Journal for the History of

Analytical Philosophy
Brentano’s Mature Theory of Intentionality
Volume 4, Number 2 Uriah Kriegel
Editor in Chief
Kevin C. Klement, University of Massachusetts The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best
known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still sur-
Editorial Board round his account of its nature. In this paper, I argue that
Gary Ebbs, Indiana University Bloomington Brentano’s mature account of the nature of intentionality con-
Greg Frost-Arnold, Hobart and William Smith Colleges strues it, not as a two-place relation between a subject and an
Henry Jackman, York University object, nor as a three-place relation between a subject’s act, its
Sandra Lapointe, McMaster University object, and a ‘content,’ but as an altogether non-relational, in-
Lydia Patton, Virginia Tech trinsic property of subjects. I will argue that the view is more
Marcus Rossberg, University of Connecticut defensible than might initially appear.
Mark Textor, King’s College London
Audrey Yap, University of Victoria
Richard Zach, University of Calgary

Review Editors
Juliet Floyd, Boston University
Chris Pincock, Ohio State University

Assistant Review Editor

Sean Morris, Metropolitan State University of Denver

Design
Daniel Harris, Hunter College

c 2016 Uriah Kriegel

 Brentano’s Mature Theory of On the basis of this passage alone, interpretive debates have
Intentionality flourished in more than one philosophical tradition. The dom-
inant interpretation, thought to require the least interpretive
Uriah Kriegel ‘creativity,’ ascribes to Brentano an ‘immanentist’ account of in-
tentionality. According to this, intentionality is a relation be-
tween subjects’ intentional acts and immanent objects, objects
that exist only ‘in the subject’s head.’ That is, when S perceives
a tree, there is (i) a perceptual act taking place in S, (ii) a ‘mental
1. Introduction tree’ or ‘tree-idea’ in S’s mind, and (iii) a primitive intentional
relation that (i) bears to (ii). Perhaps partly because this imma-
The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best nentist theory is taken to suffer from fatal flaws,2 some have at-
known for. It is striking, though, just how little there is in tempted to reinterpret the passage so as to ascribe to Brentano a
Brentano’s main work, the Psychology from an Empirical Stand- more plausible account (e.g., Moran 1996; Chrudzimski 2001).3
point (Brentano 1874), about the nature of intentionality. Long Proponents of the immanentist interpretation tend to dismiss
discussions are dedicated to arguing that intentionality is the these endeavors as ‘twisting Brentano’s words’ (Smith 1994, 40;
mark of the mental, but to say this is not yet to say anything see also Crane 2006).
about what intentionality is. On the issue of the nature of inten- My own view is that the passage is too short and underde-
tionality, all we find in the Psychology are the 97 words (in the veloped to discriminate among a number of importantly differ-
German original) constituting the ‘intentionality passage.’ Here ent accounts: many accounts of the nature of intentionality will
is the paragraph in full:1 be compatible with Brentano’s 97 words. The choice of inter-
pretation is thus strongly underdetermined by the textual evi-
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholas- dence. Moreover, it is not implausible that at that early stage
tics of the Middle Ages called the intentional or mental inexis-
of his career, Brentano had simply not yet worked out anything
tence of an object (Gegenstandes), and what we might call, though
not wholly unambiguously, reference (Beziehung) to a content (In- very specific, perhaps had not even appreciated the multitude
halt), direction (Richtung) toward an object (Object) (which is not of theoretical options. What is clear, in any case, is that by
to be understood here as meaning a thing/entity (Realität)), or im- 1911 Brentano had developed a much more textured account
manent objectivity/objectness (Gegenständlichkeit). Every mental
phenomenon includes/contains (enthält) something as object (Ob- 2 There are ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological worries:
ject) within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. ontologically, it is unclear what to make of the notion of a ‘mental tree’; epis-
In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is temologically, it is thought to raise a ‘veil of appearances’ between the subject
affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and the external world; phenomenologically, it is in conflict with the so-called
and so on. (Brentano 1874, 124–25 [88]) transparency of experience, the observation that when attending to our own
experience it is hard to pick up on anything other than what the experience
1 Quotations cite page numbers from (Book I of) Kraus’ 1924 edition of the represents.
Psychology, with page numbers in the 1973 English edition in brackets. For 3 The other option would be to defend the immanentist theory, or a slightly

the most part the translations are mine. modified variant, against the objections to it (see, for example, Brandl 2005).

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [1]

of the nature of intentionality. In 1911, the last four chapters of terminological issues. With deliberate artifice, let us pretend
the Psychology were reprinted, in slightly reedited form, along that it is a matter of simple terminological decision whether
with eleven appendices, under the title The Classification of Men- when subject S veridically perceives a tree, the expression ‘in-
tal Phenomena (Brentano 1911). In the first of these appendices tentional object’ will be used to denote (a) the external tree tar-
(1911, 133–38 [271–75]), Brentano presents a more determinate geted by S’s perception or (b) a different entity which might be
and worked out account of intentionality, to which I will refer called the-presented-tree or the-tree-qua-presented. On this ter-
as the ‘mature account.’ My goal in this paper is to defend the minological issue, it is clear that the mature Brentano chose the
following thesis about it: first route. In a 1905 letter to Anton Marty, he writes:
It has never been my view that the [intentional] object is identical
Intrinsicness Brentano’s mature account assays intentionality
to the presented object (vorgestelltes Objekt). A presentation, for ex-
as an intrinsic property of subjects.4 ample a horse-presentation, has as its [intentional] object not the
presented thing but rather the thing, in this case not a presented horse
The thesis Intrinsicness ascribes to Brentano has two impor- but rather a horse. (Brentano 1930, 87–8 [77])
tant elements: (i) it assays intentionality as an intrinsic, non-
relational property and (ii) it construes that property as a prop- This ‘decision’ raises, however, three important questions: (i)
erty not of intentional acts, but of subjects. I start by developing how to understand the status of the intentional object in non-
more fully this interpretation of Brentano’s mature theory (§2), veridical experiences, (ii) how to understand the nature of the
then present Brentano’s argument for it (§3). I then defend the relation between the intentional act and the intentional object,
ascription of the relevant view to Brentano against interpretive and (iii) whether the intentional relation involves also a third
objections (§4), and finally defend Brentano’s view, as here in- relatum, sometimes called ‘content.’
terpreted, against philosophical objections (§5). Debates among Brentano’s students (Twardowski 1894;
Meinong 1904), and Brentano’s own reflections on the various
theoretical options in the area (see Chrudzimski 2001, chaps. 2–
2. Brentano’s Mature Theory of Intentionality
7), have concerned mostly these issues. Perhaps through
A first step toward understanding Brentano’s view is a correct witnessing the various options’ travails, in particular as con-
appreciation of his conception of the intentional object. The no- cerns the accommodation of radical error and hallucination,
tion of an intentional object involves a tangle of substantive and Brentano, as I read him, had by 1911 come to the position that
intentionality is not a relation at all, but a non-relational prop-
4 I use the expression ‘intrinsic property,’ as is common, to denote a prop- erty of the intentional act, or rather of the subject performing
erty that something has not in virtue of bearing a relation to anything else that act.
independent from it. This allows two scenarios: where the thing does not
The title of the relevant 1911 piece already suggests this no-
bear a relation to anything, and where it bears a relation to a part of itself
(as when a person is intrinsically legged in virtue of having a leg as part). tion: ‘Mental reference (Beziehung) as distinguished from rela-
Sometimes the expression ‘intrinsic property’ is used to denote a property tion (Relation) in the strict sense.’ This suggests that, strictly
that something cannot exist without having—the property is thus ‘intrinsic’ speaking, intentionality is not a relation.5 The point is articu-
to the thing’s nature. However, I prefer to use ‘essential property’ to denote
that kind of property. 5 This title does contain some ambiguities, insofar as (i) mental reference

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [2]

lated most clearly here: The expression ‘relation-like’ is thus apt, as it suggests some-
thing non-relational that resembles relations in some respects
The terminus of the so-called relation does not in reality need to ex-
(rather than some intermediate status between relational and
ist at all. For this reason, one could doubt whether we really are
dealing with something relational here, and not rather with some-
non-relational).
thing in certain respects relation-like (Relativen Ähnliches), some- What does it mean to say that intentionality is not a relation?
thing which might therefore be called quasi-relational/relational- Clearly, the surface grammar of ‘S is thinking of dragons’ is rela-
ish (Relativliches). (Brentano 1911, 134 [272]) tional. Perhaps the idea is that such a statement also has a (very
different) ‘deep grammar,’ one that reflects more accurately the
The English translators chose to translate Relativliches as ‘quasi- ontological structure of its truthmaker. The goal, then, is to find
relational,’ but the expressions ‘relational-ish’ and ‘relation- the kind of paraphrase whose ‘surface grammar’ would be the
like’ may in truth be more felicitous. The expression ‘quasi- same as the ‘deep grammar’ of ‘S is thinking of dragons’ and
relational’ suggests a status curiously intermediate between that would manifest the non-relational character of the latter.
those of being relational and being non-relational. As the The ‘deep grammar’ claim boils down to this, then: (i) ‘S is
rest of the passage shows unequivocally, however, Brentano’s thinking of dragons’ is paraphraseable into some statement P
idea is rather that intentionality bears some important sim- whose grammatical structure is non-relational, and (ii) the on-
ilarities to a relation but strictly speaking is not a relation. tological structure of the truthmaker of ‘S is thinking of drag-
This is why Brentano refers to a ‘so-called relation’ and voices ons’ is more accurately reflected in P’s grammatical structure.
‘doubt whether we are really dealing with something rela- The question is: what exactly is P?
tional’ (where this seems to be a stylistically guarded nega- Several options are available. One is adverbialism, where ‘S is
tive assertion rather than genuine doubt). As Moran (1996, thinking of dragons’ is paraphrased into ‘S is thinking dragon-
11) puts it, by Relativliches Brentano ‘seemed to mean that it ly’ or ‘S is thinking dragon-wise.’ Here the grammar suggests
[intentionality] only looked like a relation.’ Strictly speaking, that the subject, S, is engaged in a certain activity, thinking, and
intentional properties are non-relational, monadic properties. is engaged in it in a certain manner, namely dragon-wise. There
Brentano works out the similarities between intentional prop- is no relation between S and a separate entity or group of en-
erties and relations in the sentences immediately following this tities, only a first-order monadic property (thinking) of S and
passage, but consistently refers to them as mere similarities.6 a second-order property (occurring dragon-wise) of the first-
order property (or of S’s instantiating of the first-order prop-
might yet be a relation in some loose sense and (ii) it is not immediately
transparent that mental reference is the same thing as intentionality. But the erty).7
passage I discuss in the text next seems to me to remove these ambiguities. Some scholars ascribe such adverbialism to Brentano (Moran
6 The similarity, according to Brentano, is that both when we think of a

(two-place) relation and when we think of intentionality, we have in mind (For what it is worth, it strikes me personally that this claim of similarity
two objects, and we think of one of them directly (‘in recto’) and of the other is fraught with difficulties, but that other claims in the vicinity would indeed
indirectly (‘in obliquo’). Thus, thinking that Jim is taller than Jane and thinking show important similarities between the non-relational property of intention-
that Jim is thinking of Jane both involve having two objects in mind, Jim and ality and paradigmatic relations and relational properties.)
Jane, and representing Jim directly and Jane indirectly. This is the crucial sim- 7 For a more detailed development of the adverbial machinery, and a hesi-

ilarity between intentionality and bona fide relations, according to Brentano. tant defense of the underlying philosophical idea, see Kriegel (2011, chap. 3).

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [3]

1996; Chrudzimski and Smith 2004). Presumably, however, ties], as in ‘There is a God’ or ‘There is a man.’ In its other uses,
what they have in mind is primarily the non-relational con- ‘there is’ must not be taken in its strict sense . . . [Thus,] ‘There
strual of intentionality. The adverbialist technique for rendering is something which is the object of thought (ein Gedachtes)’ may be
that construal intelligible is only one option. Another option is equated with [paraphrased into] ‘There is something which thinks
(ein Denkendes).’ (Brentano 1930, 79 [68])
what we might call hyphenism, where ‘S is thinking of dragons’
is paraphrased into ‘S is thinking-of-dragons.’ The purpose of More generally:
the hyphens is to intimate that ‘thinking-of-dragons’ is a gram-
matically simple, unstructured predicate, of which ‘dragons’ is . . . not the contemplated round thing, but the person contemplat-
a merely morphological, but not syntactic, part. Compare: ‘apple’ ing it is what is in the strict sense. This fiction, that there is some-
is a morphological but not syntactic part of ‘pineapple.’ Ac- thing which exists as a contemplated thing, may also prove harm-
less, but unless one realizes that it is a fiction, one may be led into
cordingly, something’s being a pineapple does not involve an the most glaring absurdities . . . Once we have translated [para-
apple as part or component. Likewise, someone’s thinking-of- phrased] statements about such fictive objects into other terms, it
dragons does not involve as part dragons: dragons are not con- becomes clear that the only thing the statement is concerned with
stituents of the truthmaker of ‘S is thinking-of-dragons.’ The is the person who is thinking about the object. (Brentano 1933, 8
only constituents of the truthmaker are S and its monadic prop- [18])
erty (which, misleadingly, is denoted by a composite-sounding
predicate).8 As in adverbialism, there is no relation involved. Here Brentano holds that intentional truths require as truth-
Unlike in adverbialism, no second-order property is invoked makers only subjects (thinkers) and their taxonomizing into
either. kinds; only careless constructions in public language mislead
Brentano himself appeals neither to adverbialization nor to us into thinking there are further constituents in these truth-
hyphenation. The closest he comes to adopting a specific para- makers.9
phrase technique is in describing the subject, especially in his A word on the issue of taxonomizing. A dragon-thinker is a
metaphysical writings (esp. Brentano 1933), as this kind of thinker species of a thinker, and a green-dragon-thinker is a subspecies
or that kind of thinker, in the sense of that-which-thinks (Denk- of it. For Brentano, in asserting ‘S is thinking of a green dragon,’
endes). This can be developed into what we may call subjec- we talk of an object (a green dragon) to indirectly classify the
tism, where ‘S is thinking of dragons’ is paraphrased into ‘S is a subject. This phenomenon is more familiar from other parts of
dragons-thinker.’ Here the grammar suggests a monadic prop- our mentalistic discourse. It is often remarked that we have no
erty of the subject, that of being a particular species of the genus better way to describe our visual experiences than indirectly, in
Thinker. Brentano writes: terms of the color and shape properties of the objects of which
they are experiences. Asked to describe your visual experience
‘There is’ has its strict or proper meaning when used in connection of a Mondrian, you are likely to fall back on terms which strictly
with genuine logical names [i.e., expressions used to refer to enti-
9 The reason Brentano prefers subjectism over adverbialism and hyphenism
8 We could obtain the same result with ‘sequencing’ instead of hyphen- seems to do with his ‘reist’ ontology. Discussing reism and how it supports
ation: we could write out ‘S isThinkingOfDragons,’ or even ‘S is TOD’ for subjectism will take us too far afield, but see Kriegel (2015) for a detailed
short. discussion of reism.

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [4]

speaking denote properties of the Mondrian you see, not prop- Ultimately, it is this reliance on terms for external objects’ prop-
erties of the seeing. If you are hallucinating the Mondrian, it is erties to indirectly describe the intrinsic properties of subjects
still true that your experience has the kind of qualitative char- that has misled philosophers to construe thought as an honest-
acter that it would have if it veridically presented an horizontal to-goodness relation between a subject and an object.
red rectangle at the bottom right corner, a vertical white rect- It is part of Brentano’s view that, in cases of non-veridical
angle next to it, and so on. That is, it is still true that your ex- presentation, strictly speaking there are no intentional objects.
perience is as of an horizontal red rectangle at the bottom right Conscious states involve intentional acts, which are intrinsic
corner, a vertical white rectangle next to it, etc. For Brentano, modifications of the subject, and intentional-object talk is just a
we essentially use the same strategy to classify our thoughts, device for characterizing different modifications. Importantly,
judgments, desires, and other intentional states: we describe intentional-object talk is still useful in classifying and describ-
them indirectly by using terms for properties of what they are ing a non-veridical intentional state. For we can still classify
about (or would be about if they were veridical). Thus, we have an intentional state according to the intentional object there
no better way to describe a thought than by noting that it is of would be if it were correct. Call this kind of ‘would-be inten-
dragons, or about the financial crisis. More generally: tional object’ a merely-intentional object. The present point could
be summarized as follows: it is hard to classify or describe an
And so when we wish to state how one thinking individual differs
intentional state without mentioning its intentional or merely-
from another, it is natural to characterize the thinker by reference
to that which he is thinking about and to the way in which he intentional object; all the same, strictly speaking there are no
relates to it as a thinker. We thus speak as though we were con- merely-intentional objects. Thus, in a 1904 fragment Brentano
cerned with a relation between two things. . . . Our language in writes that ‘there is nothing other than things, and “empty
these cases treats the object of thought as though it were a thing space” and “object of thought” (Gedachtes) do not name things’
along with the person who is thinking. (Brentano 1933, 15 [22]) (Brentano 1930, 79 [68]). There are certainly objects which are
intentional, namely, regular objects when targeted by some in-
For Brentano, then, every intentional state is but an intrinsic tentional act. But there are no objects which are merely inten-
modification of a subject, and we parasitically use expressions tional, that is, ones that have no other existence except inso-
originally designed to pick out worldly items to indirectly de- far as they are targeted by some intentional act. To that extent,
scribe these intrinsic modifications. A correct thought is accu- merely-intentional objects are useful fictions: there are no such
rately described by describing its object; an incorrect thought is things, but it is useful to cite them to indirectly describe and
accurately described by describing the object it would have if classify intentional states. In a 1916 dictation, Brentano explic-
it were correct. Thus, in a 1911 letter to his Enkelschüler Franz itly describes intentional objects as useful fictions:
Hillebrand, Brentano writes:
Obvious examples of such fictions are so-called intentional beings
[W]e can say that a centaur, if it were to exist, would be a creature [i.e., merely-intentional objects]. We speak of ‘a contemplated
whose upper parts are like those of a man and whose lower parts man,’ or of ‘a man who is thought about by this or that thinker,’
are like those of a horse. . . . [I]n such a case, it would be better and our statements are like those in which we actually do speak
to say that one is describing, not a centaur, but someone who is of a man. But in such a case what is presented in recto [‘directly’]
thinking about a centaur . . . (Brentano 1930, 114 [101]) is [just] the person thinking of the man. (Brentano 1933, 19 [24])

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [5]

Regardless of whether the man that S contemplates exists, what that the paraphrasing hypotheticals are true but do not require
is really going on when S contemplates the man is that S exists relation-instances among their truthmakers. At the same time,
and is intrinsically modified in a specific way, so that he can be the unparaphrased categoricals are strictly speaking false, so do
described—classified—as a man-contemplator. not require any truthmakers. Either way we are spared the need
for relational truthmakers.
3. Brentano’s Argument Consider now an intentional expression, such as ‘thinking of.’
The view that thinking of x is a matter of bearing a certain rela-
What is Brentano’s argument for the non-relational account of tion to x, the thinking-of relation, leads to odd results. First,
intentionality? Much of the 1911 piece is dedicated to an anal- by Brentanian lights, it requires us to reinterpret ‘S is think-
ysis of statements about relations among nonexistent putative ing of dragons’ as elliptical for ‘If there were dragons, S would
entities, outside intentional contexts. Brentano’s mature posi- be thinking of them.’ Secondly, it requires us to consider the
tion is that such statements are elliptical: unparaphrased categorical ‘S is thinking of dragons’ as strictly
speaking false. But both consequences are implausible. There-
I am not unmindful that some people nowadays, in opposition to fore, we should reject the view that thinking-of is a relation. In-
Aristotle, deny that both things must exist in order for something stead, we should construe it as a non-relational property of the
to be larger or smaller than another thing. [But . . . ] Someone who
subject, misleadingly denoted by a transitive verb.
says that three is less than a trillion is not positively asserting the
existence (Existenz) of a relation. He is saying, rather, that if there is The argument, then, is that categorical statements about inten-
a plurality/multitude (Menge) of three and a plurality/multitude tional states can be true even where the ‘intended object’ does
of a trillion, that relation must obtain (bestehen) between them . . . not exist, so intentionality cannot be a relation between an in-
(Brentano 1911, 134–5 [273]) tentional state and an intentional object.
We may summarize Brentano’s argument as follows. Let S
The passage presupposes a mathematical nominalism accord- be a statement composed of terms or expressions T1 , . . . , Tn plus
ing to which talk of numbers is just talk of pluralities or multi- logical vocabulary. Let N be a proper subset of T1 , . . . , Tn , whose
tudes. But the main point does not depend on such nominalism. members ostensibly refer to concrete particulars, and let M be
It is that a categorical statement such as ‘Hobbits are cuter than the complement of N in T1 , . . . , Tn . How can we tell whether
dragons’ only appears to assert (read: has a surface grammar S is a relational statement? A superficial criterion might require
suggesting) the obtaining or holding (bestehen) of the cuter-than M to include a ‘relational term’ as member, where T is a rela-
relation. In reality, it is merely elliptical for the hypothetical tional term just if a grammatical statement involving T must
statement ‘If there were hobbits and dragons, the former would involve at least two other terms. The problem with this crite-
be cuter than the latter.’ The hypothetical statement does not rion is that it gets the extension wrong: it correctly classifies
assert the obtaining, the actual instantiation, of any relation—it as relational the statement ‘Jimmy argued with Johnny,’ but in-
only says that if certain conditions were met, then that relation correctly classifies as relational ‘Jimmy argued with conviction.’
would obtain/be instantiated. Similarly when only one relatum A deeper, more semantic criterion might require M to include
exists: ‘Dogs are cuter than dragons’ is elliptical for ‘If there a member that successfully refers to a relation, or require S to
were dragons, dogs would be cuter than them.’ The point is

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [6]

have a relation among its truthmaker’s constituents. That sort 3. For any intentional statement S∗ and any relational state-
of criterion is surely right, but is dialectically unhelpful in the ment S, S∗ 6= S.
present context: we want to know whether ‘Jimmy is thinking
of dragons’ is a relational statement, but only because we want This seems to me, on the face of it, a very strong argument in-
to settle precisely the question of whether thinking-of is a rela- deed. Let us consider some objections, then, to the view I as-
tion. What would be useful for us would be a partly semantic cribe to Brentano (§5), but also to the ascribing of it (§4).
criterion that does not presuppose knowledge of whether a re-
lation is involved. In a way, this is what Brentano offers us. His 4. Objections to the Interpretation
proposed criterion may be put as follows:
To the ascribing, it might be objected that another interpreta-
S is relational iff: (i) M includes a relational term and tion of ‘Relativliches’ is possible: intentionality is a relation, but
(ii) for S to be both categorical and true, every mem- a special kind of relation, where only one of the relata need ex-
ber of N must successfully refer. ist. Perhaps this is what a ‘quasi-relation’ is: a relation whose
If some member of N fails to refer, S is either false or hypo- occurrence or instantiation does not require the existence of all
thetical (or else non-relational). For example, if ‘Johnny’ fails to relata.
refer, then the categorical ‘Jimmy argued with Johnny’ is false, There is no doubt that Brentano seriously entertained this
though the hypothetical ‘If Johnny existed, Jimmy would have alternative account. In some of his unpublished fragments,
argued with him’ may be true. The key to Brentano’s argument he clearly expounds the idea—see esp. Brentano (1933, 167–
is the claim that some intentional statements are categorical and 69 [126–27]), a dictation from 1915. One view might be that
true even though some of the terms ostensibly referring to con- Brentano simply changed his mind sometime between 1911 and
crete particulars (‘ostensibly singular’) in them fail to refer. For 1915 (Moran 1996). Another, however, is that Brentano wanted
example, ‘Jimmy is thinking of Bigfoot’ is true and categorical to let the idea play out in private writings but what he published
even though ‘Bigfoot’ fails to refer. Therefore, ‘Jimmy is think- should still be taken as his considered view. Regardless, I would
ing of Bigfoot’ is not a relational statement. And therefore, we argue, charity exhorts us to focus on the 1911 view, because the
have no reason to think that its truthmaker involves a relation envisaged notion of quasi-relation is forsooth not altogether in-
as constituent. telligible. As far as I can see, saying that a dyadic relation can be
Brentano’s argument for the non-relational assay of intention- instantiated even if only one relatum exists is no more plausible
ality may be represented as follows, then: than saying that a monadic property can be instantiated even
where there is no instantiator of it. On the face of it, it is absurd
1. For any relational statement S, necessarily, if S is true and
to think that the property of having mass m can be instantiated
categorical, then all of S’s ostensibly singular expressions
even if there is no object whose mass is m. (I am assuming here
successfully refer;
that mass is monadic.) It should strike us as equally absurd that
2. For any intentional statement S∗ , possibly, S∗ is true and some relation R might be instantiated in the absence of an ap-
categorical, but some of S∗ ’s ostensibly singular expres- propriate number of relata.
sions fail to refer; therefore, An objector might insist that the 1915 dictation, being poste-

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [7]

rior to the 1911 appendix, must be taken to represent Brentano’s it is true that in Brentano’s picture one would still be aware of
final, considered position. My main response to this is that if the tree-idea, but this is simply because for Brentano every in-
we accept this reasoning, I would simply contend that Brentano tentional act is intentionally directed at itself (Brentano 1874,
took one final wrong turn, and would have done better to stick 179–80 [127]). Insofar as it is its own intentional object, then, the
with his 1911 view. But it is not clear that we have to accept this intentional act is something the subject is aware of. Nonethe-
reasoning. For it is significant, in this context, that Brentano less, it is still just the intentional act of the tree thought—not the
published the 1911 piece but not the 1915 piece. For all we know, thought’s content or (primary) object!
then, the 1915 piece is just an attempt to let a view play out and A third objection to the ascription might appeal to Tim
see where it goes and how it might be defended.10 Crane’s (2006) unusual basis for an immanentist interpretation
Another objection to the ascription of a non-relational view of Brentano. Crane does not rely primarily on the intentionality
to Brentano is that Brentano clearly thinks that in thinking of passage. Rather, his main reason for ascribing to Brentano an
a tree, one is aware of a tree-idea. The tree-idea is the content immanentist theory of intentionality is that for Brentano the in-
of one’s thought. So even if the intentionality of one’s thought tentional objects of perceptual experiences are Kantian appear-
does not involve a relation to a tree, it does involve a relation to ances ‘which are signs of an underlying reality but which are
this tree-idea. One way to put this is to say that intentionality not real themselves’ (Crane 2006, 23) (and instead ‘only exist in
is a relation to a content even if it is not a relation to an object. the mind’ (2006, 25).
Another way is to say that intentionality is a relation to an im- Crane relies on passages from the opening chapter of the Psy-
manent object even if it is not a relation to a transcendent object. chology, where Brentano says, for example, that ‘light, sound,
However we put this, a relation is involved after all. heat, spatial location . . . are not things which truly and really
This objection relies on a confusion. The expression ‘tree- (wahrhaft und wirklich) exist’ (Brentano 1874, 28 [19]). Consider
idea’ can be read in two ways. One is as denoting a kind of a visual experience as of a yellow lemon. Brentano takes the
mental tree that resembles worldly trees in some respects but yellow lemon presented by the experience to be a Kantian phe-
exists only in the subject’s mind. So construed, the notion of nomenon (as opposed to a noumenon). However, Brentano
a tree-idea is both ontologically and phenomenologically sus- nowhere says that such Kantian phenomena ‘only exist in the
pect. A more plausible construal is that a tree-idea is simply an mind.’ On the contrary, he says very explicitly (including in
idea of a tree. But in this construal, the idea seems to be the in- the sentence just quoted) that they do not exist at all—not in the
tentional act, not the object (immanent or transcendent). Now, mind and not elsewhere. In ascribing the immanentist view
to Brentano, Crane is presupposing that Kantian phenomena are
10 This is particularly relevant given that Brentano apparently instructed his immanent objects that exist only in the mind. This is quite a
students to publish sparingly, and only material in genuinely good shape. It common view, of course, but it may not be Brentano’s. The only
is well known that Husserl was Brentano’s student in Vienna from 1884–86. view we can ascribe to Brentano is that Kantian phenomena are
In 1889 letter to his teacher, Husserl writes: ‘My behavior to this point has
demonstrated that the ambition to see my name in print as quickly and as mere intentional objects of our conscious states. Since Brentano
often as possible has not driven me to premature publications. I am certain takes talk of intentional objects to be a roundabout way of de-
of your approval in this matter. I will only publish what I deem really useful scribing the species of intentional act the subject is perform-
(nützlich) . . . ’ (Ierna 2015, 71)

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [8]

ing, this is how he would take talk of Kantian phenomena as the same as the passive-voice ‘Johnny is carried by Jimmy.’ Re-
well. This explains why he says that Kantian phenomena do markably, the same holds for intentional statements: ‘Jimmy is
not ‘really and truly exist.’ After all, his view—as interpreted thinking of Johnny’ means the same as ‘Johnny is thought of by
above—is that merely-intentional objects do not really and truly Jimmy’ (or indeed ‘Johnny is the object of Jimmy’s thought’).
exist. They are useful fictions and not entia realia. This suggests that thinking-of is just as relational as carrying.
In addition, Crane’s interpretation does not extend to non- In response, however, Brentano could deny that ‘Jimmy is
perceptual experiences, since those are not directed at Kantian thinking of Johnny’ means the same as ‘Johnny is thought of
phenomena. But Brentano’s theory of intentionality is sup- by Jimmy’—when left unparaphrased. Statements S1 and S2
posed to apply to non-perceptual acts such as judgments and cannot mean the same if they differ in truth value: given that
decisions. So Crane’s interpretation has no real chance of ap- the world is the same, they must be saying something differ-
plying generally. ent about it if one ends up true and the other ends up false.
It is significant, then, that ‘I am thinking of Bigfoot’ and ‘Big-
foot is thought of by me’ have different truth values: the first is
5. Objections to the View true but the second untrue. On Russell’s (1905) view, ‘Bigfoot
is thought of by me’ is false, as is ‘The present king of France
Let us assume that Brentano’s mature theory really was as I is bald’; on Strawson’s (1950) view, ‘The present king of France
claim. I want to end by considering objections to the theory is bald’ has a third, ‘neutral’ truth value intermediate between
itself. truth and falsity—and so does ‘Bigfoot is thought of by me.’ Us-
An immediate objection is that the view ascribed to Brentano ing the term ‘untrue’ to cover both falsity and the neutral truth
fails to do justice to the pull of the relational conception of in- value (if there is one), we can say that on all standard seman-
tentionality. It is not just English or German that have a rela- tic views ‘Bigfoot is thought of by me’ is untrue (unless para-
tional surface grammar for intentional ascriptions; all known phrased, of course). Accordingly, it cannot mean the same as
languages do. Surely there is some underlying reason why they the true ‘I am thinking of Bigfoot.’
are all forced to do so. Another objection in the same spirit is that there is still some-
I have already indicated the reason Brentano is likely to prof- thing hard to swallow in the non-relational account. For the
fer for this phenomenon. The elusiveness of conscious experi- phenomenology of being in an intentional state often involves a
ence forces us to describe its phenomenal character indirectly. feeling of bearing a relation to something in the outside world.
There is a kind of ‘direct-ineffability’ of conscious states, in the This is most obvious with perceptual experience: the phe-
sense that such ‘effability’ as they admit is always indirect. One nomenology of having a visual experience of a yellow lemon
might wonder why that should be the case, but perhaps the con- is a phenomenology of bearing a distinctive perceptual relation
trast between the private character of conscious states and the to an object standing before one (a Gegenstand indeed).
public nature of language could be the explanation here. It is hard to know how Brentano would respond to this ob-
One way to appreciate the pull of the relational conception jection, but here is one possible line. We may concede this:
is this. One symptom of the fact that carrying is a relation is when I have a visual experience of a yellow lemon, I experience
that the active-voice ‘Jimmy is carrying Johnny’ seems to mean

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [9]

a feeling of perceptually connecting to the lemon. In a way, the 9–10) claims that Brentano’s ‘adverbial view’ faces a ‘daunting
experience’s overall phenomenology says more than ‘here is a problem’: it cannot account for the similarity or type-identity
yellow lemon’; it says something like ‘here is a yellow lemon among some intentional states. I have suggested that Brentano
I am perceptually connecting to.’ Thus if I am hallucinating a does not have an adverbial view, but a ‘subjectist view’; nonethe-
yellow lemon before me, but there happens to be a lemon of less, Moran’s objection can be reformulated to target that. Com-
the same color, shape, and size just there, it is natural to as- pare (a) a dragon-visualizer, (b) a unicorn-visualizer, and (c) a
sess the experience as non-veridical, and non-veridical purely horse-seer. Clearly, (a) resembles (b) more than it resembles (c).
in virtue of its phenomenology (Searle 1983; Kroon 2013). If so, The most straightforward explanation of this would be that (a)
the feeling of perceptually connecting to the lemon is a compo- and (b) share an aspect or component that (c) lacks. But since
nent of the experience’s overall phenomenology, in addition to ‘visualizer’ is not a syntactic part of ‘dragon-visualizer’ and
the yellow-lemon component. So it is true that perceptual ex- ‘unicorn-visualizer’ (think of ‘apple’ and ‘pineapple’ again),
perience includes a phenomenology of perceptual connection Brentano cannot identify a component that (a) and (b) might
to an object. However, as just noted, this feeling of perceptual share. He thus lacks the resources to explain, or even accom-
connection, like any feeling, may or may not be veridical. And modate, this resemblance fact.
when it is non-veridical, the subject need not in fact perceptually One might respond that incomposite, structureless states can
connect to anything. Thus although this is a phenomenology also resemble, and the way in which they do could apply to the
as of bearing a relation to something, having the phenomenol- case of (a)–(c). Someone who believes that colors are simple,
ogy does not require actually bearing a relation to something. monadic, structureless features can still admit that red is more
The having of a phenomenology never guarantees that the phe- similar to orange than to yellow. Being a dragon-visualizer
nomenology is veridical. To that extent, the fact that the expe- might resemble being a unicorn-visualizer more than being a
rience of being in an intentional state involves a phenomenol- horse-seer in the same way. One problem with this response
ogy as of bearing a relation to something does not tell against a is that the objector may reverse it to claim that a monadic con-
non-relational metaphysic of intentionality. The non-relational ception of color has no resources to explain resemblance facts.
account can readily admit that intentional states involve such a But the main problem is that it seems to misrepresent how one
phenomenology but insist that a relation is actually instantiated could grasp what a horse-visualizer is. On the face of it, once
only when this phenomenology is veridical. Since what makes we possess the concepts of dragon-visualizer and horse-seer,
an intentional state the intentional state it is, and an intentional we can ‘put together’ the concept of a horse-visualizer, with-
state at all, is independent of whether the state is veridical or out having to go through a separate process of concept acquisi-
not, the fact that a veridical intentional state involves a relation tion.11 But if subjectism is true, we would have to acquire the
does not imply that what makes that state the intentional state concept of a horse-visualizer in the same laborious way as the
it is (and an intentional state at all) is that relation. 11 This capacity is related to, or parallels in some way, what Fodor (1975)
Perhaps the most formidable objection to Brentano’s mature called the ‘productivity’ of thought: the fact that any subject who grasps the
theory is due to Moran (1996). Adapting Jackson’s (1977) argu- proposition that John loves Mary has all the resources needed to grasp the
ment against the adverbial theory of perception, Moran (1996, proposition that Mary loves John, needing no further learning or acquisition
process.

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [10]

concepts of dragon-visualizer and horse-seer. For ‘visualizer’ Brentano distinguishes between separable and distinctional parts,
is not a component of ‘dragon-visualizer’ and ‘horse’ is not a then. Here is one example in which these come apart:
component of ‘horse-seer,’ so they could not be separated and
recombined.12 Someone who believes in [mereological] atoms believes in corpus-
A better response to the objection is to claim that although in cles which cannot be dissolved into smaller bodies. But even so he
can speak of halves, quarters, etc. of atoms: parts which are dis-
Brentano’s picture a state such as (a) has in some sense no com-
tinguishable even though they are not actually separable. (Ibid.)
ponents, it nonetheless has a structure, indeed potentially com-
binatorial structure. The obvious problem with this response By ‘atoms’ Brentano means not the entities referred to as atoms
is that it is unclear how it might work: normally, we think of in physics, but the entities genuinely admitting of no physical
an entity’s structure as precisely a matter of its having differ- division. A physics’ atom with one proton and three electrons
ent parts, or components, bearing certain interrelations. It is does have separable parts, since we can separate the electrons
unclear, then, how the property of being a dragon-visualizer from the proton—we can ‘split the atom.’ The proton too has
could have a structure despite having no components. How- separable parts—the quarks making it up. But the electrons
ever, Brentano’s mereology (his theory of part-whole relations) have no separable parts. It is impossible to ‘split the electron.’
provides him with surprising resources to address this problem. Still, even though we cannot separate in reality different parts of
Brentano’s mereology differs from modern-day Classical electron E, we can distinguish in thought different parts of it. We
Mereology in several important respects. The one that will con- can call the top half of E ‘Jimmy’ and the bottom half ‘Johnny.’13
cern us here is that while Classical Mereology operates with Jimmy and Johnny are thus distinguishable parts of E, but not
a single notion of parthood, Brentano’s distinguishes two no- separable parts. Brentano calls them distinctional (distinktionelle)
tions: parts, or sometimes divisiva.14
There are also cases of bilateral mere distinguishability.
[O]ne may be able to distinguish parts that are actually separable
from one another, until one reaches parts where such . . . separa-
Brentano offers as an example an individual blue dot at location
tion can no longer take place . . . However, even these ultimate L (Brentano 1982, 14 [18]). According to Brentano, the dot’s par-
actually separate parts, in some sense, can be said to have further ticular blueness and its particular L-locatedness are mutually
parts . . . To differentiate these from others, we may refer to them inseparable. The very same individual dot could not be located
as distinctional parts. (Brentano 1982, 13 [16]; my italics) elsewhere, nor differently colored (1982, 15 [19])—a differently
colored dot would be a different dot, and likewise for a differ-
12 Observe that in the case of colors, it is not plausible that we acquire
ently located dot. Accordingly, the dot’s particular blueness
the concept of orange by ‘putting together’ the concepts of red and yellow. cannot survive the dot’s loss of L-locatedness and vice versa.
Rather, we seem to require going again through the laborious process of ac-
quiring the concept of orange ‘from scratch.’ (This claim is compatible with It follows that that particular blueness trope and that particular
the possibility of acquiring a concept of a missing shade of blue in the more
13 More precisely, since E has a determinate mass m, we can divide m by
direct way; the point is that this cannot work for such concepts as orange,
which are ‘too distant,’ in some sense, from red and yellow to be acquired in half and consider each of E’s two halves independently.
the same way.) In this respect, we can see that the cases of color concepts and 14 For more details on Brentano’s mereology, see Baumgartner and Simons

intentional-state concepts are disanalogous. (1994) and Kriegel (2017).

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [11]

L-locatedness trope are mutually inseparable parts of the dot.15 that we can distinguish different aspects of it. We can think of
Another example, perhaps more compelling, draws on Aristo- it in different ways, just as we can think of a causal transaction
tle’s discussion in the Physics of the relationship between A’s as A acting on B or as B being acted upon by A. These distin-
agency and B’s patiency when A acts upon B. In a dictation guishable aspects of an intentional state constitute its structure,
from 1908, Brentano seems to treat these as mutually insepara- and explain, or at least enable, purely combinatorial concept
ble parts of the transaction between A and B: acquisition. A subject who acquired the concepts of dragon-
visualizer and horse-seer, could distinguish within these con-
Aristotle said that an action and a passion are the same: ‘A brings
cepts (i) an act-aspect to do with visualizing or seeing and (ii)
about B’ and ‘B is brought about by A’ appear to say the same
thing. In such cases, the same accident would be ascribed to two an object-aspect to do with dragons or horses. She could dis-
things, though in a different way to each. (Brentano 1933, 55 [49]) tinguish these even if these are not separable components of
the relevant intentional states. She could then ‘put together’
Note that in such cases of bilateral mere distinguishability, it these aspects in different combinations, thereby acquiring the
is natural to consider that in reality we have only one entity concepts of a horse-visualizer and dragon-seer. The suggestion
on our hands: one dot, one transaction. This stands to reason: is speculative, of course, but the model it offers does recover
since distinctional parts are parts that can be distinguished in combinatorial concept acquisition while insisting on the non-
thought but not separated in reality, in reality what we have in relational nature of intentionality.
these cases is just the whole. Is there any evidence that Brentano took the intentional act
This notion of bilateral mere distinguishability may shed new and the merely-intentional object to be mutually merely distin-
light on the Jackson-Moran problem—the problem of how to ac- guishable? It would seem so:
count for similarity among intentional states by appeal to com-
As in every relation, two correlates can be found here [in inten-
binatorial structure. One way to make sense of this may be to tionality]. The one correlate is the act of consciousness, the other
hold that although intentional states do not have separable parts, is that which it is directed upon . . . The two correlates are only
they do have distinctional parts. This is what their structure con- distinctionally separable from one another. And so we have here
sists in. On the standard view, intentionality is a relation be- again two purely distinctional parts of the pair of correlates, one
tween an intentional act and an intentional object, construed of which [the act] is real, the other [the merely-intentional object]
as mutually separable. An alternative picture, however, may is not. (Brentano 1982, 21–2 [23–4])
construe the intentional act and the merely-intentional object When S visualizes a yellow lemon, we can distinguish in thought
as two mutually merely distinctional parts of a single whole. a visualization element and a yellow-lemon element. Even if
In that scenario, the intentional state has no components, in the in reality there are not two separate entities here, we can tell
sense of separable parts, but it does have structure, in the sense apart these two distinctional parts of the experience. We should
15 I am using here the modern notion of a trope to speak of a particular, be able, accordingly, to acquire the concept of a visualization
dated property instantiation (Williams 1953). This is similar to—perhaps the experience and the concept of a lemon-ish experience. Once we
same as—the Aristotelian notion of an ‘individual accident.’ The mature have, we can recombine these concepts with others like them.16
Brentano rejects the existence of tropes and properties alike, but I avail myself
of these notions here to make sense of his view of intentionality. 16 It might be objected that the quoted passage only undermines the non-

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [12]

 Jackson’s (1977) original objection to adverbialism pressed It is this further relation that licenses the inference.17
the compositionality of adverbial paraphrases from another an-
gle as well. Adapted to the subjectist context, we might put 6. Conclusion
Jackson’s objection as follows: from ‘S is thinking of a dragon,’
one can validly infer ‘S is thinking’; but from ‘S is a dragon- I conclude that the subjectist version of intrinsicalism about in-
thinker,’ one cannot infer ‘S is a thinker.’ For ‘dragon-thinker’ is tentionality can withstand the main objections against it. In
a syntactically unstructured predicate, so making this inference the first half of the paper, I have argued that this view was
would be akin to inferring ‘x is an apple’ from ‘x is a pineapple.’ Brentano’s mature theory of intentionality. On this view, inten-
In response, note first that although ‘x is a pineapple, there- tional statements do not state that a relation holds between a
fore x is an apple’ is a bad inference, ‘x is a strawberry, therefore subject and an object. Rather, they state that a subject under-
x is a berry’ is a good one—even though they seem superficially goes an intrinsic modification; intentional-object talk is just an
similar. What makes the latter inference good, it seems, is the indirect way of describing such intrinsic modifications and clas-
availability of a certain bridge premise, which we may formu- sifying subjects according to them.
late as ‘A strawberry is a species of berry’ (contrast ‘An apple is
a species of pineapple’). The question, then, is whether a sim- Acknowledgements
ilar bridge principle is available to Brentano. And the answer
seems positive: ‘A dragon-thinker is a species of thinker’ is as For comments on a previous draft, I am grateful to Lionel
plausible as ‘A strawberry is a species of berry.’ Accordingly, it Djadaojee, Anna Giustina, and two referees for the Journal for
is possible to correctly infer ‘S is a thinker’ from ‘S is a dragon- the History of Analytical Philosophy. I have also benefited from
thinker.’ The point is that although ‘dragon-thinker’ is syntac- presenting drafts of this chapter at École Normale Supérieure,
tically simple, it is not true that its only relation to ‘thinker’ is Kings’ College London, and the University of Liege. I am grate-
morphological. Another relation is the genus/species relation: ful to the audiences there, in particular Géraldine Carranante,
‘dragon-thinker’ picks out a species of what ‘thinker’ picks out. Arnaud Dewalque, Bob Hale, Zdenek Lenner, Alice Martin, De-
nis Seron, and Mark Textor. For useful exchanges and conver-
relational reading of Brentano, since it speaks of a relation between the act and
sions of relevance, I am grateful to Ben Blumson, Davide Bor-
the object. But this is a ‘relation’ between two merely distinctional parts of a dini, Johannes Brandl, and Hamid Taieb.
single entity. As noted, in reality there are not two separate entities here. To
take another Aristotelian example, we can distinguish in thought between the
Uriah Kriegel
road from Athens to Thebes and the road from Thebes to Athens, and we can Jean Nicod Institute
speak of ‘relations’ between these (the relation of collocation, for example); [email protected]
but obviously, in reality there is only one road, not two. And since there are
not two roads, there can be no genuine relation between them. Why, then, 17 Itmight be objected that ‘S is a dragon-thinker’ still fails to recover the
does Brentano speak of an intentional relation in this passage? It may well exact inferential profile of ‘S thinks of a dragon,’ since the latter supports an
be that at this point Brentano’s conception of intentionality was somewhat inference to ‘S thinks’ without need of a bridge principle, whereas the former
unstable, employing both relational thinking and the notion that intentional does not. This seems right to me, but it also seems like a minor liability on
acts and intentional objects are not actually two separate entities, and that all the paraphrase. Arguably, it is permissible for a paraphrase to be somewhat
this got ironed out later on. revisionary —indeed, this is often the point of the paraphrase.

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 2 [13]

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