SPL Case Digests
SPL Case Digests
SPL Case Digests
In its well-written 40-page Decision, the The elements of this offense were summed up
Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the in Mejia v. Pamaran,15 and we restate them here:
offense described in Section 3, paragraph (b) of (1) the offender is a public officer (2) who
Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt requested or received a gift, a present, a
Practices Act),11 had been proven. Being a public share, a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf
officer, specifically an examiner of the BIR, of the offender or any other person (4) in
Peligrino had the right to intervene in the subject connection with a contract or transaction
transaction. He was a member of the Special with the government (5) in which the public
Project Committee tasked to verify the tax officer, in .an official capacity under the law,
liabilities of professionals, particularly has the right to intervene.
physicians, within the jurisdiction of Revenue
Region No. 4-A, Manila. Petitioner is a BIR examiner assigned to the
Special Project Committee tasked "x x x to
Based on the testimony of private complainant, undertake verification of tax liabilities of various
the NBI agents' entrapment scheme, and the professionals particularly doctors within the
positive results of the chemical examination jurisdiction of Revenue Region No. 4-A, Manila x
done on petitioner, the latter was found by the x x." Since the subject transaction involved the
anti-graft court to have demanded and received reassessment of taxes due from private
money for his personal benefit in connection with complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in
private complainant's tax liabilities. After noting his official capacity is undisputed. Therefore,
that they had no improper motive to testify elements (1), (4) and (5) of the offense are
against petitioner, the court a quo accorded full present.
However, petitioner disputes the prosecution circumstance or act to show acceptance is
evidence establishing that he demanded and not sufficient to lead the court to conclude
received grease money in connection with the that the crime has been committed. To hold
transaction. otherwise would encourage unscrupulous
individuals to frame up public officers by
Specifically, he contends that the simply putting within their physical custody
Sandiganbayan's conclusion that he demanded some gift, money or other property.
money from complainant was based merely on
an assumption that was not supported by any The duration of the possession is not the
evidence. He avers that he merely informed controlling element in determining receipt or
complainant of his tax deficiencies, and that it acceptance. In the case at bar, petitioner
was the latter who requested the reduction of the opened the envelope containing the boodle
amount claimed. money, looked inside, closed it and placed the
envelope beside him on the table. Such reaction
We are not convinced. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 did not signify refusal or resistance to bribery,
penalizes three distinct acts -- (1) demanding or especially considering that he was not supposed
requesting; (2) receiving; or (3) demanding, to accept any cash from the taxpayer. The
requesting and receiving -- any gift, present, proximity of the envelope relative to petitioner,
share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for as testified to by NBI Agent Ragos, also belies
any other person, in connection with any petitioner's contention that he refused the bribe.
contract or transaction between the government
and any other party, wherein a public officer in Mendoza-Ong v Sandiganbayan
an official capacity has to intervene under the G.R. Nos. 146368-69
law. These modes of committing the offense are October 23, 2003; J. Quisuimbing
distinct and different from each other. Proof of
the existence of any of them suffices to warrant Facts:
conviction.16 The lack of demand is immaterial.
After all, Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 uses the
Sometime in February 1993, the Sangguniang
word or between requesting and receiving.
Bayan of Laoang, Northern Samar, passed
Resolution No. 93-132,5 authorizing the
Like bribery, this crime is usually proved by municipality to borrow heavy equipment
evidence acquired during an entrapment, as the from the Philippine Army’s 53rd Engineering
giver or briber is usually the only one who can Battalion, to be utilized in the improvement
provide direct evidence of the commission of this of Laoang’s Bus Terminal. Resolution No. 93-
crime. Thus, entrapment is resorted to in order 132 likewise mandated the municipal
to apprehend a public officer while in the act of government to shoulder the expenses for fuel,
obtaining undue benefits.17 However, we have to oil, and the subsistence allowances of the heavy
distinguish between entrapment and instigation. equipment operators for the duration of the
project.
In "instigation," officers of the law or their agents
incite, induce, instigate or lure the accused into Allegedly, however, the borrowed Army
committing an offense, which the latter otherwise equipment was diverted by the petitioner,
would not commit and has no intention of who was then the town mayor 6 of Laoang, to
committing. In "entrapment," the criminal intent develop some of her private properties in
or design to commit the offense charged Rawis, Laoang, Northern Samar. A concerned
originates in the mind of the accused, and the citizen and ex-member of the Sangguniang
law enforcement officials merely facilitate the Bayan of Laoang, Juanito G. Poso, Sr., filed a
commission of the crime. complaint against petitioner and nine (9) other
municipal officers7 with the Office of the
Furthermore, the Court held in the said case Ombudsman (OMB), Visayas, for violation of the
that there must be a clear intention on the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
part of the public officer to take the gift so
offered and consider it as his or her own Acting on the complaint, Graft Investigation
property from then on. Mere physical receipt Officer Alfonso S. Sarmiento of the OMB
unaccompanied by any other sign,
ordered herein petitioner and her co-accused to from the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao,
submit their respective counter-affidavits and persons for whom accused Mendoza-Ong, in
other controverting evidence. Thereafter, in a any manner or capacity, has secured or
Resolution8 dated August 16, 1995, investigator obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Municipal
Sarmiento recommended the filing of the Government permit or license anent the
appropriate criminal action against petitioner operation of the bus company, JB Lines, owned
for violation of Sections 3(c) and (e) of R.A. by the aforenamed spouses, in consideration for
3019, as amended.9 Despite strenuous the help given or to be given by the accused.
opposition and objections by the defense, on
August 1, 1997, two informations were filed Petitioner claims that in a criminal
against her at the Sandiganbayan docketed prosecution for violation of Section 3(c) of
as Criminal Cases Nos. 23847 and 23848, to R.A. 3019 as amended, the law requires that
wit: the gift received should be "manifestly
excessive" as defined by Section 2(c) of the
That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime same Act. She adds that it is imperative to
thereafter, in the Municipality of Laoang, specify the exact value of the five drums of
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the diesel fuel allegedly received by Mayor Ong
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused as public officer to determine whether such
Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being is "manifestly excessive" under the
then the Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing circumstances.
the crime herein charged in relation to, while in
the performance and taking advantage of her Held:
official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, through manifest Based on the foregoing, the elements of the
partiality and evident bad faith, cause undue offense charged in the assailed information are
injury to the Government and give unwarranted as follows: (1) the offender is a public officer;
benefits, advantage or preference to her (2) he has secured or obtained, or would
husband, Hector Ong, herself, and/or her secure or obtain, for a person any
family and to spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo government permit or license; (3) he directly
Lao when she, in the discharge of her official or indirectly requested or received from said
or administrative functions, caused the person any gift, present or other pecuniary
improvement or development of a private or material benefit for himself or for another;
land owned by her husband, Hector Ong, and (4) he requested or received the gift,
herself and/or her family in Barangay Rawis present or other pecuniary or material benefit
through the use of the equipment and in consideration for help given or to be
resources of the Philippine Army, to the given.16
damage and prejudice of the Government.
In the instant case, we find that the information
in Crim. Case No. 23848 alleged that: (1)
accused Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public
(2) Criminal Case No. 23848 officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Laoang, (2) committed the crime charged in
That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime relation to, while in the performance and
thereafter, in the Municipality of Laoang, taking advantage of her official functions, (3)
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the did request or receive directly or indirectly, a
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused gift, present or other pecuniary or material
Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being benefit in the form of five drums of diesel
then the Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing fuel, for herself or for another, from spouses
the crime herein charged in relation to, while in Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons for whom
the performance and taking advantage of her accused Mendoza-Ong, (4) has secured or
official functions, did then and there willfully, obtained, or will secure or obtain, a
unlawfully and criminally, request or receive, Municipal Government permit or license
directly or indirectly, a gift, present or other anent the operation of the bus company, JB
pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five Lines, owned by said spouses, in
(5) drums of diesel fuel, for herself or for another consideration for help given or to be given
by the accused. After considering thoroughly that she had no reason not to pay the
this averment as formulated by the salaries and other benefits of Agonoy in his
prosecution, we are not prepared to say that capacity as Municipal Engineer. She was
the impugned information omitted an likewise directed to pay Agonoy’s salary and
element needed to adequately charge a other benefits until the Supreme Court had
violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019. finally decided the case,
Agonoy continued reporting for duty as
Petitioner pleads that the pertinent statute must municipal engineer from November 11, 1999.
be read in its entirety. She argues that a On August 18, 2000, the CA denied Agonoy’s
provision of R.A. 3019 such as Section 3(c) must petition for review. He filed a motion for
be interpreted in light of all other provisions, reconsideration of the decision, which the CA
particularly the definition of "receiving any gift," also denied on September 20, 2000.
under Section 2(a) thereof, which reads as Undaunted, Agonoy filed a petition for review
follows: of the CA decision with this Court. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 145016.
In contrast, Section 3 (c) earlier quoted in the In the meantime, on October 17, 2000, Mayor
present case applies regardless of whether the Velasco issued a Memorandum to the
gift’s value is manifestly excessive or not, and Municipal Treasurer directing her to
regardless of the occasion. What is important immediately release Agonoy’s salary,
here, in our view, is whether the gift is received Representation and Transportation Allowance
in consideration for help given or to be given by (RATA) and other benefits. Mayor Velasco again
the public officer. The value of the gift is not told the treasurer that she had no right to
mentioned at all as an essential element of the withhold Agonoy’s benefits
offense charged under Section 3 (c), and there
appears no need to require the prosecution to this Court, in G.R. No. 145016, resolved to
specify such value in order to comply with the deny3 the petition for review filed by Agonoy. On
requirements of showing a prima facie case. February 28, 2001, Agonoy resigned as
Municipal Engineer. The Resolution of the
Evidently the legislature is aware that in Supreme Court dismissing the petition for review
implementing R.A. 3019, it will be precedents of Agonoy became final and executory on May
that will guide the court on the issue of what 10, 2001.
is or what is not manifestly excessive.
On March 18, 2002, Philip Corpus Velasco, the
Velasco v Sandiganbayan Vice Mayor of Bacarra, filed a
G.R. 160991 Complaint4 before the Office of the
February 28, 2005; J. Callejo Sr. Ombudsman against petitioner Mayor
Velasco, Agonoy and Municipal Treasurer
Facts: Dumayag for violation of Republic Act No.
3019. In his Resolution dated April 25, 2003,
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued a the Ombudsman found probable cause
Resolution in CSC Case No. 99-2137 ordering against petitioner Mayor Velasco for violation
the dismissal of Engr. Emmanuel Agonoy, of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, and filed
Municipal Engineer of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, an Information with the Sandiganbayan
for gross neglect of duty. Agonoy did not file charging him of that crime. The case against
a motion for reconsideration thereof; instead, Agonoy was dismissed because he had
he filed a petition for review in the Court of earlier resigned; on the other hand, the
Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. Ombudsman absolved the Municipal
55596. Treasurer, on the finding that she had merely
obeyed the orders of the Mayor.
Despite his knowledge of the said CSC
resolution, petitioner Mayor Pacifico C.
Velasco of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, allowed That on or about September 21, 1999, in
Agonoy to report for work as Municipal Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the
Engineer. He even issued on October 2, 1999 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
a Memorandum to the Municipal Treasurer of named accused PACIFICO VELASCO, a public
Bacarra, Lorna S. Dumayag, informing her officer, being then the Mayor of the
Municipality of Bacarra, committing the unwarranted benefits or undue advantage or
crime charged in relation to and taking preference to Agonoy through manifest
advantage of his official functions, acting partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. The petitioner
gross inexcusable negligence, did then and further avers that he could even be charged
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give administratively, civilly, or criminally if he
unwarranted benefits to EMMANUEL relieved Agonoy from his official duties, and
AGONOY by allowing the latter to continue refused to give the latter his salary, RATA
his employment as the Municipal Engineer of and other benefits.
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte and receive his The office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
salaries, RATA and other benefits from avers that although the petitioner was not a
November 1, 1999 up to February 28, 2001, in party in CSC Case No. 99-2137, he was
the total amount of THREE HUNDRED bound to enforce the CSC Resolution of
SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED September 21, 1999 as Municipal Mayor of
SIXTY-EIGHT (₱375,168.00) PESOS Bacarra, and may even be cited for contempt
Philippine Currency, despite the fact that he for his refusal to do so. The OSP maintains
knows fully well that AGONOY has been that the resolution of the CSC was immediately
dismissed from the government service in a executory, considering that Agonoy did not file a
Resolution No. 992137 rendered by the Civil reconsideration thereof. Moreover, Agonoy’s act
Service Commission on September 21, 1999, to of filing a petition for review with the CA and the
the damage and prejudice of the government. Supreme Court did not stop the execution of
He alleged therein that while he was aware of said resolution.
the CSC resolution dismissing Agonoy from
the service, he was not bound by it because Held:
he was not a party to CSC Case No. 99-2137.
He also alleged therein that he did not The petition has no merit and is, therefore,
receive any directive from the CSC ordering denied.
him to implement its resolution. Furthermore,
even if the CSC did issue the said directive, he
could not prevent Agonoy from reporting for Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 states that -
work. He further averred that he permitted
Agonoy to report for work, and receive salaries SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.
and other benefits from the municipality because
the resolution of the CSC dated September 21, …
1999 was not immediately executory. It cannot,
therefore, be claimed that he gave unwarranted (e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
benefits to Agonoy through manifest partiality, including the Government, or giving any private
evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
negligence. preference in the discharge of his official,
The petitioner insists that while the administrative or judicial functions through
Information alleges that he was aware of the manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
September 21, 1999 Resolution of the CSC inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
dismissing Agonoy from the service, there is apply to officers and employees of offices or
no allegation therein that he was served with government corporations charged with the grant
a copy of the said resolution and was of licenses or permits or other concessions.
directed to implement the same. He avers
that such allegations are essential elements
In Librada M. Cabrera, et al. v.
of the offense of violation of Section 3(e) of
Sandiganbayan,9 this Court held that the
Rep. Act No. 3019. He reiterates that he was
essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of
not bound to implement the resolution
Rep. Act No. 3019 are as follows:
because he was not a party to the case in the
CSC. Hence, he maintains, it cannot be said
that in allowing Agonoy to continue reporting 1. The accused must be a public officer
for work and ordering the municipal discharging administrative, judicial or official
treasurer to give the latter his salary, RATA functions;
and other benefits, he (the petitioner) gave
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, Section 83 of the Uniform Rules on
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, as
implemented by CSC Resolution No. 99-1936,
3. That his action caused any undue injury to he may be cited in contempt of the
any party, including the government, or giving Commission in case of his refusal or failure
any private party unwarranted benefits, to do so, and may even be administratively
advantage or preference in the discharge of his charged therefor
functions.10
It is, thus, not necessary that the officer or
The Court explained in the same case that there employee who willfully refuses or fails to
are two (2) ways by which a public official implement such final resolution be a party to
violates Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 in the case which was resolved by the CSC or
the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by its Regional Office.
by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; or (b) by giving However, in order for such resolution to be
any private party any unwarranted benefits, implemented, it is required that a copy of the
advantage or preference. The accused may CSC Resolution be furnished to the
be charged under either mode or under both. implementing agency, or that such agency had
Moreover, in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,11 the knowledge thereof.
Court held that the use of the disjunctive
term "or" connotes that either act qualifies In this case, the petitioner knew of the
as a violation of Sec. 3(e) of Rep. Act No. questioned CSC Resolution even before he
3019. was officially furnished with a copy thereof.
In fact, the petitioner unequivocably admitted
We agree with the Sandiganbayan. The that he knew of the September 21, 1999
petitioner, at the time of the alleged commission Resolution of the CSC dismissing Agonoy as
of the crime, was the Municipal Mayor of Municipal Engineer of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte,
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. As such, he was in his Memoranda to the Municipal Treasurer.
mandated to ensure that all officers, including
himself, abide by Article I of Section 444(b) The petitioner should have known that in case
(x)13 of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as of Agonoy’s failure to file any motion for the
the Local Government Code, which directs reconsideration of the CSC Resolution, such
executive officials and employees of the resolution would become executory, and he
municipality to faithfully discharge their duties would thus be mandated to enforce the
and functions as provided by law. same. However, if Agonoy had filed a petition for
review in the CA and the appellate court had
We agree with the Sandiganbayan. The issued a stay of execution as provided for in
petitioner, at the time of the alleged Section 8215 of the Uniform Rules on
commission of the crime, was the Municipal Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, in
Mayor of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. As such, he tandem with Section 12, Rule 43 16 of the Rules
was mandated to ensure that all officers, of Court, as amended, the petitioner could not
including himself, abide by Article I of be faulted for allowing Agonoy to continue
Section 444(b)(x)13 of Rep. Act No. 7160, working and receiving compensation therefor.
otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, which directs executive officials and In this case, Agonoy did not file any motion
employees of the municipality to faithfully for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution;
discharge their duties and functions as while he filed a petition for review of the CSC
provided by law. Resolution in the CA and in this Court, no
stay order was issued by either courts in his
The LGC directs the officials and employees of favor.
the municipality to faithfully discharge their
duties and functions as provided by law. Conrado v Sandiganbayan
Considering such duty, the petitioner had to G.R. No. 94955
enforce decisions or final resolutions, orders August 18, 1993; J. Vitug
or rulings of the CSC. Furthermore, under
Facts: Second — On 31 August 1984, the
complaining witness Mariano Lim, one of the
Petitioner, then a newly hired Process Server defendants in the above civil case, learned
in the office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional the rendition of the Order and the fact that it
Trial Court ("RTC") of Antipolo, Rizal, was had not yet then been served upon the
charged, along with Cesar Villamor and Oscar plaintiffs. Lim left "agitated about the loss of
Caing, in an information, dated 26 November eleven days before the decision's period of
1985, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 11035 finality had commenced to run," and he,
(p. 7, Rollo). The arraignment was postponed for therefore, made representations with the
several times because of a pending Executive Judge, the Hon. Antonio Benedicto, to
reinvestigation then being conducted by the have the Order served on Atty. Patrocinio
Tanodbayan. After the reinvestigation, an Palanog, the counsel for the plaintiffs;
"Omnibus Motion to Admit Amended
Information and to Dismiss the case Against Third — The accused, a process server, was
Accused Cesar Villamor and Oscar Caing", directed to effect the service. His first attempt
dated 09 February 1987, was filed by the was unsuccessful because he could not
Tanodbayan locate the address of Atty. Palanog. The
That during the period from August 31, 1984 to accused again tried on September 02, 1984,
February 21, 1985 in the Municipality of and although this time he found the address,
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and Atty. Palanog and his entire family had
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, apparently gone out for the weekend. The
accused JUAN CONRADO, JR., a public officer accused found only a woman, not a member
being the Process Server of all the Regional of the family of Atty. Palanog, who had only
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, did then and been asked to watch over the house.
there wilfully and unlawfully neglect and Accused Coronado did not thus leave the
refuse to serve within reasonable time, a Order;
copy of the Order dated July 11, 1984, issued
by Executive Judge Antonio V. Benedicto in Lim went back to the courthouse where he
Civil Case was informed that the case had meanwhile
No. 290-A entitled "Pinagkamaligan Indo- been sent to the archives together with 29
Agro- Development Corporation, et al. v. other cases
Mariano Lim, et al.," denying plaintiffs' Lim returned to the courthouse and, examining
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the records, he observed additional unnumbered
January 23, 1984 dismissing their complaint pages that include, among other things, a) a
for Cancellation of Title, upon plaintiffs' return, dated 4 September 1984 (Exhibit "F"),
counsel, Atty. Patrocinio Palanog, without signed by accused Coronado stating the
sufficient justification, despite due demand plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Palanog, could not be
and request made by defendant Mariano Lim, contacted; b) an entry at the foot of the Order of
the copy of said Order of July 11, 1984 being 11 July 1984 (Exhibit "A-2") to the effect that
served on plaintiffs' counsel only on Atty. Palanog had received the Order on 25
February 22, 1985, for the purpose of giving February 1985; and (c) a return, dated 25
undue advantage in favor of the plaintiffs and February 1985 (Exhibit "B") that the Order had
discrimination against defendants in said indeed been served on plaintiffs
case by delaying the finality of the order of On the basis of the foregoing, particularly the
dismissal and allowing the plaintiffs to 5-month delay in the service of the court
prolong their stay on the land in litigation. order, the Sandiganbayan convicted herein
petitioner of having violated Section 3 (f) of
The Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Br. 71) issued Republic Act No. 3019 and imposed upon him
an Order, dated 11 July 1984, denying the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for six
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the (6) years and one (1) month to nine (9) years
order of 23 January 1984, that dismissed the and one (1) day.
complaint in Civil Case No. 290-A, entitled
"Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro-Development Issue:
Corporation, et al. v. Mariano Lim et al.";
Whether the failure of the petitioner to We agree with Sandiganbayan that, indeed,
successfully serve the 11 July 1984 Order, given there was failure on the part of the petitioner, a
the above settings, warrants his conviction under public officer, to observe due diligence in his
Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt assigned task; let us call it one of neglect, a
Practices Act. broad term which is defined as a failure to do
what can be done and what is required to be
Held: done (West's legal Thesaurus/Dictionary, 1986).
In its generic sense, it would not matter whether
No. such refusal is intended or unintended. But here
is not the real issue. To warrant conviction for a
The pertinent provision of the law (Republic Act violation of Section 3 (f) of the Anti-Graft and
No. 3019) alleged to have been violated Corrupt Practices Act, the law itself additionally
provides: requires that the accused's dereliction, besides
being without justification, must be for the
purpose of (a) obtaining, directly or indirectly,
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers: The
from any person interested in the matter some
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in
public officer and are hereby declared unlawful:
favor of an interested party or (b) discriminating
against another interested party. The severity of
x x x x x x x x x the penalty imposed by the law leaves no doubt
that the legislative intent is to consider this
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or element to be indispensable.
without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before The record is bereft of
him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or evidence, albeit alleged, to indicate that the
indirectly from any person interested in the petitioner's failure to act was motivated by
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or any gain or benefit for himself or knowingly
advantage in favor of or discriminating against for the purpose of favoring an interested
another interested party. party or discriminating against another. It is
not enough that an advantage in favor of one
Admittedly, the elements of the offense are that: party, as against another, would result from
one neglect or refusal. Had it been so, the
a) The offender is a public officer; law would have perhaps instead said, " or as
a consequence of such neglect or refusal
b) The said officer has neglected or has refused undue advantage is derived by an interested
to act without sufficient justification after due party or another is unduly discriminated
demand or request has been made on him; against."
c) Reasonable time has elapsed from such Before an accused is convicted of a crime, his
demand or request without the public officer guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt,
having acted on the matter pending before him; and the burden of that proof rests upon the
and prosecution. The stringency with which we have
scrupulously observed this rule needs no further
explanation; suffice it to say that it behooves us
d) Such failure to so act is "for the purpose of
to do no less whenever at stake is the life or
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
liberty of a person. And so it is, not only in the
interested in the matter some pecuniary or
appreciation of the evidence but likewise in the
material benefit or advantage in favor of an
application and interpretation of the law.
interested party, or discriminating against
another.
It is not that We are condoning the misconduct
of the petitioner, nor that we are unmindful of the
The attendance of the first three elements in this prejudice that may have been sustained by the
case can hardly be disputed. The private respondent, but the legal remedies lie
controversy, however, lies on the fourth elsewhere, not in the instant action.
element.
Teves v Sandiganbayan There are, therefore, two modes by which a
G.R. No. 154182 public officer who has a direct or indirect
December 17, 2004; J. Davide Jr. financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h)
Facts: of the Anti-Graft Law. The first mode is if in
connection with his pecuniary interest in any
Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, business, contract or transaction, the public
officer intervenes or takes part in his official
Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves
capacity. The second mode is when he is
seeks to annul and set aside the 16 July 2002
prohibited from having such interest by the
Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Constitution or any law.
Case No. 2337 convicting them of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing
direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit We quote herein the Sandiganbayan’s
and Recreation Center in Valencia. declaration regarding petitioners’ culpability
That on or about February 4, 1992, and anent the first mode:
sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia,
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the …[T]hat portion of the Information which
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, seeks to indict the spouses Teves
accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being for his causing the issuance of a business
then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros permit/license to operate the Valencia cockpit
Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in on or about February 4, 1992 is not well-
relation to, while in the performance and taking founded.
advantage of his official functions, and
conspiring and confederating with his wife, … Mayor Edgar Teves could not have issued
herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and a permit to operate the cockpit in the year
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause 1992 because as of January 1, 1992 the
the issuance of the appropriate business license could be issued only by the
permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit Sangguniang Bayan. He may have issued the
and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel permit or license in 1991 or even before that
Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a when he legally could, but that is not the
direct financial or pecuniary interest therein charge. The charge is for acts committed in
considering the fact that said cockpit arena is 1992.14 [Emphasis supplied].
actually owned and operated by him and
accused Teresita Teves.
The Sandiganbayan found that the charge
against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of
he essential elements set out in the afore-quoted the business permit or license to operate the
legislative definition of the crime of violation of Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law are as follows: well-founded." This it based, and rightly so, on
the additional finding that only the Sangguniang
1. The accused is a public officer; Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the
Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or Section 447(3)15 of the LGC of 1991, which took
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang
transaction; Bayan that has the authority to issue a license
for the establishment, operation, and
3. He either maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the
municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the
a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
Sangguniang Bayan,16 under the LGC of 1991,
in connection with such interest; or
the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence,
b. is prohibited from having such interest by the Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken
Constitution or by any law. part in his official capacity in the issuance of a
cockpit license during the material time, as
alleged in the information, because he was not a his wife, still he would have a direct interest
member of the Sangguniang Bayan.17 thereon because, as correctly held by
respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained
A fortiori, there is no legal basis to convict married to each other from 1983 up to 1992,
Teresita Teves as a co-conspirator in the and as such their property relation can be
absence of a finding that Mayor Teves himself is presumed to be that of conjugal partnership
guilty of the offense charged. In short, the of gains in the absence of evidence to the
Sandiganbayan correctly absolved the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code
petitioners of the charge based on the first provides that all property of the marriage is
mode. And there is no need to belabor this point. presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted the
wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code
petitioners of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti- declares all the property of the conjugal
Graft Law based on the second mode. It partnership of gains to be owned in common
reasoned that the evidence overwhelmingly by the husband and wife.
evinces that Mayor Teves had a pecuniary
interest in the Valencia Cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary
1991. Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local
government official or employee, directly or
indirectly, to:
Held:
…
The information accuses petitioner Edgar Teves,
then Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros
Oriental, of causing, "while in the performance (2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other
and taking advantage of his official functions, games licensed by a local government
and conspiring and confederating with his wife unit…. [Emphasis supplied].
… the issuance of the appropriate business
permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit The offense proved, therefore, is the second
and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Teves." The last part of the dispositive portion of Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited
the information states that "said accused Edgar interest. But can the petitioners be convicted
Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary thereof, considering that it was not charged in
interest therein considering the fact that said the information?
cockpit arena is actually owned and operatedby
him and accused Teresita Teves." The answer is in the affirmative in view of
the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in
A careful reading of the information reveals relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal
that the afore-quoted last part thereof is Procedure, which both read:
merely an allegation of the second element
of the crime, which is, that he has a direct or Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
indirect "financial or pecuniary interest in allegation and proof. – When there is a variance
any business, contract or transaction." Not between the offense charged in the complaint or
by any stretch of imagination can it be discerned information and that proved, and the offense as
or construed that the afore-quoted last part of charged is included in or necessarily includes
the information charges the petitioners with the the offense proved, the accused shall be
second mode by which Section 3(h) of the Anti- convicted of the offense proved which is
Graft Law may be violated. Hence, we agree included in the offense charged, or of the
with the petitioners that the charge was for offense charged which is included in the offense
unlawful intervention in the issuance of the proved.
license to operate the Valencia Cockpit. There
was no charge for possession of pecuniary The elements of the offense charged in this
interest prohibited by law. case, which is unlawful intervention in the
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar
Teves over the cockpit were transferred to
issuance of a cockpit license in violation of In the imposition on petitioner Edgar Teves of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are the penalty provided in the LGC of 1991, we
take judicial notice of the fact that under the old
1. The accused is a public officer; LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a
cockpit was not among the prohibitions
enumerated in Section 4126 thereof. Such
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or
possession became unlawful or prohibited only
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took
transaction, whether or not prohibited by law;
effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar
and
Teves stands charged with an offense in
connection with his prohibited interest committed
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the
capacity in connection with such interest. maiden appearance of the prohibition.
Presumably, he was not yet very much aware
On the other hand, the essential ingredients of of the prohibition. Although ignorance
the offense proved, which is possession of thereof would not excuse him from criminal
prohibited interest in violation of Section 3(h) of liability, such would justify the imposition of
the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows: the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under
Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.
1. The accused is a public officer;
Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or acquitted. The charge against her is conspiracy
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or in causing "the issuance of the appropriate
transaction; and business permit/license to operate the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center." For this charge,
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by she was acquitted. But as discussed earlier, that
the Constitution or any law. charge also includes conspiracy in the
possession of prohibited interest.
It is a rule of statutory construction that where
one statute deals with a subject in general Conspiracy must be established separately from
terms, and another deals with a part of the same the crime itself and must meet the same degree
subject in a more detailed way, the two should of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt.
be harmonized if possible; but if there is any While conspiracy need not be established by
conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the
whether it was passed prior to the general conduct of the accused before, during, and after
statute.23 Or where two statutes are of contrary the commission of the crime, all taken together,
tenor or of different dates but are of equal the evidence must reasonably be strong enough
theoretical application to a particular case, the to show community of criminal design.27
one designed therefor specially should prevail
over the other.24 Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being
married to an erring spouse. 28 For a spouse or
Conformably with these rules, the LGC of any person to be a party to a conspiracy as to be
1991, which specifically prohibits local liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that
officials from possessing pecuniary interest there be intentional participation in the
in a cockpit licensed by the local government transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
unit and which, in itself, prescribes the common design. Except when he is the
punishment for violation thereof, is mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that
paramount to the Anti-Graft Law, which a conspirator should have performed some overt
penalizes possession of prohibited interest act as a direct or indirect contribution in the
in a general manner. Moreover, the latter execution of the crime planned to be committed.
took effect on 17 August 1960, while the The overt act must consist of active participation
former became effective on 1 January 1991. in the actual commission of the crime itself or of
Being the earlier statute, the Anti-Graft Law moral assistance to his co-conspirators.
has to yield to the LGC of 1991, which is the
later expression of legislative will.25 Luz Almeda v Sandignabayan
G.R. No. 204267 the fact that the latter had no jurisdiction over
July 25, 2016: J. Del Castillo her is the sole cause of the long period of
Facts: inaction and delay which prejudiced her; and
In 2001, petitioner Luz S. Almeda, then Schools that contrary to the Ombudsman’s argument,
Division Superintendent of the Department of she should not be deemed estopped, for filing a
Education, Culture and Sports (DepEd), motion to suspend the filing of the information
Surigao del Norte, and several other public against her, from claiming her right to a speedy
officers and employees were charged disposition of her case.
administratively and criminally before the
Ombudsman, in connection with the alleged Held:
improper use and disbursement of the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) First of all, the preliminary investigation
allotted to petitioner’s co-respondent proceedings in said case took more than 11
Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. (Navarro), long years to resolve, or from March 23, 2001
Surigao del Norte Congressman, and when the proceedings were initiated and
implemented through the Department of docketed,49 to September 6, 2012 when
Interior and Local Government (DILG) and petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
the DepEd. The criminal charges were denied.
consolidated and docketed as OMB-MIN-01-
0183. On March 19, 2003, a Resolution was Secondly, the delay in the proceedings was
issued in said case by Graft Investigation and caused solely by the repeated indorsement of
Prosecution Officer (GIPO) II Hilde C. dela Cruz- the Ombudsman and the OSP, which may be
Likit (dela Cruz-Likit), to the effect that probable attributed to the Ombudsman’s failure to
cause existed to indict petitioner and her co- realize that petitioner was not under the
accused for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of jurisdiction of the OSP or
RA 3019.6 This Resolution was disapproved in the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, when dela
part by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo Cruz-Likit, the handling GIPO, went on
(Marcelo), who made minor modifications and official study leave, no GIPO was assigned to
instructions thereto. OMB-MIN-01-0183; as a result, the case was
Petitioner filed a third Manifestation before the neglected. Even if, as respondents argue,
Ombudsman, instead of the OSP, entitled petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was tardy
"Manifestation Reiterating the Right of the and that she filed a motion to defer the filing of
Accused to Speedy Trial with Prayer for the information, these have no bearing as in fact
Dismissal of the Case."23 This time petitioner they are irrelevant to the issue; the fact remains
bewailed the inaction and procedure taken that the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case
by the Ombudsman and OSP in not taking took too long; the fact that the ground for
cognizance of OMB-MIN-01-0183 and instead denying the Motion for Reconsideration involved
indorsing and repeatedly tossing the case a simple procedural issue highlights the
back and forth to each other. Ombudsman’s failure to timely resolve the same.
In seeking reversal of the assailed Order and
dismissal of OMB-MIN-01-0183 as against her,
Third, petitioner had no hand in the delay. As
with additional prayer for injunctive relief,
a matter of fact, she sent a letter and filed
petitioner contends in her Petition and
written manifestations seeking the immediate
Opposition29 to the Ombudsman’s Comment,
resolution of her case. While they were filed
which the Court treats as her Reply, 30 that the
only in 2010 and 2011, petitioner’s letter and
Ombudsman’s failure to promptly act on her
manifestations cannot be considered late, and
case for nine years from the filing of her
no waiver or acquiescence may be attached to
motion for reconsideration, or from July 2003
the same, as she was not required as a rule to
to September 2012, is a violation of her
follow up on her case; instead, it is the State’s
constitutional right to a speedy disposition
duty to expedite the same.
of her case; that despite her repeated
manifestations and follow-ups, no action was
taken on her case; that the Ombudsman and Santiago v Sandiganbayan
OSP’s actions constitute gross neglect and G.R. No. 128055
indifference; that the Ombudsman’s erroneous April 18, 2001; J. Vitug
action of endorsing her case to the OSP despite
Facts: able to come unaided to his office on 20 May
1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this The SC issued an order deferring petitioner's
Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM arraignment and the consideration of her motion
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being to cancel the cash bond until further advice from
then the Commissioner of the Commission on the Court.
Immigration and Deportation, with evident On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit
bad faith and manifest partiality in the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena
exercise of her official functions, did then from the case and to defer her arraignment
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09
approve the application for legalization for November 1992, her motion was denied by the
the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed
Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat anew a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with
Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the
Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of
Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating
Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, that the names of the aliens whose applications
Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, she purportedly approved and thereby
Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An supposedly extended undue advantage were
Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, conspicuously omitted in the complaint.
Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi
Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ The Court, in its resolution of 12 November
Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset
Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya petitioner's arraignment not later than five days
Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after from receipt of notice thereof.
January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order
No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the
legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition
fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby
assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to
giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose
decree a ninety-day preventive suspension
stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized
of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator
by said accused." 1
of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the the implementation of the suspension order.
other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91- Held:
94555 and No. 91-94897.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the
Pursuant to the information filed with the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. official charged with violation of the provisions of
Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute
(P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash provides:
bail without need for physical appearance as
she was then recuperating from injuries "SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.
sustained in a vehicular accident. The — Any incumbent public officer against whom
Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty any criminal prosecution under a valid
until 05 June 1991 or until her physical information under this Act or under Title 7, Book
condition would warrant her physical II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
appearance in court. Upon manifestation by involving fraud upon government or public funds
the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and Attention might be called to the fact that
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided
be suspended from office. Should he be by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it
if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to appropriate to render this decision for future
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits guidance on the significant issue raised by
which he failed to receive during suspension, petitioner.
unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.