9 11 Commission 1

2/6/2021 Complete 911 Timeline: 9/11 Commission
!Donate Home | Contact
UserName Login
Not registered yet?
About Timelines Blog Donate Volunteer Search this timeline only Search Go
!! History Commons Alert, Exciting News
Home » Timelines by Topic » Regions » Asia » Afghanistan » Complete 911 Timeline
Printer-Friendly View
Email to Friend
Increase Text Size
Follow Us!
Decrease Text Size
We are planning some big changes! Please follow us to stay updated and be part of our
community. Ordering
Date ascending
Time period
Categories
Complete 911 Timeline Key Events
9/11 Commission Key Day of 9/11 Events
Project: Complete 911 Timeline (102)
Open-Content project managed by matt, Derek, Paul, KJF, mtuck, paxvector Key Hijacker Events (145)
Key Warnings (95)
Day of 9/11
add event | references All Day of 9/11 Events
(1414)
Page 1 of 3 (257 events) Dick Cheney (57)
previous | 1, 2, 3 | next Donald Rumsfeld (37)
Flight AA 11 (146)
Flight AA 77 (157)
Flight UA 175 (87)
Mid-1980s: Future 9/11 Commissioner Believes White House Lies Flight UA 93 (243)
about Iran-Contra Affair without Checking George Bush (132)
Future 9/11 Commission vice chairman Lee Hamilton Passenger Phone Calls (74)
Pentagon (140)
(D-IN), at this time chairman of the House Intelligence Richard Clarke (35)
Committee, fails to properly investigate Iran-Contra Shanksville, Pennsylvania
allegations. He learns of press reports indicating that (25)
the Reagan administration is illegally funneling Training Exercises (56)
World Trade Center (91)
weapons and money to the anti-Communist rebels in
The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers
Nicaragua, but when the White House denies the story,
Alhazmi and Almihdhar
Hamilton believes it. Hamilton will later acknowledge (345)
that he has been gullible, and will say of his political Marwan Alshehhi (133)
style, “I don’t go for the jugular.” It is during the Iran- Mohamed Atta (207)
Contra investigation that Hamilton becomes friends Hani Hanjour (73)
with Dick Cheney, at this time a Republican Ziad Jarrah (74)
Other 9/11 Hijackers
congressman. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 33] Cheney is the ranking (175)
Hamilton and Cheney hold a
press conference together Republican on the House Intelligence Committee and so Possible Hijacker
about the Iran-Contra Affair must work closely with Hamilton, including on the Iran- Associates in US (79)
investigation on June 19, Alleged Hijackers' Flight
1987. [Source: J. Scott Contra investigation. [PBS, 6/20/2006] Hamilton calls
Training (73)
Applewhite] Cheney “Dick” and they will remain friends even after Hijacker Contact w
Cheney becomes vice president in 2001 and Hamilton, Government in US (33)
as vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, begins to investigate Cheney’s actions Possible 9/11 Hijacker
as a part of the Commission’s work. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 33] Hamilton will also fail to Funding (42)
properly investigate “October Surprise” allegations (see 1992-January 1993). Hijacker Visas and
Entity Tags: Lee Hamilton
Immigration (135)
Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran, 9/11 Timeline, Iran-Contra Affair Alhazmi and Almihdhar:
Specific Cases
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations
Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi
Connection (51)
1992-January 1993: Future Democratic 9/11 Commission Co- CIA Hiding Alhazmi &
Chair Leads Cover-up of Republican Plot Almihdhar (120)
Search for Alhazmi/
In 1992, a House of Representatives task force chaired by Lee Hamilton (D-NH) Almihdhar in US (39)
conducts a ten-month investigation into the “October Surprise”—an alleged
historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&investigations:_a_detailed_look=911Commission 1/55
Republican plot to delay the release of US hostages held in Iran in 1980 until Projects and Programs
after that year’s US presidential election. The investigation concludes in 1993 Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
(172)
that there is “no credible evidence” of any such plot. But Robert Parry, a Able Danger (60)
journalist writing for the Associated Press and Newsweek, gains access to the Sibel Edmonds (61)
stored records of Hamilton’s task force. He finds clear evidence of a major Phoenix Memo (27)
cover up. For instance, William Casey, CIA Director in the early 1980s, was Randy Glass/
Diamondback (8)
alleged to have been involved in the plot, and Hamilton’s investigators Robert Wright and Vulgar
discovered a CIA created index of Casey’s papers made after Casey’s death in Betrayal (67)
1987. When investigators searched Casey’s possessions, they found all the Remote Surveillance (241)
papers mentioned in the index, except for all the ones relevant to the alleged Yemen Hub (75)
October Surprise plot. But the disappearance of such evidence was not Before 9/11
mentioned in Hamilton’s findings. [SCOTT, 2007, PP. 101] In addition, an official Soviet-Afghan War (105)
Russian intelligence report placing Casey in Europe in order to arrange a Warning Signs (470)
Insider Trading/
politically favorable outcome to the hostage crisis arrived in Washington shortly Foreknowledge (53)
before Hamilton’s task force issued their conclusions, but this Russian US Air Security (81)
information was not mentioned by the task force. [SCOTT, 2007, PP. 106-107] Military Exercises (88)
Hamilton will later be appointed co-chair of the 9/11 Commission (see Pipeline Politics (67)
Other Pre-9/11 Events
December 11, 2002). (66)
Entity Tags: Lee Hamilton, William Casey, Robert Parry
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations Counterterrorism before
9/11
Hunt for Bin Laden (158)
1995: Condoleezza Rice and Future 9/11 Commission Executive Counterterrorism Action
Director Zelikow Co-author Book on European Politics Before 9/11 (225)
Counterterrorism
Future National Security Adviser and Secretary of Policy/Politics (255)
State Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow, who, as Warning Signs: Specific Cases
executive director of the 9/11 Commission, will Foreign Intelligence
investigate her performance in the run-up to 9/11, Warnings (35)
co-author a book about the implications of German Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB
reunification. The two had worked together on the (39)
Presidential Level
National Security Council in the 1980s and early 90s, Warnings (31)
but are both now working at universities. Zelikow is a The Post-9/11 World
professor at the Kennedy School of Government at 9/11 Investigations (666)
Harvard University, and Rice is the provost at 9/11 Related Criminal
Stanford. The book, entitled Germany Unified and Proceedings (22)
Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, is mostly 9/11 Denials (30)
US Government and 9/11
written by Zelikow, who is, in author Philip Shenon’s Criticism (67)
words, “pleased to share credit with such an obvious 9/11 Related Lawsuits
’Germany Unified and Europe up-and-comer as Rice.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 40-41] (24)
Transformed: A Study in Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Philip Shenon, Philip Media (47)
Statecraft,’ by Philip Zelikow Other Post-9/11 Events
and Condoleezza Rice.
Zelikow
[Source: Harvard University Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline (80)
Press] Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow, Investigations: Specific Cases
9/11 Investigations 9/11 Commission (257)
Role of Philip Zelikow (87)
9/11 Congressional Inquiry
October 15, 1998: Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director (41)
Zelikow Says ‘Public Assumptions’ Shape Views of History CIA OIG 9/11 Report (16)
In his opening remarks at a conference on contemporary political history FBI 9/11 Investigation
organized by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, (154)
WTC Investigation (111)
future 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow emphasizes that the Other 9/11 Investigations
public understanding of history is shaped by what are sometimes referred to as (135)
“public myths.” “[U]nderstanding contemporary political history is extremely Possible Al-Qaeda-Linked
important and constantly alive in public discourse. ‘Contemporary’ is defined Moles or Informants
functionally by those critical people and events that go into forming the public’s Abu Hamza Al-Masri (103)
presumptions about its immediate past. This idea of ‘public presumption’ is akin Abu Qatada (36)
Ali Mohamed (78)
to William McNeill’s notion of ‘public myth’ but without the negative implication Haroon Rashid Aswat (17)
sometimes invoked by the word ‘myth.’ Such presumptions are beliefs (1) Khalil Deek (20)
thought to be true (although not necessarily known to be true with certainty), Luai Sakra (12)
and (2) shared in common within the relevant political community. The sources Mamoun Darkazanli (36)
Nabil Al-Marabh (41)
for such presumptions are both personal (from direct experience) and vicarious
(from books, movies, and myths).” Zelikow says that public assumptions often Omar Bakri & Al-
grow out of “searing events”: “particularly ‘searing’ or ‘molding’ events take on Muhajiroun (25)
Reda Hassaine (23)
‘transcendent’ importance and, therefore, retain their power even as the Other Possible Moles or
experiencing generation passes from the scene.” [ZELIKOW, 1999 ] In a previous Informants (169)
publication, Zelikow had written about how a “catastrophic terrorism” event Other Al-Qaeda-Linked
could constitute a momentous, history-shaping milestone: “An act of Figures
catastrophic terrorism that killed thousands or tens of thousands of people… Abu Zubaida (99)
Anwar Al-Awlaki (17)
would be a watershed event in America’s history.… Like Pearl Harbor, such an Ayman Al-Zawahiri (81)
event would divide our past and future into a ‘before’ and ‘after’” (see Hambali (39)
November 1997-August 1998). Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow (140)
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Mohammed Haydar
Category Tags: Role of Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations Zammar (46)
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa
(47)
May 2000: Future Authors of 9/11 Report Produce John F. Osama Bin Laden (229)
Kennedy Book Riddled with Errors Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh (106)
An eminent historian finds serious flaws in a historical Ramzi Yousef (67)
Sheikh Omar Abdul-
treatise about former President John F. Kennedy. The Rahman (57)
book, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During Victor Bout (23)
the Cuban Missile Crisis, was written in 1997 by Wadih El-Hage (45)
conservative historians Ernest May and Philip D. Zelikow, Zacarias Moussaoui (159)
and purports to be an unprecedentedly accurate Al-Qaeda by Region
representation of the events of 1962’s Cuban Missile Crisis "Lackawanna Six" (13)
Al-Qaeda in Balkans (168)
based on transcriptions of recorded meetings, Al-Qaeda in Germany
conferences, telephone conversations, and interviews (190)
with various participants. [ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 5/2000] Al-Qaeda in Italy (55)
Zelikow is a former member of George H. W. Bush’s Al-Qaeda in Southeast
Historian Ernest May. National Security Council and a close adviser to future Asia (149)
[Source: Belfer Center] Al-Qaeda in Spain (121)
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. [US DEPARTMENT Islamist Militancy in
OF STATE, 8/5/2005] May is a Harvard professor. Both will participate heavily in the Chechnya (50)
creation of the 2004 report by the 9/11 Commission. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 387-393] Specific Alleged Al-Qaeda
Almost three years after the Kennedy book’s publication, Sheldon M. Stern, the Linked Attacks or Plots
historian for the John F. Kennedy Library from 1977 through 1999, pores over it 1993 WTC Bombing (73)
and the May/Zelikow transcripts. In the original edition, May and Zelikow 1993 Somalia Fighting (13)
1995 Bojinka Plot (78)
admitted that their final product was not perfect: “The reader has here the best 1998 US Embassy
text we can produce, but it is certainly not perfect. We hope that some, Bombings (121)
perhaps many, will go to the original tapes. If they find an error or make out Millennium Bomb Plots
something we could not, we will enter the corrections in subsequent editions or (43)
2000 USS Cole Bombing
printings of this volume.” But when Stern checks the book against the tapes, he (114)
finds hundreds of errors in the book, some quite significant. Stern concludes 2001 Attempted Shoe
that the errors “significantly undermine [the book’s] reliability for historians, Bombing (23)
teachers, and general readers.” May and Zelikow have corrected a few of the 2002 Bali Bombings (36)
errors in subsequent editions, but have not publicly acknowledged any errors. 2004 Madrid Train
Bombings (82)
Stern concludes, “Readers deserve to know that even now The Kennedy Tapes 2005 7/7 London
cannot be relied on as an accurate historical document.” [ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Bombings (87)
5/2000] One error has then-Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy talking about the Miscellaneous Al-Qaeda
planned “invasion” of Russian ships heading to Cuba, when the tapes actually Issues
show Kennedy discussing a far less confrontational “examination” of those Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked
vessels. May and Zelikow imply that the Kennedy administration was discussing Attacks (89)
Alleged Al-Qaeda Media
just the kind of confrontation that it was actually trying to avoid. Another error Statements (102)
has CIA Director John McCone referring to the need to call on former President Key Captures and Deaths
Dwight D. Eisenhower as a “facilitator,” where McCone actually said “soldier.” (124)
May and Zelikow will be rather dismissive of Stern’s findings, saying that “none Geopolitics and Islamic
of these amendments are very important.” Stern will express shock over their Militancy
US Dominance (112)
response, and respond, “When the words are wrong, as they are repeatedly, the Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda
historical record is wrong.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 42] Links (255)
Entity Tags: Kennedy administration, Philip Zelikow, John F. Kennedy, Sheldon M. Stern, Iraq War Impact on
Robert F. Kennedy, Ernest May, John A. McCone, 9/11 Commission, George Herbert Counterterrorism (83)
Walker Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Dwight Eisenhower Israel (60)
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Pakistan and the ISI (470)
Category Tags: US Dominance, 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Saudi Arabia (249)
Investigations Terrorism Financing (312)
Londonistan - UK
Counterterrorism (322)
January 2001: Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director US Intel Links to Islamic
Zelikow Not Offered Full-time Job with Bush Administration, Militancy (69)
Returns to University Algerian Militant Collusion
(41)
Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow is not offered a job in Indonesian Militant
the Bush administration, and returns to the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the Collusion (20)
University of Virginia to teach. Zelikow had worked on the transition team (see Philippine Militant
January 3, 2001), and thought he would receive an important position in the Collusion (74)
new administration. He told his friends he thought he was in line for the position Yemeni Militant Collusion
(47)
of deputy national security adviser to Condoleezza Rice, with whom he had Other Government-
written a book in the mid-1990s (see 1995). Most people in the Bush Militant Collusion (23)
administration admire his ability, but find him hard to work with. White House Pakistan / ISI: Specific Cases
Chief of Staff Andrew Card will even describe Zelikow as a “bully” historian. Pakistani Nukes & Islamic
Author Philip Shenon will later comment that Zelikow is “perplexed that his Militancy (37)
talents had not been recognized by the people who handed out the best jobs in Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11
(73)
the Bush administration.” After returning to university, Zelikow will lobby the Saeed Sheikh (59)
White House to make the university where he works the official repository of its Mahmood Ahmed (30)
oral history. His point of contact at the White House is political adviser Karl Haven in Pakistan Tribal
Rove. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 42-44] Region (179)
Entity Tags: Andrew Card, Karl C. Rove, Philip Shenon, Philip Zelikow 2008 Kabul Indian
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Embassy Bombing (10)
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Investigations Hunt for Bin Laden in
Pakistan (154)
Terrorism Financing: Specific
January 3, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke’s Power Is Cases
Reduced by Rice and Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director Al Taqwa Bank (29)
National Security Adviser Rice decides Al-Kifah/MAK (54)
BCCI (37)
this day to retain Richard Clarke, BIF (28)
counterterrorism “tsar” for the Clinton BMI and Ptech (21)
administration, and his staff. However, Bin Laden Family (62)
she downgrades his official position as Drugs (71)
National Coordinator for 'War on Terrorism' Outside
Iraq
Counterterrorism. While he is still known
Afghanistan (300)
as the counterterrorism “tsar,” he has Drone Use in Pakistan /
less power and now reports to deputy Afghanistan (53)
secretaries instead of attending Cabinet- Destruction of CIA Tapes
level meetings. He no longer is able to (92)
Escape From Afghanistan
send memos directly to the president, or (61)
Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow. [Source: easily interact with Cabinet-level High Value Detainees
Public domain] officials. [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 227-30; GUARDIAN, (179)
3/25/2004] Clarke will not be able to meet Terror Alerts (50)
with President Bush even a single time before 9/11 to discuss al-Qaeda (see Counterterrorism Action
After 9/11 (353)
January 25, 2001-September 10, 2001). In 2004, Rice will reveal that the person Counterterrorism
she tasks with considering changes to Clarke and his staff is Philip Zelikow, the Policy/Politics (432)
future Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. Zelikow recuses himself from Internal US Security After
those parts of the 9/11 Commission’s investigation directly relating to his role in 9/11 (125)
this and other matters. However, 9/11 victims’ relatives are not satisfied. For
instance, one relative says, “Zelikow has conflicts. I’m not sure that his recusal
is sufficient. His fingerprints are all over that decision [to demote Clarke].” Email Updates
[UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 4/9/2004]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice Receive weekly email updates
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline summarizing what contributors
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission, have added to the History
Commons database
Role of Philip Zelikow
Email Address Here Go
July 12, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft Reportedly Does Not

Want to Hear about Al-Qaeda Threat Donate
Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard attempts to brief Developing and maintaining
this site is very labor
Attorney General John Ashcroft on the al-Qaeda terrorist intensive. If you find it useful,
threat for a second time (see June 28, 2001), but Ashcroft please give us a hand and
donate what you can.
is uninterested and says he does not want to hear about it, Donate Now
according to Pickard’s later account.
'I Don't Want to Hear about It Anymore' - According to a
Volunteer
June 24, 2004 letter from Pickard to the 9/11 Commission,
Pickard opens the briefing by discussing If you would like to help us
“counterintelligence and counterterrorism matters.” with this effort, please
contact us. We need help with
Pickard’s letter will go on to say: “The fourth item I programming (Java, JDO,
Thomas Pickard.
[Source: Federal
discussed was the continuing high level of ‘chatter’ by al- mysql, and xml), design,
networking, and publicity. If
Bureau of Qaeda members. The AG [attorney general] told me, ‘I you want to contribute
Investigation] don’t want to hear about it anymore, there’s nothing I can information to this site, click
do about it.’ For a few seconds, I did not know what to say, the register link at the top of
the page, and start
then I replied that he should meet with the director of the CIA to get a fuller contributing.
briefing on the matter.… I resumed my agenda but I was upset about [Ashcroft’s] Contact Us
lack of interest. He did not tell me nor did I learn until April 2004 that the CIA
briefed him on the increase in chatter and level of threat on July 5, 2001” (see
July 5, 2001 and July 11-17, 2001). [PICKARD, 6/24/2004] In testimony under oath to
the 9/11 Commission in 2004, Pickard will affirm that, “at least on two
occasions” he briefed Ashcroft on a rising threat level and concerns about an
impending attack, which were being reported by the CIA. Commissioner Richard
Ben-Veniste will ask Pickard if he has told Commission staff that Ashcroft “did
not want to hear about this anymore,” to which Pickard will respond, “That is
correct.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/13/2004 ] According to Pickard’s later recollection:
“Before September 11th, I couldn’t get half an hour on terrorism with Ashcroft.
He was only interested in three things: guns, drugs, and civil rights.” [MILLER,
STONE, AND MITCHELL, 2002, PP. 293]
Differing Accounts of What Was Said at the Meeting - According to the 9/11
Commission’s June 3, 2004 record of its interview with Watson, “Pickard told
Watson that he was briefing Ashcroft on counterterrorism, and Ashcroft told him
that he didn’t want to hear ‘anything about these threats,’ and that ‘nothing
ever happened.’” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/3/2004 ] Author Philip Shenon will write
about this meeting in his 2008 book, The Commission, based on interviews with
Pickard and “Commission investigators who researched his allegations,” but
none of the quotes or representations of fact in Shenon’s text will cite a specific
source. Shenon will make reference to Mark Jacobson and Caroline Barnes as
being the 9/11 Commission staffers who interviewed Pickard. [SHENON, 2008, PP.
240-248, 433] According to Shenon’s version of the meeting, Ashcroft replies to
Pickard: “I don’t want you to ever talk to me about al-Qaeda, about these
threats. I don’t want to hear about al-Qaeda anymore.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 247]
Ashcroft, in testimony under oath to the 9/11 Commission, will dismiss Pickard’s
allegation, saying, “I did never speak to him saying that I did not want to hear
about terrorism.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/13/2004 ] Pickard will respond to Ashcroft’s
testimony in his 2004 letter, saying, “What [Ashcroft] stated to the Commission
under oath is correct, but they did not ask him, ‘Did he tell me he did not want
to hear about the chatter and level of threat?’ which is the conversation to
which I testified under oath.” [PICKARD, 6/24/2004] The deputy attorney general at
the time of the meeting, Larry D. Thompson, and Ashcroft’s chief of staff, David
T. Ayres, will sign a letter to the 9/11 Commission on July 12, 2004, in which
they say they are responding to Pickard’s allegation that when he briefed
Ashcroft “on the al-Qaeda threat prior to September 11, 2001, the attorney
general responded that he did not want to hear such information anymore.” The
letter will say Thompson and Ayres were present at that and the other regular
meetings between Pickard and Ashcroft, and “the attorney general made no
such statement in that or any other meeting.” [AYRES, 7/12/2004] The 9/11
Commission Report will conclude, “We cannot resolve this dispute.” [COMMISSION,
2004]
Differing Accounts of Who Was at the Meeting - Pickard’s 2004 letter will state
that Ayres is at the meeting, but has left the room prior to that part of the
meeting, as he does not have the required level of security clearance. Pickard’s
letter indicated that the FBI Assistant Director for Criminal Investigations, Ruben
Garcia, is at the meeting and also witnesses the exchange. [PICKARD, 6/24/2004]
Shenon’s book puts Garcia at the meeting, but does not make reference to
Garcia’s account of what is said there. Also, in the notes to Shenon’s book, it
will not say that he interviewed Garcia. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 247-248, 433] According to
a June 22, 2004 NBC News report: “Commission investigators also tracked down
another FBI witness at the meeting that day, Ruben Garcia… Several sources
familiar with the investigation say Garcia confirmed to the Commission that
Ashcroft did indeed dismiss Pickard’s warnings about al-Qaeda.” Furthermore,
“Pickard did brief Ashcroft on terrorism four more times that summer, but
sources say the acting FBI director never mentioned the word al-Qaeda again in
Ashcroft’s presence—until after Sept. 11.” [MSNBC, 6/22/2004] According to the
9/11 Commission Report, “Ruben Garcia… attended some of Pickard’s briefings
of the attorney general but not the one at which Pickard alleges Ashcroft made
the statement.” [COMMISSION, 2004, PP. 536N52]
Ashcroft Denies FBI Requests and Appeals, Cuts Counterterrorism Funding -
Following the meeting, on July 18, Ashcroft will reject the FBI’s request for an
increase in funding for counterterrorism, and instead propose cuts to that
division (see July 18, 2001). Pickard will appeal this decision; Ashcroft will
reject the appeal on September 10, 2001 (see September 10, 2001). [9/11
COMMISSION, 4/13/2004]
Entity Tags: Larry D. Thompson, John Ashcroft, Mark Jacobson, Thomas Pickard, David
Ayres, Dale Watson, 9/11 Commission, Caroline Barnes, Central Intelligence Agency,
Philip Shenon, Al-Qaeda, Ruben Garcia
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11,
Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, 9/11 Commission
August 30, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Banihammad Attempts to Get in

Airplane Cockpit; Witness Later Ignored
Future 9/11 hijacker Fayez Ahmed Banihammad attempts to get into an airplane
cockpit on a test flight across the US, according to flight attendant Gregory
McAleer. McAleer is employed by United Airlines. He will later claim to the 9/11
Commission that on August 30, 2001, he is working on Flight 514, a Boeing 737-
300 flying from Chicago’s O’Hare Airport to Logan Airport in Boston.
Strange Encounter - Early in the boarding process a Middle Eastern male enters
the airplane with a “jump seat” pass. This pass allows the person to sit in the
jump seat, an extra seat in the airplane’s cockpit. Typically, only licensed pilots
employed by US domestic airlines are given these passes. The man is not dressed
in a pilot’s uniform, but wears casual clothes and carries a suitcase. McAleer
sees this man entering the cockpit and talking to the pilot and copilot. After a
few moments, the man leaves the cockpit and takes a seat in the coach section.
McAleer is curious and asks the pilot about the man. The pilot says the man
can’t use the jump seat since he doesn’t have the proper ID. Later in the flight,
McAleer has a chance to question the man while both of them are waiting to use
the lavatory. The man claims to be a pilot for a regional airline, but when
McAleer, who has a pilot’s license, asks him questions about his job and his
knowledge of flying, the answers don’t add up and the man also asks him some
suspicious questions. McAleer finds the man’s behavior so suspicious that he
wonders at the time if he could be a terrorist.
FBI and United Airlines Not that Interested - Several days after 9/11, McAleer
will contact the FBI’s Chicago field office about the incident. An FBI agent takes
his information, but does not seem very interested or even comprehending
about the jump seat idea. Several days after that, McAleer describes the
incident to a United Airlines flight attendant supervisor. After conferring with a
manager, the supervisor tells him: “Do not talk to the FBI again. I went to
[United Airlines assistant station manager] Mitch Gross and he told me to tell
you not to talk to the FBI again. If you have any concerns you can call the
[United Airlines] Crisis Center. The FBI agents are working on the case.” McAleer
gives the information by phone to the Crisis Center, but he still is unsatisfied. He
later tells the story to Gross, and Gross tells him, “You are not to talk to anyone
about this.” On September 27, 2001, McAleer will read a local newspaper article
that shows the pictures of all of the 9/11 hijackers for the first time (see
September 27, 2001), and he quickly concludes that hijacker Fayez Ahmed
Banihammad was the suspicious man who had flown on Flight 514. McAleer
continues to try to raise the issue, for instance with United Airlines corporate
security, but without much success.
FBI Stops Media Coverage - Eventually, McAleer will come in contact with a USA
Today reporter named Blake Morrison. After checking with the FBI, Morrison
decides to write a story about McAleer’s experience. However, at the last
minute, the FBI contacts Morrison and asks him not to run the article. As a
result, the article only runs in the international edition of USA Today, on June
12, 2002. Morrison later tells McAleer that an FBI source told him that
Banihammad’s name was not on the flight manifest. This does not surprise
McAleer, since people using jump seat passes or companion passes are not
usually on the manifest. The 9/11 Commission will not mention McAleer’s story
at all, and will dismiss the jumpseating issue in general. [9/11 COMMISSION,
8/12/2003 ]
Legal Implications - There will be reports that other 9/11 hijackers used test
flights to try to get into cockpits, and some tried to sit in jump seats (see
November 23, 2001 and November 23, 2001). There will also be reports that
jump seats were used by the hijackers in the 9/11 attacks (see September 24,
2001 and November 23, 2001). Jumpseating will become a contentious issue,
because if it could be shown that the 9/11 hijackers were able to get into
cockpits using jump seats, American Airlines and United Airlines could be sued
for significant damages. In fact, McAleer’s account will later be used in a 9/11
negligence lawsuit against United Airlines. In 2011, it will be reported that
attorneys in the lawsuit are attempting to depose the agents who interviewed
McAleer, but the Justice Department is refusing to let the agents testify. [WBUR
NPR BOSTON, 1/31/2011]
Entity Tags: Mitch Gross, United Airlines, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Blake
Morrison, 9/11 Commission, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Gregory McAleer
Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training, 9/11
Commission
Late-September 2001-August 2004: Reports of Hijackers’ US

Spending and Bank Accounts Change over Time
A few weeks after the attacks, US investigators say the hijackers appeared to
have spent about $500,000 while in the US. An official says, “This was not a low-
budget operation. There is quite a bit of money coming in, and they are
spending quite a bit of money.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/29/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/1/2001;
WASHINGTON POST, 10/7/2001] In a detailed analysis published in the summer of
2002, the FBI will again report that the hijackers had access to a total of
$500,000 to $600,000, of which $325,000 flowed through their SunTrust
accounts. [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/10/2002; CNN, 7/10/2002 SOURCES: DENNIS LORMEL] The same
figure is provided by John S. Pistole, FBI Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
Division, when he testifies before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs. “[T]he 9/11 hijackers utilized slightly over $300,000 through
formal banking channels to facilitate their time in the US. We assess they used
another $200-300,000 in cash to pay for living expenses.” [9/11 COMMISSION,
8/21/2004, PP. 133 ] However, officials later back away from this figure and in
August 2004 the 9/11 Commission says that the hijackers’ spending in the US
was only “more than $270,000.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 143 ] In addition,
the number of bank accounts the hijackers are said to have opened varies.
Shortly after the attacks, investigators believe they had about a dozen accounts
at US banks. In July 2002, Dennis Lormel, chief of the FBI unit investigating the
money behind the attacks, tells the New York Times they had 35 accounts,
including 14 with the SunTrust Bank. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/7/2001; NEW YORK TIMES,
7/10/2002 SOURCES: DENNIS LORMEL] However, a year after the attacks, FBI Director
Robert Mueller tells the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, “In total, the hijackers
opened 24 bank accounts at four different US banks.” [US CONGRESS, 9/26/2002] Not
only is Mueller’s assertion contradicted by Lormel’s previous statement, but it is
also demonstrably false, as the hijackers had at least 25 US bank accounts with
at least 6 different banks (SunTrust Bank, Hudson United Bank, Dime Savings
Bank, First National Bank of Florida, Bank of America, and First Union National
Bank) (see February 4, 2000, June 28-July 7, 2000, Early September 2000, May
1-July 18, 2001, and June 27-August 23, 2001). [US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA; ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006, PP. 19 ] The 9/11 Commission’s
Report and its Terrorist Financing Monograph focus on some of the transfers
made to the hijackers (see January 15, 2000-August 2001, June 13-September
25, 2000, June 29, 2000-September 18, 2000, and December 5, 2000), but ignore
others (see June 2000-August 2001, May 2001, Early August-August 22, 2001,
Summer 2001 and before, and Late August-Early September 2001). Neither the
report nor the monograph gives the total number of bank accounts the hijackers
opened. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004 ] In addition, the
identities of the hijackers’ financiers reportedly change over time (see
September 24, 2001-December 26, 2002).
Entity Tags: Counterterrorism Division (FBI), 9/11 Commission, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Robert S. Mueller III, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Dennis Lormel, John S.
Pistole
Category Tags: Possible 9/11 Hijacker Funding, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission,
9/11 Congressional Inquiry, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Terrorism Financing
(September 25, 2001 and after): Ground Zero Workers Find

Compressed Floors and Shattered Core Columns of WTC
Two weeks after 9/11, engineers Pablo Lopez and Andrew Pontecorvo are
walking in the B2 basement level at the ruins of the World Trade Center, towards
where the North Tower stood. They discover a “solid, rocklike mass where the
basement levels of the tower had been,” and see “the recognizable traces of
twenty floors, very much like geologic strata revealed by a road cut,
compressed into a ten-foot vertical span. In one place, the steel decks of half a
dozen floors protruded like tattered wallpaper, so close together that they were
almost touching where they were bent downward at the edge. Nothing between
the decks was recognizable except as a rocky, rusty mishmash. In a few places
what might have been carbonized, compressed stacks of paper stuck out
edgewise like graphite deposits.” As New York Times reporters James Glanz and
Eric Lipton describe, Lopez and Pontecorvo have found “where the vanished
floors [of the tower] had gone. They had not just fallen straight down. The
forces had been so great and the floors so light that they had simply folded up
like deflated balloons.” Furthermore, they see the massive core columns of the
tower, which are over two feet wide and made of four-inch thick steel plate,
appearing to have suffered “a compound fracture: the upper sections looked as
if they had been kicked, with incalculable fury, about a foot south of the
sections they were resting on.” Lopez remarks, “Can you imagine the force?”
[GLANZ AND LIPTON, 2004, PP. 292-293] At some later time, ironworker Danny Doyle,
who is also working at Ground Zero, finds that floors of the South Tower have
been compressed into a formation like what happened with the North Tower’s.
He discovers “a distinct mound of debris set into the pile, about six feet high,
with strands of wire and pieces of rebar sticking out. It looked like layers of
sediment that had turned into rock and been lifted up on some mountainside.…
Here were ten stories of the South Tower, compacted into an area of about six
feet.” [GLANZ AND LIPTON, 2004, PP. 310]
Entity Tags: Danny Doyle, Pablo Lopez, Andrew Pontecorvo, World Trade Center
Category Tags: WTC Investigation, 9/11 Commission
December 14, 2001-September 28, 2005: Media Accounts Differ

on What the US Knew and Did about 9/11 Hijacker Jarrah’s
Detention in Dubai
On December 14, 2001, it is first reported that 9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah was
stopped and questioned at Dubai airport (see January 30-31, 2000); a
controversy follows on when the US was told about this and what was done
about it.
Initial Account - The story of Jarrah being detained at Dubai, United Arab
Emirates (UAE), first appears in the Chicago Tribune on December 14. This initial
report says that Jarrah was stopped because he was on a US watch list. US
officials refuse to comment on the matter. (Note that this report and most other
early accounts place the incident on January 30, 2001 (see January 31, 2000 and
After), but this appears to be incorrect and later reports say it happened exactly
one year earlier, on January 30, 2000.) [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/14/2001]
Did the US Tell the UAE to Stop Jarrah? - Jane Corbin reports the same story for
the BBC in December 2001 and then repeats it in a book. Once again, US
officials refuse to comment on the story. In her account, UAE officials claim
Jarrah was stopped based on a tip-off from the US. A UAE source tells Corbin:
“It was at the request of the Americans and it was specifically because of
Jarrah’s links with Islamic extremists, his contacts with terrorist organizations.
That was the extent of what we were told.” [BBC, 12/12/2001; CORBIN, 2003] One day
after the BBC report, a US official carefully states that the FBI was not aware
before 9/11 that another US agency thought Jarrah was linked to any terrorist
group. [SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 12/13/2001]
CNN Revives the Story, Has More Sources - In August 2002, CNN also reports that
Jarrah was stopped because he was on a US watch list. It claims this information
comes not only from UAE sources, but from other governments in the Middle
East and Europe. It also still refers to the incorrect January 31, 2001 date. For
the first time, a CIA spokesperson comments on the matter and says the CIA
never knew anything about Jarrah before 9/11 and had nothing to do with his
questioning in Dubai. [CNN, 8/1/2002]
Denials Are Helped by Confusion over Date - Regarding the denials by US
authorities, author Terry McDermott point outs: “It is worth noting, however,
that when the initial reports of the Jarrah interview [came out,] the Americans
publicly denied they had ever been informed of it. As it happened, Corbin had
the wrong date for the event, so the American services might have been
technically correct in denying any knowledge of it. They later repeated that
denial several times when other reports repeated the inaccurate date.” Based
on information from his UAE sources, McDermott concludes that the stop
occurred and that the US was informed of it at the time. [MCDERMOTT, 2005, PP. 294-
5]
FBI Memo Confirms US Was Notified - In February 2004, the Chicago Tribune
claims it discovered a 2002 FBI memo that discusses the incident. The memo
clearly states that the incident “was reported to the US government” at the
time. This account uses the January 30, 2000 date, and all later accounts do so
as well. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 2/24/2004]
9/11 Commission Downplays Incident - In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission calls
the incident a “minor problem” and relegates it to an endnote in its final report
on the 9/11 attacks. It does not mention anything about the US being informed
about Jarrah’s brief detention at the time it happened. In this account, Jarrah
was not on a US watch list, but he raised suspicion because of an overlay of the
Koran in his passport and because he was carrying religious tapes and books.
[9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 496]
Vanity Fair Adds New Details - A November 2004 Vanity Fair article adds some
new details. In this account, UAE officials were first suspicious of Jarrah
because of a page of the Koran stuck in his passport, then they searched his
luggage and found it full of jihadist propaganda videos. Six months earlier, the
CIA had asked immigration throughout the region to question anyone who might
have been to a training camp in Afghanistan, which gave the UAE even more
reason to question him. Jarrah was asked about his time in Afghanistan and
revealed that he intended to go to flight school in the US, but he was let go.
The UAE told the CIA about all this, but German officials say the CIA failed to
pass the information on to German intelligence. [VANITY FAIR, 11/2004]
German and More FBI Documents Also Confirm US Was Involved - McDermott has
access to German intelligence files in writing his book published in 2005. He says
that German documents show that the UAE did contact the US about Jarrah
while he was still being held. But the US had not told the Germans what was
discussed about him. Other FBI documents confirming the incident are also
obtained by McDermott, but they indicate the questioning was routine. UAE
officials insist to McDermott this is absolutely untrue. McDermott suggests that
the CIA may not have told the FBI much about the incident. He also says that
while UAE officials were holding Jarrah, US officials told them to let Jarrah go
because the US would track him (see January 30-31, 2000). [MCDERMOTT, 2005, PP.
294]
Continued Denials - In September 2005, US officials continue to maintain they
were not notified about the stop until after 9/11. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/28/2005]
Original reporting on the incident will not occur much in the years after then.
Entity Tags: United Arab Emirates, Terry McDermott, Jane Corbin, Ziad Jarrah, 9/11
Commission, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: Ziad Jarrah, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission, FBI 9/11
Investigation
December 21, 2001: Senators Introduce Bills to Create

Independent 9/11 Commission
Two bipartisan pairs of senators introduce legislation to create independent
9/11 commissions. Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and John McCain (R-AZ)
propose to create a 14-member, bipartisan commission with subpoena power. At
the same time, Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) and Charles Grassley (R-IN) propose to
create a 12-member board of inquiry with subpoena power. White House
spokeswoman Anne Womack is noncommittal about the proposals, saying, “We
look forward to reviewing them. Right now, the president is focused on fighting
the war on terrorism.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/21/2001]
Entity Tags: John McCain, Joseph Lieberman, Charles Grassley, Robert Torricelli
2002: Witness Possibly Connects Hijackers Alhazmi and

Almihdhar to Saudi Consulate Official
The FBI interviews Qualid
Benomrane, an Arabic-
speaking taxi driver who
had done chauffeur work
for the Saudi consulate in
Los Angeles. Benomrane is
shown pictures of young
Arab men and asked if he
recognizes any of them. He
quickly picks hijackers
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid
Almihdhar out of the line-
Qualid Benomrane’s 2001 tax driver license. [Source: FBI] up. After realizing they
were 9/11 hijackers, he
denies knowing them. The FBI asks him about his ties to Fahad al Thumairy, an
official at the Saudi consulate suspected of a link with those two hijackers.
Benomrane says that al Thumairy introduced him to two young Saudi men who
had just arrived in the US and needed help. Benomrane drove them to places in
Los Angeles and San Diego, including Sea World, a theme park in San Diego.
[SHENON, 2008, PP. 309] (Curiously, these two hijackers bought season passes to Sea
World.) [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/1/2002] 9/11 Commission staffers will later conclude
it is highly likely that the two men were Alhazmi and Almihdhar, despite
Benomrane’s later denial. This would mean al Thumairy knew the two hijackers.
[SHENON, 2008, PP. 309] However, the 9/11 Commission will fail to mention anything
about this in their final report.
Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Fahad al Thumairy, Qualid Benomrane, Khalid Almihdhar
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection, 9/11
Investigations, 9/11 Commission, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Saudi Arabia
January 24, 2002: President Bush and Vice President Cheney

Pressure Senator Daschle to Avoid 9/11 Inquiry
Vice President Dick Cheney calls Democratic Senate Majority Leader Tom
Daschle and urges him not to launch a 9/11 inquiry. When the call is made,
Howard Fineman of Newsweek is in Daschle’s office and he hears that end of the
conversation, providing important independent confirmation of Daschle’s
account. Author Philip Shenon will later describe Cheney’s tone as “polite but
threatening,” and Cheney reportedly tells Daschle that an investigation into
9/11 would be a “very dangerous and time-consuming diversion for those of us
who are on the front lines of our response today.” Cheney also says that if the
Democrats push for an investigation, the White House will portray them as
undermining the war on terror. Shenon will later call this “a potent political
threat” the Republicans are holding over the Democrats. President Bush repeats
the request on January 28, and Daschle is repeatedly pressured thereafter.
[NEWSWEEK, 2/4/2002; SHENON, 2008, PP. 29-30, 426] Cheney will later disagree with this
account: “Tom’s wrong. He has, in this case, let’s say a misinterpretation.”
[REUTERS, 5/27/2002]
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Tom Daschle, Howard Fineman, George W. Bush,
Philip Shenon
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Commission
May 23, 2002: President Bush Opposes Independent 9/11

Commission
President Bush says he is opposed to establishing a special, independent
commission to probe how the government dealt with terrorism warnings before
9/11. [CBS NEWS, 5/23/2002] He will later change his stance in the face of
overwhelming support for the idea (see September 20, 2002), and will then
sabotage an agreement reached with Congress to establish a commission.
Several years after leaving the White House, current Bush press secretary Scott
McClellan will write that the president’s reluctance to open an independent
investigation into the 9/11 attacks (see November 15, 2002) was part of a larger
penchant for secrecy in the administration. McClellan will write: “Unfortunately,
the initial response of the Bush White House to demands by partisan critics in
Congress and elsewhere for an independent investigation fueled the firestorm of
anger. It was an early indication that the Bush administration did not sufficiently
accept the necessity for transparency in its management of the public business.
The president and his senior advisers had little appetite for outside
investigations. They resisted openness, and believed that investigations simply
meant close scrutiny of things they would prefer to keep confidential. Not that
anything they’d done had necessarily crossed a legal line; rather, some things
done privately might not look so good if disclosed publicly, and might cause
political embarrassment for the president.… The Bush administration lacked real
accountability in large part because Bush himself did not embrace openness or
government in the sunshine. His belief in secrecy and compartmentalization was

activated when controversy began to stir.” [MCCLELLAN, 2008, PP. 117-118]
Entity Tags: Scott McClellan, Bush administration (43), 9/11 Commission, George W.
Bush
June 14, 2002: Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director

Offers Support for Invasion of Iraq
Philip Zelikow, who will later be appointed director of the 9/11 Commission (see
Shortly Before January 27, 2003), makes public comments supporting the
forthcoming invasion of Iraq. Zelikow says that “we’re now beginning to
understand that we can’t wait for these folks to deliver the weapons of mass
destruction and see what they do with them before we act.” He adds, “We’re
beginning to understand that we might not want to give people like Saddam
Hussein advance warning that we’re going to strike.” Zelikow will later help
draft a policy paper used as justification for the invasion (see September 20,
2002) and will attempt to link Iraq to 9/11 when appointed to head the
commission’s staff (see July 9, 2003, January 2004 and January 2004). [SHENON,
2008, PP. 128-129, 429]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Investigations
Summer 2002-Summer 2004: 9/11 Investigations Glance over

Intercepts of Hijackers’ Calls
Both the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission examine the NSA’s
intercepts of various calls made by the hijackers to an al-Qaeda communications
hub in Sana’a, Yemen (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). The 9/11 Congressional
Inquiry refers to several of the calls and gives an idea of the content of some of
them. But it does not mention those made by Nawaf Alhazmi and possibly other
hijackers from the US after the USS Cole bombing, which are only disclosed later
in the media (see Mid-October 2000-Summer 2001 and March 15, 2004 and
After). However, this section of the Inquiry report is heavily redacted so most
details remain unknown. It states that, although the NSA intercepted the calls
and disseminated dispatches about some of them, the NSA did not realize the
hijackers were in the US at the time the calls were made. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003,
PP. XII, 11-12, 143-146, 155-157 ] The 9/11 Commission Report contains a briefer
section on the intercepts and deals with those which led to the surveillance of
the al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000). In addition, it
mentions that Almihdhar called his wife from San Diego in the spring of 2000,
but fails to mention that his wife lived at an al-Qaeda communications hub and
that the calls were intercepted by the NSA (see Spring-Summer 2000). [9/11
COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 181, 222] The Los Angeles Times comments: “The [9/11
Congressional Inquiry] and the Sept. 11 commission that came after it referred
indirectly to the calls from Yemen to San Diego. But neither report discloses
what the NSA gleaned from the calls, or why they were never disclosed to the
FBI.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 12/21/2005] The publication of the 9/11 Commission
report and revelations about domestic surveillance by the NSA will lead to
increased media interest in and revelations about the intercepts starting from
2004 (see March 15, 2004 and After).
Entity Tags: Hoda al-Hada, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Commission, Nawaf
Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, National Security Agency, Ahmed al-Hada
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Remote Surveillance, Yemen Hub, 9/11
Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Investigations
September 10, 2002: Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director

Says ‘Real Threat’ of Iraqi WMDs Is to Israel
In remarks made at a foreign policy conference at the University of Virginia,

Philip Zelikow says that Iraq is more of a threat to Israel than to the US and that
protecting Israel would be a major motive for a US-Iraq war. Zelikow’s speech
goes unreported at the time but will come to light in a 2004 article. Zelikow
says: “Why would Iraq attack America or use nuclear weapons against us? I’ll tell
you what I think the real threat (is) and actually has been since 1990—it’s the
threat against Israel.… And this is the threat that dare not speak its name,
because the Europeans don’t care deeply about that threat, I will tell you
frankly. And the American government doesn’t want to lean too hard on it
rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell.” Zelikow is at the time a member
of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), and will later
serve as the executive director to the 9/11 Commission. [ASIA TIMES ONLINE,
3/31/2004] John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt will later use Zelikow’s statement
in their controversial paper “The Israel Lobby” as evidence that the Iraq War
was launched in part to advance Israel’s security. [LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS,
3/23/2006; LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, 4/25/2006; LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, 4/25/2006]
Entity Tags: John Mearsheimer, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB),
Stephen Walt, Philip Zelikow
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow
September 20, 2002: Bush Administration Releases ‘National

Security Strategy’ Document Advocating Preemptive War
The Bush administration submits to Congress a 31-page document entitled “The
National Security Strategy of the United States.”
Preemptive War - The National Security Strategy (NSS) openly advocates the
necessity for the US to engage in “preemptive war” against nations it believes
are likely to become a threat to the US’s security. It declares: “In an age where
the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive
technologies, the United States cannot remain idle. The United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively.” The declaration that the US will engage in
preemptive war with other nations reverses decades of American military and
foreign policy stances; until now, the US has held that it would only launch an
attack against another nation if it had been attacked first, or if American lives
were in imminent danger. President Bush had first mentioned the new policy in a
speech in June 2002 (see June 1, 2002), and it echoes policies proposed by Paul
Wolfowitz during the George H. W. Bush administration (see March 8, 1992).
[SHENON, 2008, PP. 128]
US Must Maintain Military 'Beyond Challenge' - The National Security Strategy
states that the ultimate objective of US national security policy is to “dissuade
future military competition.” The US must therefore “build and maintain our
defenses beyond challenge. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or
equaling, the power of the United States.” [LONDON TIMES, 9/21/2002]
Ignoring the International Criminal Court - The NSS also states, “We will take the
actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security
commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for
investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC),
whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.”
[US PRESIDENT, 9/2002]
Declaring War on Terrorism Itself - It states: “The enemy is not a single political
regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.” Journalism
professor Mark Danner will later comment in the New York Times: “Not Islamic
terrorism or Middle Eastern terrorism or even terrorism directed against the
United States: terrorism itself. ‘Declaring war on “terror,”’ as one military
strategist later remarked to me, ‘is like declaring war on air power.’” [NEW YORK
TIMES MAGAZINE, 9/11/2005]
Fundamental Reversal of Containment, Deterrence Principles - Washington Post
reporter Tim Reich later describes the NSS as “revers[ing] the fundamental
principles that have guided successive presidents for more than 50 years:
containment and deterrence.” Foreign policy professor Andrew Bacevich will
write that the NSS is a “fusion of breathtaking utopianism [and] barely disguised
machtpolitik.” Bacevich continues, “It reads as if it were the product not of
sober, ostensibly conservative Republicans but of an unlikely collaboration
between Woodrow Wilson and the elder Field Marshal von Moltke.” [AMERICAN
CONSERVATIVE, 3/24/2003]
Written by Future Executive Director of 9/11 Commission - The document is
released under George W. Bush’s signature, but was written by Philip D. Zelikow,
formerly a member of the previous Bush administration’s National Security
Council, and currently a history professor at the University of Virginia and a
member of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Zelikow produced the
document at the behest of his longtime colleague National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice (see June 1, 2002). His authorship of the document will not be
revealed until well after he is appointed executive director of the 9/11
commission (see Mid-December 2002-March 2003). Many on the Commission will
consider Zelikow’s authorship of the document a prima facie conflict of interest,
and fear that Zelikow’s position on the Commission will be used to further the
Bush administration’s doctrine of preemptive war (see March 21, 2004). [US
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 8/5/2005; SHENON, 2008, PP. 128]
Entity Tags: Tim Reich, University of Virginia, National Security Council, Bush
administration (43), Issuetsdeah, 9/11 Commission, Andrew Bacevich, Condoleezza
Rice, George W. Bush, Philip Zelikow
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, US International Relations, 9/11
Timeline
Category Tags: US Dominance, 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow,
Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, 9/11 Investigations
September 20, 2002: President Bush Changes Course, Backs

Creation of 9/11 Commission
In the wake of damaging Congressional 9/11 inquiry revelations, President Bush
reverses course and backs efforts by many lawmakers to form an independent
commission to conduct a broader investigation than the current Congressional
inquiry. Newsweek reports that Bush had virtually no choice. “There was a
freight train coming down the tracks,” says one White House official. [NEWSWEEK,
9/22/2002] But as one of the 9/11 victim’s relatives says, “It’s carefully crafted to
make it look like a general endorsement but it actually says that the commission
would look at everything except the intelligence failures.” [CBS NEWS, 9/20/2002]
Rather than look into such failures, Bush wants the commission to focus on areas
like border security, visa issues, and the “role of Congress” in overseeing
intelligence agencies. The White House also refuses to turn over documents
showing what Bush knew before 9/11. [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2002]
Entity Tags: George W. Bush, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Investigations
October 10, 2002: President Bush Backtracks on Support for

Independent 9/11 Commission
A tentative congressional deal to create an independent commission to
investigate the 9/11 attacks falls apart hours after the White House objected to
the plan (it appears Vice President Cheney called Republican leaders and told
them to renege on the agreement [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/2/2002] ). Bush had pledged
to support such a commission a few weeks earlier (see September 20, 2002), but
doubters who questioned his sincerity appear to have been proven correct.
Hours after top Republican leaders announced at a press conference that an
agreement had been reached, House Republican leaders said they wouldn’t
bring the legislation to the full House for a vote unless the commission proposal
was changed. There are worries that if the White House can delay the
legislation for a few more days until Congress adjourns, it could stop the
creation of a commission for months, if not permanently. [NEW YORK TIMES,
10/11/2002] Another deal is made a few weeks later (see November 15, 2002) and
the commission goes forward.
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney
October 17, 2002: Tenet Misinforms Congressional Inquiry about

CIA Knowledge of Hijackers’ Entry into US
In sworn testimony to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, CIA Director George Tenet
repeatedly claims that a March 2000 cable sent to CIA headquarters reporting
that hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi had entered the US was not read by anybody. He
says, “I know that nobody read that cable,” “Nobody read that cable in the
March timeframe,” and “[N]obody read that information only cable.” [NEW YORK
TIMES, 10/17/2002] Former Counterterrorist Center Director Cofer Black will also
claim that the cable was not read. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 51 ] However, a
later investigation by the CIA Office of Inspector General will find that numerous
CIA officers had actually read the cable shortly after it was sent (see March 6,
2000 and After). Nevertheless, the 9/11 Commission will later assert that, “No-
one outside the Counterterrorist Center was told any of this” (about Alhazmi’s
arrival in the US) and neglect to mention that Tenet had previously misstated
the CIA’s knowledge of the hijackers. Neither will the 9/11 Commission
investigate the cause of the CIA’s apparent inaction. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004,
PP. 181]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Commission, Nawaf Alhazmi, Cofer Black,
George J. Tenet
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, 9/11
Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Key Hijacker Events, CIA Hiding Alhazmi &
Almihdhar, 9/11 Investigations
Late 2002-2004: Imam Al-Awlaki Lives Openly in Britain, despite

Growing Evidence of Link to 9/11 Plot
Anwar al-Awlaki, the imam for three of the 9/11 hijackers in the US, lives
openly in Britain.
Growing Suspicions about Al-Awlaki in US - After 9/11, US investigators
increasingly suspect that al-Awlaki’s links with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid
Almihdhar, and Hani Hanjour in the US were more than just a coincidence. In
October 2002, al-Awlaki is briefly detained while visiting the US but is not
arrested, even though there is an outstanding warrant for his arrest (see
October 2002). The FBI as a whole does not believe he was involved in the 9/11
plot. However, some disagree. One detective tells the 9/11 Commission in 2003
or 2004 that al-Awlaki “was at the center of the 9/11 story.” The 9/11
Congressional Inquiry releases its final report in 2003, and it states that al-
Awlaki “was a central figure in a support network that aided [Alhazmi and
Almihdhar]” (see August 1-3, 2003).
No Attempt to Arrest Him Living Openly in Britain - Al-Awlaki does not visit the
US again, after his near arrest. But he lives openly in Britain, a close US ally. He
teaches Islam to students in London and adopts an increasingly religious
fundamentalist stance. His lectures grow in popularity, especially through sales
of CDs of recorded speeches. He travels widely through Britain giving lectures.
But despite growing evidence against him in the US, there is no known attempt
to have him arrested in Britain. At some point in 2004, he moves to Yemen to
preach and study there. [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/8/2010]
Entity Tags: Anwar al-Awlaki, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Hani Hanjour, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar
Category Tags: Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11
Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Anwar Al-Awlaki
November 2002 and After: Karl Rove Concerned about 9/11

Investigation
Presidential adviser Karl Rove is concerned about the 9/11 Commission, which is
soon to be established (see November 15, 2002). Author Philip Shenon will say
this is because he thinks that “in the wrong hands… [it] could cost President
Bush a second term.” According to Democratic Senate Minority Leader Tom
Daschle, Republican Senator Trent Lott says that behind-the-scenes opposition
to the commission’s creation is orchestrated by Rove and the White House’s
political office. “It’s all Rove,” Lott tells Daschle. Rove is also involved in the
selection of the Commission’s initial chairman, Henry Kissinger (see November
27, 2002), and his successor Tom Kean (see December 14, 2002). [SHENON, 2008, PP.
15, 29]
Entity Tags: Karl C. Rove, 9/11 Commission
November 15, 2002: Congress and President Bush Approve New

9/11 Commission
Congress approves legislation creating an independent commission—the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—which will later be
popularly known as the 9/11 Commission. The Commission’s mandate is to
“examine and report on the facts and causes relating to the September 11th
terrorist attacks” and “make a full and complete accounting of the
circumstances surrounding the attacks.” President Bush signs it into law
November 27, 2002. [US CONGRESS, 11/27/2002] Bush originally opposed an
independent commission (see May 23, 2002), but changed his mind over the
summer (see September 20, 2002) after political pressure. The Democrats
conceded several important aspects of the Commission (such as subpoena
approval) after the White House threatened to create a Commission by
executive order, over which it would have more control. Bush will appoint the
Commission chairman and he sets a strict time frame (18 months) for its
investigation. [CNN, 11/15/2002] The Commission will only have a $3 million
budget. Senator Jon Corzine (D-NJ) and others wonder how the Commission can
accomplish much with such a small budget. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/20/2003] (In
contrast, a 1996 federal commission investigating casino gambling received $5
million; the federal government spent $50 million investigating Bill Clinton and
Whitewater; and the investigation into the February 2003 Columbia shuttle
explosion will receive $50 million.) [CARTER, 2004, PP. 280] Senate Majority Leader
Tom Daschle (D-SD) will call the budget “a joke.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 31] The budget
will later be increased (see March 26, 2003).
Entity Tags: Tom Daschle, Jon Corzine, US Congress, 9/11 Commission, George W. Bush
Before November 27, 2002: Lee Hamilton Considered for Vice

Chairmanship of 9/11 Commission, but Republican Ties Count
against Him
Former Democratic congressman Lee Hamilton is considered by his party for the
position of vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, but does not get the
appointment, which goes to former Senator George Mitchell (see November 27,
2002). Hamilton, who is nonetheless appointed to the Commission as an ordinary
member, is rejected as vice chairman by Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle
and other leading Democrats because he is seen as too soft on Republicans—he
lacks “a taste for partisan fights,” and seems “always to assume the best about
people, Republicans included.” He is also friends with two of the investigation’s
targets, Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld,
who he calls “Dick” and “Don,” and Cheney’s White House counsel, David
Addington. He got to know Cheney during the Iran-Contra investigation, when
Cheney was the ranking Republican on the committee and Hamilton failed to
distinguish himself (see Mid-1980s), as he did over the “October Surprise” affair
(see 1992-January 1993). Author Philip Shenon will comment, “While [Hamilton]
might disagree with Cheney and Rumsfeld on policy, Hamilton trusted both men
always to tell the truth.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 32-33] However, Mitchell will
subsequently resign and Hamilton will replace him as vice chairman (see
December 11, 2002). In this role Hamilton will have good relations with the Bush
White House (see March 2003-July 2004 and Early July 2004).
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, Donald
Rumsfeld, Philip Shenon
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Iran-Contra Affair
November 27, 2002: Kissinger Named Chairman of New 9/11

Commission
President Bush names Henry Kissinger as Chairman
of the 9/11 Commission. Congressional Democrats
appoint George Mitchell, former Senate majority
leader and peace envoy to Northern Ireland and the
Middle East, as vice chairman. Their replacements
and the other eight members of the commission are
chosen by mid-December. Kissinger served as
Secretary of State and National Security Adviser for
Presidents Nixon and Ford. [NEW YORK TIMES,
11/29/2002] Kissinger’s ability to remain independent
is met with skepticism. [SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
11/29/2002; CNN, 11/30/2002; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
12/3/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/17/2002] He has a very
controversial past. For instance, “Documents
recently released by the CIA, strengthen previously-
Henry Kissinger. [Source: Public held suspicions that Kissinger was actively involved
domain] in the establishment of Operation Condor, a covert
plan involving six Latin American countries including
Chile, to assassinate thousands of political opponents.” He is also famous for an
“obsession with secrecy.” [BBC, 4/26/2002] It is even difficult for Kissinger to travel
outside the US. Investigative judges in Spain, France, Chile, and Argentina seek
to question him in several legal actions related to his possible involvement in
war crimes, particularly in Latin America, Vietnam, Cambodia (see March 1969),
Laos (see 1969-1973), Bangladesh, Chile, and East Timor (see December 7,
1976). [VILLAGE VOICE, 8/15/2001; BBC, 4/18/2002; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 12/1/2002] The New
York Times suggests, “Indeed, it is tempting to wonder if the choice of Mr.
Kissinger is not a clever maneuver by the White House to contain an
investigation it long opposed.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/29/2002] The Chicago Tribune
notes that “the president who appointed him originally opposed this whole
undertaking.” Kissinger is “known more for keeping secrets from the American
people than for telling the truth” and asking him “to deliver a critique that may
ruin friends and associates is asking a great deal.” [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 12/5/2002]
Entity Tags: George Mitchell, 9/11 Commission, Henry A. Kissinger, George W. Bush
Late 2002-July 2004: 9/11 Commission Initially Pays Little

Attention to NSA Material
The 9/11 Commission initially pays very little attention to material from the NSA
about al-Qaeda, as it is focusing on the CIA, FBI, and other agencies. Colonel
Lorry Fenner, a former air force intelligence officer assigned to the commission’s
team reviewing the structure of the intelligence community, finds this
surprising. Fenner, who had previously worked closely with the NSA, is
“dumfounded” when she learns nobody from the commission is making the short
trip to the NSA to review its material on 9/11. The NSA tracked al-Qaeda
communications for a long time before 9/11, including numerous calls between
the hijackers and other al-Qaeda operatives (see Early 2000-Summer 2001), but
the 9/11 Commission apparently does not realize or seem to care how important
the material is. Author Philip Shenon will comment: “[F]or the Commission’s
staff, [the NSA’s Maryland headquarters at] Fort Meade might as well have been
Kabul, it seemed so distant.” One reason is that some people at the commission
do not really understand what the NSA does, and also, according to Shenon,
“[For executive director Philip] Zelikow and other staff on the commission, it
was just more interesting—sexier—to concentrate on the CIA.” [SHENON, 2008, PP.
87-88, 155-6]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Lorry Fenner, National Security Agency, Philip Shenon,
Philip Zelikow
Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow, 9/11
Investigations
Between December 2002 and May 2003: Staffer Moves from One
9/11 Inquiry to Another
Barbara Grewe, a key investigator on the Justice
Department inspector general’s investigation of the FBI’s
failures before 9/11, moves to the 9/11 Commission.
[UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, 3/7/2005] She was
recommended to the Commission by a former colleague
who worked at the office of inspector general at the
Justice Department. [UNIVERSITY RECORD ONLINE, 3/14/2005] As
special investigative counsel at the Justice Department’s
office of the inspector general between July and
December 2002 she had investigated and reported on the
Barbara Grewe. [Source: FBI’s handling of intelligence prior to 9/11, and directed
Barbara Grewe] part of the investigation into information sharing between
the FBI and CIA, missed opportunities to locate the
hijackers before 9/11, and earlier warnings about terrorists using airplanes as
weapons. This is similar to the work she does on the 9/11 Commission.
According to a press release for a lecture she will give in 2005, Grewe also
“drafted and edited” the “relevant sections” of the Justice Department’s final
report. [UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, 3/7/2005; CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS
ACTION FUND, 4/16/2008] However, it is unclear how she could have done this, as
she left the Justice Department’s investigation in 2003. Although December 2002
is early on in the Justice Department inspector general’s probe, the following
important interviews have been conducted by this time:
Tom Wilshire, a CIA officer later detailed to the FBI who was involved in many
pre-9/11 intelligence failures (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000, March
5, 2000, May 15, 2001, Mid-May 2001, Late May, 2001, July 23, 2001, August 22,
2001, and August 24, 2001); [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502]
“Michael,” a female CIA officer who had blocked notification to the FBI saying
that one of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, had a US visa (see Around 7:00 p.m.
January 5, 2000 and January 6, 2000); [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502]
Dina Corsi, an FBI official who withheld intelligence information from criminal
investigators in the summer of 2001 (see June 12-September 11, 2001, Before
August 22, 2001, August 27-28, 2001, August 28, 2001, and August 28-29, 2001);
[9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 474]
Clark Shannon, a CIA officer who withheld information about Almihdhar from
the FBI (see June 11, 2001); [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 537]
Margaret Gillespie, an FBI agent detailed to the FBI involved in information
sharing problems (see (Late May-Early June) and August 21-22, 2001); [9/11
COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 538]
Robert Fuller, an FBI agent who searched for Almihdhar in the US just before
the 9/11 attacks, but failed to find him (see September 4, 2001, September 4-5,
2001, and September 4-5, 2001); [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 539]
Russell Fincher and Steve Bongardt, FBI agents from whom the CIA withheld
information (see June 11, 2001, June 12-September 11, 2001, and August 29,
2001); [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 537]
Sherry Sabol, an attorney involved in errors in the Moussaoui and Almihdhar
cases (see August 22-28, 2001 and August 28-29, 2001); [9/11 COMMISSION,
7/24/2004, PP. 538]
An FBI official who handled an al-Qaeda informer in Pakistan (see January 4,
2001); [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 537]
Harry Samit (see August 15-20, 2001), Greg Jones (see August 27, 2001), John
Weess (see August 16, 2001), and Coleen Rowley (see May 21, 2002), FBI officials
who worked on the Moussaoui case; [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 531, 540]
Rodney Middleton, acting head of the FBI’s bin Laden unit before 9/11 (see
July 27, 2001 and after); and [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 538]
Jennifer Maitner, an FBI official involved in the Phoenix memo and President
Bush’s August 6 presidential daily briefing (see July 10, 2001, July 27, 2001 and
after, and (August 4-5, 2001)). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 536]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, US Department of Justice, Barbara Grewe, Office of the
Inspector General (DOJ)
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission, Other 9/11 Investigations
December 11, 2002: Mitchell Resigns from New 9/11 Commission

George Mitchell resigns as vice chairman of the recently-created 9/11
investigative commission. Lee Hamilton, an Indiana congressman for more than
30 years and chairman of the committee which investigated the Iran-Contra
affair, is named as his replacement. [CNN, 12/11/2002] Mitchell cites time
constraints as his reason for stepping down, but he also does not want to sever
ties with his lawyer-lobbying firm, Piper Rudnick, or reveal his list of clients.
Recent clients include the governments of Yemen and the United Arab Emirates.
[NEWSWEEK, 12/15/2002]
Entity Tags: Lee Hamilton, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, 9/11 Commission, George
Mitchell
George Mitchell. [Source: Public

domain]
December 13, 2002: Kissinger Resigns from 9/11 Commission

Henry Kissinger resigns as head of the new 9/11 Commission. [ASSOCIATED PRESS,
12/13/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/13/2002] Two days earlier, the Bush administration
argued that Kissinger was not required to disclose his private business clients.
[NEW YORK TIMES, 12/12/2002] However, the Congressional Research Service insists
that he does, and Kissinger resigns rather than reveal his clients. [MSNBC,
12/13/2002; SEATTLE TIMES, 12/14/2002]
Spilled Coffee - Kissinger had also been pressured to reveal his client list at a
meeting with a group of victims’ relatives, in particular the “Jersey Girls.” One
of the “Girls,” Lorie Van Auken, had even asked Kissinger whether he had “any
clients named bin Laden?” Kissinger, who was pouring coffee at that moment,
refused to answer, but spilled the coffee and fell off the sofa on which he was
sitting. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 12-3]
Business Ties - It is reported that Kissinger is (or has been) a consultant for
Unocal, the oil corporation, and was involved in plans to build pipelines through
Afghanistan (see September-October 1995). [WASHINGTON POST, 10/5/1998; SALON,
12/3/2002] Kissinger claims he did no current work for any oil companies or
Mideast clients, but several corporations with heavy investments in Saudi
Arabia, such as ABB Group, a Swiss-Swedish engineering firm, and Boeing Corp.,
pay him consulting fees of at least $250,000 a year. A Boeing spokesman said its
“long-standing” relationship with Kissinger involved advice on deals in East Asia,
not Saudi Arabia. Boeing sold $7.2 billion worth of aircraft to Saudi Arabia in
1995. [NEWSWEEK, 12/15/2002]
Not Vetted - In a surprising break from usual procedures regarding high-profile
presidential appointments, White House lawyers never vetted Kissinger for
conflicts of interest. [NEWSWEEK, 12/15/2002] The Washington Post says that after
the resignations of Kissinger and Mitchell, the commission “has lost time” and
“is in disarray, which is no small trick given that it has yet to meet.” [WASHINGTON
POST, 12/14/2002]
Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Congressional Research Service, Lorie Van Auken,
Henry A. Kissinger, 9/11 Commission
December 14, 2002: Karl Rove Asks Thomas Kean If He Would

Consider 9/11 Commission Chairmanship
Following Henry Kissinger’s resignation as 9/11 Commission chairman the day
before (see November 27, 2002), presidential aide Karl Rove calls Thomas Kean,
a former Republican governor of New Jersey, to ask if he is willing to be
considered as chairman of the Commission. Kean, who does not know Rove well
and has been out of politics for some time, is surprised that he is being
considered for the job. He is even more surprised that it is Rove making the call,
especially given Rove’s reputation as the brain behind the rise of President
George W. Bush. However, he says that he may do the job, if chosen. Kean will
later speak to the president’s chief of staff Andy Card about the job, and
formally accept it in a call from President Bush. Rove will later say that he
thinks it was he who first suggested Kean as chairman, but will add that he
regrets this, due to later battles with the White House. Card will also say he
thinks he was the first to suggest Kean. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 16-7, 25]
Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Karl C. Rove, 9/11 Commission
December 16, 2002: Members of 9/11 Commission Have Potential

Conflicts of Interest
The 10 members of the new 9/11 Commission are appointed by this date, and
are: Republicans Thomas Kean (chairman), Slade Gorton, James Thompson, Fred
Fielding, and John Lehman, and Democrats Lee Hamilton (vice chairman), Max
Cleland, Tim Roemer, Richard Ben-Veniste, and Jamie Gorelick. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
12/12/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/16/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/17/2002] Senators Richard
Shelby (R-AL) and John McCain (R-AZ) had a say in the choice of one of the
Republican positions. They and many 9/11 victims’ relatives wanted former
Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH), who co-wrote an acclaimed report about
terrorism before 9/11 (see January 31, 2001). But, possibly under pressure from
the White House, Senate Republican leader Trent Lott (R-MS) blocked Rudman’s
appointment and chose John Lehman instead. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 12/12/2002;
ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/13/2002; REUTERS, 12/16/2002; SHENON, 2008, PP. 55-56] It will slowly
emerge over the next several months that at

least six of the 10 commissioners have ties to the
airline industry. [CBS NEWS, 3/5/2003] Henry
Kissinger (see December 13, 2002) and his
replacement Thomas Kean (see December 16,
2002) both caused controversy when they were
named. In addition, the other nine members of
the Commission are later shown to all have
potential conflicts of interest. Republican
commissioners:
Fred Fielding also works for a law firm lobbying
for Spirit Airlines and United Airlines. [ASSOCIATED
PRESS, 2/14/2003; CBS NEWS, 3/5/2003]
Slade Gorton has close ties to Boeing, which
built all the planes destroyed on 9/11, and his
Richard Ben-Veniste. [Source: C- law firm represents several major airlines,
SPAN]
including Delta Air Lines. [ASSOCIATED PRESS,
12/12/2002; CBS NEWS, 3/5/2003]
John Lehman, former secretary of the Navy, has large investments in Ball
Corp., which has many US military contracts. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/27/2003]
James Thompson, former Illinois governor, is the head of a law firm that
lobbies for American Airlines and has previously represented United Airlines.
[ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/31/2003; CBS NEWS, 3/5/2003] Democratic commissioners:
Richard Ben-Veniste represents Boeing and United Airlines. [CBS NEWS, 3/5/2003]
He also has other curious connections, according to a 2001 book on CIA ties to
drug running written by Daniel Hopsicker, which has an entire chapter called
“Who is Richard Ben-Veniste?” Lawyer Ben-Veniste, Hopsicker says, “has made a
career of defending political crooks, specializing in cases that involve drugs and
politics.” He has been referred to in print as a “Mob lawyer,” and was a long-
time lawyer for Barry Seal, one of the most famous drug dealers in US history
who is also alleged to have had CIA connections. [HOPSICKER, 2001, PP. 325-30]
Max Cleland, former US senator, has received $300,000 from the airline
industry. [CBS NEWS, 3/5/2003]
James Gorelick is a director of United Technologies, one of the Pentagon’s
biggest defense contractors and a supplier of engines to airline manufacturers.
[ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/27/2003]
Lee Hamilton sits on many advisory boards, including those to the CIA, the
president’s Homeland Security Advisory Council, and the US Army. [ASSOCIATED
PRESS, 3/27/2003]
Tim Roemer represents Boeing and Lockheed Martin. [CBS NEWS, 3/5/2003]
Entity Tags: American Airlines, Fred F. Fielding, Jamie Gorelick, 9/11 Commission,
James Thompson, John McCain, John Lehman, Trent Lott, Richard Shelby, Lee
Hamilton, Richard Ben-Veniste, United Airlines, Warren Rudman, Slade Gorton, Tim
Roemer, Max Cleland
December 16, 2002: Ex-Governor Thomas Kean Replaces

Kissinger as Chairman of 9/11 Commission
President Bush names former New Jersey governor Thomas Kean as the chairman
of the 9/11 Commission after his original choice, Henry Kissinger, resigned (see
December 13, 2002). [WASHINGTON POST, 12/17/2002] In an appearance on NBC, Kean
promises an aggressive investigation. “It’s really a remarkably broad mandate,
so I don’t think we’ll have any problem looking under every rock. I’ve got no
problems in going as far as we have to in finding out the facts.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS,
12/17/2002] However, Kean plans to remain president of Drew University and
devote only one day a week to the commission. He also claims he would have no
conflicts of interest, stating: “I have no clients except the university.”
[WASHINGTON POST, 12/17/2002] However, he has a history of such conflicts of
interest. Multinational Monitor has previously stated:

“Perhaps no individual more clearly illustrates the
dangers of university presidents maintaining
corporate ties than Thomas Kean,” citing the fact
that he is on the Board of Directors of Aramark
(which received a large contract with his university
after he became president), Bell Atlantic, United
Health Care, Beneficial Corporation, Fiduciary Trust
Company International, and others. [MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR, 11/1997]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, George W. Bush, Thomas
Kean
Thomas Kean. [Source: Public
domain]
After December 16, 2002: 9/11 Commission Chairman Gives Vice

Chairman Additional Power
The first time 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean, a Republican, and Vice
Chairman Lee Hamilton, a Democrat noted for his bipartisanship (see 1992-
January 1993, Before November 27, 2002 and March 2003-July 2004), meet after
their appointment to the commission, Kean offers Hamilton extra powers in the
investigation. In effect, Kean and Hamilton would be co-chairmen of the inquiry,
rather than chairman and vice chairman. Author Philip Shenon will call this a
“remarkable gesture,” as it gives Hamilton an equal say in the hiring and
structure of the investigation. Kean also proposes that the two of them should
be “joined at the hip,” and that they should always appear in public together,
especially on television. Hamilton agrees, thinking this will go some way to
make up for their lack of stature in Washington in comparison with the two men
they replaced on the commission, Henry Kissinger and George Mitchell. [SHENON,
2008, PP. 68]
Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Philip Shenon, Lee Hamilton
Late December 2002: White House Tells 9/11 Commission

Chairman Kean He Must ‘Stand Up’ for President Bush
Newly appointed 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean comes to the White
House to meet top officials and discuss the 9/11 investigation. Although a
Republican, Kean does not like the “message discipline” of the current White
House, where spokesmen keep repeating the same thing over and over. Kean will
later tell author Philip Shenon that he is surprised when the officials he meets
use the same tactic and keep telling him the same things. Kean thinks the
officials, including National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and chief of staff
Andy Card, are sticking to a pre-agreed script and wonders whether they are
reading off the same talking points cards. They keep telling him: “We want you
to stand up. You’ve got to stand up,” “You’ve got to have courage,” and “We
don’t want a runaway commission.” Kean is baffled by this and thinks it might
be some sort of code. He decides they must want him to stand up for the truth
and have the courage to follow the evidence wherever it leads. However, Kean
will later say: “I decided as the process went on, that’s not what they meant at
all.… You’ve got to stand up for the president, and you’ve got to protect him in
the process. That’s what they meant.” Card also suggests some names for the
key position of executive director of the Commission, but the post goes to
somebody else, Philip Zelikow, in the end (see Shortly Before January 27, 2003).
[SHENON, 2008, PP. 35-39]
Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Condoleezza Rice, Andrew Card
Mid-December 2002-March 2003: 9/11 Commission Gets Off to

Slow Start
After experiencing some problems at its inception due to the resignation of its
chair and vice-chair (see December 11, 2002 and December 13, 2002), the 9/11
Commission spends much of the next four months hiring staff, getting security
clearances (see March 27, 2003), finding office space, and asking for a budget
increase (see March 26, 2003). One of the first employees hired is executive
director Philip Zelikow, but disputes within the Commission over who will be
general council last until March, when Dan Marcus is hired. The Commission is
unable to even have a telephone until February, when it finds an official
security facility for its offices, and until then the cell phone of staffer Stephanie
Kaplan is used as the commission’s initial operations center. However, most of
the Commission’s staff cannot then enter their offices, because they do not
have the relevant security clearances yet, even though there are no secret
documents actually in the offices at this point. Author Philip Shenon will
comment: “The commission’s early logistical problems were more than a little
humiliating to men like [commission Chairman Tom] Kean and [Vice Chairman
Lee] Hamilton, who had commanded vast staffs and virtually unlimited office
space during their years in power in government. Now they were at the mercy of
others if they wanted second-hand office furniture for the commission’s
cramped offices in Washington.” [KEAN AND HAMILTON, 2006, PP. 34-45; SHENON, 2008, PP.
92]
Entity Tags: Daniel Marcus, 9/11 Commission, Stephanie Kaplan, Philip Zelikow, Philip
Shenon
2003: 9/11 Commissioner Becomes Involved in Fraud Scandal,

Has Little Time for Commission
Republican 9/11 Commissioner Jim Thompson becomes involved in a scandal
surrounding the Canadian media tycoon Conrad Black. Black is accused by
shareholders and then the US Justice Department of appropriating money—tens
of millions of dollars—that should have gone to shareholders for his own use, and
of spending it on parties, private jets, and luxury homes. Thompson gets
involved in the scandal because he was a director of Black’s company, Hollinger
International, and also the chairman of the audit committee there, meaning
that Thompson’s role is of great interest to prosecutors. Thompson spends a lot
of time trying to extricate himself from the scandal and, according to author
Philip Shenon, he “all but disappear[s] from the commission during the first year
of the investigation.” This has a bad effect on the commission’s relations with
Republicans in the House of Representatives, as Thompson is supposed to
function as an unofficial liaison to them. As House Republicans have nobody on
the commission who talks to them, they begin to attack it, in particular in April
2004 (see April 13-April 29, 2004). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 91-92]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Hollinger International, James Thompson, Philip Shenon
2003-2004: Key FBI Agents Eager to Testify to 9/11 Commission,

but Are Not Subpoenaed
Two FBI agents who were involved in a pre-911 failure, Doug Miller and Mark
Rossini, are reportedly “eager” to provide testimony to the 9/11 Commission
about that failure. However, the Commission does not issue them with a
subpoena or otherwise interview them about the matter. Miller and Rossini were
on loan to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, before 9/11, and helped block
a cable to the FBI that said 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar had a US visa (see
9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000 and January 6, 2000). [CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, 10/1/2008] The Commission will cite the transcript of an interview of
Miller by the Justice Department’s inspector general in its final report. [9/11
COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502] However, in the interview Miller falsely claims that
he remembers nothing of the incident (see (February

12, 2004)). The Commission’s final report will also cite
an interview it apparently conducted with Miller in
December 2003, although this is in an endnote to a
paragraph on terrorist financing. [9/11 COMMISSION,
7/24/2004, PP. 185, 504] As the blocked cable is not
discovered by investigators until February 2004 (see
Early February 2004), Miller is presumably not asked
about it at the interview.
Entity Tags: Mark Rossini, Doug Miller, Central Intelligence
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Alec Station
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi &
Mark Rossini. [Source: Fox
News] Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, 9/11 Investigations,
9/11 Commission
2003-2004: Administration Tries to Convince 9/11 Commissioner

of Iraqi Ties to Al-Qaeda, but Will not Show All Claimed Evidence
The Bush administration tries to convince 9/11 commissioner John Lehman that
there are ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda. The attempts take place in a series of
meetings at the White House and Pentagon, where Lehman meets with Vice
President Dick Cheney, White House chief of staff Andy Card, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Lehman, a
prominent Republican, was previously frozen out of politics by the
administration due to his ties to John McCain, who ran for the Republican
presidential nomination against George W. Bush in 2000. However, the
administration officials encourage the meetings when they see Lehman is
interested in the alleged connection between Iraq and Osama bin Laden, in the
hopes that he will use his position on the 9/11 Commission to draw attention to
the allegations. However, the White House says it cannot share all the
intelligence it has about the ties, because it is too classified. Nevertheless,
Lehman can take it on faith that the intelligence exists. Wolfowitz tells him,
“Just wait until you see the evidence we’ve got.” Lehman will later say: “I got
that from everybody I talked to: ‘Wait and see, just wait until you see the
evidence.’” After it becomes clear to Lehman the alleged links are non-existent,
he will comment, “I think they were all drinking their own bathwater.” [SHENON,
2008, PP. 178-180]
Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Andrew Card, John Lehman, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard
(“Dick”) Cheney, 9/11 Commission
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links, 9/11 Investigations
January 26, 2003: Some 9/11 Commission Members Unhappy

with Staffing Arrangements, Executive Director Zelikow’s
Appointment and Degree of Control
When all ten members of the 9/11 Commission meet for the first time, in an
informal setting, some of them are already unhappy about the way the
commission is being run. Some of the Democratic members are unhappy about
the selection of Republican Philip Zelikow as executive director (see Shortly
Before January 27, 2003), a decision made solely by chairman Tom Kean and
vice chairman Lee Hamilton. Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste will say
Zelikow’s appointment was “presented as a fait accompli.” Ben-Veniste is also
alarmed by Zelikow’s links to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see
1995 and January 3, 2001), and he and fellow commissioner Max Cleland are
upset about the proposed staff structure (see Around February 2003). There is
to be a single staff led by Zelikow, and the commissioners will not have personal
staffers, although this is usual on such commissions. Ben-Veniste proposes that
each commissioner develop an expertise in a specific field, but this plan is
blocked by Kean, Hamilton, and Zelikow. Kean and Hamilton also say that the
commissioners can visit the commission’s offices, but cannot have a permanent
presence there. Indeed, not even Kean and Hamilton will have an office in the
commission’s building. Author Philip Shenon will comment: “To Ben-Veniste, the
way the staff was being organized guaranteed that the commissioners’
involvement in the details of the investigation would be limited. It centralized
control in Zelikow’s hands.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 69-70]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Lee Hamilton, Max Cleland, Richard Ben-Veniste
Shortly Before January 27, 2003: 9/11 Commission Hires Philip

Zelikow as Executive Director Despite His Links to National
Security Adviser Rice
The 9/11 Commission hires Philip Zelikow for the key position of executive
director, the person actually in charge of the commission’s day-to-day affairs.
Zelikow was recommended by Commissioner Slade Gorton, who had worked with
Zelikow on an electoral reform commission after the disputed presidential
election in 2000. Zelikow, the director of that commission, has powerful friends
in Washington; even former president Jimmy Carter praises him. However,
according to author Philip Shenon, the staff on the electoral reform commission
think he is “arrogant and secretive,” and believe his success as commission
director rested on “his ability to serve the needs—and stroke the egos” of the
commissioners.
Plans for Commission - Zelikow impresses commission Chairman Tom Kean by
saying that he wants the panel’s final report to be written for the general
public, in a more readable style than most government documents. After about
20 candidates have been considered, Kean decides that Zelikow is the best
choice for the position.
Conflict of Interests - Zelikow has a conflict of interests, as he co-authored a
book with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see 1995) and also served
on a special White House intelligence advisory board. Both these facts are listed
on his résumé. Zelikow will say that he also mentioned his work with Rice,
whom he served on the Bush administration transition team (see January 2001),
to Kean and Vice-chairman Lee Hamilton in telephone conversations with them.
However, Kean will later say he “wasn’t sure” if he knew of Zelikow’s work on
the transition team at the time he was hired, and Hamilton will say that he
thought he knew Zelikow had worked on the transition, but did not know the
details of what he did. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card will be
extremely surprised by Zelikow’s appointment, because of his personality and
the conflicts of interest, or at least the appearance of them.
Omissions from Press Release - Zelikow’s hiring is announced in a press release
issued on January 27. Shenon will later point out that the release, written based
on information provided by Zelikow and reviewed by him before publication, is
“notable for what it did not say.” It does not mention his work for the National
Security Council in the 1980s, the book with Rice, his role on the White House
transition team, or the fact he has just written a policy paper that is going to be
used to justify the invasion of Iraq (see September 20, 2002). In fact, the Bush
administration transition team had downgraded the position of counterterrorism
“tsar” Richard Clarke, and Zelikow had played a key role in this decision (see
January 3, 2001). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 58-62, 65-67]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Thomas Kean, 9/11 Commission, Philip Shenon, Lee
Hamilton
January 27, 2003: Richard Clarke Amazed at Zelikow’s Hiring by

9/11 Commission, Thinks ‘The Fix Is In’
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is extremely surprised when he learns
the 9/11 Commission has hired Philip Zelikow as its executive director (see
Shortly Before January 27, 2003). According to author Philip Shenon, he says
aloud, “The fix is in,” and wonders why anybody would have hired a friend of
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice to investigate her, amongst others.
Clarke had previously thought that the 9/11 Commission might get to the truth
of how President George Bush and Rice had ignored the intelligence in the run-
up to 9/11, but Zelikow’s appointment dashes these hopes. Shenon will describe
Clarke’s reaction as: “[T]here [is] no hope that the Commission would carry out
an impartial investigation of the Bush administration’s bungling of terrorist
threats in the months before September 11. Could anyone have a more obvious
conflict of interest than Zelikow?” Clarke, who dislikes Zelikow personally,
wonders whether he has told the commissioners that he was one of the
architects of Clarke’s demotion at the start of the Bush administration (see
January 3, 2001). He is certain that Zelikow will not want a proper investigation
of the transition to the Bush administration, as he was such a central part of it.
[SHENON, 2008, PP. 63-65]
Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Philip Zelikow, Philip Shenon
January 27, 2003: 9/11 Commission Starts Off with Little Funding
The 9/11 Commission, officially titled the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, holds its first meeting in Washington. The
commission has $3 million and only a year and a half to explore the causes of
the attacks. By comparison, a 1996 federal commission to study legalized
gambling was given two years and $5 million. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/27/2003] Two
months later the Bush administration grudgingly increases the funding to $12
million total (see March 26, 2003). [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/27/2003] A few days later,
Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton says, “The focus of the commission will be on the
future. We want to make recommendations that will make the American people
more secure.… We’re not interested in trying to assess blame, we do not
consider that part of the commission’s responsibility.” [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL,
2/6/2003]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Commission, Bush administration (43), Lee Hamilton
January 27, 2003: 9/11 Commission Decides It Will Not Issue

Subpoenas
At its first formal meeting, the 9/11 Commission decides it will not routinely
issue subpoenas for the documents it wants from other agencies.
Different Opinions - There is some debate on the matter. Commissioner Jamie
Gorelick argues that the Commission should issue subpoenas for all requests it
makes to the administration for documents or other information, saying that a
subpoena is simply evidence of the Commission’s determination to get what it
needs. She also worries that if the Commission waits to issue subpoenas, the
time limit on its activities will mean that a late subpoena could not be
enforced. However, she is only supported by the other three ordinary
Democratic commissioners, with the top Democrat on the Commission, Vice
Chairman Lee Hamilton, siding with the Republicans.
Decision Already Taken - Author Philip Shenon will write: “But [Chairman Tom]
Kean and Hamilton had already made up their mind on this issue, too. There
would be no routine subpoenas, they decreed; subpoenas would be seen as too
confrontational, perhaps choking off cooperation from the Bush administration
from the very start of the investigation.” The four Democratic commissioners
cannot issue a subpoena by themselves, as it requires the approval of either six
of the 10 commissioners, or both Kean and Hamilton. This is not the only
occasion on which Hamilton’s Republican leanings become apparent (see March
2003-July 2004). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 70-71]
Staffer Critical - John Farmer, leader of the Commission’s team investigating
events on the day of the attacks, will be critical of the decision and will urge
Kean and Hamilton to change their minds. If subpoenas are issued at the start,
the Commission will have time to enforce them in court and the agencies
“would know that they couldn’t run out the clock,” whereas if subpoenas were
issued later, after non-compliance with document requests, the agencies could
use such tactics. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 201]
Difficulties with Receiving Documents - As a result of this policy, the Commission
will have trouble getting documents from the White House (see June 2003),
Defense Department (see July 7, 2003), FAA (see November 6, 2003), and CIA
(see October 2003), leading to delays in its investigation.
Entity Tags: Lee Hamilton, John Farmer, 9/11 Commission, Jamie Gorelick, Thomas
Kean
After January 27, 2003: 9/11 Commissioner Cleland Disappointed

with Start of Inquiry
Following the 9/11 Commission’s first formal meeting, Democratic commissioner
Max Cleland is unhappy with the state of the inquiry. Specifically, he dislikes the
facts that the Commission will not issue subpoenas for the documents it wants
(see January 27, 2003) and will have a single non-partisan staff headed by
executive director Philip Zelikow, who is close to National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice (see Shortly Before January 27, 2003). In addition, he is
disappointed by the resignations of Henry Kissinger (see December 13, 2002) and
George Mitchell (see December 11, 2002). Although Kissinger is a Republican,
Cleland had believed that “with Kissinger… we were going to get somewhere,”
because: “This is Henry Kissinger. He’s the big dog.” Kissinger’s replacement Tom
Kean has no experience in Washington and Cleland thinks he is “not going to be
the world’s greatest tiger in asking a difficult question.” Cleland respects
Mitchell’s replacement Lee Hamilton, but knows that he has a reputation for a
non-confrontational style of politics, the reason he was initially passed over for
the position of vice chairman of the Commission (see Before November 27,
2002). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 71-72]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Max Cleland
Late January 2003: White House Counsel Gonzales Denies 9/11

Commission Access to White House Documents
White House counsel Alberto Gonzales denies a request made by the 9/11
Commission for access to a number of White House documents pertaining to
9/11, citing executive privilege. The documents date from both the Clinton and
Bush administrations. The request is made by Philip Zelikow, the Commission’s
executive director, who believes the Commission must see the documents if it is
to do its job properly, and that the White House has already indicated the
Commission will get what it wants. The documents include highly classified
presidential daily briefings (PDBs), the “crown jewels” of US intelligence
reporting. Only a very few such PDBs have ever been made available, from the
Johnson and Nixon administrations. Zelikow says the Commission needs to see
the PDBs so it can determine what warnings Clinton and Bush received about al-
Qaeda. However, the PDBs had not been provided to the 9/11 Congressional
Inquiry, and Gonzales says they will not be given to the 9/11 Commission either.
Zelikow tells Gonzales that this would be bad for the Commission and the US,
recalling the uproar that ensued when it was discovered the CIA had withheld
documents from the Warren Commission that investigated the murder of
President Kennedy. Zelikow also pressures Gonzales by threatening to resign
from the Commission if it is not given the documents, knowing this will generate
extremely bad publicity for the White House.
Refusal to Meet with Zelikow - However, Gonzales refuses to cave in and, a few
days later, makes what author Philip Shenon calls a “blunt and undiplomatic”
phone call to Tom Kean, the Commission’s chairman. He tells Kean that he does
not want to see Zelikow ever again, which means that in the future he will only
discuss access to the documents with Kean and Commission Vice Chairman Lee
Hamilton.
Alleged Involvement of Rove - The battle over access to documents and
witnesses will go on for some time (see June 2003), and commissioner John
Lehman will say that White House political adviser Karl Rove is “very much
involved” in it. According to Lehman, “Gonzales cleared everything with Rove,”
and friends tell him that “Rove was the quarterback for dealing with the
Commission,” although the White House will deny this. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 73-76,
176]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Thomas Kean, John Lehman, Alberto R. Gonzales, Karl C.
Rove
Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow, 9/11
Investigations
Late January 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Tells CIA 9/11 Was
Its Fault; CIA Is Displeased
9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow makes his first visit to the
CIA, where he meets Mark Lowenthal, a CIA staffer responsible for liaising with
9/11 investigations, and Winston Wiley, the CIA’s assistant director for homeland
security. Both men have met Zelikow before and Wiley dislikes him, later saying
that Zelikow “reeks of arrogance,” and, “Here’s a guy who spent his career
trying to insinuate himself into power so when something like this came his way,
he could grab it.”
Recriminations at First Meeting - Although the visit is just supposed to be an
initial meeting introducing the 9/11 Commission to the CIA, according to
Lowenthal, Zelikow starts by saying, “If you had a national intelligence director,
none of this would have ever happened.” According to Wiley, Zelikow says that
9/11 was the result of a “massive failure” at the CIA and happened because
“you guys weren’t connected to the rest of the community.” Zelikow will later
say that he has no recollection of making these remarks and did not have a firm
opinion on a director of national intelligence at this time, but both Lowenthal
and Wiley will recall both the remarks and being extremely surprised by
Zelikow’s tone. Lowenthal thinks that Zelikow has already decided that the
intelligence community needs to be restructured, with a national intelligence
director appointed above the CIA director, and that Zelikow is “going to make
this [the 9/11 investigation] all about the CIA.”
Tenet's Reaction - When Lowenthal warns CIA Director George Tenet about the
interview, Tenet cannot believe what Lowenthal is telling him and thinks
Lowenthal may have misheard Zelikow. According to journalist and author Philip
Shenon, Tenet thinks the idea the CIA is most responsible for 9/11 is “crazy” and
the idea of creating a national intelligence director “even nuttier.” Tenet is sure
that the “incompetent, arrogant FBI” is most at fault for 9/11 and that if
Zelikow gets out of hand, he can deal with the situation by talking to some of
the 9/11 commissioners he knows. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 76-80]
Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Philip Zelikow, 9/11
Commission, Winston Wiley, Mark Lowenthal
(February 2003): White House Repeatedly Contacts 9/11

Commission Chairman to Discuss Appointment of Commission’s
Counsel
Following the appointment of the Republican Philip Zelikow as the 9/11
Commission’s executive director (see Shortly Before January 27, 2003),
Democrats on the commission demand that its general counsel be a Democrat.
However, some of the Republican commissioners are unhappy about this, and
inform the White House what is happening. Shortly after this, Commission
Chairman Tom Kean hears from White House Chief of Staff Andy Card and others
at the White House that they are concerned the commission is attempting to
find a partisan Democrat. Kean will later say, “They were very, very alarmed
when they heard some of the names being considered.” Both Kean and Vice
Chairman Lee Hamilton, himself a Democrat, agree that the counsel should be a
Democrat, but, according to author Philip Shenon, they do not want “a
candidate who seemed eager to confront the Bush administration.”
Two Rejected Candidates - One name considered is that of James Hamilton (no
relation to Lee Hamilton), who had been a lawyer on the Senate Watergate
committee. However, he had worked on the 2000 Florida recount for Al Gore, so
Kean rules him out. Another name considered is Carol Elder Bruce, but at her
interview she says issuing subpoenas for documents the commission wants would
be a good idea, although Kean and Hamilton have already decided against this
(see January 27, 2003).
Daniel Marcus Hired - In the end, the position is given to Daniel Marcus, a lawyer
who had served in the Clinton administration and specializes in constitutional
and regulatory law. Marcus has no ties to Democratic political operations, so he
is acceptable to the Republicans on the commission. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 92-95]
Entity Tags: James Hamilton, Andrew Card, Daniel Marcus, Philip Shenon, Thomas Kean,
Lee Hamilton, Carol Elder Bruce
Around February 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director

Zelikow Assumes Responsibility for Hiring Commission’s Staff
Recently hired 9/11
Commission Executive
Director Philip Zelikow
assumes responsibility for
hiring the rest of the
commission’s staff.
According to an
agreement with the
commission’s chairman
and vice chairman, Tom
Kean and Lee Hamilton,
9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean (left) and Vice-chairman the two of them can veto
Lee Hamilton (right) allowed Executive Director Philip Zelikow the people he chooses, or
(center) to handle the hiring of the commission’s staff. [Source:
Ron Sachs/Consolidated News Photos] even insist that a person
Zelikow does not want is
hired. However, these powers are exercised rarely, if at all, and, according to
author Philip Shenon, it is “left mostly to Zelikow to choose who would conduct
the investigations and how their responsibilities would be divided.” In one
instance, Zelikow puts potential hire Navy lieutenant Kevin Shaeffer, who was
badly injured at the Pentagon on 9/11, through a grueling interview before
offering him a job. Shenon will comment that Zelikow did this “to make it clear
to everyone that he was in charge; the people being hired for the commission
worked for him.” The fact that commissioners do not have their own staffers
also enhances Zelikow’s power. Zelikow will comment: “If commissioners have
their own personal staff, this empowers commissioners to pursue their own
agenda. [If there is a single nonpartisan staff it] doesn’t mean that the
commissioners are powerless, It means that they are powerless individually and
powerful together.” Shenon will point out: “It also meant that, ultimately, the
staff answered to Zelikow. Every one of them. If information gathered by the
staff was to be passed to the commissioners, it would have to go through
Zelikow.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 81-83]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Kevin Shaeffer, Philip Shenon, Philip Zelikow

Zelikow Assumes Close Control of Key Commission Team
After the 9/11 Commission’s staff is divided into nine teams, the commission’s
executive director, Philip Zelikow, begins to closely supervise the work done by
the commission’s team 3, which is investigating counterterrorism policy. Author
Philip Shenon will later point out that this team is responsible for the “most
politically sensitive” portion of the commission’s work, because it is to “review
the performance of the Bush and Clinton administrations in dealing with al-
Qaeda threats before 9/11.” It will have access to CIA and NSC files, and is
tasked with determining whether the Clinton administration did enough to
destroy al-Qaeda and why “the Bush administration had seemed to do so little in
response to the flood of terrorism warnings in the months before 9/11.” Zelikow
soon makes it clear that this team is his priority, carefully checking the lists of
documents and interviews the commission is asking the Bush administration for.
He also announces that he wants to be present at all the major interviews.
Shenon will comment: “At first, members of the team found it flattering that
Zelikow wanted to spend so much of his own time and energy on the work of
Team 3. Their suspicion of his motives grew later.” As time goes on, the team
members are startled to discover that he wants to “be involved in the smallest
details of their work” to such an extent that he “ignore[s] the work of other
teams of investigators,” who are even moved out of the commission’s main
building and into separate “dark, claustrophobic” offices known as “the Cave.”
[SHENON, 2008, PP. 86-87, 145]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Philip Shenon, Philip Zelikow
(February-April 2003): 9/11 Commissioners Rarely Visit

Commission’s Offices, Giving Executive Director Zelikow More
Power
In the first few months of the 9/11 Commission’s investigation, the ten
commissioners rarely visit the staff’s offices, partly because they are not
allowed to have their own offices there. This means that the commissioners are
separated from the staff, and that Executive Director Philip Zelikow acquires
more control of the inquiry. Author Philip Shenon will write: “[T]he staff could
see that with every passing day, Zelikow was centralizing control of the day-to-
day investigation in his own hands. He was becoming the eleventh commissioner
and, in many ways, more powerful than the others.… Zelikow was in charge.”
[SHENON, 2008, PP. 69-70, 85-86]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Philip Shenon, 9/11 Commission

Zelikow Appoints Current CIA Officer to Lead Investigation of CIA
9/11 Commission executive director Philip Zelikow appoints Michael Hurley—a
20-year CIA officer still actively employed—to lead the Commission’s
investigation of counterterrorism policy prior to 9/11. This team will be
responsible for reviewing the performance of the CIA and NSC (see Around
February 2003). Hurley and his team will also be responsible for examining the
pre-9/11 conduct of former CIA bin Laden unit manager Rich Blee, even though
Hurley presumably served under Blee in Afghanistan after 9/11. Following the
9/11 attacks, Blee was made Kabul station chief (see December 9, 2001) and
Hurley served three tours in Afghanistan. According to his biography at the 9/11
Public Discourse Project, “[Hurley] was one of the agency’s lead coordinators on
the ground of Operation Anaconda, the largest battle against al-Qaeda in the
campaign in Afghanistan” (see March 2-13, 2002). The biography also states:
“From 1998-1999, and again in 2000, he was detailed to the National Security
Council, where he was director for the Balkans, and advised the national
security adviser and the president on Balkans policy. Over the past decade he
has been a leader in US interventions in troubled areas: Kosovo (1999-2000);
Bosnia (1995-1996); and Haiti (during the US intervention, 1994-1995). Michael
Hurley has held a range of management positions at CIA headquarters and
served multiple tours of duty in western Europe.” [9/11 PUBLIC DISCOURSE PROJECT,
8/8/2008] Author Philip Shenon will describe Hurley as “a battle-hardened spy on
loan to the Commission from the CIA.” Besides Hurley, other staffers on the
counterterrorism review team are Warren Bass, a “terrorism researcher at the
Council for Foreign Relations in New York” who will “focus on the NSC,” and
Alexis Albion, a “doctoral candidate in intelligence studies at Harvard” who will
be “the central researcher on the CIA.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 87]
Entity Tags: Warren Bass, Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Commission, Alexis Albion, Michael
Hurley
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow
March 2003: Zelikow and 9/11 Commission Consultant Complete

Outline of Final Report before Staff Start Writing It
9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow and Ernest May, a long-time
associate of Zelikow and consultant to the commission, complete an outline of
the commission’s final report, although the commission has barely began its
work and will not report for another 16 months. The outline is detailed and
contains chapter headings, subheadings, and sub-subheadings. The outline
anticipates a 16-chapter report (note: the final report only has 13) that starts
with a history of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa against the US.
There will then be chapters on US counterterrorism policy, threat reporting
leading up to 9/11, and the attacks themselves will be in chapter seven (in the
final report, the day of 9/11 chapter is moved to the start).
"Blinding Effects of Hindsight" - Zelikow and May even have a chapter ten
entitled “Problems of Foresight—And Hindsight,” with a sub-chapter on “the
blinding effects of hindsight,” (actually chapter 11 in the final report, slightly
renamed “Foresight—And Hindsight;” the “blinding effects” sub-heading does
not appear in the final version, but the chapter starts with a meditation on the
value of hindsight).
Kept Secret - Zelikow shows the report to Commission Chairman Tom Kean and
Vice-chairman Lee Hamilton and they like it, but think it could be seen as
evidence that they have pre-determined the outcome. Therefore, they all
decide it should be kept secret from the commission’s staff. According to May it
is “treated as if it were the most classified document the commission
possessed.” Zelikow comes up with his own internal classification system,
labeling it “Commission Sensitive,” a phrase that appears on the top and bottom
of each page.
Staff Alarmed - When the staff find out about it and are given copies over a year
later, they are alarmed. They realize that the sections of the report about the
Bush administration’s failings will be in the middle of the report, and the reader
will have to wade past chapters on al-Qaeda’s history to get to them. Author
Philip Shenon will comment: “Many assumed the worst when they saw that
Zelikow had proposed a portion of the report entitled ‘The Blinding Effects of
Hindsight.’ What ‘blinding hindsight’? They assumed Zelikow was trying to
dismiss the value of hindsight regarding the Bush administration’s pre-9/11
performance.” In addition, some staffers begin circulating a parody entitled
“The Warren Commission Report—Preemptive Outline.” One of the parody’s
chapter headings is “Single Bullet: We Haven’t Seen the Evidence Yet. But
Really. We’re Sure.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004; SHENON, 2008, PP. 388-389]
Entity Tags: Lee Hamilton, Ernest May, Thomas Kean, 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow
March 2003-July 2004: White House Has Better Relationship with

9/11 Commission’s Democratic Vice Chairman than Republican
Chairman
The White House comes to prefer dealing with the 9/11 Commission’s vice
chairman, Democrat Lee Hamilton, rather than its Republican chairman Tom
Kean. Author Philip Shenon will comment: “The White House found that its best
support on the Commission came from an unexpected corner—from Lee
Hamilton.… Hamilton, they could see, was as much a man of the Washington
establishment as he was a Democratic partisan. Probably more so.” This is
because Hamilton, a friend of Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “underst[ands] the prerogatives of the White House—
in particular, the concept of executive privilege—in a way that Kean d[oes] not
or w[ill] not.” White House chief of staff Andrew Card will comment: “I came to
really respect Lee Hamilton. I think he listened better to our concerns better
than Tom Kean.” The White House even comes to view Kean as disloyal,
effectively operating as one of the Commission’s Democrats, while Hamilton is a
de facto Republican (see Early July 2004). Kean will later say, “I think the White
House believed Lee was more reliable than I was.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 177] Hamilton
previously helped Republicans cover up political scandals (see Mid-1980s and
1992-January 1993). He is friends with Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and trusts them to tell the truth (see Before
November 27, 2002).
Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Andrew Card, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission, Philip Shenon
February 2003 or After: 9/11 Commission Staff Set up ‘Back-

Channel Network’ to Report on Executive Director Zelikow’s
Behavior
Members of the 9/11 Commission’s staff who are suspicious of the partisanship
of the Commission’s executive director, Philip Zelikow, establish what author
Philip Shenon calls a “back-channel network” through which reports of Zelikow’s
behavior can be passed. The staff members are suspicious of Zelikow because
they think he is close to the Bush administration, in particular National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see January 3, 2001), whose interests he defends on
the Commission (see May-June 2004). The network’s aim is to “alert the
Democratic commissioners when [staff] thought Zelikow was up to no good.”
Commissioner Tim Roemer will say that he often gets phone calls late at night or
on weekends at home from staffers who want to talk about Zelikow. “It was like
Deep Throat,” he will later say (see May 31, 2005). Richard Ben-Veniste is
another one of the Democratic commissioners involved in the network. [SHENON,
2008, PP. 375]
Entity Tags: Richard Ben-Veniste, 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, Tim Roemer
March 2, 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Tries

to Prevent Staff Talking Directly to Commissioners
The 9/11 Commission’s executive director Philip Zelikow issues a five-page
memo, entitled “What Do I Do Now?” telling newly hired staff members how to
go about their jobs on the Commission. The most controversial part of the memo
prevents staffers from returning calls from commissioners, stating: “If you are
contacted by a commissioner, please contact [deputy executive director] Chris
[Kojm] or me. We will be sure that the appropriate members of the
Commission’s staff are responsive.” Author Philip Shenon will write that the
staffers are surprised by this: “It occurred to several of the staff members,
especially those with experience on other federal commissions, that Zelikow
was trying to cut off their contact with the people they really worked for—the
commissioners.”
Part of Memo Rescinded - When commissioner Jamie Gorelick learns of the

restriction, she calls the Commission’s chairman and vice chairman, Tom Kean
and Lee Hamilton, and tells them this is unacceptable. Fellow commissioner Max
Cleland also thinks the order is a bad idea, and will later say, “It violates the
spirit of an open look at what the hell happened on 9/11.” Zelikow is forced to
rescind this portion of the memo, allowing commissioners free access to the
staff.
Other Restrictions - Other rules in the memo include:
Commission staff should not disclose the exact location of the Commission’s
offices for security reasons;
Staffers should never talk to reporters about the Commission’s work, because
“there are no innocent conversations with reporters.” Zelikow or his deputy
should be notified of such calls. A breach of this rule can get a staffer fired; and
All staffers have to prepare a confidential memo describing potential conflicts
of interest. Shenon will comment, “Staff members who knew some of Zelikow’s
own conflicts of interest found it amusing that he was so worried about theirs.”
[9/11 COMMISSION, 3/2/2003; SHENON, 2008, PP. 83-85]
Entity Tags: Philip Shenon, Jamie Gorelick, 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, Max
Cleland
March 26, 2003: President Bush Turns Down Increased Budget for
9/11 Commission
Time magazine reports that the 9/11 Commission has requested an additional
$11 million to add to the $3 million for the commission, and the Bush
administration has turned down the request. The request will not be added to a
supplemental spending bill. A Republican member of the commission says the
decision will make it “look like they have something to hide.” Another
commissioner notes that the recent commission on the Columbia shuttle crash
will have a $50 million budget. Stephen Push, a leader of the 9/11 victims’
families, says the decision “suggests to me that they see this as a convenient
way for allowing the commission to fail. they’ve never wanted the commission
and I feel the White House has always been looking for a way to kill it without
having their finger on the murder weapon.” The administration has suggested it
may grant the money later, but any delay will further slow down the
commission’s work. Already, commission members are complaining that scant
progress has been made in the four months since the commission started, and
they are operating under a deadline. [TIME, 3/26/2003] Three days later, it is
reported that the Bush administration has agreed to extra funding, but only $9
million, not $11 million. The commission agrees to the reduced amount.
[WASHINGTON POST, 3/29/2003] The New York Times criticizes such penny-pinching,
saying, “Reasonable people might wonder if the White House, having failed in its
initial attempt to have Henry Kissinger steer the investigation, may be resorting
to budgetary starvation as a tactic to hobble any politically fearless inquiry.”
[NEW YORK TIMES, 3/31/2003]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Stephen Push, Bush administration (43)
March 27, 2003: Security Clearance of 9/11 Commission Members

Stalled
It is reported that “most members” of the 9/11 Commission still have not
received security clearances. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/27/2003] For instance, Slade
Gorton, picked in December 2002, is a former senator with a long background in
intelligence issues. Fellow commissioner Lee Hamilton says, “It’s kind of
astounding that someone like Senator Gorton can’t get immediate clearance.
It’s a matter we are concerned about.” The commission is said to be at a
“standstill” because of the security clearance issue, and cannot even read the
classified findings of the previous 9/11 Congressional Inquiry. [SEATTLE TIMES,

3/12/2003]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Slade Gorton, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry
March 28, 2003: Independence of 9/11 Commission Called Into

Question
An article highlights conflicts of interest amongst the commissioners on the 9/11
Commission. It had been previously reported that many of the commissioners
had ties to the airline industry (see December 16, 2002), but a number have
other ties. “At least three of the ten commissioners serve as directors of
international financial or consulting firms, five work for law firms that represent
airlines and three have ties to the US military or defense contractors, according
to personal financial disclosures they were required to submit.” Bryan Doyle,
project manager for the watchdog group Aviation Integrity Project says, “It is
simply a failure on the part of the people making the selections to consider the
talented pool of non-conflicted individuals.” Commission chairman Thomas Kean
says that members are expected to steer clear of discussions that might present
even the appearance of a conflict. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/28/2003]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, Bryan Doyle
9:15 a.m. - 9:45 a.m. March 31, 2003: 9/11 Commission Says It
Will Not ‘Point Fingers,’ Family Members Are Disappointed
After his opening comments on the first day of the 9/11 Commission’s first
hearing, Chairman Tom Kean says, “We will be following paths, and we will
follow those individual paths wherever they lead,” adding: “We may end up
holding individual agencies, people, and procedures to account. But our
fundamental purpose will not be to point fingers.” According to author Philip
Shenon, there is “a rumble in the audience, even a few groans,” as the victims’
family members realize “what the Commission would not do: It did not intend to
make a priority of blaming government officials for 9/11.” Shenon will add: “A
few of the family advocates cocked their ears, wondering if they had heard Kean
correctly. They had pushed so hard to create the Commission because they
wanted fingers pointed at the government. And Kean knew it; the families had
told him that over and over again in their early meetings. For many families,
this investigation was supposed to be all about finger pointing. They wanted
strict accountability, especially at the White House, the CIA, the FBI, the
Pentagon, and other agencies that had missed the clues that might have
prevented 9/11. The families wanted subpoenas—and indictments and jail
sentences, if that was where the facts led.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 99]
Lack of Publicity - This hearing and the next two do not receive much publicity
and Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton will later
call them “background policy hearings in front of a C-SPAN audience.” They will
later say that at this point the Commission “was not ready to present findings
and answers,” since the various staff teams are nowhere near completing their
tasks. For example, the team investigating the air defense failure on the day of
9/11 will not even issue a subpoena for the documents it needs until autumn
(see Late October 2003 and November 6, 2003). [KEAN AND HAMILTON, 2006, PP. 127-8]
Close to a Disaster - Referring to various problems with the first hearing,
including confusion over logistics, low turnout by the public, and the discontent
from the victims’ families, Shenon will say that this first public hearing “came
close to being a disaster.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 97]
Entity Tags: Philip Shenon, 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, Lee Hamilton
9:45 a.m.-10:15 a.m. March 31, 2003: New York Officials Testify
to 9/11 Commission, Mayor Tries to ‘Blindside’ Inquiry
At its first public hearing, the 9/11 Commission takes testimony from New York
Governor George Pataki and Mayor Michael Bloomberg. Pataki arrives early and
insists that he be allowed to speak immediately, so Commission Chairman Tom
Kean interrupts the commissioners’ opening statements expressing their pride in
serving on the investigation. Pataki then reads a prepared statement pledging
the state’s co-operation with the investigation and leaves without taking
questions. Bloomberg testifies next. He had originally said he would not appear,
but would send a written statement to be read by somebody else. Then he
agreed to appear, but said he would not take questions. Then he agreed to take
questions, but insisted his police and fire commissioners would not accompany
him. However, he arrives with both of them and says they will take questions.
Author Philip Shenon will comment, “it was clear to the commissioners and the
staff that the mayor was trying to blindside them,” as the Commission had not
had the chance to prepare questions for the police and fire commissioners, vital
witnesses in their inquiry. When Bloomberg enters the room to testify, in
Shenon’s words, “In a gesture that seem[s] designed to make his disdain even
clearer, he casually tosse[s] his prepared testimony onto the witness table
before taking his seat, as if this were a routine meeting of the zoning board.”
When he starts, he offers an aggressive defense of the way the city responded
to the attack, and sharp criticism of the way federal emergency preparedness
funds are distributed. Bloomberg conducts himself in this way throughout the
inquiry (see November 2003), and Shenon will write that it is never clear if
Bloomberg is “genuinely furious or if his anger [is] a well-choreographed show
by the billionaire mayor to intimidate the 9/11 Commission.” The Commission
does not schedule testimony from former New York Mayor Rudi Giuliani for this
day, as it wants to wait until it better understands his performance on the day
of the attacks. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 96-98, 100-101]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, George E. Pataki, Michael R. Bloomberg, Philip Shenon,
Thomas Kean
11:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m. March 31, 2003: US Government Draws

Harsh Criticism at First 9/11 Commission Hearing
Following introductory statements by 9/11
Commissioners (see 9:15 a.m. - 9:45 a.m. March
31, 2003) and questioning of New York officials,
several of the victims’ relatives testify on the
first day of the Commission’s first hearing. One
relative is selected from each of the four
organizations they have formed. [SHENON, 2008,
PP. 102] The relatives are unhappy and, as the
Miami Herald reports, “Several survivors of the
attack and victims’ relatives testified that a
number of agencies, from federal to local, are
ducking responsibility for a series of
Mindy Kleinberg. [Source: Public breakdowns before and during September 11.”
domain]
[MIAMI HERALD, 3/31/2003] The New York Times
suggests that the 9/11 Commission would never have been formed if it were not
for the pressure of the 9/11 victims’ relatives. [NEW YORK TIMES, 4/1/2003] Some of
the relatives strongly disagree with statements from some commissioners that
they should not place blame. For instance, Stephen Push states: “I think this
Commission should point fingers.… Some of those people [who failed us] are still
in responsible positions in government. Perhaps they shouldn’t be.” [UNITED PRESS
INTERNATIONAL, 3/31/2003] The most critical testimony comes from 9/11 relative
Mindy Kleinberg, but her testimony is only briefly reported on by a few
newspapers. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 3/31/2003; NEWSDAY, 4/1/2003; NEW YORK TIMES,
In her testimony,
4/1/2003; NEW YORK POST, 4/1/2003; NEW JERSEY STAR-LEDGER, 4/1/2003]
Kleinberg says: “It has been said that the intelligence agencies have to be right
100 percent of the time and the terrorists only have to get lucky once. This
explanation for the devastating attacks of September 11th, simple on its face, is
wrong in its value. Because the 9/11 terrorists were not just lucky once: They
were lucky over and over again.” She points out the insider trading based on
9/11 foreknowledge, the failure of fighter jets to catch the hijacked planes in
time, hijackers getting visas in violation of standard procedures, and other
events, and asks how the hijackers could have been lucky so many times. [9/11
COMMISSION, 3/31/2003]
Entity Tags: Mindy Kleinberg, Stephen Push, 9/11 Commission
Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism, 9/11 Commission, 9/11
Investigations
2:00 p.m. March 31, 2003: First Expert Witness for 9/11
Commission Promotes Iraq War
Abraham Sofaer of the Hoover Institution, a conservative think tank, becomes
the first expert witness to testify before the 9/11 Commission. He uses this
opportunity to express his support for the war in Iraq. Sofaer, a former federal
judge and State Department legal adviser, will later say that he was pleased to
testify before the Commission and that he knew what an honor it was to be the
first expert witness. According to author Philip Shenon, the witness list was
drawn up by Philip Zelikow, the Commission’s executive director, who appears to
be a supporter of the Iraq war (see June 14, 2002). Despite Sofaer’s experience,
Shenon will think it “odd” that he is the first expert witness, as he has “no
special expertise on the events of September 11.” Instead, he advocates the
recent US invasion of Iraq and champions the concept of “preemptive defense”
or “preemptive war,” even against a country that poses no imminent military
threat. “The president’s principles are strategically necessary, morally sound,
and legally defensible,” Sofaer says. He also criticizes the perceived policy of
former President Bill Clinton, saying, “The notion that criminal prosecution
could bring a terrorist group like al-Qaeda to justice is absurd.” In the future,
he says, when an enemy “rises up to kill you,” the US should “rise up and kill
him first.” He calls on the Commission to endorse the preemptive war concept,
and, in effect, the invasion of Iraq. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 103-104]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Abraham Sofaer, 9/11 Commission, Philip Shenon
April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Refuses to Approve Half

of Interview Requests for ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
Two investigators on the 9/11 Commission, Mike Jacobson and Dana Leseman,
compile a list of interviews they want to do to investigate leads indicating that
two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, were linked to
elements of the Saudi government. The list is submitted to Philip Zelikow, the
commission’s executive director, for approval. However, a few days later
Zelikow replies that the twenty interviews requested is too much, and they can
only do half the interviews. Leseman, a former Justice Department lawyer, is
unhappy with this, as it is traditional to demand the widest range of documents
and interviews early on, so that reductions can be made later in negotiations if
need be.
'We Need the Interviews' - Leseman tells Zelikow that his decision is “very
arbitrary” and “crazy,” adding: “Philip, this is ridiculous. We need the
interviews. We need these documents. Why are you trying to limit our
investigation?” Zelikow says that he does not want to overwhelm federal
agencies with document and interview requests at an early stage of the
investigation, but, according to author Philip Shenon, after this, “Zelikow was
done explaining. He was not in the business of negotiating with staff who
worked for him.”

More Conflicts - This is the first of several conflicts between Zelikow and
Leseman, who, together with Jacobson, had been on the staff of the 9/11
Congressional Inquiry and had researched this issue there. Shenon will write:
“Leseman was that rare thing on the commission: She was not afraid of Zelikow;
she would not be intimidated by him. In fact, from the moment she arrived at
the commission’s offices on K Street, she seemed to almost relish the daily
combat with Zelikow, even if she wondered aloud to her colleagues why there
had to be any combat at all.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 109-111]
Later Fired, Evidence Deleted from Final Report - Zelikow will later fire
Leseman from the commission for mishandling classified information (see April
2003 and (April 2003)) and will have the evidence of the Saudi connection
gathered by Jacobson and Leseman’s successor, Raj De, deleted from the main
text of the commission’s report (see June 2004).
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Dana Leseman, Michael Jacobson, Philip Zelikow
Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Investigations
April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Blocks Access to Key

Document by ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow prevents two investigators,
Mike Jacobson and Dana Leseman, from viewing a key document they need for
their work. Jacobson and Leseman are working on the ‘Saudi Connection’
section of the commission’s investigation, researching leads that there may have
been a link between two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf
Alhazmi, and elements of the government of Saudi Arabia. Zelikow is also
involved in another, related dispute with Leseman at this time (see April 2003).
28 Pages - The classified document in question is part of the 9/11 Congressional
Inquiry, 28 pages that were redacted in the final report and concerned possible
Saudi government support for two of the 9/11 hijackers (see August 1-3, 2003).
The 28 pages were actually written by Jacobson and are obviously relevant to
his and Leseman’s work at the 9/11 Commission, but Jacobson cannot remember
every detail of what he wrote.
Stalled - Leseman therefore asks Zelikow to get her a copy, but Zelikow fails to
do so for weeks, instead concluding a deal with the Justice Department that
bans even 9/11 commissioners from some access to the Congressional Inquiry’s
files (see Before April 24, 2003). Leseman confronts Zelikow, demanding:
“Philip, how are we supposed to do our work if you won’t provide us with basic
research material?” Zelikow apparently does not answer, but storms away.
[SHENON, 2008, PP. 110-112]
Leseman Later Fired - Leseman later obtains the document through a channel
other than Zelikow, and will be fired for this (see (April 2003)).
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Commission, Dana Leseman
(April 2003): Zelikow Fires ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigator from

9/11 Commission in Dispute over 28 Redacted Pages from
Congressional Inquiry
9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow fires one of the commission’s
investigators, Dana Leseman, with whom he has had a number of conflicts (see
April 2003). Leseman and a colleague were researching a possible link between
two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, and elements
of the government of Saudi Arabia.
Blocked - The firing stems from a dispute over the handling of classified
information. Leseman asked Zelikow to provide her with a document she needed
for her work, 28 redacted pages from the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry report she
had helped research herself, but Zelikow had failed to do so for some time (see
April 2003 and August 1-3, 2003). Leseman then obtained a copy of the report
through a channel other than Zelikow, which is a breach of the commission’s
rules on handling classified information. Some colleagues will later say that this
is just a minor infraction of the rules, as the document is relevant to Leseman’s
work, she has the security clearance to see it, and she keeps it in a safe in the
commission’s offices. However, she does not actually have authorisation to have
the document at this point.
'Zero-Tolerance Policy' - Zelikow will later say she violated the commission’s
“zero-tolerance policy on the handling of classified information,” and that she
“committed a set of very serious violations in the handling of the most highly
classified information.” Zelikow is supported by the commission’s lawyer Daniel
Marcus, as they are both worried that a scandal about the mishandling of
classified information could seriously damage the commission’s ability to obtain
more classified information, and will be used as a stick to beat the commission
by its opponents.
Fired, Kept Secret - Zelikow is informed that Leseman has the document by a
staffer on one of the commission’s other teams who has also had a conflict with
Leseman, and fires her “only hours” after learning this. Luckily for the
commission and Leseman, no word of the firing reaches the investigation’s
critics in Congress. Author Philip Shenon will comment, “The fact that the news
did not leak was proof of how tightly Zelikow was able to control the flow of
information on the commission.”
'Do Not Cross Me' - Shenon will add: “To Leseman’s friends, it seemed that
Zelikow had accomplished all of his goals with her departure. He had gotten rid
of the one staff member who had emerged early on as his nemesis; he had
managed to eject her without attracting the attention of the press corps or the
White House. And he had found a way to send a message to the staff: ‘Do not
cross me’.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 110-113] Zelikow will later be investigated for
mishandling classified information himself, but will apparently be exonerated
(see Summer 2004).
Entity Tags: Daniel Marcus, Dana Leseman, Philip Shenon, 9/11 Commission, Philip
Zelikow
Before April 24, 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director

Zelikow Cuts off Commissioners’ Access to Congressional Inquiry
Files
9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow strikes a
deal with the Justice Department to cut the 9/11
Commission’s access to files compiled by the 9/11
Congressional Inquiry (see July 24, 2003) until the White
House is able to review them. However, he keeps the
agreement secret from the commissioners and, when
Commissioner Tim Roemer, who had actually sat on the
Congressional Inquiry and already seen the material, goes to
Capitol Hill to read the files on April 24, he is turned away.
Roemer is furious and asks: “Why is our executive director
making secret deals with the Justice Department and the
Tim Roemer. [Source: White House? He is supposed to be working for us.”
US Congress] [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/26/2003; SHENON, 2008, PP. 90] He adds, “No
entity, individual, or organization should sift through or filter our access to
material.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/30/2003] Author Philip Shenon will comment,
“Roemer believed, correctly, that it was a sign of much larger struggles to come
with Zelikow.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 90]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Commission, Tim Roemer, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry,
Philip Shenon
May 2003 and Before: 9/11 Commissioner Argues Panel Should

Investigate False Claims of Iraq Link to 9/11, but Other
Commissioners Not Interested
At early meetings of the 9/11 commission, Commissioner Max Cleland tries to
persuade the other commissioners that they should investigate the Bush
administration’s reasons for invading Iraq. Cleland wants to know whether the
president used 9/11 as an excuse to launch an attack he had been planning from
the beginning of his presidency. Cleland also thinks that the administration’s
obsession with Iraq was the reason it paid so little attention to the problem of
terrorism in the spring and summer of 2001, and tells the other commissioners,
“They were focused on Iraq, they were planning a war on Iraq, they were not
paying attention to the business at hand.” However, the commission’s chairman
and vice chairman, Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, as well as Executive Director
Philip Zelikow, are against this, as are some of the Republican commissioners,
perhaps because of the popularity of the Iraq war at this point. Author Philip
Shenon will say: “Even some of the Democrats [on the commission] were
distancing themselves from him. Cleland knew he was quickly becoming a
pariah.” Cleland will comment, “It was painfully obvious to me that there was
this blanket over the commission, adding, “Anybody who spoke out or dissented,
whether against George Bush, the White House, or the war against Iraq, was
going to be marginalized.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 129-130]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Commission, Max Cleland, Thomas Kean, Lee Hamilton
Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip
Zelikow, 9/11 Investigations
May-August 2003: 9/11 Commission Has Difficulty Gaining Access

to Recording of Air Threat Conference
Members of the 9/11 Commission are informed that the air threat conference
call, initiated by the military in response to the attacks on September 11, was
recorded. This call reportedly began at around 9:37 a.m. on 9/11. Throughout
the day, numerous key officials had participated in it, including the president,
the vice president, the secretary of defense, plus senior officials from the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD). Despite more than 18 months having passed since
the attacks, Pentagon officials say they have not yet transcribed the tapes of
the conference call. After the 9/11 Commission makes repeated requests, the
Pentagon finally creates a classified transcript. On August 6, this is forwarded to
the White House for an “executive-privilege review,” which is supposedly
required because of Vice President Cheney’s participation in the call. The
commission is then promised access to the 200-page transcript. However, the
fact that it is not time coded may hinder the commission’s ability to outline an
exact sequence of events, and commissioners say they may need to obtain the
actual tapes recordings. Whether they are eventually allowed full or partial
access to the tapes is unclear: The 9/11 Commission Report, released in 2004,
will make numerous references to the “[Defense Department] transcript, Air
Threat Conference Call.” It will only make one reference to “the tape… of the
air threat conference call,” which it says was used to help reconstruct events in
the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC). The report will state that
all the times it gives for the air threat conference call are estimates, believed
to be accurate within a three-minute margin of error. This would suggest it did
not have full access to the tape recordings. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 8/31/2003;
9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 37 AND 463-465] The recording of the air threat
conference call is of particular significance, because the National Military
Command Center (NMCC), which initiated the call, is—according to military
instructions—the “focal point within Department of Defense for providing
assistance” in response to hijackings in US airspace. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

6/1/2001 ]
Entity Tags: White House, US Department of Defense, 9/11 Commission
May 23, 2003: General Claims Military Notified of Flights 77 and

93 Earlier than Apparently Happened
The 9/11 Commission holds a public hearing at which it takes testimony from
military officials about the timeline of events on the day of 9/11. The key
witness is retired Air Force General Larry Arnold, who commanded NORAD’s
Continental US Region on the day of 9/11. Under questioning from commissioner
Richard Ben-Veniste, Arnold says, “I believe that to be a fact: that 9:24 was the
first time that we had been advised of American 77 as a possible hijacked
airplane.” However, the Commission will later conclude that the military was
not notified of the hijacking at this time, although it had been mistakenly
advised Flight 11 was inbound to Washington three minutes previously (see 9:21
a.m. September 11, 2001 and (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Arnold adds that
if the military was slow in responding to Flight 77, it was because “our focus—
you have got to remember that there’s a lot of other things going on
simultaneously here—was on United 93.” However, Flight 93 was not hijacked
until a few minutes after 9:24 (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Arnold
adds: “It was our intent to intercept United Flight 93. And in fact, my own staff,
we were orbiting now over Washington, DC, by this time, and I was personally
anxious to see what 93 was going to do, and our intent was to intercept it.”
However, the Commission will later conclude that the military did not learn that
Flight 93 had been hijacked until around 10:00 a.m. (see 10:03 a.m. September
11, 2001). Prior to the hearing, the Commission’s staff had been concerned
about the inaccuracy of timelines offered by the military. Author Philip Shenon
will write: “It seemed all the more remarkable to [Commission staffer John
Farmer] that the Pentagon could not establish a clear chronology of how it
responded to an attack on the Pentagon building itself. Wouldn’t the generals
and admirals want to know why their own offices—their own lives—had been put
at risk that morning?” Therefore, Farmer thought that the hearing should clear
things up, but, according to Shenon, he and his colleagues are “astonished”
when they analyze what Arnold says, although he is not under oath on this day.
Shenon will add, “It would later be determined that almost every one of those
assertions by General Arnold in May 2003 was flat wrong.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 119-
121]
Entity Tags: John Farmer, 9/11 Commission, Philip Shenon, Richard Ben-Veniste, Larry
Arnold
(Summer 2003): 9/11 Commissioner Tells White House of Saudi

Links to 9/11 Plotters, White House Uninterested
9/11 Commissioner John Lehman repeatedly meets with Bush administration
officials and discusses links between the 9/11 hijackers and Saudi government
officials.
Lehman Interested in Saudi Money - Lehman is aware that the Commission’s
investigators are working the topic and is interested to see what they will find.
According to author Philip Shenon, “He thought it was clear early on that there
was some sort of Saudi support network in San Diego that had made it possible
for the hijackers to hide in plain sight in Southern California.” He is especially
intrigued by money possibly passed from Princess Haifa, wife of the Saudi
ambassador to the US, to associates of the hijackers (see December 4, 1999),
although Lehman thinks she would not have known the money’s real destination
and had simply signed checks given her by radicals at the Saudi embassy in
Washington. Lehman also doubts that the Saudi officials knew the details of the
9/11 plot, but thinks they knew the hijackers were “bad guys,” and “The bad
guys knew who to go to to get help.”

Critical of 'Stonewalling' - Lehman is also interested in possible links between
Iraq and al-Qaeda and goes to the White House to discuss these with
administration officials. However, at the meetings he brings up the Saudi
connection. There are several meetings, but the administration is not at all
interested in the Saudi angle. Lehman will say: “I used to go over to see [White
House chief of staff] Andy [Card], and I met with [Defense Secretary Donald]
Rumsfeld three or four times, mainly to say, ‘What are you guys doing? This
stonewalling is so counterproductive.’”
No Interest in Saudi Connection - However, there is an absolute lack of interest
on the administration’s part about the Saudi information. According to Shenon,
“Lehman was struck by the determination of the Bush White House to try to hide
any evidence of the relationship between the Saudis and al-Qaeda.” Lehman will
say: “They were refusing to declassify anything having to do with Saudi Arabia.
Anything having to do with the Saudis, for some reason, it had this very special
sensitivity.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 185-186]
Entity Tags: Andrew Card, 9/11 Commission, Bush administration (43), Donald
Rumsfeld, John Lehman
Commission, Saudi Arabia, 9/11 Investigations
(Summer 2003): FBI Reluctance over Saudi Connection Leads to

Complaint from 9/11 Commissioner
The FBI is initially reluctant to provide documents to the 9/11 Commission team
investigating possible links between hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf
Alhazmi on the one hand and some Saudi government officials on the other.
Investigators' Attitude - The investigators, Michael Jacobson, Raj De, and Hyon
Kim, have come to believe that, in author Philip Shenon’s words, there could be
“few innocent explanations for why so many Saudis and other Arab men living in
Southern California had come forward to help the two hijackers—to help them
find a home, to set up bank accounts, to travel.” Jacobson previously worked on
the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry and formed the opinion then that FBI officials
had tried to hide much of the evidence in its files linked to Almihdhar and
Alhazmi.
FBI Drags Its Feet - At first, according to Shenon, the FBI “is as uncooperative
with the 9/11 Commission as it had been in the Congressional investigation” and
is “painfully slow to meet the Commission’s initial request for documents and
interviews.” The three investigators want a formal protest to be made over the
foot-dragging, but realize their team leader, Dietrich Snell, will not make one,
due to what they perceive to be overcaution on his part. Therefore, they
approach 9/11 commissioner and former Deputy Attorney General Jamie
Gorelick and she then contacts FBI Director Robert Mueller, warning him he will
lose the Commission’s goodwill if he does not start co-operating. [SHENON, 2008,
PP. 184-185] In the spring of 2004, Mueller will launch a charm offensive against
the Commission and will make significant efforts to comply with its requests
(see Spring 2004).
Entity Tags: Hyon Kim, 9/11 Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Jamie
Gorelick, Dietrich Snell, Michael Jacobson, Robert S. Mueller III, Raj De
Commission, Saudi Arabia, 9/11 Investigations
Summer 2003-January 2004: 9/11 Commission Does Not Receive

Videotapes of Detainee Interrogations
The 9/11 Commission does not receive video or audio recordings of
interrogations of detainees thought to know something about the 9/11 plot (see
Spring-Late 2002), even though it is unhappy with the amount and quality of
information it is getting from detainees (see Summer 2003) and has a series of
meetings with CIA officials to improve access (see November 5, 2003-January
2004). The CIA will indicate

that the Commission never asks
for the tapes, saying it “went
to great lengths to meet the
requests of the 9/11
Commission,” and that one of
the reasons that the tapes are
not destroyed until after the
Commission releases its final
report in 2004 is so that it
Kean (left) and Hamilton (right) of the 9/11 Commission. could have the tapes, if it so
[Source: Doug Mills / New York Times] desires. [NEW YORK TIMES,
12/8/2007] However, when the tapes’ destruction is revealed in late 2007 (see
November 2005 and December 6, 2007), former 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom
Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton will dispute this, saying that in hours of
negotiations and discussions with the CIA and written requests they make it
clear they want all material connected to the interrogations of the relevant
detainees. [INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 12/8/2007] Kean will say, “They knew
what they had and they didn’t give it to us.” [ABC NEWS, 12/7/2007] Hamilton will
say, “The CIA certainly knew of our interest in getting all the information we
could on the detainees, and they never indicated to us there were any
videotapes… Did they obstruct our inquiry? The answer is clearly yes. Whether
that amounts to a crime, others will have to judge.” [INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, 12/8/2007]
Entity Tags: Thomas Kean, Central Intelligence Agency, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees,
Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, 9/11 Investigations
June 2003: White House Counsel Gonzales Continues to

Stonewall Commission over White House Access
In a series of meetings with 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice-
Chairman Lee Hamilton, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales continues to
deny the commission access to White House documents and personnel (see Late
January 2003). The commission wants access to classified White House
documents, as well as interviews with President George W. Bush, Vice President
Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.
Claim of Executive Privilege - Gonzales says that the access the commission
wants is protected by executive privilege, which means that if advice given to
the president by his staff is to have any value, it must remain secret. He thinks
that, as the commission was created by Congress, if he gives the commission the
access it wants, this will set a precedent, meaning the White House will have to
turn over other documents to Congress.
Not a "Viable Position" - Kean thinks that this is not a “viable position” for
Gonzales and that he must give them something. He asks himself if Gonzales
understands the political damage he is doing to President Bush, and also if Bush
knows what Gonzales is doing in his name. Kean is also aware that the
commission could subpoena documents, but never makes this threat explicitly to
Gonzales. Issuing subpoenas would lead to a constitutional argument that would
do a lot of political damage to the White House. Kean believes that Gonzales
will have to compromise in the end—9/11 was such a unique event that
providing some access will not set a precedent. 9/11 Commissioner and former
White House Counsel Fred Fielding is also extremely surprised by what Gonzales
is doing. He knows it is only a matter of time before Gonzales retreats, and the
longer it takes him to do so, the more damage he will do to Bush. [SHENON, 2008,
PP. 122-126] Fielding will return as White House counsel in January 2007. In a
scandal over the firing of US attorneys for allegedly political reasons, he will
behave in much the same way as Gonzales does in this case. [WASHINGTON POST,
4/11/2007]
Gonzales Refuses to Meet Commission Lawyer - Gonzales insists on meeting only

Kean and Hamilton and, following an earlier frosty meeting with executive
director Philip Zelikow (see Late January 2003), refuses to see anyone else from
the commission, including its counsel Daniel Marcus. When Kean and Hamilton
return from the meetings with Gonzales at the White House, Marcus has to
debrief them and work out a counter-strategy to what Gonzales’ position seems
to be. “It was very messy,” Marcus will recall. Marcus also knows Gonzales is
getting Bush in trouble: “Gonzales didn’t have good political judgment and
staked out positions that got the White House in trouble—these kinds of wooden
separation of powers arguments.”
Some Speculate Addington Behind Gonzales - Some commissioners and staff
think that what Gonzales is doing is so damaging to President Bush that he may
not even be expressing Bush’s views. According to this line of thinking, Gonzales
is being directed by Vice President Dick Cheney and his counsel David Addington,
both of whom are known to have extreme views on executive privilege (see June
26, 2007 and June 27, 2007). Kean will later say the commission “never knew”
who was really behind the arguments. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 122-126]
Entity Tags: David S. Addington, Daniel Marcus, Alberto R. Gonzales, Lee Hamilton, Fred
F. Fielding, Thomas Kean
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, 9/11 Investigations
June 2003: 9/11 Commission Begins Moves to Get Rid of

Troublesome Member
The 9/11 Commission begins to look for ways to get rid of one of its members,
Democrat Max Cleland, who the other commissioners have come to dislike.
Accusations of Partisanship - According to author Philip Shenon, some of the
Commission’s members feel that Cleland has been “so combative and harshly
partisan in the Commission’s early private meetings—so angry at the mention of
the names of [George W.] Bush or [Karl] Rove, so obsessed with what was
happening in Iraq—that it threatened any hope of a unanimous final report.”
Cleland’s stance is apparently influenced by his recent election defeat, which he
blames on what he regards as a smear campaign led by Rove and Bush (see
October 11, 2002 and After). Fellow commissioner Slade Gorton will say, “Max
Cleland is an extremely embittered individual, and all he wanted to do was ‘get’
the president.”
Appointment to Federal Agency - Therefore, Tom Kean, the Commission’s
chairman, and other commissioners begin to look for a way to remove Cleland
from the investigation. However, these moves have to be conducted in secret,
as Cleland is known to the victims’ family members as a harsh critic of the
White House. If news of plans to remove him leaked, it would lead to a
firestorm of criticism. Kean therefore calls Democratic Senate Minority Leader
Tom Daschle, who arranged Cleland’s position on the Commission. In July,
Daschle will put Cleland forward as a Democratic member of the board of the
Export-Import Bank, a federal agency that helps US exports. The lucrative
position would be markedly advantageous to Cleland, a severely injured war
veteran with no stable source of income. Although the White House does not
like Cleland, it will agree to appoint him to the board so that he can be
removed from the Commission. However, this will not occur until December (see
December 9, 2003). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 160-162]
Entity Tags: Slade Gorton, Max Cleland, Tom Daschle, 9/11 Commission, White House,
Thomas Kean
Summer 2003: 9/11 Commission Unhappy with Information

Coming from Detainees
The 9/11 Commission becomes unhappy with the quality of information being
provided by the CIA, FBI, and Pentagon about detainees in US custody who are
being interrogated, because “the government’s investigators [are] not asking the
detainees the kinds of questions [it wants] answered” - they are asking about
future threats rather than the history of the 9/11 plot. The Commission is
receiving detainee evidence “third-hand - passed from the detainee, to the
interrogator, to the person who writes up the interrogation report, and finally to
[its] staff in the form of reports, not even transcripts.” It can take up to six
weeks for a report on an interrogation to be produced. Due to the absence of
any interaction between Commission staff and detainees, they also have “no
way of evaluating the credibility of detainee information.” [KEAN AND HAMILTON,
2006, PP. 119-123] In at least one case, it seem possible that the 9/11 Commission
was not given all the information from CIA interrogations that it needed.
Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna will later independently view some
interrogation transcripts, and from them he will claim that Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed (KSM) confessed to attending a pivotal al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia
where the 9/11 plot was discussed (see January 5-8, 2000). The CIA was in
charge of monitoring this meeting, so their failure to notice the presence of
KSM, a photographed and well-known terrorist mastermind with a $2 million
bounty on his head at the time, would have been nearly inexplicable (see July 9,
2003). The Commission subsequently requests direct access to the detainees,
but this request is not granted (see November 5, 2003-January 2004).
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, Rohan Gunaratna, US Department of Defense, 9/11 Commission
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, 9/11
Investigations
June 23-24, 2003: Karl Rove Calls 9/11 Commission Executive

Director Zelikow Twice
White House adviser Karl Rove makes two telephone calls to Philip Zelikow, the
9/11 Commission’s executive director. The first call comes at 4:40 p.m. and is
taken by Karen Heitkotter, an executive secretary at the Commission. Rove says:
“This is Karl Rove. I’m looking for Philip.” Heitkotter wonders why Rove is
calling Zelikow, but it is not her place to ask for a reason. Therefore, as Zelikow
is out of the office, she gives Rove Zelikow’s cell phone number. Heitkotter has
been keeping an unofficial record of Zelikow’s calls in a notebook she purchased
herself, and logs the calls as “Karl Rove—gave PZ cell #.” Rove calls again the
next day, looking for Zelikow. As he is again absent, Heitkotter takes a message.
[SHENON, 2008, PP. 106-107] Zelikow will later describe two interactions with Rove
during the Commission’s lifetime. It appears that, according to Zelikow, this
exchange of calls was “related to past correspondence with me in my Miller
Center role [Zelikow previously worked there as a historian], related to
presidential library preparation (I had no horse in that race). It was a brief
conversation and we did not discuss the Commission.” [ZELIKOW AND SHENON, 2007
] However, a “senior White House official familiar with Rove’s memory of the
contacts with Zelikow” will dispute this, saying that there had been “ancillary
conversations” about the workings of the Commission. Rove will talk to Zelikow
again in September (see September 4-15, 2003). Interviewed around mid-
September 2003, 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee
Hamilton will say that they were not aware of the calls and seem surprised by
them, but accept Zelikow’s innocent explanation. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 173-174]
Entity Tags: Karl C. Rove, 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, Karen Heitkotter
July 7, 2003: 9/11 Commission Denounces Lack of Cooperation,

Chairman Complains about Government ‘Minders’
The 9/11 Commission releases a status report showing that various government
agencies are not cooperating fully with its investigation. Neither the CIA nor the
Justice Department have provided all requested documents. Lack of cooperation
on the part of the Department of Defense “[is] becoming particularly serious,”
and the Commission has received no responses whatsoever to requests related

to national air defenses. The FBI, State Department, and Transportation
Department receive generally positive reviews. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/9/2003]
Commissioner Tim Roemer complains: “We’re not getting the kind of
cooperation that we should be. We need a steady stream of information coming
to us.… Instead, We’re getting a trickle.” [GUARDIAN, 7/10/2003] The Commission is
eventually forced to subpoena documents from the Defense Department and FAA
(see November 6, 2003). Commission Chairman Tom Kean also highlights the
presence of government “minders” at Commission interviews. The minders
accompany witnesses the Commission is interviewing and come from the
witnesses’ parent agencies. Kean says: “I think the Commission feels
unanimously that it’s some intimidation to have somebody sitting behind you all
the time who you either work for or works for your agency. You might get less
testimony than you would.” He adds, “We would rather interview these people
without minders or without agency people there.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/8/2003;
ASSOCIATED PRESS, 7/9/2003] However, Kean will later play down the effect minders
are having on witnesses (see September 23, 2003), the full scope of which will
be revealed in an internal Commission memo (see October 2, 2003).
Entity Tags: US Department of Transportation, US Department of Justice, US
Department of Defense, US Department of State, Tim Roemer, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 9/11 Commission, Bush administration (43), Central Intelligence Agency,
Thomas Kean
July 9, 2003: Neoconservative Author’s Testimony Dismays 9/11

Commission Members and Staff
Members and staff of the 9/11 Commission are skeptical about testimony to the
commission by Laurie Mylroie on this day. Mylroie is a scholar with the
neoconservative American Enterprise Institute and is considered by many to be
one of the academic architects of the recent Iraq invasion (see April 27, 1987
and October 2000).
Support from Zelikow - Mylroie’s testimony is arranged by the commission’s
executive director, Philip Zelikow, who places her in a prominent place at the
witness table for the day’s testimony at a public hearing. Mylroie expounds her
theory that Iraq was secretly behind 9/11 and other al-Qaeda attacks. Some
commission staffers are surprised that she is testifying at all, as they think her
testimony will work in concert with the White House’s efforts to convince the
public that Iraq and al-Qaeda are, in essence, one and the same, which they
strongly doubt. Zelikow will later say he had never met Mylroie before the
hearings, and was skeptical of her theories himself, but because at least one
unnamed commissioner wanted her testimony aired before the commission, he
felt impelled to grant her a place in the hearings. Zelikow must have been
aware of Mylroie’s popularity with, and her access to, the highest levels of the
Bush administration and the Pentagon. Most of the commissioners do not fully
understand the full import of Mylroie’s testimony, or that by allowing her to
testify so early in the proceedings, the commission may appear to endorse her
views.
"Batty" - If Mylroie’s testimony is an attempt to influence the commission, it
falls flat; after her testimony, several see her as “batty,” if not entirely
disconnected from reality. Several members of the commission and its staff are
dubious about Mylroie’s claims (see July 9, 2003). Commissioner Richard Ben-
Veniste, one of those who believes her appearance is part of the
administration’s efforts to justify the war with Iraq, forces her to admit that “95
percent” of Middle East experts do not accept her theories about a connection
between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Testimony later the same day by Judith Yaphe, a
CIA expert on Iraq, further discredits Mylroie’s theories (see July 9, 2003). Both
Yaphe and Ben-Veniste feel that Mylroie’s theories are shown to be little more
than wild speculation with no evidence to bolster them, but the media coverage
of her testimony is far different. She is given great credence by almost all of the
mainstream media reports of her appearance before the commission. [SHENON,
2008, PP. 130-134] Additionally, many of those who lost family members in the
attacks are angered by Mylroie’s testimony (see July 9, 2003). Shortly after her
testimony, Mylroie’s new book Bush vs. the Beltway will be published,
expounding further on her theories. [WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 12/2003]
Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Philip Zelikow, American Enterprise Institute,
Al-Qaeda, 9/11 Commission, Laurie Mylroie, Bush administration (43)
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links, Role of Philip Zelikow,
9/11 Investigations
July 9, 2003: ’Jersey Girls’ Lambast Zelikow over Author’s

Testimony Linking 9/11 to Iraqi Government
While some find neoconservative author Laurie Mylroie’s testimony before the
9/11 Commission of a terrorist conspiracy between Saddam Hussein and al-
Qaeda to be compelling (see July 9, 2003), others do not. One group that is not
convinced is the so-called “Jersey Girls,” the group of widows who lost their
husbands in the 9/11 attacks and then worked to force the Bush administration
to create the Commission (see 9:15 a.m. - 9:45 a.m. March 31, 2003). They
lambast Commission director Philip Zelikow for allowing Mylroie to testify.
“Jersey Girl” Lorie Van Auken, who has learned a great deal about Mylroie’s
theories in her research, confronts Zelikow shortly after the hearings. “That
took a lot of nerve putting someone like that on the panel,” she tells Zelikow.
“Laurie Mylroie? This is supposed to be an investigation of September 11. This is
not supposed to be a sales pitch for the Iraq war.” Van Auken later recalls “a sly
smile” crossing Zelikow’s face, as he refuses to answer. “He knew exactly what
he was doing,” Van Auken will say. “He was selling the war.” After the hearing,
Zelikow informs the staff that he wants them to aggressively pursue the idea of
a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Author Philip Shenon will later write, “To
some members of the staff, Zelikow seemed determined to demonstrate that
whatever the evidence to the contrary, Iraq and al-Qaeda had a close
relationship that justified the toppling of Saddam Hussein.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-
134]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, ’Jersey Girls’, 9/11 Commission, Philip Shenon, Al-Qaeda,
Lorie Van Auken, Laurie Mylroie, Philip Zelikow
July 9, 2003: CIA Expert on Iraq Discredits Theory of Connection

between Iraq and Al-Qaeda
Judith Yaphe testifies before the 9/11 Commission. Yaphe, a CIA veteran who
now teaches at the Pentagon’s National Defense University, is considered one of
the agency’s most experienced and knowledgeable Iraq analysts. Yaphe states
that while Saddam Hussein was indeed a sponsor of terrorism, it is improbable,
based on what is currently known, that Hussein and Iraq had any connections to
the 9/11 attacks, nor that a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda is
believable. [NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
7/9/2003] Yaphe is disturbed by the commission’s apparent acceptance of the
testimony of Laurie Mylroie (see July 9, 2003), whose theories about connections
between Iraq and al-Qaeda have long been discredited by both intelligence
analysts and outside experts. She wonders why Mylroie’s “crazed theories” were
being heard at all, and why the commission would risk its credibility by giving
Mylroie this kind of exposure. She even speculates that Mylroie’s testimony is
some sort of setup by the commission or the staff, and hopes that her own
testimony can offset Mylroie’s theories and help discredit Mylroie before the
commission. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134] Yaphe tells the commission, in apparent
reference to Mylroie, that the use of circumstantial evidence is “troubling” and
that there is a “lack of credible evidence to jump to extraordinary conclusions
on Iraqi support for al-Qaeda.” She also calls Mylroie’s theories of Iraqi spies
using false identities to help execute the 1993 World Trade Center bombings
(see February 26, 1993) worthy of a fiction novel and completely unsupported
by fact. [NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 7/9/2003]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Al-Qaeda, 9/11 Commission, Central Intelligence Agency,
Judith Yaphe, Laurie Mylroie, National Defense University
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links, 9/11 Investigations
July 9, 2003: Mylroie Testifies Before 9/11 Commission, Airs

Theories of Connections between Iraq and al-Qaeda
The 9/11 Commission holds its first set of public hearings on al-Qaeda and its
connections to other nations and terrorist groups. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134]
'Political Theater' - The first person to testify is Laurie Mylroie, of the
conservative American Enterprise Institute. Mylroie’s testimony is, in the words
of author Philip Shenon, “a bizarre bit of political theater.” Mylroie, considered
by some to be “one of the most influential political academics of her
generation, whose research was cited by the United States government to
justify a war,” sits in front of the Commission, “spouting what would later be
shown to be—and what many experts in the field already knew to be—
nonsense.” Mylroie says that both the 1993 WTC bombing (see February 26,
1993) and 9/11 were planned and carried out by Iraqi intelligence agents, and
the planner of the 1993 attacks, Ramzi Yousef (see December 1991-May 1992
and Late July or Early August 2001), and the chief 9/11 planner, Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed (see 1987-1991), were both Iraqi spies. Iraq had planted phony
identification documents—“legends”—in Kuwaiti government offices during the
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, she says. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134] “The odds
are high that these people are not whom they claim to be, and demonstrating
that would constitute a clear link between Iraq and the 9/11 attack, as
reasonably only Iraq could have created these legends while it occupied
Kuwait,” she states. Al-Qaeda was a front group for Iraq in the same way that
Hezbollah is a front group for Syria, she claims, and tells the Commission, “We
went to war because senior administration officials believe Iraq was involved in
9/11” (see July 31, 2002). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 130-134]
Discrediting Mylroie - Several members of the Commission and its staff are
dubious about Mylroie’s claims (see July 9, 2003). Commissioner Richard Ben-
Veniste, one of those who believes her appearance is part of the Bush
administration’s efforts to justify the war with Iraq, forces her to admit that “95
percent” of Middle East experts do not accept her theories about a connection
between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Testimony later the same day by CIA expert Judith
Yaphe further discredits Mylroie’s theories (see July 9, 2003). Both Yaphe and
Ben-Veniste feel that Mylroie’s theories are shown to be little more than wild
speculations with no evidence to bolster them, but the media coverage of her
testimony is far different. She is given great credence by almost all of the
mainstream media reports of her appearance before the Commission. [SHENON,
2008, PP. 130-134] Additionally, many of those who lost family members in the
attacks are angered by Mylroie’s testimony (see July 9, 2003). Shortly after her
testimony, Mylroie’s new book Bush vs. the Beltway will be published,
expounding further on her theories. [WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 12/2003]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, American Enterprise Institute, Hezbollah, 9/11
Commission, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Richard Ben-Veniste, Laurie Mylroie, Philip
Shenon, Ramzi Yousef
July 18, 2003: Former Clinton National Security Adviser

Improperly Removes Own Notes from National Archives
Sandy Berger, a former national security adviser to Bill Clinton, takes notes he
has made on classified documents at the National Archives out of the archives.
As the papers on which the notes are based are classified, the notes are also
classified, even though they are about documents Berger saw during his time as
national security adviser. Berger is at the archives to prepare for an interview
with the 9/11 Commission, but he had previously visited them to prepare for
discussions with the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry (see May 30, 2002). As the
proper security procedures are not followed, Berger is able to create a
distraction and remove the top fifteen pages of the notes, leaving only two
pages. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 6-7] Berger will later steal copies of a classified
document from the archives (see September 2, 2003).
Entity Tags: National Archives and Records Administration, Sandy Berger
August 2003: 9/11 Commission Staffer Reviews NSC Documents;

Favors Clarke’s Account of Bush Administration’s Treatment of
Terrorist Warnings over Rice’s
Warren Bass, the 9/11 Commission staffer allocated to review National Security
Council documentation, comes to favor an account of events in the Bush
administration given by former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke over one
given by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Clarke has claimed that
the administration did not take the risk of an al-Qaeda attack seriously enough
in the summer of 2001, whereas Rice claims the administration did everything it
could to prevent one.
Documentation, Speeches, Briefings - Bass comes to this judgment partly
because of the small amount of Rice’s e-mails and internal memos about
terrorism from the spring and summer of 2001: there is, in author Philip
Shenon’s words, “almost nothing to read.” In addition, she made very few
references to terrorism in speeches and public appearances. For example, a
speech she was to give on 9/11 itself about national security contained only a
passing reference to terrorism (see September 11, 2001). On the contrary,
Clarke left a pile of documents and a “rich narrative” of events at the White
House concerning al-Qaeda, including warnings about an upcoming catastrophic
terrorist attack in the summer of 2001. Bass also sees that Clarke was not
allowed to brief President Bush on al-Qaeda before 9/11, whereas he repeatedly
talked to President Bill Clinton about it.
Memo Warned of Attacks One Week before 9/11 - He is especially astounded to
find a memo dated September 4, 2001 warning of a forthcoming attack by
Osama bin Laden (see September 4, 2001). However, when he shows this to his
team leader, Michael Hurley, they both realize it may be difficult to get this
memo included in the commission’s report due to expected opposition from
9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow, who the staff suspects is
biased towards Rice (see January 3, 2001, Before December 18, 2003, May-June
2004 and February 28, 2005). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 146-149]
Memo Called a "Jeremiad" - The September 4 memo is mentioned in the
commission’s final report, but is followed by a comment from Rice saying she
saw it as a warning “not to get dragged down by bureaucratic inertia.” The
report then calls the memo a “jeremiad” (a prolonged lamentation) and
attributes it to Clarke’s inability “to persuade [the CIA and Pentagon] to adopt
his views, or to persuade his superiors to set an agenda of the sort he wanted or
that the whole government could support.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 212-213]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Michael Hurley, Warren Bass, Richard A. Clarke, 9/11
Commission
August 2003: FAA Falsely Claims It Has Produced All 9/11-Related

Documents for 9/11 Commission
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) tells the 9/11 Commission it has
already given the Commission all the documents it asked the FAA for. John
Farmer, head of the Commission team investigating what happened on the day
of 9/11, finds this hard to believe, as the boxes of material the FAA has provided
do not contain many tapes or transcripts of FAA communications on the day of

the attacks. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 201] Later interviews of FAA staff will reveal there is
a mountain of evidence the FAA is withholding from the Commission (see
September 2003).
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Federal Aviation Administration, John Farmer
August 2003 and After: 9/11 Commission Sends Single Analyst to

Review CIA Material
The 9/11 Commission sends a single member of staff, Alexis Albion, to the CIA
to review its material. Although other commission staff and some commissioners
will also work on CIA material for the commission, the review conducted at the
agency is performed by Albion, who has a PhD in the history of intelligence from
Harvard. According to author Philip Shenon, she reads “years’ worth of case files
on the CIA and its history of dealing with terrorist threats,” as the CIA is happy
to make a lot of information available to the commission. She is also given her
own reading room, and free rein of the building. Soon after she starts coming to
the CIA in August 2003, she receives a document referred to as “the Scroll.”
Shenon will describe the Scroll as “a massive chronology prepared after 9/11 to
document every element of the CIA’s antiterrorist effort before the September
11 attacks,” adding that a CIA employee “thought the Scroll must have
measured about 150 feet across—a day-by-day, hour-by-hour, almost minute-by-
minute chronology of the agency’s battles against al-Qaeda.” In addition: “The
information was broken down by activity. On one line was a timeline of the CIA’s
covert operations, set against another line that offered a chronology of the work
of the agency’s analysts; another line showed the agency’s counterterrorism
budget over time.” After Albion finishes this, she begins to read “thousands of
other documents” the CIA has prepared for her. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 135-139]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, Alexis Albion
Late Summer 2003: 9/11 Commission Requests Some Presidential

Daily Briefs from CIA, Knows Credibility Is on the Line
The 9/11 Commission files a request to see some Presidential Daily Brief (PDB)
items it believes it may need for its investigation.
Filed with CIA - The Commission had conducted preliminary discussions about
the PDBs with White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, but they have not borne
fruit (see Late January 2003 and June 2003) and the Commission understands it
may have to fight to get the documents. Therefore, it submits the request to
the CIA, which writes and keeps the PDBs, as the Commission’s lawyers think it
will be easier to enforce a subpoena against the CIA than the White House.
Credibility - Commission Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton
are aware the Commission must get the PDBs, or at least be seen to try hard, to
maintain its credibility. This is particularly because, according to author Philip
Shenon, “the PDBs were becoming the ‘holy grail’ for the 9/11 families and for
the press corps.” Hamilton will say if the Commission’s investigation ended
without it seeing them, “that would be the only thing the press would be
interested in.” Shenon will add, “It seemed as if no other evidence unearthed
by the Commission mattered; if the Commission did not see the PDBs, it would
be seen in history as having failed.”
Scope of Request - The request is not for the full library of PDBs from the
Clinton and Bush administrations. The Commission requests items from 1998 on
that mention al-Qaeda, domestic terrorist threats, terrorist plots involving
airlines used as weapons, and intelligence involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, and Germany.
White House Says No - Although the request was addressed to the CIA, Gonzales
replies for the White House in September, saying the Commission cannot see the
PDBs, or even brief extracts. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 214-215]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Alberto R. Gonzales, Philip Shenon, 9/11
Commission, Thomas Kean, Lee Hamilton
Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Investigations
(August 26, 2003): FBI Agent Repudiates Theory US Failed to

‘Connect Dots’ before 9/11 in Interview with 9/11 Commission
In an interview with the 9/11 Commission, FBI agent Frank Pellegrino repudiates
the theory that 9/11 happened because the US intelligence community failed to
connect the dots. After a Commission staffer states the theory, Pellegrino
responds angrily: “What dots? There are no dots to connect! It was all there,
written in front of them [CIA officials].” [SOUFAN, 2011, PP. 302] Presumably this
occurs on August 26, 2003, when Pellegrino is interviewed by the Commission,
according to an endnote to its final report. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004] Pellegrino
is the FBI agent who was previously assigned to track alleged 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see Spring 2000). This incident is referenced in a 2011
book by former FBI agent Ali Soufan. Soufan thinks that the CIA’s failure to pass
on information to the bureau was deliberate, and presumably Pellegrino agrees
with him. [SOUFAN, 2011, PP. 301-302]
Entity Tags: Frank Pellegrino, 9/11 Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Category Tags: CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission
September 2003: 9/11 Commission Discovers FAA Has Withheld

Documents from Investigators
Investigators for the 9/11 Commission discover that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has withheld a large amount of documents from it about
the day of the attacks and falsely claimed it had provided everything the
Commission asked for (see August 2003). The discovery is made on a day when
the Commission’s investigators begin interviewing air traffic controllers at
centers on the East Coast and in the Midwest. John Farmer, the staffer who
leads the Commission’s team dealing with this aspect of its work, is only a few
minutes into interviews at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center when he realizes, in the
words of author Philip Shenon, “just how much evidence the FAA had held
back.” His interviewees tell him that there is “extensive information the
Commission has not seen, including tape recordings of conversations between
the individual air traffic controllers and the hijacked planes.” He also discovers
that what the FAA has provided is merely the “accident package,” rather than
the much larger “accident file.” Farmer is “furious” and contacts the
Commission’s lawyer in Washington. Asked to explain the situation, the FAA
rapidly admits there is other material and, within days, several boxes of new
material, including the air traffic control tapes, arrive at the Commission’s
offices. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 201-202] However, the Commission has lost confidence in
the FAA and will issue it with a subpoena next month (see October 14, 2003).
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Federal Aviation Administration, Indianapolis Air Route
Traffic Control Center, John Farmer
September 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow

Lunches with National Security Adviser Rice and Her Staff
Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, goes to the White
House to have lunch with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and her
staff. Zelikow is close to Rice and defends her interests on the Commission (see
1995, Before December 18, 2003, and May-June 2004). Zelikow’s White House
passes are arranged by Karen Heitkotter, an executive secretary on the
Commission. According to author Philip Shenon, during the Commission’s life,
“More than once she [is] asked to arrange a gate pass so Zelikow [can] enter the
White House to visit the national security adviser in her offices in the West
Wing.” Allegedly, at the same time, “Zelikow [is] telling people how upset he
[is] to cut off contact with his good friend Rice.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 107]
Entity Tags: Karen Heitkotter, 9/11 Commission, Condoleezza Rice, Philip Zelikow
September 2, 2003: Former Clinton National Security Adviser

Steals Apparently Compromising Document from National
Archives
Sandy Berger, a former
national security adviser to
Bill Clinton, steals a
document he believes
could be used against him
and the Clinton
administration from the
National Archives. Berger
is at the archives to
prepare for an interview
with the 9/11 Commission,
but had previously visited
them to prepare for
The National Archives building. [Source: Dan Smith] discussions with the 9/11
Congressional Inquiry (see
May 30, 2002) and had improperly removed classified notes he had made on the
documents (see July 18, 2003). The document he takes is an after-action report
drafted by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke following a period around the
millennium when the administration thought al-Qaeda might attack US interests.
The report included 29 recommendations for government counterterrrorism
programs, several of which were not implemented before Clinton left office.
Although Berger thinks the Clinton administration took counterterrorism very
seriously, he believes the document could be used against him. One of the
workers at the archives sees Berger behaving suspiciously with the documents in
a corridor, and alerts a superior. However, the documents are not cataloged, and
the archives do not know what documents, if any, have been taken. [SHENON,
2008, PP. 7-8] Berger will be caught taking a document the next time he comes to
the archives (see October 2, 2003).
Entity Tags: Sandy Berger, National Archives and Records Administration
September 4-15, 2003: Karl Rove Again Calls 9/11 Commission

Executive Director Zelikow
White House adviser Karl Rove makes two telephone calls to 9/11 Commission
Executive Director Philip Zelikow, one on September 4, the other on September
15. The subject of the calls, which are unofficially logged by Karen Heitkotter,
an executive secretary with the Commission, is unclear. Zelikow and Rove had a
previous exchange of calls in June (see June 23-24, 2003). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 107,
171-174] According to Zelikow, it concerns “this matter of his elderly friend who
had these papers. It had no relation to contemporary problems; he [Rove] was
being gracious to someone.” [ZELIKOW AND SHENON, 2007 ] This will be confirmed
by a White House official, who will say that Rove calls Zelikow on behalf of an
elderly neighbor who had been a senior lawyer at the State Department at the
end of World War II. The neighbor wonders whether the Miller Center, a
historical research institute Zelikow used to work for, would like to see his
papers and talk to him. However, a “senior White House official familiar with
Rove’s memory of the contacts with Zelikow” will say this is not the only topic
discussed and that there are also “ancillary conversations” about the workings
of the Commission. Interviewed around mid-September 2003, 9/11 Commission
Chairman Tom Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton say that they are not
aware of the calls and seem surprised by them, but accept Zelikow’s innocent
explanation. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 173-174]
Entity Tags: Karl C. Rove, Karen Heitkotter, Philip Zelikow, Lee Hamilton, Thomas Kean,
9/11 Commission
(September 15, 2003): 9/11 Commission Staffer Apparently

Agrees CIA Withheld Key Intelligence from FBI in Run Up to
Attacks
In an interview, a key 9/11 Commission staffer, Doug MacEachin, reportedly
agrees with an important witness, FBI agent Ali Soufan, that the CIA deliberately
withheld from the bureau the knowledge that al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin
Attash had attended al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit and was therefore linked to
9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. [SOUFAN, 2011, PP. 301-302] However, the
Commission’s final report will call the non-passage of this intelligence “an
example of how day-to-day gaps in intelligence sharing can emerge even when
there is mutual goodwill.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 267] This interview
appears to be the second time the Commission talks to Soufan, which is on
September 15, 2003. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 507; SOUFAN, 2011, PP. 297-302]
Soufan discusses the case of “Omar,” a joint FBI-CIA source inside al-Qaeda. At
an interview of Omar in January 2001 the CIA learned that bin Attash had
attended al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit in early 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000 and
January 4, 2001). However, it then failed to share this with the FBI (see January
5, 2001 and After). Soufan tells the Commission’s staff: “This shows that the CIA
knew the significance of Malaysia, Khallad, and Almihdhar but actively went out
of their way to withhold the information from us. It’s not a case of just not
passing on information. This is information the FBI representative working with
the source should have been told about. It was a legal requirement. Instead we
were deliberately kept out of the loop.” A staffer responds that the CIA claims
it shared the information, and Soufan asks whether the Commission checked the
“regular cables” between the field and CIA headquarters. After the staffer says
they have, Soufan asks whether the Commission has checked the “operational
traffic,” and MacEachin responds, “That must be it.” Other staffers are initially
puzzled by McEachin’s comment, but he explains it to them. Soufan will
comment: “Operational traffic refers to cables sent during an operation. The
officer will list procedures, leaving a record in case something goes wrong or
something needs to be referred to. Because these cables are strictly procedural
and not related to intelligence, they would not be sent to the FBI. If someone
wanted to hide something from the FBI, that’s where he would put it. Because
Doug had worked for the CIA, he knew what operational cables were, while
other members of the team might not have.” The Commission later finds that
the information about bin Attash was in an operational cable. [SOUFAN, 2011, PP.
301-302] The reason for the discrepancy between MacEachin’s attitude in the
interview of Soufan and the Commission’s final report is unknown.
Entity Tags: Doug MacEachin, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11 Commission, Ali
Soufan
Category Tags: CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Commission
September 15, 2003 or Shortly After: Some 9/11 Commission

Staffers ‘Furious’ at Executive Director Zelikow’s Contacts with
Karl Rove
A 9/11 Commission staffer notices a record of phone calls made to Philip
Zelikow, the Commission’s executive director, on the desk of Zelikow’s
secretary. Glancing at it, the staffer notices the name “Rove,” a reference to
White House adviser Karl Rove, who recently called Zelikow (see September 4-
15, 2003). Paging through the records, the staffer finds other references to calls
made by Rove to Zelikow (see June 23-24, 2003), as well as calls from National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice to Zelikow. According to author Philip Shenon:
“The next day, word of Zelikow’s contacts at the White House began to spread
wildly through the Commission. For many of the staff, it was just what they had
suspected: Zelikow was some kind of White House mole, feeding information
back to the administration about the Commission’s findings. Now, they thought,
they had proof of it.” Some of the staffers debate whether to make a formal
protest to the Commission’s chairman and vice chairman, but decide against
doing so, worrying about the scandal if the news ever leaked. Shenon will add:
“They were furious with what Zelikow had done and how his conflicts had
threatened the integrity of the investigation. But they knew how valuable this
work was and how valuable their affiliation with the 9/11 Commission would be
to their careers. They wanted its legacy to be untarnished.” Despite this, some
of the 9/11 victims’ family members will learn of the contacts, as will a
reporter (see September 16, 2003 or Shortly After). [SHENON, 2008, PP. 107, 172]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, 9/11 Commission
September 16, 2003 or Shortly After: 9/11 Commission Executive

Director Zelikow Reportedly Understates Amount of Contacts
with Rove in Interview with Reporter
9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow is interviewed by New York
Times reporter Philip Shenon about contacts between Zelikow and White House
adviser Karl Rove. According to Shenon, “Zelikow said that there had been only
one exchange of phone calls with Rove months earlier and that they involved
questions involving his old job at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia”
(see June 23-24, 2003). However, there has recently been another exchange of
calls (see September 4-15, 2003) and this is the source of some controversy on
the Commission, so it is unclear how Zelikow could have failed to mention it
(see September 15, 2003 or Shortly After). Shenon writes a “modest article”
about the issue for the Times, but it will not be published due to a number of
other, seemingly more important, stories. Shenon will later speculate that there
were more than just two exchanges of calls between Rove and Zelikow, pointing
out that, although records of some calls into the Commission were kept,
outgoing calls were not logged in any way: “The General Services
Administration, which maintains some of the telephone records from the 9/11
Commission, would not release records showing the specific telephone numbers
called by Zelikow on his cell phone. But the records do show frequent calls to
phone numbers in area code 202, which is Washington, that begin with the
prefix 456-. That prefix is exclusive to phone numbers at the White House.”
However, Shenon will also point out that “many if not most of the calls were
almost certainly routine.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 172-174]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Philip Shenon, 9/11 Commission
September 16, 2003 or Shortly After: 9/11 Commission Executive

Director Zelikow Tells Secretary Not to Log His Calls, Following
Controversy over Contacts with Rove
Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, tells his secretary
Karen Heitkotter not to keeps records of his calls. Although there is no formal
process for logging calls, Heitkotter has been keeping records of them for
Zelikow in a notebook she purchased herself. However, Commission staffers
recently learned of contacts between Zelikow and White House adviser Karl
Rove, leading to bad feeling on the Commission (see September 4-15, 2003 and
September 15, 2003 or Shortly After). Zelikow calls Heitkotter into his office and
gives her the order without explaining why. According to Heitkotter, Zelikow is
“insistent,” but she is worried about doing something improper so she asks a
lawyer friend on the Commission what she should do. The friend tells her to
contact someone in authority, to protect herself in case the information ever
becomes public. She chooses Dan Marcus, the Commission’s counsel and a
Democrat, telling him Zelikow has “asked me to stop keeping records—phone
logs—for his contacts with the White House.” Marcus tells her not to obey
Zelikow’s instruction and to continue to log the calls, although he does not raise
the matter with Zelikow, the Commission’s Chairman Tom Kean, or Vice
Chairman Lee Hamilton. Marcus will later say that Zelikow’s order “looks bad—it
certainly doesn’t look good.” Asked about the matter later, Zelikow will simply
deny that the Commission kept formal phone logs: “I think this is recycled,
garbled office gossip. I don’t think my office kept phone logs.” [ZELIKOW AND
SHENON, 2007 ; SHENON, 2008, PP. 171-172; DEMOCRACY NOW!, 2/7/2008]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Daniel Marcus, Karen Heitkotter, Philip Zelikow
September 2003-May 21, 2004: US Government Refuses to Hold

or Charge 9/11 Hijacker Associate Despite New Evidence against
Him
In September and October 2003, Mohdar Abdullah, an associate of 9/11
hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar who is being held in a US jail,
allegedly brags to fellow prisoners that he knew the two hijackers were planning
a terrorist attack (see Early 2000 and see Late August-September 10, 2001).
Despite suspicions that he knowingly assisted the hijackers’ plans, Abdullah is
only being held for an immigration violation, and he is due to be deported soon.
But, according to the 9/11 Commission, the US Attorney for the Southern
District of California decides not to prosecute him on charges stemming from
these new allegations. Furthermore, the US Justice Department does not even
delay his deportation to allow further investigation of this new information. In
May 2004, the 9/11 Commission first hears about the new evidence against
Abdullah. However, Abdullah is deported to Yemen on May 21, 2004 (see May 21,
2004). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 217-219] Abdullah is a Yemeni citizen, and he
has been stuck in prison for many months because the Yemeni government does
not want him back. According to his lawyer, he is only able to be deported after
intense pressure by the State Department on the Yemeni government (see May
21, 2004). [SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 5/26/2004] Not long after Abdullah is deported,
a surveillance video will be discovered from the Los Angeles airport, showing
Abdullah, Alhazmi, and an unknown third man seemingly casing the airport and
recording security measures with a video camera (see June 10, 2000). It is not
known when exactly this video is discovered, but a grand jury subpoena for it
will be dated October 2004. In September 2006, some anonymous law
enforcement officials will tell NBC News that they regret deporting Abdullah,
given the discovered video. These officials will say that the FBI has reopened its
investigation into Abdullah and is reexamining all of his contacts in the US. NBC
News will comment: “Why didn’t they find these tapes until 2004 isn’t known—
especially since the FBI knew that on the day these tapes were shot in June
2000, one of the hijackers went to Los Angeles Airport for a flight home to
Yemen. Critics are certain to question whether the FBI again missed an
important clue, and let a possible accomplice get away.” [MSNBC, 9/8/2006]
Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11 Commission, Khalid
Almihdhar, Mohdar Abdullah, US Department of State, US Department of Justice
Category Tags: Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Related
Criminal Proceedings, 9/11 Commission
September 23, 2003: 9/11 Commission Plays down Extent of

Minders’ Effect on Witnesses
Asked about the intimidation of 9/11 Commission witnesses by government
“minders,” the Commission’s chairman, Tom Kean, downplays the effect minders
are having. Although he had previously complained about intimidation (see July
7, 2003), now he says: “Talking to staff, what they have told me is that as
they’ve done these interviews, that the interviewees are encouragingly frank;
that they by and large have not seemed to be intimidated in any way in their
answers.… I’m glad to hear that it’s—from the staff that they don’t feel it’s
inhibiting the process of the interviews.” The Commission’s Vice Chairman Lee
Hamilton comments, “it is our feeling that thus far, the minders have not been
an impediment, in almost all cases.” He adds that there were “one or two
instances where the question has arisen,” but “neither are we aware at this
point that the presence of a minder has substantially impeded our inquiry. And
nor have we run into a situation where we think a witness has refrained from
speaking their minds.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 9/23/2003 ] Kean’s comments about the
staff’s feelings are untrue. Nine days later, one of the Commission’s team
leaders and two other staffers will send an internal memo entitled “Executive
Branch Minders’ Intimidation of Witnesses” (see October 2, 2003).
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, Thomas Kean
Page 1 of 3 (257 events)

previous | 1, 2, 3 | next
Home | About | Timelines | Forum | Development | Donate | Contact
Privacy Policy | Terms of Use
Except where otherwise noted, the textual content of each timeline is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike

9 11 Commission 1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

9 11 Commission 1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

9 11 Commission 1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2/6/2021 Complete 911 Timeline: 9/11 Commission

!Donate Home | Contact

July 12, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft Reportedly Does Not

August 30, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Banihammad Attempts to Get in

Late-September 2001-August 2004: Reports of Hijackers’ US

(September 25, 2001 and after): Ground Zero Workers Find

December 14, 2001-September 28, 2005: Media Accounts Differ

December 21, 2001: Senators Introduce Bills to Create

2002: Witness Possibly Connects Hijackers Alhazmi and

January 24, 2002: President Bush and Vice President Cheney

May 23, 2002: President Bush Opposes Independent 9/11

government in the sunshine. His belief in secrecy and compartmentalization was

June 14, 2002: Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director

Summer 2002-Summer 2004: 9/11 Investigations Glance over

September 10, 2002: Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director

In remarks made at a foreign policy conference at the University of Virginia,

September 20, 2002: Bush Administration Releases ‘National

September 20, 2002: President Bush Changes Course, Backs

October 10, 2002: President Bush Backtracks on Support for

October 17, 2002: Tenet Misinforms Congressional Inquiry about

Late 2002-2004: Imam Al-Awlaki Lives Openly in Britain, despite

November 2002 and After: Karl Rove Concerned about 9/11

November 15, 2002: Congress and President Bush Approve New

Before November 27, 2002: Lee Hamilton Considered for Vice

November 27, 2002: Kissinger Named Chairman of New 9/11

Late 2002-July 2004: 9/11 Commission Initially Pays Little

December 11, 2002: Mitchell Resigns from New 9/11 Commission

George Mitchell. [Source: Public

December 13, 2002: Kissinger Resigns from 9/11 Commission

December 14, 2002: Karl Rove Asks Thomas Kean If He Would

December 16, 2002: Members of 9/11 Commission Have Potential

emerge over the next several months that at

December 16, 2002: Ex-Governor Thomas Kean Replaces

interest. Multinational Monitor has previously stated:

After December 16, 2002: 9/11 Commission Chairman Gives Vice

Late December 2002: White House Tells 9/11 Commission

Mid-December 2002-March 2003: 9/11 Commission Gets Off to

2003: 9/11 Commissioner Becomes Involved in Fraud Scandal,

2003-2004: Key FBI Agents Eager to Testify to 9/11 Commission,

he remembers nothing of the incident (see (February

2003-2004: Administration Tries to Convince 9/11 Commissioner

January 26, 2003: Some 9/11 Commission Members Unhappy

Shortly Before January 27, 2003: 9/11 Commission Hires Philip

January 27, 2003: Richard Clarke Amazed at Zelikow’s Hiring by

January 27, 2003: 9/11 Commission Decides It Will Not Issue

After January 27, 2003: 9/11 Commissioner Cleland Disappointed

Late January 2003: White House Counsel Gonzales Denies 9/11

(February 2003): White House Repeatedly Contacts 9/11

Around February 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director

Around February 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director

(February-April 2003): 9/11 Commissioners Rarely Visit

Around February 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director

March 2003: Zelikow and 9/11 Commission Consultant Complete

March 2003-July 2004: White House Has Better Relationship with

February 2003 or After: 9/11 Commission Staff Set up ‘Back-

March 2, 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Tries

Part of Memo Rescinded - When commissioner Jamie Gorelick learns of the

March 27, 2003: Security Clearance of 9/11 Commission Members

classified findings of the previous 9/11 Congressional Inquiry. [SEATTLE TIMES,

March 28, 2003: Independence of 9/11 Commission Called Into