Sorsogon's Principalia and the Policy of Pacification, 1900-1903

Authors(s): STEPHEN HENRY S. TOTANES

Source: Philippine Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fourth Quarter 1990), pp. 477-499
Published by: Ateneo de Manila University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42633211
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 Philippine Studies 38 (1990): 477-99

Sorsogon's Principalia and the Policy

of Pacification, 1900-1903

STEPHEN HENRY S. TOTANES

In the light of the increasing number of studies on the Philippine

revolution of 1896-1902 and the Philippine-American War, Fr. John
Schumacher, S.J., made the observation that "it is no longer tenable
to advance a monolithic explanation for the adherence to, sympathy
for, participation in, or betrayal of a revolution . . . [o]ne would apriori
expect vast differences in response to a call for revolution/'1 Indeed,
there was a complexity of motives, factors and forces at work which
no monolithic framework could adequately explain.
Since the 1960s the standard account of Filipino participation in the
Philippine-American War has been Teodoro Agoncillo's Malolos: The
Crisis of the Republic which celebrates the role of the Filipino masses
in the second phase of the revolution and criticizes the collaboration
of the Manila-based ilustrados with the new colonizers. In the mid-
seventies, Renato Constantino in his A Past Revisited pursued and
elaborated upon Agoncillo's interpretation, emphasizing the fact that
the masses continued to resist the Americans even after the ilustrados
had been coopted into the new regime and General Emilio Aguinaldo
had surrendered to the Americans. Both interpretations however are
heavily based upon the events and characters in the centers of the
revolution - Manila, Malolos, and Cavite - and do not sufficiently cover
the events in the other provinces.2

This article was originally delivered as a paper at the First National Conference on the
Philippine-American War, 1899-1914 at the University of the Philippines, Quezon City,
on 3-4 July 1989.
1. John N. Schumacher, S.J., "Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," Philippine Stud-
ies 30 (1982): 484.
2. Teodoro Agoncillo, Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic (Quezon City: University of
the Philippines, 1960); Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (Manila: Tala
Publishing House, 1975).

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478 PHILIPPINE STUDIES

Recent studies of the revolution in the different provinces modify

some of the generalizations made by Constantino and Agoncillo. The
works of Glenn May, Norman Owen, and Milagros Guerrero on the
provinces of Batangas, Albay and parts of Luzon and the Visayas have
shown that there was a wide range of responses, from collaboration
and accommodation to resistance, among the different levels of the
Filipino population, whether principales or belonging to the masses. In
fact, Guerrero says that one of the most significant features of the
political situation during the years 1898-1902 was "the emergence of
these local elites (provincial and municipal) as the real victors of the
Philippine Revolution," as they managed to entrench themselves in
positions of power and steer the revolution in a direction which would
benefit their interest.3
This article hopes to add to the growing number of local studies
made on Filipino participation in the Philippine-American War and
confirm Guerrero's observation by focusing on a province which was
only peripherally involved at the outbreak of hostilities between the
two sides - Sorsogon, on the southeasternmost coast of Luzon. Sorso-
gon was drawn slowly into the war, having been left unoccupied by
American troops for the first ten months of the war in 1899. But in
1900, the American presence was felt and a pacification campaign was
conducted, to which the native response evolved from accommoda-
tion, to resistance, to collaboration. It was a response best reflected by
Sorsogon's prirtcipalia.

THE SETTING

Sorsogon lies on the extreme southeast end of the island of Luzon,

in the Bicol region. It has sixteen municipalities, all of which are coastal
towns except for Irosin, which lies at the center of the province. The
capital, Sorsogon, is around 600 kilometers from Manila via the South
Road, a national highway completed in the postwar period. Before
this, Sorsogon was relatively isolated via the land route. The most
convenient means of transport was the sea route, from Ragay Gulf to

3. Milagros C. Guerrero, "The Provincial and Municipal Elites oř Luzon During the
Revolution, 1898-1902/' in Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transforma-
tions , Alfred McCoy and Ed de Jesus, eds. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University
Press, 1982), p. 155; see also Guerrero, "Luzon at War: Contradictions in Philippine
Society, 1898-1902," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 19 77); Glenn May,
"Resistance and Collaboration in the Philippine-American War: The Case of Batangas,"
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 15 (March 1984): 69-90; and Norman G. Owen, "Winding
Down the War in Albay, 1900-1903," Pacific Historical Review 48 (November 1979): 557-89.

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SORSOCON'S PRINCIP ALIA 479

Bacon, nine kilometers from the capital, or through Sorsogon Bay on

the west coast.4
During much of the Spanish regime, Sorsogon fell under the juris-
diction of Albay, having become an independent province only in
October 1894, not because of any petition from its inhabitants, but due
to a bureaucratic decision.made in Madrid. From then until the arrival
of the Americans in 1900, it had its own Spanish governors who were
eventually replaced by civil and military officials under Aguinaldo' s
revolutionary government.5
In describing revolutionary activity in the Bicol region, one jour-
nalist commented: "revolutions might end in Bicol but they will
certainly not begin there."6 The description is apropos to the region
and even to Sorsogon. During the entire Spanish colonial period, there
was only one serious challenge to the Spanish regime in the region.
That was an offshoot of the Sumuroy rebellion of 1649-50 which began
in Samar and spread to the nearby provinces. While there may have
been dissatisfaction against the imposition of Spanish rule, there is
little evidence that the Bicolanos or the Sorsogueños ever mobilized
themselves on a large scale to challenge the Spanish regime.7
The new province of Sorsogon was barely two years old when the
revolution led by the Katipunan broke out in Manila in August 1896.
Liberal ideas may have circulated among some of Sorsogon' s edu-
cated citizens but these were never transformed into action. Immedi-
ately, the Spanish governor, Don Guillermo Monte Allende Salazar,
denounced several citizens in a secret report to the Governor-General
because of their alleged anti-Spanish and anti-religious views. Intent
on stemming the tide of revolutionary fervor which was now spread-
ing all over Luzon, he arrested some liberal-minded individuals and
cooperated with the governor of Albay in raising a volunteer army
of 500 men which left for Manila in February 1897 to support the
Spanish drive against the rebels in Central Luzon.8

4. Francisco G. Salazar, "Geography oř Sorsogon with Particular Emphasis on Soils

and Crops/' Philippine Geographical Journal (January-March 1956) 4: 22; A Pronouncing
Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1902): p. 589.
5. Luis C. Dery, "From Ibalon to Sorsogon: Prehistory to 1905/' (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of the Philippines, 19 87), pp. 277-79 (Hereafter, to be cited as Dery, "Sorso-
gon").
6. Teresa Castro, 'The Bicolano," Graphic, 28 September 1966, p. 29.
7. Norman G. Owen, Prosperity Without Progress: Manila Hemp and Material Life in the
Colonial Philippines (Quezon Qty: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1984), pp. 218-19.
• 8. Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 341-46. See also Elias M. Ataviado, The Philippine Revolution
in the Bicol Region, trans. Juan T. Ataviado, (Manila: Encal Press, 1953), pp. 46-48; 56.

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480 PHILIPPINE STUDIES

The end of the Spanish regime in Sorsogon began with the success-
ful revolt of the Guardia Civil of Nueva Caceres in September 1898.
By then, a large expeditionary force led by General Ananias Diokno,
representing the victorious revolutionary forces of Aguinaldo, was
headed for the Bicol region. This prompted the Spanish authorities to
consider abandoning these provinces. On 21 September 1898, the
Spanish officials of Sorsogon and their families, led by Governor
Leandro Villamil, left the province and turned over some funds of the
provincial government to the Vicar-Forane, Padre Jorge Barlin. The
dismantling of the Spanish colonial structure in the province was
completed without much bloodshed.9
The expeditionary force under General Diokno reorganized provin-
cial government in Sorsogon upon its arrival in October 1898. Elec-
tions were held for provincial and municipal positions, and the offi-
cials who had held office prior to the collapse of the Spanish regime
easily occupied positions vacated by the Spaniards. As Guerrero
observed, "the municipal elite was essentially unaltered . . . local
government offices simply rotated within its ranks."10
In November 1898, a new politico-military governor for Sorsogon,
Lieutenant Colonel Amando Airan, was appointed by President
Aguinaldo. A month later, Domingo Samson of Albay arrived as a
special commissioner of the Malolos Republic and conducted new
elections, but there were only a few changes on the municipal level.
By the end of 1898, therefore, Sorsogon had been integrated into the
new Philippine Republic, even if it did not send delegates to the Malolos
Congress held three months earlier.11
The immediate concern of this revolutionary government was to
restore socioeconomic activities and raise wartime contributions for
the fledgling Republic. But a more pressing problem was the acqui-
sition of sufficient arms and ammunitions for the defense of the
province, especially when hostilities broke out between the Americans

9. For the successful revolt in Nueva Caceres, see Ataviado, Revolution, pp. 80-82;
113-16; Manuel Sastron, La insurrección en Filipinas: Guerra Hispano Americano en el archi-
pelago, 1896-1899 (Madrid, 1901), pp. 537-38; Apolinar Pastrana Riol, ed., A Friar's Account
of the Philippine Revolution in Bicol (Q.C.: Franciscan Friary of St. Gregory the Great, 1980);
and, "Relación de los sucesos de Nueva Cáceres en la actual insurrección/' (n.a., n.d.)
microfilm copy, Ateneo de Manila Rizal Library. The abandonment of Sorsogon is
described by Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 358-61 and Ataviado, Revolution, pp. 130-31.
10. Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 361-63; for a table of elected officials see between pages
362-63. Election results can be found in Philippine Insurgent Records (hereafter, PIR), Box
No. 1-21: Election Returns, Sorsogon, 1898-1900, in Philippine National Library, Rare
Manuscript Section; Guerrero, "Provincial Elite," p. 170.
11. Ibid., pp. 363-64, citing PIR-Sorsogon, Box 1-21 and PR-182.

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SORSOGON'S PRINCIP ALIA 481

and the Filipinos in February 1899 and Aguinaldo's army broke up

into smaller groups by the year's end as the Americans began their
drive towards the other parts of Luzon.12

THE AMERICAN LANDING AND PASSIVE

ACCOMODATION

The American occupation of Sorsogon and the Bicol region was

motivated primarily by economic needs rather than by an intense desire
to pursue the "insurgents" operating there. In August 1899, General
Elwell Otis ordered a blockade of the Bicol region's ports to prevent
them from exporting their abaca and financing the cause of Aguinaldo's
army. This same blockade, however, prevented abaca from reaching
the United States and created a mild "hemp panic" among American
cordage manufacturers. The American War Department was besieged
by "urgent inquiries and anxiety about hemp."13
By 1900, American officials had decided to reopen the hemp ports
to allow the free flow of this vital raw material to the United States.
In January 1900, an expeditionary force led by Brigadier General
William A. Kobbe was sent to occupy the hemp ports of Tabaco and
Legazpi in Albay, and Sorsogon, Donsol, and Bulan in Sorsogon, to
establish civil government and customs services there so as to be able
"to render a sufficient quality of hemp available for the American
market as soon as possible."14
On 20 January 1900, two days after departing from Manila, General
Kobbe's expeditionary force, made up of the Forty-third and Forty-
seventh U.S. Volunteers, anchored in Sorsogon Bay without encoun-
tering any resistance. A soldier on the expedition described the landing:

Not a shot greeted us. Only silence and signs of a hasty departure of
inhabitants as well as troops, ... Our flotilla . . . must have seemed like
all the navies of the world advancing faithfully upon them. The deserted
town was Sorsogon . . . (it) was secured by default.15

12. Ibid., pp. 364-68.

13. Owen, "War in Albay/' pp. 575-76, citing Correspondence Relating to the War with
Spain ... 2 vols., (Washington, D.G: Government Printing Office, 1902), vol. 2, p. 1130.
14. See Brian Linn, "The War in Luzon: U.S. Army Regional Counter Insurgency in
the Philippine War, 1900-1902," (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1985), pp.
198-99, citing the report of Brig. General William Kobbe.
15. Clarence Lininger, The Best War at the Time, (New York: Robert Speller, 1964),
p. 114.

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482 PHILIPPINE STUDIES

The account of Captain J.M. Field, a quartermaster who wrote a

regimental history of the forty-seventh U.S.V. Infantry, describes this
amusing incident which they witnessed upon landing:
. . . the appearance of a small party on the pier, composed mostly of
Spaniards, who wished to give expression to their friendship for Ameri-
cans and pleasure at their appearance. The only member of the party who
could speak English and who had been selected to act as spokesman was
an Assyrian merchant of the town whose chief characteristics were a very
small and peculiarly shaped head and a generous expansiveness in the
region of the waistband. It was soon demonstrated that this gentleman's
English vocabulary was in inverse proportion to his rotundity of person
but he did the best he could with the gifts at his command and as the first
boat approached the pier ... he delivered with all the force of his lungs,
in a monotonous shrill and ridiculously childish treble the cheerful invo-
cation from the prominent citizens of Sorsogon there assembled, "Come
to Yee-sus, come to Yee-sus, come to Yee-sus!"16

The troops disembarked and headquarters were set up in Sorsogon

town. On 21st January, Company 'A' and T>' under Major Hugh Wise
occupied Donsol after meeting with slight resistance. On the same
day, Captain Charles MacLain with Company T3' occupied Bulan with
no resistance. Three companies under Colonel Walter Howe attempted
to reach Legazpi via the land route, but no road could be found and
the rough terrain compelled them to return to Sorsogon.17
General Vito Belarmino, overall commander for the revolutionary
forces for Albay and Sorsogon, explained the reason for the lack of
resistance in Sorsogon in a letter to General Mariano Trias, command-
ing officer of the Republic's Department of Southern Luzon:
Not a shot has been fired in the province of Sorsogon, which is occupied
by the enemy at the present time. The troops have withdrawn to Albay,
where they are serving under my immediate orders with the exception of
the politico-military governor, Señor Amando Airan, who is in one of the
towns of Nueva Caceres sick, so I am informed.18

We do not know the exact reason for Airan' s decision to abandon

the province and offer no resistance. The lack of firepower and the

16. United States National Archives and Records Service, Record Group 94, (hereafter
to be cited as USNA, RG #) Entry 187-396223, Adjutant-General's Office, Col. Walter
Howe, "Historical Sketch of the 47th Infantry, United States Volunteer Army," pp. 10
-11, (hereafter to be cited as "History, 47th").
17. Ibid., pp. 11-14, 18.
18. General Belarmino to Lt. Gen., commander of Southern Luzon, 28 February 1900
in John R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, 5 vols. (Pasay
City: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971), vol. 5, p. 180.

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SORSOGON'S PRINCIP ALIA 483

size oř the American fleet may have made him decide that any form
of resistance was futile and that he would save men by retreating
inland and joining Belarmino's troops in Albay. In Legazpi, the re-
sponse to the American landing was different. On 23 January 1900,
native troops under Generals Belarmino and Paua, engaged the newly-
arrived Americans in fierce combat and hand-to-hand fighting. Only
with naval artillery support were the Americans able to occupy Le-
gazpl.19
By January's end, Kobbe could happily report that the ports of
Sorsogon, Bulan and Donsol, whose storehouses contained an aggre-
gate amount of around 70,000 bales of hemp, were once again open
to trade, this time for the benefit of the Americans.20
The American troops in Sorsogon province were first met with
passive accommodation by the inhabitants, since the revolutionary
army had fled the province. Sorsogon town, the capital and commer-
cial center of the province, was spared from any revolutionary en-
counters since it was to the advantage of both sides, with their vested
interests in favor of peace and the resumption of trade, that no
confrontations take place in the capital. Secondly, the efforts of Padre
Jorge Barlin, who has been described as "instrumental in rallying the
people in the maintenance of peace and order went along finely with
the combatants, be they Spaniards, Filipinos' or Americans, for the
benefit of his province," in maintaining order and asking the towns-
people to cooperate with the Americans proved to be effective. The
Americans set up their provincial headquarters and barracks in
Sorsogon town and rented some of the private properties of local
principales. They did go on routine reconnaissance missions, many of
which turned out to be, in the words of an American soldier,
"uneventful sightseeing promenades."21
Likewise in Bulan, around 60 kilometers south of the capital, the
American captain reported that they had been received in "perfect
friendship." The town's presidente , Zacarias Asuncion, offered to
cooperate with the Americans in maintaining order. The townspeople
were only too glad to reopen the port and revive the abaca trade since
they had been suffering from a shortage of provisions since the blockade

19. "History, 47th/' pp. 12-14; Owen, "War in Albay/' pp. 561-62.
20. U. S. War Department, Annual Report, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1900), vol. 3, pp. 396, 399. (Hereafter to be cited as WDAR, with corresponding
year and volume).
21. Domingo Abella, Bikol Annals , vol. 1: The See of Nueva Caceres, (Manila, 1954),
p. 204. See also John Schumacher, S.J., Revolutionary Clergy: The Filipino Clergy and the
Nationalist Movement, 1850-1903 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1981),
p. 171; Lininger, Best War, p. 116.

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484 PHILIPPINE STUDIES

of last year. From this post at Bulan, the Americans sent a detachment
to Irosin, about 30 kilometers inland where they were also received
in friendship.22
Only in Donsol was the situation different. The arrival of the
Americans precipitated the mass evacuation of the town by its inhabi-
tants led by the vice-presidente, Indalecio Hernandez, and the cura pa-
rocco, Padre Felipe Orense. The town's presidente, Rodrigo Abitria,
some Spaniards and a few Chinese were left behind to deal with the
Americans. This force, led by Orense, was composed of around one
thousand men but armed with only thirteen rifles. It offered the longest
resistance against the Americans in Sorsogon province from January
1900 until the surrender of Orense sometime in July 1901. But their
operations fell under the command of Belarmino in Albay, particularly
his chief of operations, Colonel Ramon F. Santos of Ligao, Albay.23
The first two months of the American occupation in Sorsogon were
thus met with passive accommodation, as the inhabitants of the
province could do little but accept the American presence and return
to the peaceful life they had enjoyed before the outbreak of hostilities.

ORGANIZED RESISTANCE
AND PRINCIPALIA REACTION

The efforts at organizing resistance in the face of Col. Airan's

abandoning the province were led by Lieutenant Colonel Emeterio
Funes, a native of Bulusan, and would bear fruit only in March 1900.
Little is known of Funes's background, but prior to the American
occupation of Sorsogon, he served under General Malvaťs command
in Batangas. In August 1898, records show him requesting a loan from
Apolinário Mabini to help finance an expedition to Camarines to be
led by General Vicente Lukban.24
By around February 1900, Funes presented himself before Belarmino
in Malobago, Albay and received a commission as the overall military
commander of Sorsogon, with the power to name the provincial officials
under his command. He returned to his hometown, Bulusan, forty
kilometers southeast of Sorsogon, organized the revolutionary forces

22. WDAR, 1900, vol. 5, pp. 27-30. The full text of the report translated into Spanish
can be found in Elias Ataviado, Lucha y Libertad, vol. 2 (Manila: Commonwealth Press,
1941) pp. 147-49.
23. The resistance in Donsol is described in Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy,
pp. 168-70 and Ataviado, Lucha, vol.2, pp. 46-47, 208-14.
24. Emetcno Funes to Apolinário Mabini, Lucena, 2 Agosto de 1898, PIR-Revolution-
ary Leaders, Box #11.

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SORSOGON'S PRINCIP ALIA 485

in the neighboring towns and appointed certain principales as com-

manders of the different zones of operations. Among them were pre-
sidente Eustaquio Diaz for Bulusan, juez de paz Esteban Fulay for
Barcelona, Victorio Gratela for Matnog, and Dr. Bernardino Monreal,
who was chosen in absentia as comandante de sanidad militar. The town
of Juban sent a delegation, composed of Mario Guariña, Leoncio Grajo,
Arcádio Gisala, Eugenio Guardian, Padre Domiciano Camu and
Monreal to confer with Funes. They agreed to avoid conducting military
operations in Juban so as not to arouse American suspicions, but this
town and nearby Casiguran would both help supply the needs of the
revolutionary forces. Funes set up his headquarters in Jupi, a barrio
of Gubat. The towns of Barcelona and Bulusan would form the
backbone of the resistance while Irosin, Bulan, Sta. Magdalena and
Gubat would offer aid when necessary.25
The formation of this revolutionary army came to the attention of
the Americans in early March when a committee of principales from
Bulan, headed by Claro Muyot and escorted by American soldiers,
visited Bulusan to reorganize local government under American
sponsorship. Since the presidente, Eustaquio Diaz, was now organiz-
ing the resistance in the barrios, the vice-presidente Anastacio Camara
met with Muyot and was eventually appointed to head the local
government. This collaborative effort angered the revolutionaries. A
few days later, Diaz and around forty sandatahanes appeared in town
and accosted the two men. Camara tried to resist and was hacked to
death. Muyot was taken prisoner and having been found guilty of
treason by the revolutionaries, was executed.26
The murder of two of their collaborators was the first time that the
Americans had been challenged in these parts of Sorsogon, which
hitherto had offered no resistance. It was a case of principales who
opted to resist confronting those who had opted to collaborate. The
American troops had not yet even been engaged. After that incident
at Bulusan, the American forces would continually pursue the members
of this revolutionary army for the next few months. The American
chronicler summed up the situation thus:
The adjoining country . . . especially that portion lying along the coast of
San Bernardino was in a turmoil under the leadership of Funes, (who)
maintained for some months a very active opposition to the Americans,
necessitating on the part of the Gubat garrison a practically continuous
scouting for more than ten months 27

25. Ataviado, Lucha , vol. 2, pp. 149-51.

. 26. Ibid., pp. 199-200.
27. "History, 47th/' pp. 36-37.

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486 PHILIPPINE STUDIES

The inability of the Americans to post a garrison at Bulusan made

it the nerve-center of Funes's resistance. Late in March 1900, a detach-
ment was sent to garrison the town of Bacon. The Americans now had
posts in five towns - Sorsogon, Bulan, Gubat Bacon and Donsol. Funes's
revolutionary army would harass the garrisons at Gubat and Bulan,
while seeking refuge in the mountainous areas near Bulusan. Mean-
while, the local groups in the revolutionary army would wage their
own war with the detachments in Bacon and Donsol. The guerilla
campaign had begun.
The revolutionary army had to contend with a better-equipped
enemy. But perhaps, a more formidable foe were the principales who
refused to support their revolutionary cause and who opted to col-
laborate with the Americans.
In Bacon, where an American detachment had been set up late in
March 1900, the presidente, Cirilo Jimenez, who had been given the
rank of lieutenant colonel in Airan's army, did not offer any resis-
tance, but instead, denounced the men who had helped the revolu-
tionaries. Early in April 1900, the relatives of the men who had been
imprisoned because of Jimenez's accusations, burned the rice grana-
ries and houses of Jimenez and other local leaders, forcing them to
evacuate to Sorsogon under American escort. The reduced number of
American soldiers in Bacon led the revolutionaries to plan an attack
on the town, to be headed by Captain Valentin San Miguel from
Legazpi, whose uncle worked with Funes's headquarters in Jupi, Gubat.
On the morning of 16 April, 400 sandatahanes converged on Bacon.
But the Americans had anticipated the attack with the help of their
spies, and the small detachment was able to stave off the charge of
the rebels. At the end of the brief battle, sixteen rebels had been killed,
including Captain San Miguel. Reinforcements of cavalry coming from
Sorsogon engaged revolutionary forces under Captain Mariano Dreu
in barrio San Roque, on the way to Bacon, and routed them. This was
a major setback for the revolutionaries in Bacon.28
In the following months, the battle would be a war of words between
Captain Mariano Dreu, who was appointed chief of operations in Bacon
by Belarmino and Don Ramon Garcia, a Spanish mestizo and ex-
gobernadorcillo who was appointed by the Americans as the presidente
of Bacon. With a series of circulars, written orders and letters, the two
principales competed for the loyalty and support of the citizens of
Bacon for their respective causes. The word war ended only on 14
October 1900, when Dreu, Captain Balbino Belmonte and other revo-

28. Ataviado, Lucha, pp. 203-7, citing El Comercio, 24 Abril 1900; "History, 47th/'
p. 45.

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SORSOGON'S PRINCIP ALIA 487

lutionary officers of Bacon were captured. All revolutionary activity

on this front ground to a halt, thanks to the active cooperation of
presidente Garcia, who narrowly escaped an assassination attempt
one month later.29
In Donsol, the recognized leader of the guerilla movement was
Padre Felipe Orense, although Indalecio Hernandez held the rank of
lieutenant colonel in the revolutionary army. After evacuating the town
upon the arrival of the Americans in January 1900, the revolutionaries
succeeded in attacking the American detachment several times and
burning the town and barrios before retreating into the mountains. In
the ensuing months, the Americans tried to lure the population to
return to the town. In his proclamation to the citizens of Donsol dated
24 January 1900, Major Hugh Wise, post commander, stressed that the
Americans had come to protect them so that they could resume the
peaceful pursuit of their occupations. He emphasized that Aguinaldo' s
government had ceased to exist and that it would be foolhardy to
engage the Americans in combat. He then requested the townspeople
to return to their homes.30
For this purpose, he solicited the help of the town's presidente,
Rodrigo Abitria. The revolutionaries, in an anonymous letter, de-
nounced Abitria's collaborative efforts and labeled him "Al espia
Americanista," a traitor to the Republic.31 By late August, Wise re-
ported that efforts to resume trade were yielding results. A large
quantity of abaca, copra and vegetables had been brought into town
and sold and former residents were gradually returning to their
homes."32
The Americans intensified their operations against the revolution-
aries after November 1900 and they captured Jovellar, the lone upland
town that the revolutionaries held and which had served as Belarmino's
headquarters. In January 1901, they blockaded Burias and Ticao passes,
and within a month, captured Burias island, depriving the rebels of
a source of food.33
A last-ditch offensive by Belarmino's troops was launched in May
1901 when they attacked Donsol, but the rebels were repulsed. Finally

29. Dery, "Sorsogon/' pp. 380-86, citing documents from PIR, SD, Box 20, document
no. 594.1; Box PR 182: Sorsogon; Box AN-108; see pp. 514-15, footnotes nos. 74-81 for
individual titles; "Report of Operations: Sorsogon," USNA, RG 395, Entry 5318.
30. Maj. Hugh Wise, "Proclamación: A los habitantes de Donsol," 24 January 1900,
in USNA, RG 395, entry 3671: Letters Received, Donsol.
31. (n.a.) "Al espía americanista Rodrigo Abitria," in USNA, RG 395, Entry 3671:
Letters Received, Donsol, Box #1.
32. "Report of Operations: Donsol," USNA , RG 395 Entry 5318.
33. Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 402-3, citing PIR-RL Box 17: Papers of Ramon Santos.

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488 PHILIPPINE STUDIES

on 4 July 1901, Belarmino, almost blind, surrendered to the Ameri-

cans. On the 14th, Santos and his troops, presumably including Padre
Orense, also surrendered. With that, organized resistance in Albay
ended. The Donsol army gained the distinction of having been the last
revolutionary group in Sorsogon to capitulate to the Americans.34
The guerilla campaign in Bulusan and the neighboring towns on
the southwestern coasts of Sorsogon took on a different character. Not
all the inhabitants left the poblacion or retreated to the mountains.
Some prominent principales preferred the American presence and
sought their protection from the revolutionary forces. This can be seen
in a letter of June 1900 from Rafael Hernandez, former juez delegado
de justicia of Gubat and twenty-two others, addressed to the military
governor of the Philippines:
We . . . are all owners of lots of land within the jurisdiction of this town,
the products of which are rice, coconut and hemp . . . These properties had
to be abandoned on 3 March 1900, the date of rupture of hostilities in this
neighborhood, the owners having found themselves forced to recur to the
American detachment stationed in the town for protection. The result was
... the insurgents reaped harvests of rice, coconut, hemp and ate our cattle

It is our wish to attend personally to the cultivation of our land, but

we are unable to do so, fearing to be captured by the insurgents . . .
If this situation lasts much longer, we will be obliged to ask for help
even for the simplest necessities of life. All of the hemp in stock was sold
as well as what is being produced now in the towns of Casiguran and
Sorsogon ....
Matters will probably continue so while these insurgents thrive and are
able to obtain money and rice from this source unless it is prevented by
the American forces. We therefore beg that your excellency will consider
our situation and that measures may be adopted to put a stop to this
robbery.35

Sensing the willingness of these principales to cooperate with the

pacification effort, the Americans solicited their support in exacting
contributions for the formation of a native police force to patrol the
town and monitor the presence of these "insurgents/7 The most
generous contributor and collector of funds was Rafael Hernandez,
who in October 1900 furnished a list of the amounts donated by

34. Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, p. 170. The campaign in Donsol is recounted

by Agustin Aguilar in "Reminiscencias de un revolucionario/' in An Parabeta, 25 Janu-
ary, 1 February, 8 February 1939, copies available in the University of Nueva Cáceres
Museum, Naga City.
35. Rafael Hernandez, et. al., to Military Governor, 24 June 1900, USNA, RG 395,
Entry 3804: Letters Received, Gubat.

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SORSOGON'S PRINCIP ALIA 489

businessmen and merchants in Gubat, mostly Chinese and some his

relatives, for the maintenance of a police force.36
In Sorsogon, although most principales did not join the revolution-
ary ranks, some of them supported the cause with financial contribu-
tions. But some of them did the same for the Americans. In October
1900, Colonel Howe appointed Tomas Martinez, "who has shown
himself devoted to our interest by his acts" as presidente of Sorsogon,
to replace Hugo Nicolas who tendered his resignation on account of
ill health, and according to Howe, "whose loyalty to the United States
has been strongly suspected by me."37 The significance of this change
became apparent in early 1901, when members of an alleged "insur-
gent committee" tasked with collecting contributions for the revolu-
tionary cause were arrested and imprisoned by the Americans. Among
them were Bernardino Monreal, Justino Bautista, Pedro Duran and
Nicolas.38
Meanwhile, sometime in March 1901, Martinez appealed for an
increase in the rent of the property owned by him and occupied by
the Forty-seventh Infantry as barracks. The Americans were paying
$100 a month, which according to Martinez, was barely half of the
rental value compared to the prices of other buildings. Colonel Howe
endorsed Martinez's request, noting that the latter "has devoted a
great deal of time and energy in our interests." Howe cited the fact
that Martinez lost a house worth $5000 in March 1900 when it was
burned by some natives allegedly under the orders of the revolution-
aries. Sadly for Martinez, higher command disapproved the increase
because the garrison in Sorsogon had already been greatly reduced.
Martinez lost an apparently good opportunity to do good business
with the Americans.39
Owen's observation about the native response to the American
campaign in Albay also holds true for Sorsogon, that the most active
collaborators were mostly "ordinary principales and peasants who
had more to gain from association with the Americans."40

36. Rafael Hernandez, "Relación de los comerciantes que han dado contribución para
el sostenimieto del cuerpo de Policia de este pueblo correspondiente al presente mes/'
31 de Octubre de 1900 in USNA, RG 395 Entry 3809: Letters Received, Gubat.
37. Col. Walter Howe to Hugo Nicolas, 3 October 1900 in USNA , RG 395, Entry 5311:
Letters Sent, Sorsogon, vol. 1. Howe to Adjutant-General, 26 March 1901, entry 5134:
Sorsogon, Document File.
38. USNA , RG 395, Entry 5322.
39. Tomas Martinez to Assistant Adjutant General, 23 March 1901, USNA RG 395,
Entry 5314: Sorsogon, Document File. See attached letter oř disapproval dated 17 April
1901.
40. Owen, "War in Albay," p. 565.

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490 PHILIPPINE STUDIES

The most stubborn resistance on this front occurred in November

1900 at Capangihan, a cave along the slope of Mount Bulusan known
as "el batteria/7 From this strongly fortified positions on the the brow
of a precipitous cliff, the revolutionaries fired upon American patrols
in the rice fields below. It took the Americans and reinforcements
from Bulan and Gubat nearly two days to neutralize this position. On
21 November, the Americans were finally able to make their way up
the cliff and chase the revolutionaries away from this stronghold. No
further attempts would be made by the revolutionaries to use the
natural advantages of this position.41
By the end of 1900, operations temporarily ceased because of the
rains. In December, General Jasper Bell, who had been appointed in
March as commander for southeastern Luzon, landed 100 fresh troops
in Matnog to relieve the Forty-seventh Infantry there. He immediately
hired native police to assist them as guides, offering them attractive
salaries. By January 1901, he issued an order saying that when
"insurgents" voluntarily surrender their arms, they should immedi-
ately be released and paid $30 Mexican for the gun. 42 The difficult
conditions in resisting and the attractive incentives for surrendering
would make many a revolutionary in Sorsogon rethink his decision
to resist the Americans.
Two other factors were crucial in breaking the backbone of organ-
ized resistance. One was the capture of Dr. Bernardino Monreal on
20 January 1901, for allegedly financing the revolutionary cause. Colonel
Howe insisted that Monreal was the "leading spirit in conducting the
finances of the insurgency" and that he was said to be in correspon-
dence with both the "junta in Hongkong and Madrid." The papers
found in his room led to the arrests of other prominent principales
and the filing of charges before a military commission.43
The other factor was the organization of the Partido Federal in
Sorsogon.

THE FEDER AL PARTY

The initiative to create conditions for a workable peace between

the Americans and the revolutionaries once again came from the
principales of Sorsogon and even from the native clergy. Fr. John

41. Ibid., pp. 363-68; "History, 47th/' pp. 53-56; "Report of Operations: Sorsogon/'
USNA, RG 395, Entry 5318: Document File.
42. WD AR, 1901, p. 326; Assistant Adjutant General to Commanding General, 3rd
District, Nueva Cáceres, 3 January 1901, USNA , RG 395, Entry 5314: Box 1, Document
File.

43. "Report of Operations: Sorsogon," USNA RG 395, Entry 5318.

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SORSOGON'S PRINCIP ALIA 4^1

Schumacher, S.J. has pointed out that although resistance in Albay

and Sorsogon was largely influenced by the native clergy, as in the
case of Padre Orense, the decision to cooperate with the Americans
was also an idea which the clergy would later advocate.44 The even-
tual surrender of the revolutionaries began with this incident described
by an American captain in Bulan:
On January 27 (1901), Casiano Vera, the priest of this town, preached a
strong sermon to a large congregation. His sermon dealt with the existing
condition of affairs in the province. He urged the people to use all the
influence in their power to bring about a speedy peace; to assist the American
authorities to apprehend all persons who are acting as agitators and
disturbers of the peace. On Monday, thirty-five of the leading citizens of
Bulan and its barrios held a meeting in the tribunal and organized a branch
of the Federal Party. The meeting then adjourned and in a body visited
these headquarters, and one and all signed the oath of allegiance. The
alcalde, the justice of the peace, the priest, and the schoolmaster were in
this party and subscribed to the oath of allegiance.45

On 18 February 1901, Rufino Gerona, presidente of Bulan and other

members of the newly-formed Federal party traveled to Irosin and
spoke before a large crowd, citing the benefits of opting for peace and
that further resistance was useless. When the American lieutenant
announced that they would offer protection to those who took the
oath of allegiance, over 800 males over eighteen years of age, prom-
ised their allegiance by evening of that day. In the next two days, 200
more took the oath, among them some revolutionaries who had grown
tired of resisting. The Federalistas sent communications to Col. Funes,
inviting him to discuss the possibility of surrender. Within a day,
Funes replied that he wanted Gerona to speak to his men before they
turn themselves in.46
On 21 February 1901, at around 4:00 p.m., Col. Funes came march-
ing into the convent at Irosin with thirty-four officers. Among them
were local presidentes Victorio Gratela of Matnog, Zacarias Conspecto
of Irosin and Eustaquio Diaz of Bulusan, 23 riflemen and 113 bolomen.
Funes certified that he was in supreme command of the revolutionary
forces in Sorsogon and his surrender included all the officers under
his command. Funes expressed a desire to participate in the celebra-
tion of George Washington's birthday the following day. So on the
22nd, Funes' s command, escorted by the Irosin detachment, marched

44. For an analysis of the role of the native clergy in Sorsogon during the revolution,
see Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, pp. 171-72; see also Dery, "Sorsogon/' pp. 404-14.
' 45. WD AR, 1901, I, pt. 5, p. 421 quoted in Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy, p. 172.
46. Ibid., pp. 435-36.

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492 PHILIPPINE STUDIES

into Bulan where they were met by Captain Charles MacLain, post
commander, and members of the Federal Party who were on horse-
back and in carriages. The entire procession entered the church and
a Te Deum was chanted by Fr. Casiano de Vera, after which, Funes
surrendered the firearms in his command's possession. MacLaiņ
remarked, "The Federal Party of Bulan deserves credit for this work
. . . this surrender will bring all armed insurrection to an end/'47
Subsequent events would however prove him wrong.
Actually, a larger group of revolutionaries headed by Major Este-
ban Pulay of Barcelona surrendered in Gubat on 3 March 1901. In this
group were 64 officers and 265 soldiers, but they were armed only
with 2 rifles and 7 revolvers. Most of them were bolomen and resi-
dents of Barcelona and the barrios of Gubat. Among them was a second
lieutenant who would lead the continued resistance in Sorsogon a few
months later - Antonio Colache.48
For some of the revolutionaries, taking the oath of allegiance was
an expedient way to avoid being pursued by the Americans. But living
up to it was another matter. Later in the year, Funes was arrested for
breaking the oath of allegiance, and charges of robbery and murder,
committed during the revolutionary campaign in 1900, were filed
against him. The outcome of the trial is unknown. Funes lived only
until 1909. But the behavior he displayed as a former revolutionary
would be followed by the likes of Antonio Colache. Meanwhile, other
principales were busy reorganizing the government to assure them-
selves of a place in the new colonial set-up.49
On 7 April 1901, Col. Howe directed all post commanders of the
detachments at Donsol, Bacon, Gubat, Matnog, and Bulan to notify the
local presidentes of each municipality of the intended visit of the Phil-
ippine Commission to the province on April 28, and that all officials
and leading citizens of the different towns should assemble in Sorso-
gon on the said date to participate in the session.50

47. Ibid.; see also the report of Capt. Charles MacLain, 47th Inf., U.S.V., 25 February
1901 in P1R- Box AN-114 and USNA RG 395, Entry 5314: Box 1, Document File, Letter
of MacLain to Adjutant, 47th Inf., 22 February 1901.
48. "Report of Operations: Gubat," March, 1901, USNA RG 395, Entry 3808; and "List
of Insurgent Officers and Men who took the Oath of Allegiance," USNA, RG 395, Entry
3810.

49. See the following letters in USNA, RG 395, Entry 5311: Letters Sent, Sorsogon -
1902, letters # 21, 40, 99, 110, 112; also Entry 5313: Letters Received, Sorsogon-1902,
letters # 23, 73, 74, 114, 218. The case of an insurgent officer, Mariano Rores being
arrested and executed for the crime of murder can be found in USNA, RG 395, Entry
5311.

50. Col. Howe to Commander, Donsol, 7 April 1901, USNA RG 395, Entry 5311,
Letters Sent: Sorsogon, vol. 1, p. 13.

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SORSOGON'S PRINCIP ALIA 493

The Commission arrived on 30 April, two days late, after having

been to Tacloban, Albay, and Nueva Caceres, for the purpose of
organizing provincial governments. It was headed by William H. Taft
and accompanied by Dr. Trinidad Pardo de Tavera of the Federal
Party. D.R. Williams, who accompanied the Commission on its trip,
described their arrival in Sorsogon:
We are two days behind schedule and the elaborate preparations prepared
(sic) by the townspeople had suffered from rain and storm. They felt quite
badly about it, as also that many who had come to meet us were unable
to remain. We found the temper of the people very different from that
encountered in Nueva Caceres. Here there is a splendid set of officers, who
have the respect and confidence of the entire community. The province is
completely pacified and it is said that an American can pass unmolested
through any part of it. Our reception was enthusiastic, the only drawback
being the place of meeting, which was close (sic) and hot.51

The Commission was present to implement the Provincial Govern-

ment Code, Act No. 83, enacted in February 1901, which provided for
the establishment of civil government in provinces where peace had
been restored. It called for the creation of a provincial board, com-
posed of a governor, a treasurer and a supervisor. The Commission
later held sessions in different provinces, assisted by the Federalistas,
who expounded on the benefits of cooperating with the Americans.52
Interestingly, the first matter discussed in the meeting was the
salaries of the incoming provincial officials. Leon Paras, presidente of
Sorsogon, asked that similar salaries be paid to the officials of Sorso-
gon and Albay. But upon being presented with data that Albay' s
population was twice that of Sorsogon and the latter's revenues were
much lower, Paras settled for the same salary levels as the province
of Tayabas. The actual salaries granted were slightly higher, and Paras
ended up being chosen as the provincial secretary, with an annual
salary of $1200.53

51. Daniel Williams, The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission (Chicago: A.C. McClurg
and Co., 1913), pp. 242-43.
52. Michael Cullinane, "Implementing the New Order: The Structure and Supervi-
sion of Local Government During the Taft Era/' in Norman Owen, ed., Compadre Colo-
nialism: Philippine-American Relations , 1898-1946, (University of Michigan Papers on South
and Southeast Asia, 1971), p. 19; see also Peter Stanley, A Nation in the Making: The
Philippines and the United States 1899-1921, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1974), p. 75.
53. Annual Keport of the Philippine Commission, (L»overnment rnnting Uthce, lyuij,
1901, part II, pp. 185-86 (hereafter to be cited as RPC, with corresponding year and page
number).

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494 PHILIPPINE STUDIES

A controversial proposal was the suggestion to transfer the capital

from Sorsogon to Casiguran. Both had good ports, but no provincial
buildings. Sorsogon had a larger population, around 12,000, compared
to Casiguran's 9000. When the proposal was put to a vote among the
presidentes, a tie resulted. The Commission decided, on consultation
with Col. Howe, not to interfere with the status quo and to keep
Sorsogon as the capital. With regard to the officers, the Commission
claimed that though they often appointed a native for governor, they
had received numerous petitions to select an American instead until
the next elections in February 1902. The following were appointed:
Captain J.G. Livingston, Forty-seventh Infantry, governor; Leon Paras,
secretary; Captain E.W. Terry, treasurer; Patricio Bailon, fiscal; and
Lieutenant George Purington, supervisor. The bill organizing Sorso-
gon into a province under Act No. 124 was unanimously approved
and the officials then took their oath. Dr. Pardo de Tavera capped the
session with an address, citing the mutual benefits to be gained by
supporting the Americans.54
A new civil government under American control, but composed of
the same cast of principales, had been established. Consequently, a
Constabulary force of 150 natives under First Class Inspector Wilfred
Turnbull was organized on 30 August 1901. The Forty-seventh Infan-
try pulled out by May 1901 and was relieved by the Fifteenth Infantry.
But the armed insurrection which the Americans hoped had ended
was not yet over.55

ACTIVE COLLABORATION
IN THE COLACHE CAMPAIGN

The new provincial government had hardly buckled down to work

when it had to contend with a phenomenon that had arisen in many
provinces in the Philippines, - prolonged armed resistance by bands
of former "insurgents" even after the surrender of organized revolu-
tionary armies. These bands were often led by ex-officers, but of minor
rank, and composed of non-principales and residents of rural areas.
The Americans downplayed this form of resistance, citing the absence
of an enlightened leadership, and dismissed it merely as the fanati-
cism of "ignorant" elements in society labelling members of these
groups as bandits, thieves, or ladrones.

54. Ibid., pp. 186-87. The text of Act # 124: An Act extending the provisions of the
provincial government act to the province of Sorsogon, is found in Public-Laws and
Resolutions: United States Philippine Commission , vol. 1 , pp. 266-67. Act # 83: Provincial
Government is found on pp. 168-77.
55. RPC, 1902, part III, p. 205; History, 47th/' p. 66.

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SORSOGON'S PRINCIPALIA 495

In Sorsogon, these bands of "ladrones" began appearing in the

southern portions of the province in September 1901, six months after
Funes's surrender. They are described by an American lieutenant thus:

. . . workmen in Irosin are taking refuge in the towns because of the activities
of "ladrones" ... a fanatical craze among certain classes of people about
Irosin called "anting-anting," the belief prevailing among victims of this
excitement is that the wearing on the forehead and in the mouth of small
pieces of paper bearing signs and crosses renders them immune to American
bullets . . . when (we) encountered parties of the fanatics, each held a
dagger in the left hand, a bolo in the right and around the head was a
hanky with "anting-anting" inside and a charmed piece of writing in their
mouth ... a native styling himself Jesus Christ, accompanied by a woman
impersonating the Virgin Mary were originators of this fanaticism . . . they
sold the papers at P2.00 each.56

These members of the "anting-anting" apparently belonged to a

secret society formed by a Tagalog, Francisco de la Cruz, who had,
as early as April 1901, gathered nearly four hundred adherents in and
around the slopes of Mount Bulusan. They raided the barrios of Irosin
and Bulan occasionally, the same sites of Funes's guerilla campaign,
from September to October, until De la Cruz was captured on 6
November 1901. 57 But his capture did not bring an end to the
movement. In his report, the Constabulary Inspector stated that De la
Cruz was "a man of very low intellect, little above that of an animal
and cannot write his name." De la Cruz pointed to an Isaac Gimao
as the real commander, who affixed the former's name on the orders
and used him as a scapegoat. De la Cruz's capture was just the tip
of an iceberg. The constabulary chief expressed these forebodings:
It may seem strange that a hostile body of this proportion could organize
and virtually take control of a section of the province without the knowl-
edge of the authorities . . . once the mysterious contagion gains a few
converts in a barrio, it will sweep through it like an epidemic and the
whole barrio will go over to the standard of the fanatics, and it seems that
nothing short of gunpower will disillusion them after once becoming a
convert to the mysteries of "anting-anting."58

Isaac Gimao and Antonio Colache, the ex-second lieutenant in

Funes's army, reorganized the followers of De la Cruz in the vicinity
of Bulusan and continued to sap the energies of the authorities the
following year.

56. WD AR, 1902, pp. 373-74.

57. Ibid., pp. 378-79; see also Luis Dery, "Bicol Bulwark/' Filipino Heritage , 10 vols.
(Manila: Lahing Filipino Publishing Inc., 1978). vol. 8, pp. 2202-2207.
58. RPC, 1902, part I, p. 206.

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496 PHILIPPINE STUDIES

On 3 March 1902, Dr. Bernardino Monreal was elected governor of

Sorsogon, the first native to hold the position under American rule.
A native of Daraga, Albay, he was municipal physician of Malabon,
Rizal at the outbreak of the revolution. Believed to have been involved
in financing the revolution, he was imprisoned during the early months
of 1901 and was conspicuously absent during the meeting with the
Philippine Commission.59
Colonel Howe, commanding officer of the American troops in
Sorsogon, believed that Monreal was "one of the worst men in this
province during the insurrection/7 But his fellow officers believed
otherwise. Major Cornish, who replaced Howe in mid-1901, endorsed
the request for Monreal's release, citing the fact that the latter was "an
influential man in this community and if friendly, capable of using it
to our advantage."60
Likewise, Captain Livingston, the provincial governor of Sorsogon,
commented that Monreal, although at one time an "insurgent sympa-
thizer," did not commit any specific acts against the American gov-
ernment, and therefore, should be released. Thus, on 26 June 1901, the
man suspected of being the "financial backer" of the revolutionaries
was released. He would become one of the most active collaborators
of the Americans in the pacification campaign against Antonio
Colache.61
In March 1902, Colache's men attacked the police force of Bulusan,
killing a sergeant. The Constabulary chief dispatched a group of native
soldiers to pursue them but this group was also ambushed on the
road between Barcelona and Bulusan by around one hundred "bolo-
wielding fanatics," who killed the three policemen in this manner:
. . . beginning from the toes to the top of their head, there was not an inch
of body which had not been cut or hacked by a bolo. All joints of the legs
and arms had been unjointed and the stomach laid open, leaving the frame
hanging together by mere strips of flesh.62

The American authorities were alarmed. There were around two

hundred of these "anting-anting" in the hills disturbing the towns of

59. Ataviado, Lucha , vol. 2, pp. 150-51; Jose, Facts , p. 33.

60. Col. Walter Howe to Adjutant-General, Department of Southern Luzon, 20 April
1901, USNA RG 395, Entry 5311: Letters Sent, Sorsogon, vol. 1, p. 26, LS # 63; Major Geo
A. Cornish to Adjutant-General, 22 May 1901, USNA RG 395, Entry 5311: Letters Sent,
Sorsogon, vol. 1, p. 36. LS # 97.
61. Captain J.G. Livingston to Adjutant-General, 18 June 1901, USNA RG 395, Entry
5314: Document File, Sorsogon, 1901, Box 1, LR # 192.
62. RPC, 1902, part I, p. 207.

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SORSOGON'S PRINCIP ALIA 497

Bulusan, Barcelona, Gubat, Casiguran and Sta. Magdalena. Realizing

the widespread support for Colache among the population, Inspector
Harvey Nevili sought the help of Monreal in planning a systematic
campaign against the "anting-anting." Monreal organized a commit-
tee on public order, headed by Rufino Gerona, former presidente of
Bulan and the current president of the Federal Party in Sorsogon. The
committee decided to deploy a cordon of native volunteers around the
affected areas, suspend work within the cordon and reconcentrate the
people in the nearby towns. The Constabulary could then pursue the
"ladrones" within the cordon while depriving them of their support
from the native populace. A contingent of 450 men from the towns
of Sorsogon, Gubat and Bacon was raised to man the cordon.63
By 15 April 1902, a cordon was formed across Sorsogon town from
barrio Abuyog in the west to Buenavista in the east. Another extended
from Bulusan to Irosin and from Irosin to Casiguran. Meanwhile,
Colache consolidated his position in the deserted barrios of Sta. Barbara,
San Isidro and Sta. Cruz, near Bulusan. In four days, the cordon was
completed and the drive against Colache began. For the next month,
Constabulary men pursued Colache's forces. It was a short, but
nonetheless taxing, campaign. Some principales, like Rufino Gerona
and Esteban Fulay, former major in Funes's army and juez de paz in
Barcelona, had taken to the field. By mid-May, the native troops
swooped down on a Colache camp in the mountains west of Sta.
Barbara and captured some of his men, his correspondence and the
rolls of his organization. After this date, the "ladrones" lost all resem-
blance of an organized force. Only Colache and five others remained
at large.64
By this time, Nevili had dismissed the volunteers and employed
spies to locate Colache's whereabouts. In four days, he was spotted
at Taloanga, near Sta. Magdalena. At 3:00 a.m. of 25 May, an expe-
ditionary column headed by Gerona struck the camp and captured
Colache, his wife and daughter, Isaac Gimao and three followers. The
campaign which lasted for fifty-six days and netted around 250
prisoners proved to be successful with the active cooperation of
Sorsogon's principales and native volunteers.65
The Constabulary chief was all praises for Gov. Monreal, whom he
hailed as "efficient, unbiased and conscientious . . . who took the field
himself in the cause of law and order, and left nothing undone which

63. Ibid., p. 208, 1903, part I, p. 917.

64. The Colache campaign is described in RPC, 1902, part I, pp. 208-10; see also Dery,
"Sorsogon/' pp. 415-22.
65. Ibid., p. 209-10.

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498

would aid the senior inspector in putting down the petty insurrec-
tion/766 Monreal was also active in capturing the remnants of Colache's
band who continued their activities throughout 1902: Mariano Guiriba
in Pilar, Francisco Espocia in Sta. Magdalena and Esteban Diño in
Bulusan.67
Governor Monreal' s pivotal role in the successful campaign against
Colache was but a prelude to and a fine example of the kind of co-
operation that the principales of Sorsogon would extend to the Ameri-
cans with the establishment of a new order.

THE PRINCIPALIA AND THE POLICY

OF PACIFICATION

In retrospect, one can describe the principalia response to the paci-

fication campaign in Sorsogon during the years 1900-1903 as a process
of passive accommodation, organized resistance, then active collabo-
ration. Norman Owen characterized the Bicol campaign in this manner:
The 1900-1901 campaign, therefore, was marked not only by an unhurried
American offensive, a defensive strategy by the revolutionaries and a mutual
respect for the rules of war, but also by an unofficial economic symbiosis
offering certain advantages to each side. As a result, the Americans had
time to demonstrate to wavering Bicolanos that their rule was tolerable
and potentially beneficient. . . . the Americans did not attempt to exter-
minate all Filipinos who surrendered or enslave them or force them to
convert to Protestantism. . . .
By mid-1900, those who hoped for the restoration of some kind of civil
order had nowhere to look but to the Americans.68

This article has shown that the pacification policy or the promise
to restore civil order became an attractive option for the principales
of Sorsogon, especially those whose properties had been damaged or
confiscated because of the guerilla campaign of Funes. Realizing the
potential of benefiting from an American-controlled set-up, many
principales shifted their loyalties to the American cause by late 1900.
By 1901 they had formed the Federal Party in Sorsogon to negotiate
Funes' s surrender.

Faced with this setback, the revolutionaries, who probably felt that
the goals of the revolution had not yet been fulfilled, had to reorgan-
ize their armies and seek new leaders, as their former leaders had

66. Ibid., p. 210.

67. RFC, 1903, part I, pp. 916-18.
68. Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 577-78.

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SORSOCON'S PRINCIP ALIA 499

already capitulated to the Americans. Owen says that they now had
to "recruit leadership from further and further down the socio-eco-
nomic scale."69 Hence, the emergence of Antonio Colache, Isaac Gimao
and Francisco de la Cruz, whose backgrounds are obscure. The available
evidence shows that Colache served as a second lieutenant in Funes' s
army and surrendered in Gubat in March 1901, with Major Fulay's
forces. He took the oath of allegiance, retired to barrio San Isidro in
Bulusan, conducted a small hemp business, but soon ran into debt,
so he "resorted to banditry."70
When Colache began his campaign, this time, the principales of
Sorsogon led by Monreal, Gerona and even Major Fulay, Colache' s
superior in the army, actively supported the pacification drive against
them. This reaction was common in many provinces in the Philip-
pines, especially after Aguinaldo' s capture in 1901. Reynaldo lieto
explains:
. . . members of the Filipino elite . . . found it to their advantage to collaborate
in the American campaign of "pacification/'. . . . These individuals could
pursue their tasks with hardly any feelings of guilt or pangs of conscience
because of the myth, created by the Declaration of the "Bandolerismo Act"
in 1902, that all remaining "troublemakers" in the new colonial order were
plain bandits or "ladrones". . . . It was easy for educated or propertied
Filipinos to accept the bandit myth because the Katipunans that rose after
1901 were composed of "ordinary" people and led by . . . "men lacking
in social status and intelligence."71

The principales of Sorsogon reacted in this manner because as

Michael Cullinane put it, "by preserving the peace and order, they
were also preserving the traditional system which gave them sup-
port."72 They knew that when the smoke of the revolution and rebel-
lion cleared, the reorganization that would follow would result in
their occupying positions of leadership in the new colonial govern-
ment, positions they once held during the Spanish regime.
In effect, what determined the Sorsogon principalis s response to the
American occupation in their province was not so much their adher-
ence to the revolutionary cause, but their assessment of the pragmatic
gains to be achieved by either accommodation, resistance or collabo-
ration. The moment they realized that the first two options would not
succeed, they enthusiastically embraced the third response.

69. Ibid., p. 568.

70. RPC, 1902, part I, p. 206; see also footnote 48 above.
71. Reynaldo lieto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979), pp. 210-12.
72. Cullinane, "Implementing the New Order," p. 24.

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