G.R. No. 200558. July 1, 2015.

CONSUELO V. PANGASINAN and ANNABELLA V.

BORROMEO, petitioners, vs. CRISTINA DISONGLO-ALMAZO‐
RA, RENILDA ALMAZORA-CASUBUAN, RODOLFO
CASUBUAN, SUSANA ALMAZORA-MENDIOLA, CARLOS
MENDIOLA, CECILIO ALMAZORA and NENITA ALMAZORA,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on

Certiorari; As a general rule, the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition
is limited to the review of pure questions of law.—As a general rule, the
Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure
questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference
exists as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule
45 does not allow the review of questions of fact. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.
Civil Law; Laches; Words and Phrases; Laches is defined as the failure
or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.—Laches is defined as the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
Same; Same; The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as
such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s right,
but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a
clearly inequitable situation.—The principle of laches is a creation of equity
which, as such, is applied not really to

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s right, but rather to avoid

recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation. The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will
be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become “stale,” or who
has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who has not been
vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or
inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for peace of society, the
discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an
impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has become,
under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.
Same; Same; Elements of.—The four (4) elements of laches, as first
prescribed by this Court in Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622 (1954), are
as follows: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom
he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which
the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant’s
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack
of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice
to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit
is not held to be barred.
Same; Same; The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their
rights.—A person, endowed with properties and entitlements, but chose to
lie quietly as decades passed by, watching his property wither away,
allowing innocent bystanders to pick the fruits of his unguarded trees,
instead of safeguarding his rights through the accessibly and necessary legal
means, does not deserve the protection of equity. The law aids the vigilant,
not those who slumber on their rights.
Same; Prescription; There are two (2) kinds of prescription provided in
the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by the
lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106; The other kind is
extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of
time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article 1139.—There are
two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that
is, the acquisition of a right

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222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangasinan vs. Disonglo-Almazora
 by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106.
Acquisitive prescription is also known as adverse possession and
usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and
actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106
and Article 1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of
action. These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged. In a
plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 covers
acquisitive prescription. A registered land therein can never be acquired by
adverse possession. In the case at bench, however, it was extinctive
prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action of
petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, not because
respondents adversely occupied the property, but because petitioners failed
to institute their suit within the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the
Civil Code.
Same; Extinctive Prescription; To determine the applicable period of
extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances of the case should be
considered.—To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription,
the nature and circumstances of the case should be considered. According to
petitioners, the owner’s duplicate certificate of title was given to Conrado
for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith
when he drafted the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of
Registered Land on January 9, 1949, and transferred the title of the land to
his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282 on June 17, 1965; and
because of the purported fraud committed by Conrado against petitioners, an
implied constructive trust was created by operation of law, with Conrado as
trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.
Same; Same; Prescriptive Period; Implied Trust; It is now well-settled
that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code,
is ten (10) years pursuant to Article 1144.—Constructive trusts are created
by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and
prevent unjust enrichment. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a
person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. It
is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained
by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the

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Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144. The prescriptive

period to enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from the alleged
fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual
need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of
the property.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Clear and Convincing Evidence; Fraud; The
imputation of fraud in a civil case requires the presentation of clear and
convincing evidence. Mere allegations will not suffice to sustain the
existence of fraud.—Fraud must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence and not merely by a preponderance thereof. Clear and convincing
proof is more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty
as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. The imputation
of fraud in a civil case requires the presentation of clear and convincing
evidence. Mere allegations will not suffice to sustain the existence of fraud.
The burden of evidence rests on the part of the plaintiff or the party alleging
fraud.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rodrigo L. Yuson for petitioners.
Fornier, Fornier, Saño and Lagumbay Law Firm for
respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

The present case demonstrates the legal principle that the law
aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus,
sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and
set aside the July 28, 2011 Decision1 and the February 3,

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1 Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, with Associate Justices

Rosmari D. Carandang and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; Rollo, pp. 17-24.

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Pangasinan vs. Disonglo-Almazora

2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in C.A.-G.R. CV

No. 84529, which affirmed the June 29, 2004 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Parañaque City (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 96-0206, a case for damages.

The Facts

The subject property is a parcel of land with an area of 572

square meters located in Brgy. Sto. Domingo, Biñan, Laguna. It was
registered in the name of Aquilina Martinez (Aquilina) under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18729 by the Register of
Deeds of Laguna on July 29, 1939.4
After the liberation of Manila from the Japanese military
occupation in 1945, Aquilina and her maternal grandmother,
Leoncia Almendral (Leoncia), learned that their house on Zabala
Street, Tondo, Manila, was ruined by the war. To rebuild their house,
they borrowed money from their relative, Conrado Almazora
(Conrado). Thus, their house was reconstructed. In return, Leoncia
entrusted to Conrado the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-
18729 covering the subject property in Biñan, Laguna.
Consequently, Conrado and his family remained in the said property.
Following the death of Aquilina on July 19, 1949, the title of the
subject property was transferred to Aurora Morales-Vivar (Aurora),
as her sole heir. Accordingly, TCT No. T-35280 was issued in the
name of Aurora5 after TCT No. T-18729 was cancelled. On
February 7, 1972, Conrado passed away.
Sometime in 1994, Aurora learned from Cristina Almazora
(Cristina), the widowed spouse of Conrado, that the title of the
subject property had long been transferred in the name of

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2 Id., at pp. 26-27.

3 Penned by Judge Zosimo V. Escano; CA Rollo, pp. 55-63.
4 Records, Vol. I, p. 7.
5 Records, Vol. II, p. 673.

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Conrado and that the subject property had been sold to Fullway
Development Corporation (Fullway) by the heirs of Conrado in
consideration of P4,000,000.00.6
Aurora was shocked to learn that the subject property was
already transferred to Conrado and sold for a meager amount. On
October 30, 1995, she sent a letter to the heirs of Conrado
demanding the delivery of the payment they received for the sale of
the subject property; but it was unheeded.
On May 9, 1996, Aurora together with her husband, Arturo, filed
a complaint for damages7 against Cristina and the other heirs of
Conrado (respondents) before the RTC. They contended that the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-18729 was only given to
Conrado for safekeeping. The complaint, however, admitted that the
family of Conrado had been staying on, and using, the subject
property since 1912 with the permission and generosity of Aquilina
and Leoncia.8
Aurora asserted that, through the years, she repeatedly asked
Conrado to return the owner’s copy of the title but the latter
procrastinated, giving all kinds of excuses, until he died in 1972;
that thereafter, Aurora asked Cristina for the copy of the title but the
latter also ignored her request; that the subsequent sale of the subject
property to Fullway was without Aurora’s authorization, and, thus,
the payment received by respondents for the sale of the subject
property should be turned over to her; and that she prayed for moral
and exemplary damages.9
On June 24, 1996, respondents filed their answer with
compulsory counterclaim. They countered that the subject property
was properly transferred to Conrado under TCT No. 35282, and,
thereafter, in the names of the heirs of Conrado under TCT No. T-
114352. Respondents averred that the im-

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6 Id., at p. 663.
7 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-5.
8 Id., at p. 2.
9 Id., at pp. 3-5.

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putation of fraud on the part of Conrado in the registration of the

subject property was baseless and this assertion of fraud was not
transmissible from Conrado to his heirs, who merely acquired the
property through succession.10
Respondents raised some special and affirmatives defenses,
among others, that the complaint stated no cause of action and was
barred by prescription. A preliminary hearing for the said defenses
was set by the RTC.11 In the Order,12 dated May 27, 1999, the RTC
ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari13 to assail the said
interlocutory order of the RTC before the CA. In its Decision,14
dated February 24, 1999, the CA denied the same and held that the
complaint stated a cause of action, which was an action for damages
arising from fraud committed by Conrado, as trustee, against
Aurora, as cestui que trust. The CA further held that the complaint,
on its face, did not show that the action had prescribed.
Meanwhile, the RTC continued the proceedings and set the case
for trial on the merits. After the parties adduced their respective
pieces of evidence, the RTC required them to submit their
memoranda. Only respondents filed a memorandum.15

The RTC’s Ruling

In its Decision, dated June 29, 2004, the RTC dismissed the
complaint. The trial court held that, after a thorough evalua-

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10 Id., at pp. 18-28.

11 Id., at p. 74.
12 Id., at pp. 192-194.
13 Id., at pp. 379-398.
14 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., with Associate Justices
Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Mariano M. Umali, concurring; id., at pp. 399-423.
15 Records, Vol. II, p. 791.

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tion of the records, Aurora miserably failed to prove her right to

the subject property. It explained that even if Aurora had a claim on
the subject property, she was guilty of laches. For many years,
Aurora slept on her right over the questioned property and failed to
exhaust all means, legal or administrative, to retrieve what was
rightfully hers at the earliest possible time.
The RTC determined that Conrado was able to transfer the title of
the subject property in his name on June 17, 1965 by virtue of a
document denominated as “Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a
Parcel of Registered Land,”16 dated January 9, 1949, signed by
Aurora and her husband. The signatures of Aurora and her husband,
affixed on the deed of sale, were not properly controverted by her.
The trial court found that her allegations of repeated pleas to
Conrado to return the copy of the title deserved scant consideration.
It concluded that Aurora was not entitled to damages because there
were no clear and cogent grounds to award the same. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs having failed to prove its

case for damages, the same is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.17

Aggrieved, Aurora appealed to the CA. On June 4, 2009, the

children of Aurora, namely, Consuelo V. Pangasinan, Lucio M.
Vivar and Annabella V. Borromeo (petitioners), filed a motion for
substitution of party18 after her death on March 26, 2008. In its
Resolution,19 dated July 15, 2010, the CA granted the motion.

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16 Id., at pp. 667-668.

17 CA Rollo, p. 63.
18 Id., at pp. 132-133.
19 Id., at pp. 173-174.

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The CA’s Ruling

In the assailed Decision, dated July 28, 2011, the CA denied the
appeal of petitioners. It held that it took Aurora more than 50 years
to act on Conrado’s withholding of the title covering the subject
property. As early as 1945, the title was already in the possession of
Conrado. The CA ruled that petitioners were barred by laches as
Aurora should have been impervious in asserting her ownership and
made judicial demands to return the title and the property.
The appellate court added that even on the aspect of prescription
of actions, the case would not prosper either. It explained that the
prescriptive period to recover property obtained through fraud or
mistake giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the
Civil Code was 10 years, pursuant to Article 1144. This 10-year
prescriptive period began from the time the land was registered on
June 17, 1965. Accordingly, Aurora had only until June 17, 1975
within which to file her action. Evidently, the suit was commenced
only on May 12, 1996, beyond its prescription period. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED and

the Decision dated June 29, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
City, Branch 259 in Civil Case No. 960206 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was

denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution, dated February 3, 2012.
Hence, this petition, raising the following:

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 20 Rollo, p. 23.

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Issues

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FILED BY AURORA MORALES-
VIVAR, WHICH DECISIONS ARE ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE ACQUISITION OF CONRADO ALMAZORA,
RESPONDENTS’ PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY, IS INVALID AND PRODUCED NO EFFECT
WHATSOEVER BECAUSE NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF
LACHES, AS TO DEPRIVE AURORA MORALES-VIVAR OF HER
OWNERSHIP, ARE PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.21

Petitioners assert that they are not guilty of laches. When Aurora
was told that the subject property was already in the name of
Conrado in April 1994, she immediately filed a complaint for
damages on May 2, 1996. Petitioners also claim that prescription is
not a valid defense to defeat the title of Aurora. Section 47 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 states that no title to registered
land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
On September 24, 2012, respondents filed their Comment,22
arguing that petitioners’ assertions were tenuous. Aurora slept on her
rights for more than 50 years, impervious in

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21 Id., at p. 10.
22 Id., at pp. 36-49.

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asserting her ownership of the subject property, thereby losing

the same by laches.
 On December 11, 2012, petitioners filed their Reply,23 claiming
that the CA observed that respondents might have manipulated the
said title to their benefit and advantage. Respondents’ hands were
unclean because of their bad faith and misrepresentation.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The petition raises

questions of fact

As a general rule, the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is

limited to the review of pure questions of law. A question of law
arises when the doubt or difference exists as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule 45 does not allow the
review of questions of fact. A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.24
Petitioners challenge the findings of laches, prescription and lack
of bad faith by the CA. To answer these questions, the Court must
review the records to determine whether the lower courts properly
appreciated the evidence in concluding its findings. Clearly, the
questions raised are factual. On this ground alone, the present
petition under Rule 45 is dismissible. In the interest of substantial
justice, however, the Court deems it proper to reevaluate the records.

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23 Id., at pp. 65-68.

24 Salvador v. Rabaja, G.R. No. 199990, February 4, 2015, 749 SCRA 654.

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Petitioners are barred by laches

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable

and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.25
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is
applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s right,
but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in
a clearly inequitable situation.26 The time-honored rule anchored on
public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or
demand has become “stale,” or who has acquiesced for an
unreasonable length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who
has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. In
other words, public policy requires, for peace of society, the
discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches
is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which
has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to
permit.27
The four (4) elements of laches, as first prescribed by this Court
in Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho28 are as follows:

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25 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Centro Development Corporation,

G.R. No. 180974, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 325, 338, citing Municipality of Carcar
v. CFI of Cebu, 204 Phil. 719, 723; 119 SCRA 392, 395-396 (1982).
26 Salandanan v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 114, 120; 290 SCRA 671, 678
(1998).
27 Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Mingoa, Sr., 623 Phil. 303, 327; 608
SCRA 394, 415 (2009), citing Isabela Colleges, Inc. v. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-
Rivera, 397 Phil. 955, 969; 344 SCRA 95, 108 (2000).
28 96 Phil. 622, 637 (1954), citing 19 Am. Jur. 343-344.

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(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he

claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the
complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having
had knowledge or notice, of the defendant’s conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.29

In the case at bench, the CA correctly held that all the elements
of laches were present. First, Aurora and her family entrusted to
Conrado the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title of the subject
property in 1945. In their complaint, petitioners even admitted that
Conrado’s family had been staying in the subject property since
1912.30 Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to 1996, before
Aurora and petitioners decided to enforce their right thereon. Third,
respondents who lived all their lives in the disputed property
apparently were not aware that Aurora would one day come out and
claim ownership thereon. Fourth, there was no question that
respondents would be prejudiced in the event that the suit would be
allowed to prosper.
The contention of petitioners that they were not in delay in
claiming their rights over the subject property is specious. For 50
years, Aurora and her heirs did not take any legal step to uphold
their claim over the subject property, despite being fully aware that
Conrado and his family were occupying the

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29 Vda. de Tirona v. Encarnacion, 560 Phil. 650, 666; 534 SCRA 394, 410-411
(2007).
30 Records, Vol. I, p. 2.

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same for a very long time. Even petitioner Consuelo Vivar-

Pangasinan testified that Conrado had been using the property for 30
years31 and that Aurora had never shown her any evidence of
ownership of the property.32
In their complaint, Aurora claimed that she repeatedly reminded
Conrado to return the copy of the title. This, however, is a self-
serving allegation without any evidentiary substantiation. The two
belated demand letters, dated October 30, 1995 and March 5, 1996,
sent by Aurora’s lawyer before the institution of the present action,
are the only tangible assertions of their claim to the property.33
Indeed, not a scintilla of proof was presented by Aurora and her
heirs to establish that, for 50 years, they actively manifested to
reclaim the title and possession of the subject property.
A person, endowed with properties and entitlements, but chose to
lie quietly as decades passed by, watching his property wither away,
allowing innocent bystanders to pick the fruits of his unguarded
trees, instead of safeguarding his rights through the accessibly and
necessary legal means, does not deserve the protection of equity.
The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.

The action has prescribed

On the basis of prescription of actions, the pending petition must

also be denied. Petitioners argue that prescription shall not lie
against their action because a registered land under Section 47 of
P.D. No. 1529 cannot be acquired through prescription.34 The
argument is patently erroneous.

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31 TSN, August 16, 1999, p. 13.

32 Id., at pp. 38-39.
33 Records, Vol. II, pp. 619-620.
34 Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.

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There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code.

One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of
time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106.35 Acquisitive
prescription is also known as adverse possession and usucapcion.
The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions
are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106
and Article 1139.36 Another name for extinctive prescription is
litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription should not be
interchanged.37
In a plethora of cases,38 the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D.
No. 1529 covers acquisitive prescription. A registered land therein
can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the case at bench,
however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive
prescription, which barred the action of petitioners. As the CA
correctly held, the action must fail, not because respondents
adversely occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to
institute their suit within the prescriptive period under Article 1144
of the Civil Code.
To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the
nature and circumstances of the case should be considered.
According to petitioners, the owner’s duplicate certificate of title
was given to Conrado for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado
employed fraud and bad faith when he drafted the Adjudication and
Absolute Sale of a Parcel of

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35 Art. 1106. By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights

through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
In the same way, rights and conditions are lost by prescription.
36 Art. 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.
 37 Virtucio v. Alegarbes, G.R. No. 187451, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 412,
421.
38 D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Incorporated v. Panes, 612 Phil. 93; 594 SCRA
578 (2009); Feliciano v. Zaldivar, 534 Phil. 280; 503 SCRA 182 (2006); and Ragudo
v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., 503 Phil. 751; 466 SCRA 136 (2005).

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Registered Land39 on January 9, 1949, and transferred the title of

the land to his name with the issuance of TCT No. 3528240 on June
17, 1965; and because of the purported fraud committed by Conrado
against petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by
operation of law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que
trust.
Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in
order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust
enrichment.41 Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person
acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the
property.42 It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to
recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an
implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years
pursuant to Article 1144.43 The prescriptive period to enforce the
constructive trust shall be counted from the alleged fraudulent
registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.44 The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is
an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not
in possession of the property.45
In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely
applicable because Conrado and his family, not petitioners, were in
possession of the property. The subject property was

_______________

39 Records, Vol. II, pp. 667-668.

40 Id., at pp. 678-679.
41 Tong v. Go Tiat Kun, G.R. No. 196023, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 623, 635.
42 Heirs of Narvasa, Sr. v. Victoriano, G.R. No. 182908, August 6, 2014, 732
SCRA 171, 182.
43 Crisostomo v. Garcia, Jr., 516 Phil. 743, 753; 481 SCRA 402, 413 (2006).
44 See Estate of Margarita D. Cabacungan v. Laigo, 655 Phil. 366, 389; 655
SCRA 366, 393 (2011).
45 Brito, Sr. v. Dianala, 653 Phil. 200, 211; 638 SCRA 529, 538 (2010).
 236

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangasinan vs. Disonglo-Almazora

registered in the name of Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this

should be the starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus,
had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust and assert their
claim over the land. As properly held by the CA, petitioners
belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the land on May 9,
1996. Indeed, with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an
action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the courts.

Fraud was not proven

Granting, for the sake of argument, that the present case was not
barred by laches and had not prescribed, it must still fail on its
merits. The basis of the action for damages of petitioners would be
the fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation allegedly committed by
Conrado in transferring the title of the subject property to his name.
Petitioners, however, drastically failed to prove the fact of fraud with
clear and convincing evidence.
Fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and not
merely by a preponderance thereof.46 Clear and convincing proof is
more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as
is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases.47 The
imputation of fraud in a civil case requires the presentation of clear
and convincing evidence. Mere allegations will not suffice to sustain
the existence of fraud. The burden of evidence rests on the part of
the plaintiff or the party alleging fraud.48

_______________

46 ECE Realty and Development, Inc. v. Mandap, G.R. No. 196182, September 1,
2014, 734 SCRA 76, 83.
47 Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, 215 Phil. 808, 819; 220 SCRA 606, 611 (1993).
48 Tankeh v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171428, November
11, 2013, 709 SCRA 19.

237

VOL. 761, JULY 1, 2015 237

Pangasinan vs. Disonglo-Almazora

Here, the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of

Registered Land, which was signed by Aurora and her husband,
transferred the ownership of the subject property from Aurora to
Conrado. Petitioners, however, failed to assail the validity of such
deed. As written by the RTC, petitioners could have questioned the
authenticity of the document and submitted the same to the National
Bureau of Investigation for comparison of the signatures. This, they
failed to do.49
In fine, the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of
Registered Land, being a notarized document, enjoys the
presumption of regularity. Even assuming that Conrado truly
employed fraud, no proof was presented that respondents, as heirs of
Conrado, were in privy and had knowledge of the
misrepresentations. In the absence of evidence of fraud, the transfer
to Conrado of the title of the subject property, and the subsequent
transfer to respondents by virtue of succession,50 must be upheld.
Even on the subject of ownership, petitioners failed to
substantiate their claim. Petitioners had nothing, other than their
bare allegations, that they continuously owned the subject property.
For decades, petitioners lacked the possession and interest to recover
the subject property. The trial court even noted that petitioners could
not present a single tax declaration receipt as an indicia of their
ownership. Based on the foregoing, petitioners are certainly not
entitled to damages on the basis of their misplaced claim of
ownership over the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 28, 2011
Decision and the February 3, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 122153 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

_______________

49 CA Rollo, p. 62.
50 Records, Vol. II, pp. 665-666.

238

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangasinan vs. Disonglo-Almazora

Carpio (Chairperson), Bersamin,** Del Castillo and Leonen,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in toto.

Notes.—An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust

prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which is the date of
registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of
title over the property. (Brito, Sr. vs. Dianala, 638 SCRA 529
[2010])
 The essence of laches or “stale demands” is the failure or neglect
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,
thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It is not concerned with
mere lapse of time; the fact of delay, standing alone, being
insufficient to constitute laches. (Insurance of the Philippine Islands
Corporation vs. Gregorio, 642 SCRA 685 [2011])
——o0o——

_______________

* * Designated acting member, in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per

Special Order No. 2079 dated June 29, 2015.

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