Land Titles - 10 - MHH - Print
Land Titles - 10 - MHH - Print
Land Titles - 10 - MHH - Print
ON FRAUD
1. Palanca vs American Food Mftg Co.
DATE EVENTS/ TRANSACTIONS
May 14, 1958Palanca filed with the Philippine Patent Office, Dept of commerce and Industry an application to register trademark "LION and the representation of a lion's head"
alleging she had been using such since Jan 5, 1958 on bechin food seasoning. Respondent opposed saying such trademark was similar to theirs and that they had
used it since Aug 3, 1953.
Jun 14, 1961 The Director of Patents ruling that the trademarks of the two are similar. Question is on the priority of use, to which respondent wins. Palanca's app rejected.
No appeal was taken by Palanca until lapse of reglementary period.
Dec 4, 1961 Palanca filed with the Patent Ofc a petition to set aside judgment invoking Sec 2, Rule 38, ROC alleging fraud and/or negligence committed by former counsel,
Atty Medel since he failed to file a memorandum before the case was submitted for decision and that Palanca had been fraudulently kept in total ignorance of
the proceedings, nor was she informed of the decision thus preventing her from resorting to all legal remedies available. She only came to know about the decision
in Oct 1961 through her friend. A hearing ensuerd.
Oct 14, 1903 The Director of Patents denied petition to set aside judgment saying there was no extrinsic nor collateral fraud existing that would warrant setting aside judgment.
SC: We uphold Director of Patents' decision.
Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or order entered against a party through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence may be set aside upon
proper petition to that effect. Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. This Court has held that only extrinsic or collateral, as
distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation
which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented
from presenting fully, and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the Use of forged instruments on
perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.
The allegation that petitioner was prevented from presenting fully her case before the Patent Office and from resorting to all the legal remedies available to her, because her
former counsel failed to file a memorandum after the hearing of the evidence and had intentionally kept himself entirely out of her reach, does not charge extrinsic fraud that
would warrant the setting aside of the decision, since the acts complained of, even if assumed to be true and fraudulent, were all committed by her own counsel, and not
by the successful party or opponent in the case.
The contention that the evidence presented by the respondent-appellee in support of its claim that it was the prior user of the trademark in question consist of perjured
testimonies and falsified documents, merely charges intrinsic fraud, not extrinsic, and will not support a petition to vacate the judgment.
Mistakes of counsel as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and relevancy of evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, his failure to introduce certain
evidence, or to summon witnesses and to argue the case, are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetence of counsel be so great that his client is prejudiced and
prevented from fairly presenting his case.
2. Frias vs Esquivel
DATE EVENTS/ TRANSACTIONS
Mar 26, 1952Sps Frias filed in CFI Nueva Ecija an application to register a 2,974-sq m lot.
Sep 2, 1952 Respondent and his sisters etc opposed the application claiming ownership of the 1,357 sq m therein, ahving inherited it. They sought postponement of
proceedings pending a Civil Case filed by them against heren petitioners over ownership and possession of the land. In that case, their youngest, Anastacia,
sold the 1,357-sq m lot to Sps Frias, while still owned in common in Jul 1951, w/o their knowledge and consent. The Sps Frias knew then that their vendor only owned
a part thereof. They had taken possession fo the land and refused to reconvey such despite demands.
Sep 30, 1952 The Court issued an order postponing the hearing until final adjudication of the Civil Case.
Mar 24, 1953The Court issued an order of general default except as against oppositors and the Director of Lands.
Apr 20, 1956 SC rendered judgment on the Civil case upholding the sale between Anastacia and Sps Frias as valid w/ respect to Santiago, Felisa and Ceferina Esquivel, but not
w/ the minor heirs of Alvaro Esquivel.
Feb 15, 1957 The heirs of Alvaro, who had attained age of majority except 2, sold to Sps Frias 1/7 participation n the land.
Oct 2, 1957 After registration proceedings, the Court granted registration of the lot to Sps Frias. After it became final and executory, the Court issued a Decree of Registration.
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Dec 8, 1958 Rosario Esquivel, as duly appointed guardian of the remaining minors filed to reopen the decree of registration on the ground of fraud committed by Sps Frias when
they falsely represented to this Court they were the owners of the entire lot, when they were not.
Feb 22, 1960 SC denied petition.
Hence this appeal. SC: No extrinsic fraud here = no ground for granting relief sought.
To justify the setting aside or review of a decree of registration under Section 38 of Act No. 496, the party seeking relief must allege and prove, inter alia, that the registration was
procured through fraud — actual and extrinsic.
If the fraud alleged in the petition to set aside the decree is involved in the same proceedings in which the party seeking relief had ample opportunity to
attack the document presented by the applicant for registration, and to cross- examine the witnesses who testified relative thereto, then the fraud relied
upon is intrinsic.
The fraud is extrinsic if it was employed to deprive a party of his day in court, thus preventing him from asserting his right to the property registered in
the name of the applicant.
ISSUES: (1) WON the sale of the subject property by Delos Reyes to the Burgos siblings and the subsequent sale by the siblings to Leonarda were valid and binding; and
(2) whether respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value despite the forged deed of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes
Petitioners: The Deed of Sale purportedly executed in favor of delos Reyes was a forgery, she could not pass any valid right or title to the Burgos siblings and Leonarda. The
Rufloes also contend that since the Burgos siblings and Leonarda acquired the subject property with notice that another person has a right to or interest in such property, they
cannot be considered innocent purchasers in good faith and for value.
Respondents: Our title is valid and binding. Under the Torrens System, a person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness on the certificate of title without
the need of further inquiry. For this reason, the Court cannot disregard the right of an innocent third person who relies on the correctness of the certificate of title even if the sale is
void.
SC: It is undisputed that the forged deed of sale was null and void and conveyed no title. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod
non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally. Due to the forged deed of sale,
Delos Reyes acquired no right over the subject property which she could convey to the Burgos siblings. All the transactions subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses
Rufloe and Delos Reyes are likewise void, including the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda. The Burgos siblings were not innocent purchasers for value and the
simulated sale to Leonarda did not remove the defect in their title.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays
a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person's claim. The burden of proving the status of a purchaser
in good faith and for value lies upon one who asserts that status. This onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the ordinary
presumption of good faith.
GR: Every person dealing with registered land, as in this case, may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and will in no way oblige him to go beyond
the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
X: When the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a
defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.
Respondents were not innocent purchasers for value and the simulated sale to Leonarda did not remove the defect in their title. The Rufloes had Delos Reyes' title annotated with a
notice of adverse claim as early as Nov 1979. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property, and serves as
a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or may have a better right than the registered owner thereof.
Despite the notice of adverse claim, the Burgos siblings still purchased the property in question. The Rufloes had in their possession the land while Delos Reyes sold it to Burgos
(through a real eastate broker) then Burgos to Leonarda.
The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of a flaw in the title of his transferor. To be effective, the inscription in the
registry must have been made in good faith. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.
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2. Fule vs De Legare
de Legare was the owner of house and lot under TCT No. 21253. She lives with her adopted son John (herein defendant) and maid Purita.
DATE EVENTS/ TRANSACTIONS
Sep 26, 1951 de Legare consituted a mortgage on said house and lot in favor of Tomas Soriano to guarantee payment of loan P8,000. It was recorded in RD.
Feb 23, 1953 Mortgage was reduced to P7,000 but such change was not annotated on the memo of encumbrances on the TCT.
Mar 29, 1953An unknown man entered the house and threatened to kill de Legare asking for P10,000. He said he's come back the ff day to get the money. When he left, John told
de Legare that he could secure the money from the US Veterans Admin if she would just sign the paper he handed her. De Legare does not know how to read nor write.
But relying on John's statements, she signed it. John and Purita affixed their signatures as witnesses. After such, John asked the two to pack up their things as they
were to leave and to hide in a hotel, telling the unkown men were Huks. They did. After a 1 and 1/2 mths, de Legare and Purita decided to go home. They saw it was
occupied by strangers and their furnitures etc were gone. They learned John sold the house to them and that the paper signed by de Legare was a sale to John.
prior to May John ask Elias, a real estate broker to help sell the house and lot. Elias accepted the commission and offered the property to defendants Sps Fule. Fule, after having
9, 1953 inspected the papers and the premises agreed to buy for P12,000 less 7,000 on the mortgage he will assume. A new TCT was issued.
CA cancelled the new TCTs and revived de Legare's TCT, along with the mortgage of P7,000.
On SC level:
Issue: WON Sps Fule were purchases in good faith and for value.
SC: Yes. Being such, they are the lawful owners of the house and lot.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for
the same, at the time of such purchaser, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage of another.
Under Section 5 of Act 496, as amended, John's possession of the certificate and his subsequent production of it to the herein petitioners operated as a "conclusive authority from
the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a new certificate".
RE: Fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title.
We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the Torrens system, "registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land" (Secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration Act). Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate
right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure
would entirely be futile and nugatory.
execution of contract.All the aforementioned sales were not registered.In 1993, spouses Yu filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance and damages against Javier,
contending that Javierrepresented to them that the Langcaan Property was not tenanted, but after they already paid P200,000 as initial payment and entered into theagreement of
sale on Sept. 11, 1992, they discovered that it was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, son of Baltazar Pacleb. Subsequently, spouses Yudemanded for the cancellation of the agreement and
for the return of their initial payment.On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu, Ramon, and the latter’s wife executed a “Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng
Pagtalikod sa Karapatan", where spouses Yu paid Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the subjectproperty. But on Oct. 12, 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed
a complaint for annulment of the deed of sale to Javier, alleging that the deed of sale executedbetween him and his late first wife Angelita was spurious as their signatures were
forgeries. Meanwhile, on Nov. 23, 1995, spouses Yu filed an action forforcible entry against respondent with the MTC alleging that they had prior physical possession of the Langcaan
Property through their trustee Ramonuntil the latter was ousted by respondent in Sept. 1995. MTC ruled in favor of spouses Yu, affirmed by the RTC, but set aside by CA.His first
action for annulment of deed of sale having been dismissed, respondent filed action for removal of cloud from title on May 29, 1996,contending that the deed of sale between him
and his late first wife and Rebecca del Rosario could not have been executed on Feb. 27, 1992, becauseon said date, he was residing in the U.S. and his late first wife died 20 years
ago. During pendency of the case, respondent died, succeeded by hissurviving spouse and representatives of children with his first wife. RTC held that spouses Yu are purchasers in
good faith, but on appeal, CA reversedand set aside lower court’s decision and ordered for the cancellation of the annotation in favor of spouses Yu on the TCT of Langcaan Property.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
HELD: Petitioner spouses are not innocent purchasers for value, and they are not in good faith. Several facts should have put petitionerspouses on inquiry as to the alleged rights of
their vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan property.First, the property remains to be registered in the name of respondent despite the 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale from respondent to Del
Rosario then from the latter to Javier, and both deeds were not even annotated in the title of the subject property.
Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale were executed only 2 months apart containing identical provisions.Third, the fact that the Langcaan Property is in the possession of Ramon, son
of the registered owners, this should have made petitionerspouses suspicious as to the veracity of the alleged title of their vendor, Javier. Petitioner spouses could have easily
verified the true status of thesubject property from Ramon’s wife, since the latter is their relative.
The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself.
Corollarily, it requires a higher degree ofprudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered.
While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered owneris expected to examine
not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in thetitle of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land.
Therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be considered as innocent purchasers in good faith, and respondent has a better right over the LangcaanProperty as the true owner thereof.
4. Domingo vs Reed
3. Gasataya vs Mabasa
4. Benin vs Tuason
5. Sampaco vs Lantud
WHERE TO FILE
1. Republic vs Mangatora
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QUANTUM OF PROOF
1. Lasquite vs Victory Hills
2. Cavile vs Tong
PRESCRIPTION
1. Amerol vs Bagumbayan
2. Daclag vs Macahilig