Case Digests (Legal Writing)
Case Digests (Legal Writing)
Case Digests (Legal Writing)
Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Petitioner) wishes the Court to set aside his
conviction in violation of Republic Act (RA) no. 7080 commonly known as
the Plunder law as amended by RA 7659 through assailing its
constitutionality for alleged vagueness in defining the criminal or overt acts
being punished by the said law, and the requisite quantum of evidence to
support conviction of an accused violating it. He specifically alleges that the
word “combination” and “series” in Section 1 par (d) and Section 2, and the
word “pattern” found in Section 4 of the statute are insufficient and vague in
defining the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and the
elements of the crime.
In view of this, the Petitioner likewise alleges that the Plunder law
does not require the standard proof of beyond reasonable doubt to convict an
accused of an offense under It. To elaborate, the petitioner is of the position
that Section 4 of the said law circumvents the need to prove the acts
constitutive of the crime of plunder by requiring only a proof of overt or
criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The petitioner also
argued that in the absence of “pattern” of overt and criminal acts, there can
be no conviction of plunder under the statute. Lastly, the petitioner is
concerned that the proof of mens rea requisite to prove an act of mala in se
was removed by the provisions of the statute basing from the deliberations
made on Senate Bill no. 733. Thus, it also violates the right to due process.
Considering above arguments, the petitioner wishes the Court to declare the
Plunder law unconstitutional for its vagueness.
Issue:
Ruling.
For the definition of “pattern”, The Court agreed with the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan ruled that under Sec. 1(d) of the
law, a “pattern” consists of at least a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts enumerated in s subsections (1) to (6) of Section 1, par
(d) of the Plunder law. Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the
pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common
purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either
be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said
common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful
scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the
principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if
there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used
by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of
a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
III. NO. The Supreme Court cannot subscribe to the argument of the
petitioner that Section 4 provides for the rules on evidence to prove
the crime of plunder, and an additional element needed to be proven
by the prosecution. The Supreme Court ruled that all the essential
elements of plunder can be seen and understood from Section 1, in
relation to Section 1, par (d). A “pattern” of the acts is not one of
them. Section 4 of the assailed law only provides for the rule of
evidence for the purpose of establishing the crime of plunder
necessary for a conviction.
V. NO. The contention of the accused that the entirety of the Plunder law
should be declared unconstitutional for alleged vagueness on some of
its provisions cannot be given merit. The Supreme Court ruled on the
first issue that RA 7080 sufficiently provides for the criminal or overt
acts constitutive of the crime of plunder which still needs to be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The quantum of evidence needed to be
proven by the prosecution still requires a proof of beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, it can be concluded that the petitioner is still entitled to
his right to due process and to a presumption of innocence.
b. Point of view
The ponente maintained a third person point of view in
expressing the view of the majority on every issue. He likewise
referred to the petitioner in the third person.
2. How did the manner of presentation aid in the decision of the court?
The ponente presented the decision in an organized manner. Every
issue and ruling was accurately described and given prior context. The
manner of presentation by the ponente will help the readers to understand
each issue and its respective ruling by the Supreme Court separately as it
was given prior context and how it was resolved through the use of the
law and jurisprudence. Furthermore, it also immerses the readers as the
pentene presented a vague historical background during the time of the
decision was promulgated.
Hacienda Lusisita, Inc. vs. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011
Facts
The decision of the Regional Trial Court was the again questioned by the
Petitioners before the Supreme Court. The respondent to be extradited
argues that he is entitled to a notice or a hearing before the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, and a right to bail. Furthermore, He attests that he is not a
flight risk for not escaping the country upon knowledge of his extradition
and his confinement during the pendency of the extradition case is unfair.
The Petitioner maintains their position that the RTC erred by granting he
motion of the respondent. They likewise argue the opposite of what the
respondent has been claiming and stand by the immediate arrest of the
respondent.
Issues:
Ruling
Applying above point to the case, the Supreme Court held that the
supporting documents constitutes to a prima facie finding that
there is probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the
respondent. The procedure laid out by the Extradition law requires
the immediate arrest of the respondent without any requisite notice
or hearing.
II. Yes. The respondent judge’s act of granting the motion of Mark B.
Jimenez
III.
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992.
Facts
Justice Antonio M. Carpio (Petitioner) prays that the Court declare Republic
Act no. 6975 unconstitutional with a prayer for temporary restraining order
for the following reasons: (1) RA 6975 strips the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) of its powers by limiting its function to merely
“administrative control” over the Philippine National Police (PNP); (2) The
assailed law manifest a derogation of power of control of the NAPOLCOM
over the PNP as it vested the power to choose the PNP Provincial directors
and the Chief of Police to Governors and Mayors; and (3) The creation of a
“special oversight committee” which included some legislators as members
constitute to an encroachment in the separation of powers between the
legislation and the executive departments of the government.
For the first and second reason, the petitioner contends that in placing the
PNP under the Department of Interior and Local Government and by
limiting the powers of the NAPOLCOM to “administrative control”, there is
an usurpation of powers by the local government units from the power of
control of the President though giving the local executives the power to
choose their respective PNP provincial directors. The petitioner is of the
position that this act to be implemented by RA 6975 transgresses the powers
of control over the executive branch as it allegedly transfers the power of
control through the assailed act. As for the third reason, the petitioner is of
the position that the membership of legislators in the “special oversight
committee” created by RA 6975 as it places the concerned offices of the
executive under the control of some members of the Congress.
In addition to these assertions, Petitioner is also of the view that the creation
of “People’s Law Enforcement Boards” (PLEB) which punishes and hears
the complaints of the citizens against misconduct of PNP officers derogates
the NAPOLCOM’s power of control over the police force. Lastly, the
petitioner is also of the view that Section 12 of RA 6975 constitutes
abdication of the commander-in-chief powers through providing a transitory
transfer of the functions to the AFP upon enactment of the act. Considering
above discussion, the petitioner wishes to declare RA 6975 unconstitutional
Issues
I. Was the power of control by the Chief executive properly
implemented by RA 6975?
II. Was vesting the power to choose their respective PNP provincial
directors to Mayors and Governors constitutional?
III. Was the civilian character of the police force undermined through
the creation of the PLEBs?
IV. Is there an abdication of power of the commander-in-chief on
Section 12 of RA 6975?
V. Does the creation of a “special oversight committee” by RA 6975
constitute to an encroachment to the powers of the chief
executive?
Ruling
I. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the assailed law merely reorganizes
the offices of the executive department which is within the powers of
the President. The enactment of RA 6975 is merely an exercise of the
power of the president’s power of control. The power of control as
defined by the decision of the Supreme Court on the case of Mondano
v. Selvosa is the power to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.
Furthermore, the Doctrine of qualified agency supports this
reorganization as the President cannot exercise its control powers all of
the time. Thus, the power of control is delegated to the cabinet
members of the president acting as heads of the different departments
of the executive branch. Applying it to the case, The Supreme Court
held that the reorganization of the police force under the DILG by RA
6975 is merely a realignment of the offices of the executive branch.
II. Yes. The Supreme Court upon scrutiny of the law held that the local
executives that were given the power to choose their PNP regional
directors merely act as local representatives of the NAPOLCOM. As
such, they are presumed to act under NAPOLCOM. It also worth
taking into consideration that the local executives can only choose
from a list of eligible recommended by PNP officials. Therefore, no
derogation of any power of the President was done making the vesting
of powers to choose constitutional.
III. No. The Supreme Court held that the creation of the PLEBs does not
derogate the power of control by the NAPOLCOM. The commission is
tasked to issue implementing guidelines and procedure to be adopted
by PLEBs in hearing the cases against police officers. It may also
assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the
PLEBs. In view of this, the Supreme Court is of the position that the
creation of these PLEBs will all the more positively professionalize the
police force.
IV. No. The contention of the petitioner cannot be given merit as the
assailed provision merely provides for a transition period on which the
police force would slowly assume the function of protecting the
internal security of the state. Under this instance, the President
abdicates nothing of his war powers. He remains a civilian whose
duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part
of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are
clearly civil in nature.”
b. Point of view
The ponente maintained a third person point of view all
throughout the decision.
Facts
During his travel, two men boarded with knives in hand and robbery in
mind. One threatened the petitioner through his weapon while the other slit
his pocket forcibly taking away the money supposedly for the workers. The
two offenders subsequently jumped and ran out of the jeep. With little time
to decide, the petitioner immediately chased after the petitioners. He was
able to caught one and apprehended him after a scuffle. The other one was
able to escape with the stolen money. After several days, the petitioner filed
a request for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of the
Revised Administrative Code. The Commission on Audit however denied
the request alleging that it was his own negligence that led to the loss of the
cash.
Issues
The decision by the petitioner seemed logical at that time and the
attack by the two robbers cannot be attributed as a result of his
imprudence and negligence. The Supreme Court held that it was
undoubtedly a fortuitous event.
Facts
Atty. Noberto M. Mendoza (respondent) was a former Municipal Trial Court
Judge who abandoned his legal wife in favor of a paramour who is also
married. The respondent and his paramour have been cohabitating openly in
the eyes of the public in Barangay Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.
During their cohabitation, respondent sired two children by his paramour on
which their birth certificates provide that the two are married. Therefore,
their two daughters should be legitimate. After some time, the respondent
decided to run for public office during the 1995 elections. On his certificate
of candidacy (COC), he declared that he declared that his lawful wife was
the one he abandoned. Consequently, he also decided to run during the 1995
elections on which he declared on his COC that his civil status was
separated. Thus, prompting an administrative action by the petitioner.
The petitioners attest that the respondent should be removed from the as a
member of the bar for acts of immorality supported by documents submitted
as evidence attached to a letter submitted to their witness through an
anonymous source. The document attached was a certification issued by the
Civil Registrar attesting that the marriage between the respondent and his
lawful wife was still subsisting. In addition to the evidences submitted, the
petitioner likewise submits the letter received by the witness, and the birth
certificates of the two daughters of the respondent and his paramour.
On the other hand, the respondent did not present any evidence at all except
for a memorandum which says that the evidences presented by the
petitioners should not be admitted as the testimonies of the witnesses are
mere hearsay. Petitioner likewise argued that the pieces of evidence
submitted before the tribunal should not be admitted as it is in violation of
Rule 24 of Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993. However, upon
hearing the case, the respondent chose not to deny under oath the grave and
serious allegations made against him. In view of this, The Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines moved to suspend the
respondent from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that
he is no longer cohabitating with a woman who is not his wife and has
abandoned such immoral course of conduct.
Issues
Ruling
II. Yes. The Court concluded upon the absence of denial by the
respondent on his cohabitation with his paramour on which he sired
his two daughters. In view of this, the Supreme Court is of the
position that the respondent disregarded and made a mockery of the
fundamental institution of marriage. His acts of cohabitating with
his paramour despite his subsisting marriage to his lawful wife
contributed to the blot in his good moral character required to
remain as a member of the Bar.
Facts
On the year 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the
opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an
audiotape of a mobile phone between the President of the Philippines and
high ranking official on the Commission on Elections. The press secretary
claims that the conversation was recorded through wiretapping. He further
informed the people there are two versions of the said conversation one
being doctored which suggests that the President had instructed the
COMELEC official to manipulate the election’s results to PGMA’s favor.
Days after, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued a
press release regarding the broadcast of the audiotape released by the
opposition to media organizations. The NTC on the press release gave a fair
warning to radio and television companies that broadcasting the contents of
the audiotape shall violate the anti-wiretapping law giving them the
authority to suspend, revoke, or cancel their licenses. In view of this, the
petitioner filed a petitioner under the Court to declare the acts by the NTC
unconstitutional for it violates the freedom on expression and of the press,
and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. The
respondents answered through denying the allegations of the petitioner as
the warning was issued pursuant to the NTC’s mandate to regulate the
telecommunications industry.
Issues
Ruling
I. Yes. While the petitioner is not a member of the broast media, the Court
have held for a lot of times that where serious constitutional questions
are involved, “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if
we must, technicalities and procedure.”. Applying this to the case, as this
is a challenge to the most exalted of all civil rights, the freedom of
expression, the Court ruled that it shall not delve further as to the legal
standing of the petitioner.
The clear and present rule subjects the Government to the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality of the restriction done to
freedom of the speech or the press. The Court emphasized that this rule
shall apply equally to all kinds of media including broast media.
Applying it to the case, It is the position of the Court that the
respondents failed to justify that there is indeed an evil sought to be
prevented by the Government for the following reasons. Firstly, Firstly,
the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the
voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped
conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public
two versions, one supposed to be a "complete" version and the other, an
"altered" version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who's
and the how's of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially
considering the tape's different versions. The identity of the wire-
tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant
proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these
unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would
violate the anti-wiretapping law. Considering above rulings, the Court
concluded that there is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-
wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
Considering above points, the respondents was not able to overcome the
presumption of unconstitutionality of the restriction. Thus, the warning
issued by NTC is unconstitutional. .
Facts
II. Yes. The Court ruled that the factual findings as held by the Regional
Trial Court that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals without any
dispute shall likewise be held by the highest of courts.
III. No. The Court discussed the perceived injustice found in the
appropriation of penalties to crimes against properties committed today.
The Court noted that the penalties provided during 1932 should not
apply as the value of money have already raised in comparison to what
was the value back then. However, the Court is of the position that it
cannot pre-empt the legislation as it is their duty to promulgate penal
laws. Applying it to the case, the Court does not have any power to
change the penalty of Estafa. As a temporary measure, the Court relied
on its decision on Cosme Jr. v. People and the application of the
Indeterminate sentence law.
The writing styles of the three ponentes vary only on their manner
of presentations. It is evident on their writing styles that they
intended to use simple words except for times that there is a need
to use the technical language of the legal profession.
III. Which of these styles led to your better understanding of the legal
issues and holdings of the court?
The writing style of Justice Austria-Martinez. The writing style of the
Justice as shown in the decision was concise and meaningful. I
personally went for the writing style of Justice Austria-Martinez for I
find it a lot more comfortable to read in comparison with the other
two. The ponente was able to show in the decision aside from the
requisite facts, issues and rulings of the case, the importance of
resolving and elaborating the subject matters at hand and how it shall
set as precedence to future cases. To add, each ruling was discussed
only through the use of jurisprudence and the law. There were also no
personal comments made by the Justice. Overall, I find the writing
style of the Justice to help me in better understanding legal issues and
rulings by the Supreme Court.