Estrada Vs Sandiganbayan Digest
Estrada Vs Sandiganbayan Digest
Estrada Vs Sandiganbayan Digest
ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN
Issues:
1.
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The
amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the
various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly
vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of
the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute
is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
2.
WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.
The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it
gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense.
Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is a
very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule
of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted
of plunder
We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled
and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more
than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but
only operated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude
exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
3.
WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it.
No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are
mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the
amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and
criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of
mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of
Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution
need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it
proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions
under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree
of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable,
either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as
to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject
criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds
itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in
se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does
not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law,
as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit