OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.

JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.

Facts:

This case is made up of three consolidated cases concerning the ability of Judge Floro to serve as a judge
due to mental illness.

The First Case, Atty. Florentino Floro first applied for judgeship in 1995 but later withdrew his
application due to an unfavorable psychological evaluation revealing evidence of ego disintegration and
developing psychotic process. He applied again after 3 years but was evaluated as unfit to be a judge due
to his psychological evaluation that exposed more problems. However, because of his impressive
academic background, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion
from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared to be favorable paving the way for Atty. Floro to
be appointed as a RTC Judge in Malabon.

In 1999, he requested an audit of his sala conducted by the OCA. After such audit, the OCA
recommended that their report be considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro which
the Court adopted in a resolution that placed him under preventive suspension. The report included
misbehaviours and violations of Judge Floro on various Codes of Judicial Conduct.

Second Case, is one of the subject matter on the first case. Judge Floro allegedly used/took advantage of
his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss a Criminal Case (frustrated homicide) in the guise
of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement without presence of the trial prosecutor.

The Third Case, concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding
Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei,
Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case. When
Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued hearing and taking
cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this violates
Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution)

Issues:

WON Judge Floro be relieved of his position as Judge due to a medically disabling condition of the mind.

Ruling: YES

1. violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct, for circulating calling cards with
self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications and announcing in open court during court
session his qualification

The Supreme Court (SC) treated this as a Simple Misconduct only. Both the circulation of calling
cards and the announcement made in open court violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which provides that "a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory."
 Similarly, under Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." Being a a violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC.

Rule 140, before its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may
amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct,
which is a less serious charge or it may simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct
which is a light charge.

With the foregoing as yardstick, SC finds the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards
containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by
any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable
thirst for recognition. The same is to be said about the announcement of qualifications in open
court. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications
especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as
a sign of insecurity. 

RULE 2.02 - A judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.

2. Allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters:

In his defense, he said his action was done out of humanitarian reasons in favor of his aide or
alalay. The Supreme Court held that this charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper
or deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed another person to use his folding bed for short
periods of time during office hours and while there is no one else in the room but  it does not
augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes fodder for
gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. 

3. violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures: Rendering resolutions without
written orders ; Proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance
without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of
examination of the custodian of the accused;

The Supreme Court ruled that the action was a gross ignorance of the law. The Court noted three
fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on
recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any
opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the
probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order
granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.

The Actions are in violation of the Probation Law where the accused’s temporary liberty is warranted
only during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the application for
probation and the resolution thereon. The action of Judge Floro unceremoniously extended the pro tem
discharge of the accused to the detriment of the prosecution and the private complainants.
While in the case of Echaus v. Court of Appeals, the court held that "no judgment, or order whether
final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and
promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and
implementation."

Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it
conscientiously. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply
it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.  True, not every judicial error bespeaks
ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions.  This
rule, however, admits of an exception as "good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within
the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the
applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error."  Thus, even if a
judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable.

RULE 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and

4. Violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct ;Alleged partiality in criminal
cases where he declares that he is pro-accused.

The Supreme Court considered this as unbecoming conduct in violation of Canon 2.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which states: "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and
dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and
the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality.
Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to
himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of
a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be

RULE 1.02 - A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

5. Uusing/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No.
20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading
the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor. Additionally, for issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he
issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.

He is maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules of Court but
was also beneficial to the litigants concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their
differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties suggested that they would file
the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated
Order could be reduced to writing.

Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventura’s stance that he has no power to revise an Order,
courts have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in
form even motu proprio.

The SC dismissed this charge for lack of basis. In the case of Echaus v. Court of Appeals, the SC stated:

xx[N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set
down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing,
release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the
parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law.xx

In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court – ostensibly a judicial
approval of a compromise agreement – which was amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial
approval, the written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the
manifestations of the parties to enter into a compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have
submitted its comments thereto. 69

Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the
Echaus ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for
the charge of dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the complaint).

6. Motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and
physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang
pick-up".

The applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
reads:

SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.

The SC held it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the
arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes
upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of
counsel, cannot make a proper defense.

7. violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct : for appearing and signing
pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83,
Malolos, Bulacan. A judge must refrain from engaging in the private practice of law and for
appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing
the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing.
The SC considered this as an unbecoming conduct. A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case
does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared as counsel in his personal cases after
he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared a pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For Issuance
of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission") jointly with his counsel of record in
connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the custody of their "mild,
mentally-retarded" brother.

Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by "private practice" is
more than an isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. In herein
case, save for the "Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does not appear from the records that Judge Floro
filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It
is safe to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floro’s act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an
isolated case and does not in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the
fact that Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner.

Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined,
he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding
judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a
picture of his oath-taking.

2.04

RULE 2.04 - A judge should refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative agency.

8. Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct for openly criticizing the Rules of
Court and the Philippine justice system and for the use of highly improper and intemperate
language during court proceedings.

Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay
fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or
ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross
neglect of duties which were all unearthed by Judge Floro).

As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine judicial system,
Judge Floro contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire
Tapping Law (Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions
thereof. They also made it appear that the conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact,
this was inside his chambers.

The SC adjudged this as an unbecoming conduct. The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit
the straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs
from Judge Floro himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are consistent with
Judge Floro’s claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo
School of Law and having placed 13th in the bar examinations. Consequently, although there is no direct
proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as
intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show
that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus
guilty of unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.  In this case, there is ample and competent proof of violation on Judge
Floro’s part.

RULE 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

RULE 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. chan robles virtual law library

RULE 3.04 - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced,
to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.

9. violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.  Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a] judge
shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court."

The SC directed to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain
his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 

Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He must
always keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.’s claims that he is
endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death
and that he has unseen "little friends" are manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore
casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge

A disorderly judge generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence,
the need to maintain order and proper decorum in court. When the judge respects himself, others will
respect him too. When he is orderly, others will follow suit.  Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the
Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be conducted efficiently
and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.

*******

RECOMMENDATION

As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for
him to undergo an appropriate mental or psychological examination and which necessitated his
suspension pending investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the
functions of his office notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no
finding of dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.

There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition
of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption.
However, the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross
deficiency in competence and independence.

What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges
can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way
judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are
substantive and procedural rules of law.

The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a
knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and
unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy,
disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129

Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks leaves
much to be desired.

Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer,
may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)

(f)or using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No.
20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor." 

A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)

concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN
"In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner." Judge Floro, Jr.
denied the motion for inhibition and declared it as null and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the
case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have
the case be assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle, in violation of Administrative Circular
No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution)