Very dramatic case.. a good read.. two thumbs up!

7. JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, 

 vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court
of Appeals, respondents.

FACTS:
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid"
or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo and a case for damages arising from the same
incident .
Montecillo was acquitted in both cases, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-
claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as
moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in a Civil Case to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by
Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court
of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of
petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive
must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica".
The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision
with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and
"judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. (THIS!)
When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution, it observed that the terminology of the motion
insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It
admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration.
Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating
that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204
and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal
that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."
The Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days and to appear on January
10, 1973 why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
Respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not
making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent sent
a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the
Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the
hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973.
Not content with that move, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a
civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in
accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. (THIS!)
We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law
and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his
views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation and
construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice. (THIS!)

1st SC RULING:
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will
succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del
Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that
precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse,
worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding
even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and
condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified
copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to
this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court
was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of
law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon
Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
trying to hold them liable for their decision; that the case for damages was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar
himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay
nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices.
This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually
carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the
exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice
of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied his petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court.
He filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of
this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for
reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit.
He, then, filed a manifestation , before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk
of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same,
civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr.
Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable
judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well
know them and work for their extermination" (THIS!)
Respondent del Mar was ordered to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous
statements contained in his manifestation.

ISSUE:
Is Atty. Del Mar liable for contempt?
RULING:
(ON THE DEFAMATION CASE) The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge
Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question — "binuang man gud na" (That act
is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former,
Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the
preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what
was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for
oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-
G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the
aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.
Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No.
46504-R, became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.

(ON THIS CASE) IN HIS SHOW CAUSE DEL MAR EXPLAINED:

"Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all
human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided
to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification of his previous contemptuous statements
without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice
allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already
assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in
and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing
injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension,
commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion
blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and
those of others are all wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the
order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for
reconsideration , requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by
the Court, was given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's
manifestation that there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We
resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision.
In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of
high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is
faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked for
forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof
knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals
committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices
liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing
nowadays, the undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects
that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his
clients as regards all his pending cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the
contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements.
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his physical and mental ailment be
considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons
of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on
him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide
to do in this case.
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily
retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its
integrity and honor, We resolve, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his
clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind
them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an
officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude . As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what
he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged
error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the
case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his
concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the
people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for
law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is
merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may
not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous
from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of
change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount
qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of
proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and
honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close
the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and
dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to
this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice
and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del
Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the
practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately.