518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lalican vs. Vergara

*
G.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997.

EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A.

VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto
Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Criminal Law; Natural Resources; Revised Forestry Reform

Code; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; A law should not
be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by
law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat
compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the
plain words of the law; The phrase „forest products‰ is broad enough
to encompass lumber which is manufactured timber.·To exclude
possession of „lumber‰ from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would
certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so
construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law,
nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance
with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain
words of the law. After all, the phrase „forest products‰ is broad
enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured
timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in
tautology.

______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

519

VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997 519

Lalican vs. Vergara

 Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari may be
issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross
abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.·
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely
abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The
petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only
where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of
discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of power.

Same; Same; Same; Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of

jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the
judgeÊs findings and conclusions.·On the other hand, certiorari
may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent
court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse
of discretion. Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if
its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most
constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari. x x x In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or
mistakes in the judgeÊs findings and conclusions.

Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Motion to Quash;

Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an
information is denied.·The unavailability of the writ of certiorari,
and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that
what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is
the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him
and three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper
procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to
enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the
special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on
the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law. Certiorari is not the proper remedy
where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the
appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction,
to
 520

520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lalican vs. Vergara

appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash,

is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an
interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it
be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.

Same; Same; Same; An interlocutory order may be assailed by

certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
·An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or
prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However,
this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards
interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would
not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly
burden the courts.

Same; Judicial Review; The Supreme Court will not pass upon
a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the
case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the
application of the statute or general law.·With respect to the
constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would
have this Court consider, this Court has always desisted from
delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for
judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case, this
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis
mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other
grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law.

Natural Resources; Revised Forestry Reform Code; Criminal

Law; Judicial Notice; The Supreme Court can well take judicial
notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country,
considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now
imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing
rampaging floods in the lowlands; While the rights of an accused
must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law,
when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in
the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only
after a fair and just balancing of interests.·The Court can well take
judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this
country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are

521

VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997 521

Lalican vs. Vergara

now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by

causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the
rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal
provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare
and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a
crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just
balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the
foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform
Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one
considering that, contrary to petitionerÊs assertion, his rights to due
process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown
to have been jeopardized.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

V. Dennis M. Socrates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari

and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal
possession of „lumber‰ is excluded from the crime of illegal
possession of „timber‰ as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an
information charging the former offense or a „nonexistent
crime.‰
On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277,
was filed by the City Prosecutor of1 Puerto Princesa City
against petitioner Epifanio Lalican, Ruben Benitez, Allan
Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of
that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the
information reads:

______________

1 LalicanÊs surname appears as „Nalican‰ in the information but he

signed the instant petition as Lalican (Rollo, p. 15).

522

522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lalican vs. Vergara

„That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz,

Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species
and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a
value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00), Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the
amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.‰

At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused

pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of
P.D. No. 705 refers to „timber and other forest products‰
and not to „lumber,‰ and asserting that „timber‰ becomes
„lumber‰ only after it is sawed into beams, planks or
boards, petitioner alleged that said decree „does not apply
to Âlumber.Ê ‰ He added that the law is „vague and
standardless‰ as it does not specify the authority or the
legal documents required by existing forest laws and
regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the
information should be quashed as it violated his
constitutional
2
rights to due process and equal protection of
the law.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the
ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom
of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which
deemed it proper that the word „timber‰ should include
„lumber‰ which is a „product or derivative after the timber
is cut.‰ The position of the prosecution was that to hold
otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the
law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest,
have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution.
The prosecution

______________

2 Rollo, pp. 27-28.

523

VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997 523

Lalican vs. Vergara

asserted that the issue raised 3by petitioner was more

semantical than a question of law. 4
On September 24, 1991, the lower court, guided by the
principles that penal laws should be construed strictly
against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing the
information. It held that the distinction between „timber‰
and „lumber‰ is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as
the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D.
No. 705 classifies „timber‰ as a forest product while Sec.
3(aa) thereof considers „lumber‰ as a finished wood
product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or
collecting of „timber‰ is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale
of „lumber‰ without compliance with grading rules
established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the
lower court categorically stated that:

„Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no

more danger to forest lands by being cut, gathered, collected or
removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be
made to apply to lumber.‰
The court, however, refrained from exploring the
constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding
that the5
case could be resolved on some other grounds or
issues.
The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of
this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal
Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural
Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for
it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one
which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation
or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had
made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an
absurd interpretation of the law.

______________

3 Ibid., pp. 30-31.

4 Presided by Judge Sabas R. Acosta.
5 Rollo, pp. 32-34.

524

524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lalican vs. Vergara

Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when

apprehended, the accused presented Private Land Timber
Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had
expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy.
Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and
that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped
with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was
the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the
accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin,
lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and
delivery 6 receipts for transportation from one point to
another.
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration
contending that the DENR primerÊs definition of „timber‰ is
erroneous because the law itself distinguishes „timber‰
from „sawn lumber.‰ The non-inclusion of „lumber‰ in Sec.
68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude
possession
7
of „lumber‰ from the acts penalized under that
section.
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was
subsequently assigned to Branch 52. 8
On June 10, 1992, the lower court issued the herein
questioned Order setting aside the quashal Order of the
previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is
evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the
possession, without the required legal documents, of timber
only but also of „other forest products.‰ It stated that even
if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and
possession thereof without legal documents is equally
prohibited by the law which includes „wood‰ in the
definition of forest products.
Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but
the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition
arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion
amounting to

______________

6 Ibid., pp. 36-37.

7 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
8 Presided by Judge Filomeno A. Vergara.

525

VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997 525

Lalican vs. Vergara

lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and

in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground
that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes
„lumber‰ in the phrase „timber or other forest products.‰
The petition is devoid of merit.
Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order
No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then
President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:

„SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other

Forest Products Without License.·Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found.‰ (Italics supplied.)

Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting,

gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any
authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
In the9 recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:

______________

9 G.R. No. 104988, June 18, 1996; People of the Philippines v.

526

526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lalican vs. Vergara

„The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber

or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined
in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of
the same section in the definition of ÂProcessing plant,Ê which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination

of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood product.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed

forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
WebsterÊs Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined,
inter alia, as Âtimber or logs after being prepared for the market.Ê
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their
plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as
possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.‰

Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include

possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the
expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under
Executive Order No. 277, are the following:

„WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest

resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved
and protected through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

______________

Hon. Teresita Dizon-Capulong, et al., G.R. No. 106424, June 18, 1996;
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123784,
June 18, 1996.

527

VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997 527

Lalican vs. Vergara

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from

technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to
penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to
present situations and realities; x x x‰

To exclude possession of „lumber‰ from the acts penalized

in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law
should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act
which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford
an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create 10
an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.
After all, the phrase „forest products‰ is broad enough to
encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured
timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely
result in tautology. As the lower court said:

„Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus

not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber
is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents
is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD 705
as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code
defines forest products, viz., x x x
Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the
definition of forest product (supra). If we are to follow the rather
tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then,
it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could
stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and
escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an
interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If
lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x x x.
If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to
imply that lumber seized in their possession were procured from
lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents

______________

10 AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 3rd ed. (1995), p. 202 citing

Uy Ha v. City Mayor of Manila, 108 Phil. 400 (1960) and Asturias Sugar
Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 19337, September 30, 1969,
29 SCRA 617 (1969).

528

528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lalican vs. Vergara

contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of

timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized
by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or
possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without lawful
authority.‰

The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not
gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the
information. The petition simply has no legal basis.
Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown
that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic
11
manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility. Grave abuse of discretion12
implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of power.
On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of
where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded 13its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of
discretion. Where the court has jurisdiction over the case,
even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts
would at most constitute errors of 14
law and not abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. As this Court said:

______________

11 Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 246, 254 citing
Litton Mills v. Galleon Traders, Inc., L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA
489.
12 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Confesor, G.R. No. 11480, March 10,
1994, 231 SCRA 41, 53; Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 71771-73, March 31, 1989, 171
SCRA 579, 585; Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78591, March
21, 1989, 171 SCRA 415, 425; Soriano v. Atienza, G.R. No. 68619, March
16, 1989, 171 SCRA 284, 290.
13 San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114300, August 4, 1994, 235
SCRA 145, 150.
14 New York Marine Manager, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
111837, October 24, 1995, 249 SCRA 416, 420.

529

VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997 529

Lalican vs. Vergara

„x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed

while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be
allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit
in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the
15
original civil action of certiorari.‰
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure 16
or
mistakes in the judgeÊs findings and conclusions.
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that
of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what
petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this
case is the denial of his motion to quash the information
filed against him and three others. This Court has
consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial
of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to
trial without prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on
the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, 17
to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to
quash an information is denied. That the appropriate
recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to
appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion
to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to
quash is an

______________

15 Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101789, April 28, 1993, 221
SCRA 582, 588 quoting Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, supra.
16 Municipality of Biñan, Laguna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94733,
February 7, 1993, 219 SCRA 69, 70.
17 Yap v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68464, March 22,
1993, 220 SCRA 245, 253; Reyes v. Camilon, L-46198, December 20,
1990, 192 SCRA 445, 452; Acharon v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-23731,
February 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 309, 311.

530

530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lalican vs. Vergara

interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed

18
nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The
remedies of appeal and certiorari19 are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive. An interlocutory order
may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is
shown that the court acted without or in20 excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However,
this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as
regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of
allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by
certiorari would not only delay the administration
21
of justice
but also would unduly burden the courts.
Petitioner22 may not seek refuge under Flordelis v.
Himalaloan for his contention that a denial of a motion to
quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That
case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at
bar. The information herein not being „patently
23
defective‰
nor that the offense charged has prescribed, this case may
not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper
remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.
With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. 24
No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider,
this Court has always desisted from delving on
constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for
judicial
25
review of a constitutional matter are present in a
case, this Court will

______________

18 People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, December 8, 1994, 239 SCRA 48,
54 citing Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83754, February 18,
1991, 194 SCRA 145.
19 Oriental Media, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80127, December
6, 1995, 250 SCRA 647, 253.
20 Alcasid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94927, January 22, 1993, 217
SCRA 437, 440.
21 Atienza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85455, June 2, 1994, 232
SCRA 737, 744.
22 L-48088, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 477; Petition, p. 10.
23 Flordelis v. Himalaloan, supra at p. 482.
24 Petition, pp. 7-10.
25 These requisites are: (1) the existence of an actual and ap-

531

VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997 531

Lalican vs. Vergara

not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis

mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some
other grounds,
26
such as the application of the statute or
general law.
The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable
problem of deforestation in this country, considering that
the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling
our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing
rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the
rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation
of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the
general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven
in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a
solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests.
This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing
interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform
Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one
considering that, contrary to petitionerÊs assertion, his
rights to due process and equal protection of the law have
not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is
enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately
executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.
Torres, Jr., J., On leave.

______________

propriate case; (2) a personal or substantial interest of the party

raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case (Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 & 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA
506).
26 Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA
797, 813.

532

532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Sangil, Sr.

Petition dismissed.

Note.·Where a lumber-dealerÊs license or permit has

 been suspended, he has absolutely no right to possess, sell,
or otherwise dispose of lumber and the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources or his authorized
representative has the authority to seize the lumber.
(Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430
[1996])

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