Kant's First Paralogism: Ian Proops
Kant's First Paralogism: Ian Proops
Kant's First Paralogism: Ian Proops
Ian Proops
University of Texas at Austin
Introduction
Kant pursues a variety of projects in the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure
Reason; but chief among them is the program of transcendental criti-
cism: pure reasons systematic detection, correction, and explanation
of its own excesses.
1
These excesses occur, according to Kant, because
reason constantly strives to transcend the bounds of sense in its pursuit
of speculative knowledge. In Kants view, all such attempts to rise above
the world of sense throughthe mere might of speculation (A591/B619)
are destined to fail.
2
In particular, pure speculative reason can afford us
My thanks to Omri Boehm, Jim Hankinson, Ivan Heyman, Martin Lin, Dustin Locke,
Christopher Peacocke, Michael Della Rocca, Anat Schechtman, Nicole Smith, David
Sosa, and Zolt an Szab o. Special thanks are due to Kenneth Winkler, who read several
drafts of this essay and provided astute and generous comments on each draft. One
ancestor of this essay was presented at the University of Texas in November 2007; another
was discussed at a lunchtime meeting of the philosophy faculty at Yale University in the
spring of 2008. I amgrateful to those present on each occasion for their many helpful and
thought-provoking questions. My thanks also to two anonymous referees for this journal
who provided indispensible comments whose infuence appears on almost every page.
1. Kants other goals include the promulgation of his doctrine of the regulative use
of the Ideas of Reason (A 508/B 536ff.) and the rehearsal of his indirect argument (in
the Antinomies chapter) for Transcendental Idealism (A 490/B 518ff.).
2. For passages from the frst Critique, I have usually followed the translation by Paul
Guyer and Allen Wood (1998). The points on which I have offered my own translation,
when it concerns a substantive rather than merely stylistic alteration, are indicated by
interpolating the relevant German word or phrase and by adding translation my own
in parentheses. The basis for these translations is Kant 1902. Passages from this work are
cited in the text by the relevant volume and page number. When I mark a translation
as my own, it often departs only in minor respects from the Guyer-Wood translation,
Philosophical Review, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2010
DOI 10.1215/00318108-2010-011
2010 by Cornell University
449
I A N P R O O P S
no knowledge of the nature of the self as it is in itself, none of the world
considered as the totality of appearances, and none of the existence (or
nonexistence
3
) of God. Instead, the content of our speculative knowl-
edge is confned to those principles that must be true if experience is to
be possible, and such principlesKant supposesspeak only of objects
of possible experience.
4
Since the views Kant criticizes as dogmatic in the Dialectic had
been propounded by some of the brightest minds of the Early Mod-
ern period, he owes his reader a suitably charitable explanation of how
thinkers of the caliber of, for example, Descartes and Leibniz could have
gone as far astray as he contends.
5
Recognizing this obligation, Kant elab-
orates a novel and ingenious account of the seductiveness of dogmatic
error. The rationalist philosophers go wrong, he maintains, not because
they fall prey to the artful invention of sophistsand certainly not
because of any blundering intellectual clumsiness on their part (A 298/B
354)but simply because they succumb to a powerful illusion grounded
in the very nature of human reason itself (A 298/B 354).
6
Because he
takes even the most acute of human minds to be subject to this illu-
sion,
7
Kant can claim not to be implausibly charging his opponents
and I do not mean, in those instances, to imply a lack of indebtedness to them for the
remainder of my translation.
3. Kant believes that we will not be able to prove the nonexistence of God, say, by
discovering a contradiction in the concept of God. This feature of his view is an aspect
of his so-called doctrine of practical faith. If we are to be moral, we must believe God to
exist and, a fortiori, to be possible. This point is clear from a refection from 178384:
In moral theology it is enough to presuppose that it is still possible that there is a God,
and that no one can ever prove the non-being thereof . R 6236; 18:51920, emphasis added.
The surrounding context makes clear that by moral theology Kant means the body of
beliefs that we must hold if we are to be motivated by the moral law.
4. See B 294; A 471/B 499; 11:344, and compare B 289; A 7023/B 73031; 4:336n.
5. Kants immediate targets in the Paralogisms include both Leibniz himself and his
followersWolff and Baumgarten in particular, and as Kant himself makes clear at B 413,
on the issue of the immortality of the soul: Mendelssohn. Leibniz, as Margaret Wilson
has argued, seems to be Kants target specifcally in the second paralogism. Descartes,
for his part, is explicitly identifed as a target in the fourth paralogism. For details, see
Longuenesse 2008, 20; and Wilson 1974.
6. In the case of Leibniz, this account of the source of metaphysical error is supple-
mented by a separate account, offered in the Amphiboly to the Concepts of Refection,
of how the empirical use of the understanding can be confused with one that seeks to go
beyond experience. A 260/B 316A 292/B 349.
7. The illusion, Kant says, can fool even the most rational. A 703/B 731.
450
Kants First Paralogism
with navet e or sloppiness. Kant calls this supposedly pervasive illusion
transcendental illusion.
In Kants view, this distinctively intellectual species of illusion is
not by itself suffcient to account for the existence of dogmatic meta-
physics. It explains the pervasive and abiding temptation to dogmatism,
but the actual commission of dogmatic error is explained only with
the help of further resources. We form dogmatic views, Kant supposes,
when, in the grip of transcendental illusion, we allow ourselves to be
persuaded of the soundness of certain unsound arguments, which Kant
terms dialectical inferences of pure reason (A 338/B 396). These argu-
ments divide into three groups: The paralogisms are unsound argu-
ments for various dogmatic theses about the nature of the self. The
antinomiesor at least the mathematical subspecies of them
8
are
pairs of unsound arguments purporting to establish opposed doctrines
about the world considered as the totality of appearances. Finally, the
arguments of the Ideal of Pure Reason are unsound arguments that
lead us dogmatically to assert the existence of God, conceived abstractly
as the ens realissimuma being that is supremely perfect in the sense
of possessing the maximum possible degree of reality.
This account of Kants diagnosis of dogmatic error acknowledges
the importance of a distinctionoriginally drawn by Michelle Grier
9
). The frst
antinomy arises because we thus haveor, rather, imagine we havetwo
incompatible ways of fnding the completeness that reason enjoins us to
seek in the series of conditions. Dogmatic theorizing about the age (and
size) of the world will thus lead to unending controversies since its prac-
titioners will divide between these apparently incompatible alternatives
according to their individual proclivitiesincluding their taste, or lack
of taste, for theism.
22
20. Or, strictly speaking, part of it, since the antinomy also concerns the question
whether the world is bounded in space.
21. Kants solution to the frst two antinomies consists in arguing that thesis and
antithesis are contraries rather than contradictories and that both are false.
22. Kants account of what I have called these proclivities is in fact rather involved,
and it has an interesting philosophical motivation. He supposes that if we could consider
the thesis and antithesis positions purely on their intrinsic meritsthat is, according
to their grounds (A 475/B 503), we would be led to an unceasing vacillation. Ibid.
In fact, Kant supposes that we would fip-fop between thesis and antithesis on a daily
basis. Ibid. In practice, however, individuals who consider the antinomial questions tend
to form themselves into relatively stable camps or factions. In one corner, favoring the
thesis position, are the dogmatists (compare A 466/B 494) or advocates of Platonism
(A 471/B 499). In the other, favoring the antithesis, are the empiricists (A 468/B 496)
or champions of Epicureanism (A 471/B 499). In a broader sense, of course, both
camps are dogmatic, and it is clear that Kant views his labels for these positions as loose
and possibly historically inaccurate. A 471/B 499.
Although Kant doesnt himself explicitly mention the point, this apparent mismatch
between Kants theory of transcendental illusion, which predicts extreme doctrinal insta-
bility, and observation, which reveals a measure of stability, constitutes a prima facie dif-
fculty for his theory. To address it, Kant offers a supplementary explanation: he suggests
that in practice certain factors unrelated to the intrinsic merits of the claims infuence
our choice between them. These factors, which Kant terms interests of reason, are as
follows: First, there is a certain practical interest of reason, namely, the need to employ
the four thesis positions as cornerstones of religion and morality. A 466/B 494. Second,
459
I A N P R O O P S
This is only the briefest sketch of a good deal of complex mate-
rial, but it does, I would claim, capture the general contours of Kants
application of the model of transcendental illusion to the case of the
Antinomies. Unfortunately, it takes considerably more effort to see how
this model might apply to the case of the self as it is discussed in the
Paralogisms. It is to this question that we now turn.
2. Transcendental Illusion and the Self
The proponent of rational psychologythe rationalists putative sci-
ence of the selfpresumes that we can know the character of the self
as a simple, incorruptible, immaterial, and naturally immortal substance
(A 345/B 403, A 349)a soul as conceived by the Christian tradition.
This traditional conception of the soul should not be confused with
Kants ownmore abstract or formal conception, according to whicha soul
(Seele) is just a thinking being (ein denkend Wesen) (A 348)where the
notion of a being is maximally thin and does not, for example, entail
substantiality.
23
Kant maintains that transcendental illusion explains the
prevalence of the belief in the richer, traditional conception of the soul
because it unceasingly tempts us to draw certain fallacious inferences
about the character of this thinking being. In Kants view, however, the
there is the interest of popularity, which favors the thesis becauseKant supposesthe
common understanding has no scruples about the idea of an unconditioned. A 467/B
495. One supposes that Kant would viewthis lack of scruples as owed, at least inpart, to the
ordinary persons ignorance of the Principle of Suffcient Reason. Third, there is a certain
architectonic interest,a kind of penchant for system building and foundationalism
which favors the thesis of each antinomy. A 47475/B 503. A fourth interest of reason
does not so much stabilize the oscillation as fuel it. This is the speculative interest of
reason, which can work in favor of either the thesis or the antithesis. A 46667/B 49495.
Kant is not explicit about the nature of this interest, but he may well have in mind the
demand of reason expressed by P, which, as we have seen, can be satisfed in either of two
incompatible ways. (I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.) Notice
that since each of the stabilizing interests is supposed to favor the thesis position, Kant is
still left with a residual problem of explaining the stability of the antithesis position.
23. Kant uses a range of expressions for his own, much thinner, notion of the soul
in the frst Critique. These include: the soul [die Seele] (A 351; A 361); the thinking I
[das denkende Ich] (A 351; A 361; A 401); the thinking self [das denkende Selbst] (B 430),
and [the] transcendental subject of thoughts. A 346/B 404. At A 361 he suggests that
the frst of these expressions refers to the transcendental object of inner sense, which
presumably means the self that appears to itself in inner sense as the empirical self.
Kants remarks at B 429 are consistent with taking the thinking self at B 430 to have the
same reference. Thus the thinking I or thinking self is both the transcendental subject
of thoughts and the transcendental object of inner sense.
460
Kants First Paralogism
thinking being that we refer to by means of the word I is something
about whose inner nature we must remain forever ignorant. (In what
follows I will use the terms the self and the soul indifferently when
reporting Kants views about this thinking being.)
In the case of the B-editions frst paralogism, transcendental illu-
sion is supposed to encourage the belief that the self is a substance in the
sense of something that can exist only as subject, not as a mere determi-
nation of other things. (B 288; compare B 149, B 289). A substance in
this sense is something that cannot inhere in another thing as a deter-
mination of it. And by a determination in this context Kant means
something that is either a property or a mode. (The latter is an entity
whose existence consists in the exemplifcation of a property or relation
by another thing [or other things]. Common examples include dents
and fsts.
24
) Kant also emphasizes that it is something that need not so
inhere because it is a self-subsisting being (B 407; compare B 412, B
149). In the B-edition, Kant intends to be speaking of substance in this
sense whenever he invokes the unschematized category of substance;
but in both editions he also appeals to a distinct concept of substance
corresponding to the schematized category. This is the concept of
something that persists (A 144/B 183, A 182) in the sense of existing at
every moment (A 182). To keep ideas straight, I will follow Jonathan Ben-
netts convention of referring to the frst of these notions as substance
1
)
Here when Kant says the stone is used as subject it is clear that he means that the
concept stone is used as subject. The emphasis on the word stone thus seems intended
to indicate that in this context this word does not refer to an object (a stone) or even to
stones in general (the plurality of stones) but only to a concept. The same typographical
convention seems to be in play in Kants use of the phrase the I at A 349 when he says:
in all our thinking the I is the subject, in which thoughts inhere only as determinations,
and this I cannot be used as the determination of another thing. The parallel with the
phrase the stone suggests that the emphasis on the word I in the phrases the I
and this Iindicated in the Akademie edition by spaced typesettingis intended to
indicate that Kant means to be referring to the judgmental component expressed by the
word Iwhich component is presumably the concept of the soul spoken of at A 351.
His point, therefore, is that the concept expressed by the word I cannot be employed in
a judgment in a predicative role. Note: some editions of the frst Critique, including the
Guyer-Wood translation, depart from the Akademie edition by omitting the emphasis on
I in the phrase this I while including the emphasis in the phrase the I. For all I know,
this may be because they are relying on a text that is (at this point) more authoritative
than the Akademie edition. But even if that should be so, the fact that the phrase this I
is anaphoric on the phrase the I strongly suggests that Kant would have intended the
emphasis to be present in both phrases.
41. Kant does not treat the copula as expressing a judgmental component. Instead,
he treats it as expressing the judgments form. See, for example, J asche Logic, sec. 24,
(9:105).
474
Kants First Paralogism
judgmental component can be used only as [the] subject of the judg-
ment, what he really means is that it cannot be used as [the] predicate
of the judgmentwhereby a predicate here he means a judgmental
component in predicative role, rather than a property or mode. At the
end of the day, then, what Kant must mean by [1] is just:
[3] In thinking my existence I cannot use the representation of my
self as [the] predicate of the judgment.
42
At this point it would be well to recall what Kant says about [3] in the
footnote to B 41112. He says that all that follows from the argument is
[3] in contradistinction to the more metaphysically loaded claim that I
cannot exist otherwise than as subject. The focus on existence in each
of these claims suggests that Kant means to be saying that:
[4] All that follows from the premises of the paralogism as far as my
existence is concerned is not that I cannot exist otherwise than as
subject but merely that [3].
It is easy to see why Kant should take [3] to follow from the premises of
the paralogism; for it follows from a combination of the minor premise,
construed as saying
[5] The representation of a thinking being, considered merely as
such, cannot be used as the predicate of a judgment,
with the independently plausible claim that
[6] The representation I (or me)or, strictly, the judgmental
component expressed by these wordsis the representation of
a thinking being considered merely as such.
There is, then, good reasonprovided by footnote B 41112to
take the minor premise as meaning [5]. And, as we required, the minor
premise, so construed, seems to be true. For the representation of any
thinking being considered merely as such will be a singular represen-
42. Kant describes [1] as an identical proposition, which means that it is an analytic
judgment. A7/B10; J asche Logic, 9:111. One supposes that he must viewit this way because
it (a) contains necessity but (b) is not plausibly construed as a claim whose truth is a
condition of the possibility of experience. One supposes that Kant would have regarded
[1] as analytic because it amounts to [3] and because it is analytic of our concept of
the word Ich that it has the grammatical distribution it does. Presumably, it would be
thought of as That German word whose phonetic signal (in such-and-such a dialect)
is so-and-so and whose meaning is such-and-such and whose grammatical distribution is
so-and so, where this last so-and-so would contain the component does not occur as a
predicate. Such an account might be satisfactory for the word Ich, though one has to
worry whether it would really carry over to the level of judgmental components.
475
I A N P R O O P S
tation (whether it be a proper name, an indexical, a demonstrative, or
a defnite description). And representations in this category cannot play
the grammatical role of predicates
43
though, of course, they may fgure
as parts of predicates. Inthe case of a termfor a universal, by contrast, that
term can occupy either subject or predicate position in a judgment. For
example, both Blue is a color and American mailboxes are blue are
grammatical. (Of course, the same goes mutatis mutandis for what really
concerns us: the judgmental components these words express. Hereafter,
this point will be left unstated.)
Kants key observation about the B-paralogismthe point on
which his entire critical analysis of the argument turnsis that this fact
about the grammatical distribution of the frst-person singular personal
pronoun entails nothing about how the self can or cannot be conceived.
A fortiori, it entails nothing about whether or not the self is a substance
1
.
Thus, although the representation of the self cannot be used as the pred-
icate of a judgment, this fact discloses absolutely nothing about the man-
ner of my existence (B 412). This central point can be underscored by a
comparison with the case of an ordinary proper name. Suppose I were to
name my right fst Fred. Kant would accept that I cannot put the word
Fred in predicate position; but this emphatically does not show that
Fred is a substance
1
. Indeed, since Fred is something whose existence
depends on the confguration of other things, it must be deemed a mode;
hence, a determination of other things.
On this reading, the ambiguity on which the paralogism trades
can, as Kant suggests, be located in the word thought. In the major
premise to think of something is to conceive of it. But in the minor
premise to think of something is to assign its representation a certain
role in a judgment. Thus, in the sense appropriate to the major premise,
an entity that cannot be thought as a predicate is something that cannot
be conceived as a property or mode of another thing; while in the sense
appropriate to the minor premise an entity that cannot be thought as a
43. One might be inclined to doubt this on the grounds that in the judgment, for
example, that Allah is God, it looks as though God occupies predicate position. How-
ever, inspite of appearances to the contrary, this judgment does not in fact containa pred-
icate position since it is not of subject-predicate form. Rather, it is an identity judgment,
and so of relational form. In a Kantian setting, of course, this point may be less obvious
than it is to us today since Kant failed offcially to recognize relational judgments as hav-
ing a distinctive logical form. Nonetheless, it remains the case that the fact that God is a
singular term disqualifes it from predicate-position, even if Kant himself lacked some of
the resources needed to defend this point against alleged counterexamples of this kind.
476
Kants First Paralogism
predicate is something whose representation cannot play the grammati-
cal role of a predicate. Exploiting the ambiguity of predicate, which in
Kants writings sometimes means a property (or mode) and sometimes
a judgmental component in predicative role, we might characterize the
ambiguity in question as that between the notion of something that can-
not be conceived as a predicate and the notion of something that cannot
be deployed as a predicate. Alternatively, sacrifcing elegance to precision,
we might say that the kernel of Kants critical insight amounts to the fol-
lowing observation: the fact that somethings representation cannot be
deployed as a predicate in judgments doesnt entail that that thing itself
cannot be conceived as a property or mode of another thing, and, a for-
tiori, it doesnt entail that it cannot exist inthis manner. That observation,
I take it, constitutes a philosophical insight of real depth.
44
44. Among the interpretations of the B-edition paralogismknown to me, the one that
comes closest to my own is that of Karl Ameriks (2000). According to Ameriks (2000, 71),
the reason there can be no sound argument of the kind the frst paralogism attempts to
be is that despite systematically misleading appearances, we dont have suffcient evi-
dence to make any subsumption under the frst premise. I agree with that assessment;
but my interpretation of the B-paralogism differs from Amerikss on one substantive
point and three points of emphasis. The substantive point is that the middle term (in
the formally presented argument) can (and, if we are to make sense of Kant, must) be
viewed as ambiguous in two places: in the word thought and in the word entities. The
frst point of emphasis is that the minor premise is not, in the frst instance, as Ameriks
would have it, a claim about how I must represent myself whenever I consider myself
merely as thinking (that is, as a subject). It is more specifcally a claim about where my
representationparadigmatically, the word Icanor cannot occur ina judgment. One
might, of course, offer this as a gloss on how I must represent myself whenever . . .;
so on this point, our readings are, I think, compatible. However, they differ insofar as
Ameriks does not in fact offer this gloss, and so leaves it somewhat unclear what it is to
represent the self as a subject. A second (very minor) difference of emphasis relates to
the idea that the focus of the minor premise lies not, as Ameriks would have it, on the
point that I must think of myself as subject, which, on my reading, would mean that the
representation I must occur in subject position; it lies rather on the point that the rep-
resentation I cannot go in predicate position. A third difference of emphasis relates
to my employment of the idea that, in relation to self-consciousness (that is, in the
epistemic state Im in at the terminus of Cartesian doubt), my resources for thinking of
myself are diminished in such a way that, under the infuence of transcendental illusion,
it will easily seem that I have nothing to appeal to but an inappropriate grammatical
test when considering whether or not I can conceive of myself as a determination. In
spite of these differences, I believe there is much to admire in Amerikss account, and, in
particular, I agree with many of his criticisms of other interpreters. See Ameriks 2000, 68,
7173.
477
I A N P R O O P S
5. The Paralogistic Fallacy in the A-edition
We are now equipped to attempt a reading of the A-edition version of the
frst paralogism.
45
I will argue that Kants criticism of this version of the
paralogism consists, at bottom, in the observation that it operates with
the wrong conception of substancewrong because it fails to corre-
spond to any notion the rational psychologist might have in mind when
claiming that the self is a substance. This conception turns out to be even
weaker than the notion of substance
1
and to make an essential appeal to
considerations having to do with where a judgmental component can
(and cannot) occur in a judgment.
Kant formulates the A-edition version of the argument as follows:
That the representationof whichis the absolute subject of our judgments,
and hence cannot be used as the determination of another thing, is sub-
stance.
I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judg-
ments, and this representation of Myself cannot be used as the predicate
of any other thing.
Thus I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. (A 348)
This argument diverges even farther than did the B-edition version from
the strictly correct form of a categorical syllogism: the frst premise is a
defnition rather than a universal claim stating a suffcient condition for
being a substance; and the minor premise isnt general. Putting it into
the form of a syllogism with a singular minor premise and simplifying by
eliminating the redundant, defned predicate: is the absolute subject of
our judgments, we may reformulate the argument as follows:
Entities whose representation cannot be used as a determination of other
things are substances.
The self is an entity whose representation cannot be used as a predicate
of another thing.
Therefore the self is a substance.
On the assumption that determination in this context just means pred-
icate, the argument is valid. Moreover, because, as we have seen, the rep-
resentation of the self cannot be used as a predicate, the minor premise
is true. Since the major premise is just a consequence of a defnitional
truth, the argument is sound. The arguments only shortcoming is that
45. The ideas in this section have benefted greatly froma conversation with Kenneth
Winkler, who convinced me that the conclusion of the A-edition frst paralogism had to
be somehow weaker than the proposition that the soul is a substance
1
.
478
Kants First Paralogism
its conclusion is too weak to serve the rational psychologists purposes.
It establishes only that the self is a substance in the grammar-driven
sense of something whose representation cannot occur as a predicate in
a judgment. As Kant puts it, the argument establishes that the soul is a
substance only in the idea (A 351).
46
In order to emphasize that this
is the weakest of the conceptions of substance we have considered so
far, it will be convenient to label it substance
0
.
47
As Kant observes, the
argument doesnt entail anything metaphysically interestingleast of all
the souls natural immortality (A 35051; A 400); for, as weve seen from
our discussion of the case of Fred, some substances
0
can cease to exist
through the decomposition or rearrangement of their parts.
Because the A-edition frst paralogism employs a weak and meta-
physically neutral conception of substance, there is no need to posit a
fallacy of equivocation to diffuse its force. But, equally, lacking such an
equivocation, it fails to satisfy Kants offcial description of a paralogism.
48
46. More precisely, he says that the concept of the soul signifes a substance only in
the idea. This entails that the soul itself is a substance only in the ideaand that means
that the souls representationthe I of apperceptioncannot be used as a predicate
in judgments.
47. Kants notion of substance
0
seems not to have any close precedent in the tradi-
tion. It might be thought to correspond loosely to Aristotles notion of something that
is not said of a subject from the Categories (sec. 5) (Aristotle 1984); for its possible
to read Aristotle here as offering a characterization of substance that rests, partly, on
grammatical considerations. But that idea is only one element of Aristotles notion of
primary substance rather than the notion itself. It seems that Kant was led to the notion
of substance
0
by his attempt in the A-edition to analyze the paralogisms quite generally as
establishing nothing more than claims about the self in the idea or in concept. The
generality of this ambition is evident from his remark that mere apperception (I)
is substance in concept, simple in concept, etc., and thus all these psychological the-
orems are indisputably correct. Nevertheless, one by no means thereby cognizes any-
thing about the soul that one really wants to know, for all these predicates are not
valid of intuition at all, and therefore cannot have any consequences that could be
applied to objects of experience; hence they are completely empty. (A 400)
48. Karl Ameriks has suggestedquite plausiblythat Kants A-edition criticisms
of the frst paralogism are directed not at the argument Kant presents there as the
paralogistic syllogism per se but rather at an invalid extended argument for the perma-
nence of the soul. Ameriks 2000, 68. According to Ameriks, the rational psychologists
error consists in passing fromthe conclusion that I cannot be a determination of another
thing (that is, that I am a substance
1
) to the further conclusion that I am a substance
2
.
Such a step involves a version of the fallacy Jonathan Bennett calls infating the frst
paralogism. Bennett 1974, sec. 25. The B-edition improves on this diagnosis and criti-
cism by locating the fallacy squarely within the paralogistic syllogism itself. I agree with
the general style of this analysis, but I would claim that the conclusion that gets infated
479
I A N P R O O P S
Inorder to present the belief inthe substantiality of the soul as reached by
a genuine paralogism, what is needed is a better defnition of substance;
and that is precisely what the B-editions version of the paralogism works
withnamely, substance
1
.
As I see it, then, the main change between the A- and B-edition
versions of the frst paralogisma change that enables Kant to portray
the paralogism as invalidis the change in the defnition of substance
from that the representation of which cannot be employed as a determi-
nation of another thingsubstance
0
(compare A 348)to that which
cannot exist otherwise than as subject
49
substance
1
(B 149, B 288, B
289). This thought is confrmed by the absence of the latter notion from
the A-edition and by Kants omission of the former from the parts of the
B-edition that he rewrote. I would therefore claim that it is his reformu-
lation of the notion of substance that constitutes the main improvement
in his presentation of the frst paralogism.
6. Objections and Replies
The account I have given of the B-edition paralogism satisfes our main
desiderata: it portrays the paralogism as a fallacious syllogism contain-
ing an ambiguous middle term; the fallacy is suffciently subtle that it
might have been committed by thinkers of some sophistication; and the
equivocation is located precisely where Kant says it isnamely, in the
word thought. So the reading has its merits. But what are its points of
vulnerability?
One possible line of objection alleges that the interpretation
would commit Kant to predicting the occurrence of dogmatism where
it does not exist. If Kant is right that we are apt, when in the grip of
transcendental illusion, to confuse the idea that the selfs representation
cannot occur in predicate position in a judgment with the idea that the
self cannot be conceived as a determination (that is, as a property or
mode), why, one might want to know, arent we apt to make a similar
mistake in other cases? Why, for instance, shouldnt we also be inclined
to think of my right fst, whose representation, Fred, cannot occur in
predicate position, as a substance
1
?
(and which constitutes a lemma in the invalid, extended argument) is that the soul is a
substance
0
rather than, as Ameriks seems to suppose, a substance
1
.
49. Recall that I amtreating the omission of modal force in the predicate of the major
premise in the B-version as just a slip.
480
Kants First Paralogism
The reply, I take it, should run as follows: we are not tempted to
take Freds inability to occupy predicate position as a sign that what it
represents is incapable of being conceived as a determination of another
thing because what it represents is intuitable. In intuiting Fred, I can per-
ceive that it is complex and thereby come (perhaps tacitly) to understand
that it is something whose existence consists in the confguration of other
things. In other words, sensible intuition can assure me that Fred is a
mode. In the case of the self, by contrast, all I have to go on in consider-
ing whether or not it can be conceived of as a determination of another
thing are the features that could be known to attach to it at the terminus
of Cartesian doubt. But, crucially, among these features is nothing that
would indicate that the self is not a substance
1
. They include only the
general property of having thoughts, along with the particular proper-
ties of believing that p, doubting that q, willing that r , and so forth.
50
It is
because in considering the self we have nothing to go on beyond these
meager resources that in this case the fallacy is so easy to commit.
So much, then, for the frst line of possible criticism. A second
line challenges my attribution to Kant of the idea that the judgmental
component expressed by I cannot occur as a predicate. Some grounds
for this possible objection are mentioned by Patricia Kitcher (1982, 526).
Although she herself wants to attribute something like this claim to Kant
as part of her interpretation of the A-edition frst paralogism, she does
so only with reservations. Kant, she says, never says why the I cannot
occur as a predicate. Further he himself points out that any concept can
occur ineither the subject or the predicate positionina sentence (ibid.).
As support for the second of these claims, Kitcher cites the texts: A 349, B
12829, and A 24243/B 300301. Kitchers contention, if correct, would
pose a diffculty for my reading only if what she means by a concept is
a judgmental component in general. For the sake of argument, I shall
suppose that that is so.
The reply to this objection simply involves observing that the pas-
sages cited do not in fact support the conclusion Kitcher draws from
them. Consider A 349. Far from suggesting that any judgmental compo-
nent can play the role of a predicate, this passage actually suggests that
the judgmental component expressed by I cannot do so. It contains
50. As I noted earlier, it is clear that Kant takes us to know at least this much about the
self, for he says, Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further
is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is cognized [erkannt]
only through the thoughts that are its predicates. A 346/B 404, emphasis added, translation
my own.
481
I A N P R O O P S
the claim that in all our thinking the I is the subject, in which thoughts
inhere only as determinations, and this I cannot be used as the determination
of another thing (A 349, emphasis added). If I am correct that when Kant
speaks of using the I he means employing the selfs representation in
a judgment, this would have to be taken to mean that the judgmental
component expressed by the word I cannot occur as a predicate in a
judgment. At any rate, there is no hint of a suggestion at A 349 that this
representation can function as a predicate. Nor, so far as I can see, is
there any hint of this idea at A 24243/B 300301. The only text cited
by Kitcher that might seem to support the attribution of such a view is
the passage from B 12829. Here Kant offers a characterization of the
categories:
[The categories] are concepts of an object in general, by means of which
its intuition is regarded as determined with regard to one of the logical
functions for judgments. Thus, the function of the categorical judgment
was that of the relationship of the subject to the predicate, e.g., All bodies
are divisible. Yet in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding
it would remain undetermined which of these two concepts will be given
the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate.
For one can also say: Something divisible is a body. Through the cate-
gory of substance, however, if I bring the concept of a body under it, it
is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always be
considered as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise with all the
other categories. (A 94/B 12829)
As I read this passage, Kant is not claiming that any representation what-
soever can occur as a predicate in a judgment. Rather, he is claiming that
prior to the application of the category of substance, any general term
might play either subject- or predicate-role in a subject-predicate judg-
ment. As we have already noted (with our example of blue), this fexi-
bility is typical of general terms. That idea, however, is far from entailing
that I can occur in predicate position, for I is a representation that
purports to stand for a particular .
A third possible objection would charge that my interpretation
is fawed because it is incomplete. The problem is that immediately after
presenting the frst paralogism, Kant offers an explanation of the infer-
ences deceptiveness that appears to differ from the one in the footnote
on which we have been focusing so far:
The major premise talks about a being that can be thought of in every
respect, and consequently even as it might be given in intuition. But the
482
Kants First Paralogism
minor premise talks about this being only insofar as it is considered as
subject, relative only to thinking and the unity of consciousness, but not
at the same time in relation to the intuition through which it is given as
an object for thinking. (B 411)
The present objection simply charges that we havent yet done justice
to this apparently rather different explanation of the equivocation. The
reply to this objectionsuch as it isis just to concede its correctness
and to show that the needed further explanation is compatible with the
one given so far.
Lets begin by considering the contrast in the second sentence.
Kant says that the minor premise talks about a beingnamely, the self
in a way that contrasts with thinking of it in relation to the intuition
through which it is given as an object for thinking. Kant repeatedly
insists that the self as it is in itself is not an object of intuition; so he
cannot mean that the minor premise neglects to consider the self rel-
ative to the intuition through which it is given as an object for think-
ing. What he must mean, rather, is just that if, contrary to fact, the
minor and major premises were to mesh into a valid argument, the self
would have to be the kind of thing that could be given in intuition. He
might have said that the minor premise speaks only of entities that are
related to the unity of consciousness, not of entities that might be given as
objects.
Another reason, then, why the argument must be recognized as
invalid is that the major premise speaks of things that have the right onto-
logical status to be intuitedthat is, things that can be given as objects
while the minor premise speaks of nothing of this kind. This does not
bring out an ambiguity in the actual wording of Kants formulation of
the paralogism, but, applying a little charity, we might see the envisaged
ambiguity as being located in the word entities as it fgures in the more
formally correct formulation of the argument given in section 4 above.
Recall that this argument runs:
All entities that cannot be thought otherwise than as subjects are entities
that cannot exist otherwise than as subjects, and therefore (by defnition)
are substances.
All entities that are thinking beings (considered merely as such) are enti-
ties that cannot be thought otherwise than as subjects.
Therefore,
483
I A N P R O O P S
All entities that are thinking beings (considered merely as such) are enti-
ties that cannot exist otherwise than as subjects, and therefore (by def-
nition) are substances.
According to the line I am suggesting, we should say that in the
major premise entities is understood to mean objects, while in the
minor it is understood to mean things of another kindsubjective uni-
ties, perhapsunderstood as the pseudo-objects imagined to account
for the unity attaching to each persons thoughts in virtue of those
thoughts belonging to one consciousness.
There is no avoiding the conclusionthat Kant effectively offers two
complementary accounts of where the middle termthe whole phrase:
entities that cannot be thought otherwise than as subjectsis infected
with ambiguity, namely, in the word thought and in the word enti-
ties. But because he does not himself formulate the argument in its
strictly correct form, the term entities does not occur in the formu-
lation he offers. That being so, the account of the footnote must be
adjudged the more satisfactory of the two, and one can suppose that
Kant added the footnote in order to remedy this defciency in the main
text.
51
The fourth objection raises a problemfor our claimthat the major
premise of the B-edition paralogism would be true by Kants lights.
52
I
have argued that Kant understood the term paralogism in such a way
that the idea that the premises should be true follows trivially from the
very notion of a paralogism. However, one might reasonably wonder how
51. This account of the formal fallacy in the B-edition paralogism differs markedly
from Griers, which I fnd to be less successful than her account of transcendental illu-
sion. Grier suggests that the argument should be reconstructed as the invalid inference:
x (Ox (Sx Ex)), Sa; so Ea, where Ox is x is an object of possible experience;
Sx is x cannot be thought otherwise than as subject, and Ex is x does not exist oth-
erwise than as subject. Grier 2001, 163. Grier doesnt indicate what she takes a to be,
but one supposes it must be the singular termthe self, or, perhaps, the thinking subject
(considered merely as such). This reconstruction has several drawbacks. First, and most
obviously, it fails to portray the paralogism as a syllogism. Second, since it portrays the
minor premise as a singular judgment, it would seem to ft the frst-edition version better
than the second. Third, the very suggestion that the frst premise incorporates a restric-
tion that is absent from the second seems to run counter to Kants words. He describes
the frst premise as talking of a being that can be thought of in every respect and the
second as speaking of this being only relative to thinking and the unity of consciousness.
This suggests that the second premise is in fact more restricted than the frst.
52. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this question and to Kenneth
Winkler for discussion of some possible responses. The response I fnally settled upon
was, in its essentials, suggested to me by Ivan Heyman.
484
Kants First Paralogism
Kant could have taken himself to know the major premise to be true; for
while it seems to be intended to be read as a necessary claim, it is, at frst
sight, neither analytic nor synthetic a priori. I believe this objection can
be answered by arguing that Kant would have viewed the major premise
as analytic. Since this is far from obvious, however, it will be worth going
into this matter in some detail.
Consider the core of the major premise, namely: What(ever)
cannot be thought otherwise than as a subject does not exist otherwise
than as a subject. I argued earlier that in order to be consistent, Kant
ought to replace does not with cannot. Applying this emendation
and replacing the phrase otherwise than as a subject with the (in this
context) equivalent phrase as a determination, we obtain: Whatever
cannot be thought as a determination cannot exist as a determination.
To appreciate why Kant should have regarded such a claim as analytic it
is necessary to attend to the modalities involved. For each occurrence of
cannot, we must ask whether the modality in question is real or logical
impossibility. The answer, I believe, is that the frst impossibility is logical,
the second real. Thus the claim should be read: Whatever is such that
there is always a contradiction in representing it as a determination
of another thing cannot, as a matter of real possibility, exist as a
determination of another thing. Such a claim is analytic because it is
analytic of the notion of real possibility that whatever is really possible
is logically possible, so that whatever is logically impossible is really
impossible (compare 29:811). (We might say that x is really possible just
in case x is logically possible and x involves no real repugnancy.)
In support of such a reading of the relevant modalities, we may
observe that sometimes when Kant speaks of what can be thought he
clearly has inmind what canbe represented as logically possible. So much
is clear from, for example, Kants remark in the B-edition preface to
the frst Critique that [Although I cannot cognize freedom as a prop-
erty of my soul], nevertheless, I can think freedom to myself, that is, the
representation of it at least contains no contradiction in itself (B xxviii).
This provides some support for the idea that the frst impossibility in
the major premise is logical impossibility. (Or, more carefully, it suggests
that the whole phrase whatever cannot be thought otherwise than as
subject means whatever is such that there is always a contradiction in
representing it as a determination of another thing.) That the second
impossibility is real is only to be expected since the notion of impossi-
bility that features in the defnition of substance (as that which cannot
exist as a determination of another thing) is plausibly real impossibility.
485
I A N P R O O P S
Something, after all, would seemto still count as a substance
1
if the obsta-
cle to its existing as a determination of another thing were merely real
repugnancy rather than logical inconsistency.
Since the major premise is plausibly interpreted as analytic, we can
suppose that Kant would have taken it to be true. We can also suppose
that he would have taken the rational psychologist to have regarded it
as true.
7. A Closer Look at Transcendental Illusion
Before closing it will be useful to address some apparent problems for
applying to the Paralogisms chapter the account of transcendental illu-
sionoutlined inthe opening sections of this essay. That account, I believe,
is broadly correct; but it requires some further elaboration and refne-
ment. Two problems need to be addressed: First, although there is much
in the frst Critique to support the idea that the illusion that tempts us
to commit the fallacy of the frst paralogism is the illusion that Dor
rather an instance of it
53
is true, there are also numerous passages that,
on the face of it, suggest a rather different story. Second, the picture we
found helpful from the Prolegomenanamely, that of a regressive series
of conditions whose fnal member appears to be an ultimate subjectis
expressly repudiated at one point in the frst Critique. The present section
is devoted to showing that, in spite of these problems, the essential ele-
ments of the account of transcendental illusion given so far do nonethe-
less apply to the frst paralogism.
In the course of defending the completeness of his table of cos-
mological ideas (stated at B 443) Kant claims:
The category of substance and its accidents is not suited to a transcen-
dental idea, that is, in regard to this category reason has no ground to
proceed regressively toward conditions. (A 414/B 441)
54
53. The instance is: If a predicate is given, the whole series of subjects subordinated to
one another, a series which is therefore itself unconditioned, is likewise given.
54. Kant goes onto concede that we do have one concept of substance that might still
seem to be an idea of transcendental reason, namely, the concept of the substantial.
In this context, he understands this to be the concept of a subsisting object that lacks any
predicates. A 414/B 441. But since this would not, if it did exist, be an appearance (that
is, an object of possible experience), Kant thinks it plain that it cannot be thought of as a
fnal member in a regressive series of appearances, which is what would be required in the
present context. Note, incidentally, that we may think of the substantial as yet a fourth
conception of substance recognized by Kant.
486
Kants First Paralogism
Does this meanthat the Prolegomenas story is only a temporary aberration,
a view held feetingly between the two editions of the frst Critique? This
seems doubtful since the B-edition retains a number of remarks from
the frst edition in which the Prolegomenas account is plausibly present.
These remarks all occur in the chapter of the frst Critique dealing with
the general notion of a transcendental idea.
First, Kant describes the totality of conditions and the uncondi-
tioned as the common title of all concepts of reason (A 324/B 380).
Since one of these concepts of reason is the transcendental idea of the
self, this idea would seem to have as part of its content the notion of an
unconditioned totality of conditions. Second, in the course of arguing
that there are just as many species of deceptive syllogistic inference as
there are ideas, Kant says that in each species of [dialectical] syllogism
prosyllogisms proceed to the unconditioned: one, to a subject that is no
longer a predicate, another to a presupposition that presupposes nothing
further (A 323/B 37980, emphasis added). Here an absolute subject is
cited as an unconditioned, and the idea of a series of conditions is sug-
gested by the idea of prosyllogisms proceeding to the unconditioned.
Third, in the course of introducing the system of the transcendental
ideas, Kant explains that all transcendental ideas will be brought under
three classes, of which the frst contains the absolute (unconditioned)
unity of the thinking subject (A 334/B 391). If the thinking subjects
unity is unconditioned, it sounds as though its unity might be the stopping
point of a regress of conditions.
Together these remarks create the impression that in both edi-
tions of the frst Critique Kant takes seriously at least some parts of the Pro-
legomenas picture of the self as the unconditioned ultimate condition of a
regressive series. The passage from the Antinomies chapter also suggests
that he takes some of this picture back. So which parts of the Prolegomenas
story are supposed to go, and which are supposed to stay? It is not easy
to say, but a clue is provided by the prominent position accorded by both
editions to the following passage:
There will be as many concepts of reason as there are species of relation
represented by the understanding by means of the categories; and so we
must seek an unconditioned, frst, for the categorical synthesis in a sub-
ject, second for the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series, and
third for the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system. (A323/B380)
55
55. Compare a partial quotation from refection 5553:
487
I A N P R O O P S
This remark constitutes the fourth paragraph of the section dealing
with the transcendental ideas. It thus occurs in a part of the book in
which Kant is laying out the grosser features of the Dialectics architec-
tonic. Here Kant is trying to forge a connection between, on the one
hand, the various kinds of synthesis represented by the ideas and, on the
other, the three species of dialectical syllogismcategorical, hypotheti-
cal, disjunctivehe takes to be associated with them. The three kinds of
unconditioned under discussion here are intended to match up with
the transcendental ideas of the self, the world, and God.
Kants words at A 323/B 380 suggest that he conceives of the tran-
scendental idea of the self as the idea of an unconditioned associated
specifcally with categorical synthesis. But now he implies that this uncon-
ditioned is not to be thought of as the frst member of a series. Instead,
that notion is reserved for the unconditioned as it relates to hypothetical
synthesis, a form of synthesis that Kant elsewhere implies is associated
with the Antinomies (A 406/B 43233). Given the prominence of this
remark, it seems wisest to assume that Kants more considered strand of
thought involves the rejection of the Prolegomenas picture of the self as
the fnal member of a regressive series. In the Antinomies Kant explains
the reason for this rejection as follows: Accidents (insofar as they inhere
in a single substance) are coordinated with one another, and do not con-
stitute a series (A 414/B 441).
So, to answer our question about the application of Kants model
of transcendental illusion to the frst paralogism: what goes (or, at any
rate, should go) is the idea of a series of conditions, while what stays (or
should stay) is the idea of a subject that is not (and cannot be) a predicate
of something else, and is, in that sense, unconditioned. Admittedly, Kant
is not entirely consistent on this point,
56
but this seems like the best way
to try to make him consistent.
One says that something is a mere idea if one cannot even approximate to it. 1. The
unconditioned of inherence (or of the aggregate). 2. That of dependence or of the
series. 3. That of the concurrence of all possibility in one and of one for all. (R 5553;
18:228)
56. The account of transcendental illusion in the introduction to the Dialectic and in
the chapter on Ideas is not altogether consistent with Kants remarks in the Antinomies.
For in the two former places he maintains that all ideas give rise to regressive series of
conditions. See especially A 3078/B 364 and A 336/B 393. It seems likely that in the B-
edition Kant simply failed to correct fully the parts of the text he did not wholly redraft.
488
Kants First Paralogism
Getting clearer about these subtle architectonic considerations
also helps with our second problem. This, recall, is the worry that in
the frst Critique Kant sometimes characterizes the illusion underlying the
paralogisms interms that make no reference to the apparent truthof D
or even to the apparent truth of an instance of D. The following remark
is typical of those moments:
Nothing is more natural and seductive than the illusion of taking the
unity in the synthesis of thoughts for a perceived unity in the subject of
these thoughts. (A 402)
What is in question here is an illusion prompting us to mistake one kind
of unity for another. This characterization of the illusion corresponds
closely to the one given in an important refection, from which the fol-
lowing two partial quotations are drawn:
The paralogism of pure reason is properly a transcendental subreption
[Subreption],
57
where our judgment about objects and the unity of con-
sciousness in them is held to be a perception of the unity of the subject.
(R 5553; 18:223)
The frst illusion [that is, the one operative in the Paralogisms, as opposed
to in the Antinomies or the Ideal of Pure Reason] is that where the unity
of apperception, which is subjective, is taken for the unity of the subject
as a thing. (R 5553; 18:224)
58
These remarks suggest, frst, that the unity in the synthesis of thoughts
mentioned at A 402 is the unity of consciousness (the unity of appercep-
tion), and, second, that the illusion prompting the paralogisms consists
57. By a subreption Kant means an instance of the fallacy vitium subreptionis (the
vice of theft or pilfering). One commits this fallacy when one mistakes a thing of one
kind for something of quite another kind. Kants examples of this fallacy are often cases in
which something subjective is mistaken for something objective, for example, a judgment
of perception is mistaken for a judgment of experience (24:767), or a conceptthe
subjective of thinkingis mistaken for a thingthe objective of what is thought. Real
Progress, 20:349. Kant also describes as a vitium subreptionis the fallacy from which arises
the mixing of concepts of experience and of reason (Blomberg Logic, sec. 255; 24:254
55), and here, by a concept of reason, he means a pure concept of the understanding.
Thus one commits this fallacy when, for example, one takes the concept of cause and
effect to be derived from experience. Ibid. The reverse errorthat of taking a sensitive
concept for a pure concept of the understandingalso counts as an instance of the
subreptive fallacy. See Inaugural Dissertation, 2:412. In the Dissertation, however, Kant is
explicit that he means to be using the term only by analogy with its accepted meaning. All
of this suggests that a transcendental subreption is the error of taking a thing of one kind
for a thing of another kind, where this error is grounded in transcendental illusion.
58. Erich Adickes dates this fragment to one of the periods 177879 and 178083.
489
I A N P R O O P S
in the appearance that this unity is the unity of the subject as a thing
(R 5553; 18:224).
What does the unity of the subject as a thing consist in? I would
suggest that, in the case of the frst paralogism, it is the unity apparently
imposed on experience in virtue of the subjects apparently instantiating
the category of inherence and subsistence. The notion of the unity of
the subject as a thing must, however, be interpreted differently in the dif-
ferent paralogisms. That much is clear from Kants table at A 404, which
sums up the ways in which each of the special categories
59
namely, the
categories of subsistence, reality, unity (as opposed to plurality), and exis-
tence (A 403)is supposed to secure its own kind of unconditioned
unity.
60
The table makes plain that each of these categories is supposed
to be paired with one of the attributes the rational psychologist ascribes
to the self. Thus, while the category of subsistence (and inherence) is
deployed in dialectical inferences to the substantiality of the self, that
of reality is deployed in dialectical inferences to its simplicity. ( Just why
this category goes with simplicity is not immediately apparent, as Kant
concedes in a footnote [A 404].) For its part, the category of unity (as
opposed to plurality) is deployed in inferences to the selfs identity over
time, while the category of existence is deployed in inferences to the selfs
independence from other things.
This style of diagnosis survives into the B-edition:
Rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity
of consciousness, which grounds the categories, is here taken for an intu-
ition of the subject as an object, and the category of substance is applied
to it. But this unity is only the unity of thinking, through which no object
is given; and thus the category of substance, which always presupposes a
given intuition, cannot be applied to it, and hence this subject cannot be
cognized at all. (B 42122)
How does this story about our tendency to confuse one kind of unity
with another connect up with the account of illusion given in terms of
59. Kant identifes these four categories as special because each of them is supposed
to ground the unity of the other categories in its class. A 403.
60. Rolf-Peter Horstmann sees Kant as countenancing several senses of unity: the
relational, qualitative, quantitative, and modal, corresponding, respectively, to the sub-
stantiality, simplicity, numerical identity, and plain existence of the soul. Horstmann
1993, 417. This is certainly along the right lines. However, because I fnd it doubtful that
Kant would have supposed the German word unity to be fourfold ambiguous, I prefer
to think of these as four distinct species of unityfour ways of being an unconditioned
condition.
490
Kants First Paralogism
the appearance that D, or an instance of it, is true? The connection is
not obvious, but a hint may be gleaned by considering two remarks from
the A-edition paralogisms chapter. Reason, Kant tells us, represents
[the categories of subsistence, reality, and so forth] as conditions of the
possibility of a thinking being which are themselves unconditioned (A
403). He also claims that the self is represented in transcendental illu-
sion as enjoying the unconditioned unity of relation, and he glosses
this as meaning not as inhering but rather subsisting (A 404). Taken
together, these remarks suggest that what it is for somethings to seem
to have categorially imposed unconditioned unity is for it to seem to
be unconditioned in some respect. The relevant respect will depend on
which paralogism is under consideration. In the second paralogism, for
example, the imagined unconditioned unity of the self amounts to its
imagined simplicity. In this case, transcendental illusion inclines us to
confuse the lack of complexity in the representation I with a lack of
complexity in a supposed objective self (A 381; compare A 340/B 398; A
355).
In general, then, reason is supposed to generate the illusion that
the self instantiates each of the special categories (subsistence, reality,
unity [as opposed to plurality], and existence) in virtue of its being an
unconditioned condition of the relevant kind (for example, an unbear-
able bearer of properties, a partless part, and so forth). Owing to tran-
scendental illusion, we are inclined to think of the self not just as unifying
its representations but, further, as unifying them in virtue of standing
to them as their unconditioned condition. This idea perhaps makes the
most sense inconnectionwiththe unconditioned unity of relation since
we can see why Kant might have taken transcendental illusion to tempt
us to view the self as an unbearable bearer of the thoughts that are its
predicates (A 346/B 404). In this case transcendental illusion tempts
us to confuse the unity of consciousness with the unconditioned unity
of relation, and so to suppose that the I of apperception represents
something that is indeed an unbearable bearer of properties, or
substance
1
. Thus the soul cognizes
61
. . . itself, not as inhering but rather
as subsisting (A 4034).
Because the idea of the self as an imagined unconditioned con-
dition remains even after the notion of its being the imagined uncon-
ditioned condition in a series is downplayed, it is possible to see Kants
various remarks about mistaking one kind of unity for another as indeed
61. This is, of course, a nonfactive use of erkennen.
491
I A N P R O O P S
in keeping with the spirit (if not, admittedly, the letter) of our origi-
nal account. This is possible because the illusion operative in the frst
paralogism can now be thought of simply as the illusion that there is
an unconditioned condition for any mental predicate in a particular
consciousnessthat is, a noninhering subject in which they all inhere.
Kant supposes that, when we are in the grip of this illusion, we will be
inclined to mistake the subjective unity of our thoughtsthe unity of
apperceptionfor the objective unity of a self. And this imagined objec-
tive unity will in this case just boil down to the selfs apparent property
of failing to be capable of inhering in another thing. However, because
principle D makes an essential reference to a series of conditions, the
present account is compatible only with a modifed version of our origi-
nal account. We must now say that P gives rise to the illusion not that D
is true but that another principle, D
, is:
D
: If the conditioned is given, then so is its unconditioned condi-
tion.
Kant recommends the Prolegomenas account of the paralogisms as supe-
rior to that of the frst edition of the frst Critique (4:381); but it is clear
fromhis remarks inthe Antinomies that he also entertained doubts about
the idea of characterizing transcendental illusion specifcally as the illu-
sion that a regressive series of conditions has an unconditioned last mem-
ber. Why should he have entertained these doubts?
Again, Kant does not say; but one possible reason is that such
a conception would invite the question: Why isnt there an antinomy of
the self ? This question would arise because, if the relation of inherence
were to generate a regressive series of conditions, the situation would
be structurally parallel to the case of an antinomy: we would be able to
seek the unconditioned either in a fnal member of the regress or , sup-
posing the regress unending, in an infnite totality of members subse-
quent in the regress to a given conditioned member. Kant in fact indi-
cates his awareness of these two options in the parenthetical remark in
the passage fromthe Prolegomena. He says, Pure reason demands that for
each predicate of a thing we should seek its own subject, but that for this
subject, which is in turn necessarily only a predicate, we should seek its
subject again, and so forth to infnity (or as far as we get) (Prolegomena,
sec. 46; 4:333, emphasis added). The availability of these two options,
each equally recommended by reason, would generate what Kant calls a
two-sided illusion, and so an antinomy. And yet in the frst Critique he
is keen to maintain that the transcendental paralogism effects a merely
492
Kants First Paralogism
one-sided illusion regarding the idea of the subject of our thought, and
for the opposite assertion there is not the least plausibility forthcoming
from concepts of reason (A 406/B 433). Kant is wedded to this view for
architectonic reasons. It is important to him to maintain that there are
only four antinomies, one for each heading of the table of categories (A
415/B 442; compare A 462/B 490). Kant sees this as important because
he wishes to claim that his critical project proceeds systematically. He
takes the neat division of antinomiesinto two mathematical antinomies
and two dynamical onesas a sign that he has succeeded in identifying
all the instances of dialectical inference associated with the hypothetical
syllogism.
Kants actual view in the Paralogisms avoids the appearance of a
two-sided illusion by dispensing with the picture of a regressive series;
but when fully thought through, this change demands a corresponding
change in the general account of transcendental illusion. Principle D
rather than D must now be adopted as the most general statement of the
content of transcendental illusion.
Conclusion
I have argued that Kants diagnosis of the rational metaphysicians dog-
matic belief in the substantiality
1
of the self in the B-edition paralogism
has a hitherto unappreciated persuasiveness. Through his account of
transcendental illusion, Kant has explained why sophisticated philoso-
phers might well have been attracted to this position. And he has, in addi-
tion, offered a suggestive diagnosis of the fallacy that constitutes the frst
paralogism. This diagnosis has two parts: the frst turns on the (correct)
idea that certain grammatical (or quasi-grammatical) considerations do
not, after all, function as a guide to conceivability. That, I take it, amounts
to an insight of lasting value. The second turns on the idea that we are apt
to confuse the unity of our perceptions and thoughts with the perception
of a unity. That idea can be seen as starting fromHumes observation that
we never do catch ourselves without a perception or idea. But, it goes
beyond this in offering a novel, non-Humean diagnosis of why we might
nonetheless imagine that we do so.
62
More questionable, I believe, is Kants attempt to portray transcen-
dental illusion, and the attendant doctrine of the transcendental ideas,
62. Humes own account of why we imagine ourselves to perceive a numerically iden-
tical, enduring, simple self is offered in book 1, part 4, section 6 of the Treatise. See Hume
2000, 16471.
493
I A N P R O O P S
as an exhaustive account of the origins of speculative metaphysics. Even
if we understand that discipline as narrowly as Kant does, such a claim
can seem hard to defend. Just confning ourselves to the topic of the
self, we might wonder: How can Kant be taken to have diagnosed, for
instance, Spinozas belief that the fnite mind is merely a mode of the
infnite mind of God? Wasnt Spinoza led by purely rational considera-
tions to the doctrinea dogma by Kants lightsthat the human soul
is not a substance
1
? Or, again: How can he be taken to have diagnosed the
Cartesian doctrine that the essence of the self is to think? Kant believes
that the self can be known to think but not that it can be known to be
incapable of existing without thought. One searches the paralogisms in
vain for any diagnosis of how such doctrines might arise.
It seems likely that the pressures of Kants architectonic play a role
here. In respecting the constraints laid down by that architectonic, Kant
simply lacks the fexibility to offer diagnoses of the full range of ratio-
nalist doctrines. Nonetheless, I think it fair to say that Kant has at least
provided an elegant and somewhat plausible account of how in princi-
ple philosophers might arrive at the belief that the self is a substance
1
.
Whether that account accurately describes the actual reasoning of indi-
vidual proponents of that view is, of course, a further question; but one,
unfortunately, that lies beyond the scope of this essay.
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