The Role of the Village in Vietnamese Politics

Author(s): Paul Mus

Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1949), pp. 265-272
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
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 NOTES AND COMMENT
The Role of theVillagein Vietnamese
Politics
THE basic problemsof Vietnam-whethertheyconcerncooperationor re-
sistance,nationalismor communism,the programsand rolesof thepolitical
parties,or similarquestions-can be properlyunderstoodonly if theyhave
been appraisedfromthe standpoint of the villages.Since theend of the war
the French have succeededin re-establishing themselvesin certainof the
citiesof Vietnam,but notin theinterior of thecountry,thestronghold of the
villages.Since timeimmemorialthesevillageshave held thekeyto thesocial
structure ofthecountry and to itsoutlookon life.
The conservatismof the villages used to be contrastedwith the new
aspirations of thoserelativelyfewurbanintellectuals whoseattitudeshad been
molded by contactwith the French.In the presentsituation,however,it is
chieflythe conservativeelementsthat seem to have congregatedin the
French-held cities,whilelargeareasof thecountryside haveresortedto armed
resistanceunder leftistleadership.The explanationof this anomalyis not
thatthe two groupshave exchangedpositions,but ratherthatformulaeap-
plicablea generation ago areso no longer.
It is essentialto discardat once any notionthatin Vietnamthe French
are dealingwith nothingmorethana mass of apatheticpeasantswho have
been terrorized by theirleaders.When thewriterhad occasiontwo yearsago
to travelbehindthe Vietnameselines,he foundwidespreadevidenceof an
organizedpopularmovementboth at the frontand in the rear.
On what ruins was this new order built? Many old institutions have
certainlybeen destroyed, and in more than one instance,especiallyin the
south,the notableswho represented themhave been executedby theirown
countrymen. What were the historicalantecedentsof theseevents,and to
what extentwas the sad fateof thesenotablesdue to theirformeractivities?
In waging an anti-revolutionary campaignin the Vietnamesecountryside,
the French were sometimestemptedto employthe complexof communal
institutions for securitypurposes (including information, propaganda and
repression),but theycould not do so withoutconvertingit into a political
tool and thuswarpingit fromitsnormalfunctions. Bothin i93o and in I940-
4I thiscomplexwas used forsuch purposes,a factwhichmay explainwhy,
sinceI945, whennew leaderstookover,thetraditionalinstitutions have been
subvertedby conditionsutterly alien to thewontedrhythmof villagelife.

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 PacificAt/airs
Shelteredby theirquiet pondsand densebamboostands,thevillageswere
formerly largelyautonomous."The king'slaw," an old proverbsaid, "bows
beforevillagecustom."The collectiveobligationsof each community in such
mattersas taxes,compulsoryunpaid labor,and the provisionand mainte-
nanceof a contingent forthenationalarmywerecalculatedon thebasisof a
rosterof names which,thoughin theoryrevisedeveryfiveyears,was quite
inaccurate.The council of notables,co-optedfromamong membersof the
villageoligarchy,was responsibleforthe fulfillment of theseobligations;it
assignedduties and supervisedotherdetailsof communaladministration.
The Statehad no contactwithindividualsas long as theyremainedin their
village.To be sure,in military, judicial and religiousmattersthe State was
centralizedand authoritarian: no villagecoulddefyit.But in thepoliticaland
economicfieldsits rulewas light.It entrusted to thevillagemostadministra-
tivechores,includingthesupervision of publicworks,as well as thepayment
of public officials,
whichtherefore constituted onlya small drainon the na-
tionalexchequer.
French policy in respectof this traditionalstructurewas governedby
two,oftencontradictory, motives.The one was a sinceredesireformoderni-
zation and assimilation;theotherwas a mistrust of too speedyan evolution.
The best-qualified "colonial"expertsopposedrapid assimilationand seemed
disposedto relyon the traditionalinstitutions. On the whole,however,the
modernist tendencyprevailedin theend,and assumedconcreteformin three
groupsof reforms:(i) the institution of regularregistration of birthsand
deaths,whichpermittedthe compilationof more accuratetax rolls; (2) the
impositionof tighterFrenchcontroloverthecouncilsofnotables,particularly
in tax and budgetarymatters;and (3) the substitution of electionfor co-
optationof councilmembers.The firsttwo of thesereformsunderminedthe
patriarchalsystemby curtailingthe considerableadministrative-andcon-
sequentlyfinancial-latitudewith which the councilsof notableshad been
accustomedto function.The thirdreformencouragedthe taxpayersto look
aftertheirown affairs.
The Frenchexpectedthatthetransition to thenew orderwould be eased
by the electionto the new councilsof formernotablesfamiliarwith local
needs. Events, however,proved otherwise.Men who were qualified by
virtueof Western-style educationgenerallylacked a followingor otherin-
fluencein the villages.On the otherhand, the traditionalnotables,the na-
turalleadersof the people,who stoodto lose heavilyby the changein their
status,fadedout of thepictureand engineeredtheelectionto thecouncilsof
men of littleworth (who were usually under theirinfluence),and then
joined the ranksof theopposition.In theend,it becamequite clearthatthe
leaders of the countrysidedisliked the innovationsand that these were

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 The Role ofthe Villagein Vietnamese
Politics
doomedto failure.Accordingly,in I94I, withthe approvalof pro-Vichy
Frenchauthorities,
an imperial
decreeabolishedtheelective councilswhich
had beenestablished
twenty yearsearlier, all oftheirtraditional
and restored
prerogatives
tothecouncils
ofnotables.

SOMEobservers
oftheVietnamese thatpeacecouldberestored
scenecontend
iftheFrenchwouldencourage an over-allreversion tothetraditionalinstitu-
tionsof thecountry. The facts,however, do notsupport sucha contention:
therootcausesof thepresent stateofaffairs are notadministrative or poli-
ticalsomuchas cultural andeconomic innature.
The Frenchare inclinedto writehistory fromofficial records,thusrun-
ningtheriskof attaching toomuchimportance to official
ordersinsteadof
investigating theiractualresults in thefield.History thusconceived is really
littlemorethana recordof intentions. And,although Frenchintentions in
thematters underdiscussion havebeenexpressed mostexcellently,thecon-
creteresultsare surelymoresignificant. Whyis it thatnoneoftheirplans
concerning ruralorganization, alwaysso wiselymotivated even though
sometimes contradictory in effect, has everproducedtheexpectedresults?
One explanation, acceptedin certainof the conservative and traditionally
anti-French Vietnamese circleson whichFrenchpolicytodayis partlyde-
pendent, interpretsFrenchcommunal policyas a deliberateattempt to curb
thecouncilsof notablesbybringing themevermorecloselyunderFrench
administrative control. If theFrenchat first alteredand thenabolishedthe
traditionalstatusof the councils,theirpurpose, according to thesecritics,
was to convertthe councilsintoinstruments of theirown. If theFrench
subsequently changedtheirtacticsyetagainand restored powertothecoun-
cils,thatwas simply in ordertosecurean evenfirmer gripon themthrough
a return to traditionalforms whichtheFrenchnowrecognized to be more
In anyevent,
effective. theFrenchfailure in thisrespectwouldbe duetonon-
cooperation on thepartofthenotables in thefaceofunreasonable demands.
At firstsightthisargument seemstocontaina grainoftruth. The French
did indeedgain controlof thecouncilsof notables, and did burdenthem
withever-mounting responsibilitiesuntiltheybecameaccountable fora great
varietyof things:fortaxcollections and laborrecruiting fordifferent pur-
poses;forprevention of damageto transportation and communications in-
and equipment;
stallations forcareofforestlands; forsuppression ofalcohol
smuggling; and so forth.'
1 An extreme-leftist
sourcehas describedthe steeprise in local tax assessmentsin the fol-
lowing terms:"Between I890 and I896 directtaxes doubled. BetweenI896 and 1898 they
increasedby one-halfagain. The villageshad no alternative
but to accepttheseincreasesbecause
therewas nobodyto whomtheycouldprotest."

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 PacificAffairs
Yet,fora clearviewof thequestion, one shouldtakeintoaccountthe
problems thatconfronted theFrenchauthorities. Some of theirdifficulties
wereinvolved in theircolonialobjectives; otherswereduetolocalconditions.
The mainproblem stillconfronting Vietnamtodayis basically oneoftransi-
tion-from a looselyknit,inexpensive, traditionalstatetoa modern organiza-
tionwitha largebudget.In the earlierform,inspiredby Confucianism,
centralizationin religious andmilitary matterswas offset bydecentralization
in economic andsocialaffairs. The kingdelivered judgments, bestowed titles,
triedto expandhis territory, and,mostimportant, by meansof unending
ritualobservances soughtthefavorofthegodson behalfofthepeople.For
therest,thelifeofthecountry wasconcentrated in thevillages,andthecosts
of thecentraladministration wereaccordingly slight.The armycomprised
contingentsprovided andmaintained bythevillages, andpublicworkswere
carriedon bycorveesrecruited in similarfashion. Exceptfora fewengaged
in producing luxury items, no urbangroupofartisans wasabletosupport it-
selfon thelow priceswithwhichruralhandicraftsmen, whosemainsource
oflivelihood remained theland,weresatisfied-and thiswas onereasonfor
the smallnumberof cities.The busyruralmarketplaces contributedlittle
to thestaterevenues, whicha century ago wereestimated at onlythreemil-
lionfrancs.Nor did thestateprovideanyoftheeconomic or otherservices
essentialtoa modern society.
In ordertosurvive, thecountry needednewandlargerfacilities-railways,
highways, telecommunications, industries,financial and commercial estab-
lishments, educationaland publichealthequipment-aswell as a fresh
understanding oftheiruses.Clearlysuchneedsexceeded byfartheresources
at thecommandof theVietnamese government as longas itsrevenues de-
pendedon thetraditional administrative structure. The new administrative
system, the onus for whoseunpopularity was bornemainlyby French
colonialism,was therefore notsimplyan outgrowth ofa "colonial"outlook.
Whateverthe immediate goals of Frenchpolicyin Vietnam,the over-all
shapingfactorwas theneedto adapttheeconomy to modernrequirements.
Andthiswasimpossible unlessthefabric ofsociety werereshaped.
For example, whentheFrenchfirstinstalled a telegraph systemin the
country, thepeasantsweredelighted: theyspeedilyremovedtheoverhead
linesand putthemto varioususesin theirhomes.To stopthispractice, the
Frenchmadethevillagenotables responsiblefortheprotection of thetele-
graphlines-andalsoforthesupervision offorestlands, highways andwater-
worksas well as tax returns. In otherwords,as thedemandsof thenew
civilization
increased, theobligations ofthecouncilsofnotables becamepro-
portionatelygreater.
The dramapeculiarto Vietnam, as shapedbyhistory and geography, is
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 Politics
The Role ofthe Villagein Vietnamese
that,oncetheseneedshad beencalculated in accordance withthenewideas,
it was necessary to meetthemout of existing resources, thegreater partof
whichweredependent on theold order.For thetraditional worldwas not
dead; it stillheldswayin thecountryside, eventhoughitsscaleofeconomic
valueswas highlyanachronistic. In i939 the annualbudgetof a peasant
familywithelevenmembers was foundto be 32 piastres-asumindicative
ofa staticeconomy. Of thistotal,directtaxestook6 piastres, or i9 percent!
Yet in certain areasit was customary to paybutone centfora wholeday's
work.Fora workman toreceive onecentfora day'sworkandtohavetopay
aboutsixpiastres as an annualpersonal taxmakesno sensewhatsoever. The
firstfigurereflects the monetary valueof laborin the traditional society;
thesecondexpresses itsvaluein a modern economy. Sucha stateofaffairs, in
whichthepeople'slivelihood is calculated in termsof one worldand their
taxesin thoseofquiteanother, cannotendure.The Vietnamese peasantmust
therefore adapthimself to newcircumstances: he musthenceforth consider
his personalbudgetin termsof monetary valueratherthanof immediate
personalneeds,and accustomhimself to theconceptof extrinsic value-a
notionquiteforeign to histraditional outlook.Butitis quiteclearthatonce
he haslearnedto calculate hisowneconomic capacity in suchmodernterms
-and learnhe mustif thenationalexchequer is to meetitsgrowingex-
penses-hewillno longerbe content witha non-individualized statuswithin
a gregarious traditional community, governed by the council of notables.
This is thepricethatmustbe paidifthecountry is to developeconomically
and to justify itsclaimto nationhood in themodernworld.
In some respects Frenchcolonialadministration providedthe catalyst
thathastened theadventofthisnecessary periodoftransition, andtherecent
war precipitated thesocialrevolution, lendingit paroxysmal violence.Bas-
ically,however,the presentprocessof changestemsfroman economic
revolution on a national, or evena world,ratherthana coloniallevel.A
modern-style monetary tax,basedon theregularregistration of birthsand
deaths,inducesthetaxpayers to consider theirrights and duties,stripsthem
of theircloakof communal anonymity, and converts themintoindividuals
who mustbe reckoned within socialand politicalas wellas in economic
It is safeto predict
affairs. thatin Vietnam, as in manyothereconomically
undeveloped countries, thetranslation of theeconomy intomonetary terms
willintimecreatea needforballotboxes.

IN former daysthecouncilsof notableswereessentially

councilsof elders.
The moststriking featureof thenewVietnamese communalorganizations
in the resistanceareasis theprominencein themof youngmen."Since
i945," accordingto PierreGourou,"armedadolescents have replacedthe
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 PacificAffairs
peaceful
councils
ofnotables.""This,"he adds,"is notnecessarily
an im-
provement."
No-butit is a fact;anditshistorical
antecedents
areworth
examination.
The war,theJapanese occupation and,mostof all,theVichy-inspired
reforms, although markedly conservative, instead ofturning backthetide
ofhistory, succeeded onlyin accelerating thecourse ofevents in Vietnam.
TheFrench seemtohaveattempted toadapttheVichy "national revolution"
totheVietnamese monarchy bylinking Maurras withConfucius. TheJapa-
nese,on theother hand,apparently weredisgruntled because Admiral De-
coux,byholding outtheprospect ofa united Indochina, diverted-
Vietnam
from participating in thewarof"Asianliberation" andfrom taking much
interest inthe"Greater EastAsiaCo-Prosperity Sphere." In those daysViet-
namese youth wasarrayed in serried ranksunderFrench guidance to the
tuneof"Marshal Pe'tain,wearehere". Thismasstraining ofyouth hassince
beenutilized forother purposes.
Vietnamese schoolteachers, as wellas somelocalCatholic priests,seemto
haveexerted a powerful influence onevents. Justas elementary-school teach-
ersin Franceareoverloaded withextra-curricular duties,so in French-gov-
ernedVietnam instructors haveusually beenoverworked and underpaid.
Theireducation enabled themtocriticize thetraditional institutionsoftheir
country without, however, giving themsufficient understanding oftheeco-
nomicandhistorical basesofruralsociety. Theseteachers wereentrusted, in
thenameof theMarshal, withthetaskofpreparing theyouth forwhat
Vichytermed "thenational revolution". Thus,owing partly toFrench initia-
tive,elements of a popular revival wereassembled in theintimacy ofthe
Vietnamese countryside, behind theprotective hedges ofthevillages.
Combatant groups wouldbeverymuchmistaken ifthey should imagine
thattheyhavesinglehandedly introduced a newphasein theircountry's
history. The cell-like revolutionary committees haveundoubtedly playeda
leading partinthecourse ofevents. Butseveral other historicalfactors,some
of themlocalin character and certain others dependent on Franco-Viet-
namese intercourse, havecontributed to thesameendresult. Thesefactors
theVietnamese should keepinmindwhenthetimecomes forthem totackle
theclassic problem involved in thedemobilization ofanyresistance force.
Perhaps nothing blocks thesolution ofanyandallissuesmorehopelessly
today thanthebelief heldbyeachoftheopposing groups thatitcancontrol
thefuture course ofevents only ifit retains sufficient
powerto be ableto
destroy itsadversary ifitshould choose todo so.Thisattitude suggests that
eventhemuch-desired termination ofthemilitary conflictmayexacerbate
ratherthaneasepolitical difficulties.
Regardless ofwhatgroup mayinfuture
a
enjoy majority in the Vietnamese government,position theopposi-
the of
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 Politics
TheRoleoftheVillagein Vietnamese
tion,whether it is rightist or leftistin nature, willbe of criticalimportance
in theevolution ofa comprehensive nationalpolity.A leaderof theDemo-
craticRepublicofVietnamonceremarked to thewriter: "Nothingcan pre-
ventus fromexecuting thosewhomwe regardas traitors." Whilesuchsenti-
mentsmaybe permissible in wartime, peace-and firstof all peacein the
villages,
without whichpeacein thecountry as a wholeis unthinkable-will
require a somewhat different approach.
In theinterests ofpeaceit willbe necessary fortheFrench, as wellas for
theconservative Vietnamese, to desistfromefforts to pacifythecountry by
re-establishingtraditional villageinstitutions as partof a politicaland mili-
tary"security network"-aconcept which,as hasbeennoted,is economically
and sociallyobsolete. A country which,partlywithFrenchinspiration and
assistance,
has begunto realizeitsmodernpotentialities cannotbe pacified
merelyby beingforcedto contemplate its past.A transitional linkin the
nationaldevelopment (whichhas perhapsbeenpromoted ratherthaninter-
ruptedby the revolution)mightpossiblybe foundin the revolutionary
phaseitself.Traditional ruralsocietycontained a multitude of specialized
socialgroups-councils and subcommittees, classesbasedon age,neighbor-
hoodgroupsandliterary, religious, corporative,women'sandchildren's asso-
ciations.Hereperhaps is wherethetwoworlds-theoldandthenew-havea
pointof contact.In certainrespects the"revolutionary" frontimitates the
traditional structure of society byproliferating groups,notonlyofworkers,
soldiersandpeasants, according tothehallowedformula, butalsoofwomen,
children, old people,merchants, former soldiers, and thelike.These asso-
ciationsoriginated as a network ofcells,an aspectwhichtheywillnoteasily
shedas longas thewarcontinues. Butin peacetime theyaremorelikelyto
becomemorebroadlyand normally representative of ruralsociety.They
havealreadyhelpedto establish thetechnique ofelective institutionsin the
villages,and haveplayedan instrumental partin therecruiting of localad-
ministrative committees. Theymayhelpto satisfy theVietnamese predilec-
tionfora civilhierarchy, henceforth basedon ability insteadofon privilege.
A vigorous Resistance party, awarethattheeconomic development ofthe
Vietnamese massesis lessadvancedthanitsownleftist doctrine,mightwish
to imposean autocratic government on thepeoplewithout referencetotheir
inclinations.Or,alternatively, Vietnamese ofall politicalcomplexions might
cometogether in agreement thattheirpeople,in thecourseofitslongand
painfulhistory, has demonstrated enoughgoodqualitiesto warrant itsde-
cidingitsownfuture without havingfirst to mortgage it.The lattercourse,
however, will drawon all of thecapabilities of thecountry in all of their
diversity;ifa jointeffort is attempted, certain compromises willbe necessary.
In sum,therefore, itis likelythatVietnamwillbe unableto realizeall ofits
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 PacificAffairs
potentialities
untila sufficient
numberof former notables haverejoinedthe
innovatorsin thevillagecouncils,
whatever theshapeand natureofthena-
tionalgovernment.
Suchbeingthecase,ifFrenchactionsin themonths to comeshouldbe
calculated
solelyto advanceVietnamese reconciliation
and reconstructionby
everypossiblemeans,France,together withVietnam,wouldreturnto an
undertaking to whichshe has contributed in thepast (even duringthe
"colonial"period)in obedience
to a law morepowerful thananythingman
can opposeto it-namely,thelaw thatultimately onlynationalhistorycan
be writtenin theterritory
ofanynation.Whatever failsto contribute
to the
unityandproperstature ofthenationcanplayat mostonlya passingroleon
thelocalscene-andthefinaldecision concerning
whatitsstature anddestiny
shouldbe mustliewiththenationitself.
Paris,July1949 PAUL MUS

Repatriate in Japan
Organizations
REPATRIATES fromtheformerJapaneseoverseasterritories constitute
an
importantelementin postwarJapanand a key to certainaspectsof the Jap-
anese attitudetowardthe Occupationand the lost war. The organizations
whichtheyjoin afterreturninghome indicatein some measurethe degree
of successof theirrehabilitation and theirattitudestoward conditionsin
Japan.Their importancein the presentpoliticalscene is evidencedby the
attentionaccordedthemby the politicalparties,which,in an effortto en-
listthe supportof the large numberof votersinfluenced by them,have ad-
vocatedvariousrepatriate-assistanceprograms.
The end of the PacificWar found 6,6oo,oooJapanesesubjects(half of
whom were in the armed services) outside Japan Proper. To repatriate
thesemillionsto an alreadyover-crowded countrywould havebeen a gigantic
task underordinarycircumstances; fora countryjust defeatedin war and
underan Occupationwhosepolicieswerenotyetclear,itseemedan impossible
one. Yet it was accomplished,and remarkablyquickly.
Allied policywas to repatriateall Japanesefrom"GreaterEast Asia", ex-
ceptingthose whose technicaland professionalskills were needed until
suitablenativereplacements could be trained.The programwas administered
almostwhollyby the Japanese,underthe supervisionof the SupremeCom-
manderforthe Allied Powersand of the governments concerned.
The firstphase of the programcenteredon China, whichwas anxiousto
have the214 millionJapanesein itsterritory removedas speedilyas possible.
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