006, respondents again received calls informing them

that it had received notification from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia that their

maternity leaves had been disapproved.26

16 | C I V I L L A W

FirstSetofCasetoDigest

For08/25/2022

Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits,

respondents executed handwritten resignation letters. In Montassah's

and Rouen Ruth's cases, their resignations were executed on Saudia's

blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. These letterheads already

had the word "RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portions of their

headings when these were handed to respondents.27

On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia

and its officers for illegal dismissal and for underpayment of salary,

overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, premium, service

incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, night shift

differentials, medical expense reimbursements, retirement benefits,

illegal deduction, lay-over expense and allowances, moral and

exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.28 The case was initially

assigned to Labor Arbiter Hermino V. Suelo and docketed as NLRC

NCR Case No. 00-11-12342-07.

Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.29 It claimed that

all the determining points of contact referred to foreign law and

insisted that the Complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of

forum non conveniens.

30 It added that respondents had no cause of

action as they resigned voluntarily.31

On December 12, 2008, Executive Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-

Franco rendered the Decision32 dismissing respondents' Complaint.

The dispositive portion of this Decision

reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises' considered, judgment is hereby rendered

DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack of

jurisdiction/merit.33cralawlawlibrary

On respondents' appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission's

Sixth Division reversed the ruling of Executive Labor Arbiter

Jambaro-Franco. It explained that "[considering that complainants-

appellants are OFWs, the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC has [sic]

jurisdiction to hear and decide their complaint for illegal

termination."34 On the matter of forum non conveniens, it noted that

there were no special circumstances that warranted its abstention from

exercising jurisdiction.35 On the issue of whether respondents were

validly dismissed, it held that there was nothing on record to support

Saudia's claim that respondents resigned voluntarily.

The dispositive portion of the November 19, 2009 National Labor

Relations Commission Decision36 reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

finding the appeal impressed with merit. The respondents-appellees are

hereby directed to pay complainants-appellants the aggregate amount

of SR614,001.24 corresponding to their backwages and separation pay

plus ten (10%) percent thereof as attorney's fees. The decision of the

Labor Arbiter dated December 12, 2008 is hereby VACATED and

SET ASIDE. Attached is the computation prepared by this

Commission and made an integral part of this

Decision.37cralawlawlibrary

In the Resolution dated February 11, 2010,38 the National Labor

Relations Commission denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

In the June 16, 2011 Decision,39 the Court of Appeals denied

petitioners' Rule 65 Petition and modified the Decision of the National

Labor Relations Commission with respect to the award of separation

pay and backwages.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision

reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision

dated November 19, 2009 issued by public respondent, Sixth Division

of the National Labor Relations Commission - National Capital Region

is MODIFIED only insofar as the computation of the award of

separation pay and backwages. For greater clarity, petitioners are

ordered to pay private respondents separation pay which shall be

computed from private respondents' first day of employment up to the

finality of this decision, at the rate of one month per year of service

and backwages which shall be computed from the date the private

respondents were illegally terminated until finality of this decision.

Consequently, the ten percent (10%) attorney's fees shall be based on

the total amount of the award. The assailed Decision is affirmed in all

other respects.

The labor arbiter is hereby DIRECTED to make a recomputation

based on the foregoing.40cralawlawlibrary

In the Resolution dated September 13, 2011,41 the Court of Appeals

denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this Appeal was filed.

The issues for resolution are the following:

First, whether the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations

Commission may exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian Airlines

and apply Philippine law in adjudicating the present dispute;

Second, whether respondents' voluntarily resigned or were illegally

terminated; and

Lastly, whether Brenda J. Betia may be held personally liable along

with Saudi Arabian Airlines.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Summons were validly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over it

validly acquired.
There is no doubt that the pleadings and summons were served on

Saudia through its counsel.42 Saudia, however, claims that the Labor

Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission had no

jurisdiction over it because summons were never served on it but on

"Saudia Manila."43 Referring to itself as "Saudia Jeddah," it claims that

"Saudia Jeddah" and not "Saudia Manila" was the employer of

respondents because:

First, "Saudia Manila" was never a party to the Cabin Attendant

contracts entered into by respondents;

Second, it was "Saudia Jeddah" that provided the funds to pay for

respondents' salaries and benefits; and

17 | C I V I L L A W

FirstSetofCasetoDigest

For08/25/2022

Lastly, it was with "Saudia Jeddah" that respondents filed their

resignations.44

Saudia posits that respondents' Complaint was brought against the

wrong party because "Saudia Manila," upon which summons was

served, was never the employer of respondents.45

Saudia is vainly splitting hairs in its effort to absolve itself of liability.

Other than its bare allegation, there is no basis for concluding that

"Saudia Jeddah" is distinct from "Saudia Manila."

What is clear is Saudia's statement in its own Petition that what it has

is a "Philippine Office . . . located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen.

Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City."46 Even in the position paper that

Saudia submitted to the Labor Arbiter,47 what Saudia now refers to as

"Saudia Jeddah" was then only referred to as "Saudia Head Office at

Jeddah, KSA,"48 while what Saudia now refers to as "Saudia Manila"

was then only referred to as "Saudia's office in Manila."49

By its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign corporation, has a

Philippine office.

Section 3(d) of Republic Act No.. 7042, otherwise known as the

Foreign Investments Act of 1991, provides the

following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The phrase "doing business" shall include . . . opening offices,

whether called "liaison" offices or branches; . . . and any other act

or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements

and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the

exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in

progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the purpose and

object of the business organization. (Emphasis supplied)

A plain application of Section 3(d) of the Foreign Investments Act

leads to no other conclusion than that Saudia is a foreign corporation

doing business in the Philippines. As such, Saudia may be sued in the

Philippines and is subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine tribunals.

Moreover, since there is no real distinction between "Saudia Jeddah"

and "Saudia Manila" — the latter being nothing more than Saudia's

local office — service of summons to Saudia's office in Manila

sufficed to vest jurisdiction over Saudia's person in Philippine

tribunals.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

II

Saudia asserts that Philippine courts and/or tribunals are not in a

position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts.

This is because respondents' Cabin Attendant contracts require the

application of the laws of Saudi Arabia, rather than those of the

Philippines.50 It claims that the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law

calls into operation the principle of forum non conveniens, thereby

rendering improper the exercise of jurisdiction by Philippine

tribunals.51

A choice of law governing the validity of contracts or the

interpretation of its provisions dees not necessarily imply forum non

conveniens. Choice of law and forum non conveniens are entirely

different matters.

Choice of law provisions are an offshoot of the fundamental principle

of autonomy of contracts. Article 1306 of the Civil Code firmly

ensconces this:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,

clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided

they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or

public policy.

In contrast, forum non conveniens is a device akin to the rule against

forum shopping. It is designed to frustrate illicit means for securing

advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the

venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the

whim of either party.

Contractual choice of law provisions factor into transnational litigation

and dispute resolution in one of or in a combination of four ways: (1)

procedures for settling disputes, e.g., arbitration; (2) forum, i.e., venue;

(3) governing law; and (4) basis for interpretation. Forum non

conveniens relates to, but is not subsumed by, the second of these.

Likewise, contractual choice of law is not determinative of

jurisdiction. Stipulating on the laws of a given jurisdiction as the

governing law of a contract does not preclude the exercise of

jurisdiction by tribunals elsewhere. The reverse is equally true: The

assumption of jurisdiction by tribunals does not ipso facto mean that it

cannot apply and rule on the basis of the parties' stipulation. In

Hasegawa v. Kitamura:

52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.

Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to

this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the

application of a substantive law V'hich will determine the merits of the

case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not

automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law.

While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often, coincide,

the "minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary

"significant contacts" for the other. The question of whether the law of

a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of

whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a

judgment.53cralawlawlibrary
As various dealings, commercial or otherwise, are facilitated by the

progressive ease of communication and travel, persons from various

jurisdictions find themselves transacting with each other. Contracts

involving foreign elements are, however, nothing new. Conflict of

laws situations precipitated by disputes and litigation anchored on

these contracts are not totally novel.

Transnational transactions entail differing laws on the requirements Q

for the validity of the formalities and substantive provisions of

contracts and their interpretation. These transactions inevitably lend

themselves to the possibility of various fora for litigation and dispute

resolution. As observed by an eminent expert on transnational

law:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The more jurisdictions having an interest in, or merely even a point of

contact with, a transaction or relationship, the greater the number of

18 | C I V I L L A W

FirstSetofCasetoDigest

For08/25/2022

potential fora for the resolution of disputes arising out of or related to

that transaction or relationship. In a world of increased mobility, where

business and personal transactions transcend national boundaries, the

jurisdiction of a number of different fora may easily be invoked in a

single or a set of related disputes.54cralawlawlibrary

Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or extrinsic

validity of contracts. The first paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil

Code provides that "[t]he forms and solemnities of contracts . . . shall

be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed"55

(i.e., lex loci celebrationis).

In contrast, there is no statutorily established mode of settling conflict

of laws situations on matters pertaining to substantive content of

contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes have emerged: (1) lex

loci contractus or the law of the place of the making; (2) lex loci

solutionis or the law of the place of performance; and (3) lex loci

intentionis or the law intended by the parties.56

Given Saudia's assertions, of particular relevance to resolving the

present dispute is lex loci intentionis.

An author observed that Spanish jurists and commentators "favor lex

loci intentionis."57 These jurists and commentators proceed from the

Civil Code of Spain, which, like our Civil Code, is silent on what

governs the intrinsic validity of contracts, and the same civil law

traditions from which we draw ours.

In this jurisdiction, this court, in Philippine Export and Foreign Loan

Guarantee v. V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc.,

58 manifested preference

for allowing the parties to select the law applicable to their

contract":chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly

provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems,

however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by

the lex contractus or "proper law of the contract." This is the law

voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the

law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci

intentionis). The law selected may be implied from such factors as

substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or

domicile of the parties. Philippine courts would do well to adopt the

first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the

parties to select the law applicable to their contract, subject to the

limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the

forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to

the transaction.

59 (Emphasis in the original)

Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts

require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the

need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation the doctrine

of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine

tribunals to refrain from exercising jurisdiction.

As mentioned, contractual choice of laws factors into transnational

litigation in any or a combination of four (4) ways. Moreover, forum

non conveniens relates to one of these: choosing between multiple

possible fora.

Nevertheless, the possibility of parallel litigation in multiple fora —

along with the host of difficulties it poses — is not unique to

transnational litigation. It is a difficulty that similarly arises in disputes

well within the bounds of a singe jurisdiction.

When parallel litigation arises strictly within the context of a single

jurisdiction, such rules as those on forum shopping, litis pendentia, and

res judicata come into operation. Thus, in the Philippines, the 1997

Rules on Civil Procedure provide for willful and deliberate forum

shopping as a ground not only for summary dismissal with prejudice

but also for citing parties and counsels in direct contempt, as well as

for the imposition of administrative sanctions.60 Likewise, the same

rules expressly provide that a party may seek the dismissal of a

Complaint or another pleading asserting a claim on the ground "[t]hat

there is another action pending between the same parties for the same

cause," i.e., litis pendentia, or "[t]hat the cause of action is barred by a

prior judgment,"61 i.e., res judicata.

Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis

pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of

parallel litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia,

and res judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel

litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means

devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions.

Forum non conveniens literally translates to "the forum is

inconvenient."62 It is a concept in private international law and was

devised to combat the "less than honorable" reasons and excuses that

litigants use to secure procedural advantages, annoy and harass

defendants, avoid overcrowded dockets, and select a "friendlier"

venue.63 Thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens addresses the

same rationale that the rule against forum shopping does, albeit on a

multijurisdictional scale.
Forum non conveniens, like res judicata,

64 is a concept originating in

common law.65 However, unlike the rule on res judicata, as well as

those on litis pendentia and forum shopping, forum non conveniens

finds no textual anchor, whether in statute or in procedural rules, in our

civil law system. Nevertheless, jurisprudence has applied forum non

conveniens as basis for a court to decline its exercise of jurisdiction.66

Forum non conveniens is soundly applied not only to address parallel

litigation and undermine a litigant's capacity to vex and secure undue

advantages by engaging in forum shopping on an international scale. It

is also grounded on principles of comity and judicial efficiency.

Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal's desistance in

exercising jurisdiction on account of forum non conveniens is a

deferential gesture to the tribunals of another sovereign. It is a measure

that prevents the former's having to interfere in affairs which are better

and more competently addressed by the latter. Further, forum non

conveniens entails a recognition not only that tribunals elsewhere are

better suited to rule on and resolve a controversy, but also, that these

tribunals are better positioned to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to

dispense justice. Forum non conveniens prevents the embarrassment of

an awkward situation where a tribunal is rendered incompetent in the

face of the greater capability — both analytical and practical — of a

19 | C I V I L L A W

FirstSetofCasetoDigest

For08/25/2022

tribunal in another jurisdiction.

The wisdom of avoiding conflicting and unenforceable judgments is as

much a matter of efficiency and economy as it is a matter of

international courtesy. A court would effectively be neutering itself if

it insists on adjudicating a controversy when it knows full well that it

is in no position to enforce its judgment. Doing so is not only an

exercise in futility; it is an act of frivolity. It clogs the dockets of

a.tribunal and leaves it to waste its efforts on affairs, which, given

transnational exigencies, will be reduced to mere academic, if not

trivial, exercises.

Accordingly, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, "a court, in

conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where

it is not the most 'convenient' or available forum and the parties are not

precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere."67 In Puyat v. Zabarte,

68

this court recognized the following situations as among those that may

warrant a court's desistance from exercising

jurisdiction:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere,

either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign

jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;

2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a

practice known as forum shopping[,] merely to secure procedural

advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;

3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non residents

or aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;

4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the

right sought to be maintained; and

5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.69

In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v.

Court of Appeals,

70 this court underscored that a Philippine court may

properly assume jurisdiction over a case if it chooses to do so to the

extent: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may

conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to

make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the

Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its

decision."71

The use of the word "may" (i.e., "may refuse impositions on its

jurisdiction"72) in the decisions shows that the matter of jurisdiction

rests on the sound discretion of a court. Neither the mere invocation of

forum non conveniens nor the averment of foreign elements operates to

automatically divest a court of jurisdiction. Rather, a court should

renounce jurisdiction only "after 'vital facts are established, to

determine whether special circumstances' require the court's

desistance."73 As the propriety of applying forum non conveniens is

contingent on a factual determination, it is, therefore, a matter of

defense.74

The second sentence of Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure is exclusive in its recital of the grounds for dismissal that

are exempt from the omnibus motion rule: (1) lack of jurisdiction over

the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4)

prescription. Moreover, dismissal on account offorum non conveniens

is a fundamentally discretionary matter. It is, therefore, not a matter for

a defendant to foist upon the court at his or her own convenience;

rather, it must be pleaded at the earliest possible opportunity.

On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule,

thus: Forum non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a

ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest

possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.

This court notes that in Hasegawa,

76 this court stated that forum non

conveniens is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. The factual

ambience of this case however does not squarely raise the viability of

this doctrine. Until the opportunity comes to review the use of motions

to dismiss for parallel litigation, Hasegawa remains existing doctrine.

Consistent with forum non conveniens as fundamentally a factual

matter, it is imperative that it proceed from & factually established

basis. It would be improper to dismiss an action pursuant to forum non

conveniens based merely on a perceived, likely, or hypothetical

multiplicity of fora. Thus, a defendant must also plead and show that a

prior suit has, in fact, been brought in another jurisdiction.

The existence of a prior suit makes real the vexation engendered by

duplicitous litigation, the embarrassment of intruding into the affairs of

another sovereign, and the squandering of judicial efforts in resolving

a dispute already lodged and better resolved elsewhere. As has been

noted:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A case will not be stayed o dismissed on [forum] non conveniens

grounds unless the plaintiff is shown to have an available alternative

forum elsewhere. On this, the moving party bears the burden of proof.

A number of factors affect the assessment of an alternative forum's

adequacy. The statute of limitations abroad may have run, of the

foreign court may lack either subject matter or personal jurisdiction

over the defendant. . . . Occasionally, doubts will be raised as to the

integrity or impartiality of the foreign court (based, for example, on

suspicions of corruption or bias in favor of local nationals), as to the

fairness of its judicial procedures, or as to is operational efficiency

(due, for example, to lack of resources, congestion and delay, or

interfering circumstances such as a civil unrest). In one noted case, [it

was found] that delays of 'up to a quarter of a century' rendered the

foreign forum... inadequate for these purposes.77cralawlawlibrary

We deem it more appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence

that a defendant not only allege supposed dangerous tendencies in

litigating in this jurisdiction; the defendant must also show that such

danger is real and present in that litigation or dispute resolution has

commenced in another jurisdiction and that a foreign tribunal has

chosen to exercise jurisdiction.

III

Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to

divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application

of foreign law.

Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the

stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the

application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.

20 | C I V I L L A W

FirstSetofCasetoDigest

For08/25/2022

Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of governing

law. Thai forum non conveniens may ultimately result in the

application of foreign law is merely an incident of its application. In

this strict sense, forum non conveniens is not applicable. It is not the

primarily pivotal consideration in this case.

In any case, even a further consideration of the applicability of forum

non conveniens on the incidental matter of the law governing

respondents' relation with Saudia leads to the conclusion that it is

improper for Philippine tribunals to divest themselves of jurisdiction.

Any evaluation of the propriety of contracting parties' choice of a

forum and'its incidents must grapple with two (2) considerations: first,

the availability and adequacy of recourse to a foreign tribunal; and

second, the question of where, as between the forum court and a

foreign court, the balance of interests inhering in a dispute weighs

more heavily.

The first is a pragmatic matter. It relates to the viability of ceding

jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal and can be resolved by juxtaposing

the competencies and practical circumstances of the tribunals in

alternative fora. Exigencies, like the statute of limitations, capacity to

enforce orders and judgments, access to records, requirements for the

acquisition of jurisdiction, and even questions relating to the integrity

of foreign courts, may render undesirable or even totally unfeasible

recourse to a foreign court. As mentioned, we consider it in the greater

interest of prudence that a defendant show, in pleading forum non

conveniens, that litigation has commenced in another jurisdiction and

that a foieign tribunal has, in fact, chosen to exercise jurisdiction.

Two (2) factors weigh into a court's appraisal of the balance of

interests inhering in a dispute: first, the vinculum which the parties and

their relation have to a given jurisdiction; and second, the public

interest that must animate a tribunal, in its capacity as an agent of the

sovereign, in choosing to assume or decline jurisdiction. The first is

more concerned with the parties, their personal circumstances, and

private interests; the second concerns itself with the state and the

greater social order.

In considering the vinculum, a court must look into the preponderance

of linkages which the parties and their transaction may have to either

jurisdiction. In this respect, factors, such as the parties' respective

nationalities and places of negotiation, execution, performance,

engagement or deployment, come into play.

In considering public interest, a court proceeds with a consciousness

that it is an organ of the state. It must, thus, determine if the interests

of the sovereign (which acts through it) are outweighed by those of the

alternative jurisdiction. In this respect, the court delves into a

consideration of public policy. Should it find that public interest

weighs more heavily in favor of its assumption of jurisdiction, it

should proceed in adjudicating the dispute, any doubt or .contrary view

arising from the preponderance of linkages notwithstanding.

Our law on contracts recognizes the validity of contractual choice of

law provisions. Where such provisions exist, Philippine tribunals,

acting as the forum court, generally defer to the parties' articulated

choice.

This is consistent with the fundamental principle of autonomy of

contracts. Article 1306 of the Civ:l Code expressly provides that "[t]he

contracting parties may establish 'such stipulations, clauses, terms and

conditions as they may deem convenient."78 Nevertheless, while a

Philippine tribunal (acting as the forum court) is called upon to respect

the parties' choice of governing law, such respect must not be so

permissive as to lose sight of considerations of law, morals, good

customs, public order, or public policy that underlie the contract

central to the controversy.

Specifically with respect to public policy, in Pakistan International

Airlines Corporation v. Ople,

79 this court explained

that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is

the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially

provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed

written inta the contract. Put a little differently, the governing

principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of

law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily

impressed with public interest.80 (Emphasis supplied)

Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he

State ... shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women

and men." Contrasted with Article II, Section 1 of the 1987

Constitution's statement that "[n]o person shall ... be denied the equal

protection of the laws," Article II, Section 14 exhorts the State to

"ensure." This does not only mean that the Philippines shall not

countenance nor lend legal recognition and approbation to measures

that discriminate on the basis of one's being male or female. It imposes

an obligation to actively engage in securing the fundamental equality

of men and women.

The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination

against Women (CEDAW), signed and ratified by the Philippines on

July 15, 1980, and on August 5, 1981, respectively,81 is part of the law

of the land. In view of the widespread signing and ratification of, as

well as adherence (in practice) to it by states, it may even be said that

many provisions of the CEDAW may have become customary

international law. The CEDAW gives effect to the Constitution's

policy statement in Article II, Section 14. Article I of the CEDAW

defines "discrimination against women" as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which

has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,

enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status,

on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and

fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil

or any other field.82cralawlawlibrary

The constitutional exhortation to ensure fundamental equality, as

illumined by its enabling law, the CEDAW, must inform and animate

all the actions of all personalities acting on behalf of the State. It is,

therefore, the bounden duty of this court, in rendering judgment on the

disputes brought before it, to ensure that no discrimination is heaped

upon women on the mere basis of their being women. This is a point

so basic and central that all our discussions and pronouncements —

regardless of whatever averments there may be of foreign law — must

21 | C I V I L L A W

FirstSetofCasetoDigest

For08/25/2022

proceed from this premise.

So informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly discriminatory

nature of Saudia's policy. As argued by respondents, Saudia's policy

entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who become

pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an

occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudia's policy

excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other

consideration but sex.

We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present

physical limitations that may render difficult the performance of

functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it

would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so

permanent and immutable that, it must entail the termination of one's

employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of gender,

may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions.

However, we fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an

impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete

termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.

Apart from the constitutional policy on the fundamental equality

before the law of men and women, it is settled that contracts relating to

labor and employment are impressed with public interest. Article 1700

of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he relation between capital and

labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public

interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good."

Consistent with this, this court's pronouncements in Pakistan

International Airlines Corporation83 are clear and

unmistakable:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment

agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the

applicable law of the agreement, and, secondly, lays the venue for

settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the

agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi, Pakistan". The first clause of

paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of

Philippine labor laws and'regulations to the subject matter of this case,

i.e., the employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and

private respondents. We have already pointed out that the relationship

is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable

Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the

parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. . . .

Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment

agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and

courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.84

(Emphasis supplied)

As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege to be) the

illegal termination of respondents' employment, this case is immutably

a matter of public interest and public policy. Consistent with clear

pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly

find application in and govern this case. 'Moreover, as this premise for

Saudia's insistence on the application forum non conveniens has been

shattered, it follows that Philippine tribunals may properly assume

jurisdiction over the present controversy. Philippine jurisprudence

provides ample illustrations of when a court's renunciation of

jurisdiction on account of forum non conveniens is proper or

improper.'

In Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals,

85 this court

noted that the trial court failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs was

a domestic corporation, that one of the defendants was a Filipino, and

that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt that was the object of

the transaction subject of the litigation. Thus, this court held, among

others, that the trial court's refusal to assume jurisdiction was not

justified by forum non conveniens and remanded the case to the trial

court.

In Raytheon International, Inc. v. Rouzie, Jr.,

86 this court sustained the

trial court's assumption of jurisdiction considering that the trial court

could properly enforce judgment on the petitioner which was a foreign

corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.

In Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr.,

87 this court found no

reason to disturb the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction over a case

in which, as noted by the trial court, "it is more convenient to hear and

decide the case in the Philippines because Todaro [the plaintiff] resides

in the Philippines and the contract allegedly breached involve[d]

employment in the Philippines."88

In Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v. Schonfeld,

89 this

court held that the fact that the complainant in an illegal dismissal case

was a Canadian citizen and a repatriate did not warrant the application

of forum non conveniens considering that: (1) the Labor Code does not

include forum non conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of a

complaint for illegal dismissal; (2) the propriety of dismissing a case

based on forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; and

(3) the requisites for assumption of jurisdiction as laid out in Bank of

America, NT&SA90 were all satisfied.

In contrast, this court ruled in The Manila Hotel Corp. v. National

Labor Relations Commission91 that the National Labor Relations Q

Commission was a seriously inconvenient forum. In that case, private

respondent Marcelo G. Santos was working in the Sultanate of Oman

when he received a letter from Palace Hotel recruiting him for

employment in Beijing, China. Santos accepted the offer.

Subsequently, however, he was released from employment supposedly

due to business reverses arising from political upheavals in China (i.e.,

the Tiananmen Square incidents of 1989). Santos later filed a

Complaint for illegal dismissal impleading Palace Hotel's General

Manager, Mr. Gerhard Schmidt, the Manila Hotel International

Company Ltd. (which was, responsible for training Palace Hotel's

personnel and staff), and the Manila Hotel Corporation (which owned

50% of Manila Hotel International Company Ltd.'s capital stock).

In ruling against the National Labor Relations Commission's exercise

of jurisdiction, this court noted that the main aspects of the case

transpired in two (2) foreign jurisdictions, Oman and China, and that

the case involved purely foreign elements. Specifically, Santos was

directly hired by a foreign employer through correspondence sent to

Oman. Also, the proper defendants were neither Philippine nationals

nor engaged in business in the Philippines, while the main witnesses

were not residents of the Philippines. Likewise, this court noted that

the National Labor Relations Commission was in no position to

22 | C I V I L L A W

FirstSetofCasetoDigest

For08/25/2022

conduct the following: first, determine the law governing the

employment contract, as it was entered into in foreign soil; second,

determine the facts, as Santos' employment was terminated in Beijing;

and third, enforce its judgment, since Santos' employer, Palace Hotel,

was incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served

with summons.

Contrary to Manila Hotel, the case now before us does not entail a

preponderance of linkages that favor a foreign jurisdiction.

Here, the circumstances of the parties and their relation do not

approximate the circumstances enumerated in Puyat,

92 which this court

recognized as possibly justifying the desistance of Philippine tribunals

from exercising jurisdiction.

First, there is no basis for concluding that the case can be more

conveniently tried elsewhere. As established earlier, Saudia is doing

business in the Philippines. For their part, all four (4) respondents are

Filipino citizens maintaining residence in the Philippines and, apart

from their previous employment with Saudia, have no other

connection to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It would even be to

respondents' inconvenience if this case were to be tried elsewhere.

Second, the records are bereft of any indication that respondents filed

their Complaint in an effort to engage in forum shopping or to vex and

inconvenience Saudia.

Third, there is no indication of "unwillingness to extend local judicial

facilities to non-residents or aliens."93 That Saudia has managed to

bring the present controversy all the way to this court proves this.

Fourth, it cannot be said that the local judicial machinery is inadequate

for effectuating the right sought to be maintained. Summons was

properly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over its person was validly

acquired.

Lastly, there is not even room for considering foreign law. Philippine

law properly governs the present dispute.

As the question of applicable law has been settled, the supposed

difficulty of ascertaining foreign law (which requires the application of

forum non conveniens) provides no insurmountable inconvenience or

special circumstance that will justify depriving Philippine tribunals of

jurisdiction.

Even if we were to assume, for the sake of discussion, that it is the

laws of Saudi Arabia which should apply, it does not follow that

Philippine tribunals should refrain from exercising jurisdiction. To.

recall our pronouncements in Puyat,94 as well as in Bank of America,

NT&SA,

95 it is not so much the mere applicability of foreign law which

calls into operation forum non conveniens. Rather, what justifies a

court's desistance from exercising jurisdiction is "[t]he difficulty of

ascertaining foreign law"96 or the inability of a "Philippine Court to

make an intelligent decision as to the law[.]"97

Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and

practicable (i.e., "to make an intelligent decision"98), Philippine

tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact,

(albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and

reliability of respondents' citation) in this case, respondents themselves

have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia. In their

Comment, respondents write:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines[,] it is

illegal and unlawful to terminate the employment of any woman by

virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and

strict [sic] in that no employer can terminate the employment of a

female worker or give her a warning of the same while on Maternity

Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is

hereto quoted as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker

or give her a warning of the same while on maternity leave." (Article

155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No.

M/51.)99cralawlawlibrary

All told, the considerations for assumption of jurisdiction by

Philippine tribunals as outlined in Bank of America, NT&SA100 have

been satisfied. First, all the parties are based in the Philippines and all

the material incidents transpired in this jurisdiction. Thus, the parties

may conveniently seek relief from Philippine tribunals. Second,

Philippine tribunals are in a position to make an intelligent decision as

to the law and the facts. Third, Philippine tribunals are in a position to

enforce their decisions. There is no compelling basis for ceding

jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal. Quite the contrary, the immense

public policy considerations attendant to this case behoove Philippine

tribunals to not shy away from their duty to rule on the

case.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

IV

Respondents were illegally terminated.

In Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines,

101 this court defined voluntary

resignation as "the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation

where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor

of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to

dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or

relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the

office accompanied by the act of relinquishment."102 Thus, essential to

the act of resignation is voluntariness. It must be the result of an

employee's exercise of his or her own will.

In the same case of Bilbao, this court advanced a means for

determining whether an employee resigned

voluntarily:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of

relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged

resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in

fact, intended, to sever his or her employment.

103 (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, constructive dismissal has been defined as

"cessation of work because 'continued employment is rendered

impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion

in rank or a diminution in pay' and other benefits."104

In Penaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation,

105

23 | C I V I L L A W

FirstSetofCasetoDigest

For08/25/2022

constructive dismissal has been described as tantamount to

"involuntarily [sic] resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and

unfavorable conditions set by the employer."106 In the same case, it

was noted that "[t]he gauge for constructive dismissal is whether a

reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to

give up his employment under the prevailing circumstances."107

Applying the cited standards on resignation and constructive dismissal,

it is clear that respondents were constructively dismissed. Hence, their

termination was illegal.

The termination of respondents' employment happened when they

were pregnant and expecting to incur costs on account of child

delivery and infant rearing. As noted by the Court of Appeals,

pregnancy is a time when they need employment to sustain their

families.108 Indeed, it goes against normal and reasonable human

behavior to abandon one's livelihood in a time of great financial need.

It is clear that respondents intended to remain employed with Saudia.

All they did was avail of their maternity leaves. Evidently, the very

nature of a maternity leave means that a pregnant employee will not

report for work only temporarily and that she will resume the

performance of her duties as soon as the leave allowance expires.

It is also clear that respondents exerted all efforts to' remain employed

with Saudia. Each of them repeatedly filed appeal letters (as much as

five [5] letters in the case of Rebesencio109) asking Saudia to

reconsider the ultimatum that they resign or be terminated along with

the forfeiture of their benefits. Some of them even went to Saudia's

office to personally seek reconsideration.110

Respondents also adduced a copy of the "Unified Employment

Contract for Female Cabin Attendants."111 This contract deemed void

the employment of a flight attendant who becomes pregnant and

threatened termination due to lack of medical fitness.112 The threat of

termination (and the forfeiture of benefits that it entailed) is enough to

compel a reasonable person in respondents' position to give up his or

her employment.

Saudia draws attention to how respondents' resignation letters were

supposedly made in their own handwriting. This minutia fails to

surmount all the other indications negating any voluntariness on

respondents' part. If at all, these same resignation letters are proof of

how any supposed resignation did not arise from respondents' own

initiative. As earlier pointed out, respondents' resignations were

executed on Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. These

letterheads already had the word "RESIGNATION" typed on the

subject portion of their respective headings when these were handed to

respondents.113ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for

dismissing an employee rests on the employer."114 In this case, Saudia

makes much of how respondents supposedly completed their exit

interviews, executed quitclaims, received their separation pay, and

took more than a year to file their Complaint.115 If at all, however,

these circumstances prove only the fact of their occurrence, nothing

more. The voluntariness of respondents' departure from Saudia is non

sequitur.

Mere compliance with standard procedures or processes, such as the

completion of their exit interviews, neither negates compulsion nor

indicates voluntariness.

As with respondent's resignation letters, their exit interview forms

even support their claim of illegal dismissal and militates against

Saudia's arguments. These exit interview forms, as reproduced by

Saudia in its own Petition, confirms the unfavorable conditions as

regards respondents' maternity leaves. Ma. Jopette's and Loraine's exit

interview forms are particularly telling:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a. From Ma. Jopette's exit interview form:

3. In what respects has the job met or failed to meet your

expectations?

THE SUDDEN TWIST OF DECISION REGARDING THE

MATERNITY LEAVE.116

b. From Loraine's exit interview form:

1. What are your main reasons for leaving Saudia? What company

are you joining?

xxx xxx xxx

Others

CHANGING POLICIES REGARDING MATERNITY LEAVE

(PREGNANCY)117

As to respondents' quitclaims, in Phil. Employ Services and Resources,

Inc. v. Paramio,

118 this court noted that "[i]f (a) there is clear proof that

the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or

(b) the terms of the settlement are unconscionable, and on their face

invalid, such quitclaims must be struck down as invalid or illegal."119

Respondents executed their quitclaims after having been unfairly given

an ultimatum to resign or be terminated (and forfeit their

benefits).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

V
Having been illegally and unjustly dismissed, respondents are entitled

to full backwages and benefits from the time of their termination until

the finality of this Decision. They are likewise entitled to separation

pay in the amount of one (1) month's salary for every year of service

until the fmality of this Decision, with a fraction of a year of at least

six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year.

Moreover, "[m]oral damages are awarded in termination cases where

the employee's dismissal was attended by bad faith, malice or fraud, or

where it constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or where it was done in

a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy."120 In this

case, Saudia terminated respondents' employment in a manner that is

patently discriminatory and running afoul of the public interest that

underlies employer-employee relationships. As such, respondents are

entitled to moral damages.

24 | C I V I L L A W

FirstSetofCasetoDigest

For08/25/2022

To provide an "example or correction for the public good"121 as against

such discriminatory and callous schemes, respondents are likewise

entitled to exemplary damages.

In a long line of cases, this court awarded exemplary damages to

illegally dismissed employees whose "dismissal[s were] effected in a

wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner."122 This court has awarded

exemplary damages to employees who were terminated on such

frivolous, arbitrary, and unjust grounds as membership in or

involvement with labor unions,123 injuries sustained in the course of

employment,

124 development of a medical condition due to the

employer's own violation of the employment contract,125 and lodging

of a Complaint against the employer.126 Exemplary damages were also

awarded to employees who were deemed illegally dismissed by an

employer in an attempt to evade compliance with statutorily

established employee benefits.127 Likewise, employees dismissed for

supposedly just causes, but in violation of due process requirements,

were awarded exemplary damages.128

These examples pale in comparison to the present controversy.

Stripped of all unnecessary complexities, respondents were dismissed

for no other reason than simply that they were pregnant. This is as

wanton, oppressive, and tainted with bad faith as any reason for

termination of employment can be. This is no ordinary case of illegal

dismissal. This is a case of manifest gender discrimination. It is an

affront not only to our statutes and policies on employees' security of

tenure, but more so, to the Constitution's dictum of fundamental

equality between men and women.129

The award of exemplary damages is, therefore, warranted, not only to

remind employers of the need to adhere to the requirements of

procedural and substantive due process in termination of employment,

but more importantly, to demonstrate that gender discrimination

should in no case be countenanced.

Having been compelled to litigate to seek reliefs for their illegal and

unjust dismissal, respondents are likewise entitled to attorney's fees in

the amount of 10% of the total monetary award.130

VI

Petitioner Brenda J. Betia may not be held liable.

A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those of the

persons composing it. Thus, as a rule, corporate directors and officers

are not liable for the illegal termination of a corporation's employees.

It is only when they acted in bad faith or with malice that they become

solidarity liable with the corporation.131

In Ever Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. (EEMI) v. Samahang

Manggagawa ng Ever Electrical,

132 this court clarified that "[b]ad faith

does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest

purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it

means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill

will; it partakes of the nature of fraud."133

Respondents have not produced proof to show that Brenda J. Betia

acted in bad faith or with malice as regards their termination. Thus, she

may not be held solidarity liable with Saudia.cralawred

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner

Brenda J. Betia is not solidarity liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian

Airlines, and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable

for moral and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the

September 13, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

Accordingly, petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay

respondents:

(1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective

dates in which each of the respondents were illegally terminated

until the finality of this Decision;

(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each

of the respondents commenced employment until the finality of

this Decision at the rate of one (1) month's salary for every year of

service, with a fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being

counted as one (1) whole year;

(3) Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 per respondent;

(4) Exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 per respondent;

and

(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.

Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total

judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction

thereof.

This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed

computation of the amounts due to respondents which petitioner Saudi

Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.

SO ORDERED.