Corpuz v Sto.

Tomas
Facts:

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization in 2000. In 2005, he married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. He went to Canada soon after the wedding. When he
returned to the Philippines four months later, he discovered that his wife was having an
affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce which was granted.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his
new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite
the registration, an official of the NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition to
Gerbert's petition.

The RTC denied the petition, ruling that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the
action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law

Issues:

1. WON the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extend to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree? NO

2. WON the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree? NO

3. WON the recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate
is proper? NO

Held:
1.) No.

The provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse,
by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce
as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however,
can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by
the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability
of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right
under this provision.

2.) No. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well
as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with the
petition.

3.) No. There is no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. The
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect. (Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas,  G.R. No. 186571,
August 11, 2010)

Fujiki v Marinay

FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married

respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines On 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki
could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without

the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May
2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
on the ground of bigamy.On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for
the Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage. Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared voidab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines;and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.The
RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the provisions of the rule. Apparently, the RTC took the view that
only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file
the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for

reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC.

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated
through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation and Motion.

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings. The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in

assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castroand Nil v.
Bayadog which declared that "the validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition. Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. On the other hand,
Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.

HELD: RTC decision is reversed.

REMEDIAL LAW: Proof of foreign judgments relating to the statues of

a marriage where on of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country;
AM 02-11-SC not applicable to petition for recognition of foreign
judgment

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a

marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in
Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,the service of
summons,the investigation of the public prosecutor,the setting of pre-trial,the
trialand the judgment of the trial court.This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is
"to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."The interpretation of the RTC
is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. InMijares v. Rada,this Court
explained that "if every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."

CIVIL LAW: remarriage of a Filipino citizen whose alien spouse

divorces him or her

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend

the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial
to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." In Republic v. Orbecido,this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"under the laws of his or her
country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the

anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in
the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending
in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo
which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a

Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad
to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,
after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in
the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to
him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.

LLAVE V. REPUBLIC 

G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

FACTS: 

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole
world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous. YES

HELD: 

Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.

RATIO: 

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that
the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does
not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites.”

HELD: 

The petition is DENIED.

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

March 30, 2011
G.R. No. 169766
Ponente: Del Castillo, J

Relation to NCC 18 – In the case of Llave v Republic, respondent, Zorayda and Tamano, both
Muslims, were married on 1958 under the 1950 Civil Code. Petitioner asserts that the previous
marriage of Tamano was divorced under the Muslim Code of 1977.

In this case, SC ruled that as the marriage of Zorayda and Tamano were celebrated under the
1950 Civil Code, they are married under civil rites. Regardless if they undertook a divorce under
the Muslim Code, they are still married pursuant to the Civil Code as it was the existing law for
marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims when the union took place.
Facts:
May 31, 1958, Tamano married Zorayda under civil rites.
February 4, 1977, the Muslim Code, P.D. 1083 took effect.
May 27, 1993, Tamano married Estrellita under the Muslim Code.
June 2, 1993, Tamano married Estrellita under a civil cermony officiated by an RTC Judge.
Tamano’s civil status indicated as ‘divorced’.
May 1994, Tamano died.
November 23, 1994 Zorayda and Adib filed for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Estrellita and Sen. Tamano as under civil rites, their marriage remained subsisting when
Tamano married Estrellita in 1993.
Upon being summoned by the RCT on December 19, 1994, Estrellita asked for an extension of
30 days to file her answer. Instead of filing her answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss on
February 20, 1995 asserting that under the Muslim Code, jurisdiction on Muslim marriages fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of Shari’s courts.
Certiorari petition questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss was filed by Estrellita. RTC
continued to try the case while certiorari petition was in CA. CA denied her petition and
Estrellita was ordered by RTC to present her evidence on June 26, 1997. At the same time,
Estrellita has escalated her petiotion for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
After multiple delays in appearing in court with her evidence, on ground that she was waiting
for the outcome of her certiorari petition, the RTC proceeded with trial and rendered Estrellita’s
marriage with Tamano as void ab initio on August 18, 1998.
Estrellita appealed to the CA arguing that she was denied here right to be heard as the RTC
rendered judgment without waiting for finality on her certiorari petition. CA upheld that ruling
of the RTC stating that she was given ample opportunity to be heard and that her marriage with
Tamano was bigamous, as the marriage of Zorayda and Tamano is governed by the Civil Code,
which does not provide for an absolute divorce.
Issues:
1.) WoN the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, which the petitioner supposes to be
premature for the following reasons
a. Judgment was rendered without the SC’s final resolution of her certiorari petition (G.R.
No. 126603)
b. she has not yet filed her answer and thus denied due process
c. public prosecutor did not conduct investigation on whether there was collusion
2.) WoN the marriage between Estrelita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous. YES
3.) WoN Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab
initio. YES

Held:
1.) No. The trial court’s judgment was not premature.
a. Certiorari is an independent action which is not part of a continuation of the trial which
resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. Hence, it cannot be a reason to
put trial on hold.
 b. Estrellita failed to file an answer and refused to present her evidence even after her
multiple requests for delay were already granted
c. The lack of participation of a public prosecutor does not invalidate the proceedings in
the trial. (Tuason v Court of Appeals)
2.) Yes. The marriage of Tamano and Zorayda was solemnized under and governed by the 1950 Civil
Code as it was the only existing law governing marriage relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims at the time of their marriage in 1958. And since there was no declaration of nullity of
void marriage of Zorayda and Tamano’s union, the subsequent marriage of Estrelita and Tamano
is adjudged void ab initio.
3.) Yes. Zorayda and Adib, have legal standing to file for declaration of nullity of marriage. It has
been held that in a void marriage, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription. Zorayda and Adib, being the wife and heir respectively, are
considered interested parties.

REPUBLIC v. MOLINA
268 SCRA 198

FACTS: Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985, in Manila and bore a son.
A year after the marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility”.
In October 1986, the couple had a very intense fight which estranged their relationship.
On August 16, 1990, Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo contending that the latter is psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations. Petitioner (Roridel) argues that “opposing and conflicting
personalities” is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: WON opposing or conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity as

defined in Article 36 of the Family Code? NO

HELD: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence,

and incurability. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could not get along with each other. There was no showing of the gravity of
the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The court further laid
down the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code:
1)    The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;
2)    The root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint and proven by experts;
3)    The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the “time of the celebration”;
4)    The incapacity must be incurable or permanent;
5)    Such illness must be grave enough;
6)    The essential marital obligations are those embraced by Articles 68-71 and
 Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code;
7)    The interpretations given by the National Appellate of Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines should be given great respect by our courts; and
8)    The court must order the fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the State and the Solicitor General must issue a certification stating his reasons
for his agreement or opposition

On these grounds, the decision of RTC and CA declaring the marriage null and void ab
initio is reversed and set aside.

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists.

Republic v. Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS: Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 and begot a son. After a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father
since 1) he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered
his money; 2) he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and 3) he was never honest
with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. When
Reynaldo was relieved from his job, Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family. In
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was
estranged. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since
then abandoned them. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due
to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
(3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances. On 16 August 1990, Roridel
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for
Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. RTC declared the marriage void.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N psychological incapacity on the part of Reynaldo has been established. NO

HELD: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.  What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities.  It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which
would not meet the essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological
illness.  Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that
would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.  The evidence shown by Roridel merely
showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity
of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.  In addition, the expert
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which
is not considered as psychological incapacity.

8 Guidelines (Psychological Incapacity)

1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. 
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. 
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. 
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

 8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. 

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently
live at California.
 Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same.

However, the Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration. The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. (in other words guyss,
OSG contends that Par. 2 of Art. 26 should not apply to a situation where both persons were Filipino
citizens at the time of their marriage and later on one spouse became an alien and acquired a divorce
abroad.)

ISSUE: WON Par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code applies in this case. YES

HELD: YES. Paragraph 2, Article 26 of the family code will apply to the case. OSG’s
contention is therefore incorrect.

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law through a petition for declaratory relief.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

NOTE: Although Cipriano is allowed to remarry under par. 2 Article 26, wa gihapon sya ka remarry
diri kay wa siya ka present ug sufficient evidence to prove that he can remarry. Before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Respondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage. SAAAAD LYF

ROSANNA TAN-ANDAL vs. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL

G.R. No. 196359 May 11, 2021

Leonen, J.:

FACTS:

Mario Andal and Rosanna Tan-Andal were childhood friends. They lost contact with
each other for 17 years. Mario had worked in Switzerland, Germany, and Italy before
returning to the Philippines in April 1995. The parties reconnected and eventually
became a couple. Mario left for Italy in July 1995. Barely two (2) months after he had
left, he had quit his job and stayed in the country.

Mario and Rosanna married on 16 December 1995 at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish
in Poblacion, Makati City. On 27 July 1996, Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, the
only child of the parties. The family lived in a duplex in Parañaque City, with Rosanna's
parents living in the other half of the duplex.

According to Rosanna, Mario exhibited odd behaviors prior their wedding and during
their marriage. Mario had difficulty in managing his finances. Rosanna taught him to run
Design and Construction Matrix, the construction firm she had set up before she
married. However, Mario continued with his "emotional immaturity, irresponsibility,
irritability, and psychological imbalance." He made numerous cash advances and
purchases using supplementary credit card, which resulted to the family’s financial
losses and the closure of Design and Construction Matrix. He would leave their house
for several days without informing Rosanna of his whereabouts. Once he returned
home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep for days. Mario was also "hyper-
active" late at night.

Mario allegedly did not assist Rosanna when she gave birth to their child, Ma.
Samantha. He left her in the hospital, knowing that she could not move until the effects
of the spinal anesthesia had worn off. He only returned to the hospital later that evening
to sleep. When Rosanna and Ma. Samantha were discharged from the hospital, Mario
showed symptoms of paranoia. He thought everyone was out to attack him and, at
times, would hide Ma. Samantha from those he thought were out to hurt them. Further,
during the times when Ma. Samantha was sick, Mario would instead ignore the ill child.

Rosanna petitioned the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) to voluntarily commit Mario for
drug rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation
Center, and, eventually, at the Seagulls Flight Foundation. Mario remained confined
there until 24 December 2000, when the rehabilitation center released Mario without
completing his rehabilitation program. Rosanna wrote the trial court as to Mario's
premature release from the rehabilitation center. Since Mario's release, Rosanna and
Mario had been separated and had not lived together. Mario also failed to give support
to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha.

These events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario's psychological incapacity to

comply with his essential marital obligations to her. Rosanna contended that Mario's
drug use was the manifestation of a grave personality disorder "deeply rooted within
Mario's adaptive system." She prayed that the trial court nullify their marriage and that
she be declared the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land donated to her by her
aunt as well as the duplex built on it.

To prove Mario's psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Garcia, a physician-

psychiatrist, as expert witness. Dr. Garcia found Rosanna "psychologically capacitated
to comply with her essential marital obligations." As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him
with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with
psychotic features. Mario's narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. Garcia
found to be grave, with juridical antecedence, and incurable, allegedly rendered Mario
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to
Rosanna. Dr. Garcia testified that Mario's personality disorder was grave and "deeply
rooted" in his character. Dr. Garcia added that persons suffering from personality
disorders are "impermeable to any form of psychiatric therapeutic modality" because of
"the presence of denial and cognizance on the basic pathology of the person suffering
from the disorder."

Mario contended that it was Rosanna who was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations. He prayed that the trial court nullify his marriage to
Rosanna due to her psychological incapacity, and that the properties they had acquired
during their cohabitation be divided equally between them. He also prayed that the
custody of Ma. Samantha be awarded to him.
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage on the ground of Mario's psychological
incapacity. It awarded the custody of Ma. Samantha to Rosanna, with Mario having
visitation rights. As to the Parañaque duplex, the trial court declared Rosanna as its sole
and absolute owner, including the parcel of land on which it was built.

The Court of Appeals (“CA”) reversed the ruling of the lower court and declared the
parties’ marriage to be valid and subsisting. It found Dr. Garcia's psychiatric evaluation
of Mario to be "unscientific and unreliable" since she diagnosed Mario without
interviewing him. It ruled that Dr. Garcia "was working on pure suppositions and second-
hand information fed to her by one side."

Rosanna argued that psychological incapacity need not be grounded on psychological

illness, as this is allegedly more consistent with psychological incapacity being a “liberal
ground” for nullifying marriages. She cited cases where the Supreme Court held that
competent evidence, not necessarily expert opinion, may establish psychological
incapacity, and that what matters is the totality of the evidence presented. Rosanna
added that psychological incapacity is incurable, but not necessarily in a medical or
clinical sense. For her, incurability is manifested by ingrained behavior manifested
during the marriage by the psychologically incapacitated spouse.

ISSUE:
WON psychological incapacity need to be medically or clinically identified? NO

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that psychological incapacity need not be medically or
clinically proven. In effect, the Court modified the doctrine enunciated in Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina (“Molina”). Considering the inconsistencies with which the
doctrine laid down in Molina has been applied, the Court took a more comprehensive
but nuanced approach regarding the proper interpretation and application of said
doctrine.

Under the second guideline in Molina, the root cause of psychological incapacity must
be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven
by experts, and d) clearly explained in the decision. In Santos vs. Court of Appeals
(“Santos”), the Court defined psychological incapacity as a mental (not physical)
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligation. It involves the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In the past, however, the Court has
been inconsistent in requiring expert evidence in psychological incapacity cases. In light
of said inconsistencies, the Court now categorically abandons the second Molina
guideline. Now, psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality
disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must, however, be proof of
the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality which manifests itself through
clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. Such personality structure
must make it impossible for him or her to understand and comply with their marital
obligations. The proof required for this need not be given by an expert. Ordinary
witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted
marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the
incapacitated spouse.

Under Molina, the juridical antecedence of the psychological incapacity, pursuant to

Article 36 of the Family Code, and such incapacity must be incurable. However, the
Court acknowledges that psychological incapacity, not being an illness in a medical
sense, is not something to be cured. As such, the third Molina guideline is amended to
mean incurability in a legal sense, not a medical sense, Particularly, this means that the
incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and
contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable
and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.

Considering the foregoing, the Court found Mario psychologically incapacitated to

comply with his essential marital obligations. Rosanna was able to discharge the burden
of proof required to nullify her marriage to Mario. Clear and convincing evidence of his
incapacity was shown through testimonies on Mario’s personality and how it formed
primarily through his childhood and adult experiences well before he married Rosanna.
Dr. Garcia was also able to recount how Mario developed traits exhibiting chronic
irresponsibility, impulsiveness, lack of remorse, lack of empath, and a sense of
entitlement, behaviours which manifest his inherent psychological incapacity to comply
with his essential marital obligations.

While drug addiction is a ground for legal separation, it will not prevent the court from
voiding a marriage so long as it can be proven that the drug abuse is a manifestation of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage. Here, the totality of evidence
presented by Rosanna clearly and convincingly proved that Mario’s drug abuse was of
sufficient durability that antedates the marriage. His persistent failure to rehabilitate,
even bringing his child into a room where he did drugs, indicates a level of
dysfunctionality that shows utter disregard of his obligations not only to his wife, but also
to his child.

His failure to render mutual help and support was also clearly proven by his consistent
failure to find gainful employment and even driving to bankruptcy the construction firm
founded by Rosanna by siphoning its funds for his drug abuse.