Assessment of Security Domestic Windows
Assessment of Security Domestic Windows
Assessment of Security Domestic Windows
June 2013
This guide has been written by BRE Global in partnership with the Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure (CPNI). It is intended to help security managers and practitioners working for
the UK Government and critical national infrastructure to assess the security resistance afforded by
domestic windows.
This guide aims to highlight the key factors when assessing the resistance of domestic windows to
forced entry and provides guidance on how to enhance the security of windows. Furthermore,
although not generally assessed for domestic windows, the guide aims to familiarise the reader with
important features which could affect windows’ resistance to undetected compromise.
Contents
Materials..................................................................................................................... 7
Timber ................................................................................................................. 7
PVC-u ................................................................................................................... 8
Composite materials ........................................................................................... 8
Steel and aluminium ........................................................................................... 8
Locking mechanisms............................................................................................ 9
Non-lockable hardware ....................................................................................... 9
Lockable hardware .............................................................................................. 9
Locking Points...................................................................................................... 9
Hinges ................................................................................................................ 11
References ..................................................................................................................... 16
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Design overview
Domestic windows in the UK are generally manufactured from the following materials:
PVC-u
timber
composite materials, e.g. GRP
*
aluminium
steel†
In most cases modern domestic windows are designed in accordance with the following relevant
British Standards associated with the material the window is manufactured from:
BS 7412:20071 Specification for windows and doorsets made from unplasticized polyvinyl chloride
(PVC-U) extruded hollow profiles
BS 644:20122 Timber windows and doorsets – Fully finished factory-assembled windows and
doorsets of various types- Specification
BS 8529:20103 Composite doorsets – Domestic external doorsets – Specification
BS 4873:20094 Aluminium alloy windows and doorsets – Specification
BS 6510:20105 Steel-framed windows and glazed doors – Specification
These standards specify a range of performance criteria covering all aspects of the window design
including:
weathertightness
glazing
finishes
jointing methods/material performance
security
Further information on these standards can be obtained from the BSI (British Standards Institution).
Until late 2012 the security of domestic windows was mainly assessed in accordance with BS 7950
1997: Specification for enhanced security performance of windows for domestic applications.6
This has since been incorporated into PAS 24:2012: Enhanced security performance requirements for
doorsets and windows in the UK. External doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security
suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk which covers the assessment of
domestic doorsets and windows. This Standard assesses the security of domestic windows using a
series of manual and mechanical tests aimed at removing the glazing and overcoming the locking
mechanisms and hardware.
*
These materials are not commonly used in domestic applications. They are more commonly used in
commercial applications.
†
Although this standard is for doorsets it is often referenced for windows as no composite window standard
currently exists.
3
These tests use basic tools and assume minimal noise is made by domestic burglars. While damage to
the window is permitted, breaking the glazing is not permitted in PAS 24:20127.
The security performance of domestic windows can also be assessed in accordance with:
LPS 1175 Issue 7: Requirements and testing procedures for the LPCB approval and listing of intruder
resistant building components, strongpoints, security enclosures and free-standing barriers.8
BS EN 1627, 2011: Pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters - Burglar
resistance - Requirements and classification.9
However, it is not always possible to establish the standards to which windows have been tested, or
the manufacturing process through which they have been constructed, especially when they have
been in position for some time. This guide therefore aims to help the reader determine a window’s
likely resistance to forced entry based on a visual examination.
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Features which affect the security afforded by windows
A number of key features should be taken into account when determining a window’s likely resistance
to forced entry, undetected or otherwise. These are:
opening mode
materials used to manufacture the window and how they are assembled
locking mechanism
hinges
glazing method and type of glazing used
installation method
The following sections highlight the key factors associated with each feature which should be
considered when determining the security afforded by a window.
Opening mode
The mode of opening should not affect the window’s fundamental security performance potential,
providing the window has been constructed correctly and is fitted with appropriate locking hardware
and ironmongery. However, the following should be taken into account if it is not possible to ascertain
the quality of construction and hardware fitted to a window due to the absence of product
documentation.
Are any elements of the hardware exposed? (E.g. exposed hinges can increase the risk of entry
being gained because they can be directly manipulated.)
Does the opening sash sit tight against/within the frame when closed? (See Figure 2.) Are gaps
between the sash and the frame sufficient to access and exploit hardware? A check should be
made on sliding windows to ensure that there is no excessive movement of the sash such that:
o the sash can be levered out of the frame within which it slides;
o the sash can be levered to create access to manipulate the hardware on the protected side.
Does the window incorporate joints which would allow the internal hardware to be manipulated?
(E.g. joints between adjoining sashes on vertical or horizontal sliding windows.)
The window types shown in Figure 1 are commonly used on residential properties.
5
Figure 1: Window opening modes (viewed from outside the property)
‡§ §
Inward opening Outward opening Sash (downward Sash (upward opening)
opening)
§ § Sideways sliding
Bottom hung Top hung
‡
Inward opening windows are more commonly used on upper floor windows of multi-storey residential
buildings. This is to enable residents to clean their windows.
§
Some windows have multiple opening modes, i.e. they operate as both outward/inward opening and
top/bottom hung. These are known as ‘tilt and turn’ windows.
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Figure 2: A view of the meeting point of the sliding sash leaf and frame, where if gaps are present, tools may
be used to exploit the hardware.
Materials
The material used to assemble the window and the quality of that material can have a significant
effect on the window’s security. It should be noted that all materials used to construct domestic
windows are vulnerable to attack. In most cases, attempts to gain entry through the window will leave
some form of damage. However, although the type of material used to form the window may affect
the force required, or the method adopted to gain entry, the benefit of one material compared to
another is difficult to quantify. This is mainly because many factors influence the security afforded by
a window – not just the material from which it is made.
Timber
Timber windows are prone to degradation through rotting and weathering, therefore the type,
quality, condition and maintenance of the timber is of key importance. If there is visual evidence of
damage or deterioration, steps can be taken to investigate the quality of the timber, e.g. trying to
remove a small section of the timber and confirming whether it splinters easily.
Any degradation of the window may lower its security performance because it will be easier to gain
access through or around the material to either force the window open or manipulate the hardware.
Does the material look weathered and are there visible signs of degradation?
Is there any movement or splitting in the joints of the frame and opening sash(s)?
Is the glazing fully supported by the timber beading or other retention system, such as putty?
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In terms of general security, timber windows of a suitable quality can offer good levels of security for
domestic purposes. The quality of the timber will affect its resistance to attacks aimed at levering
open the sash, splitting the frames to remove the glazing or to remove the whole window. Any attacks
on the timber are likely to result in visible damage. However, if not significant that damage may be
repairable. This may have an effect if the main concern is undetected compromise. However, painting
the windows can make it more difficult for intruders to conceal damage.
PVC-u
Although PVC-u does degrade, the visual signs of this are not as apparent as with timber windows. If
the quality of the PVC-u is not appropriate, or the material has deteriorated, it can become brittle.
As with timber windows, PVC-u windows can offer good levels of security for domestic purposes.
Furthermore, any attacks aimed at gaining entry through the window are likely to result in visual
damage. Depending on the amount of damage and where the damage occurs, it may be possible to
repair the window more easily and more quickly than a timber window, especially if the damage only
relates to the beading around the glazing.
Composite materials
Composite materials have, in recent years, become more popular in the domestic market. These
materials come in many forms and it may not be obvious during an assessment of the windows what
combination of materials has been used. Nonetheless, as with timber and PVC-u windows, the
following checks should be made:
For domestic purposes, composite windows can offer a level of attack resistance equivalent to that
provided by timber and PVC-u products. However, unlike timber and PVC-u, depending on the actual
composite material used, it may not be very easy to repair the window if attacked. This may have
significant effect if the main concern is undetected compromise.
Steel and aluminium windows are not commonly used for domestic purposes. Nonetheless, the same
principles should be adopted as those detailed above for other materials. Steel and aluminium
windows may offer slightly greater resistance to attack by nature of the material. However, this will
depend on the design of the window and thickness of the material used. As with PVC-u windows,
damage created during some attacks may be repaired easily if the correct steel/aluminium
components can be sourced.
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Locking mechanisms and hinges
Locking mechanisms
It is not practical to cover all configurations of locking mechanisms fitted to domestic windows.
Designs are continually evolving to meet the ever-changing demands of users and the need to make
windows more secure. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify the key factors when assessing the
security resistance afforded by domestic windows.
Non-lockable hardware
Modern domestic windows are unlikely to incorporate non-lockable hardware. However, older style
pivot windows and sliding sash windows (see Figure 3), may have non-lockable hardware.
Non-lockable hardware is considered to be far less resistant to attack than lockable hardware. Non-
lockable hardware (e.g. Figure 3), may be vulnerable to manipulation through gaps in the window
frame or between the opening sash and window frame. Intruders may also be able to operate such
hardware by drilling or gouging small holes through the frame or sash.
It is recommended that non-lockable hardware is not relied upon to secure domestic windows where
any reasonable level of security is required. Consideration should be given to replacing the locking
mechanism completely if possible or incorporating supplementary locking mechanisms (see page 15,
Enhancing the security of windows).
It should be noted that the ease and effectiveness with which non-lockable hardware can be replaced
with lockable versions will depend on the design and condition of the window. In many cases it may
be more effective to replace the whole window.
Lockable hardware
Where some level of security is required, it is recommended that lockable hardware is used, as shown
in Figure 3. In many cases on domestic windows this comes in the form of a lockable cockspur handle,
although other devices are available.
Generally, unless there are significant gaps between the opening sash and the window frame, damage
would be caused to the window during any attempt to overcome the lockable hardware. The extent of
the damage would depend on the design of the window and the material from which it is made.
Locking Points
Many modern domestic windows incorporate espagnolette locking devices (see Figure 4). These
incorporate multiple locking points around the perimeter of the opening sash. They are generally
operated via a single lockable handle. On the basis that the operating handle cannot be overcome
without first creating damage to the window, such locking mechanisms offer greater resistance to
attack than devices only incorporating single locking points.
It is recommended that where possible, windows incorporate multiple locking points. Consideration
should be given to replacing the locking mechanism completely (if possible) or incorporating
supplementary locking mechanisms (see page 15), in order to enhance security.
The ease and effectiveness with which locking hardware can be replaced will depend on the window’s
design and condition. In most cases it may be more effective to replace the whole window.
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Figure 3: Lockable and non-lockable hardware
Shootbolt keep
Shootbolt
Multiple
mushroom
cams, i.e.
locking points
10
Hinges
The type and style of hinges on domestic windows varies depending on the window’s opening mode
and, to some extent, on the materials used to construct the window. Hinge types typically used on
domestic windows can include those shown in Figure 5.
In general terms, exposed hinges on the attack face of a window are more likely to be susceptible to
attack. This is because it may be possible to remove the hinge pins and/or gain greater access to
overcome the hinge fixings.
Modern domestic windows often incorporate hinge claws. These are located within the hinge jamb,
adjacent to the hinges. If loads are applied to the window to force apart the opening light and the
frame, the claws engage and thereby enhancing the window’s resistance to being levered open (see
Figure 6).
As an alternative to hinge claws, dogbolts can be used along the hinge edge to provide greater
resistance to levering attack.
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Figure 6: Hinge protection hardware
Glazing methods
Having installed the glazing unit into the window frame, beads are fixed around the perimeter of the
aperture to secure the glazing in place. Figure 7 shows a typical beading detail of an internally-glazed
PVC-u window.
The type and style of beading varies. The beading on PVC-u, aluminium and steel windows is generally
clipped into place and secured by the profile of the bead and the frame profile into which it fits. A
neoprene, or similar material, gasket would be fixed between the bead and the glazing unit to provide
a weather seal. These types of beading are designed to be removed with relative ease and without
causing any damage. Furthermore, the type and size of the beading is unlikely to affect the ease with
which it can be removed. This could be critical if undetected compromise is of concern.
The beads on timber windows are generally pinned into place or, in some cases, glued. The gap
between the bead and the glazing is usually filled with some form of gasket or sealant. Although
timber beads can be removed, this may not be as easy as the ‘clip-in’ type used on other materials. It
may also result in damage to the bead itself. Therefore, in the case of externally beaded windows, it
does not take significant effort to remove the glazing unless additional measures are taken to secure
the beading. Such measures can include:
using screws to secure the beading, especially in the case of the ‘clip-in’ beading;
securing the glazing in place using glazing clips or tape.
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Figure 7: PVC-u window section – beading detail
Double-glazed unit
incorporating
spacer bar Snap on beading
Glazing gaskets
PVC-u frame of
opening light
PVC-u window
frame
Gaskets
In older types of domestic window the glazing may be secured by putty, which deteriorates over time
and can fall out. Furthermore, putty needs time to dry, which introduces a period of vulnerability as
the putty and glass can be more easily removed when the putty is still soft on newly installed or
repaired windows. It is therefore advisable to avoid the use of putty for retaining glass.
Types of glazing
Domestic windows are generally fitted with double-glazed units. The overall thickness can vary, as can
the type of glass. Older windows may only have single-glazed units consisting of a single thickness of
glass. The glass used in modern domestic windows would typically be:
toughened glass
float/annealed**
laminated
The main difference between the glass types is the way in which it fails when broken and the ease
with which it can be broken.
Toughened glass, when broken, will shatter into small fragments that either fall out of the window or
can easily be pushed out.
Float/annealed glass will break into large, sharp pieces.
**
The use of float/annealed glass is restricted by the Building Regulations for England and Wales.
Float/annealed glass may be installed within windows in older properties which pre-date the restrictions
incorporated in building regulations.
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Laminated glass is used where a higher security level is required. There are many forms of laminated
glass, but those used in domestic windows are usually formed from two layers of glass with a PVB
interlayer. When impacted the glass will generally break but will not necessarily fall out. However,
such glazing can still be very susceptible to forced entry.
In order to significantly increase the window’s resistance to attacks aimed at creating apertures
through the glazing, consideration should be given to installing laminate glazing incorporating
polycarbonate interlayers.
Further guidance on security glazing is published in Security Glazing: Is it all it’s cracked up to be?10
Installation method
Domestic windows are normally fitted within a structural opening and fixed to the substrate using a
number of screwed fixings around the perimeter. The heads of the fixings are usually not visible from
the external face of the window. The gap between the window frame and the substrate is then filled
with sealant.
Unless access can be gained to the heads of the fixings to unscrew them, the only other way to gain
entry would be to shear all the fixings and then lever the window out of the frame.
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Enhancing the security of windows
The extent to which windows can/should be enhanced to improve their security resistance will
depend on the risk/threat to the building/location where the windows are installed. It will also depend
on whether the risk is from attacks where damage is acceptable, or whether undetected compromise
is the main concern.
General improvements
It is not always possible to significantly improve the security of the window itself. This may be due to
the condition of the window, the material from which it is made or its configuration. In some cases it
may be more economical to change the window or add proprietary products such as:
LPS 1175††
EN 1627††
††
PAS 24
PBAS
††
A current list of security products approved to this standard by LPCB can be found in the BRE Red Book:
www.redbooklive.com
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References
1. BS 7412:2007 Specification for windows and doorsets made from unplasticized polyvinyl chloride
(PVC-U) extruded hollow profiles. British Standards Institution.
2. BS 644:2012 Timber windows and doorsets – Fully finished factory-assembled windows and
doorsets of various types- Specification. British Standards Institution.
6. BS 7950: 1997 Incorporating Amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Specification for enhanced security
performance of windows for domestic applications.
7. PAS 24:2012 Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK.
External doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and
other buildings exposed to comparable risk. British Standards Institution.
8. LPS 1175: Issue 7 Requirements and testing procedures for the LPCB approval and listing of
intruder resistant building components, strongpoints, security enclosures and free-standing
barriers. BRE Global Limited.
9. BS EN 1627:2011 Pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters - Burglar
resistance - Requirements and classification. British Standards Institution.
10. Security Glazing: Is it all it’s cracked up to be? Watford: IHS BRE Press, April 2013.
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