Asian Affairs

ISSN: 0306-8374 (Print) 1477-1500 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raaf20

INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY UNDER THE

MODI ADMINISTRATION: BUDDHISM, DIASPORA
AND YOGA

Arijit Mazumdar

To cite this article: Arijit Mazumdar (2018) INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY UNDER THE
MODI ADMINISTRATION: BUDDHISM, DIASPORA AND YOGA, Asian Affairs, 49:3, 468-491, DOI:
10.1080/03068374.2018.1487696

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2018.1487696

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 Asian Affairs, 2018
Vol. XLIX, no. III, 468–491, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2018.1487696

INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY UNDER THE

MODI ADMINISTRATION: BUDDHISM, DIASPORA
AND YOGA
ARIJIT MAZUMDAR

Arijit Mazumdar, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Political Science at the

University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA. He is the author of
Indian Foreign Policy in Transition: Relations with South Asia (Routle-
dge/Taylor & Francis). His research interests include Indian foreign
policy, India’s internal conflicts and South Asian politics. E-mail:
[email protected]

Introduction
When Narendra Modi began his tenure as Prime Minister of India in May
2014, few observers expected him to be active in the area of foreign
policy. Modi campaigned on the promise of reducing corruption, improv-
ing governance and accelerating the pace of India’s economic growth.
During campaigning, he made few references to foreign policy in his
speeches beyond the challenges posed by China and Pakistan to India’s
security and the problem of illegal immigration from Bangladesh.
However, he has surprised everyone with his strong focus on foreign
policy since becoming prime minister. Even before he assumed office,
Modi signalled a new approach to foreign policy by inviting the
leaders of all the South Asian countries, including Pakistan, to attend
his inauguration.

During his first two years in office, he travelled to more than three dozen
countries (some more than once) either for a state visit or to attend a
regional or global summit.1 Modi has upgraded India’s relations with
countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia,
France, Germany, Canada, China and Israel, among others. Creating
new trade and commercial opportunities, securing foreign investment,
inviting foreign tourists to visit and projecting India as a rising country
and an engaged partner of the international community as the latter
addresses transnational challenges have been key features of India’s
foreign policy under Modi. Foreign policy became one of the many
© 2018 The Royal Society for Asian Affairs
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 469

tools (albeit, an important one) to be utilized by his administration in the

service of India’s economic growth and development.

During his foreign visits, Modi has frequently promoted India’s soft
power. The Modi administration is making concerted efforts to project
India’s soft power in the service of larger strategic goals. The Modi
administration appears to believe that although India’s soft power may
not be able to directly persuade foreign actors to support India’s pos-
itions on various issues, in the long run it will make it easier for India
to promote its traditional foreign-policy goals, related to security and
economic interests. Modi has primarily focused on three soft power
resources/assets, namely Buddhism, Diaspora and Yoga. This article
explains how the use of these three resources is designed to complement
India’s conventional diplomacy, boost its international image, project it
as peaceful rising power, improve relations with other countries and help
attract foreign investment, technology and tourists in order to promote
economic growth and development. At the outset, it needs to be made
clear that this article only looks at the exercise of India’s soft power
and its possible impact on the international stage, and does not focus
on the impact of soft power on domestic politics or its impact on dom-
estic audiences.

India’s soft power

According to Joseph Nye, the person who coined the term, ‘soft power’ is
the ability to influence others to get the results one wants through ‘attrac-
tion’ rather than ‘coercion’ or ‘payment’.2 If a country has substantial soft
power, its actions will be seen as more legitimate and it will be likely to
encounter less resistance from others. This form of power is becoming
increasingly important in the post-Cold War era. It is different from the
traditional (neorealist) understanding of power related to ‘coercion’,
which focuses on a state’s military and economic strength, i.e. ‘hard
power’. The three sources of a state’s soft power are ‘its culture’ (in
places where it is attractive), ‘its political values’ (when it lives up to
them at home and abroad) and ‘its foreign policies’ (when they are
seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Nye is very clear that
economic strength and the power of ‘inducements’ do not constitute
soft power, that soft power is more than just ‘persuasion’, and that the
ability of soft power to produce desired behaviour depends on the
context and the skills with which the resources are converted to outcomes.
470 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

The examination of India’s soft power is a relatively recent enterprise.

Indian politician and former diplomat Shashi Tharoor did a lot of the pio-
neering work in this field. Tharoor believes that although India’s soft
power may not directly persuade others to support the country, it at
least enhances its international standing.3 Developing Nye’s idea that
the “side with the better story to tell often wins”, Tharoor argues that
India’s stories are more persuasive and attractive than its rivals’ stories
and hence the country’s soft power may help produce desired outcomes.
However, he cautions that favourable outcomes depend on the context,
i.e. geopolitics, and not simply on soft power.

During the past few years, several scholars, including Tharoor, have
drawn attention to India’s growing soft power assets and their deploy-
ment.4 The sources of India’s soft power that have been identified
include Ayurveda, Bollywood, Buddhism, Cinema, Cricket, Cuisine,
Diaspora, Fine Arts (architecture, music, painting, poetry and sculpture),
Information Technology, Performing Arts (dance and theatre) and Yoga.
There are multiple objectives behind the projection of soft power by
India, including making up for lack of hard power, mitigating inter-
national anxieties about India’s rise, improving India’s image, honouring
the legacy of the founding fathers – Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru – attract-
ing foreign investment, engaging with the Indian diaspora, inviting
foreign tourists to visit and outlining India’s position on various issues.5

The exercise of soft power by various administrations since India’s inde-

pendence has also been the subject of study.6 The role of these adminis-
trations in projecting India’s soft power abroad, through ‘public
diplomacy’, has been the focus of some scholars.7 Although most of
these studies claim that governments have little role to play in terms of
the development of soft power assets, they concede that when it comes
to the projection of soft power governments need to be involved so as
to bring disparate elements of the country’s soft power assets together
in the service of its foreign policy.8

Many acknowledge that India’s poor human development indicators,

attacks against minorities and women, caste discrimination and violence,
allegations of human rights violations against security forces in Kashmir
and the north-east region and traditionally weak government involvement
in the projection of soft power are a cause for concern.9 Some question
the effectiveness of India’s soft power, point out the necessity of hard
power to back up soft power, and highlight the absence of any specific
outcome that could be attributed to the country’s soft power exercise.10
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 471

More recently, some scholars have discussed how Modi has projected
various aspects of India’s soft power in the service of its foreign
policy.11 These studies and others discuss how Modi has drawn attention
to India’s soft power resources and projected India as a benign rising
power, as well as reaching out to the Indian diaspora across the world,
re-energizing public diplomacy efforts in order to engage with people
from various countries, and promoting India as a tourism and foreign
investment destination. The use of broadcasting, print and social media
by the administration to project the country’s soft power abroad and
even towards Indians at home has also been discussed.12 Modi himself
is active on various social media networking sites, including Facebook
and Twitter. There is a developing consensus among scholars that soft
power projection will become an important element of India’s foreign
policy in future years.

This article builds on the existing literature and analyses how India’s soft
power assets, specifically Buddhism, Diaspora and Yoga, have been pro-
moted and used by the Modi administration in the service of India’s
foreign-policy interests, the reasons behind integrating and projecting
these aspects of India’s soft power to foreign audiences, the impediments
to projecting a coordinated message and image of India to the rest of the
world, and how best to address these problems.

Soft power diplomacy: Buddhism, Diaspora and Yoga

As prime minister, Modi has arguably leveraged Buddhism, Diaspora and
Yoga more than any other soft power assets in India’s diplomatic engage-
ments abroad. The reasons behind the promotion of these sources of
India’s soft power are not difficult to fathom. Ultimately, these assets
have been used as tools to pursue specific interests and goals in the
area of foreign policy.

Buddhism
In recent times, Buddhism has been witnessing a resurgence of popularity
globally. Modi has taken a keen interest in promoting India’s rich Bud-
dhist heritage.13 More than once, he has highlighted the philosophical
similarities between Hinduism (India’s largest religion) and Buddhism.14
He has emphasized Buddhist values like equality, non-violence, discus-
sion and dialogue and righteous conduct as key to an Asian ‘renewal’
and the basis for productive relations between various Asian countries.
472 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

Buddhism is considered as the common bond that ties Asian countries

together and Buddha’s message of peace is just as relevant today as it
was in the past.15

The Modi administration has drawn attention to how Buddhism, which

originated in India around the fifth century BCE, travelled to East and
South-East Asia over the next few centuries. Buddhist monks from
various countries travelled back and forth across Asia to spread the
Buddha’s message. This demonstrated the ancient cultural, civilizational
and spiritual links these countries have with India. Modi has visited Bud-
dhist temples and shrines while on official visit to China, Japan, Mongolia
and Vietnam. During his visit to Asian countries, especially those that are
Buddhist majority or have a substantial Buddhist population, he has fre-
quently evoked Buddhism. Modi’s recent push on Buddhism is seen as an
important step to address the years of neglect of Buddhism and strength-
ened India’s case for leadership of Buddhist Asia. Despite the fact that
India has a very small Buddhist population, about one per cent of the
total population, it can claim to be the spiritual birthplace of Buddhism.

In August 2014, Modi’s address to the Constituent Assembly of Nepal

highlighted how Buddhism contributed to shared cultural and civiliza-
tional ties between India and Nepal. He declared that while Buddha
attained nirvana (enlightenment) in India, Nepal was his birthplace.
The declaration was intended to assuage the feelings of those Nepalese
who have long protested against what they believed were false claims
by some Indians that the Buddha was born in India. In Sri Lanka,
Modi talked about how Buddhism was introduced into the country in
the third century BCE by Mahinda Bhikkhu, son of the great Mauryan
Emperor Ashoka of India. During former president Mahinda Rajapakse’s
tenure, Sri Lanka appeared to be getting close to China, which worried
India. However, with a new dispensation in place in Sri Lanka under
the leadership of President Maithripala Sirisena there appeared to be a
new opportunity to arrest the decline in bilateral ties. Buddhism has
been at the heart of India’s recent diplomatic engagements with some
countries in its neighbourhood. It helps project India as a pluralistic
and peaceful rising power, and counter the image that it seeks to dominate
its neighbours.

Highlighting the Buddhist connection between the south-east Asian

countries and India has provided impetus to the latter’s “Look East/Act
East” policy. Since Buddhism is tied closely to national identity and cul-
tural heritage in many of these countries, such references are useful. It
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 473

also demonstrates that although India may not be part of the Asia-Pacific
region in a strict geographic sense, it is culturally and spiritually tied to
the region through Buddhism. Modi engaged in religious diplomacy
using Buddhism during his trip to Vietnam in September 2016. The
Modi administration announced special annual scholarships for Vietna-
mese students to pursue advanced Buddhist studies at Indian institutes
for Buddhist Sangha members. Modi has thus used historical and Bud-
dhist links in his outreach to Vietnam and other south-east Asian
countries. Due to its ongoing dispute with China over the South China
Sea, Vietnam has eagerly responded to India’s overtures in an attempt
to balance China.

Some scholars have claimed that the Modi administration’s promotion of

India’s prominent place in Buddhism is designed to counteract China’s
soft power in Asia.16 Beijing has actively promoted Buddhism for the
past several years, including hosting the World Buddhist forum every
three years between 2006 and 2015. The Government of the People’s
Republic of China has recognized that Buddhism could play a major
role in connecting with some east Asian and south-east Asian states. It
is spending billions of dollars to develop the infrastructure of Lumbini,
the site of Buddha’s birthplace in Nepal.17 However, the destruction of
Tibet’s Buddhist heritage, especially during the Cultural Revolution,
has damaged China’s Buddhist credentials and posed several challenges.

In contrast, the Modi administration has projected India as the custodian

and protector of Buddhist heritage, providing refuge to the Dalai Lama,
the Tibetan spiritual leader, and his people since the early 1950s. The
visits of Chinese Buddhist monks Faxian and Xuanzang to India
during the fifth and seventh century CE, respectively, are invoked by
the administration both to highlight the ancient links between India and
China and to subtly highlight that, at least in terms of Buddhism, India
is the ‘spiritual teacher’ and China is the ‘disciple’. However, rather
than indulge in a competition over ‘ownership’ of Buddhism, the Modi
administration has talked more about how Buddhism is a cultural
thread which binds India and China together.

There are a number of historical Buddhist pilgrimage sites in India,

including three of the four holiest sites, which are Bodh Gaya, Bihar,
the site of the enlightenment of Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha),
Sarnath, Uttar Pradesh, the site of the Buddha’s first sermon, and Kush-
inagar, Uttar Pradesh, the site of his death and parinirvana (passing and
entering into nirvana). The Modi administration has tried to raise the
474 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

level of awareness among foreign tourists about India as a destination for

Buddhist pilgrimage. The Ministries of Culture and Tourism are working
together to develop the ‘Buddhist Circuit’ across several Indian states,
including Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The efforts to promote Buddhist
tourism are part of the “Incredible India” campaign started in 2002 to
promote tourism in India, which has been actively taken up by the
Modi administration.

The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) estimated that about
eight million tourists arrived in India during 2015. Travel and tourism’s
total contribution to the country’s GDP was about US$130 billion (6.3
per cent of the country’s total GDP) in 2015. It is projected to rise by
7.5 per cent p.a. between 2016–2026, constituting 7.2 per cent of the coun-
try’s total GDP in 2026.18 In 2012, it was estimated that almost 1.2 million
foreign tourists visited the various sites on the Buddhist Circuit.19 Visits by
Buddhists across the world are expected to strengthen their connection with
India and have a positive effect on the latter’s relationship with Buddhist-
majority countries. Infrastructure development and tourist revenue are also
potential sources of income generation and job creation for the local popu-
lation and thus contribute to India’s development.

In 2014, the Modi administration formally established Nalanda Univer-

sity. The new university was located near the site of Nalanda, the
famous ancient Buddhist centre of higher learning in eastern India. Bud-
dhist monks from all over India and parts of Asia came to study there. The
site was destroyed almost 800 years ago. The idea of resurrecting Nalanda
was actually conceived by the previous administration, led by Manmohan
Singh. The proposal to create this university had been shared with east
Asian countries, and they were urged to collaborate with India to make
it a reality. As a result, Japan, China, Thailand, Singapore and South
Korea are among several countries that have provided financial assistance
to the project. The Modi administration chose to take this project forward
because it highlighted the shared heritage of Asian countries, emphasized
the Indian roots of Buddhism and had the potential to help re-connect
people and societies across Asia.

As part of its outreach to ‘Buddhist Asia’, India hosted the “International

Buddha Poornima Diwas Celebration” on 4 May 2015, which was a
global celebration of the Buddha’s life and teachings. The event was
attended by Modi himself, as well cabinet ministers, parliamentarians,
diplomats (Indian and foreign) and Buddhist monks and nuns (Indian
and foreign). It was designed to promote India as the spiritual birthplace
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 475

of the Buddha and the rich Buddhist legacy of India. The Indian Council
for Cultural Relations (ICCR), set up in 1950 to promote India’s cultural
assets and heritage, has in recent times worked together with India’s Min-
istry of External Affairs (MEA) in the area of external cultural diplo-
macy.20 It has been active in organizing several seminars, conferences
and festivals in India and abroad, where Buddhist scholars and monks
interact with government officials, politicians and media personnel.

Buddhism has certainly emerged as a prominent soft power asset for India
under the Modi administration. It has been used extensively in the service
of India’s foreign policy interests and goals, especially in its outreach to
south, south-east and east Asian countries. India’s Buddhist credentials
are not hard to realize. Buddhist diplomacy has the potential to reinvigor-
ate ties and facilitate cooperation between India and its Asian neighbours.
Despite fears about competition between India and China over ‘owner-
ship’ of Buddhism, the latter actually is the spiritual bond that ties the
two Asian giants together. As such, it is unlikely to emerge as a new
arena for rivalry between India and China.

Diaspora
India has historically done a poor job of utilizing the soft power resources
related to its diaspora. Diasporas are sometimes considered to be one of
the most prominent soft power assets of a country.21 The Indian diaspora,
connected to each other and to the ‘mother’ country through digital tech-
nologies, is an asset for India.22 The diaspora is truly global, having a
presence in almost every region of the world. They include descendants
of indentured labourers who worked in former British colonies during the
19th century, mostly blue-collar workers (skilled, semi-skilled and
unskilled professionals) in the Middle-East and skilled professionals in
white-collar positions across various fields in the West. Although
diverse in ethnicity, religion, linguistic, class and caste most of them
see India as their cultural and civilizational ‘homeland’.

The diaspora includes Indian citizens temporarily residing abroad (non-

resident Indians or NRIs) and people of Indian origin or ancestry and
their descendants who are not citizens of India (persons of Indian
origin or PIOs). According to the Overseas Indian Affairs, a division of
India’s MEA, there were about 27 million members within the Indian dia-
spora in April 2016.23 In 2015, the World Bank estimated that India
received about US$69 billion in the form of remittances from overseas,
making it the top recipient country in the world.24
476 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

More recent administrations in India have cultivated the diaspora in a sus-

tained manner, using them to reach out to their adopted countries for the
purpose of transmitting information about developments in India, and
seeking investors and partners for India’s economy.25 The Modi admin-
istration has continued the practice of previous administrations in orga-
nizing the annual “Pravasi Bharatiya Divas” (non-resident Indian day),
to celebrate the successes of the Indian diaspora and to recognize their
contribution to India’s growth and development. The administration
appears to be convinced that the diaspora not only plays a key role in
India’s economic development (as a source of investment, knowledge
and technology), but also contributes to strengthening existing bilateral
ties between India and the countries in which they are based.

Many PIOs in the West occupy prominent positions in the field of poli-
tics, business, non-profits, think tanks, higher education and the like,
and are thus well-connected to their respective governments.26 Due to
its visibility and influence, the diaspora may even help secure new
markets for India’s exports and outward investment. The expectation
that the diaspora may help further India’s foreign policy interests and
goals is a key factor behind Modi’s active engagement with them.
Faster economic growth at home under Modi’s tenure has also facilitated
stronger engagement with countries having relatively large Indian
diaspora.

Since his inauguration he has visited several countries in the West. As

part of his outreach to the diaspora in these countries, he spoke to
packed audiences at Madison Square Garden in New York City (Septem-
ber 2014), Allphones Arena in Sydney (November 2014), Ricoh Coli-
seum in Toronto (April 2015) and Wembley Stadium in London
(November 2015). The message was always the same in his addresses.
He urged the diaspora to contribute their capital, expertise, time and
energy to India’s growing economy. The Modi administration perceives
that many diaspora members are proud of India’s ancient civilization and
modern achievements and are looking for opportunities to make their own
contribution to the Indian growth story. The fact that they are digitally
connected with the rest of the world and active on social media networks
has made it possible for the administration to engage with them. Major
Indian cities have already benefitted from diaspora remittances and
foreign investment, especially in the information technology (IT) sector
and IT-enabled services (ITES) sector.27 The diaspora’s economic
power is undeniable and the administration desires to harness this to
boost India’s economic growth and development, beginning with their
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 477

involvement in campaigns like “Swachh (Clean) Bharat”, “Clean Ganga

River” and “Make-in-India”.

On his maiden state visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in August
2015, Modi addressed a packed house at the Dubai Cricket Stadium,
during which he praised the Indian expatriate population’s achievements,
highlighted their positive contribution to India-UAE bilateral ties, and
talked about the various initiatives launched by his administration for
the benefit of the diaspora. His outreach efforts appear to have been
quite successful in terms of connecting with the diaspora going by the
huge turnouts at his various speeches, the large number of people
lining the streets to see him and how many wanted to shake hands and
take ‘selfies’ with him.28 Establishing bridges between India and the
West is a foreign-policy priority for Modi. His administration under-
stands that there may be apprehensions in some circles about India’s
rise as a major power. The diaspora plays a crucial role here in assuaging
such concerns. In his address at Madison Square Garden, Narendra Modi
hailed the Indian-American community as India’s ‘unofficial’ ambassa-
dors, helping build a positive image of the country in the minds of
other Americans.

In response to several complaints from the diaspora in America about

India’s cumbersome visa procedures and the harassment they faced at
the hands of Indian embassy officials and immigration personnel in
India, the administration appears to have taken steps to make the
process simpler. It hired an American company, Cox and Kings Global
Services, in March 2014 to provide Indian passport and visa application
services, and merged the existing Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) and
Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) cards into a single identity card, which
currently serves as a multi-purpose, multiple-entry, life-long visa for
holders, and does away with the requirement of mandatory reporting at
local police stations by the cardholders when they arrive. The adminis-
tration also decided to merge the existing Ministry of Overseas Indian
Affairs (MOIA) with the MEA, creating a Division of Overseas Indian
Affairs within the MEA to provide the former with more diplomatic
muscle and avoid duplication of work.

Increasingly, the Modi government is paying attention to the physical

safety and security of the Indian diaspora. During April 2015, the Modi
administration evacuated about 5,000 stranded Indian citizens and
almost 1,000 foreign nationals from Yemen, as part of “Operation
Raahat”. The evacuation became necessary due to Saudi Arabia’s
478 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

military intervention in Yemen and their attacks against targets in Yemeni

cities. The same month, the administration also evacuated thousands of
stranded Indian citizens and foreigners from Nepal, as part of “Operation
Maitiri”, in the aftermath of the massive earthquake that hit the country.
During July 2016, the administration directed the Indian Air Force (IAF)
to evacuate Indians from South Sudan, designated “Operation Sankat
Mochan”, as clashes escalated between rival groups within the country.
A small number of Indians were flown back.29

Furthermore, the Modi administration has implemented programmes to

protect women migrants and semi-skilled and unskilled workers
seeking employment in the Middle East.30 Recruitment agencies and
foreign employees have been asked to register with the proper authorities
and their duties and responsibilities vis-à-vis the workers have been
clearly laid out. The administration has implemented the Pravasi Bhara-
tiya Bima Yojna, an insurance scheme designed to cover medical
expenses, repatriation benefits and maternity and legal expenses of eli-
gible overseas workers, and the Mahatma Gandhi Pravasi Suraksha
Yojana, a social security scheme for semi-skilled and unskilled
workers. Through the Overseas Workers Resource Centre and the
Migrant Resource Centre, the administration has tried to empower
current and future emigrants by informing, guiding and advising them
about employment abroad. Finally, it has sought to enter into bilateral
social security ‘totalization’ agreements with other countries to protect
the interests of India’s overseas workers.

An institutional framework to engage with the Indian diaspora is being

put in place by the Modi administration. The Division of Overseas
Indian Affairs manages an extensive list of events, programmes and
schemes dealing with the Indian diaspora. These include Pravasi Bharat
Samman Awards (highest honour conferred by India on a member of
the diaspora for his/her achievements), Regional Pravasi Bharatiya
Divas events (in countries where there are large Indian diaspora, like
the USA, UK, UAE, etc.), the Know India Program (a forum that
allows diaspora students to visit India and learn about its developments
and achievements), the Study in India Program (which provides diaspora
youth the opportunity to study in short-term courses at Indian univer-
sities), Tracing the Roots (a programme under which diaspora members
apply to the government to help trace their roots, i.e. family tree, in
India), the proposed Pravasi Bharatiya Kendra in New Delhi (which
would include a library, resource centre, auditorium, exhibition space
and food restaurant for diaspora), the India Development Foundation of
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 479

Overseas Indians (established to enable diaspora to participate in social

development projects), the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (to
provide businesses and investors information related to India’s
economy, to facilitate visits of diaspora business delegations to India,
and disseminate information about Indian corporate internships available
for diaspora students) and the Indian Centre for Migration (a research
think-tank dedicated to the study of the diaspora).

Not unlike ‘Buddhist diplomacy’, the Modi administration’s active invol-

vement in diaspora diplomacy is designed to supplement India’s tra-
ditional diplomatic efforts, boost its international image, project it as a
benign rising power, improve relations with countries having large dia-
spora populations and help attract foreign investment, technology and
tourists from the diaspora in order to promote economic growth and
development.

Yoga
Along with Buddhism, Yoga is probably one of the most famous cultural
exports of India. The globalization of popular culture, rising stress levels
associated with modern life, and the desire to enhance strength, flexibility
and performance at the workplace and in daily lives are part of the reasons
why Yoga is becoming increasingly popular. Yoga is a Sanskrit word,
meaning ‘union’. It is originally a Hindu practice, designed to help indi-
viduals achieve ‘self-realization’ and unite with the divine. It may also be
understood as a way to balance the body and the mind. However, it is no
longer seen simply as a Hindu practice but as a means to tackle the chal-
lenges associated with modern life.

Yoga has become an integral part of the ‘health and wellness’ industry in
the West, designed to help individuals achieve a healthy body and sound
mind. A huge number of Yoga studios offering classes have sprung up
across the West, particularly in the USA. A recent survey by the Yoga
Alliance, the largest non-profit association representing the Yoga com-
munity in the USA, estimated that the number of practitioners was
about 37 million in 2016, up from about 20 million in 2012.31 Prac-
titioners spent about US$17 billion on classes, clothing, equipment and
accessories during the same year, up from US$10 billion in 2012. The
worldwide popularity of Yoga and also the business potential of this
ancient practice appear to have been part of the reason why the Modi
administration has been drawn to it.32
480 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

The focus on Yoga has generated some controversy. Critics have argued
that Modi’s championing of Yoga is an expression of Hindutva, and a
way to pander to his Hindu nationalist constituency.33 However, Modi
himself has clarified that Yoga is not simply a religious practice.34 The
promotion of India’s ancient culture and heritage abroad is part of the
Modi administration’s soft power strategy, as witnessed in the strong
focus on Buddhism. Along these lines, the administration has also
initiated steps to promote Yoga, another key element of the country’s
ancient culture, around the world. As a cultural asset, Yoga serves as
an excellent bridge between India and practitioners across the world,
and by extension the countries in which the latter reside. Modi has
hailed Yoga as one of India’s major contributions to the rest of the
world.35 As interest in Yoga grows abroad, the administration could
perhaps look forward to growing interest about ancient Indian scriptures
among foreign scholars. This will be likely to facilitate the dissemination
of India’s history and cultural ideas abroad as well as encourage travel by
foreign scholars and practitioners of Yoga to India. The Modi adminis-
tration’s involvement in this area is probably also a response to increasing
commodification of Yoga and deviations from original teachings not just
in the West, but also in India.

One of the first steps initiated by the administration with regard to pro-
moting Yoga abroad involved Modi proposing the idea of an “Inter-
national Day of Yoga” at the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) in September 2014. He stated,
Yoga is an invaluable gift of India’s ancient tradition. It embodies unity of mind
and body; thought and action; restraint and fulfilment; harmony between man
and nature; a holistic approach to health and well-being. It is not about exercise
but to discover the sense of oneness with yourself, the world and the nature. By
changing our lifestyle and creating consciousness, it can help in well-being. Let
us work towards adopting an International Yoga Day.36

It was decided to table this proposal under the “global health and foreign
policy” head of the UNGA’s already adopted agenda, given Modi’s pos-
ition regarding the linkage between Yoga and health and sustainable
living.37 For the proposal to succeed, it had to be supported by the
majority of the UN’s 193 member-states. As a result of the adminis-
tration’s efforts, several member-states agreed to co-sponsor the proposal,
including the USA, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China, Brazil, Egypt,
Indonesia, Nigeria and Iran. In the end, 177 member states supported the
idea, leading the UNGA to declare 21 June as International Day of Yoga.
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 481

This was a major victory for the Modi administration on the international
front.

The widespread support received from various countries also demon-

strated that Yoga was not simply a Hindu (or Indian) cultural product,
but a practice that had helped people achieve physical and mental well-
being across the world. It was also recognition of India’s soft power by
the international community. The significance of this step cannot be over-
estimated. The International Day of Yoga will serve to increase India’s
attractiveness to the rest of the world and further enhances its credentials
as a rising power. Henceforth, Indian administrations have a specific day
during which they may talk about India’s soft power assets, including
Yoga, to the rest of the world. Alyssa Ayres argues that the practice of
Yoga is rooted in the idea of ‘Vasudhaiva kutumbakam’, a Sanskrit
term meaning ‘the world is one family’.38 The promotion of Yoga
conveys to the world that Indian foreign policy is about maintaining har-
monious ties with everyone.

In November 2015, the Modi administration announced the creation of a

new government ministry, called AYUSH (Ayurveda, Yoga, Unani,
Siddha and Homeopathy). It was designed to integrate and project
India’s traditional medicine systems to both the domestic and inter-
national community. On 21 June 2015, a massive turnout of about
36,000 people at Rajpath, New Delhi, which included Narendra Modi
and a large number of foreign dignitaries, broke the previous world
records for the largest Yoga demonstration at a single venue and the
largest number of participating nationalities in a Yoga demonstration at
a single venue (more than 80 countries were represented).39 This event
was organized by the AYUSH ministry. India’s foreign missions cele-
brated International Day of Yoga by facilitating events where Indians
and foreigners could come together to perform Yoga asanas (postures).
These events were heavily promoted through social media networks by
the MEA and by Narendra Modi himself.

Despite the huge potential of Yoga as a soft power asset, it has not been
optimally used thus far to serve India’s foreign-policy interests. The suc-
cessful efforts of the Modi administration in declaring an International
Day of Yoga resulted in the ‘India’ name being associated closely with
Yoga. The Modi administration now has the opportunity to popularize
other aspects of Indian culture and traditions, including its fine arts,
dance and theatre, around the world, while promoting Yoga. The benefits
include the creation of new people-to-people bonds, cultural exchanges,
482 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

encouragement of tourism, and dialogue and discussion between intellec-

tual communities, government officials and ordinary people across the
world.40

The Modi administration’s use of Yoga as a soft power asset is designed

to achieve some of the same purposes that the promotion of Buddhism
and the outreach to the Diaspora are expected to achieve. The promotion
of Yoga is designed to boost India’s international image, project it as a
peaceful rising power and use it as a means to disseminate and popular-
ize other aspects of India’s ancient culture, including other soft power
assets, like Ayurveda. Ultimately, these three soft power assets are
designed to complement India’s conventional diplomacy. As Nye
argues, the exercise of soft power may not always help one achieve
their desired outcome or produce the expected results, but it does
enable one to pursue one’s interests and goals in an environment that
is conducive to achieving them.41 If a state can make its power appear
legitimate in the eyes of others, it will be likely to encounter less resist-
ance from others to its goals.42

Impediments to the exercise of soft power

There is no doubt that India has several soft power assets at its disposal
which it can leverage in the pursuit of foreign-policy interests. The
Modi administration has not been shy of deploying the country’s soft
power assets as it projects the idea of a rising India. However, India’s
ability to remain the “land of the better story”, as stated by Tharoor,
depends on its legitimacy and credibility.43 This in turn is related to its
domestic successes.44 Internal problems, including poverty, social
inequality, terrorism, communal violence, attacks against minorities
and lower castes, violence against women, corruption, weak infrastruc-
ture, poor governance, among others, hurt India’s international image
and create a disconnection between the message that the administration
wants to project and the reality of the situation. If negative attributes
become ingrained in the minds of the public abroad, no amount of soft
power can attract people and governments.45 India’s poor human devel-
opment indicators (it was ranked a poor 130 out of 188 countries in the
Human Development Index Report in 2015) and its unenviable position
in various international rankings related to malnutrition, child mortality,
per capita income, ‘ease of doing business’, ‘transparency’ and similar
fields are matters of concern.46
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 483

Mukherjee discusses how India’s soft power has fallen short of in terms
of achieving desired outcomes.47 This is primarily the result of the over-
estimation of the attractiveness of India’s soft power assets, a lack of suf-
ficient hard power to back up soft power, and contradictions and lack of
coherence with respect to its national identity. The institutional frame-
work for projecting soft power is relatively weak and remains a ‘work-
in-progress’.48 The ICCR remains underutilized. There are only about
three dozen ICCR centres around the world today, compared to the
much larger number of China’s Confucius Institutes. The institutions
involved in India’s public diplomacy, including the Division of Overseas
Indian Affairs, External Publicity and Public Diplomacy Division, and
the Development Partnerships, which all function under the MEA, have
been established relatively recently and haven’t been adequately funded
or staffed to carry out the task expected of them.

In addition to these general impediments to India’s soft power projection,

there are also specific problems affecting the Modi administration’s
ability to leverage Buddhism, Diaspora and Yoga in the service of the
country’s foreign-policy goals. As it promotes its Buddhist credentials
across the world, India needs to make urgent upgrades and repairs to
many Buddhist temples, shrines and landmarks. Many have fallen into
disrepair due to negligence on the part of the authorities. This conveys
the impression that, contrary to Modi’s statements, India does not take
pride in its Buddhist heritage. Major towns that may be tourist desti-
nations for Buddhist pilgrims are in urgent need of a facelift. The short-
comings in the areas of road, rail and air connectivity, public utilities,
ATMs and foreign exchange facilities, boarding and lodging facilities
(premium and budget hotels and tourist-quality restaurants), public
restrooms, shopping and services, tourist activities beyond visiting Bud-
dhist sites, availability of multilingual tour guides as well as concerns
about air pollution, traffic congestion, law and order and safety of
women have the potential to drive away tourists.49

Additionally, Buddhism itself does not have many followers in India

compared to some other Asian countries. Any claims of being part of a
‘Buddhist Asia’ community are likely to be received with much scepti-
cism from Buddhist-majority countries. Finally, India and China’s pro-
motion of Buddhism in their soft power diplomacy risks sparking off a
competition between the two countries. Such a competition would not
be looked upon favourably by the international Buddhist community.
This could lead to the perception that India is merely using Buddhism
as a tool to check growing Chinese influence in Asia, which may
484 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

ultimately damage India’s claims of being a ‘spiritual’ country which has

a deep respect for ancient cultures and traditions.

Tapping the diaspora to project India’s rising status is also not without its
problems. Despite successive Indian administrations’ outreach to the dia-
spora community, Raja Mohan and Chauhan point out that the country
still lacks comprehensive and reliable data about Indians travelling and
residing overseas.50 This makes it difficult sometimes to respond to the
needs of the diaspora community, especially during times of crisis requir-
ing their swift evacuation from their locations. Poor coordination between
the various government agencies tasked with public diplomacy is another
problem that needs to be urgently addressed. Markey highlighted the
institutional shortcomings of the MEA, including inadequate staffing at
headquarters and under-staffing in diplomatic and consular posts due to
meagre human resources.51 This limits the administration’s outreach to
the diaspora.

Despite efforts by the Modi administration to ease the diaspora members’

travel and stays in India, problems remain. Complaints regarding the
high-handed behaviour of Indian embassy and immigration officials
have continued to be registered. These lead members of the diaspora to
assume that travelling, staying and investing in India are associated
with many challenges. They will question and criticize the Modi admin-
istration’s contention that bureaucratic hurdles are gradually being
removed and India is a country that welcomes its diaspora and their
business. Additionally, ideological divisions within the diaspora have
the potential of hurting the Modi administration’s outreach to the larger
diaspora community. The administration may be able to tap those
elements of the diaspora that are more favourable towards it instead of
the entire community. This may result in a weak projection of India’s
soft power and criticism of the administration’s positions by some sec-
tions of the diaspora. The latter can be potentially embarrassing for
Modi if it takes the shape of public protests when he is visiting a
foreign country (as happened during his UK visit in 2015).

The Modi administration has sought to harness the diaspora’s economic

power to boost India’s economic growth and development. In his
addresses directed to the diaspora during his foreign visits, Modi encour-
aged them to contribute to India’s growth story. He assured them that they
would not face insurmountable bureaucratic hurdles. However, India’s
vast system of licenses, regulations and procedures, which regulate econ-
omic and industrial activity, continues to discourage foreign and diaspora
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 485

investors. According to the World Bank, India ranked 130 in ‘ease of

doing business’ during 2016.52 This is likely to give those members of
the diaspora who may be interested in participating in the Indian
economy pause for thought, if not drive them away completely. The
Modi administration therefore needs to implement reforms designed to
further deregulate and liberalize foreign-investment rules and regulations.
However, progress has been relatively slow on this front since Modi
became prime minister, with his administration taking a gradual, incre-
mental approach to reforms.53

Finally, Modi’s promotion of Yoga as an invaluable element of India’s

ancient traditions has led to criticism. Yoga’s association with religious
faith has led to charges that the government is promoting Hindu nation-
alism. The promotion of Yoga has not been met with enthusiasm among
some circles. Some Muslim scholars and leaders have argued that Yoga is
against the tenets of Islam.54 Others have questioned the costs associated
with the celebration of International Day of Yoga across the country and
abroad, claiming that it is a case of misallocation of resources.55 There are
questions raised as to whether promoting Yoga is a way to “repackage
political Hinduism in a form palatable to the world”.56 Additionally, it
is unclear how the administration would tap into the business potential
of this ancient practice or how it would address the problem of the
increasing commodification of Yoga and deviations from original
teachings.

How can the Modi administration overcome the impediments and chal-
lenges to soft power projection? Abraham suggests that in order to
bolster its soft power, India must increase foreign aid to developing
countries, tap into the pool of India-trained foreign students as a resource
for diplomacy, and create a volunteer youth corps that would provide
relief and rehabilitation and impart vocational skills to those in need in
other countries.57 It has also been suggested that the challenges associated
with soft power projection are likely to remain until India is able to effec-
tively deal with issues like poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, social
inequality, caste discrimination, terrorism, communal violence, corrup-
tion, weak infrastructure and poor governance and develop its ‘hard
power’ to complement its soft power. Also, India’s cultural assets will
appear more attractive to others if the country’s development model
raises the incomes and living standards of the masses.

The role that public diplomacy plays in soft power projection and convey-
ing the message of an emerging India to the rest of the world cannot be
486 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

overestimated. Public diplomacy allows the administration to communi-

cate with the international community and influence public attitudes
abroad so that they support India’s foreign-policy interests.58 However,
coordination and cohesion between the various organizations engaged
in public diplomacy need improvement if they are to convey a unified
message to the rest of the world.59 The institutional shortcomings of
the MEA and the various divisions that function under it, including the
Division of Overseas Indian Affairs, need to be addressed through
active recruitment of new personnel, mid-career training and use of
outside expertise.60

Conclusion
Under the Modi administration, the use of soft power assets and tools is
becoming increasingly common in India’s foreign policy. This is in line
with the Modi administration’s efforts to integrate and project various
aspects of India’s soft power in the service of larger strategic goals.
The Modi administration has focused on these three soft power assets pri-
marily because they assist India in its pursuit of traditional diplomatic
goals. Cultural diplomacy, in the form of promotion of Buddhism and
Yoga, and Diaspora diplomacy have been used to complement India’s
conventional diplomacy, boost its international image, project it as peace-
ful rising power, improve relations with other countries and help attract
foreign investment, technology and tourists in order to promote economic
growth and development.

The promotion of Buddhism and its identification with it helps India

create a benign image of itself, builds new links with Asian countries,
attracts tourists and helps it in its search for commonalities with China.
The outreach to the diaspora is designed to tap the latter’s talents,
skills and wealth to assist India’s growth and development. Influence in
foreign capitals, projection of India as a ‘talent-supplier’ as well as a
rising power, utilizing the diaspora as ambassadors of goodwill, and
attracting tourism and foreign investment are the primary motivations
behind the outreach to the diaspora. Finally, the promotion of Yoga is
designed to introduce foreigners to India’s ancient culture, encourage
them to visit India to learn about other aspects of India’s culture,
address Yoga’s increasing commercialization and deviations from tra-
ditional practices (reclaim Yoga), and identify India as a country that pro-
motes the physical and spiritual wellbeing of others. This work
demonstrates how specific soft power assets have been utilized in the
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 487

service of specific goals. This includes the promotion of Buddhism as a

common cultural and civilizational link to build a new relationship
with south-east Asian countries in the post-Cold War era, in line with
the objectives of India’s “Look East/Act East” policy.

However, the promotion of soft power is not without its problems. Nye
places a heavy emphasis on the credibility of a country when it comes
to determining its soft power. In India’s case, poor human development
indicators, social inequality, political violence, corruption, weak infra-
structure, poor governance and relatively weak ‘hard power’ are some
of the impediments to the exercise of soft power. The Modi adminis-
tration’s ability to use the soft power assets of Buddhism, Diaspora and
Yoga depend on finding the right balance between economic reforms
and social welfare spending in order to put India on the path of high
growth rates. Unless India’s development model succeeds in changing
the lives of the majority of citizens for the better, its exercise of soft
power will produce limited results.

NOTES

1. Narendra Modi, ‘International Visits and Summits’. Narendra Modi, 2016, http://
www.narendramodi.in/internationalmainhtml (accessed 10 November 2016).
2. The concept of ‘soft power’ is discussed in Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft Power’. Foreign
Policy Vol. 80 (1990): 153–171; Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to
Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004; Joseph S. Nye,
‘Think Again: Soft Power’. Foreign Policy, February 23, 2006, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2006/02/23/think-again-soft-power/ (accessed 6 June 2018);
Joseph S. Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political Science Vol. 616 (2008): 94–109.
3. India’s soft power strengths are described in Shashi Tharoor, ‘The Land of the Better
Story: India and Soft Power’. Global Asia Vol. 2. Issue 1 (2007): 70–76; Shashi
Tharoor, ‘India as a Soft Power’. India International Centre Quarterly Vol. 35.
Issue 1 (2008): 32–45; Shashi Tharoor, Pax Indica: India and the World of the
21st Century. New Delhi: Penguin, 2012.
4. See for example, Patryk Kugiel, ‘India’s Soft Power in South Asia’. International
Studies Vol. 49. Issue 3&4 (2012): 351–376; Rani D. Mullen, ‘India’s Soft
Power’, in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and S. Raghavan (Eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp.
188–204; Rani D. Mullen and Sumit Ganguly, ‘The Rise of India’s Soft Power’.
Foreign Policy, May 8, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/08/the-rise-of-
indias-soft-power/ (accessed 10 September 2016); Harsh V. Pant, ‘New Delhi’s
Soft Power Push’. YaleGlobal Online, August 20, 2015, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/
content/new-delhi%E2%80%99s-soft-power-push (accessed 11 September 2016);
488 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

C. Raja Mohan, Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence. Noida, UP:
HarperCollins Publishers India, 2015.; Sudha Ramachandran, ‘India’s Soft Power
Potential’. The Diplomat, May 29, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/indias-
soft-power-potential/ (accessed 6 June 2018); Daya Thussu, Communicating
India’s Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.
5. See for example, Nicholas Blarel, ‘India’s Soft Power: From Potential to Reality’.
LSE IDEAS, Report SR010, 2012, http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/
reports/pdf/SR010/blarel.pdf (accessed 1 October 2016); J.E.C. Hymans, ‘India’s
Soft Power and Vulnerability’. India Review Vol. 8. Issue 3 (2009): 234–265;
Kugiel, ‘India’s Soft Power in South Asia’; John Lee, ‘Unrealised Potential:
India’s ‘Soft Power’ Ambition in Asia’. Centre for Independent Studies Issue 4,
June 30, 2010, http://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2015/07/fpa4.pdf? (accessed 4
June 2018); David M. Malone, ‘Soft Power in Indian Foreign Policy’. Economic
and Political Weekly Vol. 46. Issue 36 (2011): 35–39; Rohan Mukherjee, ‘The
False Promise of India’s Soft Power’. Geopolitics, History, and International
Relations Issue 1 (2014): 46–62; Mullen and Ganguly, ‘The Rise of India’s Soft
Power’; Raja Mohan, Modi’s World; Aakriti Tandon, ‘Transforming the Unbound
Elephant to the Lovable Asian Hulk: Why is Modi Leveraging India’s Soft
Power’. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs
Vol. 105. Issue 1 (2016): 57–65; Tharoor, Pax Indica; Daya Thussu, Communicating
India’s Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.
6. See for example, Ian Hall, ‘India’s New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power and the
Limits of Government Action’. Asian Survey Vol. 52. Issue 6 (2012): 1089–1110;
Hymans, ‘India’s Soft Power and Vulnerability’; Shairee Malhotra, ‘EU-India
Relations: A Soft Power Approach’. European Institute for Asian Studies, Decem-
ber 2015, http://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/EU-Asia-at-a-glance-
Malhotra-EU-India-Relations-A-Soft-Power-Approach-2015.pdf (accessed 4 June
2018); Manoj K. Mishra, ‘The Impacts and Limits of India’s Soft Power’. George-
town Journal of International Affairs, 28 March 2016, http://journal.georgetown.
edu/the-impacts-and-limits-of-indias-soft-power/ (accessed 15 September 2016);
Thussu, Communicating India’s Soft Power.
7. See for example, Blarel, ‘India’s Soft Power: From potential to Reality’; Hall,
‘India’s New Public Diplomacy’; Peter Martin, ‘Yoga Diplomacy: Narendra
Modi’s Soft Power strategy’. Foreign Affairs, January 25, 2015, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2015-01-25/yoga-diplomacy (accessed 4 June
2018); Mullen and Ganguly, ‘The Rise of India’s Soft Power’; Kadira Pethiyagoda,
‘Modi Deploys his Culture Skills in Asia’. Brookings India, 2013, http://www.
brookings.in/in-focus/modi-deploys-his-culture-skills-in-asia/ (accessed 4 June
2018); Kishan S. Rana, ‘India’s Diaspora Diplomacy’. The Hague Journal of Diplo-
macy Vol. 4. Issue 3 (2009): 361–372; Navdeep Suri, ‘Public Diplomacy in India’s
Foreign Policy’. Strategic Analysis Vol. 35. Issue 2 (2011): 297–303.
8. See for example, Blarel, ‘India’s Soft Power: From Potential to Reality’; Ian Hall,
‘India’s New Public Diplomacy’; Martin, ‘Yoga Diplomacy: Narendra Modi’s
Soft Power Strategy’; Uma Purushottam, ‘Shifting Perceptions of Power: Soft
Power and India’s Foreign Policy’. Journal of Peace Studies Vol. 17. Issue 2&3
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 489

(2010), http://www.icpsnet.org/adm/pdf/1291714915.pdf (accessed 25 October

2016).
9. See for example, John Lee, ‘Unrealised Potential: India’s ‘Soft Power’ Ambition in
Asia’. Centre for Independent Studies Issue 4, June 30, 2010, http://www.cis.org.au/
app/uploads/2015/07/fpa4.pdf? (accessed 4 June 2018); Anuradha Sharma and
Vishal Arora, ‘India’s Soft Power: An Interview with Professor Daya Kishan
Thussu’. The Diplomat, June 10, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/interview-
indias-soft-power/ (accessed 6 June 2018); Tharoor, ‘The Land of the Better
Story’; Christian Wagner, ‘India’s Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations’. India
Quarterly Vol. 66. Issue 4 (2010): 333–342.
10. See for example, Ajaya K. Das, ‘Soft and Hard Power in India’s Strategy Towards
Southeast Asia’. India Review Vol. 12. Issue 3 (2013): 165–185; Lee, ‘Unrealised
Potential’; Malone, ‘Soft Power in Indian Foreign Policy’; Mukherjee, ‘The False
Promise of India’s Soft Power’; Ramachandran, ‘India’s Soft Power Potential’.
11. See for example, Rama Lakshmi, ‘Narendra Modi Urges the Indian Diaspora to
become an Extension of Foreign Policy’. The Guardian, March 2, 2015, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/02/narendra-modi-india-overseas-diaspora-
united-states (accessed 4 June 2018); Martin, ‘Yoga Diplomacy: Narendra Modi’s
Soft Power Strategy’; Pant, ‘New Delhi’s Soft Power Push’; Mohan, Modi’s
World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence; Ramachandran, ‘India’s Soft
Power Potential’; Tandon, ‘Transforming the Unbound Elephant to the Lovable
Asian Hulk’.
12. Martin, ‘Yoga Diplomacy’; Pant, ‘New Delhi’s Soft Power Push’.
13. Charu S. Kasturi, ‘Modi Govt Plans Buddhism Blitz in Cultural Diplomacy
Refocus’. The Telegraph (India), August 30, 2015, http://www.telegraphindia.
com/1150831/jsp/nation/story_39952.jsp (accessed 4 June 2018).
14. Rishika Chauhan, ‘Modi and Buddhism: Between Cultural and Faith-Based Diplo-
macy’. Observer Research Foundation (ORF), ORF Occasional Paper no. 77, pp. 1–
22, November 2015, http://dhqxnzzajv69c.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/
2015/12/OP_77.pdf (accessed 8 September 2016).
15. Ibid., 7.
16. Pethiyagoda, ‘Modi Deploys his Culture Skills in Asia’.
17. Chauhan, ‘Modi and Buddhism’.
18. World Travel and Tourism Council, ‘Travel and Tourism: Economic Impact 2016
India’. World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), March 2016, https://www.
wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/countries-2016/india2016.
pdf (accessed 4 June 2018).
19. International Financial Corporation, ‘Investing in the Buddhist Circuit 2014–2018’.
International Financial Corporation, 2014, http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/
a0b004004618b490804eb99916182e35/Buddhist+Circuit+Tourism+Strategy+Fina
l.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (accessed 4 June 2018).
20. Indian Council for Cultural Relations, ‘Welcome to the Indian Council for Cultural
Relations’. Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, India, 2016, http://
www.iccr.gov.in/ (accessed 4 June 2018).
21. Rana, ‘India’s Diaspora Diplomacy’.
490 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY

22. Thussu, Communicating India’s Soft Power.

23. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘Overseas Indian Affairs’. Min-
istry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2016, http://www.mea.gov.in/
overseas-indian-affairs.htm (accessed 4 June 2018).
24. World Bank, ‘Migration and Remittances Data’. The World Bank, September 24,
2015, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/
brief/migration-remittances-data (accessed 4 June 2018).
25. Rana, ‘India’s Diaspora Diplomacy’, 366–368.
26. Thussu, Communicating India’s Soft Power.
27. Tridivesh S. Maini and Sridhar Ramaswamy, ‘The Need for Introspection in India’s
Diaspora Diplomacy’. The Diplomat, October 1, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/
10/the-need-for-introspection-in-indias-diaspora-policy/ (accessed 4 June 2018).
28. Lakshmi, ‘Narendra Modi Urges the Indian Diaspora to become an Extension of
Foreign Policy’.
29. Maha Siddiqui, ‘Operation ‘Sankat Mochan’: IAF to Airlift 600 Indians from War-
Torn South Sudan’. India Today, July 13, 2016, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/
iaf-to-airlift-600-indians-from-war-torn-south-sudan/1/714131.html (accessed 4
June 2018).
30. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘Overseas Indian Affairs’. Min-
istry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2016, http://www.mea.gov.in/
overseas-indian-affairs.htm (accessed 25 October 2016).
31. Yoga Alliance, ‘2016 Yoga in America Study’. The Yoga Alliance, 2016, https://
www.yogaalliance.org/Portals/0/2016%20Yoga%20in%20America%20Study%
20RESULTS.pdf (accessed 4 June 2018).
32. Anmol Saxena, ‘India Eyes Profit in Yoga’s Soft Power’. Al Jazeera, November 22,
2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2014/11/99721.html (accessed 4 June
2018).
33. Jason Burke, ‘Modi’s Plan to Change India and the World through Yoga Angers
Religious Minorities’. The Guardian, June 6, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/jun/06/narendra-modi-yoga-india (accessed 4 June 2018).
34. The Indian Express, ‘Yoga is Not a Religious Activity: PM Modi in Chandigarh’.
The Indian Express, June 21, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-
news-india/yoga-not-a-religious-activity-pm-modi-on-international-yoga-day-
chandigarh-2865993/ (accessed 4 June 2016).
35. Padmapriya Govindarajan, ‘Indian Soft Power at Work: International Yoga Day
Captures Global Attention’. The Diplomat, June 23, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/
2016/06/indian-soft-power-at-work-international-yoga-day-captures-global-
attention/ (accessed 4 June 2018).
36. United Nations Information Centre for India and Bhutan. ‘United Nations Declares
21 June as International Day of Yoga’. United Nations Information Centre for India
and Bhutan, Press Release, December 12, 2014, http://unic.org.in/display.php?E=
13712&K=Yoga (accessed 10 August 2016).
37. Asoke Mukerji, ‘Revealed: The Diplomatic Moves that Delivered Modi his Yoga
Day’. The Wire, June 21, 2016, http://thewire.in/44205/revealed-the-diplomatic-
moves-that-delivered-modi-his-yoga-day/ (accessed 4 June 2018).
 INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY 491

38. Alyssa Ayres, ‘Namaste World! India Amps up its Yoga Diplomacy’. Council on
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58. Suri, ‘Public Diplomacy in India’s Foreign Policy’.
59. Ibid., 297.
60. Markey, ‘Developing India’s Foreign Policy ‘Software’’.