Citizenship Typed Notes

Unit 2

Q. Critically review T.H. Marshall’s view on Citizenship and State? Criticism of Marshalls theory by
Anthony Giddens?

A. Introduction- The concept of citizenship has a long history and its meaning has changed overtime
as it has been applied to new and different circumstances. The Greeks saw citizenship as the
enjoyment of the right. The Greeks saw citizenship as the enjoyment of the right of sharing in the
deliberative or judicial office. The Romans citizenship guaranteed the right to vote, eligibility for
public office, right to intermarriage, etc. Bodin saw citizenship as the mutual obligation between
subject and sovereign to obey and to protect.

With the moving to later periods, citizenship was discussed by thinkers like Mill, Bentham, who
focussed mainly on individual liberty, political participation and property rights and Green, who
focussed on the criterion of having a good life and social welfare. T H Marshall viewed citizenship as
different parts and how they were all intertwined. In his famous book ‘Citizenship and Social Class’
he brings out these points and views citizenship as a dynamic idea.

Marshall’s Tripartite Analysis of Citizenship

Citizenship for Marshall is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. Those
who possess this status are equal with respect to the rights and duties that come with it. However,
since there is no universal principle which determines necessary rights and duties of citizenship,
different societies attach different rights and duties to the status of citizen. Marshall divides
citizenship into three parts

• Civil- Rights necessary for individual freedom, e.g. liberty of person, freedom of speech, thought
and faith, right to own property and enter into contracts, and the right to justice.
• Political- the right to participate in the political process, e.g. right to franchise, right to contest
and to hold public office etc. as a member of a political community.
• Social- a whole range of rights, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to
the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according
to the standards prevailing in the society.

Evolution of Civil, Political and Social Rights over three Successive Centuries

In early times, these three elements of citizenship were fused, as a result of the institutions being
fused. Marshall goes on to trace the history of citizenship by studying it a process of fusion and
separation, where the fusion was geographical and separation functional. He assigned the
development of each part to a century- civil rights to the 18 th century, political to the 19th and social
to the 20th.

Talking in the context of England he wrote that the development of the institutions of modern
citizenship coincided with the rise of capitalism. As a doctrine, citizenship was the quest of the
bourgeois class for great representation in society in opposition to aristocratic privileges. In its initial
phase citizenship entailed legal and civil equality. The civil element of citizenship essentially laid in
the rights necessary for individual freedom and the institutions most directly associated with it were
the rule of law and a system of courts, protection of individual liberty such as freedom of speech,
belief and religion, the right to own property etc.
Marshall provides an account of the emergence of citizenship in the modern nation- state in terms of
historical development of industrialization, market economy and capitalist society. But contrary to
Marxist conclusion, Marshall argues that as capitalism evolved into a social system and as the class
structure developed, the concept of citizenship also underwent transformation. From being a system
of rights which supported the market system and the propertied class, citizenship changed into the
system of rights which were opposed to market and a particular class i.e. rights of the non-
propertied class. This development of citizenship rights helped in the necessary integration of the
working class into the capitalist society and the decline of class conflict.

During 19th century, a number of political rights to franchise were granted to the urban working
class through the institution of bourgeois democracy. Political rights refer to those facilities that
guarantee activities necessary to participate in the political process and to share in sovereignty, such
as the right to vote, form political parties and hold public offices. These sets of rights, according to
Marshall, posed a threat to the capitalist system. Full danger to the capitalist class could be avoided
because the newly enfranchised working class was too inexperienced to wield political power
effectively. But the working class was able to create trade unionism and through collective
bargaining was able to wrest a number of concessions from the capitalist class to raise their
economic and social status. Thus the collective exercise of rights by members of this working class,
established the claim that they as citizens were entitled to certain social rights.

For Marshall citizenship is not simply a conjunction of civil and political rights. It is not enough to
have merely an ‘equal moral worth’, which civil rights ensured. Civil rights were dispensed with a
presupposition that one was equipped with the means to protect oneself against social and
economic insecurities.

State’s Mediation between Citizenship and Capitalism

The addition of social rights in the 20th century made the situation more complex. It brought
‘citizenship and capitalist class ’ at odds because citizenship is based on the principle of equality,
whereas capitalism is based on inequality. The ethic of capitalism entails the maximization of profit,
regardless of whether it endangers community membership. Such a tendency legitimizes the need
for state intervention. Marshall invested the state with the power to deliver welfare functions. In the
schema of a welfare state, welfare is considered a social right. The state bears an obligation to
guarantee a minimum supply of goods and services to the people, referred to as ‘social security’. The
state also assures persons of their right to a share in the social heritage, which gives them a sense of
being citizens.

Marshall’s chief concern was to moderate, reform and civilize the liberal-capitalist society, and he
believed that social citizenship could do the job. Social citizenship attempted to reform capitalism
through legislature. The development of universal provisions for basic education, health and social
security changed the nature of cash nexus between capital and labour. Legislation on minimum
wages, hours of work, working conditions and compensation of occupational accidents etc made the
employees less vulnerable to the capitalist exploitation. Thus the conflict between the two seemed
inevitable but the problem according to Marshall was more complex. Between the rival demands of
capitalist class for profit and the working class for welfare, the state through positive intervention
and by reformulating its taxation and expenditure policies has been able to resolve the conflict
between the two.
Criticisms

• The social citizenship of Marshall and Rawls is agency-based as for both, the state is the agency
to facilitate conditions for a good life. The critics having a left leaning argue that both Marshall
and Rawls forget that even the state can act to further the interest of a particular class as
inequalities in capitalist societies are structural.

• Feminist theories, since the 1970s, have also sharply criticized the liberal model of social
citizenship. The feminist scholars contend that liberal citizenship is sharply gendered as it
perpetuates the private/public dichotomy.

• Marshall’s approach to citizenship has been criticized as being faulted on methodological

grounds. Critics like Anthony Giddens find a strong teleological element in Marshall’s account of
tripartite citizenship. It is argued that compartmentalizing citizens’ rights into three sets is
misleading.
• In Giddens’ view, Marshall has treated citizenship as though it has unfolded in phases according
to some inner logic inherent to the modern era.
• By attributing the evolution of citizenship to a structural logic, Marshall meant to imply that the
said evolutionary process was smooth and deterministic. Hence, one set of rights prepared the
stage for achieving another set of rights in a sequential order. Marshall underlined the
indispensability of this process and hence critics charged that Marshall obscured historical facts
and undermined the role of social movements in obtaining citizenship rights.
• Giddens finds a crisis of cogency in Marshall’s defense of civil citizenship as a homogeneous
category of rights. Giddens distinguishes civil rights for individual freedom from economic civil
rights. While the former was secured by the struggle of the emergent bourgeoisie the latter
were won by the struggle of the working class.
• It is also problematic for Giddens that Marshall has treated the expansion of citizenship rights as
an ‘irreversible process’. However, the rise of libertarianism and New Right theories has proved
otherwise.
• Besides, Giddens also sees in Marshall’s account ‘an oversimplification of the role of state and
politics.
• The three variants of citizenship are complementary components in Marshall’s theory. But the
thesis can be faulted as while civil citizenship is directed against the state, social citizenship is
guaranteed by the state.
• Social rights and civil rights are at conflict, in view of the fact that the expenditure for social
security is met through progressive taxation which invades the civil rights of individuals.
• According to David Held, in Citizenship and Social Class Marshall was referring to major social
movements that have shaped the contemporary world and in his later works Marshall is ‘even
more explicit about formative role of political and social conflict’.
• There is also a common criticism against social citizenship that it breeds a ‘culture of
dependency’. It develops a tendency towards state paternalism, and thus promotes a notion of
‘passive citizenship
• Autonomy theorists speak the language of moral independence and moral freedom. There are
two distinct ideas behind autonomy:
 One is that people should not be dominated by others, not even by the state.
 The other, as Joseph Raz states, is that they should be self-governing ‘creators of their own
moral world’. This is an important and a good reason why an autonomy theorist would
object to the paternalistic thrust of social citizenship.
• Though Marshall’s social citizenship seeks to correct the economic inequalities that compromise
one’s ability to act autonomously, it fails to consider autonomy in terms of ‘capacity’, which is
impaired in many ways other than economic asymmetries- e.g. caste, ethnic and gender
hierarchies prohibit free choice and preferences in one’s social life.
• Social citizenship theories are accompanied by an overwhelming quest for security; the problem,
though, is that the quest for security is often attended to at the cost of dignity and integrity. It
undermines autonomy.

Q. Analyse the modern notion of citizenship and its development with special reference to T.H.
Marshall?

A.Citizenship is commonly understood as referring to the relationship between the

individual/collective and the state. This relationship is understood as being made up of reciprocal
rights and responsibilities. The most commonly accepted definition of citizenship comes from the
English sociologist T.H. Marshall who describes it as ‘full and equal membership in a political
community’. Citizenship, according to this definition, denotes membership in a political community,
which in our present context is the nation-state. Citizenship would, thus, signify a specific aspect of
the relationship among people who live together in a nation. It emphasises political allegiances and
civic loyalties within the community rather than any cultural/emotional identity. The idea of
citizenship evolved in 4 stages namely-

Ancient Greece

The idea of citizenship in Greek republics or city-states was based on the principle of active political
participation. The political and public aspects of a person’s life were seen as more important than
the private and familial. Citizenship, therefore, required active participation in political and public
affairs. It may be pointed out, however, that not everybody could participate in the process of
governance and not everybody, therefore, was a citizen. Aristotle described the Greek citizens as ‘all
who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn’. This sharing was confined only to those
having the capacity to participate in the process of governance, i.e. only the ‘free native born men’.
Thus, women, children, slaves, and resident aliens were excluded from citizenship.

Ancient Rome

In the Roman tradition, the Greek idea of citizenship as active participation was modified by the
needs of holding together the Roman Empire. The need to incorporate the conquered peoples into
the empire led to the idea of citizenship as a legal status. Thus, a larger and more heterogeneous
population was integrated into the Roman Empire by subjecting them to the protection of a uniform
set of laws. Women and the lowest classes (chiefly rural) were, however, denied the status of
citizens. Thus, citizenship could now be imagined not primarily as participation in the making and
implementing of laws (as was the case in the Greek tradition), but as a legal status involving certain
rights and equal protection of the law. It may, however, be pointed out that these new elements of
citizenship while making possible a degree of inclusiveness (i.e., including non-Romans within the
Roman citizenship), added also a hierarchy of status by introducing the second-class category of
‘civitas sine suffragio’ (citizenship without franchise, i.e. legal but not political rights).

The increase in the scale of administration (city-state as different from the empire) also meant that it
was not possible for all who had the status of citizens to participate in the affairs of governance. The
characteristics of a citizen, however, continued to be marked in a way so that citizenship denoted
activity. The citizens were required, thus, to develop qualities of ‘civic virtue’, a term derived from
the Latin word ‘virtus’ which meant ‘manliness’ in the sense of performing military duty, patriotism,
and devotion to duty and the law.

The Late Medieval and Early Modern Period

The sixteenth century absolutist states were also concerned with imposing their authority over
heterogeneous populations. In this context, a citizen came to be defined by Jean Bodin as ‘one who
enjoys the common liberty and protection of authority’. The citizen in this view was unlike the Greek
citizen, not himself an authority, but following the Roman tradition, someone who was under the
protection of the state. Unlike the Greek and Roman traditions, however, citizenship was a passive
idea. Citizenship in this period did not stand for common (shared) public responsibilities and civic
virtues. Instead, the notion of ‘common (shared) liberty’ became the primary concern of citizenship.
This concern embodied a ‘passive’ or ‘negative’ notion of citizenship. It indicated claims for ‘security’
or protection, which was to be provided by the authorities. What needed to be protected was one’s
physical life (as in Hobbes), the family and home (as in Bodin and Montesquieu) or conscience and
property (as in Locke). This principle of a ‘common shared liberty’, thus, established the primacy of
the individual and his private/ familial world. The protection of authority was needed primarily to
preserve this private world/domain. Citizens were, thus, not political people, the political community
was not the predominant core of their lives but rather the other framework, in which each citizen
enjoyed the liberty of private pleasures and pursuit of happiness and, as mentioned earlier, the
protection and security of the private/familial domain in which these pleasures were realised.

Thus, the principle of imperial inclusiveness can be seen to have brought about in this period a
passive notion of citizenship as a legal status. Alongside, however, there remained nostalgia or a
longing for the classical notion of citizenship as activity, with an emphasis on civil virtue and public
duty.

The French Revolution (1789) can be seen as a revolt against the passive citizenship of the late
medieval and early modern times. The revolution attempted to resurrect the ideals of active
participation against the claims of the monarchical/ imperial state. Apart from attempting to change
the apolitical/ passive lives of citizens, the French revolutionary tradition introduced an important
element to citizenship, which changed the way in which rights were incorporated into the notion of
citizenship. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens which followed in the wake of the
revolution, brought in the notion of the citizen as a ‘free and autonomous individual’ who enjoyed
rights equally with others and participated in making decisions which all had agreed to obey. The
manner in which citizenship is understood today as a system of horizontal (equal) rights as against
the hierarchical (unequal) privileges which accrued to a person by reason of higher birth, has its
roots in the doctrines of the French Revolution. The Declaration was influenced by the ideas of Jean
Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) who in his famous work ‘The Social Contract’ (1762) wrote not only
about the ‘free and autonomous’ citizen and the right of the citizen to participate equally with
others in decision making, but also established the primacy of the common good over private
interests. Thus, the conception of the citizen established by the French Revolution, combined
strands of modern liberal individualism with the classical connotation of citizenship as civic
participation.

Modern Notions of Citizenship

The growing influence of liberalism in the nineteenth century and the development of capitalist
market relations, however, saw the classical republican understanding of citizenship slip to the
background. The liberal notion of citizens as individuals bearing/ enjoying certain rights in order to
protect and promote private interests gained precedence. Citizenship as a legal status, which gave
the citizen certain rights assuring protection from state interference, was integral to the liberal
understanding of state and politics.

It would be appropriate to discuss here T.H. Marshall’s account of the development of citizenship in
Britain as outlined in his influential work ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, published in 1950. In this
work, Marshall studies the growth of citizenship alongside capitalism and the peculiar relationship of
conflict and collusion which citizenship shares with it. He describes the development of citizenship
over a period of 250 years as a process of expanding equality against the inequality of social class,
which is an aspect of capitalist society. Marshall distinguishes three strands or bundles of rights,
which constitute citizenship: civil, political and social. Each of these three strands has, according to
Marshall, a distinct history and the history of each strand is confined to a particular century. Civil
rights which developed in the eighteenth century have been defined by Marshall as ‘rights necessary
for individual freedom’. These were ‘negative’ rights in the sense that they limited or checked the
exercise of government power and included freedoms of speech, movement, conscience, the right
to equality before the law and the right to own property. Political rights viz., the right to vote, the
right to stand for elections and the right to hold public office, developed by and large in the
nineteenth century and provided the individual with the opportunity to participate in the political
life of the community. Social rights, which were largely a twentieth century development,
guaranteed the individual a minimum economic/social status and provided the basis for the exercise
of both civil and political rights. Social rights, says Marshall are ‘positive’ rights ‘to live the life of a
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society’. These standards of life and the social
heritage of society are released through active intervention by the state in the form of social services
(the welfare state) and educational system.

Marshall’s scheme of historical development of rights in England since the eighteenth century
cannot, however, be held true for other societies. Civil rights for example, were not fully established
in most European countries until the early nineteenth century. Even where they were generally
achieved, some groups were omitted.

The modern notion of citizenship as pointed out earlier, seeks to constitute free and equal citizens.
This freedom and equality, which underlies modern citizenship, is sought to be achieved by
eliminating ascriptive inequalities and differences (of culture, caste, gender, race etc.). Thus, citizens
are conceived as bearing rights and exercising their rights equally with other citizens. Conditions of
equality i.e., conditions in which citizens are able to exercise their rights equally are ensured by
making circumstances of inequality i.e. race, ethnicity, gender, caste etc., irrelevant for the exercise
of the rights of citizenship. The citizen, thus, is the right bearing individual whose caste, race, gender,
ethnicity etc. are seen as unrelated to the status of citizenship. Seen in this manner, citizenship
constitutes an overarching identity concealing all other identities to produce what are called
masked/unmarked (and therefore) ‘equal’ citizens of the nation. In much of liberal theory till most of
the twentieth century, the bias in favour of the individual rights bearing citizen pursuing private
interests, persisted.

Q. Define Citizenship and examine its Liberal Framework?

A. In general terms, citizenship is a relationship between an individual and state. It is seen in the
context of complementary rights and responsibilities. According to T H Marshall, citizenship is ' full
and equal membership in a political community. The earliest forms of citizenship were limited and
exclusionary in nature as only those who had property were given citizenship rights. Women and
slaves were excluded from these rights. It was with the advent of modern liberal states that the
demand for equality gained momentum and for the socio-economic inclusion of the marginalized
sections, the citizenship rights were extended to them.

Citizenship is the status of a person recognized under the custom or law as being a legal member of
a sovereign state or part of a nation. The term 'citizen' can be understood in a narrow or in a broad
sense. In a narrow sense, it means the resident of a city or one who enjoys the privilege of living in a
city. While in a broad sense, citizen means a person who resides within the territorial limits of the
state. Citizenship and nationality are the same in a legal sense.

In the most generic sense, a citizen enjoys ‘full and equal membership’ to a political community, and
is one who bears certain rights and responsibilities by virtue of that membership.eg right to vote.
Citizens are not merely bearers of certain rights and responsibilities; they also carry certain
identities. They are considered the inheritors and trustees of their culture and civilization. Hence,
citizenship has three essential components—right, responsibility and identity.

Citizenship in Classical Liberalism

The core value of Classical liberalism is Liberty. Hence, for liberals, liberty is by default the most
essential condition for enjoying life to the maximum. Two characteristic attributes of citizenship—
rights and equality—were already inherent in the concept of natural rights. Needless to say, the
theory of natural rights is at the heart of classical liberal political theory. Natural rights are genetic to
the rise of both liberalism and capitalism, and have a predominantly civic thrust. Hence, equality was
understood as ‘equality of moral worth’ in claiming civic freedom. John Locke in his work ‘Two
Treatises of the Civil Government’;(1690) ,expounded his theory of natural rights—‘to preserve the
life, liberty, and the estate’. They were presented in the form of rights to enforce their inviolability.
Rights have traditionally been thought of as the guarantor of freedom. Those rights were provided
moral sanctity, in the sense that the kind of freedoms they were going to safeguard constituted the
basic precepts and essence of human life. The metaphorical use of the term ‘natural’ was invoked to
stress the inseparability of those freedoms from human life.

It is to be noted that it connoted only a limited sense of equality—equality of moral worth in

enjoying one’s life and liberty. This is the reason why the right to life and liberty is the quintessence
of liberalism. The natural equality of moral worth was also invoked in terms of having ‘freedom of
choice at the market place’, that is, to conduct economic business without interference from
coercive agencies like the state. And reciprocally, property was thought of as a necessary condition
of life and liberty. Such a philosophical posture is genetic to the rise of capitalism. The fact that the
right to life, liberty and property are not mutually exclusive gives liberalism and capitalism a special
relationship. Their relationship is innate or inbuilt , in the sense that they are products of the same
historical process and components of the same philosophical statement. Hence, if citizenship is
simply a manifesto of rights and equality, the seeds of liberal citizenship can be traced in the
doctrine of natural rights itself.

Citizenship and Capitalism

There is a view that the emergence of capitalism paved the way for the evolution of citizenship. Pre-
capitalist societies were feudal, and were hierarchically ordained. One’s work and one’s destiny were
situated in one’s station in the social hierarchy. Relationships were defined on the basis of personal
subservience rendered to the masters. Hence, there was no sense of community membership. The
economy was pre-modern, fragmented and diffused. It was pre-modern in the sense that market
dynamics were missing.
However due to a number of factors the process of decay of feudal society began, setting the stage
for the emergence of market economy. These changes were also conducive to the emergence of
liberal citizenship. The idea of citizenship was a stimulus that accelerated the transformative process
from feudalism to capitalism. This was given effect by integrating the notions of ‘civic equality’ and
‘national identity’. So, in a way, capitalism facilitated the emergence of liberal citizenship.

However, the relationship between the two has not always been so smooth. This is because the
concept of the individual is too strong in capitalism. Individual’s dislike being identified with the
community too strongly through bonds of membership. Hence, correspondingly, liberal citizenship is
defined by a set of civil rights honoured by the community, that is, the state. Those rights are
contractual, in the sense that citizens render an obligation to the state in lieu of the latter
safeguarding their rights. The state interferes as little as possible in a citizen’s life.

Thus, when compared to republican citizenship, the liberal variant does not demand too many
obligations from citizens. It has a very weak and loose sense of membership. But with the advent of

social rights, the relationship between citizenship and capitalism started fraying between
citizenship and capitalism started fraying. The modern State is caught in the middle. The normative
question that arises here is what should the state do in this context. Prof. T.H. Marshall in his
celebrated essay titled ‘Citizenship and Social Class ’ addresses this question on a sound theoretical
basis.

Social Citizenship

• Prior to Marshall, J.S. Mill and T.H. Green had sparked a rethinking of classical liberal theory. The
critical question for Mill was how to reconcile the social and individual aspects of human life.
Mill argues that important freedoms must be situated in a social context. Mill recognizes the
worth of the community in promoting the good of citizens. Likewise, Green does not consider
individuals to have rights against the state, rather, it is the state which provides social
recognition to rights and removes the hindrances to good life.

• T.H. Marshall a social liberal aimed at reducing the conflict between capitalism and citizenship.
Marshall’s tripartite analysis of citizenship is divided into civil, political and social components:

 Civil- Rights necessary for individual freedom, e.g. liberty of person, freedom of speech,
thought and faith, right to own property and enter into contracts, and the right to
justice.
 Political- the right to participate in the political process, e.g. right to franchise, right to
contest and to hold public office etc. as a member of a political community.
 Social- a whole range of rights, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and
security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.

• Talking in the context of England he wrote that the development of the institutions of modern
citizenship coincided with the rise of capitalism. As a doctrine, citizenship was the quest of the
bourgeois class for great representation in society in opposition to aristocratic privileges. In its
initial phase citizenship entailed legal and civil equality. In the first instance, Marshall said, the
18th century saw the gradual acceptance of the idea of equal civil rights, including the right to
freedom of speech, the right to own property and the right to justice (understood as “the right
 to defend and assert all one’s rights on terms of equality with others and by due process of
law”). With the rule of law thus entrenched, Marshall continued, the 19th century then saw the
expansion of the franchise and hence the universalization of political rights, including the right to
elect representatives to Parliament.

• Finally, according to Marshall, in the 20th century, social citizenship began to emerge, with the
right to material resources and social services increasingly regarded as an integral component of
each citizen’s package of rights.

• For Marshall citizenship is not simply a conjunction of civil and political rights. It is not enough to
have merely an ‘equal moral worth’, which civil rights ensured.

• Civil rights were dispensed with a presupposition that one was equipped with the means to
protect oneself against social and economic insecurities. Marshall argued that civil rights were
meaningless unless buttressed by social rights.

• Social rights provide ‘equal social worth’, which is at the heart of social citizenship. It gave a
direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilization, which was a common
possession.

• Citizenship is a principle by which social life is organized on the basis of equality. In contrast,
capitalism is a system of class inequalities. The ethic of capitalism entails the maximization of
profit, regardless of whether it endangers community membership.

• Such a tendency legitimizes the need for state intervention. Marshall invested the state with the
power to deliver welfare functions. In the schema of a welfare state, welfare is considered a
social right. The state bears an obligation to guarantee a minimum supply of goods and services
to the people, referred to as ‘social security’.

• The state also assures persons of their right to a share in the social heritage, which gives them a
sense of being citizens.

• Marshall’s chief concern was to moderate, reform and civilize the liberal-capitalist society, and
he believed that social citizenship could do the job.

Rawls theory of Social Citizenship

• Rawls too was enthusiastic about the welfare state as he believed that it could ameliorate the
hardship of the worst-off without destroying the ethic of liberalism.

• The core of the libertarian argument is that the market would generate an automatic effect to
alleviate the misery of the worst-off.

• Rawls radically altered this libertarian position and, in his view, all distributive questions are to
be settled by the state. The state is the key agency to perform distributive tasks in such a way
that the worst-off gets the best deal.

The new right conception of citizenship

The New Right is an umbrella term. It covers under its banner a range of ideas, often imprecise and
contradictory. For example neo liberals and neo-conseravtist. All thinkers of the New Right are wary
of the socialist, collectivist and welfarist economics attributed to the state. They vehemently oppose
the post-war liberal consensus developed around the idea of a welfare state. In their view, the
market is the best creator of wealth, the best allocator of values, and the best guarantor of personal
freedom. In the context of citizenship theory, they pose a central question: Who needs a theory of
citizenship? In sharp contrast to social liberals, they have traditionally espoused a minimal state and
identified it as the realm of coercion and unfreedom. The ideas of the New Right became very
popular in the mid-1970s, and radically altered the nature of politics and economics in the USA and
Europe.

Libertarian citizenship(The term can be in this case used interchangeably) can be traced to British
Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher in 1979 who gave more importance to market
rights over social rights. It was believed that the social rights (welfare policies) were becoming
unaffordable for the state. They argue that people seek to pursue their values and preferences
through private activity rather than public redistribution.

Libertarians say citizenship is the product of free choice and contract among individuals. It considers
market society as its basis and a suitable model of civic life. Robert Nozick is the chief exponent of
this theory. He observes that individuals resort to private activity, market exchange and association
to realise their values, beliefs and preferences. Libertarians prioritize market rights which are seen as
'entrepreneurial freedom'. They want freedom to earn and own property as well as its protection.
Accordingly, for the protection of right to property, protective institutions are needed and state
proves to be the most efficient of all. Critiques point out that free market based individualism does
not provide for adequate foundation of social solidarity.

Q. In what ways have the ideas of citizenship transformed with the advent of modern nation
state?

A. Modern citizenship is integrally associated with the nation state, the principal form of political
organisation across the globe. The seventeenth century marked the beginning of the modern nation-
state system, which has been referred to as the Westphalian model or system.

The Treaty of Westphalia created a system based on the idea of the state as a container of national
policy, national culture and national economy. The state was viewed as having impermeable
boundaries with internal and external sovereignty. External sovereignty implies the independence of
the state in the global system. Citizens were defined as members of this shared political
community, with a common fate, a sense of nationality, and a commitment to the nation.

Modern citizenship was thus born of the territorial nation-state. The history of citizenship is
intrinsically associated with modern citizenship rights drawn from the nation-state . In the second
half of the 20th century, the democratic nation-state became the principal unit of political
organisation throughout the world. Within its boundaries, individuals were defined as citizens with
rights and obligations laid down by constitutions and laws. Citizenship as a political category and
citizen activity became possible only within the boundaries of the state. Modern citizenship is linked
to the territory of the nation-state, and like the nation-state, it is geographically bounded. The
exclusive link between citizenship and territory or state boundaries created the language of inclusion
and exclusion—the duality—insiders/citizens/members/‘us’ versus ‘Self’ and outsiders/non-
citizens/non-members/‘them’/ ‘Other’.

However, In the last two decades of the 20 th century, globalization coupled with post-modernisation
challenged the nation-state as the only source of authority over citizenship and democracy.
Globalization has systematically interrogated the themes surrounding modern citizenship—
territoriality, identity, belonging and allegiance.
By spelling out the powers and limits of the nation-state, international law has tried to qualify the
principle of state sovereignty. The international human rights regime has played an important role in
weakening the national grip on citizenship. It has led to the strengthening of civil rights, which allow
citizens to make claims against their states. At the same time, the integration of markets, the
presence of MNCs, increased transnational flows such as migration the spread of cultures , global
tourism, and transnational criminal networks have resulted in new human rights problems.

The Deterritorialization and social interconnectedness across existing geographical and political
boundaries associated with globalisation ion pose a fundamental challenge to the underpinnings of
the Westphalian model. While boundaries and territory still remain important, the idea of a ‘political
community of fate for all the essential purposes of human life’ (Held 2004) can no longer be
meaningfully located within the boundaries of a single nation-state, because the most fundamental
forces and processes that determine the life chances of citizens in a political community have
become transnational. State’s autonomy is compromised as it finds itself nested in webs of social
relations whose scope extends beyond the confines of national borders, and over which it has
limited control.

Globalization and Citizenship

It has challenged modern understandings of citizenship grounded in the nation-state. The ongoing
processes—the emergence of a global economy, revolutionary changes in communications
technology, the formation of regional economies and markets, the development of supranational
bodies and legal norms, the growing importance of human rights and democracy, the reality of
immigration and emigration, and the emergence of a global commitment to a common set of values
—have contributed to a rethinking of the meaning of citizenship. In the context of the disintegration
of the domestic-foreign divide, the traditional tendency to picture the domestic arena as a privileged
site for the realisation of citizenship, as a normative ideal and an empirical practice, becomes
problematic.

At the turn of the 21 st century, guided by the processes of globalization, mobility citizenship(which is
concerned with the rights and responsibilities of visitors to other places and cultures), minority
citizenship, cultural citizenship, ecological citizenship, diasporic citizenship, and cyber citizenship,
these alternative conceptions could be considered the ‘citizenship of flow’, which are concerned
with the causes and consequences of the flows of migrants, visitors, cultures and risks across
national boundaries

Changing relationship between the citizen and the State

Neo-liberalism as a public philosophy is based on the claim that the market is better than the state at
distributing public services. As a result, it marks a shift in emphasis from the public to the private and
from the state to the market. Thus, it conceives of citizenship in economic terms; citizens are
transformed into consumers, looking for the party or programme that promises to augment their
market positions.

As the neo-liberal model rejects the idea that citizenship confers a status independent of economic
standing in a society, protection of the rights of property owners is given primacy over the
participatory rights of citizens, both nationally and globally. This leads to a major shift away from
public citizenship, directly provided by the nation-state and based on compulsory taxation, insurance
and participation rights, to some kind of consumer citizenship, provided by many diverse
institutions, nation-states, global organisations, NGOs, and the media.
This has two major consequences for citizenship. First, a state cannot protect its citizens from the
fluctuating effects of the global economy over which it does not have effective control. Second,
Marshallian social rights are dismantled as the welfare state comes under increasing strain in the age
of neo-liberalism. The inability of the state to ensure the social rights of its citizens creates new
scales of inequality, and makes civil and political rights incapable of providing meaning to citizens’
lives.

These two factors have resulted in an erosion of state legitimacy or erosion of the committed
adherence to or allegiance of its citizens, and a decline in social solidarity and citizenship.

Global civil society and the Internet have contributed to the emergence of unbounded notions of
citizenship. The Internet has greatly influenced political consciousness, and has created a specific-
identity ‘netizen’ or a new discursive or interactive form of citizenship—‘cyber-citizenship’. It is
based on unmediated dialogue, information exchange and networking around the world, and thus
challenges the idea of a state-centric world. It provides democratic space for the expression of
alternative and contesting voices that transcend national boundaries.

The last decade witnessed a proliferation of dual or multiple citizenship accords, underpinned by the
blurry notions of belonging and origin contrary to traditional notions of citizenship based on birth,
place of birth and decent etc.

Post National Citizenship

So in the age of globalization and migration, citizenship is becoming a transnational matter.

Immigration, the movement of refugees and stateless persons, the formation of supranational and
transnational bodies like the EU, the codification of international human rights norms, and the
emergence of a global civil society are undermining the very basis of national citizenship.

Post-national citizenship highlights the emergence of locations for citizenship outside the boundaries
of the nation- state. It aims at a democratization of citizenship— an expansion of individual rights
and maximization of inclusion.

First, a momentous effect of globalization has been the rise of global cities- NY, LA, London, Paris,
Mumbai—whose role and stature pertaining to citizenship transcend the nation- state in which they
happen to be located . Second, in recent times some inter-governmental organisations have
extended the practice of citizenship to the international level, which is referred to as transnational
citizenship. Eg. EU citizenship. Third, a globalising world demands a system of global rights and
duties. One emergent category in this direction is ecological/earth citizenship. Ecological citizenship
makes us environmental citizens since we all have a common future with regard to the natural
environment. Fourth, contemporary economic globalization is associated with an accelerating gap
between rich and poor states, and between people in the global economy. Conceivably, a deepening
polarization of income and wealth, global inequality, poverty, social exclusion and social conflict
have become the most pressing and contentious issues on the global agenda. So we require a
system of global justice based on a just distribution of goods and services in the international arena
Fifth, as we can see, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the nation- state model cannot offer
an adequate basis for citizenship, identity, rights and duties, and justice in the globalizing age.

Conclusion

Contemporary citizenship is becoming post-modern in the sense that the nation-state is no longer
the sole source that provides citizenship and citizenship rights, and duties and identity. Although the
nation-state remains the most important site, it is no longer the exclusive site as far as citizenship
practices and experiences are concerned.

Citizenship was initially attached to the city (local citizenship) before it came to be linked with the
nation-state (national citizenship); and it then became closely linked with the EU (transnational
citizenship). Therefore, many believe that there are good prospects for the linkage between
citizenship and the world at large (deterritorialized/ cosmopolitan citizenship) in the future.

Citizenship in a globalising world has to be based on a recognition of (a) the increasing inter-
connectedness of political communities or nation-states, although national sovereignty is still
important; and (b) the supposition to rethink the scope and content of citizenship rights (the issues
of inclusion and substance) both within and beyond the nation-state.

Although state sovereignty is not necessarily eroded, it is arguably redefined as a shared exercise in
public power and authority in a complex system of multi-layered governance.

Q. Marxist theory of citizenship?

A. INTRODUCTION

The dialectical relationship of liberty and welfare has guided modern political development, and it
sets the criteria for citizenship in a modern state. However, to absolutize either liberty or welfare
can undermine both. The governance of any mature, legitimate state whether capitalist or socialist
requires respect for the autonomy of individuals and civil society as well as effectiveness in the
promotion of general welfare. In the process of governance each state makes its own path as it
adjusts to its own successes and failures.

MARX ON CITIZENSHIP

Marx believed that human history, on the whole, is such a process: from the individual being just
″the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate″ to ″the independence of the people
on the basis of the dependence of object″ through the bourgeois'' ″political revolution″ and then to
″a real community in which the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association.″ In
such a historical perspective, on the one hand, the modern citizenship in a bourgeois state shows its
historical limitations, and on the other hand, it also represents a historical progress.

Marx's critique of modern citizenship in the modern bourgeois state is not to end citizenship, but to
transform citizenship. The historical limitations of modern citizenship lie in that the person whom
the bourgeois state recognizes through ″human rights″ and protects through ″citizenship rights″ is
just a member of ″civil society″ rather than a member of the ″human society.″

According to Marx’s well-known dictum, the rights of man, insofar as they are distinguished from the
rights of the citizen, are those of the ‘‘member of civil society, i.e., the rights of egotistic man, of man
separated from other men and from the community.’’ Marx thus examines the four ‘‘natural and
imprescriptible’’ rights as they are articulated in ‘‘the most radical’’ version of the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen(1793) that of - equality, liberty, security, and property. He shows
that all come back to property, of which they serve as metaphors and whose free enjoyment they
aim, in turn, to guarantee. ‘‘Natural’’ rights are conceived on the model of the individual-man,
ideally self-sufficient and motivated by the unlimited desire to satisfy personal needs, what C. B.
MacPherson designates as ‘‘possessive [or proprietary] individualism.’’ Marx’s argument rests on the
following: that this anthropological figure of man-as-property owner results from an exclusion, from
a primordial separation between man and his ‘‘generic essence’’, that is, man considered in
constitutive multiplicity of his relations with other men and with social activities. Therefore, the
human rights system of the modern bourgeois state, as a matter of fact, recognizes and preserves
the privileges of the propertied class through the formal equality of rights, and consequently the
substantial inequality in civil society.

In ‘On the Jewish Question’, Marx claims that contrary to the mystification conveyed by the state,
which claims that the citizen is the truth of the man, the reverse is true: ‘‘This man, the member of
civil society, is thus the basis, the precondition, of the political state.’’ This amounts to saying that
the citizen, the ideal proclaimed by the Declaration, is the projection of a profane man, devoted to
the materialism of bourgeois society, who thenceforth appears as the natural man.

The historical progress of modern citizenship is that it replaces the absolute obedience to a monarch
with the political system based on the rights of citizenship, liberates its members from the feudal
relationship of personal dependence, and makes them become members with personal freedom in
the ″civil society.″ Without the personal freedom that modern citizenship affirms and recognizes,
there would be no free flow of factors of production, no capitalist development, and hence no
material precondition towards ″a real community in which the individuals obtain their freedom in
and through their association.″ In this regard, the establishment of modern citizenship is an
insurmountable step towards human emancipation; in addition, the citizenship in the modern
bourgeois state also provides the weapon for the proletariat and its political party to fight for and
defend their own interests and to promote the human's emancipation.

The ideology of the state plays a major role in containing class-struggle and in reconstituting social
relations on a basis other than class relations. Under capitalism, Marxists argue, social relations are
formulated by this ideology as relations between citizens. The citizens are declared as free and equal
and sometimes, as rooted in a cultural ethos and civilisational bond. The freedom and equality of
citizens has its counterpart in the exchange relations of the market where from a one-sided view,
equals gets exchanged for equals and the agents of such a system of exchange are free to exchange
the products they have. However, such an ideology formulated by the state can be seen as
superficial and partial when understanding and analysis is not confined to the surface. In such an
exercise, social relations are marked as class-relations that are caught in an irreversible struggle
between basic classes. For Marxists, however, state ideology has a real basis in all societies including
capitalism, although that real basis lies in an exclusive and one sided projection of social reality. It is
not mere chimera.

Social agents irrespective of the classes they belong to come to locate their role and place in society
in and through this ideology. In capitalist society, the force of this ideology remains persuasive and
pervasive due to the massive institutional and ideological complexes of the state through which it is
disseminated such as public education, the media, civic associations, political parties, trade unions,
legal and juridical organisations and sometimes, religious organisations as well. The French
philosopher, Louis Althusser, called them the ideological apparatuses of the state. The consciousness
of social agents, routinely and prominently, under conditions of this ideology remains the
consciousness of citizens, unless and until it is not challenged by the contradictions of capitalism and
class struggle to overcome them. In terms of its emphasis on substantive equality, social citizenship
is consistent with Marx's view in the spirit, but this does not mean that Marx would have no criticism
against the practice of social citizenship in the 20 th century. Marxism, therefore, calls for a double
critique of the notion of free and equal citizenship avowed by liberal democracy without denying the
worth of the notion itself.
● First, it expresses only the superficial face of the market related freedoms of the bourgeois society
and hides the profound contradictions in which social relations under capitalism are caught. An
entire array of public institutions rest on this notion and in their turn reinforce it.

● Secondly, rights and duties associated with citizenship are important and necessary to lay bare the
contradictions of capitalist relations and mount struggles to overcome them. Social classes cannot
organise themselves, if the basic freedoms associated with citizenship are denied to social agents.

Anthony Giddens a critique of Marshall

Marxist theory of citizenship treats the rights associated with citizenship as the product of class
conflict. Anthony Giddens is the chief exponent of this theory. In his two important works A
Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (1981) and Profiles and Critiques of Social Theory
(1982), Giddens has contradicted Marshall’s view in order to bring forth his own viewpoint. He has
particularly raised three issues:

1. Firstly, Marshall treats the development of citizenship as if it were something that unfolded
in phases according to some inner logic within the modern world. Giddens find this account
as oversimplification of the role of politics as the state, as if the whole process was
supported and strengthened by ‘the beneficent hand of the state’. Giddens argues that the
unprivileged have achieved their citizenship in substantial degree only through struggle; they
succeeded to tilt the balance of power in their favour only during the times of war,
particularly during the period of world war.

2. Secondly, according to Marshall, development of citizenship has taken place in a unilinear

manner. Giddens disagrees with him on this point. He argues that it was the product of
various social movements. The varying strength of these movements led to variations in the
benefits conceded to the unprivileged. Erosion of welfare rights of the poor during 1970s
and 1980s, particularly under Margaret Thatcher (in England) and Ronald Reagon (in US) are
the cases in point.

3. Thirdly, Marshall identified three types of rights associated with citizenship: civil, political
and social rights. He held that these rights belong to a single category. On the contrary,
Gidden identified two types of citizenship rights which belonged to different categories:

 Individual freedom and equality before law signify those civil rights which were largely won
by the emergence of bourgeoisie through their struggle against the feudal privileges. These
rights helped to consolidate industrial capitalism and modern representative state.

 Economic civil rights signify those rights for which working class and trade-union activists
fought against bourgeois system of power. These include workers’ right to form their union,
expand its activities, right to bargaining and right to strike. These rights sought to challenge
the dominance of capitalist system.

According to Giddens, development of citizenship and modern democracy began in late 16 th century
with the expansion of state sovereignty and administrative build-up. This paved the way for the
extension for the state’s capacity for surveillance which implied the collection and storing for
information about members of society. This type of supervision increased the state’s dependence on
cooperative forms of social relations. It was no longer possible for the modern state to manage its
affairs by force alone. More opportunities were generated for subordinate groups to influence their
rulers. Giddens has termed this phenomenon as ‘two-way’ expansion of power.
In his work ‘The Nation State and Violence (1985)’, Giddens has conceded the contemporary
capitalism is different from 19th century capitalism. Labour movements have played a prominent role
in its transformation. In most of the capitalist countries of today, ‘welfare capitalism’ has come into
existence which safeguards the civil rights of the working class. These civil rights have helped to
consolidate industrial capitalist system.

Thus, Giddens has departed from the original tenets of Marxism and has come round the view that
citizenship rights can be maintained within the structure of liberal democracy.

Q. Antony Giddens notion of Citizenship ?

A. Anthony Giddens in his views on citizenship sates that the idea citizenship is born with nation
states. According to Giddens, the sovereignty of the state means control over the subjects. But the
control over the subjects cannot be done by force, but only with the consent of the people.  In order
to control the people, the rulers tried to increase their power, but at the same time the people also
tried to control the rulers. Thus a struggle started between the people and the rulers. Nation, state
and citizenship were born out of this struggle.

Anthony Giddens explained the state, sovereignty and democracy with his theory. According to
Giddens, after the rise of the state, the need was felt that how to exercise maximum control over the
people and collect information related to the people. But for both these works it was necessary to
increase the power of the state. As the state tried to increase its power. Similarly people opposed
the state. Thus began the struggle between the people and the rulers and two things were born out
of this conflict.

 The first was the victory of the people in the struggle between the people and the rulers,
that is, democracy was born. And the government was controlled by the people.
 Second, after the rise of democracy, the people formed the government according to
their wishes and the people were ready to increase the power of the government.

According to Anthony Giddens, after the rise of the state, sovereignty and democracy, everyone got
equal membership. But this situation arose after a long time. Like in the beginning special rights
were given to the powerful classes and to the feudalist classes. However, after the rise of
democracy, equal rights were given to all. But the struggle between the capitalist and the workers
continued.

The state adopted welfare policies to pacify the workers. Thus the welfare state was
born. Citizenship was born out of class struggle and this class struggle took place in every era.  The
workers fought against the bourgeoisie and the feudal lords because the working class and the lower
class people wanted to have equal rights with the upper class people. This struggle led to the idea
that all the people living on a certain territory should have equal civil rights.  Whether a person is rich
or poor. It should not have anything to do with rights, but all citizens should get equal rights.

In this way Giddens tried to prove with his theory that citizenship was born out of class
struggle. Whereas Marshall did not talk about the class struggle at all. Therefore, Anthony Giddens
does not accept Marshall's views. According to Anthony Giddens citizenship and nation state are
intertwined. Feudalism One system feudalists have been given more rights and the rest have been
given very few rights. The feudal system was a hindrance in the development of the people. So the
people were fed up with the feudal system and the people together fought to end the feudal
system. The feudal system ended and after the end of the feudal system, nation states were
formed. And the people who cooperated for nation building became the citizens of the state. The
citizenship that was thus born was born out of class struggle.

Giddens Criticism of Marshall

In his two important works A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (1981) and Profiles
and Critiques of Social Theory (1982), Giddens has contradicted Marshall’s view in order to bring
forth his own viewpoint. He has particularly raised three issues:

1. Firstly, Marshall treats the development of citizenship as if it were something that unfolded in
phases according to some inner logic within the modern world. Giddens find this account as
oversimplification of the role of politics as the state, as if the whole process was supported and
strengthened by ‘the beneficent hand of the state’. Giddens argues that the unprivileged have
achieved their citizenship in substantial degree only through struggle; they succeeded to tilt the
balance of power in their favour only during the times of war, particularly during the period of
world war.
2. Secondly, according to Marshall, development of citizenship has taken place in a unilinear
manner. Giddens disagrees with him on this point. He argues that it was the product of various
social movements. The varying strength of these movements led to variations in the benefits
conceded to the unprivileged. Erosion of welfare rights of the poor during 1970s and 1980s,
particularly under Margaret Thatcher (in England) and Ronald Reagon (in US) are the cases in
point.
3. Thirdly, Marshall identified three types of rights associated with citizenship: civil, political and
social rights. He held that these rights belong to a single category. On the contrary, Gidden
identified two types of citizenship rights which belonged to different categories:

 Individual freedom and equality before law signify those civil rights which were largely won by
the emergence of bourgeoisie through their struggle against the feudal privileges. These rights
helped to consolidate industrial capitalism and modern representative state.

 Economic civil rights signify those rights for which working class and trade-union activists fought
against bourgeois system of power. These include workers’ right to form their union, expand its
activities, right to bargaining and right to strike. These rights sought to challenge the dominance
of capitalist system.

According to Giddens, development of citizenship and modern democracy began in late 16 th century
with the expansion of state sovereignty and administrative build-up. This paved the way for the
extension for the state’s capacity for surveillance which implied the collection and storing for
information about members of society. This type of supervision increased the state’s dependence on
cooperative forms of social relations. It was no longer possible for the modern state to manage its
affairs by force alone. More opportunities were generated for subordinate groups to influence their
rulers. Giddens has termed this phenomenon as ‘two-way’ expansion of power.

In his work ‘The Nation State and Violence (1985)’, Giddens has conceded the contemporary
capitalism is different from 19th century capitalism. Labour movements have played a prominent role
in its transformation. In most of the capitalist countries of today, ‘welfare capitalism’ has come into
existence which safeguards the civil rights of the working class. These civil rights have helped to
consolidate industrial capitalist system.

Thus, Giddens has departed from the original tenets of Marxism and has come round the view that
citizenship rights can be maintained within the structure of liberal democracy.
Q. What is Multi Multiculturalism? Discuss the idea of citizenship of Bikhu Parekh?

A. The term multiculturalism is used to describe a society in which different cultures can coexist. It
signifies attempts to balance diversity against cohesion. Multiculturalism not only recognises cultural
diversity, but also advocates that such differences should be respected and publicly affirmed. It
maintains respect for cultural differences and does not favour assimilation of minority culture into
the dominant one. Instead of seeking a melting pot in which minority groups assimilate into the
majority culture, multiculturalism uses metaphors like salad bowl or glorious mosaic where the
minorities can maintain their distinctiveness. From the multiculturalism perspective, the public
policy should not aim for standardization of cultural forms or any type of uniformity or homogeneity,
but instead, heterogeneity should be maintained.

Diversity, as a positive value within multiculturalism, does not simply indicate the absence of cultural
homogeneity. Rather, it points to the presence of several distinct and heterogeneous cultures. The
concept of diversity further asserts that each culture has attributes deserving of our respect.
Contemporary multiculturalism also endorses the idea of difference and heterogeneity exemplified
in the concept of diversity. It does not simply point to the presence cultures within the nation-state;
rather, it admits that these multiple cultures are discrete and often incommensurable. The concept
of cultural diversity constitutes the basic idea on which the structure of multiculturalism is
constructed.

Bhiku Parekh criticises Kymlicka’s view on culture that make him(Kymlicka) dismiss the claims to
special rights by immigrants and he says that “If culture is a primary good in that it is a necessary
condition for the good life, then are we right to deny immigrants access to their culture?” he says
that in a world of unprecedented cultural mobility in terms of peoples and symbols, it makes little
sense to argue that cultures are confined to national and ethnic boundaries. In this respect,
Kymlicka’s proposal could well lead to a form of cultural apartheid, rather than the intercultural
recognition of difference and the necessity of dialogue.

With these considerations in mind, Parekh’s (2000) own version of multiculturalism proceeds from
the view that unity-creating public spaces are based upon inclusive forms of dialogue. In this we
need not make the distinctions nationals, ethnics and immigrants that Kymlicka finds persuasive.
Parekh argues that multicultural societies need to establish a constitutional settlement, implement
justice in a way that respects difference and grant group and collective rights. Parekh agrees with
Kymlicka that collective rights can be used to oppose individuals’ neglects to consider the idea that
individual rights can also destroy community. Collective rights can be granted on a number of
grounds, including the respect of deeply held religious beliefs, to compensate for previous
oppression and disrespect, and the maintenance of collective minority identities. However, what
makes Parekh’s contribution distinctive of his argument that multicultural societies should aim to
create a common culture out of difference.

Such a culture he reasons could grow out of cross-cultural conversations and intercultural dialogue.
The key resource to develop such sensibilities among its citizens is the progressive development of
genuinely multicultural education. In terms of European liberal societies, this would involve the
enhanced questioning of Eurocentrism and monoculturalism more generally, and the development
of an educated curiosity in respect of other cultures. In this, simply to learn about the great and
glorious past of a particular ethnic or national society not only breeds racism. The central aim of the
multicultural education would be the fostering of sensibilities that were open to the sheer diversity
of cultures that make up the general history and experience of a community.
In the promotion of intercultural dialogue, Parekh distances himself from many of the assumptions
of mainstream liberalism. Rather than starting from the view that we already know what counts as
civilized behaviour, he argues for a transformative dialogue that respects difference. In these
dialogues we need to be guided by what Parekh calls ‘operative public values’ . While these values
are open to question, they are both general and regulative and embodied within the rights and
obligations of citizenship, which are in turn shaped by established legal norms and practice. In this,
Parekh argues that ‘our decision to allow a cultural practice cannot and should not be based on
abstract moral principles or the right to autonomy also but also on its cultural and historical context.’
Such dialogues should have a transformative effect upon both minorities and majorities alike, as
they critically interrogate a number of cultural practices.

Parekh best illustrates the possibilities that such dialogues can have through his investigation of the
Salman Rushdie dispute. For Parekh, the dispute within Britain was marked by entrenched modes of
thinking that failed to make use of the opportunity to give a more informed understanding of one
another. The liberal defenders of ‘The Satanic Verses’ mostly failed to appreciate the sense of harm
felt by the Muslim protestors, while they are in turn often failed to grasp the significance of ideas
about the freedom of speech for liberals. What the dispute actually highlights is the need to
formulate new public forums and institutions designed to deal with questions of intercultural
conflict and confusion.

These dialogues would need to recognize the different cultural associations, fears and cultural
projections both ourselves and others. Parekh argues that such deliberations are not simply the cold
exchange of reasons, but would need to be informed by the spirit of compromise, curiosity and
mutual respect. Such dialogues are sustained by the idea that such cultures are limited and benefit
from dialogue. A multicultural society has the principle of dialogue at its centre, and refuses to
privilege a particular cultural perspective (including liberalism). It is the principle of intercultural
communication and the recovery of ‘other’ that governs a multicultural society, and ethos
threatened by claims to cultural homogeneity and ethnic purity. The point here is to foster a society
that avoids collapse either into separatism or the tyranny of the majority, while being fully inclusive
of the cultural capabilities and capacities of its members.

As we have seen, multicultural societies are likely to benefit from the granting of some group rights
and different ways of anchoring intercultural forms of dialogue. While situations inevitably involve
the trade-off between universal principles and, more contextual forms of understanding, they will
inevitably proceed on a case-by-case basis. Such dialogic contexts would also, as many of the critics
of multiculturalism have argued, need to address the question of unequal power relations, which led
to some cultures being stereotyped and considered as ‘other’ (Yuval Davis, 1997). Such forms would
need to make sure the minority within minority communities finds a voice and that the diversity of
the host cultures is properly represented.

A report called ‘The Future of Multi-cultural Britain’ (also known as Parekh report) was published in
2000, the same year as Parekh’s ‘Rethinking Multiculturalism’. The report recognizes ‘the rights of
the communities to live according to their own conception of the good life, subject to certain moral
constraints.’ In this respect, it is critical of mainstream liberalism for promoting monoculturalism in
the public and multiculturalism in the private. The report highlights specific ways to enhance
intercultural dialogue and the auditing of dominant institutions to ensure their inclusivity. However,
as is well known, the publicizing of these proposals in the British press was overshadowed by the
report’s claim that Britishness was ‘racially coded’. The incident reveals the extreme difficulty of
seeking to develop a politics of difference rather than one limited to liberal ideals of tolerance.
As Henry Giroux (1994) has argued, multiculturalism inevitably seeks to question the ways in which
the national culture privileges certain identities over others. Multiculturalism presents the mutual
challenge of seeking to deconstruct the ideas that ‘black’ and ‘white’ encode essential identities, and
the need to help dominant groups to unlearn their own privilege. Again multiculturalism points
towards the possibility of deconstructing identities of power, primarily by making ‘whiteness’ visible
and by recovering ‘other’ voices, which are often stereotyped and marginalized. However, these
dimensions, as the reaction of the British press demonstrates, will always have to move within less
than perfect social and cultural conditions, and these are dangers and difficulties that any version of
multiculturalism would inevitably have to face. A dialogic multicultural politics would have to
negotiate the dangers of fundamentalist reaction, disengagement by dominant groups and the
politics of ‘otherness’ that sought security in the permanent margin.

The other criticism that has been brought to bear on Parekh’s suggestion is his anti-universalism.
Brian Barry (2000:69) has argued that Parekh’s equivocation on these themes fails to recognize the
binding force of ‘the principle of non-discrimination’. It is this universal liberal principle that should
ethically guide a multicultural society, rather than intercultural dialogue. Parekh’s concern with
universalism is two-fold. First, he argues that Rawlsian liberalism tend to exclude and marginalize
practices and perspectives that seem to be ‘unreasonable’. That is liberalism is actually inhospitable
to cultural diversity, in that it presupposes an individualistic ethos. Second, he argues that universal
norms are too abstract to do anything more than offer general norms for guidance. What is actually
required is the empowerment of weaker groups in dialogue and the development of multicultural
conversations. The concern here is the imposition of abstract norms can be divisive, and indeed may
become disputed in practice. While Parekh occasionally bends to stick too far, his proposals are
actually a call to develop what Lister has called ‘differential universalism’ (1997). As Parekh (1995)
has argued elsewhere, the point where liberalism becomes illiberal is where it finds it difficult to
respect those who do not value individualism, secularism, ambition and pursuit of wealth. The other
side of liberalism is that it may come to code those who fail to be reasonable through normalizing
discourses. Parekh’s concern is less with a minimal universalism than with the cultural insensitivity of
liberalism. Yet he is on weaker ground where he fails to recognize any ongoing conversation or
transformative dialogue actually presupposes certain universals, such as equal respect (Benhabib,
1999).

Q. In view of the criticisms of Bhikhu Parekh and others examine the contribution of Will Kymlicka
to multicultural citizenship? /Does the dominant liberal theory exclude minorities? Explain with
reference to the idea of multiculturalism?/Examine the challenges of diversity to the idea of
citizenship. What is the contribution of Will Kymlicka in this regard(Answers all 3 questions)(Write
1st para only for 2nd Q.)

A. The term multiculturalism is used to describe a society in which different cultures can coexist. It
signifies attempts to balance diversity against cohesion. Multiculturalism not only recognises cultural
diversity, but also advocates that such differences should be respected and publicly affirmed. It
maintains respect for cultural differences and does not favour assimilation of minority culture into
the dominant one. Instead of seeking a melting pot in which minority groups assimilate into the
majority culture, multiculturalism uses metaphors like salad bowl or glorious mosaic where the
minorities can maintain their distinctiveness. From the multiculturalism perspective, the public
policy should not aim for standardization of cultural forms or any type of uniformity or homogeneity,
but instead, heterogeneity should be maintained.
 At its most fundamental level, multicultural citizenship involves a departure from traditional notions
of citizenship, which emphasize individual rights and duties in a particular state. Multicultural
citizenship insists that we recognize cultural differences between citizens and the unique identity of
an individual. Citizens should not be viewed as merely abstract entities. Multicultural citizenship
seeks to protect the integrity of the individual while recognizing that individuality is formed in a
variety of social and cultural contexts.

There are two distinctive theories of multiculturalism—

1. Radical-Radical formulations of multicultural citizenship advocate a fundamental shift in the

understanding of citizenship. They criticize the liberal idea of universal citizenship, arguing that the
concept of universal citizenship makes an attempt to assimilate other cultures within a single
dominant culture. Proponents of the radical version argue for a ‘differentiated citizenship’, which
reserves special rights for ‘oppressed’ minority groups. This notion was developed by Iris Marion
Young, who developed her concept of differentiated citizenship around the idea of oppression.
However, the concept of oppression being a problematic one, the notion of multicultural citizenship
cannot be built around it. It is extremely difficult to define who the oppressed groups are and which
minorities should be considered oppressed. This is why Marion Young’s idea of differentiated
citizenship has been rejected in political theory as a viable solution to the problem of minority rights.
Marion Young was unable to provide a proper definition of who the oppressed groups are.
2. Liberal- the above mentioned problems are absent from liberalism as it skilful in mediating the
relationship between the individual, the identity group and the state. A liberal theory of minority
rights explains how minority rights coexist with human rights, and how they are limited by principles
of individual liberty, democracy and justice. Articulated most comprehensively by Will Kymlicka, this
approach presents multicultural citizenship as a liberal theory of minority rights, taking as its premise
individual freedom as the defining principle of liberalism. For Kymlicka, individualism, autonomy,
critical self-reflection and choice are central to liberalism. While Kymlicka was sure that liberalism
provided the best opportunity for protecting minority rights, he was also aware of the limitations of
liberalism.

First, a liberal conception of minority rights would not justify internal restrictions. Internal
restrictions imply that minority groups restrict the basic civil or political liberties of its own members
in order to retain certain cultural heritages of the minorities. Liberals are committed to supporting
the right of individuals to decide for themselves which aspects of their cultural heritage they should
retain. Liberalism propounds that individuals should have the freedom and capacity to question, and
possibly revise, the traditional practices of their community. Second, liberal principles are more
sympathetic to demands for external protection, which leaves the minority community vulnerable to
the decisions of the larger society.

In short, the liberal view requires freedom within the minority group and equality between the
minority and the majority group. Due to these two limitations, a liberal conception of minority rights
fails to accommodate all the demands of majority groups. For example, some cultural minorities do
not want a system of minority rights that is tied to the promotion of individual freedom or political
autonomy.

Will Kymlicka

Commitment to freedom and toleration are two hallmarks of liberalism. Toleration is a willingness to
allow existence and expression of rival views. Liberalism gives an individual the right to choose
his/her beliefs, cultural practices and way of life. However, toleration extends to values, views and
social practices that are compatible with autonomy and personal freedom. Practices such as forced
marriages and female circumcision will not be endorsed by liberal multiculturalists as they are
against individual freedom.

Will Kymlicka’s theory on liberal multiculturalism is one of the most important, as he combines the
liberal values of equality and autonomy with the value of cultural membership. His views are
expressed in his books, Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989) and Multicultural Citizenship
(1995). According to Kymlicka, culture is important to individuals for two reasons. First,
membership of a culture is an important condition of personal autonomy as they serve as ‘contexts
of choice’ and provide meaningful options by which an individual frames his life and goals. Second,
cultural membership is important in shaping self-identity of an individual. A person’s self-respect is
connected to the respect that is accorded by others to his/her culture. The first argument stresses
the autonomy building of culture, and the second is contribution to human well-being and creation
of stable communities. Although both functions are important, they do not necessarily coincide.
Some culture might promote human well-being more than autonomy; others might do the opposite

Will Kymlicka, provides a framework of representation and membership which accommodates

cultural and group differences in such a way that a person's group membership and membership in a
cultural community do not pose any disadvantage to her/him.

Moreover, Kymlicka also seeks to find a meeting ground between the rights of cultural communities
to self-preservation and those rights of individuals defined as civil and political rights. A multicultural
state or society needs both universal rights and a special status or some group differentiated rights
for minority cultures. This will produce a comprehensive notion of justice in a multicultural society.

Kymlicka uses the phrase ‘societal culture’ and defines it as shared history and language, making it
synonymous with a nation or a people. Kymlicka argues that in a multicultural society, access to a
societal culture can become an issue of equality and justice under certain circumstances. Here, it is
important to note that no state can be culture-neutral. Most of the time the state promotes the
majority culture at the cost of the minority culture, proving that there is a nexus between the state
and the majority culture. The traditional liberal explanation of ethnic and cultural difference has not
been enough.

In contrast to Young’s idea of minorities which problematically involved a vast majority, Kymlicka
tried to narrow down the minority groups entitled to special rights. Since he takes ‘societal culture’
as the central point of reference for defining minorities, it narrows down the ‘minority groups’
considerably. He suggests that the demands of national minorities and ethnic groups may be
accommodated within a framework of democratic citizenship (a) by protecting the common rights of
all citizens, which basically means the protection of the civil and political rights of individuals:
freedom of association, religion, speech, mobility and political organization in order to protect group
difference, and (b) by accommodating cultural diversity through special legal and constitutional
measures, with members of specific groups being guaranteed special rights. Kymlicka identifies three
forms of group-differentiated rights:

Special group representation rights: democratising the structures of state by making it more
representative by including members of ethnic and racial minorities, women, disabled, etc.

Polyethnic rights: concern themselves with the specific rights of immigrant communities, enabling
them to express their particularities and differences without fear of prejudice or discrimination in
mainstream society. These include protecting their religious and cultural practices. It is intended to
promote integration into the larger society.
Self-government rights recognise some kind of political autonomy or territorial jurisdiction of the
national minority by granting federalism.

For Kymlicka , membership to a stable and historically continuous cultural community—is essential
to human freedom and autonomy, and hence is a primary good. Although individuals have a right to
cultural membership and all that follows from it, Kymlicka does not think the right belongs to all
minorities equally. He is largely interested in two kinds of minorities, national and ethnic.

According to him, the right to full cultural membership belongs only to the national minority
because it is territorially concentrated, has a more or less complete cultural structure, and is often
protected by treaties. Unlike the majority community, whose culture is embodied in the major
institutions of society and which enjoys considerable power and dignity, the national minority is
often disadvantaged by factors beyond its control and needs the relevant rights to place it on an
equal footing with the majority community. It may therefore legitimately claim the right to self-
government, to control immigration, to restrict the sale of land, to make its own language policy,
and so on.

As far as the national minorities are concerned, Kymlicka believes that a liberal society should not
impose its values on them largely for pragmatic reasons. Ethnic minorities fall under the second
category. Immigrants are treated as ethnic minorities. They have voluntarily uprooted themselves
from their natural homes, and thereby waived their right to their culture. And they enter the latter
with full knowledge of its values and practices and implicitly undertake to abide by these. Kymlicka
argues that they therefore have no right to self-government, to provision of public services in their
mother tongue, and so on.

Criticism- Parekh explicitly picks up on the point that there appear to be no general or undisputed
principles that inform Kymlicka’s hierarchy of national refugee and immigrant minority rights. If
culture is a primary good in that it is a necessary condition for the good life, then are we right to
deny immigrants access to their culture? Parekh also believes that Kymlicka ‘absolutises liberalism’.
His pervasive suggestion that national minorities are to be given self-government rights provided
they govern themselves within certain liberal parameters fails to take cultural diversity seriously
enough.

Even feminists are unhappy with the multicultural notion of citizenship. For example, significant
minority groups in many countries constrain girls under the control of their families. They impose a
dress code on them and restrict their movement. It is therefore difficult to understand how these
young women's cultures provide them with contexts that enable them to make informed decisions
about how to lead their lives. Many instances of culture-specific discrimination in the private sphere
will never emerge in the public realm. Thus, one's place within one's culture is also important, as a
culture can enable an individual to develop self-respect and make choices about her/his life

Q. What do you understand by Multicultural citizenship? Examine the contemporary theories of

multicultural citizenship?

A. At its most fundamental level, multicultural citizenship involves a departure from traditional
notions of citizenship, which emphasize individual rights and duties in a particular state.
Multicultural citizenship insists that we recognize cultural differences between citizens and the
unique identity of an individual. Citizens should not be viewed as merely abstract entities.
Multicultural citizenship seeks to protect the integrity of the individual while recognizing that
individuality is formed in a variety of social and cultural contexts.
There are two distinctive theories of multiculturalism—

1. Radical-Radical formulations of multicultural citizenship advocate a fundamental shift in the

understanding of citizenship. They criticize the liberal idea of universal citizenship, arguing that
the concept of universal citizenship makes an attempt to assimilate other cultures within a
single dominant culture. Proponents of the radical version argue for a ‘differentiated citizenship’,
which reserves special rights for ‘oppressed’ minority groups. This notion was developed by Iris
Marion Young, who developed her concept of differentiated citizenship around the idea of
oppression. However, the concept of oppression being a problematic one, the notion of
multicultural citizenship cannot be built around it. It is extremely difficult to define who the
oppressed groups are and which minorities should be considered oppressed. This is why Marion
Young’s idea of differentiated citizenship has been rejected in political theory as a viable solution
to the problem of minority rights. Marion Young was unable to provide a proper definition of
who the oppressed groups are.
2. Liberal- the above mentioned problems are absent from liberalism as it skilful in mediating the
relationship between the individual, the identity group and the state. A liberal theory of minority
rights explains how minority rights coexist with human rights, and how they are limited by
principles of individual liberty, democracy and justice. Articulated most comprehensively by Will
Kymlicka, this approach presents multicultural citizenship as a liberal theory of minority rights,
taking as its premise individual freedom as the defining principle of liberalism. For Kymlicka,
individualism, autonomy, critical self-reflection and choice are central to liberalism. While
Kymlicka was sure that liberalism provided the best opportunity for protecting minority rights,
he was also aware of the limitations of liberalism.

First, a liberal conception of minority rights would not justify internal restrictions. Internal
restrictions imply that minority groups restrict the basic civil or political liberties of its own members
in order to retain certain cultural heritages of the minorities. Liberals are committed to supporting
the right of individuals to decide for themselves which aspects of their cultural heritage they should
retain. Liberalism propounds that individuals should have the freedom and capacity to question, and
possibly revise, the traditional practices of their community. Second, liberal principles are more
sympathetic to demands for external protection, which leaves the minority community vulnerable to
the decisions of the larger society.

In short, the liberal view requires freedom within the minority group and equality between the
minority and the majority group. Due to these two limitations, a liberal conception of minority rights
fails to accommodate all the demands of majority groups. For example, some cultural minorities do
not want a system of minority rights that is tied to the promotion of individual freedom or political
autonomy.

Will Kymlicka

Commitment to freedom and toleration are two hallmarks of liberalism. Toleration is a willingness to
allow existence and expression of rival views. Liberalism gives an individual the right to choose
his/her beliefs, cultural practices and way of life. However, toleration extends to values, views and
social practices that are compatible with autonomy and personal freedom. Practices such as forced
marriages and female circumcision will not be endorsed by liberal multiculturalists as they are
against individual freedom.

Will Kymlicka’s theory on liberal multiculturalism is one of the most important, as he combines the
liberal values of equality and autonomy with the value of cultural membership. His views are
expressed in his books, Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989) and Multicultural Citizenship
(1995). According to Kymlicka, culture is important to individuals for two reasons. First, membership
of a culture is an important condition of personal autonomy as they serve as ‘contexts of choice’ and
provide meaningful options by which an individual frames his life and goals. Second, cultural
membership is important in shaping self-identity of an individual. A person’s self-respect is
connected to the respect that is accorded by others to his/her culture. He further argues that since
cultural minorities are disadvantaged in accessing their own culture compared to members of
majority culture, minorities are entitled to special rights.

He says that it is impossible for the state to be completely neutral and its involvement in the cultural
character of the state is unavoidable. For ex, the public holidays that a government decides to
observe would promote a certain culture and those who do not share the culture promoted by the
state would be disadvantaged. True equality, according to him requires different treatment for
different groups. Kymlicka has listed three types of minority rights or group differentiated rights.

First, there are self-government rights which belong to the national minorities. Examples would
include Native Americans and Maoris in New Zealand. Second are the polyethnic rights which help
religious and ethnic minorities and have been developed through immigration to main their culture.
For ex, legal exemptions could be extended to Jews and Muslims from animal slaughtering laws in a
country. Third, there are special representation rights that try to rectify underrepresentation of
minorities in public life, for ex, the affirmative action in the US. Kymlicka argues that multicultural
citizenship and minority rights give minority groups external protections against outsiders. They do
not aim to allow the groups to restrict the autonomy and rights of their own members. Kymlicka
does not grant right to intervene to the liberal state in the illiberal groups who restrict the freedom
of their own members.

Criticism- Parekh explicitly picks up on the point that there appear to be no general or undisputed
principles that inform Kymlicka’s hierarchy of national refugee and immigrant minority rights. If
culture is a primary good in that it is a necessary condition for the good life, then are we right to
deny immigrants access to their culture? Parekh also believes that Kymlicka ‘absolutises liberalism’.
His pervasive suggestion that national minorities are to be given self-government rights provided
they govern themselves within certain liberal parameters fails to take cultural diversity seriously
enough.

Pluralist Multiculturalism

This theory of cultural diversity is based on value pluralism, an idea that there are many values which
are equally correct and fundamental although they may be in contradiction to each other. Bhikhu
Parekh has given his views on pluralist multiculturalism. He argues that multiculturalism is neither a
political doctrine nor a philosophical school. Instead, it is a perspective on the way of viewing human
life. It has three central tenets.

First, human beings are culturally embedded and they grow and live within a culturally structured
world. Their thoughts are deeply shaped by culture and they can overcome some, but not all of its
influences. Second, different cultures have different meanings of good life. Since each culture can
develop limited range of human capabilities and can understand only a part of human existence as a
whole, it requires other cultures to stretch its imagination and expand its intellectual boundaries. It
also guards against any tendency towards absolutism in any culture. An individual’s life is likely to be
richer if that person has access to others and in an interdependent and modern world, culturally
self-contained life is impossible. Third, every culture is internally plural, its different strands of
thought are in continuous conversation and hence, its identity is fluid, open and plural. Various
cultures grow by conscious and unconscious interaction with each other and each carries bits of the
other within itself.

Multiculturalism, according to Parekh, is a creative interplay between these three factors. He further
argues that from a multicultural perspective, a society does not commit itself to a particular political
doctrine or vision of good life. It also does not ask how much diversity to tolerate within the limits
set by it as it forecloses its future development. Multiculturalism begins by accepting the desirability
and reality of cultural diversity and structures its political life accordingly. It is a dialogically
constituted society which wants to keep the continuous dialogue and nurture an atmosphere where
boundaries of prevailing forms of thought can be expanded to generate collectively acceptable
policies and principles. Such a society does not give any priority to any cultural perspective, be it
liberal or otherwise.

There are certain institutional preconditions that are a prerequisite for dialogue like equal rights,
freedom of expression, participatory public spaces, an accountable authority and empowered
citizens. It also calls for political virtues like tolerance, concern, mutual respect, self-restraint, love
for diversity, a mind open to new ideas and ability to live with unresolved differences. Such a society
nurtures wide range of ideas and fosters the spirit of dialogue. By doing this, it draws a line against
those who are too dogmatic or self-righteous to participate in its conversational culture and accept
its outcome.

Q. ‘There is nothing like universality; it is only dominant particularity.’ In the light of this
statement explain the concept of differentiated citizenship of Iris Marion Young.

A. The idea of Universal citizenship

For most of the twentieth century, the dominant understanding of citizenship continued to place the
individual at its core, and citizenship was seen as a legal status indicating the possession of rights.
Citizenship in the democratic nation-state established the principle of non-discrimination insofar as
all citizens participate equally in universal rights and entitlements.

This ideal of ‘Universal citizenship’ is premised on the assertion of the equal moral worth of all
persons, who, according to Kant, are deserving of equal respect as rational agents capable of
directing their lives through principles. After all, it had been this assumption of equality that
underlay the political attack on the ancient regime with its system of status and group differences
before the French Revolution.

We inherited from the Enlightenment an ideal of universal citizenship which claims to deal with us in
our essentially human concerns. The vision of democracy associated with this ideal claims to treat us
as abstract individuals or citizens regardless of our sex, race or class. Liberalism takes no interest in
the character or identity of individuals; nor is it concerned directly with furthering the human cause.
It has no collective projects, expresses no group preferences, and promotes no particular individual
or individual interests. It is only concerned with upholding the framework of law within which
individuals and groups can function peacefully. This of course is not to deny that upholding the
framework of the rule of law may at some time require intervention in the affairs of individuals and
groups. However, liberal politics is indifferent to both particular human affairs and the particular
pursuits of individuals and groups.

The dominant liberal model of citizenship, as discussed above, has some limitations. Contemporary
debates on citizenship and rights have therefore questioned the idea that the (individual) citizen can
enjoy rights independent of the contexts/circumstances to which s/he belongs, that is, class, race,
ethnicity, gender, etc. Since the 1980s, globalization and multiculturalism have newly interpreted the
notion of citizenship. Ideas of world citizenship and human rights beyond national borders are
gaining ground. Given that modern societies are being increasingly recognized as multicultural, the
liberal understanding of the idea of citizenship has been opened up for debate. The specific contexts
—cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc.—of citizens are now seen as determining citizenship in
significant ways. This ongoing contest aims to make visible those differences which liberal theory
saw as irrelevant for understanding citizenship. In most societies, ethnic, religious and racial
communities have pressed for rights that would look at their special cultural contexts and
substantiate the formal equality of citizenship. An increasing number of theorists argue that
different groups can be accommodated into common citizenship only through adopting what Iris
Marion Young calls ‘differentiated citizenship’.

Differentiated citizenship

• Young, among the most influential theorists of cultural pluralism, asserts that the attempt to
create a universal conception of citizenship which transcends group differences is fundamentally
unjust to historically oppressed groups:

• The thrust of Iris Marion Young’s radical formulation is to denounce the ‘universal’ in universal
citizenship as the disguised particularism of the dominant group/groups.

• ‘Oppression’ is key to her scenario: Young argues that in a society where some groups are
privileged while others are oppressed, and yet one which insists that as citizens, persons should
leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences and adopt a general point of view,
serves only to reinforce the privileged.

• This is because the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified
public, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups seeking to redefine the principle of
equality, to make it compatible with the ‘multicultural present’

• Not much is said about the dominant group, despite occasional reference to ‘white middle-class
men’.

• This omission is perhaps not accidental, because the dominant can hide their groupness under
the cloth of universalism
• According to Young Differentiated Citizenship is mostly about special representation rights in
the polity which is reserved for ‘oppressed’ groups.
• Oppression is defined rather broadly as including anything from economic exploitation to
cultural discrimination.
• Differentiated Citizenship advocates the incorporation of members of certain (cultural) groups
not only as individuals, but also as members of groups, their rights depending in part on this
group membership catering to their special needs
• From this broad definition of oppression follows a long list of groups entitled to differentiated
citizenship: Women, blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and Spanish-speaking
Americans, Asian Americans, gay men, lesbians, working-class people, poor people, old people,
and mentally and physically disabled people.

Critical Evaluation of Differentiated Citizenship

• Young’s failure to come up with a more concise definition and elaboration of what
constitutes an ‘oppressed group’ is instructive. It shows the difficulty of building a theory of
multicultural citizenship around the notion of ‘oppression’.

• This notion is too vague and simplistic to account for the asymmetries of power and
resources in complex societies.

• There is no explanation as to why should oppression stop when The Others are in charge.

• If ‘universal is just a smokescreen for dominant group interests, the purpose cannot be
inclusion into this false universal.

• Accordingly, the quest for differentiated citizenship is presented as a ‘politics of difference’

that rejects traditional ‘inclusion’.